Purpose of Issue Rev Date of Issue Author Agreed Approved

Client Issue for Review 0 July 2001 SW EPS JB

EXXONMOBIL PRODUCTION COMPANY

ASABO COMPLEX

THE FIRE AND BLAST ANALYSIS OF TOPSIDES

STRUCTURES – PHASE 3 – DETAIL DESIGN

DOC REF CH134R003 Rev 0 JULY 2001

MSL Services Corporation

11111 Katy Freeway, Suite 620
Houston, Texas 77079-2116

Tel: 713 463 6180

Fax: 713 463 6557
E-mail: JBucknell@MSLEngineering.com

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 1 of 34

 EXXONMOBIL PRODUCTION COMPANY

ASABO COMPLEX

THE FIRE AND BLAST ANALYSIS OF TOPSIDES

STRUCTURES – PHASE 3 – DETAIL DESIGN

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 4
1.1 Background .............................................................................. 4
1.2 Project Structure ........................................................................ 5
1.3 Major Assumptions made during the execution of the response analyses. ... 5
1.4 Performance Standards ................................................................ 6

2. BASIS OF THE STUDY...................................................................... 11

2.1 General .................................................................................. 11
2.2 Layout. .................................................................................. 11
2.3 Explosion loads ........................................................................ 11
2.4 Mitigation by the Use of Grating in the Upper and Lower Decks
of the GIP ............................................................................... 12

3. UPRATING OF THE CONTROL ROOM - MODULE F………………………..….17

3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...17
3.2 Explosion Assessment of Existing Panels – Module F……………………..….17
3.3 Explosion Assessment of Primary Framing – Module F………………….…..18
3.4 Doors and Windows……………………………………………………………..….18
3.5 Fire Resistance of Cladding – Module F…………………………………….…..19
3.6 Uprating Penetrations and Cables………………………………………..….……19

4. CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………………………………..….……..31

REFERENCES

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 2 of 34

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
APPENDIX B BLAST AND FIRE WALL MANUFACTURERS AND INFORMATION
APPENDIX C CALCULATIONS
APPENDIX D PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 3 of 34

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

MSL Services Corporation (MSL) was instructed by the ExxonMobil Production

Company to examine the ability of the Asabo platform complex to resist hydrocarbon
explosion overpressures. Part of this study has also involved the fire assessment of
parts of the complex.

This report covers Phase 3 of the work relating to detailed design. A previous report,
Reference 1 has been issued which deals with the simulations and calculations leading
to the suggested modifications described in this document.

The Asabo complex consists of three bridge-linked structures, a Quarters Platform

(QP), a Gas Injection Platform (GIP) and a Production Platform (PP), see Figure 1.1
from Reference 2.

It was always ExxonMobil’s intention to mitigate the explosion overpressures by

replacing some of the plated areas by grating. Various levels of grating have been
examined and it has been found that the overpressures can be considerably reduced.
This is a result of the venting through the grated portions of decks which is now
possible.

The main area of interest is the control room in Module F of the GIP which could be
occupied during an explosion event (Figures 1.2 to 1.4). Conclusions are also
presented which relate to the capacity of the module and control room to resist
explosions and fires. Minor modifications have been suggested which enable the
structure to better resist moderate overpressures of the order of 2psi and to bring the
fire rating of the control room up to H60 standards (2).

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 4 of 34

1.2 Project Structure

The project was in 3 phases:

1. Phase 1 consisted of blast response analyses for the topsides of the GIP
platform and an assessment of options for strengthening or replacing existing
fire walls. This work is reported in Appendix D of Reference 1.

2. Phase 2 consisted of the analysis of options to mitigate the explosion loads on

the primary framing of the three platforms. In particular by the replacement of
deck plates by grating.

3. Phase 3 relates to the detailed design of preferred strengthening schemes

suggested by the results of Phases 1 and 2.

This approach was adopted so that the results of each phase could be available to
determine the work necessary to complete the next phase efficiently.

1.3 Major Assumptions Made During the Execution of the Response Analyses.

Exxon Mobil has provided drawings from a recent offshore survey. The drawings
did not give any indication of steel material grades used for fabrication, therefore we
have conservatively assumed that all steel has a yield strength of 36 ksi, (250
N/mm2).

It is assumed that a blast may occur in the compressors either to the North or South of
the module (but not both). For the purposes of this study it is assumed that the blast
occurs before the fire has developed and so the requirement is for blast resistance
followed by fire resistance. A fire resistance rating of H60 is required for the control
room. This will give full protection against an impinging jet fire for about 30
minutes.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 5 of 34

1.4 Performance Standards

When dealing with extreme loads such as those encountered in blast it is necessary to
define the structural response ‘performance standards’ to enable acceptance of local
failures which would not occur under conventional design loads.

The main principle is that local damage may be accepted so long as global collapse
does not occur and that after the extreme explosion event it is possible for the
survivors to escape from the platform. In this case we are considering an explosion in
the GIP platform which is bridge linked to the PP on the North side and to the QP at
the South side. This serves to provide at least one escape route so long as it is
protected from thermal radiation during a fire.

The Asabo complex is a permanently manned installation. The Quarters Platform

requires special consideration as this is the ‘Temporary Refuge’ for the people on
board. It is usually required that people inside the quarters should be protected from
fire, blast and smoke during an explosion event. In view of the low predicted
overpressures (2), the integrity of the walls of the quarters will remain gas tight. No
permanent deformations of the panels on the outside of the quarters are expected and
the main framing will remain within elastic limits.

Secondary releases of inventory from broken pipework and displaced vessels must
also be restricted. Essential safety systems must remain operational throughout the
blast event although checking for this is not in the scope of the present work.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 6 of 34

 Figure 1.1. Installation Layout (from Reference 2)

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 7 of 34

 Figure 1.2. GIP Module F – North Elevation

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 8 of 34

 Figure 1.3. GIP Module F – South Elevation

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 9 of 34

 Figure 1.4. GIP Module F – East and West Elevations

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 10 of 34

2. BASIS OF THE STUDY

2.1 General

This review is based on blast overpressures provided in the ACE document Ref 99-
007, Phase 3(1).

2.2 Layout

The Control Room is located in the West part of Module F, which in turn straddles
Grid Line 3 of the platform. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the control room adjacent to
the generators. The Control Room is on two levels separated by a mezzanine floor.
The rest of Module F is taken up by generators and walkways and is open from the
Lower Deck at El+50’ to the Upper Deck at El+70’.

To the south of Module F there are 5 Compressor Modules (A to E), to the North are
the two Compressor Modules (G and H Figure 2.3). All the Modules are supported
by a steel truss structure. The space between each module is either 610mm (2’-0”) or
1219mm (4’-0”). A continuous steel plate runs across the top of all the modules
connecting them together at the El+70’ level. Only module F has cladding on the
main framing.

2.3 Explosion loads

Pressure time histories for a four scenarios have been supplied by ACE in Reference
2 and are discussed in detail in Reference 1.

Scenario 1 – central ignition of a gas cloud in the low pressure compressor area of
the GIP at the South side of the platform. This scenario gives greatest loads on the
QP. Figure 2.4 from Reference 1 illustrates the position of the gas cloud in the low
pressure compressor area.

Scenario 2 – central ignition of a gas cloud in the high pressure compressor area of
the GIP at the North side of the platform. This scenario represents a cloud nearer to
the PP platform. Figure 2.5 from Reference 1 shows the position of the gas cloud in
the high pressure compressor area.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 11 of 34

2.4 Mitigation by the Use of Grating in the Upper and Lower Decks of the GIP

The use of grating in the upper and lower decks limits the loads to those described as
Cases 5 and 6 as described in the ACE Report Reference 2. It has been assumed that
about 66% of the top deck plate can be replaced by grating and that the 69% of the
lower deck is grated. The peak pressures experienced for Case 6 are given in the
Table below.

Wall Peak Pressure (psi)

North wall 1.5
East Wall 1.125
South wall 0.5
West wall 0 (no load reported)
Table 2.1 Peak overpressures on the GIP control room – Case 6

It has been confirmed by ExxonMobil (Appendix A of Reference 1) that it is

acceptable to assume the loads for load Cases 5 and 6 with a 10% increase to allow
for grating blockage.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 12 of 34

 Figure 2.1. GIP Module F – Control Room Plan and Cladding Details
(Third Issue updated - November 2000)

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 13 of 34

 Figure 2.2. GIP Module F – Control Room Plan (Mezzanine)

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 14 of 34

 Figure 2.3. GIP – Main Deck Module Skid Layout

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 15 of 34

 Figure 2.4. Location of Gas Cloud - Scenario 1 – from Reference 2

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 16 of 34

 Figure 2.5. Location of Gas Cloud – Scenario 2 – from Reference 2

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 17 of 34

3. UPRATING OF THE CONTROL ROOM - MODULE F

3.1 Introduction

The modifications described in this section have been designed to bring the blast
rating up to a level consistent with the peak design pressures given in Table 2.1. No
pressure loads are given for the West wall of the Control Room but given the gas
cloud location the pressure levels on the West wall have been assumed to be
comparable with those of the East wall.

The pressures have been applied in the capacity checks as static loads. This is
consistent with the fact that the natural period of the panels is very short compared
with the load duration of about 50 milliseconds giving essentially static response. The
Calculations are given in Appendix C.

It has been confirmed by e-mail (Appendix A) that an H60 rating is appropriate for
the control room in general. A number of modifications are suggested to bring the
control room fire resistance up to this standard. In the case of a jet fire, the H60
rating is interpreted as giving an endurance of 30 minutes in a jet fire.

3.2 Explosion Assessment of Existing Panels – Module F

In view of the low overpressures, it was possible to check the existing cladding panels
for their capacity to resist overpressure loads by checking the components which
make up the panel supports member by member. These checks are reported in
Reference 1.

Two areas have been investigated: The North and South walls of Module F under a
positive peak overpressure of 1.65 psi (1.5 psi plus 10%) and the East wall under
positive pressure of 1.25 psi.

North and South walls of Module F

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are photographs showing the exterior and interior cladding
panels. In this case, the internal cladding has been assumed not to contribute to the
strength of the wall. The cladding and channel supports have been checked for the
blast load and, it survives the explosion overpressures. The outer cladding thickness
is 0.75mm with no perforations as shown in Figure 2.1.

No end details of the walls are provided, however it is assumed that the cladding
overlaps the primary steelwork at its top and bottom edges so that load transfer to the
main frame is by bearing contact rather than relying on welds.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 18 of 34

 East Wall and West Wall of the Control Room
The available drawings have been reviewed and details of the fire wall construction as
shown in Figure 2.1 have been assessed for blast resistance. The connecting interior
channels and bolts have sufficient shear resistance to enable the internal and external
cladding to act as a composite section. The span between angle connections is
assumed to be similar to the North and South walls at about 962 mm.

The conclusion is that the East and West walls are adequate to resist the overpressure
without modification. The main beams supporting the walls have been checked and
shown to be adequate.

3.3 Explosion Assessment of Primary Framing – Module F

The Primary framing of the module has been analysed using ABAQUS. The results
are reported in Reference 1.

In order to overcome the predicted failure of the columns at the Eastern most end it is
necessary to improve the load carrying capacity of the East face. It is not possible to
fully brace this face because of the presence of the generators in this area, therefore,
as previously proposed, it is recommended that Module F be tied to adjacent Modules
E and G at the Upper level. Figure 3.4 provides a suggested detail, an A3
engineering drawing is also supplied for this detail

3.4 Doors and Windows

There are double doors into the control room at both the 15.26m level and at the
mezzanine level on the East side. There are single doors at these levels in the West
wall. There are hence two escape routes on each level.

Figure 3.5 is a general view of the East wall of the control room.

The doors do not appear to have sufficient resistance either for fire or explosions. In
view of the large windows in these doors we would recommend that the doors and
frames are replaced. The upgraded frames will also serve to restrain the wall if the
verticals are extended upwards and connected to the flanges of the main horizontal
beams.

It is proposed that square hollow section SHS columns are welded in from floor to
ceiling to connect the door frame to the primary structure. Figure 3.6 shows the
steelwork required to support the double doors on the East side. Figure 3.7 shows the
steelwork to support the single doors on the West side. A3 Engineering drawings are
supplied.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 19 of 34

 The doors should be installed before Chartek is applied in order to protect the frames
from fire attack.

Quotations have been received from Booths on replacement doors which are H60
rated and can resist the overpressure. The full text of the Booths quotation is included
in Appendix B.

A grilled window is shown in Figure 3.8. The window which is estimated to be

700mm wide by 600mm high, can be replaced to give a 0.2bar and H60 rating. A
quotation for this item is included in Appendix B.

Notes

Module layouts are based on drawings 3361-ZQ-C-2851 Rev 02 and –2852 Rev 02.

The thickness of the cladding on the detail of 3361-ZQ-C-2851 (Figure 2.1) is shown
as 203mm plus 42mm for the corrugations whereas the thickness is shown as 152mm
on drawing 3361-ZQ-C-2852 (Figure 2.2). 150mm is taken for the cladding thickness
in drawings CH134/003 and 002 supplied by MSL with a note to that effect included
on these drawings.

See also the notes on the MSL supplied drawings.

3.5 Fire Resistance of Cladding – Module F

The existing cladding currently has uncertain fire resistance estimated to be A60 and
will need a coating of Chartek or similar to upgrade the wall’s fire resistance to the
required H60 level.

Information has been received information from TEXTRON the makers of

CHARTEK passive fire protection (PFP) and they have confirmed that a H60 and
H120 rating for the walls can be achieved by a spray-on coating onto the corrugations
of up to 16mm in thickness (see Appendix D). There are apparently no problems with
applying the CHARTEK to the corrugations. The PFP will remain intact under the
predicted deflections under blast loading.

3.6 Uprating Penetrations and Cables

Figure 3.9 shows a MCT penetration in the Control Room wall – this will need
uprating against fire by enclosure or insulation. The cables are control cables, gas
detection cables and power cables and are hence necessary for the continued operation
of essential safety systems. A typical enclosure detail is shown in Figure 3.10. The
cables themselves should be insulated. Figure 3.11 shows the unprotected cables on

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 20 of 34

 the East side Fire wall which are in need of insulation. Boxing in before Chartek
application is an option so long as subsequent access to these cables is not essential.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 21 of 34

 Figure 3.1. GIP Module - North Elevation

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 22 of 34

 Figure 3.2. Photograph of Cladding - Exterior

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 23 of 34

 Figure 3.3. Photograph of Cladding – Interior

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 24 of 34

 Figure 3.4 Proposed Strengthening Scheme – Tie-ins to Modules E and G

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 25 of 34

 Figure 3.5 General View of East Wall of Control Room

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 26 of 34

 Figure 3.6 Double Doors in East Wall of Control Room

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 27 of 34

 Figure 3.7 Single Doors in West Wall of Control Room

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 28 of 34

 Figure 3.8 Small Grilled Window in Wall of Control Room

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 29 of 34

 Figure 3.9 - MCT penetration in the Control Room wall

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 30 of 34

 Figure 3.10 Typical Detail for Cable Transit Penetration

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 31 of 34

 Figure 3.11 Unprotected Cables on East end of North Fire Wall

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 32 of 34

4. CONCLUSIONS

Measures have been designed and presented which will bring the Control Room in
Module F up to an H60 rating.

With the measures described in Section 3 the Control Room of Module F will be able
to withstand the blast loads simulated in Reference 2 for Case 6 elastically and
without damage.

These conclusions and the strengthening schemes are based entirely on the drawings
and photographs of the installation supplied by ExxonMobil.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 33 of 34

REFERENCES

1. ‘Asabo Complex - The Fire and Blast Analysis of Topsides Structures’, MSL Report
CH134R002 Rev 1, June 2001

2. ‘ACE Project 99-007, Phase 3 Evaluation of Asabo Gas Platform’, J. Keith Clutter,
ACE, November 2000.

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001 Page 34 of 34

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Installation Layout

1.2 GIP Module F – North Elevation
1.3 GIP Module F – South Elevation
1.4 GIP Module F – East and West Elevations

2.1 GIP Module F – Control Room Plan and Cladding Details

2.2 GIP Module F – Control Room Plan (Mezzanine)
2.3 GIP – Main deck Module Skid Layout
2.4 Location of Gas Cloud – Scenario 1
2.5 Location of Gas Cloud – Scenario 2

3.1 GIP Module F – North Elevation

3.2 Photograph of Cladding - Exterior
3.3 Photograph of Cladding - Interior
3.4 Proposed Strengthening Scheme – Tie-ins to Modules E and G
3.5 General View of east Wall of Control Room
3.6 Double Doors in East Wall of Control Room
3.7 Single Doors in West Wall of Control Room
3.8 Small Grilled Window in Wall of Control Room
3.9 MCT Penetration in the Control Room Wall
3.10 Typical details for Cable Transit Penetration
3.11 Unprotected Cables on East end of North Fire Wall

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

 APPENDIX A

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

E-mail from Y Awoyelu to M P Honderich 15:51 10th April 2001

From: Yinka Awoyelu [mailto:yinka_awoyelu@email.mobil.com]

Sent: 10 April 2001 15:51
To: Michael P Honderich
Cc: Stephen K Davis; Jorge B Valdivieso; P G Cavazos; clutter@aceng.net;
PShuttleworth@mslengineering.com
Subject: Re: Asabo - Blast analysis of topside structures

Mike,

Thank you for the prompt response.

This is what we will do now:

TOP DECK
Replace all (100%) of the deck plates with gratings.

BOTTOM DECK
Replace all the plates except those under equipment.
This makes it so easy for us all.

But please do have MSL confirm I will not require to build the blast walls any longer since with
this arrangement, I would vent off most of the blast loads that might have been generated due to
deck plating.

The comments on the LQ and PP is well taken. The simulations actually show minimal loads on
those sides.

Again thank you for all your help.

Yinka Awoyelu
Projects Department
Mobil Producing Nigeria Ultd.,
Mobil House, Victoria Island Lagos
Level 6, Room 6B28
234-1-2621660 Ext. 2319 (Phone)
234-1-2621733 (Fax)

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

Yinka_Awoyelu@email.mobil.com(Email)
Michael P Honderich
04/10/2001 01:33 PM

To: Yinka Awoyelu/Africa/Mobil-Notes@Mobil

cc: Stephen K Davis/Africa/Mobil-Notes@Mobil, Jorge B Valdivieso/Africa/Mobil-
Notes@Mobil, P G Cavazos/U-Houston/ExxonMobil@xom

Subject: Re: Asabo - Blast analysis of topside structures

I have been trying to call this morning - I cannot get through - I think we should talk as soon as
possible.

I have confirmed that the % area grated in the explosions studies AND the engineering work by
MSL is 66% for the top deck and 69% for the bottom deck.
You are proposing 50% for the top and 30% for the bottom.
What you are proposing is about 1/2 of the grating that the engineering analysis was based on.
Unless you can increase the scope of your grating project to an areal percent equivalent to the
original assumptions, this requires additional analysis.

ACTION PLAN
I discussed this with Justin at MSL this morning. By this Friday, he will deliver to me the blast
loads which will be tolerated by the stiffening they propose. I will then work with Keith at MSL
to estimate the increase in blast load associated with the 50%/30% grating scenario and compare
this with the strength of what MSL has proposed. Hopefully, no revisions to your project scope
will be necessary.... but I won't know that until coming Friday/Monday
time frame. Worst case, Keith won't be able to prudently estimate this(requiring another CEBAM
model run) and/or MSL would have to positively adjust their stiffening recommendations.

Let me know if you have a problem with the above ... otherwise, you may assume I am working
on it with a target to get back to you ASAP but by late Monday

Regarding the PP and the LQ. The original recommendations were for a
Firewall on the south side of the PP and H60 fireproofing on the North side of the LQ.
Since MSL did not have drawings on which to perform a structural analysis on existing
construction this will be addressed practically in their report.
ACE's results for the upper and lower deck grating cases show very low blast pressures on both
the North Side of the LQ and the South side of the PP (less than 0.1 psi) - we would not expect
significant structural damage therefrom...
I would expect some recommendations to e.g. reinforce any windows on the northside of the LQ
but nothing more.

Regards,

Michael P. Honderich, J.D.,C.S.P.

Safety, Risk & Operations Integrity
800 Bell Street, Room 4140K
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 656-8559 phone
(713) 656-1512 fax

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

e-mail from Yinka Awoyelu 10th July 2001

Steve,

Based on Mike's note and recommendation which I basically agree with,

can we
upgrade the doors and penetrations to H60 fire rating and disregard my
earlier
comment about the fire rating?.

Thanks.

Mike, Thank you for the input.

Yinka Awoyelu
Projects Department
Mobil Producing Nigeria Ultd.,
Mobil House, Victoria Island Lagos
Level 6, Room 6B28
234-1-2621660 Ext. 2319 (Phone)
234-1-2621733 (Fax)
Yinka_Awoyelu@email.mobil.com(Email)

michael.p.honderich@exxonmobil.com on 07/09/2001 02:32:17 PM

To: Yinka Awoyelu/Africa/Mobil-Notes

cc: "Steve Walker" <SWalker@mslengineering.com>, Stephen K
Davis/Africa/Mobil-Notes
Subject: Re: Asabo Fire and Blast project - progress report

Yinka,

In this situation, the fire danger is presented by a high intensity jet

fire which would be expected to burn through an A60 barrier in say less
than 10 minutes. We could expect H60 to provide us, rule of thumb,
about
1/2 its 1 hour rating, or 30 minutes. (The H60 refers to at leat one
hour
protection from a high intensity pool fire). In my opinion, in the
context
of the Asabo GIP, this should be sufficient to blow down and evacuate.
So
I recommend you upgrade to H60 including doors and penetrations.

Regards,

Michael Honderich

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

Safety, Risk & Operations Integrity; 800 Bell Street, Houston Texas
77002;
ph (713) 656-8559, fax (713) 656-1512

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

 APPENDIX B

BLAST WALL MANUFACTURERS AND LITERATURE

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

1. Mech Tool Engineering Ltd
Mech Tool House
Whessoe Road
Darlington
County Durham DL3 0QT
England
Tel +44 (0)1325 355141
Fax +44 (0)1325 487053
Contact Ian Shoulder
Email ian.shoulder@mechtool.co.uk

2. Booth Industries Ltd

PO Box 50
Nelson Street
Bolton BL3 2AP
England
Tel +44 (0)1204 366333
Fax +44 (0)1204 380888
Contact Stuart Moss
Email marketing@blast-systems.co.uk

3. Darchem Engineering Ltd

Stillington
Stockton on Tees
County Durham TS21 1IB
England
Tel +44 (0)1740 630461
Fax +44 (0)1740 632912

4. Vosper Thornycroft (UK) Ltd

Victoria Road
Woolston
Southampton
Hampshire SO19 9RR
Tel +44 (0)1703 445144
Fax +44 (0)1703 685913
Email 106030.2263@compuserve.com

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
 APPENDIX C

CALCULATIONS

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

Calculation Index

Section Title

1 Component blast resistance

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

Calculations

Section 1 - Component blast resistance

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001
 APPENDIX D

PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

The attached information has been supplied by Textron

(the manufacturers of Chartek).

CH134 R003 Rev 0 July 2001