United States vs Aniceto Barrias
11 Phil. 327 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of
Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats).
The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to
be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the
Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a
lighter which is manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation
of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered ships
should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information
against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be
a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was pursuant to
Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending
shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the
discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is
entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a
penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange
was more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty
different from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then
in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or
authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve
itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall
be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and
of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot
exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be
penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this
case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.
SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death
benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the
validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-
delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA),
as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how
the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the
latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL OF MINDORO
39 Phil. 660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from
their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still
in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment
if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to
that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are
a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was
later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped
from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf
by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had
been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes
undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their
liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality
of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who
else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but
the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the
law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the
provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees
of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt
to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “.
. . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process
of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
People vs Vera
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed
a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied.
He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was
also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a
motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to
the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act
No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of
the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of
the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands
of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon
the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of
the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for
provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no
probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no
argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual
situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no
probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without the probation system.
CERVANTES vs. AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS
 This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the
government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon
recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on
two grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting manager’s salary to
P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under
R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is
Constitutional.
DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative
power to the executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to
streamline GOCC’s operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was
promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with
costs
Pelaez vs Auditor General
15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil
action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for
the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370
which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios
were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from
the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power
to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to
the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare
may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as
the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the
phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat
of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially
and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
FACTS
- The National Coal Company (NCC) was created by Act 2705 (approved March
10, 1917) and subsequently amended by Act 2882 (March 5, 1919)
- Act 2882
“The voting power of all such stocks owned by the Gov’t of the Philippines shall
be vested exclusively in a committee, consisting of the Gov. Gen, the Pres. of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
- The National Bank was created by Act 2612 (approved February 4, 1916) and
subsequently amended by Act 2747 (February 20, 1918) and Act 1983 (January
30, 1921)
- Original act: voting power vested exclusively on the Gov. Gen.
- Amended acts: voting power vested in a board (Board of Control) composed of
the Gov. Gen., Senate President, and Speaker of the House of Representatives
- Same voting power in four other nationally organized / controlled stock
corporations
- The petitioners were elected directors of the NCC by a vote of the gov’t-owned
shares cast by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
- The Governor General challenged the validity of the legislated amendments
and did not participate in the elections
ISSUE
- Whether or not the amendments introduced by the legislated acts are
unconstitutional
HELD
- Yes. The court sustained the contention of the Government that “the election of
the directors and managing agents by a vote of the government-owned stock
was an executive function entrusted by the Organic Act to the Gov. Gen,
and that the acts of the Legislature, divesting him of the that power and vesting it,
the majority of which in each instance consisted of officers and members of the
Legislature, were invalid as being in conflict with the Organic Act.”
- The court entered judgments of ouster against the petitioners
NOTES
- Sec. 21
“That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer… ‘The
Governor General of the Phil. Islands’.”
“…general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus of the
government…”
- Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to
its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative
office, since that would to usurp the power of appointment by indirection
ABELLA vs COMELEC
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene)
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running
as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her
certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a
resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running
for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the
Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the
Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second
highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga,
Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be
proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was
originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of
Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains
that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded
with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province
voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate.