KAGERO TOPCOLORS Battle of Britain par: -n June 1940, after the fall of France, ground opera ions in Europe came to halt. Henceforth, only the battles taking place in the sky and at sea would provide evidence that a war was still belng fought. For the frst time in modern history. naval and air forces alone would Whilst the opposing warships clashed only occasionally, the air war began to dominate events due to ite intensity Following the defeat of the Allies on the continent, two armies faced each other ~ the battered remnant of the British Expeditionary Foree and the hitherto invin- ible German war machine. The {wo were separated by the English Channel, a strip of open water approx! niately a dozen kilometres in width at its narrowest point, Realizing that they stood little chance at sea Against the mighty Royal Navy, the Germans knew that the key to dfeating Great Britain lay in achieving alr superiority. There was no doubt on elther side of the Channel that vietory in the fortheoming battle would {0 to whichever side controlled the airspace over the Contested area. ‘The Battle of Britain proved to be a turning point in the war for Europe, It was the Luftwaffe’ first major failure, fand a portent of things to come. Although not entirely Gofeated, it suffered an unacceptably high rate of atte ton, and the morale of its personnel suffered wccord: ingly. No fewer than 2,500 German airmen were hulled Wa, Le eee or eaptured in the battles over the Channel. They consti besttrained cadres. Such crippling losses were never nade ood, despite the Germans implementing. mas Omtcially, the Battle of Britain, as It came to be known, lasted from 10th July to B1st October 1940. Obviously clashes took place both before and after that timeframe, albeit on a reduced scale. Most sources agree on four iin phases of the battle “phase T (known to the Germans as the Kanalkampf) started on 10th July 1940 with the frst major Luftwaffe fir raids against coastal shipping: "Phase Il, commencing on 12th August, saw the Luft: waffe focus on airfields and industrial targets: “phase III heralded the bombing of civilian targets, in cluding: London; "Phase IV, dated from 7th to 2st October, witnessed th Lisfwaffe daylight offensive fizele out in favour of night bombings. On 17th October 1940 Hitler decided to postpone th invasion of Grest Britain indefinitely. However, German operations across the Channel continued. Having been curtailed by unfavourable weather conditions dur- ing the winter of 1940/41, the air war over the Channel front flared up again in May 1941. During that month the Luftwaffe launched its last massive alr raid against London, despatching some 700 aircraft. Shortly after- eewards the Germans shifted thelr attention {othe east by starting: the war with the So- vet Uni By July 1940 the Luftwaffe had amassed ‘some 2,700 frontline aircraft for the tmnt! nent alr battle with Great Britain. Sources wary as to the actual composition of this for- Ildable foree. Len Deighton mentions 1,260 bombers, 316 Ju 87 dive-bombers, 893 BI 109 singlo-engined fighters and 260 Bf 110 twin- engined fighters. The Germans were sup- ported by a somewhat token contingent sent by the Malian Regia Aeronautica, amounting 10 180 airorant Relchsmarschall Herman Géring slated three of his five Air Fleets (Luftlotten) for the task Goneralfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring’s 2nd Luttlotte was to bear the brunt of the fight ‘ng, being assigned to cover the London area ‘and counties along England's southern coast. Generalfeldmarschall Hog Sperrie's Sed Lat Aotte was to operate over the southwestern ‘const, mainly against the port areas of Brie tol, Plymouth and Southampton. Further more, Generaloberst Hane-JGngen Stumps 5th Luftflotte was to add its weight to the onslaught by launching attacks from Nor way and Denmark against the eastern coasts of England and Scotland, All the participating ‘unite had been resupplied after the campaign fgainst France; most were rearmed with the latest equipment, and their personnel rosters were up to their authorized strength. The Tighter unite (agdgeschwadern) were to rely fon their combat-tested Messerschmitt Bf 108 Es and Messerschmitt BE 110 Cs. The bomber units (Kampfgeschwadern) had a wider va. ety of types on strength: Dornier Do 175 (anainly of the Z variant), Junkers Ju 888 and Heinkel He 111s. The dive-bomber units were ‘equipped with Junkers Ju 87s. The notor fous Stukas were to suffer devastating losses in the forthcoming battle, a fact that would ‘effectively end the legendary status they had faoquired during the early phase of the war ‘The Luftwaffe sporadically deployed other types of aireraft throughout the battle, but thelr importance was marginal During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwatto experimented with new paint schemes, main- ly for fighter aircraft. The RLM (Reichsluft fartministerium), the Releh Alr Ministry, an- icipated that it would be necessary to adapt German aircraft camouflage schemes to sult the new theatre of operations. The earlier sohieme, devised in March 1996, featured RLM 70 Schwaragrin and RLM 71 Dunkelgriin fn the upper surfuces, with RLM 68 Hella fon the undersides, separated by a low colour emareation line. On factory-fresh machines Gelivered to operational units RLM 70 was to be replaced by RLM 02 Grau, whilst the division line between the colours was moved up towards the spine, leaving the fuselage sides in RLM 65. During the interim period however, RLM. 02 was in some oases used to replace RLM 71 (as can be seen on ar chive photographs). Furthermore, as might bbe expected under wartime conditions, older aircraft sometimes had their RLM 70/71/69 camouflage scheme “upgraded” at unit level by the simple expedient of raising the colour division line on the fuselage, TOgCOLORS