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William Rowlandson
50
Borges, Swedenborg
ISBN 978-3-0343-0811-3
ISBN 978-3-0343-0811-3
Volume 50
Edited by
Claudio Canaparo
PETER LANG
Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Wien
William Rowlandson
Borges, Swedenborg
and Mysticism
PETER LANG
Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Wien
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche National-
bibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet
at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Rowlandson, William.
Borges, Swedenborg and mysticism / William Rowlandson.
pages cm. -- (Hispanic Studies: Culture and Ideas ; 50)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-3-0343-0811-3 (alk. paper)
1. Borges, Jorge Luis, 1899-1986--Criticism and interpretation. 2. Swedenborg,
Emanuel, 1688-1772--Influence. 3. Mysticism in literature. I. Title.
PQ7797.B635Z91635 2013
868’.6209--dc23
2012048394
ISSN 1661-4720
ISBN 978-3-0343-0811-3 (print)
ISBN 978-3-0353-0438-1 (eBook)
Printed in Germany
It seemed only proper that a blind man might be able
to be my guide to the world of darkness
— michael harner, The Way of the Shaman
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
Chapter One
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 47
Chapter Two
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 79
Chapter Three
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 125
Chapter Four
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 165
Chapter Five
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 193
Bibliography 243
Index 253
Acknowledgments
Thanks above all to the wonderful and beautiful Eva, Lucía and Blanca, to
whom this book is dedicated.
Introduction
Every time I read something, that something is changed. And every time
I write something, that something is being changed all the time by every
reader. Every new experience enriches the book. […] People read my
stories and read many things into them that I have not intended, which
means that I am a writer of stories. A writer who wrote only the things
he intended would be a very poor writer. A writer should write with a
certain innocence. He shouldn’t think about what he is doing. If not,
what he does is not all his own poetry.
— Borges, Borges at Eighty
I’m sorry to say that people have written fifty or sixty books about me. I
haven’t read a single one of them, since I know too much of the subject,
and I’m sick and tired of it.
— Borges, Borges at Eighty
They tell me there are some 300 books that have been written about me.
But I think the writers should choose a better subject.
— Borges: interview with William F. Buckley
Emanuel Swedenborg writes in the Preface of Heaven and Hell (1758):
‘it has been granted me to be with angels and to talk with them person
to person. I have also been enabled to see what is in heaven and in hell, a
process that has been going on for thirteen years’ (§1).1 He writes later in
1 All citations of Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell are from the translation of George F.
Dole for the Swedenborg Foundation’s New Century Edition, 2000. As is customary
2 Introduction
the work: ‘I have been allowed to talk with some people who lived more
than two thousand years ago, people whose lives are described in history
books and are therefore familiar’ (§480). He repeatedly claims that ‘I can
bear witness from all my experiences of what happens in heaven and in
hell’ (§482), and begins many paragraphs with statements such as ‘Angels
have told me that …’ (§184, §222, §302, §310, §480). Swedenborg, it would
appear, was fully aware that his accounts would constitute a challenge to his
readership, and, indeed, he famously writes in Arcana Cœlestia: ‘I am well
aware that many will say that no one can possibly speak with spirits and
angels so long as he lives in the body; and many will say that it is all fancy,
others that I relate such things in order to gain credence, and others will
make other objections. But by all this I am not deterred, for I have seen, I
have heard, I have felt’ (§68). How is the reader to judge this? What herme-
neutic tools does the reader employ in order to judge the literary aesthetic
of Swedenborg’s texts against works of fantasy or voyages of discovery?
Borges admired Swedenborg and wrote extensively about him; indeed
the strong presence of Swedenborg in Borges’ work constitutes a curious
absence in the scholarship. Following the lead of Ralph Waldo Emerson,
Borges delivered lectures on Swedenborg which he later transcribed and
published and in which he called Swedenborg ‘un místico mucho más
complejo que los otros’ (2005: 202) [‘a mystic far more complex than the
others’] (my translation). In the lecture and in other writings Borges paid
close attention to the otherworld journeys of Swedenborg, to his commu-
nication with angels and demons and with the discarnate souls of the dead.
Whilst uncomfortable with the theological dimension of Swedenborg’s
writings, arguing that his originality and innovation demonstrated a strong
degree of heterodoxy, Borges greatly admired the ethical aspect of his works.
Furthermore, Borges repeatedly defended Swedenborg against charges
of insanity, arguing that the man was remarkably lucid, that his accounts
were the product of a profoundly intellectual mind, and that his voyages
constituted journeys of discovery akin to Swedenborg’s Viking ancestors.
with the Swedenborg scholarship, I will use throughout paragraph marks: §, rather
than page references.
Introduction 3
to discuss their personal reactions to the texts and the manner in which the
course had af fected them. Some discussed curious dreams of labyrinthine
landscapes; others described sleepless nights or late-night discussions with
friends puzzling over the metaphysical riddles crafted by Borges. I myself
recalled reading The Book of Sand at the age of seventeen, and how I had
struggled to conceptualize and accommodate such alluring horrors as the
infinite book, the monstrous Preetorius, and the meeting of the young and
old Borges on a bench by a river. To this day I still feel the same vertiginous
thrill at contemplating the one-sided disc. What could possibly be on the
other side? Clearly there is something transformative in the process of close
reading of Borges’ works and spirited group discussion.
A word that had surfaced at repeated moments throughout the course,
especially when we dwelt on the tales ‘El Aleph’ and ‘La escritura del dios’
[‘The God’s Script’] was ‘mysticism’. Nothing, it was soon revealed, is
straightforward about this troublesome term, firstly because the defini-
tions of the word are strikingly variant and contradictory, and secondly
because the terms ‘mysticism’, ‘mystical’ and ‘mystic’ raise some profound
epistemological questions about the nature of reality. Furthermore, in rela-
tion to the act of interpretation of, for example, the ecstatic episode of ‘El
Aleph’, questions emerged in class discussion about how to reconcile the
text with the author and with the reader. Is a ‘mystical’ text necessarily the
product of a ‘mystic’? Is ‘El Aleph’ a mystical text? What is a mystical text?
Was Borges a mystic? What is a mystic? Can a text itself be mystical, or is it
merely the description of a mystical state? Can there be a mystical reading
of a non-mystical text, and vice-versa? If, for example, a reader experiences
something profoundly ‘mystical’ in reading ‘El Aleph’, what would be the
implications of finding out that the text were a parody of mystical texts?
Is ‘El Aleph’ a parody of mystical texts?
Borges was profoundly interested in the ill-defined and shape-shifting
traditions of mysticism, writing numerous essays and poems about mys-
tical writers in the Christian traditions: Scotus Erigena, Dante, Meister
Eckhart, Jakob Böhme (also written Boehme and Behmen), Angelus
Silesius, Emanuel Swedenborg, William Blake, Novalis, and Emerson;
exploring Sufi mystical poetry, Buddhist and Zen doctrines of spiritual
philosophy, the Kabbalah, and various traditions of Neoplatonism and
Introduction 5
Swedenborg’s visions of the angelic realms.2 Are all these texts fantasy,
or does Borges develop separate textual hermeneutics for fiction, science
fiction, mystical, metaphysical and theological texts? In brief, as I explore
in Chapter One, does Borges appraise Swedenborg’s angels in the same
ontological light as the genies of the Thousand and One Nights, or do his
repeated claims of Swedenborg’s ‘authenticity’ suggest a dif ferent and curi-
ous distinction between fantasy and mystical vision?
Thirdly, and importantly, it would appear that Borges scholarship, tied
as it is to the Academy, treats the shape-shifting and ill-defined landscape of
mysticism and mystical texts with reservation. This, as Kripal (2001) argues,
relates to a general mistrust of the numinous within a scholarly methodol-
ogy that seeks robust conclusions to robust hypotheses. Mysticism, and the
many cognate aspects of anomalous human experience generally appraised
under the titles of parapsychology, paraphenomena or the occult, appear to
defy such a methodology. This aspect is explored in detail in Chapter Two.
Borges is, of course, ideal fodder for academic discourse. The complex
literary structures of the great Ficciones, the meta-textual game-playing, the
web of literary and philosophical inf luences upon his work, his inf luence
upon other writers, the rigorous and meticulous scepticism, the interplay
of philosophies, theologies and metaphysics, the dazzling intellect – all
such attributes of his work provide limitless scope for further levels of
interpretation for research papers and rich material for teaching. There
is something academically reliable in Borges, as a judicious choice of his
fictions can illustrate with suf ficient complexity aspects of literary theory,
literary movements, the style of the short story, the interplay of literature
and philosophy, and so on. His works are studied to illustrate characteristics
of modernism and postmodernism, magical realism (however obliquely),
Argentine and Latin American literature, and even postcolonialism (see
Warnes 2009). However, I feel that something is often lost in the habitual
employment of Borges to illustrate such academic concepts, and it was in
response to this that I developed a course dedicated exclusively to the works
2 See Brescia (2008) for an evaluation of how Borges (and Bioy Casares) blurred genre
distinctions in their anthologies of the fantastic.
Introduction 7
of Borges in which close reading of the texts and responsive discussion are
encouraged over a teaching of literary schools and movements, genre buzz
words or single attributes of Theory. What, though, is lost?
Borges regularly urged the students at his lectures, whether in Argentina
or the US, to seek the transformative dimension of literature, to seek ‘el
encanto’ that a text can bring: ‘El encanto es, como dijo Stevenson, una
de las cualidades esenciales que debe tener el escritor. Sin el encanto, lo
demás es inútil’ (1989: 209)’ [‘Enchantment, as Stevenson said, is one of
the special qualities a writer must have. Without enchantment, the rest is
useless’] (1984: 9). He likewise discusses the importance of the love of lit-
erature: ‘I think that compulsory reading is wrong. You might as well talk
of compulsory love or compulsory happiness. One should be reading for the
pleasure of the book. I was a teacher of English literature for some twenty
years and I always said to my students: if a book bores you, lay it aside. It
hasn’t been written for you’ (Barnstone 1982: 113).3 As I have discovered
through conversations with occasional disheartened readers of Borges,
an over-examination of his most famous tales – such as ‘Pierre Menard,
autor del Quijote’, ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’, ‘La muerte y la brújula’, ‘La
biblioteca de Babel’ or ‘El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan’ – can lead to
a reception of Borges as cold, scholastic, passionless and claustrophobic,
whose texts are mere springboards for further academic displays of erudi-
tion. This is a fair reading, especially amongst pressured undergraduates
in full lecture theatres; but it is not the only reading, and it saddens me to
consider readers who consequently assume that the text ‘hasn’t been writ-
ten for them’ and who feel dissuaded from exploring further. Reading need
not be a purely intellectual exercise. To argue, however, that there is a more
numinous aspect to Borges is problematic, owing to the radical scepticism
and spiritual agnosticism that characterize his extensive works.
3 ‘I said to my students […] I can’t teach you English literature because I don’t know
it. But I can teach you the love of English literature. […] They all fell in love with
some book or another, and that’s the gist, that’s the important thing, yes?’ (Burgin
1998: 209).
8 Introduction
The relationship between Borges and philosophy has been extensively ana-
lysed; and the heart of many of these studies is described by Bosteels (2006:
23) as the perennial question from the audience member in the front seat
who, ‘with the triumphant smile of an ironist, remark[s] that the Argentine
should not be taken so seriously since, after all, he is not a philosopher but
a literary writer, that is, someone who merely toys with philosophical ideas
for the sake of entertainment and aesthetic pleasure, without implying
any systematic philosophy of his own.’ To put it more simply: was Borges
a philosopher? This question has been approached from the perspective
that yes, he was a philosopher, if taking the etymological roots of the term
as a lover of wisdom; that no, he was instead an ‘antiphilosopher’, in that
his scepticism of philosophical discourses was itself systematic.4 Other
responses to the contrary have been of fered, encapsulated in Victor Lange’s
preface to the original English translation of El Hacedor [Dreamtigers]:
The ancestors of this philosophy of detachment and self-doubt seem present at every
moment of Borges’ ref lections: the voice of Pascal or Berkeley, of Hume and Kant
join to liberate the spirit of man from the confining reality of this world; Heraclitus,
Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche testify to the eternal recurrence in which the
single act becomes myth and symbol. Yet there is in Borges’ writings no coherent
attempt at elaborating his own or others’ philosophical positions; indeed, his dis-
taste for any supposition of meaning leads him to insist that all systems of thought,
all philosophical or theological speculations are merely evidence of that desperate
compulsion to ref lect upon our own delusions; as such they are instances of fan-
tastic literature. And it is the agony of philosophical perplexity, those moments at
which ‘the scruples and wonders of thought’ appear at their most illusory, that are
the matter of Borges’ art. (Lange, in Borges 1970: xiii)
From his repeated and emphatic statements, we can suggest that Borges
employed a degree of Kantian logic and Schopenhaurian scepticism in
order to expose the frailty of philosophical, theological and metaphysical
systems and doctrines. This does not derive from a position of intellectual
arrogance, but more from a Jamesian location in which such belief systems
are shown to be true only insofar as they relate to provisory human af fairs.
Thus the ‘antiphilosophical’ stance of Borges, which is indeed systematic,
is gloriously inclusive, not selective, and celebrates the intellectual and
aesthetical splendour of his treasured artists, philosophers and metaphysi-
cians. It is an agnostic position in its fullest sense.
12 Introduction
‘Being an agnostic’ Borges argued, ‘means all things are possible, even
God, even the Holy Trinity. This world is so strange that anything may
happen, or may not happen. Being an agnostic makes me live in a larger, a
more fantastic kind of world, almost uncanny. It makes me more tolerant’
(Shenker 1971).5 Agnosticism here should be appreciated in its etymologi-
cal sense – not a position of disinterest in matters religious or spiritual, as
it is habitually understood to signify, nor as simply not belonging to any
particular faith group – but, as Borges describes, an acceptance that ulti-
mate knowledge of the mysteries of existence is not forthcoming. There
are two immediately recognisable characteristics within Borges’ fiction,
poetry, essays and interviews that demonstrate this agnostic position. Firstly,
numerous texts conclude with a bathetic absence of revelation. For example,
the narrator of the tale ‘Pedro Salvadores’ of Elogio de la sombra concludes
with ‘Como todas las cosas, el destino de Pedro Salvadores nos parece un
símbolo de algo que estamos a punto de comprender’ (1974: 995) [‘As
with so many things, the fate of Pedro Salvadores strikes us as a symbol of
something we are about to understand, but never quite do’] (1975a: 65).
Most well-known, perhaps, is the conclusion of ‘La Muralla y los Libros’
[‘The Wall & the Books’] (1950):
La música, los estados de felicidad, la mitología, las caras trabajadas por el tiempo,
ciertos crepúsculos y ciertos lugares, quieren decirnos algo, o algo dijeron que no
hubiéramos debido perder, o están por decir algo; esta inminencia de una revelación,
que no se produce, es, quizá, el hecho estético. (1974: 635)
[Music, states of happiness, mythology, faces molded by time, certain twilights and
certain places – all these are trying to tell us something, or have told us something
we should not have missed, or are about to tell us something; that imminence of a
revelation that is not yet produced is, perhaps, the aesthetic reality.] (1964: 4)
5 Ever mercurial, Borges also recognized that ‘agnostic’ and ‘gnostic’ are vague and
mutable words. He humorously def lects the sombre tone of Barnstone’s question:
‘“Returning to the question of a personal god, are you a gnostic?” “I am an agnostic.”
“No, a gnostic.” “Ah yes, I may be. Why not be Gnostics today and agnostics tomor-
row? It’s all the same thing”’ (Barnstone 1982: 103).
Introduction 13
I think of them [mazes and labyrinths] as essential tokens, as essential symbols. I
have not chosen them. They were given me. I stick to them because I find that they
are the right symbols for my state of mind. I am always being baf f led, perplexed, so
a maze is the right symbol. They are not, at least to me, literary devices or tricks. I
don’t think of them as tricks. They are part of my destiny, of my way of feeling, of
living. I haven’t chosen them. (Barnstone 1982: 37)
If life’s meaning were explained to us, we probably wouldn’t understand it. To think
that a man can find it is absurd. We can live without understanding what the world
is or who we are. The important things are the ethical instinct and the intellectual
instinct, are they not? The intellectual instinct is the one that makes us search while
knowing that we are never going to find the answer. (Burgin 1998: 241)
nature. In this Gulliver-esque tale the future is full of old, tired, people,
free of earthly trappings but having found no illumination concerning the
riddle of existence. The Borges-like narrator and his Borges-like host have
abandoned themselves to despondent cynicism, dulled by governments and
politics, dulled by nations and peoples, dulled by language and history;
indeed the old man sees it as hubris to attempt to gather meaning from
existence. Once having lived out their allotted one hundred years, the old
folk end their days by voluntarily entering the gas chamber designed by
the ‘filántropo’ Hitler. Knowing Borges’ reaction to Hitler and the Third
Reich, the irony in this is severe. In the epilogue to the volume, Borges says
of this tale: ‘[…] es, a mi juicio, la pieza más honesta y melancólica de la
serie’ (1989: 72) ‘[[it] is in my judgement the most honest and melancholy
piece in the collection’] (1979: 93).
The opposite polarity is presented in ‘Undr’, a tale brimming with
movement, energy and desire, with the narrator visiting strange lands with
strange kings and strange languages, searching throughout for the Word –
a single word that combines all the mystery of the poetic craft and as such
all the wonder of existence. At end of tale the narrator recounts his travels
to Thorkelsson, an old poet, who responds:
‘A mí también la vida me dio todo. A todos la vida les da todo, pero los más lo
ignoran. Mi voz está cansada y mis dedos débiles, pero escúchame.’ Dijo la palabra
Undr, que quiere decir maravilla. Me sentí arrebatado por el canto del hombre que
moría, pero en su canto y en su acorde vi mis; propios trabajos, la esclava que me dio
el primer amor, los hombres que maté, las albas de frío, la aurora sobre el agua, los
remos. Tomé el arpa y canté con una palabra distinta. ‘Está bien’, dijo el otro y tuve
que acercarme para oírlo. ‘Me has entendido.’ (1989: 51)
[‘Life gave me everything as well. Life gives everything to everyone, but most men
are unaware of it. My voice is tired and my fingers weak, but listen to me.’ He took
up his harp and uttered the word ‘undr’, which means ‘wonder’. The dying man’s song
held me rapt, but in it and in his chords I recognized my own verses, the slave woman
who gave me my first love, the men I had killed, the chill of dawn, daybreak over the
water, the oars. I took up the harp and sang to a dif ferent word. ‘All right,’ the other
man said, and I had to draw close to hear him. ‘You have understood.’] (1979: 63)
Introduction 17
Both tales construct their narrative upon a foundation of ignorance of the
divine, yet they portray radically contrasting perspectives of this agnostic
position. The narrator and the aged euthanist of ‘Utopía …’ have followed
the trail that Borges beat in ‘La nadería de la personalidad’ of exposing the
substancelessness of the fabric of reality. Politics, nations, language and even
the human race have been hollowed out and jettisoned as mere ephemera
of endless and useless cycles and repetitions; and suicide is the inevitable
cessation of this meaningless existence. The narrator of ‘Undr’, on the other
hand, has no firmer teleological understanding, but is empowered to kiss
the joy as it f lies and sing to this glorious meaninglessness. In scrutinising
the many interviews that Borges performed throughout the 1960s, 1970s
and early 1980s, it is strikingly clear how both visions are present in his
philosophical outlook: his exclamations of delighted baf f lement and rapt
wonder come in equal measure to his anticipation of ‘being blotted out,
[of being] sick and tired of myself, [and] greedy for death’ (Barnstone
1982: 17). Whilst on the one hand this is a polarity of despair and joy, it is
a dialectic that can be perceived at many further levels: reason and intui-
tion, intellect and emotion, empiricism and esotericism, the revealed and
the occult, fact and fiction, reality and fantasy.
These are dif ficult polarities to reconcile. Borges, for example, main-
tained the same degree of critical distance vis-à-vis mysticism as he main-
tained with philosophy: ‘Many people have thought of me as a thinker, as
a philosopher, or even as a mystic. […] People think that I’ve committed
myself to idealism, to solipsism, or to doctrines of the cabala, because I’ve
used them in my tales. But really I was only trying to see what could be
done with them’ (Burgin 1998: 79). Whilst we should be cautious of leap-
ing to call Borges a mystic, for the reasons that are explored in Chapter
Two, nevertheless we need to appraise the deeper ramifications of this
insistence that his interests in all systems of thought were purely aesthetic.
My reading of Borges over the last five years has accompanied a close read-
ing with weekly group discussions of the works of Jung. It has become an
increasingly motivating enterprise to perceive the close af finities between
Jung and Borges, not at the level of personal connections (although Borges
did read Jung and commented on his works, and there are intermediary
contacts between them, such as Victoria Ocampo and Gershom Scholem),
18 Introduction
but at the level of their shared interests.6 Of most concern for us here is the
tension of opposites that is central to both their works.
Jung underwent a period of psychic crisis in his thirties, yet kept secret the
harrowing accounts of his experience with the unconscious entities and the
discarnate dead, documenting them in great majesty in the Liber Novus
which he never published (it was published in 2009 as The Red Book). He
was aware that his experiences constituted a radical discord with the onto-
logical certainties held by himself and the wider public, and he was fully
cognizant of the ridicule that he would face amongst friends and peers if he
claimed that he conversed with Old Testament prophets and the dead. Even
as late as 1958, his essay on UFOs concentrates almost entirely in evaluating
the ‘psychic cause’ and ‘psychic ef fect’ of the phenomenon, and not the
phenomenon itself. Jung was emphatic in the critical distance maintained
6 There is much to link Borges and Jung at three levels: firstly, as I discuss in Chapter
Five, Borges’ engagement with Jung’s psychological works. Secondly, Jung’s and
Borges’ debt to William James; their reading of mystics, especially Swedenborg,
Dante, Jakob Böhme, Angelus Silesius, Meister Eckhardt, Blake; their admiration
of Schopenhauer and Kant; their reading of Gnosticism, hermeticism and alchemy,
especially Paracelsus; their interpretation of the Book of Job; their critical reading of
Joyce; their critique through a mythological prism of the Third Reich; their inter-
est in the epistemological value of fantasy, imagination, myth, symbols and dreams.
Thirdly, biographical parallels: their association with Gershom Scholem; their con-
nection with Victoria Ocampo (she met Jung and sponsored Ramón Gómez de la
Serna to translate Psychological Types [Tipos psicológicos: Buenos Aires 1945], the first
Spanish translation). One might object to a comparative appraisal of Borges and Jung
based on the idea that Jung was a psychologist and Borges an artist. I would argue,
however, that Jung was manifestly an artist (viz The Red Book) and that Borges was
fascinated by the complexities of the psyche. In this and other respects their projects
have far more in common than has hitherto been acknowledged.
Introduction 19
7 A number of commentators, not least Jung himself, have observed his vociferous
appeal to the reader not to consider him anything other than a rational scientific
empiricist. Note a later footnote to the text on UFOs: ‘Here I must beg the reader
to eschew the popular misconception that this background is “metaphysical”. This
view is a piece of gross carelessness of which even professional people are guilty. It is
far more of a question of instincts which inf luence not only our outward behaviour
but also the psychic structure. The psyche is not an arbitrary fantasy; it is a biological
fact subject to the laws of life’ (1958: 346). It is important to note that this footnote
pertains to a paragraph in which he declares: ‘Since the discovery of the empirical
unconscious the psyche and what goes on in it have become a natural fact and are
no longer an arbitrary opinion’ (346). Some may suggest that in equating the uncon-
scious to a natural law of physics, he is demonstrating a level of dogmatic faith in
his discovery such as he observed in Freud’s defence of ‘pleasure and its frustration’
(348) being the sole roots of psychic illness.
20 Introduction
Now that we have the record of Jung’s struggles to integrate the polarities of scientist-
philosopher versus mystic within his soul we can also see how they urged upon him
another mantle that he was very reluctant to wear – because so many have been
ridiculed and persecuted for wearing it – that of shaman-prophet. […] The evidence
of the Red Book and of those who knew him intimately us that Jung was very much
Introduction 21
a shaman. […] Perhaps Shamdasani shies away from calling Jung a ‘shaman’ because
‘shamanism’ is not politically correct in academic or conservative professional circles
in Britain. (2011: 4–5).
8 ‘That Borges’ work demonstrates certain Gnostic leanings and concepts is well-
documented, but it is generally ignored in deconstructive criticism’s haste to erase
the logos in the name of its own brand of indeterminacy and deferral. It is much fairer
to view Borges’ Gnosticism, particularly his af finity for the “malevolent demiurge”
who creates an imperfect universe, as his own attempt to work through the concerns
22 Introduction
of theodicy, and his sense of the inadequacy of orthodox religions’ ef forts to do so’
(Soud 1995: 748).
9 ‘I was translating, with María Kodama, Angelus Silesius’ Cherubinischer Wandersmann
and we came to the same statement that if a soul is damned it is forever in hell’
(Barnstone 1982: 8).
10 ‘Yo sé que en la Biblioteca Nacional hay un ejemplar de Del cielo, del infierno y sus
maravillas. Pero en algunas librerías teosóficas no se encuentran obras de Swedenborg’
(2005: 202) [‘I know that in the National Library there is an edition of Heaven and
Hell. But you will not find Swedenborg’s works in Theosophical bookshops’] (my
translation).
11 Ouspensky is a name generally associated with Gurdjief f, a particularly curious guru
figure of the early twentieth century whose inf luence was felt upon writers, painters,
film directors, philosophers and even politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. The
Borges-Gurdjief f-Ouspensky connection is obscure, and whilst I can find no refer-
ence to Gurdjief f in Borges’ writing, it would seem likely that Borges’ knowledge of
Ouspensky’s works would guarantee him at least a passing knowledge of Gurdjief f.
James Webb (1987: 492) writes that Borges attended a Gurdjief f group in Argentina
though provides no evidence. Likewise Gurdjief f scholar Sophia Wellbeloved (2003:
xxvii) attests that Borges attended meetings on Gurdjief f ’s Work in Buenos Aires,
Introduction 23
Borges read Swedenborg with great devotion, and died with the project
still unrealized of writing an entire book on Swedenborg’s voyages to the
heavens and hells. He paid close attention to Swedenborg’s otherworld
journeys, the angelic and demonic beings Swedenborg encountered there,
his communication with the discarnate dead, and his description of the
process of death, all the while adamant that Swedenborg was not a madman.
In defending Swedenborg against charges of insanity, therefore, Borges
would appear to defend the possibility that Swedenborg’s adventures were
neither fantasy, fiction nor hallucination. This splendidly tolerant attitude,
which Borges would correlate with the tolerance inherent in agnosticism,
needs to be assessed in light of Borges’ scepticism – even cynicism – regard-
ing faith. There is a sensitivity and sensibility to such matters visible in
Borges’ work that demonstrate something more than mere material for
story-telling. Borges, as I explore in this book, investigated mysticism in
particular with a series of questions and arguments that reveals a level of
deep personal investment.
This tension of polarities is likewise visible in the Libro del cielo y del
infierno, which Borges edited with Bioy Casares, which contains passages
but provides no evidence that Borges even read Gurdjief f : ‘Jorge Luis Borges is said
to have attended meetings in Argentina in the 1950s. By then Gurdjief f ’s inf luence
was widespread in South America.’ In email communication with Wellbeloved, she
explained to me that this notion derived not from Webb, but from her communica-
tion with Gurdjief f scholar Martin Wallace who had, she wrote, met Borges and had
asked him whether he knew Ouspensky’s – and by extension Gurdjief f ’s – works.
Wellbeloved explained to me: ‘Martin Wallace wrote the introduction to the second
edition of my Gurdjief f, Astrology and Beelzeub’s Tales. I asked him by email if he
thought that Borges had been inf luenced by Ouspensky, and he sent me an email
recounting meeting Borges and asking him the same question, Borges replied by
immediately reciting the entire list of cosmoses from memory, an achievement as
you can see, you can find them in In Search of the Miraculous (1949), which gives
and account of Gurdjief f ’s teaching in Russia before the revolution. Ouspensky was
obsessed with theories of time and also recurrence, this was an aspect of what he
taught that was in addition to Gurdjief f ’s teaching’ (private email correspondence).
The true extent of the inf luence or co-interests of Borges, Gurdjief f and Ouspensky
remains to be fully explored.
24 Introduction
Borges writes in ‘Avatares de la Tortuga’ [‘Avatars of the Tortoise’] of the
dream-like nature of reality, and postulates that the anomalies and vagu-
eries that are encountered might suggest our own participation in the
construction of reality:
‘El mayor hechicero (escribe memorablemente Novalis) sería el que se hechizara hasta
el punto de tomar sus propias fantasmagorías por apariciones autónomas. ¿No sería
ése nuestro caso?’ Yo conjeturo que así es. Nosotros (la indivisa divinidad que opera
en nosotros) hemos soñado el mundo. Lo hemos soñado resistente, misterioso, visible,
ubicuo en el espacio y firme en el tiempo; pero hemos consentido en su arquitectura
tenues y eternos intersticios de sinrazón para saber que es falso. (1974: 258)
[‘The greatest sorcerer (writes Novalis memorably) would be the one who bewitched
himself to the point of taking his own phantasmagorias for autonomous apparitions.
Would not this be true of us?’ I believe that it is. We (the undivided divinity that
operates within us) have dreamed the world. We have dreamed it strong, mysterious,
visible, ubiquitous in space and secure in time, but we have allowed tenuous, eternal
interstices of injustice in its structure so we may know that it is false.] (1964: 120)
found. And we were working over an anthology of Spanish verse. He had
those books of Rivadeneyra in a collection, he had a pile of them on the
table. While I was talking to him, he opened one of the books, and there
he found a poem of Cristóbal de Castillejo, Garcilaso’s enemy, glossing the
line ‘defiéndeme Dios de mí.’ I said, ‘Look here, I found it in Montaigne
this morning.’ We would have had to have examined thousands of vol-
umes in thousands of years and perhaps never found out these things.
And then we felt very proud. Of course, we wrote a short note (in the
translation), saying Sir Thomas Browne took this quotation from essay
number so and so of Montaigne where the same misprint is found and
so on. […] You see, there you had a coincidence, and the coincidence was
of no use whatever. (Burgin 1969: 110–12)13
There is much to glean from this quite remarkable episode. Firstly, and
significantly, Burgin does not respond to Borges’ lengthy account, but
changes the subject. This demonstrates the unease that such a radical posi-
tion presented by Borges can occasion in his readers and listeners. Secondly,
it is striking how like a ficción this episode is, most of all the parallels with
‘Tlön’: a furtive citation discovered by Borges and Bioy; further discover-
ies of the citation in arcane volumes; links through literary-philosophical
authors: Castillejo, Garcilaso, Montaigne; and the shadowy presence of Sir
Thomas Brown. Borges’ language is also revealing. He suggests, for exam-
ple, that ‘coincidences are given to us’, and that ‘there may be a more subtle
kind of pattern’. Such statements, whimsical as they may be, nevertheless
imply some manner of extrinsic guiding principle upon life – an external
authorship – a divine force. Again, I am not seeking the deist in Borges, but
I am revealing the Jungian perspective present in Borges of perceiving an
interrelationship between psyche and matter. He also twice mentions the
uselessness of the coincidence, emphasizing that the only use was ‘the fact
that they leave a pattern’. This, conversely, is a most valuable use as it serves
13 Importantly, Bioy Casares writes of this episode, presenting it with exactly the same
detail as Borges. He titles it ‘un recuerdo’ (2006: 1540). So close is Bioy’s rendition
of the episode to Borges’ that one wonders whether he was using Borges’ interview
extract as his basis. Bioy obviously felt the episode to be intriguing enough to war-
rant its own inclusion in his memoirs, yet he of fers no assessment of the nature of
the coincidence, nor any examination of the phrase itself.
28 Introduction
14 ‘“Defenda me Dios de me.” I am sorry when I am sick, that I have not some longing
that might give me the pleasure of satisfying it; all the rules of physic would hardly
be able to divert me from it. I do the same when I am well; I can see very little more
to be hoped or wished for. ’Twere pity a man should be so weak and languishing, as
not to have even wishing left to him’ (Montaigne 1910: 613).
15 ‘I feel that original canker corrode and devour me; and therefore Defenda me DIOS
de me, “LORD deliver me from my self,” is a part of my Letany, and the first voice of
my retired imaginations. There is no man alone, because every man is a Microcosm,
and carries the whole World about him’ (Browne 2003: 114).
Introduction 29
Like Jung, Borges achieved fame and success in his life, travelled widely
and met with many well-known figures. Jung describes at the beginning of
Memories, Dreams, Ref lections that none of these experiences was of last-
ing importance in his later reminiscences; instead it was the experience
of the unconscious – of the numinous – that characterized his life’s work.
In the end the only events in my life worth telling are those when the imperishable
world irrupted into this transitory one. That is why I speak chief ly of inner experi-
ences, amongst which I include my dreams and visions. These form the prima materia
of my scientific work. They were the fiery magma out of which the stone that had to
be worked was crystallized. All other memories of travels, people and my surround-
ings have paled beside these interior happenings. ( Jung 1989: 4–5)
Were Borges to have produced the equivalent of Jung’s memoirs (beyond
the ‘Autobiographical essay’) it is highly likely that his recollections would
likewise have concentrated on the more ‘timeless’ aspects of his life experi-
ences, and not on the more mundane. I would argue, indeed, that the many
interviews of the 1970s and 1980s themselves constitute his oral autobi-
ography, and that his dialogues with Burgin, Barnstone, Enguídanos, di
Giovanni, Barili and others inevitably encircle the deep wells of timeless
moments – poetry, dreams, literature, symbols – rather than his encounters
with political and cultural figures. Mystical experience, as we will inves-
tigate in Chapters Two and Three, was for Borges a sensation of moving
beyond the mundane passage of time into a of state of timelessness. It is at
this level, as Jung also acknowledged, that the ‘intersticios de sinrazón’ are
most prone to occur: a conversation with a dead friend, a glimpse of the
future or a moment of deep inspiration.16 Borges paid particular attention
to this deeper area of consciousness, suggesting in two particular texts that
16 ‘[Y]ou know there are these peculiar faculties of the psyche, that it isn’t entirely
confined to space and time. You can have dreams or visions of the future, you can
see around corners, and such things. Only ignorance denies these facts, you know;
it’s quite evident that they do exist, and have existed always. Now these facts show
that the psyche, in part at least, is not dependent upon these confinements. And then
what? When the psyche is not under that obligation to live in time and space alone,
and obviously it doesn’t, then to that extent the psyche is not subjected to those
30 Introduction
his truest sense of self was that area of the psyche ‘untouched by time’. He
dedicated Historia universal de la infamia to S. D., of fering her [in English]
‘that kernel of myself that I have saved, somehow – the central heart that
deals not in words, traf fics not with dreams, and is untouched by time,
by joy, by adversities’ (1974: 293). He dedicated the ‘Two English Poems’
(1934) to Beatriz Bibiloni Webster de Bullrich of fering her also ‘that kernel
of myself that I have saved, / somehow – the central heart that deals not /
in words, traf fics not with dreams, and is / untouched by time, by joy, by
adversities’ (1993: 179). This is the visionary element, the deeper, transper-
sonal part of his being, the dark layers of unconscious described by Jung.
These are the depths that I seek to explore in this book.
But wait! The reader may cry, the fact that Borges wrote fictions in which
anomalous episodes emerge does not mean either that he experienced such
matters nor that he gave them any credence. This is a valid point, and indeed
we should never forget that Borges was an artist, and therefore a merchant
of artifice. The writer of a ghost story need not believe in ghosts; a scholar
of religion need not be religious. For example, when Borges writes in Atlas
(1985): ‘veo en los sueños o converso con muertos, sin que ninguna de esas
dos cosas me asombre’ (1989: 430) [‘Asleep, in my dreams, I see or converse
with the dead. None of these things surprises me in the least’] (1985: 54);
or when he writes of a dream, also in Atlas: ‘En un restaurante del centro,
Haydée Lange y yo conversábamos. […] De pronto recordé que Haydée
Lange había muerto hace mucho tiempo. Era un fantasma y no lo sabía.
No sentí miedo; sentí que era imposible y quizá descortés revelarle que
era un fantasma, un hermoso fantasma’ (1989: 438) [‘Haydée Lange and I
laws, and that means a practical continuation of life, of a sort of psychical existence
beyond time and space’ ( Jung 1993: 437).
Introduction 31
were conversing in a restaurant in the center of town. […] All of a sudden,
I remembered that Haydée Lange had died a long time ago. She was a
ghost and didn’t know it. I felt no fear, but felt it would not be right, and
perhaps rude, to reveal to her that she was a ghost, a lovely ghost’] (1985:
67), one can only conjecture what level of personal experience provided
the background for such textual creations. We know, for example, that
Borges placed great noetic value on dreams and nightmares. What level
of communication, consequently, occurred between Borges and the dead
Haydée Lange? I argue in Chapter Two, with reference to Jef frey Kripal’s
(2001) evaluation of the key scholars of mysticism, that a level is clearly
reached at which thorough exploration of a phenomenon like mysticism
cannot be sustained by sceptical, objective, impartiality if it is to succeed
with any integrity. A threshold of scepticism is always crossed if the scholar
of mysticism is able to contribute anything of any value to the scholarship.
This, I argue, is the case with Borges.
And yet, in true mercurial fashion, Borges danced back and forth across
this threshold; in his earlier writings demonstrating a more rigorous, intel-
lectual scepticism, in his later works displaying a more world-weary, whim-
sical acquiescence to the persistence of mystery. Nevertheless, like Jung, he
brandished his keen intellect and encyclopaedic knowledge of texts as the
means of preventing credulity or adherence to doctrine. There is not the
sense, such as Lachman identifies in Jung, that Borges was determined not
to be ‘draped in the unwanted robes of mysticism’ (2010: 4); rather I would
argue that his inveterate iconoclasm, mistrust of doctrine, and admiration
of heresy made him defensive of being taken for credulous. Note that in
the essay on nightmares in Siete Noches, Borges criticizes British anthro-
pologist, folklorist, and classical scholar, Sir James Frazer for being ‘muy
crédulo, ya que parece aceptar todo cuanto le cuentan los viajeros’ (1989:
222) [‘extremely credulous, as it seems he believed everything reported by
the various travellers’] (1984: 28). Borges, it would appear, would be more
wary of being labelled credulous than a mystic. As his numerous interviews
and essays testify, Borges appeared to equate belief – whether religious,
philosophical or even political – with a surrender of one’s intellect and
faculty of critical enquiry. One senses in Borges that believers are some-
how gullible. When evaluating a peculiar coincidence of dreams associated
32 Introduction
with Coleridge’s poem Kubla Khan, for example, Borges displays a similar
defensive position observable in Jung: ‘Quienes de antemano rechazan lo
sobrenatural (yo trato, siempre, de pertenecer, a ese gremio) juzgarán que la
historia de los dos sueños es una coincidencia, un dibujo trazado por el azar,
como las formas de leones o de caballos que a veces configuran las nubes’
(1974: 644) [‘Those who automatically reject the supernatural (I try, always,
to belong to this group) will claim that the story of the two dreams is merely
a coincidence, a chance delineation, like the outlines of lions or horses we
sometimes see in the clouds’] (1964: 16). This may sound a straightforward
comment, in which Borges maintains that the narrative similarities across
time are merely coincidental and inconsequential. Yet like Lönnrot rejecting
Treviranus’s suggestion that the murder of Yarmolinsky was a blunder, and
choosing instead to seek the symbolic, Borges rejects his declared position
to explore the more poetic, mysterious dimension of this parallel.
Otros argüirán que el poeta supo de algún modo que el emperador había soñado el
palacio y dijo haber soñado el poema para crear una espléndida ficción que asimismo
paliara o justificara lo truncado y rapsódico de los versos. Esta conjetura es verosímil,
pero nos obliga a postular, arbitrariamente, un texto no identificado por los sinólogos
en el que Coleridge pudo leer, antes de 1816, el sueño de Kubla. Más encantadoras
son las hipótesis que transcienden lo racional. Por ejemplo, cabe suponer que el alma
del emperador, destruido el palacio, penetró en el alma de Coleridge, para que éste lo
reconstruyera en palabras, más duraderas que los mármoles y los metales. (1974: 644)
[Others will argue that the poet somehow found out that the Emperor had dreamed
the palace, and then said he had dreamed the poem in order to create a splendid fic-
tion that would also palliate or justify the truncated and rhapsodic quality of the
verses. That conjecture seems reasonable, but it obliges us to postulate, arbitrarily, a
text not identified by Sinologists in which Coleridge was able to read, before 1816,
and about Kubla’s dream. Hypotheses that transcend reason are more appealing. One
such theory is that the Emperor’s soul penetrated Coleridge’s, enabling Coleridge to
rebuild the destroyed palace in words that would be more lasting than marble and
metal.] (1964: 16, emphasis mine)
The implications of Borges’ comments are striking. He would reject a priori
the supernatural, and yet the explanation of the repeated vision of Kubla
Khan he most favours is one of the transmigration of souls. This appears
contradictory, not least when we correlate this assertion with Borges’ other
Introduction 33
17 Borges returns to this theme in a later interview: ‘William Blake says: “Time is the gift
of eternity.” Let’s try to expand on those truly wise words: if all Being were revealed
to us – the Being rather than the world – at a single instant, undoubtedly we would
be annihilated, killed. Thus, as Blake says, “time is the gift of eternity”; that is to say,
eternity allows us all those experiences in succession. Thus, we have days and nights,
hours and years. We have memory, we have our present perceptions, and then we
have the future whose shape we are ignorant of, but which we foresee or fear. All,
absolutely all, is given to us sequentially, and wisely so, I should add, for if it were
given to us all of a sudden, it would be impossible for human beings to endure such
a terrible vision – the unbearable burden of the whole Being of the universe. […]
The totality of Being is unattainable to us. All is given us, but, thankfully, gradually’
(Alifano 1984: 63–4).
34 Introduction
Ya que hemos visto estas diversas etimologías, tenemos en francés la palabra cauche-
mar, vinculada, sin duda, con la nightmare del inglés. En todas ellas hay una idea
(voy a volver sobre ellas) de origen demoníaco, la idea de un demonio que causa la
pesadilla. Creo que no se trata simplemente de una superstición: creo que puede
haber – y estoy hablando con toda ingenuidad y toda sinceridad – , algo verdadero
en este concepto. (1989: 225)
[We also have the French word, cauchemar, which is probably linked to nightmare.
In all of these words there is an idea of demonic origin, the idea of a demon who
causes the nightmare. I believe it does not derive simply from a superstition. I believe
that there is – and I speak with complete honesty and sincerity – something true
in this idea.] (1984: 32)
18 ‘Son hombrecitos serviciales de color pardo, del cual han tomado su nombre. Suelen
visitar las granjas de Escocia y durante el sueño de la familia, colaboran en las tareas
domésticas. Uno de los cuentos de Grimm refiere un hecho análogo. El ilustre escri-
tor Robert Louis Stevenson afirmó que había adiestrado a sus Brownies en el oficio
literario. Cuando soñaba, éstos le sugerían temas fantásticos; por ejemplo, la extraña
transformación del doctor Jekyll en el diabólico señor Hyde, y aquel episodio de
Olalla en el cual un joven, de una antigua casa española, muerde la mano de su her-
mana’ (1978: 17) [‘Brownies are helpful little men of a brownish hue, which gives
them their name. It is their habit to visit Scottish farms and, while the household
sleeps, to perform domestic chores. One of the tales by the Grimms deals with the
same subject. Robert Louis Stevenson said he had trained his Brownies in the craft
of literature. Brownies visited him in his dreams and told him wondrous tales; for
instance the strange transformation of Dr Jekyll into the diabolical Mr Hyde, and
that episode of Olalla, in which the scion of an old Spanish family bites his sister’s
hand’] (1974: 32).
36 Introduction
He oscillates between disavowal of God, and desire for verification of a divine exist-
ence. On the one hand he at times intellectualizes God and seems to be dismissing his
existence on rational grounds; on the other, he continuously searches for something
bigger than himself or the intellect. […] The tension lies in the balance which Borges
struggles to strike between his enquiring intellect and a faith reality. (Flynn 2009: 4–5)
[It has been said that if time is infinite, how can an infinite thing reach the present?
We think that if time is infinite, and I believe it is, then that infinite time must
include all the presents and, among all the presents, why not this present here, in
the University of Belgrano, with you and I together? Why not that time also? If
time is infinite, at any given moment we are in the center of time.] (2000: 487–8)
With Plato, you feel that he would reason in an abstract way and would also use
myth. He would do those two things at the same time. But now we seem to have
lost that gift. I mean, you have gone from myth to abstract thinking. But Plato could
do both at the same time. […] I suppose at that time it could be done. But nowadays
those things seem to be in watertight compartments. Either we are thinking or we
are dreaming. But Plato and Socrates could do both. (Burgin 1998: 160)
38 Introduction
exploration; that is to say, to take Borges on his word and treat these sub-
jects as mere picturesque arcana and entertaining superstitions worthy
only of providing thematic for fiction. Academic analysis, I would argue,
should in no way prohibit a close, personal, transformative, engagement
with Borges’ texts, and an equally close engagement with the texts and
philosophies that he explored. Amelia Barili (2009: 47–8), who knew
Borges when she was editor of La Prensa, outlines this pedagogical ten-
sion in brave and lucid terms:
I have sensed more and more that our times demand that we integrate into our
teaching a contemplative methodology that fosters insight. We are in the midst of
a content explosion that quickly outdates any instruction based on content alone.
Further, students are increasingly anguished, and it is important that they find ways
to more deeply understand this vast amount of information, to sort out what matters
to them and to their communities, and to create new meaning from what is present to
them. […] We need a paradigm shift in education. Universities need to be sources of
creative solutions and of engaged citizens. They should be centers of transformation,
not just repositories of information. […] For deep learning to occur, there needs to
be ref lection about intra- and inter- subjectivity.
The transformative quality of the human participation in transpersonal and spiritual
phenomena has been observed by a number of modern consciousness researchers
(e.g. Grof, 1985, 1988; Harman, 1994) and scholars of mysticism (e.g. Barnard, 1994,
Staal, 1975). One needs to be willing to be personally transformed in order to access
and fully understand most spiritual phenomena. The epistemological significance
of such personal transformation cannot be emphasized enough, especially given that
the positivist denial of such a requisite is clearly one of the main obstacles for the
epistemic legitimization of transpersonal and spiritual claims in the modern West.
oft-proclaimed radical scepticism and his mistrust of faith and religious
doctrine, as a reader he himself was deeply af fected and transformed by the
mystical and religious texts that he read. Secondly, it becomes clear that
many of Borges’ texts themselves may be considered deeply transformative
texts if the reader is open to such qualities in the works. Thus, as I explore in
Chapter Two, whilst ‘El Aleph’ and ‘La escritura del dios’ may be interpreted
as parodies or even satires of mystical texts, they may also be considered
profoundly mystical texts in their own right. Such an interpretation, as I
explore, is not without its dif ficulties, yet such a quality must be addressed.
Both Barili and Ferrer would argue, furthermore, that the personal and
transpersonal experiences of the students may be given greater value than
many traditional pedagogical practices would customarily permit. In this
work I hope to pursue the avenue proposed by Barili and Ferrer in explor-
ing Borges’ relationship with mysticism as a field of investigation that was
of greater significance for Borges than mere exercises in gathering material
to craft into fiction and poetry.
readers and critics of Borges from his early publications to the present. For
example, Garayalde (1978: 27), in her exploration of the inf luence of Sufi
mysticism upon Borges’ works, addresses the aspect of Borges as guide in
the dark world beyond reason: ‘Once we have lost our faith in reason as a
means of seeking truth, Borges does not abandon us but opens up a new
range of possibilities by following the path of intuition. […] Borges is trying
in this way to familiarize us with intuition, a kind of knowledge that man
no longer takes into account and which he has completely forgotten.’ As
discussed earlier, and as Garayalde identifies, Borges demonstrates a shifting
balance of reason and intuition, scepticism and tolerance, in such matters
of poetic obscurity.
The question of Borges as guide and fellow traveller can perhaps be
best illustrated with a literary analogy. In his many writings and lectures
about Dante, Borges paid particular attention to the enigmatic figure of
Virgil as guide and close friend of the poet-narrator Dante. There are many
attributes to Virgil in the Commedia which, as Borges notes, the scholarship
over the centuries has investigated. What concerned Borges above all other
matters was the friendship between Dante and Virgil and the consequent
anguish that Dante experienced in acknowledging that Virgil, as pagan,
would be forever consigned to the nobile castello and would be unable to
achieve union with the godhead:
Dante viene a ser un hijo de Virgilio y al mismo tiempo es superior a Virgilio porque
se cree salvado. Cree que merecerá la gracia o que la ha merecido, ya que le ha sido
dada la visión. En cambio, desde el comienzo del Infierno sabe que Virgilio es un
alma perdida, un réprobo; cuando Virgilio le dice que no podrá acompañarlo más allá
del Purgatorio, siente que el latino será para siempre un habitante del terrible nobile
castello donde están las grandes sombras de los grandes muertos de la Antigüedad,
los que por ignorancia invencible no alcanzaron la palabra de Cristo. En ese mismo
momento, Dante dice: Tu, duca; tu, signore; tu, maestro … Para cubrir ese momento,
Dante lo saluda con palabras magníficas y habla del largo estudio y del gran amor
que le han hecho buscar su volumen y siempre se mantiene esa relación entre los
dos. Esa figura esencialmente triste de Virgilio, que se sabe condenado a habitar
para siempre en el nobile castello lleno de la ausencia de Dios … En cambio, a Dante
le será permitido ver a Dios, le será permitido comprender el universe. (1989: 213)
Introduction 45
[Dante comes to be the son of Virgil, yet at the same time he is superior to Virgil for
he believes he will be saved, since he has been given the vision. But he knows, from
the beginning, that Virgil is a lost soul, a reprobate. When Virgil tells him that he
cannot accompany him beyond Purgatory, he knows that the Latin poet will always
inhabit the terrible nobile castello with the great shades of Antiquity, those who never
heard the word of Christ. At that moment, Dante hails him with magnificent words:
‘Tu, duca; tu, signore; tu, maestro …’ He speaks of the great labor and of the great love
with which his work has been studied, and this relation is always maintained between
the two. But Virgil is essentially a sad figure who knows he is forever condemned to
that castle filled with the absence of God. Dante, however, will be permitted to see
God; he will be permitted to understand the universe.] (1984: 14)20
20 Dante knows that Virgil is a damned soul, and the very moment that Virgil tells
him that he will not be able to accompany him beyond purgatory, Dante feels that
Virgil will always be an inhabitant of that ‘nobile castello’ where the great shadows
of the great men of antiquity dwell, those that through unavoidable ignorance did
not accept or could not reach the word of Christ. […] Dante salutes him with the
highest epithets and speaks of the great love and the long study to which Virgil’s
writings have led him, and of their relationship which has always been constant. But
Virgil is sad since he knows that he is condemned to the ‘nobile castello,’ far from
salvation and full of God’s absence; Dante, on the other hand, will see God, he will
be allowed to, and he will also be allowed to understand the universe. (Alifano 1984:
97)
46 Introduction
Fantastic or real?
Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 1
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as an article in Variaciones Borges:
‘Borges’s reading of Dante and Swedenborg: Mysticism and the real’, 32 (October
2011), 59–85. Many thanks to the journal editors for kind permission to reproduce
the text here.
48 Chapter One
Comedia?’ (1989: 217) [‘The Comedia is a book that everyone ought to read.
Not to do so is to deprive oneself of the greatest gift that literature can give
us; it is to submit to a strange asceticism. Why should we deny ourselves
the joy of reading the Comedia?’] (1984: 20). The Divine Comedy is also
the book that he would choose to rescue from the hypothetical destruc-
tion of all books (Cortínez 1986: 87). There is much to say about Borges’
appreciation of Dante, and whilst the Borges scholarship has approached
numerous elements, one central feature prevalent in most of Borges’ writ-
ings of Dante has been curiously overlooked. This is Borges’ strident af fir-
mation that Dante was not a visionary, but that he was a visionary poet.
Borges explains: ‘No creo que Dante fuera un visionario. Una visión es
breve. Es imposible una visión tan larga como la de la Comedia. La visión
fue voluntaria: debemos abandonarnos a ella y leerla, con fe poética. Dijo
Coleridge que la fe poética es una voluntaria suspensión de la incredulidad’
(1989: 211) [‘I don’t think that Dante was a visionary. A vision is brief. A
vision as large as the Comedia is impossible. His vision was voluntary: we
may abandon ourselves to it and read it with poetic faith. Coleridge said
that poetic faith is the willing suspension of disbelief ’] (1984: 12).2
Firstly, therefore, Borges asserts that Dante’s vision was not a vision
in the mystical sense, because, rather than being spontaneous and unbid-
den (i.e. grace of the divine), it was voluntary. Secondly, Dante was not
a visionary because of the length of this vision, which, Borges maintains,
would be unsustainable. Thirdly, Dante was not a visionary because the
vision itself was inspired by poetic faith, and was therefore culturally condi-
tioned within established theological and artistic frameworks. Furthermore,
argues Borges elsewhere, Dante wrote in verse, and there is no possible way
that he could have experienced the various circles of the Divine Comedy in
such an aesthetic language.
En el caso de Dante, que también nos ofrece una descripción del Infierno, del
Purgatorio y del Paraíso, entendemos que se trata de una ficción literaria. No pode-
mos creer realmente que todo lo que relata se refiere a una vivencia personal. Además,
ahí está el verseo que lo ata: él no pudo haber experimentado el verso. (2005: 202)
[In the case of Dante, who also of fers us a description of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise,
we understand that we’re dealing with literary fiction. We cannot really believe that
all that he relates refers to personal experience. Furthermore, there is the verse which
binds it: he could not have experienced verse.] (My translation)
The whole poetic cycle is thus, for Borges, resolutely and beautifully a lit-
erary fiction, a poetic text, an artifice. At face value this assertion does not
seem too problematic, indeed it attunes perfectly to Borges’ love of fantasy
and fiction in all their guises. However, complications begin to emerge
when assessing Borges’ discussion of Swedenborg.
The most extensive appraisal of Swedenborg in Borges’ works is his
biographical essay on Swedenborg.3 This text abounds in highly revealing
passages in which Borges af firms the authentic, non-fictive, genuine experi-
ences of Swedenborg, and in which he emphasizes precisely the opposite
of what he maintains about Dante, that Swedenborg was a visionary.
En una epístola famosa dirigida a Cangrande Della Scala, Dante Alighieri advierte
qué su Comedia, como la Sagrada Escritura, puede leerse de cuatro modos distintos
y que el literal no es más que Uno de ellos […]. Pasajes como Lasciate ogni speranza,
voi ch’entrate fortalecen esa convicción topográfica, realizada por el arte. Nada más
diverso de los destinos ultraterrenos de Swedenborg. (2005: 156)
[In a famous letter to Cangrande Della Scala, Dante Alighieri points out that his
Commedia, like Sacred Scripture, can be read four dif ferent ways, of which the literal
way is only one […]. Passages such as Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’entrate (‘All hope
abandon, ye who enter here’) reinforce the topographical conviction created through
art. Nothing is farther from the ultra-terrestrial destinations of Swedenborg.] (1995: 9)
Paul Claudel ha observado que los espectáculos que nos aguardan después de la agonía
no serán verosímilmente los nueve círculos infernales, las terrazas del Purgatorio o
los cielos concéntricos. Dante, sin duda, habría estado de acuerdo con él; ideó su
4 Aside, however, from the opening couplet of the cycle: ‘Nel mezzo del cammin di
nostra vita / mi ritrovai per una selva oscura. Es decir, a los treinta y cinco años ‘me
encontré en mitad de una selva oscura’ que puede ser alegórica, pero en la cual cree-
mos físicamente’ (1989: 211) [‘That is, at thirty-five I found myself in a dark forest.
It may be allegorical, but we physically believe it’] (1984: 12).
52 Chapter One
[Paul Claudel has observed that the sights that await us after dying will not, in all
likelihood, include the nine circles of Hell, the terraces of Purgatory, or the concentric
heavens. Dante would undoubtedly have agreed; he devised his topography of death
as an artifice demanded by Scholasticism and by the form of his poem.] (2000: 268)5
5 Borges also derives this observation from Flaubert: ‘Por eso me parece justo lo que
ha dicho Flaubert diciendo que Dante al morir debe haberse asombrado al ver que el
Infierno, el Purgatorio o el Paraíso – vamos a suponer que le tocó la última región –
no correspondía a su imaginación. Yo creo que Dante no creía, al escribir el poema,
haber hecho otra cosa sino haber encontrado símbolos adecuados para expresar de
un modo sensible los estados de ánimo del pecador, del penitente y del justo’ (Borges
2002: 205–6) [‘For that reason, Flaubert’s comments seem to me apt, that Dante,
upon dying, must have been astonished to see that Hell, Purgatory and Paradise – let
us suppose that he reached this final region – did not correspond to his imagination.
I believe that Dante did not believe, when he wrote his poem, that he was doing
anything other than finding symbols to express in an understandable manner the
states of the soul of the sinner, the penitent, and the just’] (my translation).
6 The literary style of Swedenborg intrigues his readers. Henry James Sr. (father of
William and Henry) labels him ‘insipid with veracity’ (in Johnson 2003), which is
echoed in his friend Emerson’s comments that Swedenborg ‘remained entirely devoid
of the whole apparatus of poetic expression’ (Emerson 2003: 54). This is then fur-
ther iterated in William James: ‘But why should he be so prolix and so toneless – so
without emphasis?’ (in Johnson 2003) W. B. Yeats comments: ‘And all this happened
to a man without egotism, without drama, without a sense of the picturesque, and
who wrote a dry language, lacking fire and emotion’ (1920: 299). Kathleen Raine,
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 53
objective of such a studious and prosaic language, suggesting that it was the
product of an almost mimetic reproduction of his visionary experiences.
[The explanation is obvious. The use of any word whatsoever presupposes a shared
experience, for which the word is the symbol. If someone speaks to us about the f lavor
of cof fee, it is because we have already tasted it; if about the color yellow, because we
have already seen lemons, gold, wheat, and sunsets. To suggest the inef fable union of
man’s soul with the divine being, the Sufis of Islam found themselves obliged to resort
to prodigious analogies, to images of roses, intoxication, or carnal love. Swedenborg
was able to abstain from this kind of rhetorical artifice because his subject matter
was not the ecstasy of a rapt and fainting soul but, rather, the accurate description of
regions that, though ultra-terrestrial, were clearly defined. In order for us to imagine,
or to begin to imagine, the lowest depth of hell, John Milton speaks to us of ‘No
light, but rather darkness visible.’ Swedenborg prefers the rigor and – why not say
it? – possible wordiness of the explorer or geographer who is recording unknown
kingdoms.] (1995: 7)
meanwhile, calls his writing ‘stilted and voluminous’ (1995: 54). Borges is part of a
long tradition of critical reception of Swedenborg’s language.
54 Chapter One
and a treatise on the diameter of the moon’] (1995: 4).7 These accounts
of heaven and hell, Borges maintains, were subject to the same degree
of rational scrutiny that Swedenborg employed in his assessment of the
natural world, and consequently were unadulterated by religious dogma.8
Similarly, Borges emphatically defends Swedenborg against the reader’s
incredulity, stressing that any of the arguments commonly employed to
discredit Swedenborg – deceit or madness – are invalid. Swedenborg was
not attempting to proselytize, because, Borges asserts, ‘A la manera de
Emerson (Arguments convince nobody) y de Walt Whitman, creía que los
argumentos no persuaden a nadie y que basta enunciar una verdad para
que los interlocutores la acepten’ (2005: 155) [‘Like Emerson and Walt
Whitman, he believed that arguments persuade no one and that stating a
truth is suf ficient for its acceptance by those who hear it’] (1995: 8). Had he
been mad, he argues, ‘no deberíamos a su pluma tenaz la ulterior redacción
de miles de metódicas páginas, que representan una labor de casi treinta
años y que nada tienen que ver con el frenesí’ (2005: 155) [‘we would not
owe to his tenacious pen the thousands of methodical pages he wrote
during the following thirty years or so, pages that have nothing at all to do
with frenzy’] (1995: 8). Herein lies a puzzling feature of Borges’ admiration
of Swedenborg. Who, we may ask, is this reader that Borges so stridently
conceptualizes and answers? Why would he seek to defend Swedenborg
7 Conan Doyle (in McNeilly ed., 2005: 105) suggests that Swedenborg ‘was a great
authority upon […] the determination of latitude’ [2005: 96], whilst Borges asserts:
‘We are indebted to him for a personal method of fixing longitude’. It would appear,
however, that Conan Doyle mistook ‘latitude’ for ‘longitude’, as the title of the work
in which Swedenborg established this nagivational principle is the delightfully-
named Försök at finna östra och westra lengden igen, igenom månan, som til the lärdas
ompröfwande framstelles [Attempt to find the East and West Longitude by means of the
moon. Put forward for the examination of the learned]. I have not seen any attempt
to correct Conan Doyle’s (or his editor’s) mistake.
8 Yeats also notes the similarity in style between Swedenborg’s scientific journals and
his visionary journals: ‘He considered heaven and hell and God, the angels, the whole
destiny of man, as if he were sitting before a large table in a Government of fice put-
ting little pieces of mineral ore into small square boxes for an assistant to pack away
in drawers’ (1920: 299).
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 55
(and himself ) against the charge of ‘la deliberada impostura de quien ha
escrito esas cosas extrañas’ (2005: 154) [‘deliberate imposture on the part
of the man who wrote such strange things’] (1995: 7) if, having included
Swedenborg in El libro de los seres imaginarios he had already established
his fantastical nature? To address this question, it is first necessary to qualify
the statement made earlier that the distinction between fact and fiction,
reality and imagination, is not present in Borges as writer or reader.
Whilst we may assert, as Borges himself repeatedly does, that his admi-
ration of philosophical and theological discourses lay in their aesthetic
value, this should not impoverish the aesthetic as mere elegance or literary
finery. In the work of Borges the aesthetic – as related to poesis and imagina-
tion – is a pathway to knowledge. Like Lezama Lima’s vision of poetry, in
which there is a gnosis in the aesthetic, or Blake’s ‘Imagination’ or ‘imagi-
native energy’, which is the true path to the divine, or Corbin’s mundus
imaginalis, in which the secret nature of the divine is revealed, Borges
places a strong epistemological value to the imagination, the dreamworld,
and the aesthetic.9 The aesthetic is neither simply linguistic nor simply the
sonorous play of words. Arguments themselves can be the index of aesthetic
brilliance, typified by Schopenhauer’s elegant philosophy. Borges professes
an admiration for Blake, emphasizing that ‘Blake asimismo afirmará que
no bastan la inteligencia y la rectitud y que la salvación del hombre exige
un tercer requisito: ser un artista’ (2005: 158) [‘Blake also af firms that the
salvation of man demands a third requirement: that he be an artist’] (1995:
13). Such a sentiment is strikingly akin to Borges’ own ars poetica, exempli-
fied in his calm belief in the persistence of literature: ‘I don’t think of life as
being pitted against literature. I believe that art is a part of life’ (Barnstone
1982: 96). Borges paid close attention to the spiritual power that Blake
associated with the aesthetic, and it would seem that this Blakean vision
inspired his relationship to Art and Imagination, borne out in his comment
9 See Mualem 2004. See also Núñez-Faraco (2009: 41): ‘Despite his scepticism and
anti-religious stance, there is in Borges a conspicuous interest in mysticism and in its
revelation of divine truth. […] Borges’s interest in religion, like his fascination with
metaphysics, hinges on an aesthetic perception of the world’.
56 Chapter One
to Barnstone (1982: 102): ‘We are creating God every time that we attain
beauty’. This moving aphorism could come from the illuminated pages of
Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell.
Borges’ relationship to imagination, to fantasy and to the dreamworld
is perhaps the most striking feature of his poetics, is discussed in the majority
of his interviews, and is illustrated in so many of his tales. Yet to approach
the dreamworld epistemologically is an intriguing endeavour which reveals
Borges’ kinship with, amongst others, Blake, Corbin and Jung. Kathleen
Raine, whose essay appears alongside Borges’ in Lawrence’s Testimony to
the Invisible, emphasizes this path of wisdom:
The ultimate knowledge, according to Blake and Swedenborg, is that the universe is
contained in mind – a view to be found also in the Gnostic writings, in the Vedas,
and in other spiritually profound cosmologies of the East, but long forgotten in the
West with its preoccupation with externality. (Raine 1995: 62)
Lima: ‘no hay nada más real que la imaginación’ (2001: 133) [‘there is noth-
ing more real than the imagination’] (my translation). Furthermore, and
considering the imagination epistemologically, the question of authentic-
ity of experience is problematic. Borges discusses the tale ‘El Congreso’
[‘The Congress’] in the afterword to El Libro de Arena, suggesting that ‘el
fin quiere elevarse, sin duda en vano, a los éxtasis de Chesterton o de John
Bunyan. No he merecido nunca semejante revelación, pero he procurado
soñarla’ (1989: 72) [‘its end tries, doubtless in vain, to match the ecstasies
of Chesterton and John Bunyan. I have never been worthy of such a rev-
elation, but I managed to dream one up’] (1979: 93). This is paradoxical if
we follow the very f luidity of fact and fiction, reality and fantasy, present
in Borges. If he has dreamt one up then he has been worthy of such a rev-
elation. Upon what principles could a distinction be based, if we judge
imagination to be itself experiential? Borges repeatedly emphasizes that
dreaming and artistic – poetic – creativity are aspects of the same process:
The essential dif ference between the waking experience and the sleeping or dreaming
experience must lie in the fact that the dreaming experience is something that can
be begotten by you, created by you, evolved out of you […] not necessarily in sleep.
When you’re thinking out a poem, there is little dif ference between the fact of being
asleep and that of being awake, no? And so they stand for the same thing. If you’re
thinking, if you’re inventing, or if you’re dreaming, then the dream may correspond
to vision or to sleep. That hardly matters. (Barnstone 1982: 29)
Surely one of the most abiding sensations delivered to the reader of Borges
is that reality is fictional and fiction is real. Is he not declaring at every stage,
therefore, that we really are in no position to judge so firmly between an
event of the imagination and one of empirical experience? Borges, for
example, makes no distinction between the experience of reading and the
experience of travelling. That is to say, the textual and the meta-textual are
epistemologically no dif ferent. He declares to Richard Burgin:
then you have on the other side, you have imaginary life and fancy and that means
the arts. But I don’t think that that distinction holds water. I think that everything
is a part of life. (Burgin 1998: 14)
Bioy Casares and Borges dined together regularly, whilst discussing lit-
erature, poetry and metaphysics. One conversation could be recorded by
Borges in a recollection; another could be recorded at the beginning of
‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’. It would be a step into a rigid binary pattern
of thinking to attempt to distinguish between a factual and a fictional
conversation between these two. Both are fantastic, both are textual, both
are factual and fictional at the same time. ‘I don’t see how things can be
unreal’ Borges opined. ‘I don’t see any valid reason why Hamlet, for exam-
ple, should be less real than Lloyd George’ (Burgin 1998: 77), ‘or why
Macbeth should be less real than today’s newspaper’ (Burgin 1998: 85). It
is abidingly evident, therefore, that in all matters of human expression, and
in whichever system he was contemplating – whether fantastical, poeti-
cal, mythological, theological, philosophical, or political – experience is
experience whether it derives from physical or imaginal travel. Memory is
creative and thus a fiction, and yet the experience of fiction is tangible and
real. Why, therefore, does Borges draw such a firm distinction between
the real experiences of Swedenborg and the unreal or fictional experiences
of Dante? In order to address this question, it is important to focus on
Borges’ assessment of other writers of mystical vision and eschatology,
and in particular, on the presence of doctrine that Borges could perceive
looming over them.
Borges reviewed Leslie Weatherhead’s After Death, and he damns
Weatherhead for being a mediocre and almost non-existent writer, for
being ‘estimulatado por lecturas piadosas’ [‘stimulated by pious readings’]
and for making unconvincing ‘conjeturas semiteosóficas’ (1974: 282) [‘semi-
theosophical conjectures’] (2000: 255–6). Weatherhead’s poor writing
status betrays an aesthetic poverty that is not only clearly indicative of a
wholly unappealing metaphysical vision, but is, furthermore, inauthentic,
derivative, and, importantly, non-experiential. At the beginning of his pug-
nacious review, Borges reasserts the famous declaration of the narrator of
‘Tlön’, that metaphysics is but another branch of fantastic literature. Here
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 59
he embellishes this with a mention of his own book of fantastic literature,
and his guilty omission of the masters of the fantastic genre: ‘Parménides,
Platón, Juan Escoto Erígena, Alberto Magno, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant,
Francis Bradley’ (1974: 280) [‘Parmenides, Plato, John Scotus Erigena,
Albertus Magnus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Francis Bradley’] (2000: 255).
He then, as if to confirm his agnostic credentials, compares the fantastic
with the religious, mocking the theological discourse that Weatherhead
presents:
En efecto, ¿qué son los prodigios de Wells o de Edgar Allan Poe – una f lor que nos llega
del porvenir, un muerto sometido a la hipnosis – confrontados con la invención de
Dios, con la teoría laboriosa de un ser que de algún modo es tres y que solitariamente
perdura fuera del tiempo? ¿Qué es la piedra bezoar ante la armonía preestablecida,
quién es el unicornio ante la Trinidad, quién es Lucio Apuleyo ante los multiplica-
dores de Buddhas del Gran Vehículo, qué son todas las noches de Shahrazad junto
a un argumento de Berkeley? He venerado la gradual invención de Dios; también el
Infierno y el Cielo (una remuneración inmortal, un castigo inmortal) son admirables
y curiosos designios de la imaginación de los hombres. (1974: 280–1)
[What, in fact, are the wonders of Wells or Edgar Allan Poe – a f lower that visits
us from the future, a dead man under hypnosis – in comparison to the invention
of God, the labored theory of a being who in some way is three and who endures
alone outside of time? What is the bezoar stone to pre-established harmony, what
is the unicorn to the Trinity, who is Lucius Apuleius to the multipliers of Buddhas
of the Greater Vehicle, what are all the nights of Scheherazade next to an argument
by Berkeley? I have worshiped the gradual invention of God; Heaven and Hell (an
immortal punishment, an immortal reward) are also admirable and curious designs
of man’s imagination.] (2000: 255)
10 One might assume that Borges could well have included a passage from Swedenborg
in his Extraordinary Tales (1973). As it is, he and Bioy Casares include a brief text
60 Chapter One
from ‘The False Swedenborg’ of 1873. I have not been able to locate this source. It
might well be one of their many invented texts.
11 Philemon, for example, was both ‘real’ and ‘psychological’ for Jung. The distinction
is, ultimately, irrelevant. It must also be noted that Borges was a sympathetic reader
of Jung: ‘I’ve always been a great reader of Jung’ (Burgin 1969: 109). He also makes
reference to Jung in ‘Nathaniel Hawthorne’ (1974: 670), and to Jung’s Psychologie und
alchemie in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ (1974: 710) and in El libro de los seres imaginarios.
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 61
[Here we arrive at the near miracle that is the true motive for this writing: what we
might call the survival of the angel. The human imagination has pictured a horde
of monsters (tritons, hippogrif fs, chimeras, sea serpents, unicorns, devils, dragons,
werewolves, cyclopes, fauns, basilisks, demigods, leviathans, and a legion of others)
and all have disappeared, except angels. Today, what line of poetry would dare allude
to the phoenix or make itself the promenade of a centaur? None; but no poetry,
however modern, is unhappy to be a nest of angels and to shine brightly with them.
I always imagine them at nightfall, in the dusk of a slum or a vacant lot, in that long,
quiet moment when things are gradually left alone, with their backs to the sunset,
and when colors are like memories or premonitions of other colors. We must not be
too prodigal with our angels; they are the last divinities we harbor, and they might
f ly away.] (2000: 19)12
12 Borges was notoriously scathing of the book in which this essay appeared – El
tamaño de mi esperanza: ‘I am thoroughly ashamed of that book […] I try to forget
it. A very poor book’ (Barnstone 1982: 82). The legend (that Borges promoted) was
that he gathered any copies of the book he could find and burned them. He also,
though, says the same about Inquisiciones (Barnstone 1982: 110). One cannot help
feeling that Borges is actually a canny promoter of his own works; by claiming in
countless interviews that both Tamaño and Inquisiciones should not be read, he is
actually encouraging people to read them.
62 Chapter One
mother claims that her dead father had returned to her in a dream to
assure her of the existence of God.13 He unpicks the nature of vision of
Swedenborg, and opens (though does not explore) a thorny question that
arises regularly in the nebulous scholarship of mysticism: are experiences
unique to the individual or are they universal? Are experiences exceptional
or culturally conditioned? Or, put in a dif ferent way, did Teresa de Ávila
encounter Christ, or did she encounter the same ‘source’ or ‘power’ that
non-Christian mystics might encounter, but that she interpreted this power
as Christ? Yeats, for example, attributes a strong cultural inf luence upon
Swedenborg’s own appreciation of the angelic realm: ‘Swedenborg because
he belongs to an eighteenth century not yet touched by the romantic revival
feels horror amid rocky uninhabited places, and so believes that the evil are
in such places while the good are amid smooth grass and garden walks and
the clear sunlight of Claude Lorraine’ (1920: 303), and he maintains that
13 ‘En la entrevista con Carlos Cortínez encontramos, por desgracia, muy sintetizada,
aquella famosa conversación que tuvieron Borges con su madre acerca de Dios. “No
recuerdo cómo la conversación derivó hacia las creencias religiosas de cada cual.
Entonces ella me declaró su fe con una simplicidad no exenta de dramatismo … me
contó un sueño que ella tuvo cuando murió su padre: él se le acercaba, muy fatigado,
y le aseguraba, de un modo que no ha podido olvidar, que Dios existe. … Dos o tres
veces fue interrumpido por su hijo que oponía razones de su escepticismo. Era para-
dójico oír a Borges desconfiar de la seriedad de los sueños, para no dejarse convencer
por la belleza del relato de su madre. En una de esas, ella sin molestarse pero con
la superioridad del creyente lo hizo callar: – ¡Deja Georgie, tú no piensas en estas
cosas …!”’ (Romero 1977: 492)
[‘In the interview with Carlos Cortínez we regretfully find that famous conversation
that Borges had with his mother about God: “I don’t remember how the conversation
moved towards their religious beliefs. She declared to me her faith with a simplicity
not lacking drama … she told me about a dream she had when her father died: he,
exhausted, had approached her and had assured her in a way she could not forget that
God exists. … Two or three times she was interrupted by her son who put forward
reasons for his scepticism. It was paradoxical to hear Borges mistrust the serious-
ness of dreams, in order not to allow himself to be convinced by the beauty of his
mother’s tale. On one of those interruptions she calmly and with the superiority of
a believer made him silent: Enough Georgie! You don’t believe in such matters!”’]
(my translation).
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 63
14 ‘He was a man crying out for a mythology, and trying to make one because he could
not find one to his hand. Had he been a Catholic of Dante’s time he would have
been well content with Mary and the angels; or had he been a scholar of our time he
would have taken his symbols where Wagner took his, from Norse mythology’ (1903:
174). Borges, it must be recalled, was often reserved about Blake’s complex mytholo-
gies, claiming: ‘La obra de Blake es una obra de lectura extraordinariamente difícil,
ya que Blake había creado un sistema teológico, pero para exponerlo, se le ocurrió
inventar una mitología sobre cuyo sentido no están de acuerdo los comentadores’
(Borges 2002: 215) [‘The work of Blake is extraordinarily dif ficult to read, seeing
that Blake created a theological system, but that, in order to express it, it occurred
to him to invent a mythology that none of the commentators can agree upon’] (my
translation). He also at one stage calls Blake ‘generally long-winded and ponderous’
(Barnstone 1982: 26), and he states that one would need a dictionary of Blake to
understand Blake.
15 This is, indeed, a pervasive question. Robert Moss suggests that Swedenborg’s religious
upbringing was contributory towards his visions: ‘These encounters [with the dead]
also gave him a first-hand understanding of the conditions of the afterlife. Previously,
his religious faith had convinced him that the spirit survives physical death. Now he
could begin to study how it survives’ (1998: 188). Colin Wilson, meanwhile, pursues
a line similar to that of Yeats and Borges: ‘[Swedenborg] lived in a religious age; his
father was a bishop; he had studied the Bible since childhood. It was, therefore, natural
that his visions expressed themselves in terms of the Bible. If he had been brought
up on the works of Shakespeare or Dante, no doubt his ideas would have expressed
themselves in the form of gigantic commentaries on Shakespeare’s tragedies or the
Divine Comedy. The chief obstacle to the modern understanding of Swedenborg is
64 Chapter One
Barnstone: You’ve been immersed in the writings of the Gnostics, the mystics,
in the Kabbalah, the Book of Splendor.
Borges: I’ve done my best, but I am very ignorant.
Barnstone: You have been interested in the mystics –
Borges: At the same time I am no mystic myself.
Barnstone: I imagine that you would consider the voyage of the mystics a true
experience but a secular one. Could you comment on the mystical
experience in other writing, in Fray Luis de León …
Borges: I wonder if Fray Luis de León had any mystical experience. I should
say not. When I talk of mystics, I think of Swedenborg, Angelus
Silesius, and the Persians also. Not the Spaniards. I don’t think they
had any mystical experiences.
Barnstone: John of the Cross?
Borges: I think that Saint John of the Cross was following the pattern of the
Song of Songs. And that’s that. I suppose he never had any actual
experience. In my life I only had two mystical experiences and I can’t
tell them because what happened is not to be put in words, since
words, after all, stand for a shared experience. And if you have not
had the experience you can’t share it – as if you were to talk about
the taste of cof fee and had never tried cof fee. Twice in my life I had
a feeling, a feeling rather agreeable than otherwise. It was astonish-
ing, astounding. I was overwhelmed, taken aback. I had the feeling
of living not in time but outside time. It may have been a minute or
so, it may have been longer. […] Somehow the feeling came over me
that I was living beyond time, and I did my best to capture it, but it
came and went. I wrote poems about it, but they are normal poems
and do not tell the experience. I cannot tell it to you, since I cannot
retell it to myself, but I had that experience, and I had it twice over,
and maybe it will be granted me to have it one more time before I
die. (Barnstone 1982: 10–11)
that few of us can take the Bible for granted in the way that our great-grandfathers
did. This is a sad ref lection on the modern age’ (1995: 100).
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 65
Again, his dismissal of ‘the Spaniards’ lies in his sense of their doctrinal
adherence. Whilst Borges admires John of the Cross’s poetic craft, he nev-
ertheless perceives the same sense of inauthenticity of experience that he
does in Weatherhead. John of the Cross was merely ‘following the pattern
of the Song of Songs’ in the same fashion that Weatherhead was merely
parroting ‘conjeturas semiteosóficas’ (1974: 282). Furthermore, he derides
Pascal for doctrinal adherence claiming that his derision of Pascal was
itself derived from Swedenborg: ‘No es [Pascal] un místico; pertenece
a aquellos cristianos denunciados por Swedenborg, que suponen que el
cielo es un galardón y el infierno un castigo y que, habituados a la medi-
tación melancólica, no saben hablar con los ángeles’ (1974: 704) [‘He is
not a mystic; he belongs to those Christians, denounced by Swedenborg,
who suppose that heaven is a reward and hell a punishment and who,
accustomed to melancholy meditation, do not know how to speak with
the angels’] (1964: 99). Borges’ own mystical experiences, as he describes,
were unique and personal, purportedly uninspired by textual sources, and
consequently inexpressible. Here lies the nub of the paradox. Whilst we
are all the products of our inf luences, and whilst he repeatedly maintains
that all great literature is merely the re-articulation of a few perennial
symbols, nevertheless, for Borges the mystical experience by necessity must
be somehow free of inf luence in order to shine with authenticity. It is my
hypothesis that this opinion of authenticity is a smokescreen, and that what
really is at stake is not a metaphysical judgment about the true substance
and structure of heaven, nor of the ontology of angelic beings. Rather, it
is Borges’ inveterate iconoclasm, his mistrust of doctrine, and his love of
heterodoxy, heretics, heresy and heresiarchs.
Doctrine, and its constellation as dogma, was, for Borges a denial of
individual will and creative liberty. Political doctrine merely entertains
people, or, in the case of Juan and Evita Perón, only entertains the igno-
rant.16 In the case of Nazism, its appeal can lead them to outrageous acts
17 Recall the oft-quoted statement of the narrator of Tlön ‘Hace diez años bastaba
cualquier simetría con apariencia de orden – el materialismo dialéctico, el antisem-
itismo, el nazismo – para embelesar a los hombres. ¿Cómo no someterse a Tlön, a la
minuciosa y vasta evidencia de un planeta ordenado? Inútil responder que la realidad
también está ordenada’ (1974: 442) [‘Ten years ago, any symmetrical system what-
soever which gave the appearance of order – dialectical materialism, anti-Semitism,
Nazism – was enough to fascinate men. Why not fall under the spell of Tlön and
submit to the minute and vast evidence of an ordered planet? Useless to reply that
reality, too is ordered’] (1976: 34).
18 ‘No church – whether Catholic or Protestant – has ever been tolerant, nor is there
any reason for them to be tolerant. If I believe I am in possession of the truth there
is no reason for me to be tolerant of those who are risking their own salvation by
holding erroneous beliefs. On the contrary, it’s my duty to persecute them’ (Burgin
1998: 73–4).
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 67
are common to exegetic commentaries on the Comedy; other areas are perti-
nent, so it would appear, only to Borges. Firstly, Borges identifies in almost
every passage that he composed on Dante the essential motivation behind
Dante’s vast poetic cycle: the union not with the godhead but with Beatrice.
[We must keep one incontrovertible fact in mind, a single, humble fact: the scene was
imagined by Dante. For us, it is very real; for him, it was less so. (The reality, for him,
was that first life and then death had taken Beatrice from him.) Forever absent from
Beatrice, alone and perhaps humiliated, he imagined the scene in order to imagine
he was with her. Unhappily for him, happily for the centuries that would read him,
his consciousness that the meeting was imaginary distorted the vision. Hence the
appalling circumstances, all the more infernal for taking place in the empyrean: the
disappearance of Beatrice, the elder who replaces her, her abrupt elevation to the
Rose, the f leetingness of her glance and smile, the eternal turning away of the face.
The horror shows through in the words: come parea refers to lontana but contaminates
sorrise, and therefore Longfellow could translate, in his 1867 version:
Thus I implored; and she, so far away,
Smiled as it seemed, and looked once more at me …
And eternal seems to contaminate si tornò.] (2000: 304–5)19
19 Enamorarse es crear una religión cuyo dios es falible. Que Dante profesó por Beatriz
una adoración idolátrica es una verdad que no cabe contradecir; que ella una vez se
burló de él y otra lo desairó son hechos que registra la Vita nuova. Hay quien man-
tiene que esos hechos son imágenes de otros; ello, a ser así, reforzaría aún más nuestra
68 Chapter One
This immediately evokes a pathetic quality to the cycle that betrays Dante’s
earthly, human love over the love of the divine.
Secondly, this aspect cannot be separated from the equally pathetic
envy and regret that Borges identifies in Dante’s portrayal of the lovers
Paola and Francesco:
Infinitamente existió Beatriz para Dante; Dante, muy poco, tal vez nada, para Beatriz;
todos nosotros propendemos, por piedad, por veneración a olvidar esa lastimosa
discordia inolvidable para Dante. Leo y releo los azares de su ilusorio encuentro y
pienso en dos amantes que el Alighieri soñó en el huracán del segundo círculo y que
son emblemas oscuros, aunque él no lo entendiera o no lo quisiera, de esa dicha que
no logró. Pienso en Francesca y en Paolo, unidos para siempre en su Infierno (Questi,
che mai da me non fia diviso …) Con espantoso amor, con ansiedad, con admiración,
con envidia. (1989: 371).
[Beatrice existed infinitely for Dante. Dante very little, perhaps not at all for Beatrice.
All of us tend to forget, out of pity, out of veneration, this grievous discord which
for Dante was unforgettable. Reading and rereading the vicissitudes of his illusory
meeting, I think of the two lovers that Alighieri dreamed in the hurricane of the
second circle and who, whether or not he understood or wanted them to be, were
obscure emblems of the joy he did not attain. I think of Paolo and Francesca, forever
united in their Inferno: ‘questi, che mai da me non fia diviso’ (this one, who never
shall be parted from me). With appalling love, with anxiety, with admiration, with
envy.] (2000: 300–1)20
Thirdly, Borges writes with passion of the abiding love and respect
that Dante bore for Virgil, and for Homer, Horace, Ovid and Lucan, and
the deep sadness and regret that Dante experienced in acknowledging their
banishment to the nobile castello.
Dante knows that Virgil is a damned soul, and the very moment that Virgil tells
him that he will not be able to accompany him beyond purgatory, Dante feels that
Virgil will always be an inhabitant of that ‘nobile castello’ where the great shadows of
the great men of antiquity dwell, those that through unavoidable ignorance did not
accept or could not reach the word of Christ. […] Dante salutes him with the highest
epithets and speaks of the great love and the long study to which Virgil’s writings
20 He also reiterates this in Siete noches: ‘esos dos réprobos están juntos, no pueden
hablarse, giran en el negro remolino sin ninguna esperanza, ni siquiera nos dice
Dante la esperanza de que los sufrimientos cesen, pero están juntos. Cuando ella
habla, usa el nosotros: habla por los dos, otra forma de estar juntos. Están juntos para
la eternidad, comparten el Infierno y eso para Dante tiene que haber sido una suerte
de Paraíso’ (1989: 216) [‘They cannot speak to each other, they turn in the black
whirlwind without hope, yet they are together. When she speaks, she says “we,”
speaking for the two of them, another form of being together. They are together for
eternity; they share Hell – and that, for Dante, must have been a kind of Paradise’]
(1984: 18).
70 Chapter One
have led him, and of their relationship which has always been constant. But Virgil
is sad since he knows that he is condemned to the ‘nobile castello,’ far from salvation
and full of God’s absence; Dante, on the other hand, will see God, he will be allowed
to, and he will also be allowed to understand the universe. (Alifano 1984: 97)21
Otra razón, de tipo técnico, explica la dureza y la crueldad de que Dante ha sido
acusado. La noción panteísta de un Dios que también es el universo, de un Dios
que es cada una de sus criaturas y el destino de esas criaturas, es quizá una herejía y
un error si la aplicamos a la realidad, pero es indiscutible en su aplicación al poeta y
a su obra. El poeta es cada uno de los hombres de su mundo ficticio, es cada soplo y
cada pormenor. Una de sus tareas, no la más fácil, es ocultar o disimular esa omni-
presencia. El problema era singularmente arduo en el caso de Dante, obligado por
el carácter de su poema a adjudicar la gloria o la perdición, sin que pudieran advertir
los lectores que la Justicia que emitía los fallos era, en último término, él mismo. Para
conseguir ese fin, se incluyó como personaje de la Comedia, e hizo que sus reacciones
no coincidieran, o sólo coincidieran alguna vez en el caso de Filippo Argenti, o en
el de Judas, con las decisiones divinas. (1989: 346)
[There is a technical explanation for the hardheartedness and cruelty of which Dante
has been accused. The pantheistic idea of a god who is also the universe, a god who
is every one of his creatures and the destiny of those creatures, may be a heresy and
an error if we apply it to reality, but it is indisputable when applied to the poet and
his work. The poet is each one of the men in his fictive world, he is every breath and
every detail. One of his tasks, and not the easiest of them, is to hide or disguise this
omnipresence. The problem was particularly burdensome in Dante’s case, for he was
forced by the nature of his poem to mete out glory or damnation, but in such a way as
to keep his readers from noticing that the Justice handing down these sentences was,
in the final analysis, he himself. To achieve this, he included himself as a character in
the Commedia, and made his own reactions contrast or only rarely coincide – in the
case of Filippo Argenti, or in that of Judas – with the divine decisions.] (2000: 270)
Lastly, Borges acknowledges with great respect that Dante himself was
torn between the need (and desire) to adhere to orthodoxy, and the desire
to operate with poetic, aesthetic and, indeed, metaphysical freedom. In
almost all the nine Dantesque essays, and in Siete noches, Borges describes
the tension apparent in Dante between adhering to doctrine and expressing
his own artistic vision. He talks of Dante’s ‘own invention’ of the limbo
for the pre-Christian elevated souls (the Classical poets):
Para mitigar el horror de una época adversa, el poeta buscó refugio en la gran memoria
romana. Quiso honrarla en su libro, pero no pudo entender – la observación per-
tenece a Guido Vitali – que insistir demasiado sobre el mundo clásico no convenía
a sus propósitos doctrinales. Dante no podía, contra la Fe, salvar a sus héroes; los
pensó en un Infierno negativo, privados de la vista y posesión de Dios en el cielo, y
72 Chapter One
[To allay the horror of an adverse era, the poet sought refuge in the great memory of
Rome. He wished to honor it in his book, but could not help understanding – the
observation is Guido Vitali’s – that too great an insistence on the classical world did
not accord well with his doctrinal aims. Dante, who could not go against the Faith
to save his heroes, envisioned them in a negative Hell, denied the sight and posses-
sion of God in heaven, and took pity on their mysterious fate. […] In the invention
and execution of Canto IV, Dante plotted out a series of circumstances, some of
them theological in nature. A devout reader of the Aeneid, he imagined the dead
in the Elysium or in a medieval variant of those glad fields. […] For pressing reasons
of dogma, Dante had to situate his noble castle in Hell.] (2000: 274 italics mine)
Conclusion
The presence of Dante in Borges has been widely acknowledged. The pres-
ence of Swedenborg has not. It is striking, however, to notice the depth
of inf luence of Swedenborg’s thought upon Borges. This inf luence is vis-
ible not least the inclusion of extracts of Swedenborg’s texts in Historia
Universal de la Infamia and in El libro de los seres imaginarios, but through
the adumbration of Swedenborg’s visions in so many of Borges’ tales, and
the manifest af finity to Swedenborg. This forms the basis of Chapter Five.
Similarly, such considerations must be accompanied with an assessment of
Borges’ own considerations of the landscape of death. Whilst again here is
not the space to elaborate, it is worth explaining that throughout his work,
in many facets of his writing, Borges appears pulled by two polarities: the
inevitability of oblivion or annihilation and the possibility of continuity.
In countless interviews, especially in his later years, he expresses a firm
wish for annihilation:
I look forward to being blotted out. But if I thought that my death was a mere illu-
sion, that after death I would go on, then I would feel very, very unhappy. For really,
I’m sick and tired of myself. Now, of course if I go on and I have no personal memory
of having ever been Borges, then in that case, it won’t matter to me; because I may
have been hundreds of odd people before I was born, but those things won’t worry
me, since I will have forgotten them. When I think of mortality, of death, I think
of those things in a hopeful way, in an expectant way. I should say I am greedy for
death, that I want to stop waking up every morning, finding: ‘Well, here I am, I have
to go back to Borges.’ (Barnstone 1982: 17)
His reading, however, of Plato and other philosophers reveals a curiosity
about the soul’s persistence after corporeal death, and even the transmi-
gration of souls. The Borges-protagonist of ‘Delia Elena San Marco’, for
example, lamenting Delia’s loss, declares: ‘Anoche no salí después de comer
y releí, para comprender estas cosas, la última enseñanza que Platón pone en
boca de su maestro. Leí que el alma puede huir cuando muere la carne’ (1974:
790) [‘Last night I stayed in after dinner and reread, in order to understand
these things, the last teaching Plato put in his master’s mouth. I read that
74 Chapter One
the soul may escape when the f lesh dies’] (1970: 32). There are many tales
and poems that demonstrate this tension between ‘olvido’ [oblivion] and
afterlife, expressed most succinctly in a brief comment in interview:
In spite of oneself, one thinks. I am almost sure to be blotted out by death, but some-
times I think it is not impossible that I may continue to live in some other manner
after my physical death. I feel every suicide has that doubt: Is what I am going to do
worthwhile? Will I be blotted out, or will I continue to live on another world? Or
as Hamlet wonders, what dreams will come when we leave this body? It could be a
nightmare. And then we would be in hell. Christians believe that one continues after
death to be who he has been and that he is punished or rewarded forever, accord-
ing to what he has done in this brief time that was given to him. I would prefer to
continue living after death if I have but to forget the life I lived. (Burgin 1998: 240)
The question of faith here arises. Borges’ position as agnostic is of crucial
concern for us, and it is important to note that for Borges agnosticism
was not apathy to spiritual matters; on the contrary, it leads to a greater
opening to the numinous.22 Faith, in Borges’ worldview, is an indication
of belief in matters about which we have no knowledge, and thus betrays
a limitation of one’s imagination. It would seem restrictive, he maintains,
to limit oneself to a particular doctrine of life after death unless, as in the
case of Swedenborg, one has visited such a realm. His statement that ‘I have
never been worthy of such an experience’ is the acknowledgment that in
matters metaphysical, he must rely on his reading and his imagination. In
both cases, though, no firm conviction can be reached.
There are many speculations about life after death. Swedenborg describes in detail
hells and paradises. Dante’s poem is also about hell, purgatory, paradise. Where does
this tendency of man come from, to try to imagine and describe something that he
cannot possibly know? (Burgin 1998: 247)
22 ‘Being an agnostic means all things are possible, even God, even the Holy Trinity.
This world is so strange that anything may happen, or may not happen. Being an
agnostic makes me live in a larger, a more fantastic kind of world, almost uncanny.
It makes me more tolerant’ (Shenker 1971).
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 75
Borges professes his profound admiration of Swedenborg’s mode of knowing in this
essay, and one quickly discerns that he also feels a kindred spirit to the Swedish mystic.
Borges declares that he himself is not a mystic, but that mysticism is an important
and fascinating subject for him. When the epistemology of the knower is of solid
pedigree, he believed, then the ensuing perceptions are the most sublime humanity
has known. Borges felt that he shared with Swedenborg the same fundamental objec-
tives; they simply traversed the same terrain in somewhat dif ferent ways. […] Borges
believed in Swedenborg’s spiritual journeys more profoundly than many artists and
poets who have expressed perhaps some admiration or inspiration but who have
not been so deeply inclined to explore the same realities with as much conviction
and daring as Borges. It is in this sense that Borges is most deeply Swedenborgian.
(Lawrence 1995: x–xi)23
This is a powerful assessment of Borges, and whilst readers familiar with
Borges would smirk at Lawrence’s naïveté in assuming that Borges was
a believer in a particular theological tradition (albeit heterodox), such a
reading is nevertheless fully borne out both in the language of Borges and,
as mentioned, in the strong presence of Swedenborg in Borges. So what
is the nature of this belief ? Clearly, as this chapter has elucidated, there is
a paradoxical question at the heart of Borges’ reading of mystics. Reality
and artifice are indistinguishable. The text and the meta-text are both text.
Hamlet is as real as Bioy Casares. This, as established, is an abiding element
of Borges. Upon this basis, therefore, an invented text of heaven is as real
as a genuinely experienced text of heaven. And upon this basis, despite
Borges’ acknowledgment that the mystical passage in ‘The Aleph’ was an
imitation of mystical texts, it is nonetheless a mystical text.24 If we follow
the Borges who maintains that the London of Chesterton or Dickens is
as real as the ‘real’ London and that ‘there is no dif ference between fact
and fiction’ (Barnstone 1982: 117), then the Aleph, ‘the Spaniards’, Dante
24 Borges explains the artifice, or the invention, of this passage: ‘A man in Spain asked
me whether the aleph actually existed. Of course it doesn’t. He thought the whole
thing was true. I gave him the name of the street and the number of the house. He
was taken in very easily. […] That piece gave me great trouble, yes. I mean, I had to
give a sensation of endless things in a single paragraph. Somehow, I got away with
it.
Q: Is that an invention, the aleph, or did you find it in some reference?
No. I’ll tell you, I was reading about time and eternity. Now eternity is supposed to
be timeless. I mean, God or a mystic perceives in one moment all of our yesterdays,
Shakespeare says, all the past, all the present, all the future. And I said, why not
apply that, well, that invention to another category, not to time, but to space? Why
not imagine a point in space wherein the observer may find all the rest. I mean, who
invented space? And that was the central idea. Then I had to invent all the other
things, to make it into a funny story, to make it into a pathetic story, that came
afterwards. My first aim was this: in the same way that many mystics have talked of
eternity … that’s a big word, an eternity, an everness. And also neverness; that’s an
awful word. Since we have an idea of eternity, of foreverness in time, why not apply
the same idea to space, and think of a single point in space wherein the whole of
space may be found? I began with that abstract idea, and then, somehow, I came to
that quite enjoyable story. (Burgin 1998: 212)
Fantastic or real? Borges’ reading of Dante and Swedenborg 77
25 A colleague of mine made this clear to me, stating that reading the paragraph in ‘The
Aleph’ in which the narrator attempts to vocalize the vision of the Aleph af fected
her in a profound and ‘spiritual’ manner.
Chapter Two
The range of mystical experience is very wide, much too wide for us to
cover in the time at our disposal.
— William James, Varieties of Religious Experience
Knowledge of God, the realization of one’s union with God, in a word,
mysticism, is necessary.
— Alan Watts, Behold the Spirit
In my life I only had two mystical experiences and I can’t tell them because what
happened is not to be put in words, since words, after all, stand for a shared experi-
ence. And if you have not had the experience you can’t share it – as if you were to
talk about the taste of cof fee and had never tried cof fee. Twice in my life I had a
feeling, a feeling rather agreeable than otherwise. It was astonishing, astounding. I
was overwhelmed, taken aback. I had the feeling of living not in time but outside
time. It may have been a minute or so, it may have been longer. […] Somehow the
feeling came over me that I was living beyond time, and I did my best to capture it,
but it came and went. I wrote poems about it, but they are normal poems and do
not tell the experience. I cannot tell it to you, since I cannot retell it to myself, but I
had that experience, and I had it twice over, and maybe it will be granted me to have
it one more time before I die. (Barnstone 1982: 10–11)
80 Chapter Two
[Many years later, a journalist suddenly asked me, ‘What is the Aleph?’ and I replied,
‘it is the tale of a mystical experience.’ When I mentioned this to Georgie, I realized
that he hadn’t forgotten my article, written thirty-five years earlier. He said to me,
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 81
‘you have been the only person to say this,’ implying that I had been right in my sug-
gestion. He liked my appreciation, which was contrary to the idea circulated around
Argentine writers, which depicted Borges as a cold and geometric author, a creator
of purely intellectual games.] (My translation)
Los místicos hablan de ‘la noche oscura del alma’. ‘¿Quién puede distinguir entre la
oscuridad y el alma?’, se pregunta Yeats, un poeta muy admirado por Borges. Y más
allá de esa noche están los éxtasis de la liberación. A su manera tenue, pero empeci-
nada, él luchaba por alcanzar esa liberación. Los místicos suelen ser tácitos, a veces
escriben, rara vez hablan. (1999: 14)
[Mystics speak of ‘the dark night of the soul.’ ‘Who can distinguish darkness from
the soul?’ asks Yeats, a poet whom Borges admired. Beyond the dark night are the
ecstasies of liberation. In his own tenuous yet tenacious way, Borges strove to achieve
that liberation. Mystics are often taciturn, they sometimes write but they rarely
speak.] (My translation)
With further reference to ‘El Aleph’, Canto then appears to contradict her-
self by saying that Borges was a mystic, albeit an unsuspecting one: ‘La difer-
encia está en que Borges era un místico sin quererlo. Los místicos buscan
el éxtasis y a veces lo alcanzan tras sacrificios, ascesis, renuncias. Borges no
renunciaba a nada: el elemento místico estaba en él, funcionaba sin que él
lo quisiera, tal vez sin que lo sospechara’ (1999: 211). [‘The dif ference is that
Borges was a mystic without wishing to be so. Mystics seek ecstasy and at
times they achieve it through sacrifice, aestheticism, renunciation. Borges
renounced nothing: the mystical element was in him without him desiring
it, perhaps without him even aware of it’] (my translation). Canto, as we
shall see, unwittingly enters the perennial debate within the scholarship of
82 Chapter Two
Pocas personas han advertido las relaciones de Borges con el misticismo; una de ellas
fue Estela Canto. Dijo, en una crítica sobre los cuentos de El Aleph, que llamó rela-
tos, ensayos y también leyendas: ‘El universo, su contradicción aparente, sus sentidos
ocultos y la angustia del hombre frente a él, aparece de lleno en todos los cuentos de
Borges. Una de las características de los pensadores místicos es su afición a expresarse
por símbolos. Yo diría que la mejor definición de Borges es la de unos de los gran-
des – y escasísimos – pensadores místicos de nuestra época’. Pensador místico, desde
luego; no místico a secas. (1996: 98)
[Few people have noticed Borges’ relationship with mysticism; one of them was
Estela Canto. In a review of the tales in El Aleph, which she called tales, essays and
also legends, she said: ‘The universe, its apparent contradictions, its hidden mean-
ings and man’s anxieties faced with it, are the mainstay of all of Borges’ tales. One of
the characteristics of mystical thinkers is their inclination to express themselves by
means of symbols. I would say that the best definition of Borges is that he is one of
the greatest – and rarest – mystical thinkers of our time.’ Mystical thinker, obviously,
not just mystic.] (My translation)
1 James’ use of ‘passive’ as a definition of mysticism is problematic owing to his own
use of nitrous oxide and ether to activate the mystical consciousness in himself.
2 Kripal (2001) investigates the extent to which the mystical experiences of James and
Underhill inf luenced their scholarship.
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 83
It is true that he talked about the mystics, but as writers who recorded certain curi-
ous experiences, whose statements concerning time and timelessness, recurrence,
cosmology had a great speculative interest for him, but nothing more. He did not
admit to any personal concern with such things. Yet so many of Borges’ stories […]
firmly contradict Borges’ defensive denial of personal involvement in this matter
[…]. His references to Christianity or Buddhism, to Plato, Swedenborg, the Sufis,
show a fascination with magic, and particularly with the magical moment, which is
identified in his poetry with the moment of déjà vu in which he first saw the pink
painted street corner in the Buenos Aires suburb, and to other such moments in
childhood or in his nocturnal walking in which things looked dif ferent; moments,
one may say, in which ‘time stopped’, as it did for Hladík when he faced the firing
squad. We may leave the subject of Borges’ personal involvement in this area with
the remark that he shows an uncanny familiarity with the stages of the mystic search
for one only speculatively interested in such matters. (1973: 78–9).
through her employment of the terms ‘passive’ and ‘inef fable’ appears in her
understanding of mysticism to be inf luenced by both Borges and William
James, does an admirable job in making simple a strikingly complex area of
thought, though in so doing she overlooks some of these complexities. For
example, she cites St John of the Cross’s description of the contemplative,
spiritual path that can lead to the mystical state, yet fails to appreciate that
Borges himself denied that St John of the Cross was a mystic (Barnstone
1982: 11). She concludes her overview of the essential characteristics of the
mystical state by stating: ‘Once we have determined these characteristics,
we can see that they appear repeatedly in Borges’ poems and short stories’
(Borges 2010: viii). Again, this position is more complex than it may appear.
The fact that mystical states are represented in poems and stories does not
necessarily imply that the author experienced this particular state. And yet
this assertion is problematic: as I argue in Chapter One, Borges constantly
blurs the division between text and meta-text, and emphasizes the Blakean
position that imagination is experiential. Consequently one can argue that
the invention of a text describing a mystical state constitutes an experience
of the mystical state. The text is the experience. Kodama appears to intuit
this conundrum, suggesting that ‘I believe that we could speak, in the case
of Borges, of a mysticism of creation’ (viii), where, I suppose, she locates
the mystical moment in the act of textual creation.
Giskin (1990) considers Borges’ fictions in the light of the principles
of mysticism as defined by William James: Inef fability, Noetic experience,
Transiency, and Passivity. Giskin’s analysis has provided a fruitful avenue
of enquiry in the Borges course at the University of Kent, and students
find it a helpful guide for orientating themselves through the unnerving
texts of ‘El milagro secreto’, ‘Las ruinas circulares’, ‘La escritura del dios’,
and in particular, ‘El Aleph’. Giskin concludes that owing to the fact that
certain texts of Borges embody the defining characteristics of mysticism
as articulated by William James, Borges was consequently a mystic. This
conclusion, however, leaves many questions unanswered: is a ‘mystical’ text
necessarily the work of a mystic? Can an author parody a mystical text, and
if so, does that negate the mystical qualities of the text? What on earth is
a mystical text? What on earth is a mystic? These questions are not mere
‘frivolidad escolástica’ [‘scholastic frivolity’] (a term Borges employs in
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 85
Borges’s stories […] are designed primarily as metaphysical arguments; they are dense,
self-enclosed, with their own deviant logics. Above all, they are meant to be imper-
sonal, to transcend individual consciousness […] One reason for this is that Borges
is a mystic, or at least a sort of radical Neoplatonist – human thought, behavior and
history are all the product of one big Mind, or are elements of an immense cabalistic
Book that includes its own decoding. (2004)
There is an evident problem in all these assertions, as the authors avow that
Borges was or was not a mystic based upon a rudimentary examination of
what the word itself means, and without any exploration of the long and
often contradictory nature of the scholarship of mysticism, which has for
decades grappled precisely with the definition of this troublesome term.
As such, Canto’s analysis almost inevitably trips over itself as her position
appears derived more from an ethical and perhaps emotive than an intel-
lectual response to the question in the assumption that agnosticism and
mysticism are contradictory enterprises. Kodama does venture away from
the James/Borges position to include a Vedantic perspective, but still the
reader is left with questions about the nature of experience-author-text-
reader. Wallace, meanwhile, makes one sweeping comment about ‘one big
Mind’ as the determining position, and concludes that Borges fits within
this category. Giskin, perhaps the most thorough examiner of the mystical
aspect of Borges, nevertheless bases his full analysis only on the four char-
acteristics outlined by James, with no exploration either of the distinction
86 Chapter Two
between author, text and reader (that is to say, is the text mystical, or is it
the reader’s response?), nor of the many other scholars of mysticism, such
as Underhill, Zaehner, Stace, Watts or Staal, who often refuted James and
whose salient characteristics are markedly dif ferent. It is doubtful, for
example, that Borges’ scepticism, agnosticism and literary game-playing
would qualify him as a mystic in Zaehner’s strictly theistic and theological
approach to mysticism. Núñez-Faraco (2006: 41) sums up the nature of the
problem, indicating that ‘if the term “mystic” applies to Borges, it becomes
necessary to define the precise meaning of such a designation’. Promising as
this sounds, Núñez-Faraco pursues this line no further, and so the reader is
left in suspense as to how such a designation is, indeed, defined.
It becomes clear that we cannot rely on any immediate consensual
understanding of the term ‘mystic’ in order to judge whether a certain
individual was or was not a mystic. One can only arrive at such a conclu-
sion by plotting the figure and his/her literary works against a checklist of
defining characteristics as determined by a respected scholar such as James.
This implies, however, not only an agreement with these characteristics as
suitable definitions of mystic and mysticism, but, importantly, an accord
over the meaning of the terms employed in these characteristics themselves.
As such, when James suggests ‘noetic’ as one such criterion, we must assume
a consensual understanding of this term. This may sound pedantic, but it
is alarming how often one encounters a declaration that a certain poet-
author-theologian was or was not a mystic because their experience was
or was not ‘unitive’, ‘extravertive’ or ‘inef fable’. These terms themselves are
thorny. Surely the root of the inef fability of the mystical state might lie
less with the experience than with the linguistic skills of the experiencer?
As we examine in Chapter Four, for over a century readers of Emerson
have battled over whether he was or was not a mystic through arguing, for
example, that he may not have experienced God, but that he did experience
Nature, and hence he was a ‘nature mystic’ (Quinn 1950).3 Little, I would
argue, is clarified in employing God or Nature as distinctive definitions
of mysticism, as owing to their inherent arbitrariness they would them-
3 A new term, indeed, was coined for Emerson based on his particular religious yet
anti-ecclesiastical spiritual philosophy: ‘Yankee mystic’ (Hurth 2005: 336).
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 87
What is mysticism?
So how does one judge these textual accounts of mystical experiences against
the scholarship? Which of the many classifications does one turn to in order
to qualify or refute the mystical nature of a given author or text? The essen-
tial standpoint for many of the scholars that justifies this array of of ferings
is the inherent inexplicability of the mystical experience. From the early
scholarship of the end of the nineteenth century through to the present,
scholars have identified the initial problem of identifying what exactly it is
that they are investigating. William Ralph Inge (known normally as Dean
Inge), in his Christian Mysticism (1899) begins his investigation with the
assertion that the word itself is semantically slippery:
No word in our language – not even ‘Socialism’ – has been employed more loosely
than ‘Mysticism.’ Sometimes it is used as an equivalent for symbolism or allegorism,
sometimes for theosophy or occult science; and sometimes it merely suggests the
mental state of a dreamer, or vague and fantastic opinions about God and the world.
In Roman Catholic writers, ‘mystical phenomena’ mean supernatural suspensions of
physical law. Even those writers who have made a special study of the subject, show
by their definitions of the word how uncertain is its connotation. (1913: 3)
4 ‘(1) that all division and separateness is unreal, and that the universe is a single indivis-
ible unity; (2) that evil is illusory, and that the illusion arises through falsely regarding
a part as self-subsistent; (3) that time is unreal, and that reality is eternal, not in the
sense of being everlasting, but in the sense of being wholly outside time’ (Russell
1961: 179).
88 Chapter Two
However, many years later Inge revisited the designations, this time categori-
cally expunging from his definitions those matters contrary to orthodoxy,
such as supernatural, erotic, etc.
I cannot accept any definition which identifies mysticism with excited or hysterical
emotionalism, with sublimated eroticism, with visions and revelations, with super-
natural (dualistically opposed to natural) activities, nor, on the philosophical side,
with irrationalism. I suggest that a generation which treats its experience of ghosts
with respect ought not to be rude about the experience of God. I propose to divide
my subject into three sections ontological, the doctrine of ultimate reality; episte-
mological, the doctrine of knowledge; and ethical, the chart by which the mystic
finds his way up the hill of the Lord. (Inge 1947: 154)
William James, who cited Inge in Varieties of Religious Experience and
who argued like Schopenhauer that the mystical experience is at the heart
of all religious experience, maintained that both mysticism and religion
are themselves impossible to define: ‘Most books on the philosophy of
religion try to begin with a precise definition of what its essence consists
of. […] The very fact that they are so many and so dif ferent from one
another is enough to prove that the word “religion” cannot stand for any
single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name’ (1913: 26). Like
Inge’s use of ‘socialism’ James used as analogy the word ‘government’, sug-
gesting that it signifies many dif ferent and at times conf licting things,
yet its full meaning relies on a composite of all these disparate meanings.
Importantly, and in tune with so much of Borges’ philosophical outlook,
James acknowledged that in so many cases, an investigation into religion
or mysticism is in essence an investigation into the language employed to
describe these ideas: ‘the question of definition tends to become a dispute
about names’ (1913: 30). This linguistic variance, as we shall see later in this
chapter when discussing the problem of textual hermeneutics of mystical
texts, is of crucial importance.
Frits Staal, in Exploring Mysticism (1975: 8), likewise identified the
problem of names, arguing that ‘The study of mysticism [has] tended to
deteriorate into enumerations and classifications of a variety of narratives,
without any attempt at a critical evaluation.’ Whilst I would argue that
there is critical evaluation (as, curiously, does Staal himself in his book),
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 89
Staal does identify the problem that I will discuss in the following chapter
concerning the semantic circularity that can ensue in a debate about mys-
ticism. It is defined according to other terms whose meaning then often
needs defining. In some cases this chain of signifiers can lead back to the
use of the word ‘mysticism’ to define one of these sequential terms. Jaf fé
(1989: 12) is, for example, admirably precise in suggesting that mysticism
is ‘the experience of the numinous’, but in this matter one needs to define
the term ‘numinous’, a similarly tricky exercise. Staal also identifies the
many dif ficulties in studying mysticism; most notable among them is that
‘it is not so simple’ (1975: 124). ‘We call a mystic anyone who for a certain
length of time has mystical experiences’ (125). That is fair enough, but
what exactly is a mystical experience? More recently, David Wulf f, in one
of the chapters of Cardeña, Lynn and Krippner’s James-inspired Varieties
of Anomalous Experience (2000), has argued that: ‘Falling by definition
outside the realm of ordinary discourse, mystical experience eludes any
precise description or characterization. Furthermore, as relatively recent
constructions that serve diverse and even opposing purposes, the terms
mystical and mysticism are themselves hard to pin down’ (2000: 397). This
emphasis on meaning variance is important, as whilst Canto and Jurado
assert that – por supuesto – Borges was no mystic, they of fer little explana-
tion as to why this assertion is so immediately obvious. Were they to have
attempted to qualify the assertion with a more thorough investigation
into the meaning of the term ‘mystic’, they would have encountered many
choices of definitions, often contradictory.
James suggested that the terms can have dif ferent values attached to
them depending on the situation in which they are employed. Likewise,
he explored the definitions of mysticism according to certain aspects of
human experience that are not mysticism:
The words ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical’ are often used as terms of mere reproach, to throw
at any opinion which we regard as vague and vast and sentimental, and without a
base in either facts or logic. For some writers a ‘mystic’ is any person who believes in
thought-transference, or spirit-return. Employed in this way the word has little value:
there are too many less ambiguous synonyms. So, to keep it useful by restricting it, I
will do what I did in the case of the word ‘religion,’ and simply propose to you four
90 Chapter Two
marks which, when an experience has them, may justify us in calling it mystical for
the purpose of the present lectures. In this way we shall save verbal disputation, and
the recriminations that generally go therewith. (1913: 379)
Some Things Which Mysticism Is Not. The word ‘mysticism’ is popularly used in a
variety of loose and inaccurate ways. Sometimes anything is called ‘mystical’ which
is misty, foggy, vague, or sloppy. It is absurd that ‘mysticism’ should be associated
with what is ‘misty’ because of the similar sound of the words. And there is nothing
misty, foggy, vague, or sloppy about mysticism. A second absurd association is to
suppose that mysticism is sort of mystery-mongering. There is, of course, an etymo-
logical connection between ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystery.’ But mysticism is not any sort
of hocus-pocus such as we commonly associate with claims to be the elucidation
of sensational mysteries. Mysticism is not the same as what is commonly called the
‘occult’ – whatever that may mean. Nor has it anything to do with spiritualism, or
ghosts, or table-turning. Nor does it include what are commonly called parapsycho-
logical phenomena such as telepathy, telekinesis, clairvoyance, precognition. These
are not mystical phenomena. It is perhaps true that mystics may sometimes claim
to possess such special powers, but even when they do so they are well aware that
such powers are not part of, and are to be clearly distinguished from, their mystical
experience […]. Finally, it is most important to realize that visions and voices are
not mystical phenomena, though here again it seems to be the case that the sort of
persons who are mystics may often be the sort of persons who see visions and hear
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 91
voices […]. What mystics say is that a genuine mystical experience is nonsensuous.
It is formless, shapeless, colorless, odorless, soundless. But a vision is a piece of visual
imagery having color and shape. A voice is an auditory image. Visions and voices
are sensuous experiences.
5 In addition to being creator of Sherlock Holmes, Conan Doyle was a committed
researcher into spiritualism and related anomalous matters. Whilst I can find in
Borges no mention of Conan Doyle’s essay on Swedenborg, there are a couple of
areas of great similarity with Borges’ essay ‘Testigo’ that might indicate that Borges
was familiar with the essay:
‘They may say that the man was mad, but his life in the years which followed showed
no sign of mental weakness. Or they might say that he lied. But he was a man who
was famed for his punctilious veracity’ (Conan Doyle 2005: 99). ‘Dos conjeturas:
La deliberada impostura de quien ha escrito esas cosas extrañas o el inf lujo de una
demencia brusca o gradual. La primera es inadmisible. […] La hipótesis de la locura
no es menos vana. […] Si se hubiera enloquecido, no deberíamos a su pluma tenaz
la ulterior redacción de miles de metódicas páginas, que representan una labor de
casi treinta años y que nada tienen que ver con el frenesí’ (Borges 2005: 155) [‘Two
assumptions: deliberate imposture […] or the inf luence of sudden or progressive mad-
ness. The first is inadmissible. […] The hypothesis of madness is equally unfounded
[…] If he had gone mad, we would not owe to his tenacious pen the thousands of
methodical pages he wrote during the following thirty years or so, pages that have
nothing at all to do with frenzy’ (Borges 1995: 7–8)].
‘In spite of all his theological symbolism, his name must live eternally as the first
of all modern men who has given a description of the process of death, and of the
world beyond, which is not founded upon the vague ecstatic and impossible visions
of the old Churches, but which actually corresponds with the descriptions which we
ourselves obtain from those who endeavour to convey back to us some clear idea of
their new existence’ (Conan Doyle 2005: 104). ‘Swedenborg pudo renunciar a tales
artificios retóricos porque su tema no era el éxtasis del alma arrebatada y enajenada,
sino la puntual descripción de regiones ultraterrenas, pero precisas’ (Borges 2005:
154). [‘Swedenborg was able to abstain from this kind of rhetorical artifice because
his subject matter was not the ecstasy of a rapt and fainting soul but, rather, the
accurate description of regions that, though ultra-terrestrial, were clearly defined’]
(Borges 1995: 7).
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 93
lost receipt,6 the knowledge of the queen’s secret,7 and, most famously, his
contemporaneous knowledge of the fire in Stockholm whilst he was dining
in Gothenburg.8 Kant, it is to be assumed, would have paid little attention
6 ‘In April or May 1761, a countess de Marteville came to Swedenborg. Her husband,
ambassador extraordinary of the Netherlands, had died in Sweden. He had given
her a valuable silver service before he died. Now the silversmith was demanding a
payment she could not af ford even though she was sure her husband had paid for
it. The matter was urgent to the woman. She had heard Swedenborg could contact
the souls of the departed. Would he contact her husband and ask of the receipt?
Swedenborg said he would. Three days later he returned and said he had spoken with
her husband. The receipt was in a bureau upstairs. The woman said she had already
searched the bureau. The husband had told Swedenborg that a certain drawer was to
be pulled out and a false back removed. The woman and her company went upstairs
and found the receipt and other lost papers as directed. This incident was related by
eleven dif ferent sources, most of whom agreed on the above account. When ques-
tioned on the matter Swedenborg also af firmed its occurrence’ (Van Dusen 1974:
142).
7 ‘Swedenborg met the queen [Louisa Ulrica of Sweden] [who] lightly asked if he had
a message from her [dead] brother. Swedenborg answered yes and suggested that
they speak alone, and he related what he had learned from the queen’s brother. The
queen was variously described as in shock, disturbed, or so indisposed that she had
to retire. She said later that Swedenborg had reported what no other living person
knew’ (Van Dusen 1974: 143).
8 ‘On July 17, 1759, Swedenborg and fifteen others were guests of the prominent mer-
chant William Castel in Gothenburg at his fine home on Canal Street. At six in the
evening Swedenborg appeared quite pale and alarmed. When asked what was wrong,
he described a fire burning at that moment in Stockholm, three hundred miles away.
He paced in and out of the house evidently agitated by the fire. His detailed descrip-
tion and evident sincerity upset the guests, many of whom were from Stockholm.
Swedenborg described exactly where the fire was burning, where it had started, and
when, and was dismayed to see a friend’s house already in ashes. The next day, Sunday,
the governor, having heard of the incident, asked to see Swedenborg and received a
detailed report. The news spread through the city. Two days after the fire, messengers
arrived and confirmed every detail as Swedenborg had reported it, including when
and how it started, what it burned, and where and when it was contained. There were
several separate reports of this incident that agreed on essentials. Even the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant was impressed and sent his own agent to check the
details’ (Van Dusen 1974: 141).
94 Chapter Two
9 ‘The content of holotropic states of consciousness is often philosophical and mys-
tical. In these episodes, we can experience sequences of psychospiritual death and
rebirth or feelings of oneness with other people, nature, the universe, and God. We
might uncover what seem to be memories from other incarnations, encounter pow-
erful archetypal beings, communicate with discarnate entities, and visit numerous
mythological domains’ (Grof 1998: 7).
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 95
(1) The awakening of the Self to consciousness of Divine Reality. […] (2) Purgation
[self-knowledge] […] (3) Illumination […] a certain apprehension of the Absolute,
a sense of the Divine Presence: but not true union with it. It is a state of happiness.
(4) […] the final and complete purification of the Self, which is called by some con-
templatives the ‘mystic pain’ or ‘mystic death,’ by others the Purification of the Spirit
or Dark Night of the Soul. […] This is the ‘spiritual crucifixion’ so often described by
the mystics: the great desolation in which the soul seems abandoned by the Divine.
The Self now surrenders itself, its individuality, and its will, completely. It desires
nothing, asks nothing, is utterly passive, and is thus prepared for (5) Union: the true
goal of the mystic quest. In this state the Absolute Life is not merely perceived and
enjoyed by the Self, as in Illumination: but is one with it. This is the end towards
which all the previous oscillations of consciousness have tended. It is a state of equi-
librium, of purely spiritual life; characterized by peaceful joy, by enhanced powers,
by intense certitude. (1912: 205–7)
Suzuki (1956), a close reader of Swedenborg and admirer of James, and
the figure widely credited with introducing Zen spiritual practices into
the West in the early twentieth century, likened the word Satori to the
word mysticism, and thus arrived at his own salient eight characteristics:
Irrationality, Intuitive Insight, Authoritativeness, Af firmation, Sense of the
Beyond, Impersonal Tone, Feeling of Exaltation, Momentariness (103–8).
Stace (1961), arguing from a perennialist position – i.e. that there is a com-
monality in the mystical experience across time and cultures – divided the
mystical experience into ‘extrovertive’ and ‘introvertive’, whose character-
istics in common are: ‘1. The Unifying Vision – all things are One. 2. The
more concrete apprehension of the One as an inner subjectivity, or life,
in all things. 3. Sense of objectivity or reality. 4. Blessedness, peace, etc. 5.
Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine. 6. Paradoxicality 7. Alleged by mystics
to be inef fable’ (1961: 131–2). Zaehner (1961), drawing on a wider field than
James or Underhill in including his knowledge of Buddhist and Hindu
traditions, limited the field to three essential characteristics:
Therefore, I ask again, was Borges a mystic? Borges himself would answer
brusquely – of course not! Yet when we scrutinize the scholarship, we
encounter many markers that would, indeed, qualify him for the term; and
in order to address this question, one would need to position the reading
of Borges’ texts – including his autobiographical sketches in interviews –
alongside the many systems of classification. Underhill’s insistence upon the
intuitive approach over and above the intellectual or the theoretical would
fit only uneasily with an approach to mysticism concerning Borges, who,
as we have seen, praised the intellectual capacity of Swedenborg and Blake
above all other qualities. Williamson (2004: 444) records how Borges was
keen to seek the guidance from Shinto monks while in Japan.10 His desire
10 ‘During a visit to the Rioan-ji Temple, a centre of Zen Buddhism, he met a monk,
Morinaga Yushoku, with whom he had the most searching conversation of his entire
visit to Japan. As with the nun, Borges wished to learn something of Yushoku’s com-
mitment to the contemplative life, but above all he wanted to know whether the
monk had ever experienced a mystical enlightenment. María recalled that Borges kept
pressing this point, and Yushoku replied that he had twice experienced nirvana but
that it was impossible to convey such an experience to someone who had not himself
found enlightenment. All the same, Borges described to the monk an experience he
had undergone one night in the 1920s while roaming the outskirts of Buenos Aires,
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 99
in particular was to correlate his own timeless moments with the pathways
to enlightenment developed by the religious teachings of Japan. Borges
refers to Suzuki in the essay ‘El Budismo’ of Siete Noches as one of the
leading scholars of Buddhism in his time, to be applauded furthermore for
revitalizing Zen in his own native Japan. Consequently Suzuki’s equation
of satori and mystical vision is perfectly in tune with Borges’ meditation
on the close af finities between Oriental spiritual practices and western
mystical traditions.
Schopenhauer, whom Borges acclaimed as the most lucid and sound of
all philosophers, argued that mysticism is the origin and also the culmina-
tion of all religion, but that, unlike James’s suggestion of noetic value, no
knowledge is to be derived from the ecstatic mystical state. Indeed, argued
Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation (a book of which
Borges was particularly fond), mysticism opposes philosophy and cannot
constitute a pathway to consensual knowledge owing its inherently subjec-
tive rather than objective relationship with the individual.
[…] we see all religions at their highest point end in mysticism and mysteries, that
is to say, in darkness and veiled obscurity. These really indicate merely a blank spot
for knowledge, the point where all knowledge necessarily ceases. Hence for thought
this can be expressed only by negations, but for sense-perception it is indicated by
symbolical signs, in temples by dim light and silence, in Brahmanism even by the
required suspension of all thought and perception for the purpose of entering into
the deepest communion with one’s own self, by mentally uttering the mysterious
Om. In the widest sense, mysticism is every guidance to the immediate awareness
when the sight of a particular moonlit street had induced a preternatural sense that
time was an illusion [‘Sentirse en muerte’ (‘Feeling in Death’)]. Might such an epi-
sode qualify as a mystical illumination? That was possible, came the reply, since an
illumination could be prompted by any number of things, such as the ringing of a
bell or the sound of water f lowing over a stone, but true enlightenment would entail a
complete transformation of the soul and would change everything in a man’s life. The
monk explained that one must dispel the illusion of selfhood in order to experience
enlightenment: our sense of personal identity was the product of our conditioning,
but otherwise there was nothing within us, not basis for the existence of the self,
and so one must shed all notions of individuality and start again from zero before
one could reach nirvana’ (Williamson 2004: 443).
100 Chapter Two
Borges, as we shall see, would appear to agree with this sentiment with
regards his own mystical, ‘timeless’ experiences, and one might argue
that the repeated fictional representations of that state – the Aleph and
Tzinacán’s ecstasy – were means of objectifying and thereby abstracting
the inef fability of the experience. Consequently one might suggest that
Borges was a mystic in the Schopenhauerian sense. However, Schopenhauer
emphasizes the ‘blank spot for knowledge’, which would entail a contrary
position to James’s ‘noetic value’. We will explore in the following chapter
the degree to which Borges assumed that knowledge may or may not be
derived from the mystical experience. Schopenhauer, although rarely cited
in the scholarship of mysticism, nevertheless identified a binary division
that pervades all approaches to mysticism, what Daniels (2003) labels
Essentialism versus Constructivism. This particular division, as we will
also see in Chapter Three, is integral to Borges’ understanding both of the
mystical texts that he read, and of his own mystical experiences.
Some definitions of mysticism are complex; others are simple. One
of the most basic definitions I have encountered comes from Wilson Van
Dusen, Swedenborg scholar and self-avowed mystic:
I use the word mystic in its simplest and most basic sense. A mystic is one who
experiences God. There are other associated meanings and very complex analyses
in religious encyclopaedias, but they all rest in this – the experience of God. Some
might ask, ‘Don’t all people experience God?’ And I would answer yes, but many
are not aware of it. The mystic is aware of it. (Van Dusen 1995: 105)
however, is perfectly aligned with Ellwood (1999: 2): ‘For others direct
experience of God is the pinnacle of what religion is all about. Experiences
like these are often called mystical experiences’. Did Borges have direct
experience with God? Flynn (2009) was only able to identify the cease-
less philosophical search for God, not the encounter. Borges would argue
with reference to Shaw that ‘God is in the making’, and hence the divine
is immanent, not transcendent, and within the human soul. It is unlikely
that such an expression would chime with the more orthodox Zaehner.
Ellwood, however, appears fully cognizant of the problem inherent in defin-
ing mysticism, poignantly remarking that: ‘What is it that thousands of
other accounts of transcendent experience have or do not have in common?
A host of scholars have wrestled with this question in attempting to define
mysticism and mystical experience’ (1999: 15).
Alan Watts describes the mystical experience as the opposite of feel-
ing ‘that one is a separate individual in confrontation with a world that is
foreign to one’s self, that is “not me.” In the mystical kind of experience,
though, that separate individual finds itself to be of one and the same nature
or identity as the outside world. In other words the individual no longer
feels a stranger in the world; rather, the external world feels as if it were his
or her own body’ (2006: 35). The crucial aspect here in relation to Watts
is the notion of harmony and purpose: ‘It is the overwhelming sense that
everything that happens – everything that I or anybody else has done – is
part of a harmonious design and that there is no error at all’ (2006: 36). Be
that as it may, in tune with Borges, the reason for life need not be neces-
sarily to accomplish any thing directed by a divine will – the purpose may
simply to be alive. ‘The mystic has seen that the meaning of being alive is
just to be alive’ (2006: 37). Furthermore, owing to Borges’ inherently ludic
quality, he would fit with Watts’ description of the mystic: ‘The mystic is
the person who has realised that the game is a game’ (2006: 39).
As identified, these definitions cannot be considered conclusive, not
least owing to the contradictions amongst them when read as a body.
Likewise, as identified, the practices or experiences that are proposed that
are categorically not mystical experiences cannot be considered either so
easily identifiable or definable, nor so necessarily removed from the mystical
experience. Most of the features of anomalous experiences that Stace would
102 Chapter Two
so firmly assert do not constitute the mystical are, indeed, the prominent
features of many mystics appraised in the scholarship: Swedenborg, for
example, was a dedicated practitioner of breath control similar to yogic
techniques, seemingly with no knowledge of eastern practices (Van Dusen
1974: 19–21). One might argue, consequently, that his mystical experi-
ences were induced and therefore not at all passive in the Jamesian sense.
His psychic abilities are described above, and yet they cannot be divorced
from his explorations of the realm of the dead – indeed such explora-
tions are the psychic abilities. Lastly, his remarkably lucid dreams are of
paramount importance, as they both herald the onset of a mystical experi-
ence yet also provide the very doorway into these other landscapes. In the
case of Swedenborg, therefore, breath control, psychic abilities and lucid
dreaming – added to his meditative constitution, his dazzling intellect,
his energy and determination, his vast knowledge of the Bible and, let us
not overlook, his wealth – were all factors that together constituted the
mystic. Therefore it would seem pernickety to isolate his talents as being
individually not mystic, corporately mystic. The purpose of this preamble
concerning Swedenborg is not to demonstrate that Borges was divested
with similar talents, but to give some platform from which to demonstrate
that those talents that Borges did have are not so easily consigned to the
category of mere ‘mystery-mongering’ (Stace 1960), and may be appraised
as manifest mystical attributes.
and woke up’ (Barnstone 1982: 21).11 This deserves greater consideration
than has been hitherto granted, as the ability to take positive, conscious
decisions within a dream, to the point of choosing to wake and depart
the dream state, is one that few possess and many strive to achieve. Green
(1994), in her ground-breaking study: Lucid dreaming: the paradox of con-
sciousness during sleep, notes that the technique of lucid dreaming has for
centuries and in many dif ferent cultures been integrally related to matters
of religious experience and spiritual practice, and has been the hallmark
of so many accounts of mystical experiences. Borges also remarks in the
essay on nightmares in Siete Noches that the experience of vivid dreams of
such lucidity that they resemble waking life is an attribute of children (his
nephew) and mystics: ‘Todo corría para él en un solo plano, la vigilia y el
sueño. Lo que nos lleva a otra hipótesis, a la hipótesis de los místicos […].
Para el salvaje [de Frazer] o para el niño los sueños son un episodio de la
vigilia, para los poetas y los místicos no es imposible que toda la vigilia sea
un sueño’ (1989: 223) [‘Everything, waking and dream, occurred to him on
a single plane. This brings us to another, similar but contrary, hypothesis:
that of the mystics and the metaphysicians. For [Frazer’s] savage and for
the child, dreams are episodes of the waking life; for poets and mystics, it
is not impossible for all of the waking life to be a dream’] (1984: 29).12 It
is clear from this and from many other similar assertions of Borges, that
one of the central features of the mystical life, that he himself shared, was
the vivid, lucid, intense dream.
11 He repeats this, almost verbatim, in another interview in the same volume (Barnstone
1982: 73).
12 It must be noted for the record that Weinberger’s translation of this passage is wrong
and radically alters the sense of the text. Borges writes that his nephew, having
recounted his dream to Borges in which his uncle had appeared: ‘Se interrumpió
bruscamente y agregó: “Decime, ¿qué estabas haciendo en esa casita?”’ (1989: 223).
Weinberger translates: ‘I interrupted him sharply: “Stop making things up about
my house!”’ (1984: 29). Unfortunately the translation contrasts with the sense of
the passage, as it suggests that Borges was unsympathetic to his nephew’s confusion,
when in the original text he is delighted by it.
104 Chapter Two
Whilst Borges dramatizes the faculty of lucid dreaming in the fic-
tion of the mago of ‘Las ruinas circulares’, a more precise and less dramatic
account, which seems less fictional and more autobiographical, is ‘Episodio
del enemigo’ [‘Episode of the Enemy’] from Elogio de la sombra. In this
brief text, the Borges-protagonist is confronted by an ancient rival whom
he has evaded for years. At the point in which the antagonist is about to
murder him, Borges’ only strategy to save himself is to wake up, which he
does. The perennial narrative motif of revealing that it was all a dream,
when correlated with Borges’ comments to Barnstone, further demon-
strates his vivid experience of lucid dreaming. Furthermore, and whilst I
am aware that we should treat the passages of Atlas with the same criti-
cal scrutiny as one should treat any of the Ficciones, nevertheless there is
a strong autobiographical, reminiscent quality to the pieces. In Atlas, as I
remarked in the Introduction, are passages in which Borges recounts dream-
dialogues with the dead, in particular with Haydée Lange. Three lines of
argument can be pursued. Firstly, as mentioned, one may argue that this
is merely a fiction and therefore of no consequence in the meta-fictional
world; secondly, that it was not a fiction per se, but was only a dream and
therefore likewise of no consequence ‘in the real world’. The third line of
argument is of interest to me and was of manifest interest to Borges: that
in this mysterious world many things are possible, such as the persistence
of the soul after death, and the possibility for that discarnate soul (Lange)
to enter dialogue with an incarnate soul (Borges) through dreams. This last
possibility was of great interest also to Jung, and was explored by him in
his private accounts that became The Red Book. One question that arises in
this work, in relation to Jung’s dream of his father, was whether he dreamt
of his father, or whether his father visited him in his dream. Answers to this
question are unlikely to be forthcoming, but the purpose is to show that
such a question was of great concern to Borges, the non-mystic por supuesto;
and yet dream encounters of this nature were the bedrock of Swedenborg’s
communication with spirits of the spirit-world, and were thus integrally
related to those qualities considered mystical.
The importance of dreams and dream-creativity in Borges’ poems and
fictions is well-documented, and indeed, reading through my extensive
notes of Borges citations that serve as background for this work, I am struck
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 105
by the hundreds of appearances of the words ‘dream’ and ‘sueño’. There is
scarcely an essay, tale, poem or interview in which Borges does not discuss
the creative possibility of dreams, the timeless dimension encountered, the
epistemological capacity ( James’s ‘noetic’), the traditional ancient dialectic,
from Chuang-Tzu to Calderón and Shakespeare, of life as a dream, and,
importantly, his intuition that dreams and visions are a pathway to the
eternal. He declares, for example, in the lecture on the nightmare in Siete
Noches, apropos J. W. Dunne’s Experiments with Time: ‘A cada hombre le
está dado, con el sueño, una pequeña eternidad personal que le permite ver
su pasado cercano y su porvenir cercano’ (1989: 222) [‘Each man is given,
in dreams, a little personal eternity which allows him to see the recent past
and the near future’] (1984: 28). Borges concludes the lecture with the
observation ‘que los sueños son una obra estética, quizá la expresión estética
más antigua’ (1989: 231) [‘that dreams are an aesthetic work, perhaps the
most ancient aesthetic expression’] (1984: 40). He describes in ‘Inferno, I,
32’ (El Hacedor) how Dante was touched by the divine in a dream and was
given an image that would crown his poetic cycle (a narrative not dissimilar
from ‘El milagro secreto’). He wrote plentifully about Coleridge’s reverie-
inspired poem Kubla Khan, and he was likewise fascinated by Stevenson’s
account of receiving plots fully formed in his dreams from the Brownies,
whom Stevenson formally acknowledges and thanks.
However, Borges was not merely speculating on the creative power of
dreams, nor was he merely illustrating an abstract idea in his fictions. He
also described receiving poems and plots fully f ledged in his reveries. For
example, he described to Barnstone how the poem ‘El ciervo blanco’ [‘The
White Deer’] came to him in its entirety in a dream: ‘I don’t feel that I
wrote that poem […]. I physically dictated the words. The poem was given
to me, in a dream, some minutes before dawn. At times dreams are pain-
ful and tedious, and I object to their outrage and say, enough, this is only
a dream, stop. But this time it was an oral picture that I saw and heard. I
simply copied it, exactly as it was given to me’ (Barnstone 2000: 30). He
recalled to Burgin that El Hacedor was his favourite book ‘because it wrote
itself ’ (Burgin 1969: 125). He described in other interviews that sonnets
appeared to enter his conscious mind from some apparent source beyond
consciousness; he described dreams and nightmares as being given to him
106 Chapter Two
for the purpose of making poetry; and he repeatedly described the divine
or demonic source of dreams and nightmares. So whilst Underhill might
boldly assert that mysticism is not a term to be applied ‘to “menticulture”
and sorcery, dreamy poetry’, nevertheless we can assess these matters in light
of their collective relationship to what may be considered a mystical nature.
We are, consequently, in a dif ficult position with mysticism. Too much
worrying about a definition is proscriptive and becomes an exercise of hair-
splitting. Too little concern for a definition allows any experience to muscle
in under its banner, and the word becomes meaningless. One solution is to
combine together all the defining characteristics as put forward by over a
century of scholars. This then becomes a wild and unwieldy shopping list
riddled with contradictions, and the selection of one defining category
over another becomes either arbitrary or an attempt to match the text with
the theory. Another solution is to seek a general term, generous enough
to embrace the various scholars’ findings, yet limited enough to guarantee
some purchase on the term. This, of course, is what so many scholars have
attempted to do, and yet no unified theory has emerged that does not jar
with some previous attempt at the unified theory. The only workable solu-
tion, therefore, is to enquire exactly why such a definition is required. Is it
in order to assess whether one figure was or was not a mystic, as is Quinn’s
case with Emerson (see Chapter Four)? If so, the response can only be
articulated by stating that, for the purposes of the present study, the defi-
nition of the term as of fered by, say, Underhill, or James, will suf fice; but
that this definition is by no means foundational. The conclusion will be,
therefore, that so-and-so was a mystic, according to certain principles of
James, was not according to the principles of Underhill, equally was not
according to the principles of Zaehner, but may have been according to
Stace. Consequently, and notwithstanding its inconsequentiality, in relation
to our investigation into Borges, one might suggest that he was a mystic
and he was not a mystic.
Borges, as we explored in Chapter One, emphasized the authority of
the mystical experience unmediated by doctrine or dogma, which makes
the experience somehow atextual. He established a forthright distinction
between the ‘authentic’ experiences of Swedenborg, and the textually-
inspired, and consequently ‘invented’ texts of Dante. He declared that the
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 107
visions of Dante could not have occurred in verse, and that Fray Luis de
León was merely mimicking the Song of Songs. His own ‘mystical’ experi-
ences he described as being ‘genuine’ and therefore likewise unmediated by
prior textual assumptions. I suggested that this distinction is itself highly
problematic because it implies that an experience may be free from textual
inspiration – a position that appears contradictory to the whole Borges
project, where texts inspire experiences, experiences inspire texts, texts are
experiences and experiences are texts.
The vast scholarship of mysticism concentrates on approaching the
mystical experience through a variety of epistemological avenues: historical,
theological, psychological (and psychopathological), sociological, philo-
sophical, and phenomenological. Inge, James, Underhill, Zaehner, Stace,
Otto, Watts, Staal, and other scholars, in their variegated and thorough
approaches to the fields of mysticism, move towards helpful categorical
distinctions of the mystical experience. Yet despite this comprehensive
critical approach, few scholars appear to have considered the complex
dynamic concerning experience, recollection, textual reproduction of the
experience, and the ensuing act of reading. Where is the mystical moment?
Is there a transmission through these levels? Can there be betrayal of the
experience, falsehood, parody? Can the putative mystical experience be
invented? If so, and allowing the noetic value of the imagination as sug-
gested by Blake, Jung, Corbin and Borges himself, can the invention of a
mystical text constitute for the inventor a mystical experience? Stace (1960:
9) was emphatic that the mystic ‘always mean[s] a person who himself has
had mystical experience’ and that the word should not be applied simply
to ‘anyone who is sympathetic to mysticism’. This would imply that the
mystical encounter is between the experiencer (mystic) and the experience
(mystical state) and not between the textual account of the experience and
the reader or scholar. How do we define the mystical text itself ? William
James, for example, defines ‘inef fability’ as one of the four attributes of
the mystical experience, yet can ef fability be given such a clear category?
If the experience is truly inef fable then both the mystic and the reader of
the mystic’s text rely on a textual approximation of the experience, not the
experience itself; and thus a highly accomplished writer would be capable of
crafting a text closer to the experience than one inexperienced in expressive
108 Chapter Two
Thus I wish to emphasize the role of the text, and in order to do so, and in
order to address more fully the position maintained by Stace of distinguish-
ing mystic from scholar, I shall compare two ‘mystical’ texts of Borges – one
‘real’ and one ‘fictional’, allowing for the permeability of these terms. The
first, which he labelled ‘sentirse en muerte’, is a purportedly honest (i.e.
non-fictional) account of a moment of eternity that Borges experienced as
a young man. It is the experience that he later discussed with Barnstone as
one of his ‘mystical moments’ and which, according to Williamson (2004:
444), spurred him to an exploration of its meaning with Japanese Shinto
monks in 1979. The second is the oft-quoted mystical moment in ‘El Aleph’,
an invented, fictional account of ecstatic vision which Borges described as
based on his ‘reading about time and eternity’ (Burgin 1998: 212). By the
standards that Borges himself applied in his appraisal of Swedenborg and
Dante, can we establish that the first passage is ‘authentic’ and the second
not so? My first hypothesis here would be that both are real and both are
textual – indeed both are real because they are both textual. My second posi-
tion would be that the text’s mystical qualities can only be judged through
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 109
an understanding of the transformative ef fect upon the reader, and that
if this moment of textual jouissance is somehow impaired by the reader’s
assumption that the text is merely fictional, then the text, for that reader,
is not mystical. However, as a colleague of mine averred, if the reading of
the ‘fictional’ ‘Aleph’ constitutes a truly transformative experience, then, for
that particular reader, the text is manifestly mystical. No cross-referencing
the scholarship of mysticism in order to determine the text’s characteristics
will af fect that. Borges’ emphasis on authenticity and fictionality are thus
unworkable platforms for an understanding of mystical texts. Furthermore,
to muddy the waters even more, I hope to establish that the text of ‘sentirse
en muerte’ reads like one of Borges’ fictions, and that both his evaluation
of his own mystical experience and the experience itself were inf luenced by
Borges’ reading of James. Consequently, and in tune with Borges’ visions
of the textual nature of experience, I would argue that the ‘non-fictional’
account is, itself, strikingly fictional.
As Flynn identifies, Borges was clearly moved by his experiences of
timelessness, motivating him to recount the most profound of the two in
three separate essays; and in the essay ‘Historia de la Eternidad’ to appraise
the experience as a corollary of the many treatments of eternity and infin-
ity that he analyses.
The liminal revelation of the timeless moment in ‘Sentirse en muerte’ recalls the
experience of the nullity of self and personality which Borges had recounted in ‘La
nadería de la personalidad’. The fundamental dif ference between the two, despite their
shared revelatory character, is that the experience of 1923 is perceived as negative, of
annihilating any notion of oneness and plenitude, whereas the experience of 1928 is
positive, albeit unsustained, and recounted by Borges as addenda to various other texts
over three successive decades. It is what he longs for and yet only ever experiences as
a f leeting state of utter contentedness. ‘Sentirse en muerte’ is about the experience of
a union with, and at the same time a transcendence of, the material universe; at once
becoming one with the material universe, and dissolving its very constituents: time
and selfhood. This is reminiscent of the mystic who, in union with the divine, passes
from time to eternity. But is Borges’ ecstatic moment a life-transforming, mystical
union with God? It surely is a case of momentary transcendence and may well have
been a spiritual moment that was perhaps over analysed and therefore only wistfully
remembered and reiterated over decades. (Flynn 2009: 65–6)
110 Chapter Two
Deseo registrar aquí una experiencia que tuve hace unas noches: fruslería demasiado
evanescente y extática para que la llame aventura; demasiado irrazonable y sentimental
para pensamiento. Se trata de una escena y de su palabra: palabra ya antedicha por
mí, pero no vivida hasta entonces con entera dedicación de mi yo. Paso a historiarla,
con los accidentes de tiempo y de lugar que la declararon. (1974: 365–6)
[I wish to record an experience I had a few nights ago: a triviality too evanescent
and ecstatic to be called an adventure, too irrational and sentimental for thought.
It was a scene and its word: a word I had spoken but had not fully lived with all my
being until then. I will recount its history and the accidents of time and place that
revealed it to me.] (2000: 137)
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 111
What was this word, with which he was familiar in theory but not in
practical experience? In tune with the essay, the word would be ‘eternity’,
but in tune with other essays, it would be ‘mysticism’. Borges makes firm
declarations about the nature of the experience. It was too f lighty to be
called adventure, which would chime immediately with James’s decree of
‘transiency’. We recall that it was the extensive duration of Dante’s vision,
the fact that it was not transient (plus the versification) that led Borges to
suggest that Dante was not a mystic. Borges’ experience was also too full of
feeling, too removed from reason, to be called a thought. This would appear
perfectly cognate with James’s category of ‘inef fable’, which James quali-
fies as ‘[t]he subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no
adequate report of its contents can be given in words. […] its quality must
be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In
this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states
of intellect’ (1913: 380). However, he describes a great many thoughts that
he had whilst undergoing this experience; or are these the thoughts that
he had when recalling the experience?
The passage itself is highly textual, reading like one of his tales; with
familiar symbols that he notes are symbols in his fiction: the dark grasslands
of the South, the lonely streets of the rough suburbs, the humble houses,
the scattered symbols of the bird and crickets. ‘No quiero significar así el
barrio mío, el preciso ámbito de la infancia, sino sus todavía misteriosas
inmediaciones: confín que he poseído entero en palabras y poco en reali-
dad, vecino y mitológico a un tiempo’ (1974: 366) [‘I am not alluding to
my own neighborhood, the precise circumference of my childhood, but
to its still mysterious outskirts; a frontier region I have possessed fully in
words and very little in reality, at once adjacent and mythical’] (2000:
137). He feels that he is walking in a landscape already made literature
by him. He is therefore the character in a fiction, and everything is being
fictionalized by him, either at the point of experience or in its retelling:
‘No habrá manera de nombrar la ternura mejor que ese rosado’ (1974: 366)
[‘Tenderness could have no better name than that rose color’] (138). This
is qualified by his inability to escape literary allusion in the text: ‘me alejó
hacia unos barrios, de cuyo nombre quiero siempre acordarme’ (1974: 366)
[‘gravitation pushed me toward neighborhoods whose name I wish always
112 Chapter Two
to remember’] (2000: 137), and one wonders whether this Cervantine line
came to him at the point of the experience, during a reminiscence, or at
the point of writing the text.
Pensé, con seguridad en voz alta: Esto es lo mismo de hace treinta años. […] El fácil
pensamiento Estoy en mil ochocientos y tantos dejó de ser unas cuantas aproximativas
palabras y se profundizó a realidad. Me sentí muerto, me sentí percibidor abstracto
del mundo: indefinido temor imbuido de ciencia que es la mejor claridad de la meta-
física. No creí, no, haber remontado las presuntivas aguas del Tiempo; más bien me
sospeché poseedor del sentido reticente o ausente de la inconcebible palabra eternidad.
Sólo después alcancé a definir esa imaginación. (1974: 366–7)
motivated him to seek deeper knowledge of the experience years later in
Japan. One would suggest that the experience also fuelled his interest in
mystical writers across the world’s literatures. And yet can we consider
this episode to have been, as Borges emphasizes with Swedenborg, some-
how outside of textual inf luence? As we have seen, the episode conforms
closely to two of James’s categories: transiency and passivity. Its inef fability
is impossible to judge, as without being Borges we are in no position to
determine the proximity between the textual reproduction and the expe-
rience itself. Its ‘noetic value’ – an arbitrary definition, to be sure – would
appear to be codified into Borges’ philosophical perspective regarding
the f lexibility of time. Indeed his inclusion of this episode in the various
essays would demonstrate his consideration of it as an ideal case study to
defend his radical theories of time. The inclusion of the passage in the
essay ‘Historia de la Eternidad’ indicates the relationship with the many
philosophical accounts of eternity that Borges encountered in literature,
and his own transient experience. As Kripal argues about the scholarship
of mysticism, James, Underhill and other writers were only able to explore
the nebulous fields of mysticism with such integrity because the texts they
read chimed so closely with their own, often unstated, mystical experiences.
Would Borges the reader, however, judge his own text as a fiction? This
is an important question based, as discussed, on his division of Dante and
Swedenborg into the fictional (poetic) and the non-fictional (authentic).
Firstly, this may be merely a question of style: many readers across the
decades have been unsettled by the exquisitely realist nature of some of
Borges’ tales in which time’s f lexibility is explored. ‘El encuentro’ [‘The
Meeting’] from El Libro de Arena concerns the young and the old Borges
sitting by a river each attempting to establish who is dreaming who. Its
realism makes it uncanny, and yet we read it as a fiction primarily because,
despite its outlandishness, it accompanies a selection of fantastic tales in
the volume. Yet were it to have been included as an episode in one or more
philosophical essays (as in the case of ‘sentirse en muerte’) and were Borges
to have discussed it autobiographically in interviews, then our interpreta-
tive position would be dif ferent. It is thus the contextual quality beyond
the textual that will determine the reader’s judgment of authenticity. The
sister tale to El encuentro is ‘Veinticinco de agosto, 1983’, from La Memoria
114 Chapter Two
single of the myriad readers of the tale could ever have considered Daneri
a mystic – his character is too asinine, what Molloy (1994: 54) describes
as ‘an af fected middle-brow braggart’ – and thus one must assume that as
readers we have already made the basic assumption that a mystical experi-
ence does not necessarily make a mystic. This essential assumption forms
the basis of another tremendous debate that has dominated the scholarship
of mysticism since William James and which fuelled Underhill’s critique of
James: the relationship between drugs (psychedelics) and mystical states
(see Huston Smith [2000], Rowlandson [2013]). Cohen (1973: 83) perhaps
alludes to this matter when suggesting that ‘“The Zahir” and “The Aleph”
describe false ways of inducing vision which, as Borges admits, produce false
or partial, and always terrible, experiences.’ Such a statement is reminiscent
of so much of the literature (Underhill, Zaehner, Von Franz) in which psy-
chedelic experiences are described as ‘false’ pathways towards knowledge,
or the divine. Núñez-Faraco (2006: 47) is the only critic to my knowledge
to have likened the experience of the Aleph to a drug-induced vision, sug-
gesting that the use of the words ‘veneno’ and ‘narcótico’ ‘is particularly
interesting for its many literary associations, both ancient and modern’;
and whilst a case could be made that Borges may have been aware of, for
example, James’s description of the state of nitrous oxide intoxication, this is
not my purpose here. It is pertinent, I would argue, simply to highlight the
basic postulation, related to Bossart’s ‘failed enlightenment’, that a mystic
is characterized as a mystic not for the experiences he has undergone, but
for some visible manifestation of those experiences upon his character and
behaviour. Furthermore, such assumptions would not necessarily correlate
with the definitions of William James, who, unlike Stace and Pahnke,
did not appraise the legacy of the experience upon the individual beyond
the notion of ‘noetic value’. Had Daneri composed splendid poetry, like
Dante, San Juan de la Cruz or William Blake, would the noetic value be
of greater worth here?
The Borges-narrator presents a phenomenological problem with
his description of the Aleph which exposes the curious relationship
between Borges-author and the Borges-narrator-character. Both identify
the Jamesian ‘inef fable’ quality of a mystical experience, and express the
problem of inef fability as a linguistic problem based not on the lack of
116 Chapter Two
Todo lenguaje es un alfabeto de símbolos cuyo ejercicio presupone un pasado que los
interlocutores comparten; […] Los místicos, en análogo trance, prodigan los emble-
mas: para significar la divinidad, un persa habla de un pájaro que de algún modo es
todos los pájaros; Alanus de Insulis, de una esfera cuyo centro está en todas partes y
la circunferencia en ninguna; Ezequiel, de un ángel de cuatro caras que a un tiempo
se dirige al Oriente y al Occidente, al Norte y al Sur. (1974: 624–5)
[All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared
past. […] Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols: to signify the
godhead, one Persian speaks of a bird that somehow is all birds; Alanus de Insulis,
of a sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference is nowhere; Ezekiel, of
a four-faced angel who at one and the same time moves east and west, north and
south.] (1971a: 26)
[The use of any word whatsoever presupposes a shared experience, for which the
word is the symbol. If someone speaks to us about the f lavor of cof fee, it is because
we have already tasted it; if about the color yellow, because we have already seen
lemons, gold, wheat, and sunsets. To suggest the inef fable union of man’s soul with
the divine being, the Sufis of Islam found themselves obliged to resort to prodigious
analogies, to images of roses, intoxication, or carnal love. Swedenborg was able to
abstain from this kind of rhetorical artifice because his subject matter was not the
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 117
ecstasy of a rapt and fainting soul but, rather, the accurate description of regions
that, though ultra-terrestrial, were clearly defined.] (1995: 7)13
13 Borges argues this elsewhere, in another essay on Swedenborg from 1978: ‘Hay una
diferencia esencial entre Swedenborg y los otros místicos. En el caso de San Juan de
la Cruz, tenemos descripciones muy vividas del éxtasis. Tenemos el éxtasis referido en
términos de experiencias eróticas o con metáforas de vino. Por ejemplo, un hombre
que se encuentra con Dios, y Dios es igual a sí mismo. Hay un sistema de metáforas.
En cambio, en la obra de Swedenborg no hay nada de eso. Es la obra de un viajero
que ha recorrido tierras desconocidas y que las describe tranquila y minuciosamente’
(2005: 200) [‘There is an essential dif ference between Swedenborg and the other
mystics. In the case of St John of the Cross, we have very vivid descriptions of ecstasy.
Ecstasy referred to in erotic terms or with metaphors of wine. For example, a man
encounters God, and God is the same as the man. There is a system of metaphors.
In the work of Swedenborg, on the other hand, there is none of this. It is the work
of a traveller who has explored unknown lands and who describes them in precise
detail’] (my translation).
118 Chapter Two
The Borges-narrator is thus making the same assumptions that we later find
in Borges’ many statements about Pascal, Dante, Luis de León, Juan de la
Cruz and Weatherhead; that their texts are somehow ‘non-mystical’ or even
‘false’ because they are literary – i.e. textually-inspired. As discussed in the
previous chapter, this is a perplexing conundrum, as it implies both the
possibility of a non-literary text and, more subtle yet equally Borgesian, the
possibility of a non-textual experience. Despite, therefore, his knowledge
of de Lille and Ezekiel, the Borges-narrator is suggesting not only that his
description of the vision of the Aleph in the basement of Daneri’s house was
somehow free of prior textual inf luence, but that the experience itself was
somehow free of this inf luence. As suggested earlier, this division between
experience and textual account of the experience, which can constitute
a tremendous gulf, is scarcely addressed in the scholarship of mysticism.
It is abundantly clear that the ecstatic passage at the heart of ‘El Aleph’,
‘[e]l inefable centro de mi relato’, is absurd, and, akin to the absurdity of
Funes’ perpetual ecstasy, constitutes a parodic inversion of possible mys-
tical rapture. Whilst we may assert that Borges was employing a fictional
space in order to appraise his own prior experience, so may we justifiably
argue that the tale is merely an exquisitely crafted parody of mysticism; and
whilst Borges praised Estela Canto for appreciating that the text was mys-
tical, so Borges himself argued that it was nothing more than an invented
tale inspired by his reading material. Borges explains the artifice, or the
invention, of this passage:
A man in Spain asked me whether the aleph actually existed. Of course it doesn’t. He
thought the whole thing was true. I gave him the name of the street and the number
of the house. He was taken in very easily. […] That piece gave me great trouble, yes.
I mean, I had to give a sensation of endless things in a single paragraph. Somehow,
I got away with it.
Q: Is that an invention, the aleph, or did you find it in some reference?
No. I’ll tell you, I was reading about time and eternity. Now eternity is supposed to
be timeless. I mean, God or a mystic perceives in one moment all of our yesterdays,
Shakespeare says, all the past, all the present, all the future. And I said, why not
apply that, well, that invention to another category, not to time, but to space? Why
not imagine a point in space wherein the observer may find all the rest. I mean, who
invented space? And that was the central idea. Then I had to invent all the other
things, to make it into a funny story, to make it into a pathetic story, that came
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 119
afterwards. My first aim was this: in the same way that many mystics have talked of
eternity … that’s a big word, an eternity, an everness. And also neverness; that’s an
awful word. Since we have an idea of eternity, of foreverness in time, why not apply
the same idea to space, and think of a single point in space wherein the whole of
space may be found? I began with that abstract idea, and then, somehow, I came to
that quite enjoyable story. (Burgin 1998: 212)
Such is the power of the fiction that the man in Spain failed to perceive
the artifice and sought the actual Aleph. One must assume, therefore, that
fact or fiction, genuine or imagined, the tale clearly is capable of delivering
a tremendous impact upon the reader. J. M. Cohen (1973: 81), meanwhile,
argued that Borges was attempting to mimic the ecstasies of Böhme: ‘The
idea for the Aleph itself came, I believe, from a passage in the biography of
Jakob Boehme which describes his first illumination in 1599. It is quoted
by William James in his Varieties of Religious Experience.’ This is a power-
ful statement, as it implies not only a familiarity with the mystical text of
Böhme, but also with James’ scholarship of mysticism, something we will
explore in the next chapter.
Likewise, whilst it has been suggested that Borges was searching for a
fictional text in which to explore his own ‘timeless’ moment (‘sentirse en
muerte’), the inef fable centre of ‘El Aleph’ appears less a reaction to his
own personal experience than to the philosophical perplexity caused by the
gulf between personal experience and textual accounts of mystical ecstasy.
Countless responses to ‘El Aleph’, from academic articles and book chapters,
to biographical accounts and reviews, describe the central episode as being
mystical. Canto and Kodama, as mentioned above, both identify a strong
mystical dimension to it; Alazraki calls the Aleph a ‘mystic symbol’ (1988:
49); Jason Wilson (2006: 16–17) considers it an extensive ‘Buddhist joke’
ridiculing the inability to capture Nirvana, and qualifying this perspective
by suggesting that this is the predicament that mystics encounter.
Buddhism also warns that language cannot communicate Nirvana, the void beyond
appearances. Truth is not found in words; Borges’s greatest fable, the fiction ‘The
Aleph’, is also a Buddhist joke. The vision granted to Borges under the staircase in the
story cannot be recreated in sequential words, despite Borges’s lists. Only a mystic
outside time can see everything at once, but then cannot communicate it.
120 Chapter Two
Yet is the text truly mystical? The ecstatic heart of the tale evokes the vision-
ary raptures of Meister Eckhart, Hildegard of Bingen or Teresa de Ávila.
In particular, and ref lecting Borges’ familiarity with the poetry of William
Blake, the tale may appear to suggest Blake’s ‘Auguries of Innocence’: ‘To see
a world in a grain of sand, / And a heaven in a wild f lower, / Hold infinity
in the palm of your hand, / And eternity in an hour’. Despite these illus-
trious antecedents, the tale’s complex intertextuality and its metatextual
gameplaying with regards literary figures of Argentine letters (Williamson
2004) provide a context in which the mystical rapture appears wantonly
parodic to the extent of ridicule. It is also the most extreme of images –
the vision of totality. Amidst the mundane context of a basement in a
soon-to-be-demolished house belonging to a pompous poet, the narrator
appears to experience a vision of totality that far exceeds even the most
sublime descriptions of visionary poets. Whereas Henry Vaughan’s cosmic
poem ‘A vision’ (1650) begins ‘I saw Eternity the other Night’, this poem
is generally considered a dream-like poetic image rather than the descrip-
tion of a genuine experience. The Borges-narrator, however, is attempting
not poetry (that is Daneri’s hapless task) but prosaic description. It is,
therefore, by Borges’ own standards, genuine. Borges presents something
beyond our most basic powers of cognition. What can it possibly mean to
see everything? ‘Everything’ as a word and as a concept becomes meaning-
less, as there can be no division between one ‘thing’ of totality and another.
The vision of ‘El Aleph’ becomes as harrowingly impossible as Funes’ total
memory – it simply cannot be.14 Consequently, the enumeration of the
things that the Borges-narrator does see is ridiculous, as it is like measuring
an inch in infinity. It is neither a portion of totality nor any approximation
of it. The vision of the Aleph is a nominalist chaos, where ultimately all
we have is a random succession of words and no things in themselves. He
may just as well have listed twenty other things, or twenty further things,
ad infinitum. Or no things at all.
14 The hyperbolic nature of the vision of the Aleph is similar to Douglas Adams’ torture
device ‘the Total Perspective Vortex’ from The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, in
which the victim is annihilated through being forced to see himself in relation to
the enormity of the cosmos.
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 121
Conclusion
The common assumption that God is so bound up with the world that it is as neces-
sary to Him as He is to it is incompatible with mysticism. The Supreme, whether we
call it God or with Plotinus the One or with Eckhart the Godhead, or with some
moderns the Absolute, is transcendent. The notion that God is evolving with His
universe, coming into His own, realizing Himself, or emerging, owes its popular-
ity to ‘the last Western heresy,’ the idea that the macrocosm is moving towards ‘one
far-of f divine event.’ There can be no process of the Absolute, no progress, and no
change. Exhortations to take time seriously may be in place when we are dealing
with history; but to subordinate the Eternal to space and time is a fatal error in
metaphysics. (Inge 1947: 154)
15 Note that Russell (1961: 179) mocks Inge’s favouring of Christian mysticism over
the mysticism of other faiths: ‘The chief argument in favour of the mystics is their
agreement with each other. “I know nothing more remarkable,” says Dean Inge, “than
the unanimity of the mystics, ancient, mediaeval, and modern, Protestant, Catholic,
and even Buddhist or Mohammedan, though the Christian mystics are the most
trustworthy.”’
122 Chapter Two
such positions are at once visible. Staal, for example, identifies this striking
feature of Zaehner, arguing that his religious beliefs led him to a narrow
view of other beliefs and practices. ‘The main dif ficulty with this book as a
whole [Zaehner’s Hindu & Muslim Mysticism (1960)] is the author’s own
religious allegiance, which clearly prevents a fair and adequate description
and evaluation of dif fering points of view and which leads the author to
a classification which is nothing but a ref lection of his own belief ’ (1975:
67). Zaehner similarly weighed into the debate on mysticism and psych-
edelics with a level of invective that revealed deep-seated moral concerns
with the proposal that mystical states are achievable through such means.
Zaehner criticized Huxley’s exuberant use of words from Catholic and
Hindu traditions, arguing that Huxley had no right to make these bold
declarations about ‘gratuitous grace’, ‘Beatic state’ or ‘one-ness’, as these
are matters of spiritual practice within established traditions of faith. The
mescaline experience, he argued, aside from specific Native American tra-
ditions, lies outside established traditions of faith. It is clear that Zaehner
is arguing not from a phenomenological position – i.e. is a mystical state
possible with mescaline – but a theological – is such a state permissible.
There is also the tendency present within the whole scholarship of
mysticism to reduce the mystical aspect of a text to mere textual markers,
and to correlate these textual instances against the check-list of the scholar-
ship of mysticism, such as James, Underhill or Stace. Whilst this may be a
justifiable exercise in attempts to determine whether a text is, for example,
a good example of Modernist or postcolonial literature, there is something
slightly disjointed when such textual scrutiny occurs with the study of
mysticism, in that the ceaseless attempts to pin it down to the salient char-
acteristics can seem contradictory to the very f luid and mysterious nature
that is, itself, mysticism. There is consequently something exasperating in
running through endless academic approaches to ‘deistic’ or ‘non-deistic’,
‘extravertive or intravertive’, ‘hot’ or ‘cool’, ‘perennialist’ or ‘essentialist’, as
these questions rarely confront actual and pressing ontological questions.
The questions, in my opinion, should not concern whether Emerson was
a ‘religious mystic’ or a ‘nature mystic’, nor whether Swedenborg’s experi-
ences were ‘hot’ or ‘cool’, ‘structured’ or ‘unstructured’ (Rawlinson 1998:
120), but what are we, as readers, to do with his texts? It occurred to me
Was Borges a mystic, and does it matter? 123
that Blake (regardless of whether he was or was not a mystic) would have
railed against so much scholastic inactivity. Swedenborg, likewise, was
highly critical of scholastic debates that served as mere displays of erudi-
tion rather than interrogating the nature of reality,16 and would have been
equally dismayed at seeing his moral theology ignored and his own status
pinned to a graph of ‘hot unstructured’, or having his experiences forensi-
cally analysed according to whether they satisfy the requirements of tran-
siency (no), inef fability (no), passivity (no), noetic quality (yes) and so
on. Kripal (2001) has bravely attempted to realign the scholars and their
scholarship with their own mystic-erotic experiences, but even his study
leaves many questions unaddressed concerning the nature of the mystical
experience itself. The fact that James called the debate one of names is of
key importance here, as there appears to be an endless circling above the
experience described in the text without the courage to plunge into the
very questions that mysticism itself raises.
Borges was manifestly astonished by his own experiences of timeless-
ness, and, whilst he may not have engaged in theological discussions with
angels, as Swedenborg did, he nevertheless invested deeply in an aesthetic
and intellectual ef fort to understand the full significance of his experi-
ences. It is consequently of little importance whether Borges was or was
not a mystic. What is certain is that Borges experienced many matters that
habitually appear in the repertoire of mystical experiences: a sense of the
numinous and the inef fable, noesis, ecstasy and a sense of moving outside of
time, lucid dreams, possible communication with the dead, synchronicities,
awe at the mystery of existence, and other experiences of ‘intersticios de
sinrazón’. These matters delighted and puzzled him, and his encyclopaedic
reading of other accounts of mystical and anomalous experience, especially
16 ‘If people have loved the academic disciplines only in order to sound learned, with-
out using them to develop their ability to reason, taking delight in their pride at
the contents of their memories, they love sandy areas and prefer them to meadows
and gardens because sandy areas correspond to these kinds of study. People who are
wrapped up in knowing the doctrines of churches, their own and others’, without
applying them to life, love stony areas and live among rock piles. They avoid culti-
vated land because it is repulsive to them’ (Heaven & Hell §488).
124 Chapter Two
In order to be able to decide if the prophet is telling the truth or lying,
we shall have to investigate the mystical experience for ourselves. This can
be done in two ways: from the outside, by studying the biographies and
writings of the saints; and from the inside, by following the instructions
they have given us.
— Christopher Isherwood, Vedanta for The Western World
By the word ‘mystic’ I shall always mean a person who himself has had mystical
experience. Often the word is used in a much wider and looser way. Anyone who is
sympathetic to mysticism is apt to be labeled a mystic. But I shall use the word always
in a stricter sense. However sympathetic toward mysticism a man may be, however
deeply interested, involved, enthusiastic, or learned in the subject, he will not be
called a mystic unless he has, or has had, mystical experience.
reading of Jakob Böhme and Swedenborg with his own ecstatic experience.1
William James, like Borges, denied his own mystical nature, yet nevertheless
emphasized that his mystical sensibilities predisposed him towards a study
of mysticism: ‘I have no mystical experiences of my own, but just enough of
the germ of mysticism in me to recognize the region from which their voice
comes when I hear it’ ( James 2003: 210). Indeed, like Borges, he describes
in great detail four particular experiences ‘which could only be described
as very sudden and incomprehensible enlargements of the conscious field,
bringing with them a curious sense of cognition of real fact’ ( James 1910:
87). It has been argued, indeed, that James was describing himself when
describing the ‘divided self ’ that an anonymous Frenchman suf fered, in
the chapter ‘The Sick Soul’ of Varieties.2 Alicia Jurado, we recall from the
previous chapter, focuses on Estela Canto’s suggestion that Borges was
‘“one of the greatest – and they are extremely rare – mystical thinkers of
our time”’, and reaf firms the idea of Borges ‘as Mystical thinker, naturally,
not just mystic’ (1996: 98). Again, how are we to distinguish between the
terms ‘mystic’ and ‘mystical thinker’? Would we approach this laudatory
comment from a dif ferent angle if she had called Borges ‘one of the great-
est mystics of our time?’ Does ‘mystical thinker’ permit the marriage of
intellect with spiritual sensibility, i.e. does it imply critical distance, even
scepticism, whilst ‘mystic’ would imply abandonment to irrationality or
to faith? The subtlety of distinction is important.
To pursue a study of mystical texts and scholarly analyses thereof, one
must already accept at least the possibility of certain postulates: that the
term ‘mysticism’ is worthy of investigation and that something useful may
be derived from this study. This would imply that the student of mysticism
would take seriously the claims made both by those known as mystics, and
1 ‘We return to reason and faith. There I feel that nothing can befall me in life, – no
disgrace, no calamity, (leaving me my eyes,) which nature cannot repair. Standing
on the bare ground, – my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite
spaces, – all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I
see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle
of God’. (Emerson 2005: 12)
2 I am grateful to Jeremy Carrette for this information.
128 Chapter Three
3 ‘I hope to establish [that] the modern, and now postmodern, study of mysticism,
from its early beginnings to its contemporary practice, has been largely inspired,
sustained, and rhetorically formed by the unitive, ecstatic, visionary, and mystico-
hermeneutical experiences of the scholars themselves. The mystical experiences of
scholars of mysticism – no archaeology of the comparative study of mysticism can
justifiably ignore this weirdly beautiful, if ethically ambiguous, source of inspiration,
theory, and writing’ (Kripal 2001: 3).
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 129
at the heart of James’s epistemology. Since experience is all that exists and
all that exists is experience’ (Taylor 1996), and yet would jar with Russell’s
emphasis on distinguishing the two modes of knowledge. Van Dusen
suggests that Swedenborg’s writings, beyond describing the otherworld
realities, provide direct experience to the dedicated reader, and thus enact
a didactic method that can, if read properly, make a mystic of the reader:
If I had to describe Swedenborg’s spiritual writings and their fundamental purpose
in one line, it would be this: the writings are a clear presentation meant to be used by
individuals to lead them into the life of God – as an actual part of their experience.
His writings are rational, but that is their style, not pre-eminently their nature. Their
nature and overwhelming purpose are to lead to God, which accounts for many aspects
of their structure. So in this sense, not only are his writings the work of a mystic,
they are meant to help create mystics, that is, to lead others to the Divine. (1995: 134)
In this sense the writings of Swedenborg become sacred texts – texts whose
oral transmission enacts a spiritual and numinous reaction in the readers or
listeners. This assertion is itself problematic if we follow the comments of
Emerson, Henry James Sr., William James, Yeats, and Borges about how dry
and ‘insipid’ was the style of Swedenborg. From Van Dusen’s perspective,
the text is not the narrative of an experience, it is the experience, and thus
the sympathetic reader (the student of mysticism) is the mystic. Van Dusen
takes this perspective to another level in the essay ‘Swedenborg’s Spiritual
Method’ (1991), where he cites his friend, a Swedenborgian scholar named
David St Amour, who derives great spiritual solace from Swedenborg’s
texts ‘even when he did not understand them’ (original emphasis). In this
sense the text is authoritative and somehow above the interaction of critical
scrutiny. Whilst Stace would balk at this muddying of the waters of mystic,
text and researcher of mysticism, it is important for a study of Borges to
acknowledge that the distinctions are not so radically distinct.
Staal (1975) approaches the question of the researcher of mysticism
from another angle, and whilst recognising the necessary distinction
between mystic and scholar, suggests that the examination of the mystical
state requires methodical and dispassionate (i.e. unmystical) approaches to
the phenomenon: He also suggests that mystics are probably not the best
to formulate theories of mysticism: ‘It is the students of mysticism whose
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 131
task it is to evolve a theory’ (63). This seems to imply that if the mystic
were the intrepid explorer, then the scholar is the cartographer; the two
have a natural symbiosis where the mystic provides the raw data, and the
scholar assimilates, contrasts and analyses the material and prepares it for
the wider readership. This perspective is again not without its dif ficulties,
as evinced by James and Borges, in that the scholar himself may derive his
knowledge experientially (that is to say, non-textually, if such is possible)
as much as textually. With this distinction established, however, Staal was
also keen to emphasize that attempts by the scholar to detach him/herself
altogether from the field of study can lead to an impoverishment both
of the scholarship and of the possible experiences of the researcher. It is
incumbent upon the researcher to have some working experience of the
matters that are under investigation:
No linguist would refuse to study sentences because we cannot perceive how they
are internally produced. Nor would a physicist be content with mere speculation and
refuse to devise experiments to test some part of a hypothesis, on the grounds that
such experiments might be dif ficult to carry out, might be of uncertain outcome,
or might be time-consuming or expensive. And neither would a person interested
in reaching the South Pole, out of fear that he might not be able to get there, stay
at home and refuse even to move in a southerly direction. Yet students of mysticism
have, in their field, left all such things undone. Content with mere speculation and
talking, they have not even considered the possibility of traveling themselves that
part of the road that appears to be within reach – even though not very well paved.
This can only be understood if it is the outcome of a deep-seated prejudice, for such
a negative attitude has in no domain of knowledge been taken seriously or been
expected to lead to results. (Staal 1975: 127)
This division between truth claims of the ‘empiricist’ over those of the
‘mystic’ is a central concern of the scholarship of mysticism, and forms
the central area of concern for the conclusion of William James’s chap-
ter on mysticism in Varieties, and the central focus of Russell’s chapter
on mysticism in Religion and Science. James would argue that the mystic
is empowered with knowledge through the mystical experience, Russell
would argue that we have no way of knowing, if such an experience and
such an account cannot be transmitted successfully. The essence of both
arguments, though, as ref lected also in Jaf fé’s comments about Jung, is that
scholars are likely to be reticent in suggesting their own mystical nature
for fear of accusations of ‘subjectivity’, ‘irrationality’, or even outright delu-
sion. In the case of Borges, as discussed in the previous chapter, his desire
not to be considered a mystic appears less a fear of academic malpractice
than an eagerness not to be considered credulous, nor to have given him-
self over to statements of faith. Whilst one may justifiably object to the
equation of mysticism with faith, one can perceive in Borges’ many com-
ments concerning the faculty of critical enquiry, and his other comments
about the faint and rapt outpourings of mystics, that he was keen to have
been seen, like Jung, as a sober and intellectual empiricist. So much value
is placed upon the term mystic that derives from the period, culture and
environment in which the term is used. As Jaf fé observed, the term had
4 Van Dusen (1995: 129) would reinforce the non-rational aspect of mysticism, though
more needs to be discussed in order to determine exactly what ‘non-rational’ means:
‘Mysticism is nonrational; this is again from the layperson’s definition. As a matter
of fact, mystical writings vary across the whole spectrum of clarity and nonrational-
ity. Basically, mysticism, or the experience of God, is irrational to those outside the
experience. It is rational, true, and clear to those in the experience. It informs reason
of higher truths.’
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 133
implications of unreliability both in the time of Jung and ‘today’ (1980s).
At the time of Emerson, the term was employed ostensibly to designate a
vapid and over-emotional religiously-inclined personality (Hurth 2005).
In other times and cultures the term and its cognate expressions can have
notably divergent significations.5
This contradiction established between intellectual pursuit and mys-
tical experience is problematic for two reasons: firstly it implies that the
scholarly method can only be ef ficacious if all steps of rigorous analy-
sis are both expressed and expressible, and secondly, that epistemologi-
cal pathways that fall outside of such a scholarly method are somehow
inferior. Both assumptions are based on a dichotomy built up since the
Enlightenment but made more robust within academic scholarship
over the last century of prioritizing to an alarming degree one method
of enquiry over another. Borges himself alluded to this division within
modernity, arguing, as mentioned earlier, that Plato and Socrates con-
sidered reason and myth as similar epistemological pathways (Burgin
1998: 160), and that the Paris of the Enlightenment worshipped ‘el culto
de la razón’ (1989: 235) [‘the cult of reason’]. Similarly, when discussing
Buddhism in Siete Noches, Borges dwells on the many binaries that char-
acterize modern western thought and that prevent a full engagement in
Buddhist spiritual practice: ‘Nosotros pensamos siempre en términos de
sujeto, objeto, causa, efecto, lógico, ilógico, algo y su contrario; tenemos
que rebasar esas categorías. Según los doctores de la zen, llegar a la verdad
por una intuición brusca, mediante una respuesta ilógica’ (1989: 252) [‘We
always think in terms of subject-object, cause-ef fect, logic-illogic, a thing
and its opposite. We must go beyond these categories. According to the
Zen masters, to reach truth through sudden intuition requires an illogi-
cal answer’] (1984: 73). Many scholars, such as Kripal (2001) and Ferrer
(2002, 2008), have attempted to redress this radical division, and, in the
5 Hurth’s mention of the historical variance of the use of the term ‘mysticism’ is of
crucial importance here, and we must also consider possible dif ferences between
English and Spanish when considering Borges. I have heard ‘él es un místico’ in Spain
to refer to a daydreamy man who regularly missed appointments.
134 Chapter Three
Borges’ stories were to make more obvious use of philosophy than did any of his pre-
vious writing [prior to his head injury], and in a way that pitted one type of James’s
binary firmly against the other: the idealist or pantheistic aspects of the history of
philosophy, from Plato to Plotinus to Schopenhauer, were to be set against the most
hard-headed nominalism of Aristotle, Hume or James himself. Yet, instead of the
agons of dialectic and argument, Borges was to allow realism (in the Platonic, idealist
sense) to inspire and structure and inform his short stories, relishing the aesthetic
potential of idealism while always holding it in abeyance, checking it with an irony
both recalcitrant and def lationary, ludic and nominalist. (2008: 22)
Borges felt that this prologue to James’s book gave his game away, so to speak; it was
too close to the marrow of his creative praxis. […] If I am correct in arguing that
Borges utilizes a Jamesian pragmatism to engage the history of philosophy for aesthetic
ends, and makes pragmatic use of the nominalist-realist controversy and empirical-
rationalist binary that was central to James’s own historiography of philosophy, then
it is unsurprising that he sought to avoid any obvious giveaways. Perhaps revealing
the intellectual engine of his fictions was anathema to Borges; he may have viewed
such an admission as a kind of self-incrimination. (2008: 32)
I can say very little about mysticism personally, though of course I have
studied, I have read my Varieties of Religious Experience, and I have done
much reading in the mystics, especially Swedenborg, also Blake’ (Burgin
1998: 130). Cohen (1973: 81), we recall from the previous chapter, also
argues that Borges found the inspiration for the Aleph from a biography
of Jakob Böhme, which he found reproduced in James’ Varieties.
James, as we also recall from the previous chapter, set a standard that
ensuing scholars would inevitably measure themselves against in the produc-
tion of discrete defining characteristics. In the absence of a list of the salient
characteristics we can work through the Borges’ obra – tales, poems, essays,
lectures and interviews – and assemble from these varied texts a working
theory that Borges applied when considering mysticism. I will hereby list
these characteristics, and then, following James’ model in Varieties, examine
them in the light of Borges’ work in greater detail. Mysticism, according
to Borges is:
1) pre-religious
2) original
3) spontaneous
4) revelatory
5) inef fable
6) outside of time
7) transient
8) transformative
Whilst not all these aspects are necessarily articulated by William James, nev-
ertheless my hypothesis, as will now be examined, is that Borges’ understand-
ing of mysticism is inherently inf luenced by his reading of William James.
Pre-religious
[‘he made an awkward mistake when he decided to adapt his ideas to the
framework of the two Testaments’] (1995: 9). I also argued that this is an
abiding perspective in the scholarship of Swedenborg. What lies at the
heart of Borges’ position is on the one hand an iconoclastic commenda-
tion of rebelliousness and heterodoxy, but on the other a declaration that
the experience of the Swedish mystic could have somehow occurred in a
‘pure’ state that was coloured a posteriori by the embellishment of religious
authority.
Like his godfather, Emerson, and like his father, Henry James Sr.,
William James was a close reader of Swedenborg. Although Swedenborg
is scarcely mentioned in Varieties, and whilst he did not write about him
in the same fashion as Emerson, nevertheless, as Eugene Taylor suggests,
James’ reading of Swedenborg was essential to his discussion of metaphys-
ics, religious experience and mysticism. Taylor, indeed, suggests that the
‘Swedenborgian Doctrine of the Rational and the Doctrine of Use [were]
key inf luences on Charles Peirce as well as William James’ (2003: 4). Taylor
also af firms that: ‘the origin of his philosophy is neither Cartesian, Kantian,
nor Hegelian, but rather Swedenborgian and transcendentalist’ (2003: 5).6
Emerson and William James critiqued the ecclesiastical or ‘church-bound’
manner of Swedenborg, maintaining that the essence of the mystical expe-
rience is transcultural, but that the transmission is both individually and
culturally determined.
James had said in the Varieties that religious experience could be understood both
in terms of what was generic to all human beings and what was idiosyncratic to the
individual. From the generic could be derived an understanding of psychological
processes common to all men and women insofar as phenomenological accounts of
spiritual experience was concerned. What was idiosyncratic to the individual was
an expression of that person’s personal beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality,
which might or might not have relevance for anyone else except that one person.
6 This statement is challenged by James scholar Jeremy Carrette, who, having scru-
tinized the correspondence of James in which he openly distances himself both
from his father’s Swedenborgian perspective and from Swedenborg himself, argues
that Swedenborg may not have been such a significant inf luence on James as Taylor
indicates (personal discussion).
140 Chapter Three
These beliefs held by the individual over and above what was common to all human
beings regarding religious experience James called ‘overbeliefs’. (Taylor 2003: 3)
All investigators recognise that there are many varieties of mystical experience. The
major debate centres on whether these many forms represent dif ferent interpreta-
tions or accounts of what is essentially the same experience (or a few basic types of
experience) or whether, on the other hand, the experiences themselves are funda-
mentally dif ferent. According to the first, perennialist, view (e.g., Forman, 1998;
Huxley, 1947; Smith, 1976; Stace, 1960; Underhill, 1911/1995) people everywhere
have the same basic experience(s) but they may interpret and describe them rather
dif ferently depending upon the personal, social, cultural and linguistic context. If
this view is correct, it makes sense, as Wainwright (1981) has argued, to try to iden-
tify the essential cross-cultural characteristics and types of mystical experience (i.e.,
the characteristics and types that exist prior to any secondary interpretative dif fer-
ences). At the other extreme are the constructivists (e.g., Gimello, 1978, 1983; Katz,
1978) who argue that the experiences themselves (rather than simply their post-hoc
interpretations) are profoundly and irrevocably determined by predisposing personal,
social, and cultural factors, including religious doctrines and particular forms of
spiritual practice. Thus there are, according to Katz (1978), no pure or unmediated
experiences. For this reason there can be no true common experiential denomina-
tors in mysticism. The implication of this second view is that there is, in principle,
an indefinite number of dif ferent mystical experiences, each one potentially unique
to the individual experiencer although there may be identifiable commonalities of
experience within particular mystical traditions. (2003 no pagination)
Original
of heaven and hell as ‘su concepto originalísimo’ (2005: 155) [‘extremely
original concept’] (1995: 9). When describing Swedenborg’s vision of the
hermit who through his own asceticism had denied himself the company
of the intellectually engaged angels in heaven, Borges employed the term
‘innovación’:
[This is an innovation of Swedenborg, because it has always been thought that salva-
tion is ethical in its nature. It is understood that if a man is just, he is saved. ‘Blessed
are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven’, etc. Jesus proclaimed
this. But Swedenborg went further. He writes that this is not enough, that a man
must save himself intellectually also. He pictured heaven, above all, as a series of
theological conversations amongst angels. And if a man is unable to follow these
conversations he is not worthy of heaven, and he must live alone. He was followed
by William Blake, who added a third means of salvation. He says that we can – that
we must – save ourselves through Art. Blake explains that Christ was also an artist,
as he did not preach through words but through parables. And parables are, clearly,
an aesthetic expression. That is to say that salvation is through intelligence, ethics
and Art.] (My translation)
The idea of ‘mysticism’ is a social construction and that it has been constructed in
dif ferent ways at dif ferent times. Although […] medieval mystics and ecclesiastics
did not work with a concept of ‘mysticism’ they did have strong views about who
should count as a mystic, views which changed over the course of time. Furthermore,
those changes were linked to changes in patterns of authority and gender relations.
[…] The current philosophical construction of mysticism is therefore only one in a
series of social constructions of mysticism.
On the continent, in places as diverse as Paris, Avignon, St. Petersburg, and Stockholm,
Swedenborg’s imagery was absorbed into the rituals of occultist freemasonry by indi-
viduals who recognized its af finity with alchemical and cabalistic conceptions of
spiritual reality. […] Throughout Europe, those who dabbled in alchemy, cabalism,
and Mesmerism found in Swedenborg’s spiritual experiences one more confirma-
tion of the existence of truths beyond the reach of the five senses. Many of them
were Freemasons, associated with the various occultist and mystical lodges that had
sprung up in the eighteenth century. (Garrett 1984: 70 & 74)
[Uranus], – but, unhappily, not also of the eighth [Neptune]’ (2003: 10). I have
not found anyone aside from Emerson claim this, so it could be that Emerson was
mistaking Swedenborg’s scientific statements with a visionary one. Swedenborg,
after all, did communicate in visions with inhabitants of other planets. It would be
astonishing indeed if Swedenborg described the planets Uranus and Neptune in a
manner that would tally with their descriptions by Herschel (Uranus) and Le Verrier
and Adams (Neptune).
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 149
Spontaneous
I have found no indication that Borges was familiar with the branch of the
scholarship of mysticism concerning psychedelics and the supposed dangers
of electing what Indian guru Meher Baba (1966) condemned as ‘short-cuts
to the divine’, or what Huxley (1954: 59) called ‘gratuitous grace’. That he
was familiar with Huxley is certain from his reviews of Huxley’s works;
that he engaged with the arguments put forth in The Doors of Perception
(1954) and Heaven and Hell (1956) is less certain. Nevertheless this is an
integral aspect of the scholarship of mysticism, originating a century before
James in both scientific and Romantic literature, and reaching its apogee in
the 1960s (see Jay 2000, Doblin 1991, Rowlandson 2013). Borges’ misgiv-
ings of subversive social movements in the 1960s and his self-proclaimed
conservatism in his later decades would imply a rejection of any proposals
that mystical consciousness may be experienced through the ingestion of
psychoactive substances. Yet without encountering any specific declaration
on the matter, we can nevertheless conclude that Borges would posit that
such activities cannot constitute genuine mystical experience, as he indi-
cated that the mystical state is spontaneous and unmediated. Describing
his ‘timeless’ moment, Borges often suggested that the experience was
some manner of divine gift: ‘I had that experience, and I had it twice over,
and maybe it will be granted me to have it one more time before I die’
(Barnstone 1982: 10–11). He made no suggestion that the experience was
in any way inspired by the subject matter of his reading material, nor the
consequence of his meditative, trance-inducing strolls; rather that the expe-
rience was somehow ‘granted’ to him. When he suggested that ‘el fin [de
‘El Congreso’] quiere elevarse, sin duda en vano, a los éxtasis de Chesterton
o de John Bunyan. No he merecido nunca semejante revelación, pero he
procurado soñarla’ (1989: 72) [‘its end tries, doubtless in vain, to match the
ecstasies of Chesterton and John Bunyan. I have never been worthy of such
a revelation, but I managed to dream one up’] (1979: 93), this would imply
an extrinsic, perhaps divine, agency that judges whether an individual may
or may not experience mystical consciousness.
Borges likewise emphasized that the first profound mystical experience
of Swedenborg came upon him utterly unbidden. Despite the fact that ‘Lo
150 Chapter Three
sudden event that is beyond logic’] (1984: 72). The mystical experience,
therefore, in its brief and rare occurrence for Borges, and in its repeated
and sustained occurrences for Swedenborg, is not to be considered the
result of will or conscious desire, but as grace of the divine.
Revelatory
10 ‘I think of the world as a riddle. And the one beautiful thing about it is that it can’t
be solved’ (Barnstone 1982: 8).
152 Chapter Three
soul, something that appears in so many of his poems, yet he cannot accept
it unconditionally.
Likewise, and especially in his later poetry, Borges presents death and
mystical revelation through a Platonic perspective as the possibility that
the true nature of things will be revealed. In the poem ‘The Unending
Rose’ (from La Rosa Profunda) the blind, old, and desert-battered Attar
of Nishapur caresses a rose and lovingly lists its qualities. He wistfully ima-
gines the eternal Rose ‘Que el Señor mostrará a mis ojos muertos’ (1993:
465) [‘the Lord will show my dead eyes’] (Alifano 1984: 137). The poem
‘Elogio de la sombra’ concludes with the poignant hope that the poet’s
forthcoming death will be the revelation of his true identity: Llego a mi
centro, / a mi álgebra y mi clave, / a mi espejo. / Pronto sabré quién soy’
(1975a: 126) [‘I reach my center, / my algebra and my key, / my mirror. /
Soon I shall know who I am’] (1975a: 127).
Borges’ ceaseless search for meaning, though, compelled him to
acknowledge that textual descriptions of the mystics cannot, despite the
best powers of imagination, constitute true knowledge or experience. As
such the lucid prose of Swedenborg, in which he reveals his vision and expe-
rience of the otherworld, cannot be construed as empirical proof. Indeed a
further aspect of the Borges obra suggests that even in death, and even with
the possibility of the soul’s survival, the solution to the riddle of existence
will not be forthcoming. Death may be neither oblivion and annihilation
nor revelation of divine purpose. It may be simply another area of igno-
rance, and consequently the dead may be no nearer illumination than the
living. Jung found the souls of the dead to be keen for human contact as
their own knowledge was lacking, describing in the opening lines of Seven
Sermons to the Dead how the dead came seeking him as they remained
frustrated by ignorance.11 Swedenborg found dead wandering aimlessly
11 Around five o’clock in the afternoon on Sunday the front doorbell began ringing
frantically. It was a bright summer day; the two maids were in the kitchen, from which
the open square outside the front door could be seen. Everyone immediately looked
to see who was there, but there was no one in sight. I was sitting near the doorbell,
and not only heard it but saw it moving. We all simply stared at one another. The
atmosphere was thick, believe me! Then I knew that something had to happen. The
154 Chapter Three
whole house was filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They
were packed deep right up to the door, and the air was so thick it was scarcely pos-
sible to breathe. As for myself, I was all a-quiver with the question: ‘For God’s sake,
what in the world is this? Then they cried out in chorus, “We have come back from
Jerusalem where we found not what we sought.” That is the beginning of the Septem
Sermones’ ( Jung 1989: 190–1).
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 155
Inef fable
The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as mystical is negative.
The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report
of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be
directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In this peculiar-
ity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect. No one
can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or
worth of it consists. One must have musical ears to know the value of a symphony;
one must have been in love one’s self to understand a lover’s state of mind. Lacking the
heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician or the lover justly, and are even likely
to consider him weak-minded or absurd. The mystic finds that most of us accord to
his experiences an equally incompetent treatment. ( James 1913: 380)
The sense that Borges developed is that the mystical experience is described
only in terms that necessarily fail to describe it, and hence ‘Para sugerir la
inefable unión del alma del hombre con la divinidad, los sufíes del Islam se
vieron obligados a recurrir a alegorías prodigiosas, a imágenes de rosas, de
embriaguez o de amor carnal’ (2005: 154) [‘To suggest the inef fable union
of man’s soul with the divine being, the Sufis of Islam found themselves
obliged to resort to prodigious analogies, to images of roses, intoxication,
or carnal love’] (1995: 7). Not so with Swedenborg, Borges argued, who
was fully able to capture the essence of his experience through scholarly
Latin. Herein one finds the Jamesian angle of Borges’ comments, as James
156 Chapter Three
argues that the inef fability of the experience lies not so much with the
transmission from experience to text, but from text to reader: ‘The mystic
finds that most of us accord to his experiences an equally incompetent treat-
ment’ ( James 1913: 380 emphasis added). As such, unlike Borges’ Sufis, it
is the reader who is unable to grasp the text rather than the text unable
to grasp the mystical moment. As I also suggest earlier, if Borges empha-
sized the inability of the Sufi poets to represent their experience, this itself
implies not so much the inef fable nature of the experience, but the limited
vocabulary of the Sufi poets. As such, Swedenborg was unique amongst
mystics not for the radicality of his visions, but for his dazzling command
of Latin. Despite the best ef forts of both James and Borges to present the
category of inef fability as definitive, it is clear that many questions remain.
Time, for Borges, is the essential mystery. There is scarcely an essay, fiction
or poem in which Borges did not discuss or illustrate the anomaly that is
time; indeed for Borges an experience of the f lexibility of time is perhaps
the primary constituent of the mystical experience. He described in great
detail in ‘Sentirse en muerte’ that the abiding sense was that of moving
outside of time and experiencing eternity. He discussed this matter in
interview: ‘Somehow the feeling came over me that I was living beyond
time’ (Barnstone 1982: 10–11). Concerning mysticism he stated that ‘I’ve
had only two experiences of timeless time in eighty years’ (Barnstone 1982:
73). Barnstone even cites Borges’ sense of the mystery of time as a chapter
heading in Borges at Eighty: ‘Time is the Essential Mystery’. This is the
chapter in which Borges refers to St Augustine’s legendary baf f lement at
the strangeness that is time:
I think that time is the one essential mystery. Other things may be mysterious. Space
is unimportant. You can think of a spaceless universe, for example, a universe made
of music. We are listeners of course. But as for time, you have the one problem of
definition. I remember what Saint Augustine said: ‘What is time? If nobody asks
me, I know what it is. If I am asked, I am ignorant, I do not know.’ I think that the
problem of time is the problem. (Barnstone 1982: 111)
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 157
We recall that the nature of the vision of the Aleph is both infinite space
and infinite time, and thus no distinction is to be made between the past,
present and future. He expressed to Biguenet and Whalen that ‘eternity
is supposed to be timeless. God or a mystic perceives in one moment all
of our yesterdays’ (Burgin 1998: 212). In this we can understand that the
vision of the Aleph was an attempt – albeit ironic and parodic – to por-
tray such a mystical rapture. The dominant characteristic of the mystical
experience was, for Borges, the transcending of mundane time. Writing
about Swedenborg’s angels in El Libro de los Seres Imaginarios Borges
declared that ‘En el Cielo no existe el tiempo’ (1967: 63) [‘In Heaven there
is no time’] (1974: 137). Ayora (1973: 595) identifies a strongly Gnostic
aspect to Borges’ treatment of time, suggesting that Borges’ views of the
circularity of time over linearity constitute of a rejection of the hegemonic
Christian worldview, and that ‘Any reader of Borges’ works will agree that
Borges’ whole being rebels against the power of time as a crucial dimen-
sion of reality.’ He discussed with Burgin ‘the idea of dif ferent times. Of
dif ferent time schemes’ (Burgin 1998: 39) which he had depicted in ‘New
Refutation of Time’, and he discussed in the same interview ‘Psychological
time’, which implies the dimension in which the most synchronistic of
Jung’s psychic phenomena can occur. This irregular pattern of time, upon
consideration, can be considered the mainstay of his entire fictional and
poetic work: Hladík experiences a year in a moment of temporal stasis;
Menard becomes the seventeenth century Cervantes; the younger and
elder Borges bend time to meet each other both in ‘El Encuentro’ and
‘Veinticinco de agosto, 1983’; the players in the poem ‘Truco’ are plunged
into archetypal time through entering the ludic space; and so on. The
instances are too numerous to cover and would constitute a critical study
in its own right. In addition to other aspects of the mystical experience,
therefore, the most profound and recurrent characteristic of the descrip-
tions provided in mystical texts – from Plato and Plotinus through to
Blake and Xul Solar – is this sense of transcending the regular linear
pattern of time.
158 Chapter Three
Transient
There is a beautiful paradox exposed in this matter of time and the mystical
experience. The mystic, for both James and Borges, experiences a radically
altered perspective of time, and yet this vision can only be transient, not
persistent. Eternity, in this sense, can only be experienced in an instant.
James describes the essence of this transience:
Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. Except in rare instances, half an hour,
or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they fade into the
light of common day. Often, when faded, their quality can but imperfectly be repro-
duced in memory; but when they recur it is recognized; and from one recurrence to
another it is susceptible of continuous development in what is felt as inner richness
and importance. (1913: 381)
We recall Borges’ assertion that Dante’s vision could not have been truly
mystical: ‘I don’t believe that Dante was a visionary; a vision is something
more f leeting, something more ethereal. A vision as prolonged as The
Divine Comedy is impossible’ (Alifano 1984: 95). He also described his
own mystical experiences as mystical in part because of their transiency: ‘It
may have been a minute or so, it may have been longer. […] Somehow the
feeling came over me that I was living beyond time, and I did my best to
capture it, but it came and went’ (Barnstone 1982: 11). Despite the regular-
ity of Swedenborg’s visions, Borges likewise emphasized their transiency,
examining in ‘Testigo’ how dreams and daylight visions would occur to
Swedenborg in brief and illuminating spells, rarely of any duration. Whilst
one may pursue the lasting legacy of the mystical vision – James’ category
of ‘noetic’ – the vision itself in both James’ and Borges’ assessment is nec-
essarily of a transient nature.
Transformative
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experi-
ence them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of
truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full
of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule
they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-time. ( James 1913: 380–1)
The central thesis of James’ chapter on mysticism in Varieties is that the mys-
tical experience grants the mystic ‘authority’ in his understanding of reality
that stands beyond analytical scrutiny. This, clearly, is the chief rationalist
concern with the mystical experience, something present in Kant’s dis-
missal of Swedenborg’s theological authority in his dense, bewildering and
under-studied Dreams of a Spirit-seer, and present in Russell’s critique of
the alleged authority of the mystic. In Borges’ analysis, Silesius, Swedenborg
and Blake gained true insight into the mysteries of existence through the
intuitive, experiential pathway of vision. This, he emphasized repeatedly
in discussion about Swedenborg, was neither falsehood, madness, delusion
nor hallucination, but a perspective on the real as epistemologically valid as
any rationalistic discourse. Indeed one senses that for Borges this mode of
enquiry into the nature of existence was of greater epistemological worth
than any other discourse because, in its pre-religious, perennial nature, it
transcends the limitations of orthodox structures of thought, whether, as
discussed, philosophical, theological, cultural or political. James concludes
his exploration of mysticism with the strikingly pragmatic summary of the
authority that the mystical experience confers:
160 Chapter Three
(1) Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, abso-
lutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.
(2) No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who
stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.
(3) They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic conscious-
ness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only
one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in
which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to
have faith. ( James 1913: 422–3)12
12 ‘Once more, then, I repeat that non-mystics are under no obligation to acknowledge
in mystical states a superior authority conferred on them by their intrinsic nature.
Yet, I repeat once more, the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the
pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we
may believe. As a rule, mystical states merely add a supersensuous meaning to the
ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the emotions
of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts already objectively
before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a new connection with our active
life. They do not contradict these facts as such, or deny anything that our senses have
immediately seized. It is the rationalistic critic rather who plays the part of denier
in the controversy, and his denials have no strength, for there never can be a state
of facts to which new meaning may not truthfully be added, provided the mind
ascend to a more enveloping point of view. It must always remain an open question
whether mystical states may not possibly be such superior points of view, windows
through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world. The
dif ference of the views seen from the dif ferent mystical windows need not prevent
us from entertaining this supposition. The wider world would in that case prove to
have a mixed constitution like that of this world, that is all. It would have its celestial
and its infernal regions, its tempting and its saving moments, its valid experiences
and its counterfeit ones, just as our world has them; but it would be a wider world all
the same. We should have to use its experiences by selecting and subordinating and
substituting just as is our custom in this ordinary naturalistic world; we should be
liable to error just as we are now; yet the counting in of that wider world of meanings,
and the serious dealing with it, might, in spite of all the perplexity, be indispensable
stages in our approach to the final fullness of the truth’ ( James 1913: 427–8).
In the shadow of William James: Borges as scholar of mysticism 161
Conclusion
The Arabians say, that Abul Khair, the mystic, and Abu Ali Seena, the
philosopher, conferred together; and, on parting, the philosopher said,
‘All that he sees, I know’; and the mystic said, ‘All that he knows, I see’.
— Ralph Waldo Emerson, Representative Men
Why was he gazing upwards from the steps of the porch, hearing their
shrill twofold cry, watching their f light? For an augury of good or evil?
A phrase of Cornelius Agrippa f lew through his mind and then there
f lew hither and thither shapeless thoughts from Swedenborg on the cor-
respondence of birds to things of the intellect and of how the creatures of
the air have their knowledge and know their times and seasons because
they, unlike man, are in the order of their life and have not perverted
that order by reason.
— James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man
1 ‘Emerson, lector de los hindúes y de Attar, deja el poema Brahma’ (1974: 251)
[‘Emerson, reader of the Hindus and of Attar, left us the poem Attar’] (my transla-
tion); ‘Esa misma intuición de que el universo es una proyección de nuestra alma y
de que la historia universal está en cada hombre, hizo escribir a Emerson el poema
166 Chapter Four
refers to Emerson’s notion of the One Book in which all books are written,
citing (and translating) Emerson in ‘La Flor de Coleridge’: ‘“Diríase que
una sola persona ha redactado cuantos libros hay en el mundo; tal unidad
central hay en ellos que es innegable que son obra de un solo caballero
omnisciente”’ (1974: 639) [‘“I am very much struck in literature by the
appearance that one person wrote all the books”’] (1964: 9). It is signifi-
cant that Borges quotes from this particular essay of Emerson ‘Nominalist
and Realist’ in the very essay in which he presents the historical polarity
of nominalists and realists; indeed one can see ‘La Flor de Coleridge’ in
many respects as a condensed edition of Emerson’s essay.2
Borges was ef fusive about his own admiration of and debt to Emerson,
stating: ‘I like to be indebted to Emerson, one of my heroes’ (Barnstone
1982: 67), and ‘I greatly admired Emerson’ (1975b: 717), calling Emerson
‘un caballero y un clásico’ (2005: 44) [‘a gentleman and a classic’] (my
que se titula History’ (1974: 679) [‘That same intuition that the universo is a projec-
tion of our soul and that universal history is within every man, compeled Emerson
to write the poem entitled History’] (my translation). ‘Emerson dijo que una bib-
lioteca es un gabinete mágico en el que hay muchos espíritus hechizados’ (1989:
254) [‘Emerson said that a library is a magic cabinet full of bewitched spirits’] (my
translation). ‘Emerson dijo que el lenguaje es poesía fósil’ (1989: 440) [‘Emerson
said that language is fossil poetry’] (my translation). We find this in Borges at Eighty:
‘I remember what Emerson said: language is fossil poetry. He said every word is a
metaphor. You can verify that by looking a word up in the dictionary. All words are
metaphors – or fossil poetry, a fine metaphor itself ’ (Barnstone 1982: 165). ‘Emerson
wrote that “arguments convince nobody” and that it is suf ficient to state a truth for it
to be accepted’ (1971b: 26). This line also appears in Borges’ essay on Swedenborg: ‘A
la manera de Emerson y de Walt Whitman, creía que los argumentos no persuaden a
nadie y que basta enunciar una verdad para que los interlocutores la acepten’ (2005:
155) [‘Like Emerson and Walt Whitman he [Swedenborg] believed that arguments
persuade no one and that stating a truth is suf ficient for its acceptance by those who
hear it’ (1995: 8)].
2 In the essay that Borges cites, ‘Nominalist and Realist’, Emerson writes: ‘I am very
much struck in literature by the appearance, that one person wrote all the books; as
if the editor of a journal planted his body of reporters in dif ferent parts of the field
of action, and relieved some by others from time to time; but there is such equality
and identity both of judgment and point of view in the narrative, that it is plainly
the work of one all-seeing, all-hearing gentleman’ (2005: 270).
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 167
The roots of transcendentalism were multiple: Hindu pantheism, Neoplatonic specu-
lations, the Persian mystics, the visionary theology of Swedenborg, German idealism,
and the writings of Coleridge and Carlyle. It also inherited the ethical preoccupa-
tions of the Puritans. Edwards had taught that God can infuse the soul of the chosen
with a supernatural light; Swedenborg and the cabalists, that the external world is a
mirror of the spiritual. Such ideas inf luenced both the poets and the prose writers
of Concord. The immanence of God in the universe was perhaps the central doc-
trine. Emerson reiterated that there is no being who is not a microcosm, a minuscule
universe. The soul of the individual is identified with the soul of the world; physical
laws are mingled with moral laws. If God is in every soul, all external authority disap-
pears. All that each man needs is his own profound and secret divinity. Emerson and
Thoreau are now the most prominent names in the movement, which also inf luenced
Longfellow, Melville, and Whitman. The most illustrious individual example of the
movement was Emerson (1803–1882). (Borges 1971b: 24–5)
Quite clearly, noting these inf luences upon Emerson and his group, and
noting the inf luence of these dif fering streams of philosophical and religious
thought upon Borges, one must readily conjecture that Borges’ member-
ship in the Transcendentalists was only prevented by time and geography.4
Barnstone identifies the Emersonian aspect of Borges, employing a pecu-
liarly problematic judgment of ‘secular mystic’:
So, along with the mathematician of time and the cerebral master, intensely passion-
ate and despondent, there is the exquisitely calm and wise man who is reconciled to
human limitations, and to a godless world that will forever suggest yet disguise its
mystery. There is the Borges of Emersonian transcendence, the secular mystic, and
[…] there is the man waiting in the ghetto of his earthly blindness, free from the
tyranny of metaphor and myth. (Barnstone 2000: 47)
There are many similarities between Borges and Emerson at the level of
literary taste, style, poetics, secular religiosity, af finity to mysticism, and
a philosophical outlook coloured by Stoicism, Idealism, Puritanism and
Americanism.5 The debt that Borges owes to Emerson’s particular style can
4 That is, despite the assertion of Holditch: ‘Any attempt to make a case for Borges as
a Transcendentalist in the Emersonian sense would be foolish and futile, but what
is apparent from the evidence of fered above, incomplete as it may be, is the fact that
Borges feels for that “tall gentleman” of Concord both an admiration and an af finity.
The value of finding and analyzing such a relationship is the evidence it of fers for
the value of tradition and the relationship of that tradition to poets and poetry,
and the insight which such a study can af ford readers to the writings of two great
“intellectual” poets, one of the nineteenth century, one of the present; of two – as
Borges himself might express it – “amanuenses” of the one great Spirit that connects
all literature of the past and present and – if human beings continue to read – of the
future’ (1986: 206).
5 Borges also attributes his dislike of newspapers to Emerson: ‘Borges: La crucifixión
de Cristo fue importante después, no cuando ocurrió. Por eso yo jamás he leído un
diario, siguiendo el consejo de Emerson. Sábato: ¿Quién? Borges: Emerson, que
recomendaba leer libros, no diarios’ (Borges & Sábato 2002: 18). [‘Borges: The cru-
cifixion of Christ was important afterwards, not when it occurred. That’s why I have
never read a newspaper, following the advice of Emerson. Sábato: Who? Borges:
Emerson, who recommended reading books, not newspapers’] (my translation).
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 169
be appraised by a comparison of these two passages, the first from Emerson’s
1841 essay ‘The Transcendentalist’, the second from Borges’ essay on Keats:
Coleridge observes that all men are born Aristotelians or Platonists. The latter feel
that classes, orders, and genres are realities; the former, that they are generalizations.
For the latter, language is nothing but an approximative set of symbols; for the former,
it is the map of the universe. The Platonist knows that the universe is somehow a
cosmos, an order; that order, for the Aristotelian, can be an error or a fiction of our
partial knowledge. Across the latitudes and the epochs, the two immortal antagonists
change their name and language: one is Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Francis
Bradley; the other, Heraclitus, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, William James. In the ardu-
ous schools of the Middle Ages they all invoke Aristotle, the master of human reason
(Convivio, IV, 2), but the nominalists are Aristotle; the realists, Plato. The English
nominalism of the fourteenth century reappears in the scrupulous English idealism
of the eighteenth century; the economy of Occam’ formula, entia sunt multiplicanda
praetor necessitatem, permits or prefigures the no less precise esse est percipi. Men, said
Coleridge, are born Aristotelians or Platonists; one can state of the English mind
that it as born Aristotelian. For that mind, not abstract concepts but individual
ones are real; not the generic nightingale, but concrete nightingales. It is natural, it
is perhaps inevitable, that in England the ‘Ode to a Nightingale’ is not understood
correctly. (Borges 1964: 129)6
6 For ease of comparison I have placed the translation first. Herewith the original:
‘Observa Coleridge que todos los hombres nacen aristotélicos o platónicos. Los
últimos sienten que las clases, los órdenes y los géneros son realidades; los primeros,
que son generalizaciones; para éstos, el lenguaje no es otra cosa que un aproxima-
tivo juego de símbolos; para aquellos es el mapa del universo. El platónico sabe que
el universo es de algún modo un cosmos, un orden; ese orden, para el aristotélico,
puede ser un error o una ficción de nuestro conocimiento parcial. A través de las
latitudes y de las épocas, los dos antagonistas inmortales cambian de dialecto y de
170 Chapter Four
For further and more detailed appraisal of this inf luence, see, Christ (1969),
Coleman (1972), Golobof f (1977), Holditch (1986). It is Emerson, indeed,
whom Coleman refers to as ‘at the heart of Borges’ Aesthetics’ (1972: 359).
The avenue of enquiry that is of interest to us here, though, is the particu-
lar relationship to mysticism, and in particular to Swedenborg, that links
Emerson to Borges. Borges suggests further that it was thanks to Emerson
that he, as a young man in Geneva, first encountered Swedenborg:
Lo conocí por Emerson. Porque Emerson tiene un libro: ‘Representative Men’. Ese
libro está escrito un poco a la manera de ‘On Heroes Heroworship and the Heroic
In History’, de Carlyle, que fue de algún modo su maestro; entonces, él toma dis-
tintos tipos humanos. Recuerdo que son: Montaigne o el escéptico, Swedenborg o
el místico, Shakespeare o el poeta, Napoleón o el hombre del mundo y Goethe o
el escritor. Yo comencé leyendo ese libro. Ese libro lo leí en Ginebra en el año 14 ó
5; y luego, mi padre tenía un ejemplar de ‘Heaven and Hell’, ‘Caelo et Inferno’; él
lo tenía en una edición de la Everyman’s Library. Bien, yo leí ese libro y encargué a
Inglaterra los otros tres publicados por la misma editorial. Publicaron cuatro libros de
Swedenborg de acuerdo con la Sociedad Swedenborg de Londres. Y luego en francés
conozco solamente una versión de Caelo et lnferno’. Swedenborg fue a Inglaterra
porque quería conocer a Newton, y finalmente no pudo lograrlo, qué raro, eh? Yo he
hablado mucho sobre Swedenborg con el pintor y místico argentino Xul Solar, yo era
muy amigo de Xul, iba a casa de él en la calle Laprida 1214, y leíamos a Swedenborg,
leíamos a Blake, leíamos a los poetas alemanes, leíamos al poeta inglés Swinburne y
muchos otros textos. (Wildner 1991)
nombre: uno es Parménides, Platón, Spinoza, Kant, Francis Bradley; el otro, Heráclito,
Aristóteles, Locke, Hume, William James. En las arduas escuelas de la Edad Media,
todos invocan a Aristóteles, maestro de la humana razón (Convivio IV 2), pero los
nominalistas son Aristóteles; los realistas Platón. El nominalismo inglés del siglo xiv
resurge en el escrupuloso idealismo inglés del siglo xvii; la economía de la fórmula
de Occam, entia non sunt multiplicanda, praeter necessitatem permite o prefigura el
no menos taxativo esse est percipi. Los hombres, dijo Coleridge, nacen aristotélicos o
platónicos; de la mente inglesa cabe afirmar que nació aristotélica. Lo real, para esa
mente, no son los conceptos abstractos, sino los individuos; no el ruiseñor genérico,
sino los ruiseñores concretos. Es natural, es acaso inevitable, que en Inglaterra no sea
comprendida rectamente la Oda a un ruiseñor’ (1974: 718–19).
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 171
essential theoretical model of the enigmatic phenomenon. The inf luence of
Emerson on Borges thus becomes a determining factor in Borges’ under-
standing of mysticism.
Swedenborg belonged to an age of faith, when the majority of people believed in
angels and devils; now, the new German critics insisted that the Bible was merely a
piece of imaginative fiction, and that Jesus never existed. Intellectual men began to
look back on the ‘age of faith’ with nostalgia. Many of them – like Carlyle, Tennyson,
Emerson, Melville – were men of religious feelings who were totally unable to accept
traditional Christianity; they felt stranded in an emotional wasteland.
earth unmarked, unknown’, and Borges’: ‘Más alto que los otros, caminaba /
Aquel hombre lejano entre los hombres’ [‘Taller than the others, this man /
Walked among them, at a distance’]. Or Emerson’s line: ‘Through snows
above, mines underground, / The inks of Erebus he found’, and Borges’:
‘Lo que no ven los otros terrenales: / La ardiente geometría, el cristalino /
Laberinto de Dios y el remolino / Sórdido de los goces infernales.’ [‘That
which earthly eyes do not see: / The fierce geometry, the crystal / Labyrinth
of God and the sordid / Milling of infernal delights’]. That Borges found
inspiration for his laudatory sonnet in Emerson’s verse is at once evident.
There is much to compare between the two essays, and there are many
identifiable hooks that link the two. Borges, for example, mimics Emerson
in the equation of Swedenborg’s voyages to the otherworld with his Viking
heritage and the legacy of epic voyages. Emerson writes that Swedenborg
laboured ‘with the heart and strength of the rudest Viking that his rough
Sweden ever sent to battle’ (2003: 15). Borges writes: ‘No one was less like a
monk than that sanguine Scandinavian who went much farther than Erik
the Red’ (1995: 3).7 Emerson writes: ‘This man, who appeared to his con-
temporaries a visionary, and elixir of moonbeams, no doubt led the most
real life of any man then in the world’ (2003: 7).8 Borges writes: ‘The word
[mystic] runs the risk of suggesting a man apart […] No one is less like that
image than Emanuel Swedenborg. […] No one accepted life more fully, no
one investigated it with such passion, with the same intellectual love, or
with such impatience to understand it’ (1995: 3).9 Emerson writes: ‘Having
adopted the belief that certain books of the Old and New Testaments were
7 ‘Nadie más distinto de un monje que ese escandinavo sanguíneo, que fue mucho más
lejos que Enrico el Rojo’ (2005: 152).
8 Borges repeats this line of Emerson’s in the lecture ‘Emanuel Swedenborg’ (2005:
195).
9 ‘Esta palabra, aunque justísima, corre el albur de sugerir un hombre lateral, un
hombre que instintivamente se aparta de las circunstancias y urgencias que llamamos,
nunca sabré por qué, la realidad. Nadie menos parecido a esa imagen que Emanuel
Swedenborg, que recorrió este mundo y los otros, lúcido y laborioso. Nadie aceptó
la vida con mayor plenitud, nadie la investigó con igual pasión, con idéntico amor
intelectual y con tanta impaciencia de conocerla’ (2005: 152).
174 Chapter Four
10 ‘Se pensó que el Señor había escrito dos libros, el que denominamos la Biblia y el que
denominamos el universo. Interpretarlos era nuestro deber. Swedenborg, lo sospecho,
empezó por la exégesis del primero’ (2005: 159).
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 175
Emerson’s ecstatic and romantic vision of nature would clearly dif fer from
Swedenborg’s meticulous cataloguing of all aspects of material and spiritual
reality, an approach cognate with the Enlightenment spirit of his intellec-
tual powers. Eugene Taylor pays attention to Emerson’s misgivings on this
matter: ‘Emerson rejected as too absolute the so-called Swedenborgian dic-
tionary of correspondences, which required the reader to accept as gospel
the exact spiritual meaning Swedenborg himself had placed on each object
in nature’ (1995: 153). Borges, like Emerson, was uneasy with this notion of
correspondence, and, like Emerson, his description of it bears something
of the absurdity of taxonomy that we famously encounter in ‘El idioma
analítico de John Wilkens.’ Borges continues in ‘Testigo’:
Swedenborg […] llegó a elaborar un vasto sistema de significaciones ocultas. Las pie-
dras, por ejemplo, representan las verdades naturales; las piedras preciosas, las verdades
espirituales; los astros, el conocimiento divino; el caballo, la recta comprensión de
la Escritura, pero también su tergiversación por obra de sofismas; la Abominación
de la Desolación, la Trinidad; el abismo, Dios o el Infierno; etcétera. […] no hay
un solo ser en la tierra que no perdure sino por el inf lujo constante de la divinidad.
[…] Esa perturbadora sospecha de que somos cifras y símbolos de una criptografía
divina, cuyo sentido verdadero ignoramos, abunda en los volúmenes de Léon Bloy,
y los cabalistas la conocieron. (2005: 159)
[Swedenborg […] prepared a vast system of hidden meanings. Stones, for example,
represent natural truths; precious stones, spiritual truths; stars, divine knowledge;
the horse, a correct understanding of Scripture but also its distortion through soph-
istry; the abomination of desolation, the Trinity; the abyss, God or hell; etc. […]
There is not a single creature on earth that does not owe its continued existence to
the constant inf luence of the Divine Being. […] The disturbing suspicion that we are
ciphers and symbols in a divine cryptography whose true meaning we do not know
abounds in the volumes of Leon Bloy, and the Jewish Cabalists knew of it.] (1995: 14)
Dante’s Divine Comedy – that beautiful literary work – free will ceases upon
death. The dead are tried by a tribunal and deserve heaven or hell. None
of this occurs in Swedenborg’s work. He tells us that when a man dies he
is not aware that he has died because everything that surrounds him is the
same as before’] (my translation). This dimension of free will was another
of the significant heterodox claims of Swedenborg, and was one of the
litany of accusations (alongside his rejection of the Trinity, his belief that
Christ was God on earth, not the son of God, his critique of St Paul, his
belief that direct experience of the divine could be achieved without the
medium of clergy) that led to his censorship and publication prohibition
in his native Sweden: ‘Swedenborg radically departed from the orthodox
Christian belief in an individual and final judgment. The spirit, not God,
ultimately decided where to spend eternity’ (McDannell & Lang: 189. See
also Bald 2006: 16–18).
The universe, in his poem, suf fers under a magnetic sleep, and only ref lects the
mind of the magnetizer. Every thought comes into each mind by inf luence from
a society of spirits that surround it, and into these from a higher society, and so
on. All his types mean the same few things. All his figures speak one speech. All
his interlocutors Swedenborgize. […] Only when Cicero comes by, our gentle seer
sticks a little at saying he talked with Cicero, and, with a touch of human relent-
ing, remarks, ‘one whom it was given me to believe was Cicero;’ and when the soi
disant Roman opens his mouth, Rome and eloquence have ebbed away, – it is plain
theologic Swedenborg, like the rest. His heavens and hells are dull; fault of want of
individualism. (Emerson 2003: 44)
The ontological implications of this statement are profound when we cor-
relate it with other statements of Emerson and Borges about the ‘reality’
of Swedenborg’s visions. If Emerson detects a distinctly Swedenborgian
language of the characters then the author of such visions is not God but
Swedenborg. Consequently his angels inhabit the same fictional space as
H. G. Wells’ Morlocks, Shakespeare’s Hamlet or Tolkien’s Hobbits. This is
the question that concerned us in Chapter One, in which Borges repeatedly
separated mystics (‘When I talk of mystics, I think of Swedenborg, Angelus
Silesius, and the Persians also’) from non-mystics (‘Not the Spaniards. I
don’t think they had any mystical experiences’ [Barnstone 1982: 11]) based
upon, precisely, the non-fictional quality of the mystics’ texts. We recall that
he opined that Dante could not have experienced his vision in verse. This
is of crucial concern. Borges argued that Dante, in his letter to Cangrande
Della Scala, proposed an allegorical reading of The Divine Comedy: ‘Nothing
is further from the ultraterrestrial destinations of Swedenborg’ (1995: 9);
they are real, not fictions. Emerson appears to share Borges’ view about
Dante, but here applies the notion to Swedenborg, further emphasising
180 Chapter Four
the a priori nature of Swedenborg’s visions and making a brief equation
with Dante:
The parish disputes, in the Swedish church, between the friends and foes of Luther
and Melancthon, concerning ‘faith alone,’ and ‘works alone,’ intrude themselves into
his speculations upon the economy of the universe, and of the celestial societies […]
He is like Michaelangelo, who, in his frescoes, put the cardinal who had of fended
him to roast under a mountain of devils; or, like Dante, who avenged, in vindictive
melodies, all his private wrongs. (Emerson 2003: 46–7)
These angels that Swedenborg paints give us no very high idea of their discipline and
culture: they are all country parsons; their heaven is a fête champêtre, and evangeli-
cal picnic, or French distribution of prizes to virtuous peasants. Strange, scholastic,
didactic, passionless, bloodless man, who denotes classes of souls as a botanist disposes
of a carex, and visits doleful hells as a stratum of chalk or hornblende!12 He has no
12 This is the aspect of Swedenborg that Yeats (1920: 299) famously equated to his work
as a mineralogist: ‘He considered heaven and hell and God, the angels, the whole
destiny of man, as if he were sitting before a large table in a Government of fice put-
ting little pieces of mineral ore into small square boxes for an assistant to pack away
in drawers’, and that Garrett (1984: 68) describes as: ‘an odd, dry precision to his
descriptions of Heaven that suggests the engineer far more than the mystic’.
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 181
sympathy. He goes up and down the world of men, a modern Rhadamanthus in gold-
headed cane and peruke, and with nonchalance, and the air of a referee, distributes
souls. […] Behmen is healthily and beautifully wise, notwithstanding the mystical
narrowness and incommunicableness. Swedenborg is disagreeably wise, and, with
all his accumulated gifts, paralyzes and repels. (2003: 53)
Borges, however, of fers a slightly more sympathetic appraisal of the persis-
tent biblical, theological tone of Swedenborg’s many volumes, suggesting
that, despite the ‘unfortunate mistake’ of adapting his visions to doctrine,
Swedenborg would inevitably have experienced such an ecclesiastical vision
of the otherworld reality, as this was his vision of the mundane reality also.
‘[…] el padre de él era obispo, obispo evangélico, luterano. El tiene que
haberse criado en un ambiente muy piadoso. […] él pensaba naturalmente
en el espíritu de la Biblia’ (Wildner 1991) [‘His father was an evangelical
Lutheran bishop. He must have been brought up in a very pious environ-
ment. […] He must have considered the spirit of the Bible quite naturally’]
(my translation).13 In this respect, Borges would appear more forgiving
of Swedenborg’s ecclesiastical tone than Emerson; and just as Emerson
and Borges were troubled by the presence of orthodoxy in Swedenborg,
Emerson was greater troubled by the translation of Swedenborg’s visions
into doctrine: ‘These books should be used with caution. It is dangerous
to sculpture these evanescing images of thought. True in transition, they
become false if fixed. It requires, for his just apprehension, almost a genius
equal to his own. But when his visions become the stereotyped language of
multitudes of persons, of all degrees of age and capacity, they are perverted’
(2003: 43). Emerson railed against the perversion of Swedenborg’s ‘evanesc-
ing images of thought’ into something quotidian and mundane, arguing that
this would remove the mystery and the moral truth of Swedenborg’s texts.
This again is a sentiment fully visible with Borges, who paid close attention
to the ‘original’ experiences and unorthodox theology of Swedenborg, but
was at no stage prepared to accept the constellation of such accounts into
doctrine or articles of faith. For both Emerson and Borges, this predicament
13 This is similar to Conan Doyle’s comment that Swedenborg ‘sucked in theology with
his mother’s milk’ (2005: 96).
182 Chapter Four
was at the heart of their strained relationships with orthodox religion:
mystery lies at the heart of the religious experience, and yet the conversion
of such mystery into matters of faith is the erection of a rigid belief system
bereft of the transformative power of mystery.
[I wrote a prologue for a book about Swedenborg upon the request of the Swedenborg
Foundation. I have a project in mind about a book of the three salvations: the first is
that of Christ, which is ethical in its nature; the second is that of Swedenborg, which
is ethical and intellectual; and the third is that of Blake, rebel disciple of Swedenborg,
which is ethical, intellectual and aesthetic, and which is based in Christ’s parables,
which he calls works of art.] (My translation)
There are aspects of the language of Borges’ essay on Swedenborg that reveal
profound admiration for Swedenborg’s mighty intellect; indeed his intel-
lect in many respects supersedes his heavenly visions in Borges’ esteem. ‘No
le bastaron las versiones latinas; investigó los textos originales en hebreo y
en griego’ (2005: 153) [‘He always preferred the study of sacred scripture
to that of dogmatic theology. Latin translations were not good enough
for him; he studied the original texts in Hebrew and Greek’] (1995: 5).
Borges, as we recall, likewise ‘preferred the study of sacred scripture to that
of dogmatic theology’, and in many places describes reading Schopenhauer
and Kant in the original German so as to appreciate their authentic style.
One might conclude, therefore, that on matters of the intellect, Borges
indeed, as Lawrence suggests, felt himself ‘a kindred spirit to the Swedish
mystic’ (1995: x).
184 Chapter Four
principles of his county at that period in history; a spirit that later informed
his godson William James in his depiction of pragmatism: ‘As a “Yankee
mystic” Emerson was a pragmatic mystic to the core’ (Hurth 2005: 336).
Hurth also concisely addresses the central arguments of this contro-
versy over Emerson’s mystical credentials.
Parkes’ essay is vitriolic against both Emerson and any critic foolhardy
enough to call him a mystic. This is familiar in the scholarship of mysti-
cism, for example in Zaehner’s refutation of Huxley, and demonstrates, as I
mentioned in Chapter Two, the degree of reliance that many scholars place
on one or other of the defining categories of the term ‘mystic’ and ‘mysti-
cism’. In Parkes’s case mysticism cannot be a common-or-garden sensation
of harmony, but is something far more closely aligned to religious ortho-
doxy. What is visible in Quinn’s firm assertion is a bias of the work ethic
that we encounter with Zaehner’s rejection of Huxley’s ‘gratuitous grace’
and Meher Baba’s God in a Pill? Apotheosis does not come cheaply. One
cannot take a shortcut to the divine. It is the perennial argument concern-
ing ‘dif ficult’ or ‘easy’ spiritual paths, characterized (and satirized) by Alan
Watts’ division of the easy approach to satori: ‘Beat Zen’ and the dif ficult
approach: ‘Square Zen’ (Watts 2006). Quinn qualifies his assertion with
a definition of what the ‘true’ mystic is: ‘For the mystics we know of, in
the East as in the West, dedicated years to the spiritual exercises by which
they might become united with God. Emerson would have this rare phe-
nomenon take place almost instantaneously. It is obvious that whatever
we may call this theory of Emerson’s, it will hardly do to call it mysticism’
(1950: 411). Quinn would doubtless reject Watts’ ‘Beat Zen’.
186 Chapter Four
Both Quinn and Hurth evaluate the many scholars who have assessed
Emerson’s works, in particular the famed passage from Nature, and argue
that most scholars agree not only on the literary quality of Emerson’s text,
but that the text was inspired by other texts, in particular Böhme: ‘Emerson
welcomed Böhme as someone who was taught directly by God through his
own intuitions, not by book learning – a mystic in the most exact sense’
(Hurth 2005: 337). Emerson’s theoretical position concerning mysticism,
therefore, is strikingly close to that of Borges’ in the emphasis on the unme-
diated mystical vision. Hurth also points out that ‘since Emerson did read
the Aurora shortly before the publication of Nature, one may guardedly
assume that Böhme’s work was a possible inf luence for his most famous
passage. Emerson may also have noticed that Böhme often used the physi-
cal eye as a symbol for the communion between soul and God’ (2005:
339). Whilst this is a position taken by many of the scholars she mentions,
Hurth does allow for the originality of experience which was later framed
in a style inf luenced by Böhme: ‘But while on the surface Böhme’s descrip-
tions of mystical experience are largely in accord with the mysticism of the
“transparent eye-ball” passage, the underlying beliefs and assumptions are
quite dif ferent, and the Aurora is thus a source for Emerson only in the
sense that it provided him with a vocabulary for his own ideas’ (2005: 339).
Quinn, meanwhile, suggests the Jamesian principle of inef fability: ‘As
a rule, most mystics find it exceedingly dif ficult to describe their mystical
experiences. Words fail them. But words do not fail Emerson. He, indeed,
is almost glib’ (1950: 409). Quinn goes on to suggest that Emerson’s lan-
guage may be borrowed from Plotinus. This needs emphasising, as it is
related to the views of Borges concerning Swedenborg and Dante’s mystical
texts. What emerges, quite ironically, is that an unliterary description of
the experience would testify to a failure of language to accommodate the
experience, and would thus testify to the experience’s inef fability, which
would thus testify to its genuine mystical aspect. In brief, therefore, the
better the poet, the worse the mystic.
As we assessed in Chapter Three, Borges is also polemically described
as a mystic, a ‘mystical thinker’, an almost-mystic, a non-mystic, etc., and as
discussed the term can only have meaningful value if determined according
to one or other of the theoretical positions that define mysticism. What is
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 187
Conclusion
14 Borges discusses this in ‘Autobiographical Essay’. Nubiola (2005) explores the verac-
ity of this claim and locates the correspondence.
15 ‘an Anglican clergy [sic] and Swedenborgian preacher who was a good friend and
a frequent visitor in the De Quincey household. […] Clowes even lent copies of
Swedenborg’s works to De Quincey [who] is known to have given Coleridge the
works of Boehme years later’ (García 2007: 64) ‘In his translation of Immanuel
Kant’s Abstract of Swedenborgianism, De Quincey found the Kantian framework
for interpreting mystical dreams and divine states compelling enough to translate and
publish. Kant argues that Swedenborg’s prophecies are a product of a disorder in the
faculty of sensibility; and that in communicating with spirits, Swedenborg is simply
echoing his inner ideas within himself, projecting what is in the mind outward. For
Kant, these mystical visions are therefore a form of madness’ (García 2007: 65).
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 189
16 ‘Toward the end of this decade, Blake began to read Swedenborg’s works, and in 1789
he attended the First General Conference of the New Church, which was held at
Eastcheap from April 13 to 17, 1789. Here we might speculate on a “first meeting” of
Tulk and Blake’ (Deck 1977: 218). See also Rix 2007.
17 ‘We can then combine this evidence with Crabb Robinson’s statement about Blake
and Coleridge to conclude that this meeting occurred in 1825 or very early in 1826’
(Deck 1977: 224).
18 ‘Blake must early have been acquainted, inasmuch as his father was a dissenter inter-
ested in Swedenborg and sympathetic to his teachings if not, like William’s brother
Robert, actively associated with a Community’ (Schorer 1938: 157).
19 ‘From May 1744, Swedenborg lodged with his Moravian friend John Paul Brockmer.
Together they attended Moravian services, and Swedenborg became so attracted to
Fetter Lane Chapel (to which Blake’s mother was later connected) that he considered
formal af filiation’ (Rix 2007: 51). Ankarsjö (2009: 32) is more forthcoming in suggest-
ing a personal connection between Blake’s mother and Swedenborg: ‘Swedenborg’s
af filiation with the Moravians […] coincided with the period when Blake’s mother
Catherine and her first husband Thomas Armitage and Blake’s possible uncle John
had their most active years in the church. Particularly, Catherine seems to have been
a devoted Moravian member at the time.’
190 Chapter Four
Should Catherine Blake and Swedenborg not have met, then a path can be
traced from Blake to Robert Hindmarsh, one of the original founders of
Swedenborgianism and friend of Tulk’s father, John Augustus Tulk, whose
gatherings Blake attended with his friend and supporter John Flaxman
(Rix 2007: 53–5). Hindmarsh’s father, James Hindmarsh, was one of John
Wesley’s preachers, and was trained by Wesley in London. Swedenborg cor-
responded with Wesley in 1772, inviting the Methodist minister to visit him
in London (Synnestvedt 1977: 33).20 John Wesley and his brother Charles
were also members of the Fetter Lane Moravian Church at the same time
as Swedenborg (Ankarsjö 2009: 37). As such, and allowing any number of
variant trajectories and alternative figures, there is direct person-to-person
contact that links Swedenborg to Borges via Emerson.
As established in the previous chapter, Borges adopted a curiously
contradictory stance in his evaluation of Swedenborg. His repeated empha-
sis on the heterodox aspect of the Swedish seer resulted in a judgment
about originality of experience that is problematic. It is striking to note,
as scholars such as Quinn and Hurth have done so, that Emerson presents
an equally problematic and at times inconsistent approach to his evalua-
tion of Swedenborg and Böhme. It is therefore of concern for this study
to appraise the strong kinship that Borges felt for Emerson, to note the
similarities and the dif ferences in their outlook, and to chart the visible
marks of inf luence.
As indicated, both Emerson and Borges delivered lectures on
Swedenborg which they later published, in which they presented bio-
graphical material alongside a critical evaluation of his work. Emerson and
Borges paid particular attention to the magnitude of Swedenborg’s intel-
lect. This is of great importance to both, and, as discussed, it becomes clear
20 A word of caution for the scholar approaching Swedenborg for the first time; these
three names can be confusing: Toksvig, Signe (1948) Emanuel Swedenborg: Scientist
and Mystic (New Haven: Yale University Press). Sigstedt, Cyriel (1952) The Swedenborg
Epic: The Life and Works of Emanuel Swedenborg (New York: Bookman Associates,)
Synnestvedt, Sig (1970) The Essential Swedenborg. Boston: Houghton Mif f lin Co.
(The Spanish-language edition of this latter volume is what Borges was invited to
contribute to).
Two lectures on Swedenborg: Emerson and Borges 191
Mystical experience was of fset by the sudden inf lux of skepticism. Böhme’s mysti-
cism appeared to Emerson to leave no room for such doubt and skepticism. Emerson
acutely sensed the simple sincerity and piety of Böhme and was sure that with this
‘sentiment of piety’ Böhme experienced ultimate reality as indubitably present. Böhme
was aware of this reality with a vividness and vitality that the aging Emerson could
only long for. (Hurth 2005: 349)
the poem ‘Otro poema de los dones’ (El otro, el mismo), ‘El espejo de
los enigmas’ (Otras Inquisiciones), ‘Nueva refutación del tiempo’ (Otras
Inquisiciones), four tales of El libro de los seres imaginarios: ‘El Devorador
de las Sombras’, ‘El Monstruo Aqueronte’, ‘Los Demonios de Swedenborg’
and ‘Los Ángeles de Swedenborg’, ‘La duración del infierno’ (Discusión),
‘Historia de la Eternidad’ (Historia de la Eternidad), ‘La memoria de
Shakespeare’ (La Memoria de Shakespeare), ‘Veinticinco de agosto, 1983’
(La Memoria de Shakespeare), ‘Laprida 1214’ (Atlas), ‘Sobre Oscar Wilde’
(Otras Inquisiciones), ‘Pascal’ (Otras Inquisiciones), ‘Nota sobre (hacia)
Bernard Shaw’ (Otras Inquisiciones), ‘Sobre el Vathek de William Beckford’
(Otras Inquisiciones), ‘Prólogo de prólogos’ (2005: 13), ‘Dos interpretaciones
de Arthur Rimbaud’ (2005: 315), ‘Emanuel Swedenborg: Mystical Works
(2005: 152), ‘Personality survives death, de Sir William Barrett’ (2005: 361),1
‘William Blake. Poesía completa’ (2005: 554),2 ‘Leon Bloy: La salvación
por los judíos. La sangre del pobre. En las tinieblas’ (2005: 544),3 ‘Leslie
Weatherhead: After Death’ (Discusión), Prologue to Xul Solar, Catálogo de
obras del Museo (Borges 1990). He also reproduces a number of Swedenborg
texts: ‘Un teólogo en la muerte’ (Historia universal de la infamia and
Antología de la literatura fantástica), ‘Un doble de Mahoma’ (Historia
universal de la infamia), two passages of El libro de los seres imaginarios:
‘Los Demonios de Swedenborg’ and ‘Los Ángeles de Swedenborg’, seven
passages of El Libro del cielo y del infierno: ‘Correspondencias arcanas’, ‘El
hombre elige su eternidad’, ‘Las formas del infierno’, ‘Infiernos ruinosos’, ‘Los
ricos en el cielo’, ‘Un réprobo en el cielo’, ‘Camino de perfección’ [although
this latter piece is authored by El Falso Swedenborg]. For the following
interviews in which he discusses Swedenborg, please consult bibliography
for full details. Salas (1976), Bourne (1980), Enguídanos (Barnstone 1982),
Hughes et al. (Cortínez 1986), Sábato (2002), Barili (Burgin 1998), Christ
(Burgin 1998), Yates (Burgin 1998), Enguídanos (Burgin 1998). He tells
Miguel Enguídanos at Indiana University in March 1976 that ‘I also intend
to write a book on Swedenborg’ (Barnstone 1982: 97); he tells Barnstone: ‘I
would like to write a book on Swedenborg’ (Barnstone 1982: 109); and he
says to Hughes et al. ‘I’m writing a book on him [Swedenborg]’ (Cortínez
1986: 16). The book was never written, or at least never published.
This volume of references cannot indicate by deduction neces-
sary inf luence, but it certainly demonstrates the perpetual presence of
Swedenborg in Borges’ mind whilst he composed tales or poems, reviewed
the works of others, or analysed a particular field in a critical essay. In par-
ticular, Borges appraised accounts of life after death, heavenly voyages,
communication with the dead or with angels, anomalous experiences with
time and heterodox theologies with reference to Swedenborg. It becomes
quite clear that for Borges Swedenborg is the yardstick of such mysterious
matters against which other accounts are judged. This is most manifest
by the proportion of Swedenborg passages that fill the pages of Borges’
and Bioy’s Libro del cielo y del infierno. Not only are there seven texts of
Swedenborg, but the authors make specific reference to Swedenborg in
the prologue. It is clear that on matters eschatological and of the afterlife,
Swedenborg constituted the greatest authority for Borges.
When did Borges first write about Swedenborg? How did he initially
come across his works? Borges relates his introduction to lecturing on
Swedenborg in his ‘Autobiographical Essay’:
So, at forty-seven, I found a new and exciting life opening up for me. I traveled up
and down Argentina and Uruguay, lecturing on Swedenborg, Blake, the Persian
and Chinese mystics, Buddhism, gauchesco poetry, Martin Buber, the Kabbalah,
the Arabian Nights, T. E. Lawrence, medieval Germanic poetry, the Icelandic sagas,
Heine, Dante, expressionism and Cervantes […]. Not only did I end up making far
more money than at the library, but I enjoyed the work and felt that it justified me.
(1971a: 245)
4 ‘Goethe once said that only by reading Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell was he enabled
to finish his masterpiece, Faustus, which he had put aside in frustration for a decade’
(Lawrence 1999).
5 See Lawrence 1999.
6 As a reader of Schopenhauer, Borges would likely have been aware of Schelling.
7 ‘Of course I delight in Yeats’ (Barnstone 1982: 87).
8 His novel Serafita, is an exposition of Swedenborgian spiritual theology.
9 There are only brief mentions of Swedenborg in Chesterton, yet the fact that he
wrote a book on Blake indicates his knowledge of him.
10 Borges makes no mention that I can find of Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit Seer, in which
Kant investigates Swedenborg, but he discusses in Autobiographical Essay reading
Kant as a young man. He also declares to Christ (1967): ‘I tried my hand at Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason. Of course, I got bogged down as most people do – as most
Germans do’.
11 ‘Like the discovery of love, like the discovery of the sea, the discovery of Dostoevsky
marks an important date in one’s life’ (Borges 2000: 517).
12 Russell wrote about Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit Seer. Borges declared that Russell’s
History of Western Philosophy would have chosen as his desert-island book (Sorrentino
2001: 230).
13 ‘Shaw, que yo sepa, no habló nunca de Swedenborg; cabe suponer que escribió bajo
el estímulo de Blake, a quien menciona con frecuencia y respecto, o, lo que no es
inverosímil, que arribó a las mismas ideas por cuenta propia’ (2005: 155–6) [‘Shaw
never, so far as I know, spoke of Swedenborg; it might be supposed that he wrote
under the stimulus of Blake, whom he mentions frequently and with respect’] (Borges
1995: 9).
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 197
Mark Twain, Unamuno, Lewis Carroll, T. S. Eliot, Frost, Ezra Pound,
Faulkner, Stephen Crane, Ambrose Bierce, Keats, H. G. Wells, Kafka.
Swedenborgian scholars, such as Eugene Taylor, Wilson Van Dusen
and James Lawrence have attempted to demonstrate that Swedenborg is
a far greater inf luence upon streams of intellectual, artistic and spiritual
thought – principally in the West but also, viz Suzuki, in the East – than
has hitherto been acknowledged. It would appear that Swedenborg con-
stitutes a far less pervasive presence in Hispanic artistic traditions than
in the English-speaking world. There are many reason for this, the most
immediately apparent being the twofold nature of Swedenborg’s relation-
ship to the Enlightenment at a time when the Catholic authorities in Spain
were resistant to such secular inf luences; and secondly his Protestant,
non-conformist, anti-ecclesiastical and heterodox religious dimension.
Chadwick (2003: 2–3), Swedenborgian scholar and translator, is the only
scholar I have encountered to address the issue of Swedenborg’s impact
(or lack of ) in the Catholic world:
The Vatican maintained an Index of prohibited books, and I had always assumed
that Swedenborg’s theological books appeared on it. […] The Vatican Library, which
includes the library of the Inquisition, has no copies of the original editions, other
than Volume I of the Principia. Similarly the Library of the Institut de France in
Paris reports only The Apocalypse Revealed among the major works of which it has
first editions. From this I deduce that the educated public of Catholic countries
were almost totally unaware of these books when they were published in London
and Amsterdam.
the spirit of free enquiry typified by such denominations; a far cry from
the Argentine Catholicism of which Borges was so critical.
However, beyond the many references, and beyond the employment
of Swedenborg in his ref lections on mysticism, to what extent was Borges’
poetic and fictional aesthetic inf luenced by Swedenborg? In this chapter
I concentrate on the narrative space of the tales and poems in order to
investigate the abiding presence of Swedenborgian ideas of heavens and
hells, the persistence of the soul after death, the landscape of the visionary
world and the symbolic aspect of dreams. Importantly, and surprisingly
given Borges’ seeming disdain for the moral aspect of theological works,
I intuit in Borges’ work a strong ethical dimension that bears visible hall-
marks of the heavenly ethos of Swedenborg. Rarely does the question
of ethics in Borges’ work appear in the scholarship, but I propose that a
ethical dimension present in his many interviews and essays demonstrates
the inf luence of Swedenborg. An example of this is his description of a
‘moral law’ to Amelia Barili: ‘I feel that we all know when we act well or
badly. I feel ethics is beyond discussion. For example, I have acted badly
many times, but when I do it, I know that it is wrong. It is not because of
the consequences. In the long run, consequences even up, don’t you think?
It is the fact itself of doing good or doing bad’ (Burgin 1998: 245). As we
will explore in this chapter, such a statement reveals the Swedenborgian
perspective that heavens and hells are states of the soul that surround us
even in life, and that the ethical instinct within us encourages us to choose
those pathways most appropriate to our moral state. Borges also discussed
the natural ethical nature of man in the preface to Elogio de la Sombra,
exclaiming somewhat provocatively, that the Protestant mentality privi-
leges this ethos more than the Catholic: ‘Una de las virtudes por las cuales
prefiero las naciones protestantes a las de tradición católica es su, cuidado
de la ética’ (1974: 975) [‘One of the virtues for which I prefer Protestant
countries to Catholic is their regard for ethics’] (1975a: 10). This Protestant/
Catholic aspect with regards Swedenborg is discussed later in this chapter.
The earliest mention of Swedenborg that I have encountered in
Borges’ work is the 1929 essay ‘La Duración del Infierno.’ What is curious
about this piece is that whilst he refers to Swedenborg only in a footnote,
nevertheless the whole trajectory of his analysis leads to a conclusion of
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 199
El Infierno es la otra cara del Cielo. Su reverso preciso es necesario para el equilibrio
de la Creación. El Señor lo rige, como a los cielos. El equilibrio de las dos esferas es
requerido para el libre albedrío, que sin tregua debe elegir entre el bien, que mana del
Cielo, y el mal, que mana del Infierno. Cada día, cada instante de cada día, el hombre
labra su perdición eterna o su salvación. Seremos lo que somos. Los terrores o alarmas
de la agonía, que suelen darse cuando el moribundo está acobardado y confuso, no
tienen mayor importancia. Creamos o no en la inmortalidad personal, es innegable
que la doctrina revelada por Swedenborg es más moral y más razonable que la de un
misterioso don que se obtiene, casi al azar, a última hora. Nos lleva, por lo pronto,
al ejercicio de una vida virtuosa. (2005: 157)
[Hell is the other face of heaven. Its exact opposite is necessary for the balance of
creation. The Lord rules over it as he does over heaven. Balance between the two
spheres is required for free will, which must unceasingly choose between good,
which emanates from heaven, and evil, which emanates from hell. Every day, every
instant of every day, man is shaping his eternal damnation or his salvation. We will
be what we are. The terrors or anxieties of agony, which usually occur when a dying
person is frightened and confused, are of little importance. Whether we believe in
the immortality of the soul or not, we must recognize that the doctrine revealed by
Swedenborg is more moral and reasonable than one that postulates a mysterious
gift gotten, almost by chance, at the eleventh hour. To begin with, it leads us to the
practice of virtue in our lives.] (1995: 11)
14 ‘There is infernal freedom and there is heavenly freedom. It is from infernal free-
dom to think and to will evil, and so far as civil and moral laws do not hinder, to
speak and to do it. On the other hand, it is from heavenly freedom to think and to
will good, and so far as opportunity is granted, to speak and to do it. Whatever a
man thinks, wills, speaks and does from freedom he perceives as his own; for all the
freedom which everyone has is from his love. Therefore those who are in the love of
evil perceive only that infernal freedom is freedom itself, while those who are in the
love of good perceive that heavenly freedom is freedom itself and consequently the
evil and the good perceive the opposite to be slavery’ (Divine Providence, §43).
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 201
Swedenborg’s works as one of the more compelling aesthetic and ethical
depictions of hell. In repeated interviews of his later decades, he continues
to draw on these two writers as portraying hell in a manner that champi-
ons the human seizure of destiny over either the reward of faith or the
arbitrariness of divine will. Importantly, Borges draws from Swedenborg’s
vision of elected afterlife locations an ethical position that emphasizes the
state of rapture at the mystery of existence, and the fulfilment gained from
following one’s own particular destiny. He returns to these two positions
repeatedly in the interviews compiled in Borges at Eighty:
I think that one is dying all the time. Every time we are not feeling something, dis-
covering something, when we are merely repeating something mechanically. At that
moment you are dead. Life may come at any moment also. If you take a single day,
therein you find many deaths, I suppose, and many births also. But I try not to be
dead. I try to be curious concerning things, and now I am receiving experiences all
the time, and those experiences will be changed into poems, into short stories, into
fables. I am receiving them all the time, although I know that many of the things I
do and things I say are mechanical, that is to say, they belong to death rather than
to life. (Barnstone 1982: 13)
156) [‘The heaven and hell of his doctrine are not places, even though the
souls of the dead who inhabit and, in a way, create them perceive them as
being situated in space. They are conditions of the soul, determined by its
former life. Heaven is forbidden to no one; hell, imposed on no one. The
doors, so to speak, are open’] (1995: 10). Borges’ statements thus chime with
Swedenborg, and consequently one can allow greater room for manoeu-
ver within Lawrence’s claim that Borges was himself Swedenborgian. It is
also a position that informs Borges’ reading of Dante. As discussed, whilst
Borges’ praises the Divine Comedy as being the pinnacle of poetic vision,
he rejects outright the theological basis of reward and punishment that he
perceives in the structure of the poetic cycle. He repeats his gnostic and
Swedenborgian credentials in recognising that hell is a state in the present,
not a future punishment:
You know, Dante was wrong about hell, wrong about the meaning of that inscrip-
tion on the gate of the Inferno in the first lines of Canto 3: Lasciate ogni speranza,
voi ch’entrate (Abandon every hope, you who enter). Hell doesn’t begin down there.
There is no entry to the afterlife. Hell begins here, and here is where we should
abandon all hope. Then we have the possibility, the hope, of some momentary hap-
piness. (Barnstone 2000: 31)
between faith and experience, orthodoxy and heterodoxy, pride and humil-
ity, that we find throughout Borges’ critical work.
I have been unable to ascertain whether Borges transcribed the passage
from Swedenborg’s Arcana Cœlestia directly from a Spanish translation, or
whether he translated it himself from an English (or perhaps other) trans-
lation. Borges’ self-confessed poor Latin would indicate that it is unlikely
he translated it directly from Swedenborg himself.16 The passage itself, as
one would expect in a piece that Borges chose to incorporate in two of his
many anthologies, is arrestingly Borgesian. To begin with, as with so many
tales of Borges, whether from the period of Ficciones or the later Brodie,
the text is itself second-hand, as Swedenborg remarks that his account
had been told him by the angels. Regardless of the ontological question
of angels, as a narrative strategy this provides layers of fictionality over
the account, inviting the reader into the textual space. This is reinforced
by the rendition of the passage in a collection of Borges in which fiction
and historical legend are juxtaposed.
‘I have been allowed to talk with some people who lived more than
two thousand years ago, people whose lives are described in history books
and are therefore familiar’ (§480). Swedenborg recounts the activities of
the theologian Melanchthon (who, I conjecture, is Philipp Melanchthon,
the German reformer and collaborator with Martin Luther), who upon
dying is unable or unwilling to acknowledge that he is dead and contin-
ues with his theological entreaties concerning faith as of greater value
in heaven than charity. Over a period of time (though as Borges indi-
cates elsewhere, there is no time in Swedenborg’s heaven) he becomes
entrenched in his dogmatic doctrine of faith, and distances himself ever
16 One can only conjecture whether Borges was really familiar with all the eight vol-
umes of Swedenborg’s Arcana Cœlestia (or more, depending on the edition; Borges
refers to the nine volumes of Arcana Cœlestia in ‘Testigo’). Judging by his review of
Hesse’s Glass Bead Game, for example, which is merely a biographical sketch about
Hesse, with one empty brief paragraph about the novel, and which thus suggests that
he did not read the novel (2005: 512), and by his confession that he could not finish
Joyce’s Ulysses, it is perfectly likely that he skimmed Arcana Cœlestia (as I confess to
have done), selecting the passages relating to the situation of the souls of the dead,
the angels and the demons, and hurrying over the extensive biblical exegesis.
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 205
more from divine love and wisdom. His pride and obstinacy eventually
drive him into consort with magicians and demons and exclude him for-
ever from heaven. This passage demonstrates the severe critique – to the
point of heresy – that Swedenborg maintained concerning doctrines of
faith, perfectly encapsulated in Swedenborg’s damning sentence in Heaven
and Hell: ‘I can bear witness from all my experiences of what happens in
heaven and in hell that people who have confessed faith alone as a matter
of doctrine and have engaged in evil as regards their lives are all in hell’
(§482). Repeatedly in Arcana Cœlestia and in Heaven and Hell he depicts
the astonishment of newly-dead upon realising that faith alone serves
them no purpose if not justified by love and charity – a position resonant
of St Paul. Faith, Swedenborg argues, must be borne out by manifestation
of love, and whilst a cruel heart may be disguised on earth, there is no
hypocrisy possible in heaven, as the individual’s true nature is visible.17
Furthermore, writes Swedenborg, believers and non-believers alike share
the afterlife with no distinction. As I argued in the Introduction, whilst
Swedenborg was demonstrably a man of faith, this heterodox theological
position would chime at once with Borges’ intellectual dif ficulty with the
exhortation to treat matters theological or metaphysical as matters of faith.
Experience and imagination, not adherence to faith, are the epistemologi-
cal bases of Borges’ philosophical outlook, and thus he would have found
great accommodation within Swedenborg’s vision.
‘Diálogo de muertos’
17 ‘In heaven no one can conceal his interiors by his expression, or feign, or really deceive
and mislead by craft or hypocrisy’ (§48).
206 Chapter Five
18 It needs emphasising that Borges paid particular attention to the squalid landscape
of hell depicted by Swedenborg. ‘Ahora, ¿qué son los infiernos? Los infiernos, según
Swedenborg, tienen varios aspectos. El aspecto que tendrían para nosotros o para los
ángeles. Son zonas pantanosas, zonas en las que hay ciudades que parecen destruidas
por los incendios; pero ahí los réprobos se sienten felices. Se sienten felices a su modo,
es decir, están llenos de odio y no hay un monarca de ese reino; continuamente están
conspirando unos contra otros. Es un mundo de baja política, de conspiración. Eso
es el infierno.’ (2005: 198) [‘So, what are these hells? Hells, for Swedenborg, have
various aspects: one for us and one for the angels. They are swampy places in which
there are cities that seem destroyed by fire. But the damned feel happy there. They
feel happy in their particular way, that’s to say, they are filled with hatred, there is no
monarch, and they are continually plotting against each other. It is a world of lowly
politics, of conspiracy. This is hell’] (my translation).
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 207
dead. This putrid landscape is at once resonant of the landscapes of hell
described by Swedenborg:
In some hells you can see what look like the ruins of houses and cities after a fire, where
hellish spirits live and hide out. In the milder hells you can see crude huts, sometimes
grouped in something like a city, with alleyways and streets. There are hellish spirits
in these homes, with constant quarrels, hostility, beating, and violence. The streets
and alleys are full of thieves and robbers. In some hells there are nothing but brothels,
foul to look at and full of all kinds of filth and excrement. (Heaven and Hell: §586)
their features are mutilated, atrocious’] (1995: 10). In the tale ‘Diálogo’, these
faceless or ghoulishly disfigured souls gravitate towards Rosas clearly drawn
to his still manifest mundane power. Rosas, like Swedenborg’s theologian,
likewise seems gravely resistant to abandoning the power and authority
that had been his during life. Swedenborg writes in Heaven and Hell that
souls filled with hatred and malice naturally are attracted to the regions
of hell rather than heaven:
There is no way that people who are engaged in carnal love can live in heaven’s warmth,
because heaven’s warmth is heavenly love. They can live in hell’s warmth, though,
which is a love of cruelty toward people who do not support them. The pleasures of
this love are contempt for others, hostility, hatred, and vengefulness. When they are
absorbed in these they are in their very life, with no knowledge whatever of what it
means to do good for others out of sheer goodness and for the sake of the good itself.
All they know is how to do good out of malice and for the sake of malice. (§481)
Borges, perhaps referring to this passage or any of the many similar pas-
sages in Heaven and Hell and Arcana Cœlestia, writes of ‘los réprobos’ [‘the
damned’] that ‘El ejercicio del poder y el odio recíproco son su felicidad.
Viven entregados a la política, en el sentido más sudamericano de la palabra;
es decir, viven para conspirar, mentir e imponerse’ (2005: 156) [‘for them,
happiness lies in the exercise of power and in mutual hatred. They devote
their lives to politics, in the most South American sense of the word: that
is, they live to scheme, to lie, and to impose their will on others’] (1995:
10). It is clear that his depiction of Rosas is of a soul defiantly unwill-
ing to relinquish such political power, and who is consequently guiding
himself towards the demonic regions of hell. Emerson, in his chapter on
Swedenborg, concisely describes this desperate nature depicted by Borges
in Rosas: ‘The ghosts are tormented with the fear of death, and cannot
remember that they have died’ (2003: 34). Quiroga appears like the broth-
ers Cain and Abel in ‘Leyenda’ (Elogio de la sombra), Borges’ brief and
Swedenborgian account of the dead brothers meeting in the next world,
in that, like Cain, he has forgiven Rosas through his oblivion. Quiroga is
consequently fully cognizant of his status, and fully prepared to move on
into the further regions of the dead, whereas Rosas, puf fed up with pride
for his life achievements, wishes to remain Rosas even in death, believing
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 209
‘Será que no estoy hecho a estar muerto’ (1974: 792) [‘It must be that I am
not made to be a dead man’] (1970: 35).
In the poem ‘Rosas’, the youthful Borges considers the tremendous
presence of Rosas upon contemporary Argentine society. Again, ref lect-
ing his abiding interest in the dialectic of memory and oblivion (‘olvido’),
Borges concludes the poem with the ref lection that to maintain hatred
for Rosas is to keep him alive ‘Ya Dios lo habrá olvidado / y es menos una
injuria que una piedad / demorar su infinita disolución / con limosnas de
odio’ (1972: 16) [‘Even God has forgotten him, / and to delay his eternal
extinction / for a pittance of hatred / is to turn our contempt into charity
now’] (1972: 17). The poem ‘El General Quiroga va en coche al muere’,
meanwhile, presents a proud Quiroga defiantly rejecting his forthcoming
death, proclaiming his integral power and importance with the world and
the living: ‘Ya muerto, ya de pie, ya inmortal, ya fantasma, / se presentó al
infierno que Dios le había marcado, / y a sus órdenes iban, rotas y desan-
gradas, / las ánimas en pena de hombres y de caballos’ (1972: 40) [‘Now
dead, now on his feet, now immortal, now a ghost, / he reported to the
Hell marked out for him by God, / and under his command there marched,
broken and bloodless, / the souls in purgatory of his soldiers and his horses’]
(1972: 41). These early poetic musings on the deaths of Rosas and Quiroga
also present a Swedenborgian vision of the complex web of relationships
between the souls of the dead, the people they had been when alive, and
their persistent presence in the memory of the living. Rosas, it would seem
both from the poem and the tale, is prevented from any development of
his soul in the realm of the dead partly because of his towering pride, but
partly because of the sustaining force of hatred that the living (Borges, for
example) thrust upon him. Quiroga, perhaps as a result of his premature
death four decades previously, appears to have overcome the pride that char-
acterized his death, indicated in the poem, and would seem keen to find a
passage away from these infernal regions: ‘Yo pensaba como usted cuando
entré en la muerte, pero aquí aprendí muchas cosas’ (1974: 792) [‘I thought
as you do when I entered death, but I learned many things here’] (1970:
35). In the case of both figures, the thoroughly Swedenborgian approach
to the conscious choices that the souls of the dead have is developed; and
consequently the hell which the figures inhabit is not one of punishment,
210 Chapter Five
The Shire were for Tolkien and his readers. They are, as Borges suggests
‘conditions of the soul’ and thus correspond to the Imagination of Blake
and Coleridge, to Corbin’s imaginal, to Jung’s dreamworld, as liminal spaces
neither one nor the other. Kathleen Raine lucidly describes this liminal
state: ‘For the landscapes of poetry, the landscapes of the great painters are
not to be found in nature at all. […] They are landscapes of the soul, and
the imagery is not an end but a means – a language for discoursing upon
realities of the intelligible world, not of the physical world. The theme
of imaginative art is not physical but metaphysical’ (2007: 25). It must
be emphasized that Swedenborg did not walk out of his door and into a
parallel universe populated with angels and demons, but neither was he
‘making it up’ in the sense that a novelist might create a fiction.19 This is a
dif ficult idea to conceive of, let alone describe, and yet Corbin succeeds in
defining the imaginal as, precisely, this liminal landscape that has charac-
terized religious and mystical experience (both in Christianity and Islam),
poetry and art, across time and cultures; and Swedenborg was for Corbin
of supreme importance, in the same way that he was for Borges, as ‘recorrió
este mundo y los otros, lúcido y laborioso. […] ese escandinavo sanguíneo,
que fue mucho más lejos que Erico el Rojo’ (2005: 152) [‘(he) journeyed,
lucid and laborious, through this and all other worlds […] that sanguine
Scandinavian who went much further than Eric the Red’] (1995: 3). This
19 Perhaps, however, his voyages were of such a physical order. Swedenborg writes in
Heaven and Hell: ‘As to being carried away by the spirit to another place, I have
been shown by living experience what it is, and how it is done, but only two or three
times. I will relate a single instance. Walking through the streets of a city and through
fields, talking at the same time with spirits, I knew no otherwise than that I was fully
awake, and in possession of my usual sight. Thus I walked on without going astray,
and all the while with clear vision, seeing groves, rivers, palaces, houses, men, and
other objects. But after walking thus for some hours, suddenly I saw with my bodily
eyes, and noted that I was in another place. Being greatly astonished I perceived
that I had been in the same state as those who were said to have been led away by
the spirit into another place. For in this state the distance, even though it be many
miles, and the time, though it be many hours or days, are not thought of; neither
is there any feeling of fatigue; and one is led unerringly through ways of which he
himself is ignorant, even to the destined place’ (§441).
212 Chapter Five
Blake’s The Marriage of Heaven and Hell is modeled on Swedenborg, and he would
have been amused by an inquiry into whether he had ‘really’ seen the devils and angels
he describes. The crux of the problem – and a serious challenge to the mind – is
Blake’s respect for both the imagination of Dante, who was a poet, and the imagina-
tion of Swedenborg, whose works are written in quite pedestrian Latin prose. Dante
was regarded by his contemporaries as a man who had visited the other world. Yet
Jaspers would not have called him a schizophrenic, because the right of the poet to
invent – that is, to lie – was recognized in Jaspers’s lifetime as something obvious. It
is not easy to grasp the consequences of the aesthetic theories which have emerged
as the f lotsam and jetsam of the scientific and technological revolution. The pres-
sure of habit still forces us to exclaim: ‘Well then, Swedenborg wrote fiction and he
was aware it was no more than fiction!’ But, tempting as it is, the statement would
be false. Neither Swedenborg nor Blake were aestheticians; they did not enclose the
spiritual within the domain of art and poetry and oppose it to the material. At the
risk of simplifying the issue by using a definition, let us say rather that they both were
primarily concerned with the energy that reveals itself in a constant interaction of
Imagination with the things perceived by our five senses. (1995: 25–6)
apocryphal gospel’]. Whilst it would be rash to ascribe all or even most of
these proverbs to a Swedenborgian source, nevertheless, these proverbs are
a clear articulation of the central ethical position, inf luenced strongly by
Swedenborg, that we find Borges discussing in his many later interviews.
That they have been so overlooked is a shame, as they truly embody all
that is most Borgesian: iconoclastic, ironic, humble, wise, ethical, humor-
ous, whimsical and, importantly, practical. Borges would balk at being
called a spiritual teacher, but a perusal of these proverbs reveals a deeply
measured and insightful counsel; some proverbs barbed like a Zen kōan,
others revealing the presence of Swedenborg. Without the space to discuss
each one, for the purposes of this study I will appraise the Swedenborgian
aspect of a brief selection.
‘3. Desdichado el pobre en espíritu, porque bajo la tierra será lo que
ahora es en la tierra’ (1975a: 106) [‘Wretched are the poor in spirit: for
what they were on earth, so shall they be in their graves’].21 Recounting it
in his biographical sketch on Swedenborg, Borges took obvious relish in
Swedenborg’s account of the hermit who had renounced all worldly goods
and activities, who then found himself woefully unfit for heaven. This first
proverb appears as a direct allusion to this matter, indicating the position
that Swedenborg maintained that full engagement with life and with the
world are the essential drives of the living that can only be denied at a price.
Swedenborg explains this in detail in Heaven and Hell.
I have spoken with some after death who, while they lived in the world, renounced the
world and gave themselves up to an almost solitary life, in order that by an abstraction
of the thoughts from worldly things they might have opportunity for pious medita-
tions, believing that thus they might enter the way to heaven. But these in the other
life are of a sad disposition; they despise others who are not like themselves; they are
indignant that they do not have a happier lot than others, believing that they have
merited it; they have no interest in others, and turn away from the duties of charity
by which there is conjunction with heaven. They desire heaven more than others;
but when they are taken up among the angels they induce anxieties that disturb the
21 In this chapter and the ensuing Conclusion, all translations of texts of Elogio de la
sombra are by Di Giovanni and are from the bilingual edition entitled In Praise of
Darkness (1975a).
216 Chapter Five
happiness of the angels; and in consequence they are sent away; and when sent away
they betake themselves to desert places, where they lead a life like that which they
lived in the world. (§360)
[…] the angels refuse all thanks for the good they do, and are displeased and withdraw
if any one attributes good to them. They wonder how any one can believe that he is
wise from himself or does anything good from himself. Doing good for one’s own
sake they do not call good, because it is done from self. But doing good for the sake
of good they call good from the Divine; and this they say is the good that makes
heaven, because this good is the Lord. (§9)
a distraction from the true purpose, and that the rich man may become
tempted by the temptations of the money system and so neglect his true
self. Borges writes in ‘Testigo’ that wealth is no obstacle for entrance into
heaven in Swedenborg’s theology, unless it is the cause of greed or sloth.
Wealth per se is unimportant. The full exposition of this highly unorthodox
revelation appears throughout a series of paragraphs of Heaven and Hell:
Out of a great deal of conversation and living with angels, I have been granted sure
knowledge that rich people enter heaven just as easily as poor people do, and that no
one is shut out of heaven for having abundant possessions or accepted into heaven
because of poverty. There are both rich and poor people there, and many of the rich
are in greater splendor and happiness than the poor. (§357)22 […] One person can
live like another in outward form. As long as there is an inward acknowledgment of
the Deity and an intent to serve our neighbor, we can become rich, dine sumptu-
ously, live and dress as elegantly as befits our station and of fice, enjoy pleasures and
amusement, and meet our worldly obligations for the sake of our position and of our
business and of the life of both mind and body. So we can see that it is not as hard to
follow the path to heaven as many people believe. The only dif ficulty is finding the
power to resist love for ourselves and love of the world and preventing those loves
from taking control, since they are the source of all our evils. (§359)
This sentiment is also ref lected in Borges’ maxim number 47: ‘Feliz el pobre
sin amargura o el rico sin soberbia’ (1975a: 110) [‘Happy is the poor man
without bitterness, and the rich man without arrogance’].
Whilst there are further proverbs that echo a Swedenborgian senti-
ment, it is perhaps of greatest worth to consider the final two proverbs
which, in their simplicity, evoke Swedenborg’s works with greatest power:
‘50. Felices los amados y los amantes y los que pueden prescindir del amor’
[‘Happy are the lovers and the loved, and they that can do without love’]. ‘51.
Felices los felices’ (1975a: 110) [‘Happy are the happy’]. Not only in Arcana
Cœlestia and Heaven and Hell, but importantly his work Conjugal Love,
Swedenborg goes to tremendous lengths to describe the nature of conjugal
love as being the terrestrial portion of divine love, and that true lovers may
22 This is the very passage that Borges and Bioy reproduce as ‘Los ricos en el cielo’ in
Libro del cielo y del infierno. Their brief passage is a composite of sentences from §357
and §361.
218 Chapter Five
remain together in the next world, a matter to which Borges pays atten-
tion in his essay ‘Testigo’. Beyond the matter of lovers, Swedenborg’s entire
heavenly opus is dominated by a perpetual return to the idea of happiness
as the ultimate state of divine love. Again, as with other matters described
above, there are innumerable passages in Heaven and Hell that describe the
happiness of the angels, the happiness of those souls that dwell in the angelic
realms, and the absence of happiness for those who reside in the hellish
regions. Amidst detailed descriptions of heavenly joy, Swedenborg writes
that ‘the angels have everything that is blessed, delightful, and happy, or that
which is called heavenly joy’ (§286); ‘Those that are in heaven are continu-
ally advancing towards the spring of life, with a greater advance towards a
more joyful and happy spring the more thousands of years they live’ (§414).
We recall Borges in the poem ‘El remordimiento’: ‘He cometido el peor
de los pecados / que un hombre puede cometer. No he sido / feliz’ [‘I have
committed the worse sin of all / That a man can commit. I have not been /
happy’] (Burgin 1998: 140), and that in his many interviews he writes that
whilst sadness, loneliness and suf fering are the source of art, happiness is a
good in and of itself, and requires neither cause nor objective. Whilst we
would be exaggerating to claim that such a sentiment springs directly from
his reading of Swedenborg, we can nevertheless determine that amidst so
many references to Swedenborg, so many allusions to his heavenly land-
scape, and so many ethical considerations that echo Swedenborg’s ethics,
we may determine a respectful thread concerning happiness that Borges
identifies in Swedenborg.
Such a presence of Swedenborg is not limited to these two texts. Elogio
de la sombra contains another brief and wholly under-studied tale titled
‘His end and his beginning’ (the original title is in English), which relates
the activities of a man who has recently died and, in a manner reminis-
cent of many narratives in Heaven and Hell, begins a process of learning
the nature of death. Following the Swedenborgian dimension, one must
first identify the curious relationship within the anonymous protagonist
between sleep and death. The tale begins: ‘Cumplida la agonía, ya solo, ya
solo y desgarrado y rechazado, se hundió en el sueño’ (1975a: 116) [‘After
death, after the wrench and the stark loneliness, he dropped into a deep
sleep’]. Swedenborg recounts in numerous passages of Heaven and Hell
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 219
that discarnate spirits, like living people, wake and sleep and even dream
whilst asleep. Indeed, as with the living (as with Swedenborg himself ) the
dream of the dead can constitute a journey of discovery into the realms
of further mystery. ‘Some spirits who were not evil settled down into a
peaceful state, rather like sleep, and in this way were taken into heaven in
respect to the deeper levels of their minds’ (§411).23 Whilst Swedenborg’s
narrative of Melanchthon which Borges reproduced concerns a man whose
pride prevents his admission into heaven, in the brief tale ‘His end and his
beginning’ the man is destined to heaven, yet is simply unable to compre-
hend this most cognitively challenging of matters. Now dead, he returns
to work and attempts to maintain the life that he had. Like Melanchthon,
however, the material objects surrounding him begin to evanesce and dis-
appear, whilst his former colleagues fail to perceive him.
One of the most important matters of this tale for our present analysis
is the matter of the protagonist’s dreams. He is made aware that he is dead
through the sudden realisation ‘que no podía recordar las formas, los sonidos
y los colores de los sueños’ (1975a: 116) [‘that he was unable to recall the
shapes or sounds or colours of his dreams’]. He is made suddenly aware that
his reality is now a dream. This immediately brings us back to the discussion
above about the nature of dream, vision and death. Swedenborg, again in
Heaven and Hell, recounts in many passages that whilst alive he has been
granted entry into the land of the dead through dreams and visions, and
that the soul of the dead, upon death, moves into the same dream landscape
that he may have experienced once alive. Indeed Swedenborg recounts in
§449 that his visions into the land of the dead were of great profundity
precisely because his material body was capable of such inactivity (mini-
mal heartbeat and breath) that he ef fectively was both dead and dreaming.
Whilst on the one hand this evokes the metaphor that so intrigued Borges,
and which he identified in poets throughout the ages including, obviously,
23 Conan Doyle writes of Swedenborg’s works: ‘Death was made easy by the presence
of celestial beings who helped the newcomer into his fresh existence. Such newcom-
ers had an immediate period of complete rest. They regained consciousness in a few
days of our time’ (2005: 100).
220 Chapter Five
24 ‘Cuando Shakespeare, por ejemplo, equipara la vida con un sueño, él, en lo que
insiste, es en la irrealidad de la vida, en el hecho de que es difícil fijar una diferencia
entre lo que soñamos y lo que vivimos. En cambio, en el caso de Calderón, creo que
la frase tiene un sentido teológico: la vida es sueño, en el sentido de que nuestra vida,
nuestra vigilia, no corresponden a la realidad, sino a una breve parte de la realidad, el
sentido de que lo verdadero son el cielo y el infierno’ (Sorrentino 2001: 133). [‘When
Shakespeare, for example, equates life with a dream, he refers to the unreality of life,
in the fact that it is dif ficult to establish a division between what we dream and what
we live. With Calderón, on the other hand, I feel that the phrase Life is a dream has a
theological sense, in that our waking life does not correspond to reality, but to a brief
part of reality, the sense that heaven and hell are the true reality’] (My translation).
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 221
(1975a: 118) [‘from the moment of death he had been in heaven’]. ‘Diálogo
de muertos’ and ‘His end and his beginning’, therefore, can both be consid-
ered remarkably Swedenborgian, and published in the same volume, may
be considered synoptic treatments of Swedenborg’s heterodox theological
perspective on the soul’s ability to choose his angelic or demonic environ-
ment. Rosas, like Melanchthon, chooses hell; the anonymous man of the
other tale chooses heaven.
Conclusion
psychopomp – that is to say he decides not to help her move further into
the heavenly realm – resolving, one would assume, that angelic guides
would perform that function.
One final text may be selected to draw to a close this chapter. The
text, entitled ‘Abramowicz’, from Borges’ final published volume before
his death, Los Conjurados, bears the hallmarks of Swedenborg’s visions of
the afterlife with which Borges was so familiar. I deem this text to be of
great importance for an understanding of the whole of Borges’ work, as
it can be seen to constitute a state of genuine revelation about the myster-
ies of death that do not stem from books but from immediate experience.
Through a Jamesian Radical Empiricist method, Borges, it would appear,
received confirmation about the persistence of the soul after death that he
had read with such attention and for so many years in Swedenborg. Maurice
Abramowicz (1901–1981) was Borges’ friend from his youth in Geneva
with whom he maintained correspondence. In this brief piece (which he
describes to Amelia Barili)25 Borges becomes suddenly and delightedly
aware that his dead friend is still, in some way, present: ‘Esta noche, no
lejos de la cumbre de la colina de Saint Pierre, una valerosa y venturosa
música griega nos acaba de revelar que la muerte es más inverosímil que
la vida y que, por consiguiente, el alma perdura cuando su cuerpo es caos’
(1989: 467) [‘Tonight, not far from the top of the hill of Saint Pierre, a
courageous and happy Greek music has just revealed to us that death is
more implausible than life and that, therefore, the soul survives when its
body is chaos’].26 Borges intuits not only that his dead friend is still pre-
sent, but, like Swedenborg’s depiction of the communities of discarnate
souls, he is surrounded by the souls of the departed: ‘Contigo estaban las
25 ‘It was a beautiful night. María Kodama, Maurice Abramowicz’s widow and I were
at a Greek tavern in Paris, listening to Greek music, which is so full of courage. I
remembered the lyrics: “While this music lasts, we will deserve Helen of Troy’s love.
While the music lasts, we will know that Ulysses will come back to Ithaca.” And I
felt that Maurice was not dead, that he was there with us, that nobody really dies,
for they all still project their shadow’ (Burgin 1998: 241).
26 Translation Frank Thomas Smith <http://www.southerncrossreview.org/47/abramo-
wicz.htm>.
The Inf luence of Swedenborg on Borges 223
Artists are magical helpers. Evoking symbols and motifs that connect
us to our deeper selves, they can help us along the heroic journey of our
own lives.
— Joseph Campbell, Pathways to Bliss
Borges’ later fictions have received far less critical attention than his well-
known publications of Ficciones (1944) and El Aleph (1949). Bell-Villada
(1999: 260), for example, dismisses El Informe de Brodie as ‘rather slight’,
suggesting that: ‘Because none of the material in Dr. Brodie’s Report even
approaches the level of the Ficciones or the stories in El Aleph, there is little
reason to discuss any one piece in detail’. The prose pieces of Elogio de la
sombra and the tales of El libro de arena and La Memoria de Shakespeare
are, with notable exceptions, often overlooked. This can be explained partly
by the enigmatic and at times pseudo-realist character of these later fic-
tions, which may fail to evoke the labyrinthine complexity and literary
puzzles of his earlier pieces. This to me is a scholarly oversight, as I feel that
1 An earlier version of this conclusion was published as an article in Journal for Romance
Studies: ‘Confronting the Shadow: The Hero’s Journey in Borges’ “El Etnógrafo”’,
12/2 (summer 2012), 17–32. Many thanks to the journal editors for kind permission
to reproduce the text here.
226 Chapter Five
apparent within both ‘El Etnógrafo’ and other tales of Borges. By such an
evaluation I hope to depict within the tale an implicit search for psychic
wholeness – the voyage into the unconscious and the confrontation with
the shadow – analogized by the hero’s journey.
There is a rich tradition in the Borges scholarship of binding his work
to his biography through a psychoanalytical perspective, most notably
Freudian, but also, in the case of Rodríguez Monegal (1978), through a
Lacanian and Kleinian lens. Characteristic of the psychoanalytical reading
are the Oedipal, Narcissicistic and parricidal elements of his life and work,
described by Rodríguez Monegal (1990: 129) in a later article: ‘Educated
by his father in the writer’s calling, he had practiced it as a son; in so doing
he avoided parricide. But on the death of his father in 1938, and after an
accident on Christmas Eve of the same year, Borges committed symbolic
suicide in order to conceal the parricide and to be free to begin writing his
most important fictions.’2 This interpretation, which Woodall described
as ‘an obsessively psychoanalytical view of the man’ (1997: xxi), remains
inf luential, with parallel arguments concerning the failed writer-father, the
overbearing mother, the consequent troubled relationships with women
and the clues of this dynamic implicit in the literary works, forming the
central narrative of Williamson’s Borges: A life (2004). There are limita-
tions, however, to the psychoanalytical reading of Borges, as it can limit
the artistic creation to a mere cipher of this dominant Freudian dynamic of
psychological trauma. This is highlighted by Earle (2000: 100) in his review
of the starkly Freudian analysis by Woscoboinik (1998): ‘In this psycho-
portrait our model is cornered by the ghosts of Oedipus and Narcissus –
the mother-obsession and the self-obsession, that is – and never escapes.’
Furthermore, Borges himself was critical of Freudian psychoanalytical
2 Molloy (1994: 78) questions whether Borges was consciously alluding to Freud
in his examination of das unheimlich – the uncanny – in his review of Beckford’s
Vathek. Tcherepashenets (2008) approaches Borges’ interest in dreams in relation to
Freud’s dream analysis. de Costa (2000: 47) appraises the humour in ‘Death and the
Compass’ in light of Freud’s Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. A number
of articles, such as Portugal M. Saliba (2001), also appraise Borges through a variety
of psychoanalytical perspectives.
228 Chapter Five
analyses establishing too rigid a bond between artistic creativity and child-
hood, family and sexuality. His scathing comments to Burgin about Freud’s
obsession are well known:
I think of [Freud] as a kind of madman, no? A man laboring over a sexual obsession.
Well, perhaps he didn’t take it to heart. Perhaps he was just doing it as a kind of game.
I tried to read him, and I thought of him either as a charlatan or as a madman, in a
sense. After all, the world is far too complex to be boiled down to that all-too-simple
scheme. (Burgin 1969: 109)3
His views of Freud chime closely with those that Jung expressed later in
his life concerning Freud’s obsessive desire to maintain his theories of
sexuality,4 and, indeed, in the same interview Borges expressed his respect
for Jung: ‘Jung I have read far more widely than Freud, but in Jung you feel
a wide and hospitable mind’ (Burgin 1969: 109). Borges was an engaged
reader of Jung, citing his work on numerous occasions.5 However, his
3 Borges jokingly called Freud ‘not my favourite fiction writer’ (Barnstone 2000: 111),
and Jason Wilson reminds us that Borges was ‘as anti-Marxism or anti-pyschoanalysis
(merely gossip) as he was anti-Hitler’ (2006: 119). Kristal remarks on the irony that
Borges presented a lecture on Spinoza 1981 at the Freudian School of Buenos Aires,
‘given his skepticism about Freud, and his sometimes disparaging remarks about
psychoanalysis’ (2002: 144).
4 ‘There was no mistaking the fact that Freud was emotionally involved in his sexual
theory to an extraordinary degree. When he spoke of it, his tone became urgent,
almost anxious, and all signs of his normally critical and skeptical manner vanished.
A strange, deeply moved expression came over his face, the cause of which I was
at a loss to understand. I had a strong intuition that for him sexuality was a sort
of numinosum’ ( Jung 1989: 150). ‘When, then, Freud announced his intention of
identifying theory and method and making them into some kind of dogma, I could
no longer collaborate with him; there remained no choice for me but to withdraw’
( Jung 1989: 167).
5 Some notable examples of his references to Jung, in particular to Psychologie und
Alchemie, are: ‘Nota sobre Walt Whitman’ (1974: 249–53), ‘Nathaniel Hawthorne’
(1974: 670–85), ‘Kafka y sus Precursores’ (1974: 710–12), ‘El Verdugo Piadoso’, of
Nueve Ensayos Dantescos (1989: 357–9), ‘Los Conjurados’, of Los Conjurados (1989:
501), ‘William Beckford. Vathek’ (2005: 533), and El Libro de los Seres Imaginarios.
He also refers to Jung in many interviews.
Conclusion – Confronting the shadow: The hero’s journey in ‘El Etnógrafo’ 229
familiarity with Jung’s works should not be considered here as grounds for
perceiving a necessary Jungian inf luence on his writings, such as one might
find, for example, a conscious inf luence of Freud upon certain Dadaist art-
ists. Rather I hope to demonstrate that the archetypal narrative of the Hero,
as indicated by Jung and illustrated by Campbell, is apparent in Borges’ art
as it is apparent in dreams, myths and art across time and culture.
‘El Etnógrafo’6
initial lack of consciousness against the later position of heightened con-
sciousness. Jung depicts this character type as in ignorance of the uncon-
scious and consequently living in peril of neurotic fear of the unknown:
‘A man who is unconscious of himself acts in a blind, instinctive way and
is in addition fooled by all the illusions that arise when he sees everything
that he is not conscious of in himself coming to meet him from outside as
projections’ (1983: 335). This state of passivity sets the scene for the devel-
opment of ego-consciousness in relation to the unconscious, a process
analogized in the journey of the hero. Whilst numerous passages of Jung’s
extensive work elucidate this psychic process, it is summarized cogently by
Joseph Campbell as the prototypical sequence of steps pursued by mythic
heroes across time and cultures, illustrated dramatically in The Hero with
a Thousand Faces (1949). Campbell borrowed the term ‘monomyth’ from
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake to describe this process: ‘A hero ventures forth from
the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous
forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes
back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on
his fellow man’ (1949: 30). Importantly, through his passivity, Murdock
embodies a collective ego that is likewise not in tune with the deeper
dimensions of the unconscious. This becomes apparent when Murdock
leaves the security of home and its nurturing environment and plunges
into the unknown represented by the prairie.
The narrator reveals that one of Murdock’s ancestors had died in hos-
tility with the Indians and that ‘esa antigua discordia de sus estirpes era un
vínculo ahora’ (1975a: 46) [‘this old family bloodshed was now a link’]. A
link to what? The relationship here is immediately apparent with Borges
and his ancestral heritage (Williamson 2004: 24), and as such Murdock
confronts a personal shadow in the guise of ancestral strife, and his trip
to the prairie could indicate a step towards redemption or vindication of
this historical enmity. Murdock certainly prepares himself for such an
encounter, aware that in order to learn the language of ‘los hombres rojos’
(1975a: 46) [‘the red men’] he would need to be accepted by them: ‘Previó,
sin duda, las dificultades que lo aguardaban; tenía que lograr que los hom-
bres rojos lo aceptaran como unos de los suyos’ (1975a: 46) [‘No doubt he
foresaw the dif ficulties that were in store for him; he would have to do his
Conclusion – Confronting the shadow: The hero’s journey in ‘El Etnógrafo’ 231
best to get the red men to accept him as one of them’]. Murdock is also
symbolically bound to the Indians by the curious facial description of ‘de
perfil de hacha’ (1975a: 46) [‘hatchet face’], which evokes the mythologized
Native American hatchet.
Amplifying Murdock to the embodiment of collective psyche, how-
ever, his experience expresses a collective confrontation with the traditional
‘other’ represented by the Indians. Campbell describes this archetypal
encounter and its significance:
There’s a lot in you that’s neither being carried into this persona system nor into
your ego, as part of what you perceive as ‘you.’ Just opposite to the ego, buried in
the unconscious, is what Jung calls the shadow. […] The nature of your shadow is a
function of the nature of your ego. It is the backside of your light side. In the myths,
the shadow is represented as the monster that has to be overcome, the dragon. It is
the dark thing that comes up from the abyss and confronts you the minute you begin
moving down into the unconscious. It is the thing that scares you so that you don’t
want to go down there. (2004: 73)
1998: 51), and the military junta of the Dirty War. The conf licting polari-
ties of civilization and barbarism are ref lected in his appreciation or dis-
like of novelists and poets, philosophies, theologies and cosmologies, and
in his interpretation of such philosophical dialectics as William James’
‘tough-minded’ or ‘tender-minded’, Jung’s shadow complex, or Nietzsche’s
articulation of the cosmopolitan Apollonian and the barbarian Dionysian.
The debate is central to the Argentine national character and is central to
Borges and his readership. For wider analysis see: Balderston (1993), Ulla
(2002), Williamson (2004), and Orrego Arismendi (2007).
Importantly for Borges, however, the time-worn debate evoked in
the sixteenth century by Las Casas and Sepúlveda and rearticulated by
Sarmiento cannot be reduced to a simple binary. As indicated by the enu-
meration above, barbarism is visible in Borges’ work in many guises beyond
the mythical Indian, and indeed constitutes an essential characteristic of
the individual psyche. In this way one can see Dahlmann’s journey into the
unconscious in the tale ‘El Sur’ [‘The South’] leading him to confrontation
with his shadow projection, the gauchos. In this tale the gaucho represents
the brutish opposite of Dahlmann – uncultured, instinctive, dealing not
with abstraction but tangible reality – but also, conversely, what Dahlmann
most desires. Such an interpretation is reinforced by the idea that Borges
himself supported, that Dahlmann’s whole adventure into the pampa was
a dream, and hence a compensatory vision of unconscious desire.7 The
integration of the shadow, in this case through the ritual death with the
assistance of the senex figure who throws him the knife, is one of compen-
7 ‘It [“The South”] can be read in two ways. You may read it in a straightforward way
and you may think that those things happen to a hero. Then, you may think there’s
a kind of moral behind it – the idea that he loved the south and in the end the south
destroyed him. But there’s another possibility, the possibility of the second half of
the story which is hallucination. When the man is killed, he’s not really killed. He
died in the hospital, and though that was a dream, a kind of wishful thinking, that
was the kind of death he would have liked to have – in the pampas with a knife in
his hand being stabbed to death. That was what he was looking forward to all the
time. So I’ve written that story in order that it would be read both ways’ (in Burgin
1998: 8).
Conclusion – Confronting the shadow: The hero’s journey in ‘El Etnógrafo’ 233
sation, and brings about symbolic psychic wholeness. Similarly, in the tale
of Brodie ‘El evangelio según Marcos’ [‘The Gospel according to Mark’],
the protagonist Espinosa and the rustic Gutre family (who themselves are
of ‘civilized’ Scottish ancestry) enact a symbolic union of compensation –
the civilized embodying the barbarous and vice versa – through Espinosa’s
ritual crucifixion. The ‘indio de ojos celestes’ [‘Indian with blue eyes’] of ‘El
cautivo’ [‘The Captive’] is both barbarous and civilized, unable to remain
rooted to one polarity. Lastly, as Bell-Villada (1999: 158–9) discusses, the
tale of ‘Historia del guerrero y de la cautiva’ [‘Story of the Warrior and the
Captive’] concerns the double characterization of the Lombard barbarian
warrior who becomes civilized and the civilized Englishwoman who turns
savage, but also the pairing of the cautivas – the Englishwoman and Borges’
grandmother, one civilized one savage, both captive; and consequently the
double guerrero – Droctulf and Colonel Borges. These multiple and subtle
pairings in Borges’ fiction evoke a strongly Jungian alchemical vision of
the twin polarities within each individual psyche: light and dark, civilized
and barbarous, ego and shadow.
It is interesting to note that both Jung and Borges were fascinated by
Stevenson’s tale Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), Jung equat-
ing Mr Hyde with our shadow (Fordman 1953: 49), Borges acknowledging
that his tales ‘Borges y yo’, and ‘El otro’ were adaptations of Stevenson’s tale
(Borges 1982: 166), and that ‘Las ruinas circulares’ was a retelling of his tale
‘El Golem’, which itself follows Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray, which itself
was a retelling of Jekyll and Hyde (Barnstone 1982: 82). In brief, therefore,
Borges repeatedly evokes the confrontation with the barbarous other,
often depicted as fetch, doppelgänger, gaucho, Indian or knife-fighter,
who evokes a powerful psychic drive within the ‘civilized’ protagonists and
whose integration is often evoked by a ritual death. Borges’ position is strik-
ingly akin to Jung’s in this perspective, and importantly can be understood
within a framework of the process of individuation, the journey towards
psychic wholeness. Just as Dahlmann integrates the shadow of the barba-
rous in his journey south, so Jung writes of the ‘savage’ or the ‘primitive’
within us whose integration likewise propels the individual or the collec-
tive towards wholeness: ‘Indeed, for a wide-awake person, the primitive
contents may often prove to be a source of renewal’ (1993: 195). And just
234 Chapter Five
as Borges recognized the cult of violence that lay within his psyche hidden
beneath layers of language, literature and culture, so Jung recounts in his
memoirs a ‘primitive’ figure who appeared in a dream and who led him to
conclude that: ‘The small, brown-skinned savage who accompanied me
[…] was an embodiment of the primitive shadow’ (1989: 181).
Murdock endures the arduous separation from home, friends, family,
customs and even his language over his two-year encampment on the
plains. He confronts a deeper aspect of the ‘barbarous’ shadow, both on
a personal and collective level, with the great challenge to the deep-set
epistemological certainties that his culture had instilled in him: ‘llegó a
pensar de una manera que su lógica rechazaba’ (1975a: 48) [‘he came to see
things in a way his reason rejected’]. This is the result of his many months
of apprenticeship, his dialogue with the tribal ‘sacerdote’ [‘medicine man’],
his rigorous moral and physical exercises and his awakening understanding
of the language of dreams. It is at this level that the most profound trans-
formation occurs with Murdock, discernible in his realization that ‘en las
noches de luna llena soñaba con bisontes’ (1975a: 48) [‘on nights when the
moon was full he dreamed of bison’].8 This insight, which he relays to the
medicine man, signifies the conclusion of his sojourn on the prairie and he
returns home. Importantly, Murdock has engaged on the hero’s journey – a
narrative encountered in countless myths (Campbell) and dreams ( Jung)
– allegorizing the journey inward into the unconscious (Campbell 2004:
111–33). Having heeded the herald (his professor) and headed out to the
prairie, having undergone trials and training, he encounters in his dreams
the tribe’s totem animal, the bison. The bison represents another shadow
projection of Western history, as they were slaughtered en masse during
the final decades of the nineteenth century in order to drive the nomadic
tribes into the reservations and make way for cattle. Campbell explored the
importance of the buf falo in Native American myths, discussing the impact
of the slaughter in depth with Bill Moyers: ‘That was a sacramental viola-
tion. […] The frontiersmen shot down whole herds, taking only the skins
to sell and leaving the bodies there to rot. That was a sacrilege. It turned
the buf falo from a “thou” to an “it”’ (Campbell 1988: 78).9 The slaughter
of the bison was not simply a strategy to assist ethnic translocation; it was
also, as Campbell observes, an attempt to erase the animal nature from
within the Euro-American psyche, concomitant with a refusal to acknowl-
edge the shadow. Jung intuited that such acts of extreme aggression arose
from a fear of the unconscious content: ‘When I see a man in a savage rage
with something outside himself, I know that he is, in reality, wanting to
be savage toward his own unconscious self ’ (1993: 16). Murdock has thus
passed through a threshold from one mythic order represented by ‘razón’
[‘reason’] and ‘ciencia’ [‘science’] into another represented by dreams, the
full moon and the totem animal.
Everything has changed for Murdock. He had set out on the adventure
at the behest of the professor in order to study indigenous languages and
later to present the thesis. After radical separation from home and a new
vision of reality, he returns home and, like the captive of the eponymous
tale, he feels homesick for the prairie. He returns to the professor and
informs him that he will not present the thesis. What has changed? There
are many aspects to this question. Firstly, on an individual basis, Murdock
has atoned for his ancestor who died in a skirmish with the Indians. This
family lineage is symbolic of a collective need to atone for the brutality of
colonialism. However, the tale is not a discourse in postcolonialism, and
atonement for colonialism is a loose interpretation. Murdock has learned
to harken to his dreams. Here the aesthetics of Borges and the psychol-
ogy of Jung come together in harmony. A central pillar of Jung’s entire
life’s work rests on the importance of dreams, in brief, as messages from
the unconscious:
9 Campbell also quotes the famous 1852 letter Chief Seattle wrote to the US President:
‘Your destiny is a mystery to us. What will happen when the buf falo are all slaugh-
tered? The wild horses tamed? What will happen when the secret corners of the
forest are heavy with the scent of many men and the view of the ripe hills is blotted
by talking wires? Where will the thicket be? Gone! Where will the eagle be? Gone!
And what is it to say goodbye to the swift pony and the hunt? The end of living and
the beginning of survival’ (1988: 34).
236 Chapter Five
In the end, we have to ask what the aim of the dream is from a teleological point of
view. Why does this person’s unconscious wish to show him an image like that? […]
The dream is a product of the imagination, a gallery of images, images of protection
from some blow that is threatening; the function of the dream is to compensate the
conscious attitude. I believe that what dreams show us in vivid and impressive images
are our vulnerable points. (1993: 143)
It is in our dreams that the body makes itself aware to our mind. The dream is in large
part a warning of something to come. The dream is the body’s best expression, in the
best possible symbol it can express, that something is going wrong. The dream calls
our mind’s attention to the body’s instinctive feeling. If man doesn’t pay attention
to these symbolic warnings of his body he pays in other ways. A neurosis is merely
the body’s taking control, regardless of the conscious mind. (1993: 49)
forms a mainstay of his philosophical discourse.10 ‘Los sueños son una obra
estética, quizá la expresión estética más antigua. Toma una forma extraña-
mente dramática’ (1989: 231) [‘Dreams are an aesthetic work, perhaps the
most ancient aesthetic expression. They take a strangely dramatic form’]
(1984: 40). Borges places a strong epistemological value on the dreamworld
and the aesthetic, and innumerable passages testify to the power of dreams
to grant the dreamer knowledge of deeper aspects of the self and further
panoramas of landscapes and times. Dreams are crucial, both for Borges
and for Jung, in pursuing the path towards psychic well-being.
Murdock has thus travelled deep into the unknown, and has released
the powerful psychic energy represented by the dream of the bison. This
is the energy of healing, the vital force that is essential to the shaman in
tribal societies and was essential for Jung. The medicine man himself would
have had to walk the similar path of physical and psychological separation,
arduous training and attention to dreams prior to gaining the power to
heal. Such a process of trauma is documented in the literature concern-
ing shamanism (Eliade 1972, Halifax 1982, McKenna 1991), encapsulated
by Campbell: ‘In primal societies, the shaman provides a living conduit
between the local and the transcendent. The shaman is one who has actu-
ally gone through a psychological crack-up and recovery’ (2004: xviii). In
this respect, the medicine man acts as psychoanalyst for Murdock, guiding
him on his exploration of the unconscious, supporting him in the darkness.
So strong is that association between shaman and doctor that Campbell’s
explanation of it deserves quoting in full:
Psychoanalysis, the modern science of reading dreams, has taught us to take heed
of these unsubstantial images. Also it has found a way to let them do their work.
The dangerous crises of self-development are permitted to come to pass under the
protecting eye of an experienced initiate in the lore and language of dreams, who
then enacts the role and character of the ancient mystagogue, or guide of souls, the
initiating medicine man of the primitive forest sanctuaries of trial and initiation.
The doctor is the modern master of the mythological realm, the knower of all the
secret ways and words of potency. His role is precisely that of the Wise Old Man of
the myths and fairy tales whose words assist the hero through the trials and terrors
of the weird adventure. He is the one who appears and points to the magic shining
sword that will kill the dragon-terror, tells of the waiting bride and the castle of many
treasures, applies healing balm to the almost fatal wounds, and finally dismisses the
conqueror, back into the world of normal life, following the great adventure into
the enchanted night. (1949: 9–10)
Murdock returns home radically transformed from the naïve and uncriti-
cal student that he was prior to his voyage of discovery, and informs his
professor that he intends not to publish. This interchange – also a symbolic
confrontation – is of particular importance for an understanding of the
psychological processes of the narrative. Murdock has changed but the acad-
emy has not. He has activated a powerful force of psychic energy through
his journey, and yet the wisdom gained lies beyond the strict measures of
academic discourse. His professor is visibly displeased with this judgement
and snidely alludes to the fact that Murdock has abandoned his culture
and language, that he has gone native. But Murdock does not intend to
return to the prairie; he has integrated the psychic force represented by
the shadow figures of the Indian and the bison, and has returned to his
cultural home. The westerner, Jung argued, cannot pretend that his roots
lie elsewhere and that his psychic constitution is other than its particular
cultural formation. Jung, perhaps problematically from our twenty-first
century outlook, perceived certain people, such as the Taos Pueblo Indians
or the eastern Africans, operating with a more direct, unconscious and
less ego-orientated psychic structure than the Europeans ( Jung 1989). He
consequently advised against an abandonment of the ‘storm-lantern of
the ego’ (Von Franz 1975: 41), not allowing it to be engulfed in the dark
seas of the unconscious. For this reason, as documented in his memoirs,
he broke up a festive nocturnal drum and dance ceremony in the Sudan
as he felt threatened by the overwhelming forces of unconscious energy:
‘At that time I was obviously all too close to “going black”’ (1989: 271);11
11 ‘I was not to recognize the real nature of this disturbance until some years later, when
I stayed in tropical Africa. It had been, in fact, the first hint of “going black under
Conclusion – Confronting the shadow: The hero’s journey in ‘El Etnógrafo’ 239
the skin,” a spiritual peril which threatens the uprooted European in Africa to an
extent not fully appreciated’ ( Jung 1989: 245).
240 Chapter Five
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Index
Böhme, Jakob (Boehme or Behmen), 119, Fernández, Macedonio, 137, 188, 239
127, 138, 177, 186–7, 190–1 Ficino, Marsilio, 21
Bruno, Giordano, 21 Flaubert, Gustave, 52, 75, 196
Buddhism, 5, 15, 33, 39–43, 83, 99, 119, 133, Flynn, Annette, 36–9, 101, 109–10, 114,
150, 195, 220 137, 191
Zen, 98–9, 133, 150, 185, 215 Freud, Sigmund, 19, 227–9
Jurado, Alicia, 82, 89, 127 Raine, Kathleen, 52, 56, 63, 176, 211
Reid, Alastair, 43, 45
Kabbalah (Cabala), 4–5, 17, 39, 64, 79, Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 206–14, 220
145, 148, 162, 195 Russell, Bertrand, 24, 87, 121, 129–30, 132,
Kant, Immanuel, 9, 11, 18, 59, 61, 93, 159, 196
137, 139, 159, 169, 170, 183, 188,
196 Scholem, Gershom, 17–18, 148
Kodama, María, 22, 83–5, 114, 119, 222 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 9, 18, 55, 88,
Kripal, Jeffrey, 6, 31, 39, 82, 113, 121, 123, 99–100, 136, 140, 151, 183,
128, 133 196
Schuchard, Marsha Keith, 146–7, 163
Lachman, Gary, 20, 31, 91 Scotus Erigena, 4–5, 59
Lange, Haydée, 30–1, 104, 154, 221 Shakespeare, William, 63, 76, 105, 118, 152,
Lezama Lima, José, 55–7, 176 161–2, 170–1, 179, 220
Luis de León, 5, 64, 77, 107, 118, 140, 145, Shamanism, 20–1, 94, 237, 239
162 Shaw, George Bernard, 15, 57, 101, 194,
196, 200, 202
McKenna, Terence, 94, 237 Silesius, Angelus, 4, 5, 18, 22, 43, 64, 126,
Milosz, Czeslaw, 212 159, 179, 187, 239
Montaigne, Michel de, 26–8, 170–1 Cherubinischer Wandersmann, 22
Myers, Frederic, 24 Socrates, 37, 133, 152
Staal, Frits, 42, 86, 88–9, 107, 122, 126,
Neoplatonism, 4, 21, 85, 142, 146, 167 130–1, 144, 150
Novalis, 4, 25 Stace, Walter, 5, 86, 90–1, 96–7, 101–2,
106–8, 115, 122, 124, 126, 129–30,
Ocampo, Victoria, 17–18 135, 141
Ocampo, Silvina, 203 Steiner, Rudolf, 22, 196
Ouspensky, Peter, 22–3 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 5, 7, 57, 196
‘Brownies’, 34–6, 46, 105
Pahnke, Walter, 97, 115 Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr
Paracelsus, 18, 21 Hyde, 34–5, 233
Parmenides, 59, 169 Sufi mystical poetry, 4, 22, 44, 53, 83, 116,
Pascal, 5, 9, 65, 118, 162, 187, 194 155–6, 242
Pedro Páramo, 206 Suzuki, Daisetsu Teitaro, 94, 96, 99, 150,
Plato, 9, 13, 34, 37, 59, 73, 83, 90, 110, 133, 197
135–6, 142, 152–3, 157, 169, 176 Swedenborg, Emanuel
Poe, Edgar Allan, 48, 59, 167, 196 Arcana Coelestia, 2, 203–10, 217
postcolonialism, 6, 235 reception in Catholic countries,
psychedelic, 94, 115, 122, 149, 239 197–8
doctrine of correspondences, 94, 145,
Quiroga, Facundo, 206–14, 220 174–6, 188, 202
Index 257
Heaven and Hell, 1–2, 22, 45, 47, 54, Von Franz, Marie-Louise, 20, 115, 238–9
56, 59, 123, 128, 143, 170–1, 178,
180, 196, 199–221 Watts, Alan, 79, 86, 101, 107, 185
as heterodox or heretic, 63–6, 77, 94, Weatherhead, Leslie Dixon, 48, 59, 64–5,
106, 123, 178, 181, 187, 192, 199 72, 77, 108, 118, 194
Melanchthon, 204–7, 213, 219–21 Wellbeloved, Sophia, 22–3
Moravian Chapel, 146, 189–90 Wells, H. G., 5, 48, 59, 179, 197
psychic or extra-sensory powers, 91–4 Western esotericism, 5, 17, 24, 40, 142
as Viking or as Eric the Red, 2, 36, 51, Whitman, Walt, 54, 135, 166–7, 196,
173, 178, 211 228
Wilson, Colin, 63, 172
Teresa de Jesús (Teresa de Ávila, St Woolger, Roger, 20
Teresa), 5, 8, 62, 97, 120, 126, 145,
162, 187 Xul Solar (Oscar Agustín Alejandro
Thousand and One Nights, 6 Schulz Solari), 5, 77, 80, 126, 157,
170–1, 194
Underhill, Evelyn, 82, 86, 90–1, 95–6,
106–7, 113, 115, 121–4, 135, Yeats, W. B., 52, 54, 62–3, 81, 130, 161, 181,
141 196
Van Dusen, Wilson, 38, 92–4, 100, 102, Zaehner, R. C., 86, 96, 101, 106–7, 115,
130, 132, 134, 197, 213 122, 135, 141, 150
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