400817362.
xls
CASE FACTS
African American and Latino
employees (Ps) sue their
employer, Precoat Metals,
1. DAVIS V PRECOAT METALS( (D), alleging race and
2002) national origin discrimination requested discovery?
and retaliation in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964
Steffan (P) sued Secretary of
Defense Cheney (D) claiming
that he was constructively
discharged from the naval
academy based on the
2. STEFFAN V. CHENEY(1990)
statement that he is
homosexual. Steffan refused
to answer deposition
questions about his sexual
conduct in his suit.
An employee, who was sued
by a former co-worker for
sexual harassment, sought a
protective order preventing
3. STALNAKER V. KMART the co-worker from deposing
CORP(1996) four non-party witnesses in
order to determine whether
they had any romantic
conduct or sexually related
activities with the co-worker.
Hickman brought a wrongful
death action against the tug
J.M.Taylor for the death of
her husband which resulted
when the tug sank in an
4. HICKMAN V. TAYLOR unusual accident. Hickman
(1947) sought to obtain copies of
written statements and
descriptions of oral
interviews acquired by
Fortenbaugh, the opposing
counsel.
1
ISSUE RULE
Yes. 26(b)(1) Permits
discovery of "any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to
the claim or defense of any
party." Discoverable
information is not limited to
Are Ps entitled to the
that which would be
admissible at trial. It is
relevant for Rule 26 if the
discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
Is evidence relevant if it does No. Evidence is not relevant
not speak to a matter if it does not relate to a
pertinent to the decision of matter pertinent to the
the case? decision of the case.
A party seeking a protective
Can the discovery of
order must establish good
information potentially
cause for the order by
embarrassing and annoying
submitting a particular and
to a party or non-party be
specific demonstration of
limited?
fact.
No. A party is not entitled ,
without a showing of good
Are all of an attorney's files
cause, to obtain copies of an
related to an incident open
opposing attorney's notes
to discovery by the opposing
and memoranda acquired
party?
from interviews with
witnesses.
HOLDING
The district court erred in
finding the issue of
homosexual conduct to be
relevant in this case.
Discovery is limited to
inquiry about any "voluntary to protect a party or person
romantic or sexual activities from annoyance,
with defendant to the extent embarrassment, oppression,
they show any conduct on
his part to solicit or influence expense." Also, a "party is
any employee to engage or entitled to request a
continue in such activities"
Rule 26(b) provides
necessary limitations on
discovery when the inquiry
encroaches on the
recognized domains of
privilege.
FRCP OTHER INFO
26(b)(1) Permits discovery of
"any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim
or defense of any party."
Discoverable information is
not limited to that which
would be admissible at trial.
It is relevant for Rule 26 if
the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead Discoverable information is
to the discovery of not limited to that which
admissible evidence. would be admissible at trial.
Information is relevant for
26(b)(2) A court can limit the purposes of Rule 26 if
discovery if it determines the discovery appears
that the discovery is reasonably calculated to lead
unreasonably cumulative or to the discovery of
duplicative, obtainable from admissible evidence.
another source that is more
convenient, less
burdensome, or less
expensive, or the burden or
expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. THE REQUEST OF
DISCOVERABLE INFO MUST
BE REASONABLE
Rule 26c provides that the
court, upon a showing of
good cause, "may make any
order which justice requires
or undue burden or
protective order to preclude
any inquiry into areas clearly
outside the scope of
appropriate discovery.'
Work Product Doctrine- All
Rule 26(b)(3) expands the
relevant and nonprivileged
Hickman work product
materials prepared by an
doctrine by giving the
attorney "with an eye toward
qualified privilege to a party
litigation" are free from
or his representative, and
discovery unless the party
giving an absolute privilege
seeking discovery can show
from discovery to the mental
a substantial need for the
impressions, conclusions, or
materials and an inability to
opinions of a party's attorney
obtain equivalent material by
or other rep.
other means.
400817362.xls 2

Can a party compel

discovery of the opinions or
findings of a non-testifying
An employee suing an
expert's report, retained by
employer for sexual
6. THOMPSON V. THE the opposing party in
harassment seeks to protect
HASKELL CO (1994) preparation of litigation,
a psychologist's report
where there are no other
regarding the employee.
means to obtain the facts
and opinions contained in
the report?
Yes. A party cannot compel Rule 26(b)(4) -an opposing
discovery of the opinions or party's expert's opinions or
findings of the opposing facts retained in anticipation
There are exceptional
party's non-testifying exert of litigation cannot be
circumstances allowing for
unless there are exceptional discovered unless
the disclosure of Dr. Lucas'
circumstances, i.e. no other exceptional circumstances
report.
practical means to obtain the make it impracticable for the
facts and opinions contained party to discover the facts or
in the report. opinions by other means.

A carrier, sued by a shipper Can discovery of an opposing

for loss and damage to a
cargo of bananas, sought to
depose and discover any
6. CHIQUITA INTERNATIONAL
documents held by a non-
LTD. V. M/V/ BOLERO REEFER
testifying expert witness
hired by the shipper to
examine the cause of the
damage.
In 1995, class
representatives of African-
American residents of
Baltimore's public housing
developments (Ps) sued
federal and local
governmental officials (Ds) in
federal court alleging that Ds
and their predecessors
7. THOMPSON V. established and perpetrated
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING de jure racial segregation in Are Ps' discovery requests
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Baltimore's public housing
(2001) since 1933 in violation of a
number of federal laws.
Pending before the court is
Ps' motion to compel the
local Ds to provide
responsive answers to
interrogatories propounded
pursuant to Rule 33 and to
inspect documents
requested under Rule 34.
Poole sued Textron in federal
court for alleged defects in a
golf car, which resulted in
serious injuries to P. P
requested attorney's fees
and other expenses related
to three substantive
discovery motions and other
sanctions. The three motions
are: (i) motion to determine
8. POOLE V. TEXTRON, INC.
the sufficiency of answers
(2000)
and objections to requests
for admissions(Rule36); (ii)
motion for sanctions raising
six instances of discovery
abuse (Rule 37); and (iii) the
motion to compel production
of documents (Rule 34). The
motions were made under
the rules and the court's
inherent powers.
party's non-testifying expert No. The exceptional
be permitted under the circumstances exception
exceptional circumstances does not apply where the
exception where the party party seeking discovery had
seeking discovery had an an opportunity to examine
opportunity to examine the the subject of the expert's
subject of the expert's opinion.
opinion?
Yes. The parties are expected
to focus their discussions not
on their scope differences
under Rule 26(b)(1), but
instead on a particularized
overly broad or burdensome? analysis of the
burden/benefit factors of
Rule 26(b)(2) Thus, the
challenged requests are too
broad as stated.
Is an award of expenses
Yes. Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions. response to document
including attorney's fees or
Rule 37 sanctions imposed
other sanctions justified
because D's responses and
under the governing rules
objections were not
and case law, and if so, in
substantially justified.
what amount?
Rule 26(b)(4)(B)applies
Chiquita will produce
information from Mr. Winer's
Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
files that do not contain his
observations or opinions or
are otherwise privileged.
Motion denied. Rule 26(b)
(2)-" The frequency or extent
of use of the discovery
methods otherwise
permitted under these rules
and by any local rule shall be
limited by the court if tit
determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative, or
is obtainable from some
other source that is more
convenient, less
burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party
seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to
obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the burden or
expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, taking into account
the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation, and
the importance of the
proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.
Rule 26(g)-a signature
certifies that the lawyer has
made a reasonable effort to
assure that the client has
Motions granted in part. D's provided all the information
and documents available to
requests violated its duty him that are responsive to
under Rule 26(g), was not the discovery demand. Rule
substantially justified, and 26(g)(3) gives the court
therefore an award of latitude to fashion an
expenses is just. "appropriate sanction" in
addition to an award of
expenses, including
attorneys' fees. Rule 37-
sanctions imposed

9. ADR-JANE SMART V. GROW

400817362.xls
A casino being sued for
sexual discrimination by a
former employee sought to
10. KALINAUSKAS V. WONG avoid the deposition of
(1993) another former employee
with whom the casino had
previously settled a sexual
discrimination suit.
Charged with several claims
for asbestos poisoning that
lead to the death of Mr.
Catrett, Celotex(D) moved
11. CELOTEX CORP. V.
for summary judgment on
CATRETT (1986)
the grounds that Mrs. Catrett
(P) failed to produce
evidence to support the
claims.
The Estate Of Bias sued
Advantage International and
A. Lee Fentress in federal
Was there a triable issue of must come forward with
12. BIAS V. ADVANTAGE district court for the District
fact as to whether Bias was a specific facts showing that
INTERNATIONAL, INC. (1990) of Columbia for failure to
drug user?
secure life insurance policy.
Ps appeal district court
award of summary judgment.
Sanders (P) sued his
employer Union Pacific in
federal court under the
Federal Employer's Liability
Act. The District Court
13. SANDERS V. UNION
dismissed the plaintiff's
PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
action with prejudice after
(1998)
counsel repeatedly missed
deadlines and failed to
comply with the
requirements of the pre-trial
order.
In a negligence suit against a
landlord, the tenant's
attorney moved to introduce
housing regulations as proof
14. McKey v. Fairbairn (1965) of negligence, but the court
denied the motion because
the regulations were not
contained in the pretrial
order.
Several employees sued
their union, the Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local
391 (D), for alleged
15. CHAUFFERS, TEAMSTERS violations of the Union's duty
& HELPERS,LOCAL NO. 391 V. of fair representation.
TERRY (1990) Against the union's protest
that the claim was equitable
in nature, the district Court
and Appellate Court granted
a right to jury trial
Does a settlement
agreement, entered into by
private litigants, prevent the
future discovery of materials
or testimony held
confidential by the
agreement?
Must a party moving for
summary judgment supply
evidence or affidavits
showing the absence of a
genuine dispute about a
material fact?
No. The nonmoving party
there is a genuine issue for
trial.
Does a court abuse its
discretion when it dismisses
an action with prejudice for
failure to obey an order,
without first resorting to
lesser sanctions?
Does a court abuse its
discretion when it refuses to
amend the pretrial order so
that pertinent evidence,
which came to light during
trial, may be admitted;
particularly where the other
party was aware of the
evidence?
Does an employee seeking
an award of back pay from a
union's alleged breach of fair
representation have a right
to a trial by jury?
3
No. In order to avoid
repetitive discovery, courts
may modify protective orders
or settlement agreements to
allow for the discovery of
facts otherwise held
confidential under the
agreement.
No. In a summary judgment
motion, a moving party may
meet its burden of
persuasion by demonstrating
that the nonmoving party
failed to supply sufficient
evidence of a genuine
dispute of material fact.
No. A court may dismiss an
action for prejudice if a
party's failure to comply with
deadlines and court orders
leads to unnecessary delay
and expense.
No. Trial judges have
justifiably large discretion in
refusing parties to change
their theory during the trial,
after a pre-trial order.
Yes. An action for breach of
fair representation, although
Affirmed. The remedy of
analogous to equitable
back pay is legal in nature.
claims at common law,
carries a right to jury trial.
The public policies favoring
broad discovery in Federal
Civil cases trump settlement
agreements that prohibit a
party from disclosing any
aspect of a settled case.
The burden may be
discharged by relying on
depositions, answers to
interrogatories, as Rule 56(c)
provides. Summary
Rule 56
judgment may be
appropriate even if the
moving party fails to produce
evidence demonstrating a
lack of a factual dispute.
Rule 56c -provides for
summary judgment where
the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file,
Judgment affirmed together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
Two pronged approach to
determining Seventh
Amendment right: 1.
Compare the statutory action
to the 18th century actions
brought in England prior to
the merger of law and equity.
2. Is remedy legal or
equitable in nature? Here,
the Supreme Court expands
the Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial.
400817362.xls
Gas station owner and gas
station operator filed
complaint and counterclaim
against each other seeking
both equitable and legal
16. AMOCO OIL CO. V. relief. Court of Appeal
TORCOMIAN (1983) examines both complaint
and counterclaim to
determine if "legal" relief is
sought; and if claims are
valid, denial of jury trial is
error.
Action for negligence by train
brakeman's heir against
railroad contending that
17. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD
certain rail cars collided
V. CHAMBERLAIN (1933)
killing brakeman based upon
indirect evidence of hearing
collision.
Liquor company sales
manager obtained jury
18. LIND V. SCHENLEY verdict for breach of contract
INDUSTRIES (1960) and liquor company moved
for j.n.o.v., and alternatively
new trial.
Employee of University
successfully obtained a jury
verdict, but new trial was
19. PETERSON V. WILSON
ordered based upon
(1998)
statements made by jurors
to judge and employee
thereafter lost on re-trial.
Rhodda Thompson sued her
employer in federal court
under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 charging
racial discrimination. During
voir dire, Leiter, a juror,
Did trial judge abuse his
20. THOMPSON V. ALTHEIMER explained that her status as
discretion in failing to strike
& GRAY (2003) an employer and business
Leiter for cause?
owner will definitely sway
her judgment. P exhausted
her peremptory challenges,
but asked the judge to strike
Leiter for cause. He refused
and P lost case. P appeals.
A car owner brought suit
against the city in which he
21. FRIER V. CITY OF
lived for multiple towings of
VANDALIA (1985)
a number of cars that he
tended to park illegally.
Does the seeking of
equitable relief in addition to in addition to legal relief
legal relief eliminate the
right to a jury trial?
Has a party sustained her
burden of proving facts by a
preponderance of the
evidence where the facts
give equal support to each of
two inconsistent inferences?
Does a trial judge abuse his
discretion in granting a new
trial where he substitutes his
judgment for that of the jury
concerning the weight of the
evidence?
Is it error to grant a new trial
based upon post verdict
statements from jurors
relating to the mental
processes of the jurors
during their deliberations?
Can a plaintiff bring the
same suit against the same
defendant more than once?
4
No. Seeking equitable relief
does not eliminate the right
to a jury trial.
No. Where the facts give
equal support to each of two
inconsistent inferences, a
party has not sustained her
burden of proving facts by a
preponderance of the
evidence.
Yes. A verdict may be set
aside by way of motion for
j.n.o.v. or in the alternative
new trial.
Yes. Juror's comments which
reveal lack of understanding
of the instructions cannot be
used to impeach verdict.
Yes. When a prospective
juror manifests a prior belief
that is both material and
contestable, it is the judges
duty to determine whether
the juror is capable of
suspending that belief during
the duration of the trial.
No. Where the parties and
the causes of action in two
different suits are identical,
the first suit precludes the
second under the doctrine of
claim preclusion. A plaintiff
cannot bring two identical
suits against one defendant
in two different courts.
The joinder of an equitable
claim with a legal claim does
not defeat the right to a jury
trial. Because the claim and
counterclaim seek legal
relief, Torcomian (D) was
entitled to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment.
A trial judge may not
substitute his judgment for
that of the jury concerning directed verdict-made before
the weight of the evidence. the verdict. j.n.o.v. - made
Here the judge did so and after the verdict. Both based
thus abused his legal on same grounds-insufficient
discretion. Case reversed evidence to support the
and remanded with direction verdict.
to reinstate the verdict and
judgment in favor of P.
Rule 606(b)- Federal Rules of
Evidence- when inquiring
into the validity of a verdict,
a juror may not testify
concerning matters or
statements made during the
jury's deliberations.
Claim preclusion- one suit
precludes a second where
the parties and the causes of
action are identical. Causes
28 USC 1738- requires of action are identical where
federal courts to follow state the evidence necessary to
claim preclusion rules. sustain a second verdict
would sustain the first, i.e.
where the causes of action
are based on a common core
of operative facts.
400817362.xls 5

The Court suggests that Rule

Semtek(P) filed a complaint
against Lockheed (D) in
California state court,
alleging breach of contract
and various business torts. D
removed the case to the
22. SEMTEK INTERNATIONAL district court for the Central
INC. V. LOCKHEED MARTIN District of California on the
CORP (2001) basis of diversity of
citizenship. D then moved to
dismiss P's claims as barred
by Ca's 2 year SOL. The
federal district court granted
D's motion and dismissed P's
complaint.
A former restaurant owner
23. MARTINO V. MCDONALD'S brought suit against the
SYSTEM, INC. (1979) McDonald's (D) franchise for
violation of the Sherman Act.
A partnership brought suit
against a recently divorced
24. SEARLE BROTHERS V. woman who was, in a divorce
SEARLE (1978) decree, awarded ownership
of property belonging to the
partnership.
Is the claim-preclusive effect
of a federal judgment in a
diversity action (whether
based on SOL or other
grounds) determined by the determined by the law of the Maryland courts. That
law of the state in which the state in which the federal
federal court sits instead of court sits.
by rule 41 (b)?
Can a consent judgment
form the basis for an
application of claim
preclusion?
Are agents and principles in
privity with one another for
the purposes of claim and
issue preclusion?
The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals erred in
holding that, pursuant to
Rule 41(b)(1), dismissal of
Yes. The claim-preclusive the California federal action
effect of a federal judgment necessarily precluded the
in a diversity action is bringing of this action in the
Rule 41(b)
judgment is reversed and the
case is remanded for a
determination of the
preclusive effect under
California law of a dismissal
on SOL grounds.
Yes. Res judicata treats a
judgment on the merits as
an absolute bar to
relitigation between parties
Claim preclusion applies to
and those in privity with
consent judgments just as it
them of every matter offered
does to judgments arrived at
and received to sustain or
following trial.
defeat the claim or demand
and to every matter which
might have been received for
that purpose.
The Searle Brothers cannot
be bound by the decree
No. A person is in privity with
entered in the previous suit,
another when he is so
nor is it estopped from
identified in interest with
litigating its own claim
another that he represents
against the property in a
the same legal right as that
subsequent suit. Collateral
other person; privity means
Estoppel-issue preclusion-
one whose interest has been
can only be asserted against
legally represented at the
a party who was a party or in
time.
privity with a party in a prior
suit.
Rule 13(a)-a pleading shall
state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the
pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises
out of the same transaction
or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and
does not require for its
adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
41(b) means one thing in
diversity cases(a deference
to state rules of preclusion)
but quite another thing in
federal-question cases(a
deference to federal rules of
preclusion) The California
federal court deferred to the
California SOL rule , but the
Maryland state courts did not
defer to the California
preclusion rules. The Court's
objective is to make the law
of preclusion in diversity
cases the same not state by
state, but within state and
federal courts of the same
state.
Judgment on the merits--A
final judgment based not on
technical or procedural
grounds, but on actual
evidence going to the
substance of the issue before
the court.
Collateral Estoppel-4 factors-
1. Was the issue decided in a
prior adjudication identical
with the one presented in
the action in question? 2.
Was there a final judgment
on the merits? 3. Was the
party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the
prior adjudication? 4. Was
the issue in the first case
competently, fully, and fairly
litigated?

Does a federal court have to

apply state claim preclusion Yes. A final judgment by a Gargallo stands for the
law in deciding whether a state court upon a cause of Under Ohio law a court must proposition that a judgment
A disgruntled investor
prior state court judgment on action over which the have jurisdiction over a must be "on the merits" in
25. GARGALLO V. MERRILL, brought suit against his
subject matter over which adjudicating court had no matter to render a final order for claim preclusion to
LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & broker on grounds of
only a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction judgment on the merits for apply. Courts without subject
SMITH (1990) violations of federal
exclusive jurisdiction is a bar does not have claim the purpose of claim matter jurisdiction could not
securities law.
to a subsequent federal preclusive effect in any preclusion. make a judgment that is
court claim upon the subsequent proceedings. final.
identical cause of action?

No. Where a judgment may

have been based upon either
In order for issue preclusion
or any of two or more
When a prior case was to apply, there has to be
distinct facts, a party
An accident victim brought a determined on one of two solid proof that a particular
desiring to plead the
second suit against the separate issues, and it is not issue has already been
judgment as an estoppel by
26. ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF railroad company that clear which issue it was litigated. A person deserves
verdict ( issue preclusion) or
RAILROAD V. PARKS (1979) crashed into his car, after decided on, can issue to have his or her day in
finding upon the particular
having not been successful preclusion be used to court, and only when it is
fact involved in a subsequent
in the first suit. prohibit a suit that will raise clear that the day has been
suit must show that it was
one of the two issues? had will a court disallow
previously decided upon that
bringing suit.
fact, or else the question will
be open to a new contention.
400817362.xls
Shore (P), a stockholder in
Parklane Hosiery Co. (D)
(Parklane") brought a class
action against the latter
27. PARKLANE HOSIERY CO.
alleging that Parklane (D)
V. SHORE (1979)
had issued a materially false
and misleading proxy
statement in connection with
a merger.
Suit regarding the propriety
of employing issue
28. STATE FARM FIRE & preclusion where three cases inconsistent in their verdicts,
CASUALTY CO. V. CENTURY regarding the negligence of a can a court refuse to apply
HOME COMPONENTS (1976) house builder in starting a
fire reached inconsistent
results.
Suit regarding the preclusive
effect of a prior decision as
29. DURFEE V. DUKE (1963) to the ownership of certain
bottom land on the Missouri
River.
Plant borrowed $2520 from
Blazer Financial, made no Is an action on an underlying
30. PLANT V. BLAZER
payments for 8 months, then debt in default a compulsory
FINANCIAL SERVICES (1979)
sued Blazer financial under counterclaim?
the Truth in Lending Act
6
1. Can a party be precluded
from re-litigating facts
resolved adversely to the
party in prior equitable Trial courts have broad
proceedings where the court discretion to apply the
determines that the party doctrine of offensive
has had full and fair collateral estoppel even in
opportunity to litigate the cases where the defendant
facts? 2. Would the use of will be deprived of a jury
offensive collateral estoppel trial.
violate such party's Seventh
Amendment right to a jury
trial?
Yes. Where, in a prior case,
there are extant
determinations that are
When prior cases are
inconsistent on the matter in
issue with those made in a
subsequent case, it is a
collateral estoppel in a third
strong indication that the
suit?
application of collateral
estoppel would work an
injustice.
Yes. A judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit, even as
When an issue has been fully to the question of
and fairly litigated and finally jurisdiction, when the second
decided in a particular court, court's inquiry disclosed that
must other courts give full those questions have been
faith and credit to that fully and fairly litigated and
judgment? finally decided in the court
which rendered the original
judgment.
Yes. An action on an
underlying debt in default is
Debt counterclaims in truth
a compulsory counterclaim
in lending actions are
that must be asserted in a
compulsory.
suit by the debtor on a truth-
in-lending cause of action.
The Supreme Court of the
United States gives courts
broad discretion in
determining when and where
offensive collateral estoppel
should be applied. Offensive
Collateral Estoppel- refers to
a situation where a plaintiff
is seeking to estop a
defendant from re-litigating
the issues which the
defendant previously
litigated and lost in an earlier
action. Non-Mutual Collateral
Estoppel-Where a party who
is not bound by an earlier
judgment may use the
judgment against the party
who is bound by the
judgment.
If the circumstances are such
that a court's confidence in
the integrity of a prior
judicial determination is Fairness is the key to issue
severely undermined, or that preclusion. It is up to the
the result would likely be judge to decide when it
different in a second trial, it would and wouldn't be fair to
would work an injustice to apply issue preclusion.
deny the litigant another
opportunity to present his
case.
Full faith and credit generally
requires every state to give
to a judgment at least the
Res Judicata effect which the
judgment would be accorded
in the state which rendered
it.
Joinder of Claims------
Compulsory counterclaim-
Arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence as
the present claim. Permissive
Rule 13-permits defendants
counterclaim-Does not arise
to bring claims against
out of the present claim.
plaintiffs in the same action.
Ancillary jurisdiction-the
Counterclaims are either
federal court acquires
compulsory or permissive.
jurisdiction over the entire
case, even though some of
the matters would not
independently be subject to
federal jurisdiction.
400817362.xls
Mosely (P) and nine others
joined together to bring suit
31. MOSLEY V. GENERAL
against General Motors for
MOTORS CORP. (1974)
discrimination against blacks
and women.
Price, a chicken farmer, sued
Latco (D1) and CTB (D2) in
state court, which case was
later removed to federal
court. P alleges that D1 used
poor materials and
workmanship in the
construction of Ps new
Did D1 properly implead ITW defendant third-party
32. PRICE V. CTB, INC. (2001) chicken house, and that D2
under Rule 14(a)?
supplied the defective
material. D1 sought to
implead ITW pursuant to
Rule 14(a) by filing a third-
party complaint alleging that
ITW supplied defective nails
used in the construction of
Ps chicken house.
In a wrongful death suit for
the electrocution of her
husband, Mrs. Kroger (P)
33. OWEN EQUIPMENT AND attempted to obtain federal
ERECTION CO. V. KROGER diversity jurisdiction over
(1978) Owen Equipment and
Erection Company(D), a
nondiverse party, by alleging
pendent party jurisdiction.
Temple sued his doctor, the
hospital, and a medical
manufacturer in separate
34. TEMPLE V SYNTHES
proceedings, for injuries
CORP. (1990)
sustained when a metal
plate and screw device
malfunctioned.
7
Yes. The difficulties in
Are the issues of ten
ultimately adjudicating
plaintiffs claiming unlawful
damages to various plaintiffs
employment sufficient to
in a class are not so
sustain joinder under Federal
overwhelming as to require
Rules of Civil Procedure
severance of the plaintiffs"
20(a)?
causes of action
Yes. To implead a third-party
defendant under Rule 14(a),
the third party plaintiff (D1)
must show that the third-
party defendant's liability is
in some way derivative of
the original claim-third-parry
defendant may be impleaded
only when the original
plaintiff is trying to pass all
or part of the liability onto
that third-party defendant.
Derivative liability means
that there must be a right of
contribution or
indemnification under the
substantive law that is the
subject matter of the third-
party complaint.
No. The complete diversity
requirement cannot be
Does a federal court retain circumvented by waiting for
jurisdiction over an action, a defendant to implead a
based on diversity of nondiverse party. If a plaintiff
citizenship, when the plaintiff obtains jurisdiction based on
adds a pendant party diversity of citizenship, the
defendant who destroys plaintiff cannot later add a
complete diversity? defendant, who would
destroy the complete
diversity as a pendant party.
No. It is not always
Must all interested entities
necessary to make all joint
always be made party to a
tortfeasors parties to the
lawsuit?
same lawsuit.
Rule 20(a)- "all persons may
join in one action as Ps if
they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or
occurrences and if any
question of law or fact
common to all these persons
will arise in the action." Rule
20(b) and Rule 42(b) vest in
the district court the
discretion to order separate
trials or make such other
orders as will prevent delay
or prejudice.
Rule 14(a)-permits a
defendant (called third-party
plaintiff) to "implead" (join) a
nonparty to the action
(called the "third-party
defendant" ) who is or may
be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim
against him."
Rule 19(a) -provides that any
nonparty who is necessary
and indispensable to a fair
and complete resolution of a
lawsuit must be joined as a
party. Rule 19(b) - If a
necessary party cannot be
joined( not within the court's
personal jurisdiction) or if
joinder would destroy the
court's diversity jurisdiction,
the action must be dismissed
if the court determines that
she is an indispensable party.
Joinder-The uniting of several
causes of action or parties in
a single unit. Rule 20-Two
requisites to the joinder of
parties-1. A right to relief
must be asserted by, or
against, each plaintiff or
defendant relating to or
arising out of the same
transactions or occurrence,
or series of transactions or
occurrences 2. some
question of law or fact
common to all the parties
must arise in the action. The
purpose of Rule 20 is to
promote trial convenience
and expedite the final
determination of disputes,
thereby preventing multiple
lawsuits.
Implead- The act of bringing
a new party, who is part of
the subject matter of a
claim, into an action.
1.Ancillary jurisdiction-
Jurisdiction obtained when a
party injects a claim lacking
an independent basis for
jurisdiction by way of a
counterclaim, crossclaim, or
third party complaint. 2.
Third-party complaint-
complaint brought against a
person or entity who was not
formerly a party to the
lawsuit.
4 factors to determine
indispensability--1. The
extent to which a judgment
rendered in the nonparty's
absence would prejudice the
interest of the parties and
the nonparty. 2. The extent
to which the court is able to
order action that could
lessen or avoid such
prejudice. 3. Whether a
judgment rendered in the
nonparty's absence would be
adequate 4. Whether an
adequate remedy is
available to the plaintiff if
the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder. **********Goal of
joinder is judicial efficiency. If
complete relief cannot be
afforded without the
presence of a certain party,
he must be made a party to
the lawsuit.
400817362.xls 8

35. HELZBERG'S DIAMOND
SHOPS V. VALLEY WEST DES
MOINES SHOPPING CENTER
(1977)
A jewelry store sued the
shopping mall for violating
its lease agreement and
allowing four full line jewelry for failure to join an
stores lease spaces in the
mall.
Did the district court properly dispensable to an action to
deny the motion to dismiss
indispensable party?
Yes. It is generally
recognized that a person
does not become
determine rights under a
Rule 19(b)
contract simply because that
person's rights or obligations
under an entirely separate
contract will be affected by
the result of the action.

Rule 24(a) "anyone shall be

A complaint was filed to
36. NATURAL RESOURCES
prevent NRC from issuing
DEFENSE COUNCIL V. UNTIED
licenses for the operation of
STATES NUCLEAR
uranium mills without first
REGULATORY COMMISSION
preparing environmental
(1978)
impact statements.
Pursuant to consent
judgments between the city
of Birmingham ("City") and
the Jefferson County
Personnel Board ("Board")
37. MARTIN V. WILKS ( 1989)
with black firefighters, the
white firefighters filed a suit without mandatory joining
against the City and the
Board alleging reverse
discrimination.
A fight between an art
dealer, Imelda Marcos and
38. COHEN V. THE REPUBLIC her agent, and the Philippine
OF THE PHILIPPINES ( 1993) Government over true
ownership of paintings which
hung in Marcos's home.
High school girls sued their
39. COMMUNITIES FOR high school athletic
EQUITY V. MICHIGAN HIGH association for gender
SCHOOL ATHLETIC discrimination with regard to
ASSOCIATION (1999) the athletic programs, which
favor boy's athletics.
Was the Court's denial of
intervention correct under
Rule 24(a) of the FRCP?
May a party seeking a
judgment binding another
obligate the latter to
intervene in the action
that party in the action?
May a person intervene in an an action if the applicant
action if he or she has an
interest relating to property the property or transaction
which is the subject of the
action?
Does a group of high school
female athletes meet the
requirements of Rule 23,
FRCP, to certify a class
action?
No. Applicants satisfying
their burden of the three
requirements of Rule 24(a)
(2) should be allowed to
intervene in an action.
No. A party seeking a
judgment binding on another principle of Anglo-American
cannot obligate the latter to jurisprudence that one is not
intervene in the action
without mandatory joining
that person in the action.
Yes. Rule 24 of the FRCP
allows anyone, upon timely
application, to intervene in
claims an interest relating to
which is the subject of the
action, and that interest is
subject to possible prejudice
and lack of adequate
representation.
Yes. A class is not
maintainable merely
because the complaint
parrots the legal
requirements of Rule 23; a
hearing may be necessary
for the court to probe behind
the pleadings before coming
to rest on the certification
question.
permitted to intervene in an
action (2)when the applicant
claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction
which is the subject of the
Intervention will be allowed if action and the applicant is so
the applicant has any situated that the disposition
significant interest in the of the action may as a
transaction at issue. practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's
ability to protect that
interest, unless that
applicant's interest is
adequately represented by
existing parties.
1. Intervention--A proceeding
permitting a person to enter
into a lawsuit already in
progress. The person was not
an original party to the suit,
The impermissible collateral
Rule 19 indicates that and the person is admitted
attack doctrine is
existing parties to a lawsuit to protect some right or
inconsistent with rules 19
bear the burden of adding interest which is allegedly
and 24 and the general
new parties where such a affected by the proceeding.
step is in order. Rule 24 The "impermissible collateral
indicates that potential new attack doctrine" should not
bound by a judgment in
parties have no duty to be added to the class of
personam in a litigation in
intervene. Joinder under Rule exceptions to the mandatory
which he is not designated
19 is mandatory, and joinder rule, permissive
as an a party or to which he
intervention under Rule 24 is intervention rule, and
has not been made a party
permissive. general Anglo-American
by service of process.
principle, because the
system of joinder presently
contemplated by Rules 19
and 20 serves the many
involved.
Interpleader--a party places
property in the hands of the
court to decide who should
Rule 24(a)(2) allows rightfully receive the
intervention if four elements property; used to avoid
are met-1. the motion is double or multiple liability on
timely 2.the petitioner has the part of the debtor.
Marcos fulfills all the
an interest in the subject Whether a motion to
requirements of Rule 24(a)
matter 3. the petitioner's intervene is timely --1. how
(2), and her motion to
interest is likely to be long the applicant knew of
intervene is granted.
prejudiced 4. the existing his interest before making
parties are unable to the motion;2. prejudice to
adequately represent the the existing parties from any
petioner's interest. such delay;3.prejudice to
applicant if the motion is
denied;4. other unusual
circumstances
Rule 23(a)- 4 requirements
for certifying a class action- Class action--Lawsuit brought
1. Numerosity 2. by a representative member
Commonality-common of a large group of persons
question of law and fact 3. on behalf of all members of
Typicality-The case is typical the group. Satisfying Rule
of other claims against a 23(a) is relatively easy in (b)
petitioner because of (2) class actions because of
common questions of law the presence of a
and fact. 4. Adequate representative organization.
representation
400817362.xls 9

Yes. Where the district court

Heaven leased a car from
Sun Trust and then sued
40. HEAVEN V. TRUST
them for failure to comply
COMPANY BANK (1977)
with disclosure requirements
of the Consumer Leasing Act.
Was the district court's
denial of the motion to
certify a class consistent with
the facts and circumstances
before the court?
has given due consideration
to all the relevant factors of
FRCP Rule 23 within the
context of a rigorous analysis
and has not relied upon
impermissible factors, there
is no abuse of discretion in
denying a class action.
The district court's decision
whether to certify a class
may only be overturned if it
constitutes an abuse of
discretion.

The mere fact that all of the Hansberry was litigated in

Hansberry (D), the black
purchaser of land that was
subject to a racially
41. HANSBERRY V. LEE
restrictive sales covenant,
(1940)
sought to avoid a prior class
action holding that the
covenant was valid.
Shutts (P) and several other
holders of royalty interests
brought a class action
against Phillips Petroleum (D)
42. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM V.
to recover royalty payments.
SHUTTS (1985)
The Kansas court obtained
personal jurisdiction over all
parties and applied Kansas
law to all claims.
People exposed to asbestos
products created in a
43. AMCHEM PRODUCTS,
settlement only class to
INC. V. WINDSOR (1997)
settle current and future
asbestos-related claims.
Where the procedural
requirements for class action
have not been satisfied, is
the judgment res judicata
and therefore binding on
absent parties?
1. May a court exercise
personal jurisdiction over
absent class members even
if the members do not
possess the minimum
contacts with the forum
which would support
personal jurisdiction over a
defendant? 2. Does a mailed
notice and opt out provision
satisfy the notice
requirements for due process
purposes? 3. May a forum
state apply that state's law
to every claim in a class
action where the state does
not have a significant
contact and interest in every
claim asserted by each
member of the class?
Does settlement play a role
when determining the
propriety of a settlement-
only class certification?
parties had signed the state court, and hence did
Granting res judicata effect Rule 23c(3)- a class action
agreement does not make not specifically involve rule
to a class action judgment, in decree should define the
them the same class, and 23. However Hansberry's
which the prerequisites and members of the class,
the absent parties in the rationale applies to Rule 23
procedures for class action presumably to aid in future
original litigation were not and specifically comes in
were not satisfied, violates determination of the
provided due process through Rule 23(a)(4)'s
due process. judgment's binding effect.
protections in asserting their adequate representation
interests. requirement.
In class actions, personal
jurisdiction does not require
that each class member
have minimum contacts with
the forum state, but the
forum state must have
sufficient interests in the
claims to assert its state law
to all claims.
The proposed settlement
class action cannot be
certified because it does not
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)
requirement that common
questions of law or fact
Yes. In determining the
predominate. The
propriety of a settlement A settlement class is a
predominance requirement is
only class certification, the lawsuit in which a proposed
not met by the fact that all
requirements of Rule 23(a) settlement is filed at the
asbestos victims may share 1. Rule 23(a) 2. Rule 23(b)(3)
and (b)(3) FRCP must be same time the class action is
an interest in expeditious
satisfied, and the settlement filed. The class action is filed
resolution of their claims.
must be taken into account only for settlement purposes.
Also, Rule 23(a)(4)'s
as well.
requirement of adequate
representation is not
satisfied because the
"inventory" Ps' claims were
traded off against the
"futures" claims.
Rule Case Other info
14th Amendment Frier v City of Vandalia Requirement for prompt hearing when property is seized.
28 USC 1335 Federal Interpleader Statute
28 USC 1337 Federal Interpleader Statute
28 USC 1367 Owen v Kroger Supplemental jurisdiction
28 USC 1397 Federal Interpleader Statute
28 USC 1738 Frier v City of Vandalia / Gargallo v Merrill Lynch Full faith and credit clause.
28 USC 2361 Federal Interpleader Statute
29 USC 1983 Frier v City of Vandalia Requirement for prompt hearing when property is seized.
7th Amendment provides that in suits at common law, where controversy >$20
7th Amendment Chauffeurs+ Teamsters Union v Terry then right of trial by jury preserved.
7th Amendment Amoco v Torcomian Question if 7th covers action at law or equity- law=jury trial.
FRCP 13
FRCP 13 (a) Martino v McDonalds / Plant v Blazer Compulsory counterclaims have to be raised at the time of litigation or lost.
FRCP 14 Price v CTB Right to indemnity
FRCP 14 (a) Kroger v Owen Implead a 3rd party for any claim arising out of the same T&O
FRCP 16 Sanders v Union Pacific RR / McKey v Fairbairn Failure to comply with pretrial conference resulted in dismissal with prejudice
FRCP 19 Temple v Synthes / Helzberg v Valley West
Someone who is subject to service or process and the court has SMJ over, should be joined if their
FRCP 19 (a) Helzberg v Valley West / Martin v Wilks absence will not give complete relief to the parties.
Compulsory joinder has to be raised, but it is not necessary for all joint tort-feasors to be named as
FRCP 19 (b) Temple v Synthes / Helzberg v Valley West defendants in a single lawsuit.
FRCP 20
FRCP 20 (a) Mosley v GM sJ granted- There was no question of fact- “there was no one liable for the damages”
FRCP 20 (b) Mosley v GM Separate trials
FRCP 22
FRCP 23 Bnk Class certification granted b/c met all requirements
FRCP 23 (a) Amchem v Windsor Court denied class certification b/c there was no common issue and no adequate representation.
FRCP 23 (b) (2) Communities for equity v MI High School Athletic Ass. Injunctive or Declaratory Relief class action
FRCP 23 (c) (2) (a) Phillips v Shutts Opt out provision for class actions. IN this case, 3,400 people opted out of the class.
Rule 23c(3)- a class action decree should define the members of the class, presumably to aid in future
FRCP 23 (c) (3) Hansberry v Lee determination of the judgment's binding effect.
FRCP 24 Martin v Wilks Right to intervention
Intervention was permitted when the applicant claimed an interest relating to transaction which was the
subject of the action and he was so situated that the disposition of the action could impair his ability to
FRCP 24 (a) (2) NRDC v USNC / Cohen v Republic of Philippines protect that interest, unless his interest was adequately represented by existing parties.
FRCP 26
permits discovery into any matter,
FRCP 26 (B) (1) Johnson / Davis v Precoat Metals / Thompson v DHUD not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.
FRCP 26 (B) (2) Davis v Precoat / Thompson v DHUD By order, the court may alter the limits; allows for protected facts to be discovered.
FRCP 26 (B) (3) Hickman v Taylor Work product doctrine
FRCP 26 (b) (4) (b) Thompson v Haskell Protection of medical records-work product
FRCP 26 (b) (4) (b) Chiquita v MV Bolero Reefer Precludes discovery of facts known or opinions held by a non-testifying expert
FRCP 26 (C) Stalnaker v Kmart Protective orders
FRCP 26 (g) Poole v Textron Discovery sanctions
FRCP 27
FRCP 28
FRCP 29
FRCP 30
FRCP 31
FRCP 32
FRCP 33
FRCP 34
FRCP 35
FRCP 36 Poole v Textron Requests for admissions
FRCP 37 Cheudasmana / Gargallo v Merrill Lynch Sanctions for violating Rule 26
FRCP 37 (a) (4) (A) Poole v Textron Violated FRCP 26(g), absent bad faith, sanctions are not applicable.
FRCP 37 (B) (2) Steffan v Cheney Sanction for violating discovery order
FRCP 47 Thompson v Altheimer&Gray Right to impartial jury.
FRCP 50 Penn RR v Chamberlain Case dismissed b/c a jury could not determine what happened for lack of evidence.
FRCP 50 (b) Lind v Schenley Indust. verdict.
FRCP 56 Kroger v Omaha SJ granted- There was no question of fact- “there was no one liable for the damages”
FRCP 56 (c) Celotex v Catrett SJ is proper when there is no issue to material facts.
After moving party makes SJ case,
FRCP 56 (e) Bias v Advantage nonmoving party has to prove there should be a trail
Blank v Soloman