Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R.

Dacudao,
vs.
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales of the Department of Justice,

G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013 1

Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and
his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the
DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country
to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to
the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order
which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against
Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City
need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ
orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel
of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which according to
the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to
speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional
or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office
of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances should cover only
future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They
maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws
with retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for,
no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural law.
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA
Funa vs Agra
GR 191644 Feb 19 2013 2

Facts:

Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as
the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been
appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting
Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then
relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an
Acting Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent
designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding
multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to
a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol
Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

Issues :
 Whether or not Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
 Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the
“hold-over principle”
 Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice
is in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other

RULING:

No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position
of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section
13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section
13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices
or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against
dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective
of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity,
by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions
due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally
apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the
Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show
that his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his
position.” To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent
designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary
functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached
to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987
decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417,
the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications
for appointment, rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of
Presiding Judges of the Court of Appeals

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 194139, 24 January 2012, 3

FACTS:

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an

election protest may not directly assail the order before the Supreme Court through
a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of said
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division. Petitioner Douglas
R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of
Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest
alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws,
rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division. In his
affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash
deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the
acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special
affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the
COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC
First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting
him to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC

RULING:
Petition DENIED. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on
the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it
limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. There is no
question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner
to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits,
and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative
defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors committed by the
Division upon the merits. It is true that there may be an exception to the general
rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the
Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has
no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence
to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained
of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether
such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.

Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina

G.R. No. 165223. January 11, 2016 4

Doctrines:
The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack
factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without
legal basis.

Gloria vs. CA has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees
charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is
authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the
charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the
employee concerned.

Facts:
For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) nullified the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his
capacity as the President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), had
charged the respondent, an Attorney V in the Litigation Department of the Legal Service
Group of the GSIS, with grave misconduct and preventively suspended him for 60 days.

In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had
handed to him on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True supposedly written by
one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner.
Considering that Ibasco denied authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion came to
point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively investigated for grave
misconduct. After the investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum
dated September 1, 2003 to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and
publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be
imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act.

Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally

charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60
days effective upon receipt.

The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless;
and requested the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body. The
respondent also instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the
legality of the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's
Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of
the GSIS to impose disciplinary action on the respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987; that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave
misconduct was not arbitrary because the latter had intentionally passed on or caused
the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby transgressing "some established and
definite rule of action" that sufficiently established a prima facie case for an
administrative charge; that the respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty to
defend and assist the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral or social duty" to stop or
at discourage the publication or circulation of the letter. He submits that the
respondent's preventive suspension was done in accordance with the Civil Service
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on
record.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had

sufficient basis to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct and
impose preventive suspension as a consequence.
2. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is
applicable.

Rulings:

1. To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of handing over the
letter to Caretero constituted grave misconduct. The CA concluded that the act of the
respondent of handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct
because the act did not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.

The Court concurs with the CA.

Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his
performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a
private individual. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration
or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Moreover, it
is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” It becomes grave if it
“involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.”

The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct.
The passing of the letter to Caretero did not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful
behavior," for it was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule
pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation" of the letter inasmuch
as the letter was handed only to a single individual who just happened to be curious
about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter
occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other
employees or passengers were on board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass
the letter in order to publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of the
letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero categorically affirmed in his
affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with the letter, to
wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply
replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the
widespread dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be
justifiably inferred.

To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a

direct connection to the performance of his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the
GSIS. The connection was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the
connection the conduct would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to
lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension
without legal basis. The formal charge against the respondent was for grave
misconduct, an administrative offense that justifies the imposition of the preventive
suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil
service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified
even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to
the employee concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had
legal basis, he was not entitled to backwages.

2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his
administrative remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service provides the option either of filing a motion for reconsideration against
the preventive suspension order by the disciplining authority, or of elevating the
preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 days
from the receipt thereof.

We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. His failure to file the motion for reconsideration did not justify
the immediate dismissal of the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain
exceptional circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Among the exceptional circumstances are the following, namely: when the issue
involved is purely a legal question.

Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against
justified the filing of the formal charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of
preventive suspension pending investigation — was a purely legal question due to the
factual antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the respondent had no
need to exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing the motion for
reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on

certiorari;AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated on April 29, 2004 and the
resolution promulgated on September 6, 2004 insofar as the Court of Appeals
dismissed the formal charge for grave misconduct against respondent Mario I. Molina,
but REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they
nullified the respondent's preventive suspension and awarded backwages to him
corresponding to the period of his preventive suspension; and MAKES NO
PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.

Ray Peter O. Vivo vs.

Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation (PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013 5

Facts:
The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of
its Gaming Department. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S.
Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising
that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that
he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time
being placed under preventive suspension.

On February 26, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel, replying to Ela’s letter, assailed
the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension. On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the
summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before
PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002. At the petitioner’s
request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His
statement was taken in a question-and-answer format. He was also furnished the
memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts
and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its
investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee. The Adjudication Committee
summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address
questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting
because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied
the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the
proceedings. His counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request.

The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of
the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the
effect that he was being dismissed from the service. In its resolution dated April 11,
2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due process,
and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. On February 27, 2009, the CA
promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its
finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process.

Issues:

1. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s right for due process
was not violated transgressed the fundamental rules in administrative due
process.

2. The Court of Appeals decision in setting aside CSC Resolutions Nos. 070732,
dated 01 April 2007, and 071485, dated 01 August 2007, is contrary to the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled
jurisprudence.

Ruling:
The petition for review lacks merit.

The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and
hearings conducted by PAGCOR. He received the letter from Ela apprising him of his
being administratively charged for several offenses, and directing him to submit an
explanation in writing. He was later on properly summoned to appear before the CIU,
which conducted its proceedings in his own residence upon his request. During the
administrative inquiry, the CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of charges,
which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions
constituting his alleged offenses. He was also given the opportunity to appear before
the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions. Lastly, he was informed
through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from
the service.
In contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due
process by PAGCOR as set forth herein. He made no credible showing of the supposed
violation of his right to due process. He was heard through the written statement he
submitted in response to the memorandum of the charges against him. He actively
participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own residence. He
was afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings before the
Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the adverse decision to dismiss
him from the service to the CSC. There is also no question that PAGCOR complied with
the twin-notice requirement prior to the termination of his employment, the first notice
being made through Ela’s letter dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being
administratively charged for the offenses mentioned, and the second being through the
letter dated May 15, 2002 advising him that PAGCOR’s Board of Directors had resolved
to dismiss him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due
process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded. The right to counsel is not imperative because administrative
investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are
facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with
the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. It is noteworthy, however,
that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the
administrative case against him

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN:

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015 6

Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears
at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of
the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post
bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was
issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that
the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and
voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail
and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan
denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted,
he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the
amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or
life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of
guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to
the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record
to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail
can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution
of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion

perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
“[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The
hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong
SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Nelson Lai vs. People of the Philippines

G. R. No. 17599, July 1, 2015 7
The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." An essential part of the right is to be afforded a
just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be
condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and
decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process.

FACTS:
The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide through the
assailed decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA). The
conviction had been handed down by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 42, in Bacolod City (RTC). The accused alleging that he was
deprived of due process when this case was decided by the Honorable Presiding
Judge who acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the
bench.
ISSUE: Whether Lai was denied of due process because of the non-disqualification of
Judge Elumba?
RULING:
Yes. It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be
denied to any accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." An essential part of
the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any
violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on
and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due
process. The Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, it has been held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. In support to this, Section 1 of Rule 137 contemplates two
kinds of self-disqualification. The first paragraph enumerates the instances when the
judge is prohibited and disqualified from sitting on and deciding a case.The prohibition is
compulsory simply because the judge is conclusively presumed to be incapable of
impartiality.The second paragraph speaks of voluntary inhibition; whether or not the
judge can sit in and try the case is left to his discretion, depending on the existence of
just and valid reasons not included in the first paragraph, but in exercising the
discretion, he must rely only on his conscience. In relation to this, Section 5,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judic2Philippine Judiciary,which pertinently
demands the disqualification of a judgewho has previously served as a lawyer of
any of the parties. As such, the mere appearance of his name as the public prosecutor
in the records of the case sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and
deciding the case. Having represented the State in the prosecution of the petitioner,
he could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the trial judge who would
continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed himself from being the trial
judge in the case. Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was
passive, or that he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the
Prosecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not really matter. The evil
sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with
the judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. Under the
circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not
be expected to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the
criminal case of the petitioner. His non-disqualification resulted in the denial of the
petitioner's right to due process as the accused.

Marichu Ejera vs. Beau Merto and Erwin Vergara

G.R. No. 163109, January 22, 2014 8

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial

system. It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
an ironclad rule, but recognizes exceptions; however, the exceptions did not cover
the petitioner’s case. The rule is that judicial intervention should only be availed of
after all administrative remedies had been exhausted.
FACTS:
The petitioner held the position of Agricultural Center Chief I in the Office of the
Provincial Agriculturist in Negros Oriental. Upon the retirement of the Supervising
Agriculturist, she applied for that position, but one Daisy Kirit was eventually
appointed. She filed a protest against the appointment of Kirit before the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office in in Cebu Citybut that said office dismissed
her protest. Meanwhile, respondent Provincial Agriculturist Beau Henry L. Merto
issued Office Order No. 008 (Amending Office Order No. 008, Series of
2000, Re: Assignment/Re-assignment of BADC Area Coordinators and Development
Team Members). The petitioner was one of the personnel re-assigned under
Office Order No. 008. When she refused to obey the office order, Merto ordered
her to explain in writing within 72 hours why no administrative disciplinary action
should be taken against her.After she did not submit her explanation, Merto
summoned her to a conference. She and her counsel, Atty. Lenin R. Victoriano,
attended the conference, but later on walked out allegedly because Vergara
refused to record her objections to the questions she was
being asked to answer.The petitioner filed in the RTC her complaint for
“final injunction with temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, and
damages,” averring that Merto had issued OfficeOrder No. 008 because he had so
bitterly resented her attacks against him before the CSC Regional Office. The petitioner
moved for the admission of a supplemental complaint in order to implead
Gregorio P. Paltinca, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial
Agriculturist, for issuing on June 29, 2001 Office Order No. 005, Series of 2001,
to amend Office Order No. 008. The latter moved to dismiss the supplemental
complaint. The RTC dismissed the case, holding on the legality of Office Order
No. 008 and Office Order No. 005.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 were
illegal for violating the rule against indiscriminate and whimsical reassignment
enunciated in the Administrative Code of 1987
Whether or not petitioner’s non-exhaustion of her available administrative
remedies was fatal to her cause. Whether or not Paltinca’s motion to dismiss
could be resolved before the admission of the supplemental complaint.

RULING:
Firstly, Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of theAdministrative Code of
1987lists the personnel actions that may be taken in the government service,
namely: (1) appointment through certification; (2) promotion; (3) transfer; (4)
reinstatement; (5) reemployment; (6) detail; and (7) reassignment. The subject of
the assailed office orders was a reassignment, which is not to be confused with
a transfer. The office orders themselves indicated that the personnel action
involved was a reassignment, not a transfer, for, indeed, the petitioner was being moved
from the organizational unit of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist in
Dumaguete City to that in the barangays of the Municipality of Siaton.That the
reassignment was made without the petitioner’s consent can be deduced from her
refusal to report to the station of her new assignment. She lost the opportunity
to ventilate her reason for refusing the reassignment by walking out of the conference
instead of explaining her refusal to follow Office Order
No. 008.Secondly, under theAdministrative Code of 1987,the
CSC has the power and function to “[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
other pertinent laws.”A public servant who has an issue against a directive for
her re-assignment must exhaust her available administrative remedies before
resorting to judicial action. The non-exhaustion of available administrative remedies is
fatal to the resort to judicial action. The reassignment of the petitioner was a
“personnel” and “Civil Service” matter to be properly addressed in accordance
with the rules and guidelines prescribed by the CSC. Her resort to judicial
intervention could not take the place of the grievance procedure then available to her.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system. It is true that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
ironclad rule, but recognizes exceptions; however, the exceptions did not cover the
petitioner’s case. The rule is that judicial intervention should only be availed of
after all administrative remedies had been exhausted. The Judiciary must not
intervene because Office Order No. 008 and Office Order No. 005 both concerned the
implementation of a provincial executive policy. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are
peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates
as a shield that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and thushinders courts
from intervening in matters of policy infused with administrative character. The
Court has always adhered to this precept, and it has no reason to depart from it now.
Verily, had the petitioner followed the grievance procedure under the CSC’s Omnibus
Rules,her next step would have been to elevate her case to the CSC itself,the
constitutional body charged with the exclusive jurisdiction not only over
disciplinary actions against government officials and employees but also over cases
involving personnel actions.The petitioner filed her supplemental complaint to assail
Office Order No. 005, and thereby raised issues identical to those raised in her
original complaint involving Office Order No. 008. Hence, the RTC could already resolve
Paltinca’s motion to dismiss even without first admitting the supplemental complaint.
Unlike an amended complaint, her supplemental complaint could “exist side-by-side”
with the original complaint, because the supplemental complaint averred facts
supervening from the filing of the complaint pursuant to Rule 10 of the1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Brenda Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology

,Regional Office No. IX vs. Hon. Reynaldo Villar, Hon. Juanito Espino Jr. (CHR
Commissioners) and Dir. Khem InokG .R. No. 188635, January 29, 2013 9
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the
payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by
law to a covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by
the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.
FACTS:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to
provide a program for human resources development in science and technology
in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower
that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery. Section 7 of
R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits (Ma 23Carta
benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST. Under R.A. No. 8439, the
funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are tobe appropriated by the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439. The
DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998
despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA.
Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon
E. Vargas, several NDs were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits. The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr.
Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP) through his
Memorandum for the authority to utilize the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna
Carta benefits. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the
President, approved the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr. Petitioner, in her
capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA
Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowanceof the
Magna Carta benefits.
ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing their report?

RULING:
No. The authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in
order that a transfer of appropriation from the agency’s savings would be validly
effected. The first required that there must be savings from the authorized appropriation
of the agency. The second demanded that there must be an existing item, project,
activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings
would be transferred for augmentation purposes only. Clearly and indubitably, the
prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently,
the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or
provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOST’s
savings in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the
Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001. The COA is endowed with
sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has
the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for
which they had been intended by law. The Court has accorded not only respect but
also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.Only when
the COAhas acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a petition
for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of
Court,demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the COA
gravely abused its discretion.Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials
who caused the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and
employees acted in good faith in the honest belief that there was a firm legal basis for
the payment of the benefits. Evincing their good faith even after receiving the NDs from
the COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the OP for the
authorization to use the DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits. On their part,
the DOST covered offic 24employees received the benefits because they
considered themselves rightfully deserving of the benefits under the long-awaited
law. The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good
faith need not be reimbursed to the Government.

Valentino Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson

G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013 10

The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs)
is to ensure the enjoyment by each of the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the
National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to
the LGUs. Each political subdivision is thereby vested with such powers subject to
constitutional and statutory limitations.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize
any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido
Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,
Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by
Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and
its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the chairman and operatives
or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM), seeking the
declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative
powers of the City of Cebu
RULING:
Yes. Tests for a valid ordinance In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court restates the
tests of a valid ordinance thusly: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established.
A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. As jurisprudence
indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted
within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherentmerit,
like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy).

Optional… if further discussion is needed

(Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements. Indeed, with no
issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the enactment of
Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard.
Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the
various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power
of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to
delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in
the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully
functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory
limitations. In particular, police power is regarded as “the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’” It
is unquestionably “the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make,
ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, eitherwith penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subject of the same.”In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of
delegated police power. The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to
leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic
congestions associated with development and progress because they were
directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the
LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of their
familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities. With the broad
latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations
must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional
limitations and statutory safeguards. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the
substantive requirements The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the
adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty is
embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Even under strict scrutiny
review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy. To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles
used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to include illegally
parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which
were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly aiming to ensure
“a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times”
(Section 1).Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary.
Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could
protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the
ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an
administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle
upon a p directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee
on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor
Felipe Belciña –officials named in the ordinance itself. The release could be ordered
by any of such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. That none of
the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the
fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly,
the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not
necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the
apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer
would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic
citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only
to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions.
And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a
summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from
obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow
of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.)