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Acting From Virtue
ROBERTAUDI
Virtueethics shouldtell us not only what virtueis but also what consti-
tutesactingfromit, Merelyto do the rightthing,say fromself-interest,is
not to live up to a standardof virtue.But despitethe extensiverecentdis-
cussionof virtueethicsthe notionof actingfromvirtuestill needs clarifi-
cation.The problemis especiallychallengingbecauseit straddlesethics
andactiontheory.It cannotbe solvedwithoutan adequateunderstanding
of virtue,butthe relationof actionsfromvirtueto the virtuesthey express
is-I shall argue-mainly a question of how such actions are to be
explained.Aristotleis highly instructiveon this problemandis my point
of departure.It is also rewardingto considerKant'sconceptionof acting
from duty,construedas a case of actingfrommoralvirtue,for instance
fromrectitude,andviewed as a foil for Aristotle'snotionof such action.
Even if Kantianactionfromdutyoughtnot to be so viewed, Kantianeth-
ics, like anyruleethics,needsan accountof somethingclosely analogous
to actingfromvirtue:actingfromwhateverrule-guidedelementsof char-
acterrenderthe actionsthatexpressthemmorallypraiseworthy.My first
taskwill be to sketch-of necessitywithoutdoingdetailedtextualanaly-
sis-Aristotelian and Kantianconceptionsof acting from virtue.I shall
then constructa generalaccountof actingfromvirtue.The final section
will show how the accounthelps in answeringan importantquestionof
generalethics:whetherregularlyactingfromvirtue-and therebyachiev-
ing the chief normativegoal of virtueethics-is sufficientfor a morally
good life.
Mind, Vol. 104 . 415 . July 1995 ? Oxford University Press 1995
450 RobertAudi
duce a life of flourishing,we can see how the agentin question-the vir-
tuous agent-chooses in mattersinvolving pleasure and pain, which
constitutethe largerfield of moral virtue. In rough terms,the virtuous
agentaimsat targetsappropriate to humanflourishingandacts so as to hit
a meanbetweenexcess and deficiency.Supposethis is correct.Thereis
still a normativenotionbuiltintoflourishing,andthis would seem at best
difficultto discernwithouta senseof whatbehaviouraloutcomes areto be
sought.Some such outcomesseem essentialfor hittingthe righttargets.
Are we happywhen merelycontent,or mustwe performcertainintellec-
tual, aesthetic,andphysicaltaskswith a certainkindof result?Are there
not intellectualstandards,suchas thoseof logic andmathematics,at least,
thatmustbe broughtto ouractivitiesas guideswithinwhichvirtuedevel-
ops? (Aristotlehimself must have thoughtso, for he consideredphilo-
sophical contemplation the highest happiness and surely saw it as
governedby logical andepistemicstandards.)21
It is truethatonce we have role models, virtuecan be taughtby their
example and withoutantecedent(propositional)standards.Historically,
then,virtueethicsmightoperateindependentlyof ruleor othernon-virtue
accounts, such as intuitionism.But conceptually,virtue notions seem
dependenton othernormativeconcepts.
This negative conclusion must not be overstressed.It remainsquite
possible that the moral worthof actionsdependson theirbeing actions
from virtue:even if virtue concepts cannotby themselvestell us what
conductbefits us as moralagents, it may be thatthe only (or the most)
morallycreditableway to do the thingsin questionis fromvirtue.A sec-
ond majormoralthesis is also left open:that even the moralworth-in
the sense of goodness-of personslies in theirvirtuouscharacter(or lack
of it).22Togetherthese theses constitutea virtuetheoryof moral worth,
andthey may be regardedas partiallyexplicatingwhatit is for character
to be morallyfundamental.This kind of virtueethics is consistentboth
with Kantianismand with otherviews commonlycontrastedwith virtue
ethics when the latteris construedas embodyinga theoryof moralobli-
gation.23
Conclusion
REFERENCES
Aristotle:NicomacheanEthics.Translatedby TerenceIrwin 1985. Indi-
anapolis:Hackett.
Audi, Robert 1986: "Acting for Reasons". The Philosophical Review 95,
4, pp. 511-546.
1989:PracticalReasoning.LondonandNew York:Routledge.
Baier, Kurt 1959: The Moral Point of View. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Broadie, Sarah 1991: Ethics with Aristotle. New York and Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress.
Cooper, John: 1975. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Cambridge,
Mass:HarvardUniversityPress.
Frankena,WilliamK. 1973:Ethics.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall.
Garcia,JorgeL. A. 1989:"TheProblemof ComparativeValue".Mind98,
390, pp. 277-283.
Gert,Bernard1988:Morality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
24 An earlier
versionof this paperwas given at SantaClaraUniversity'sCon-
ferenceon VirtueEthicsin March1994,andI benefitedfromdiscussionwith the
otherspeakers,especiallyPhilippaFoot.I also wantto thankNormanDahl,Julia
Driver,PhilipKain,ChristopherKulp,MichaelMeyer,WilliamPrior,Elizabeth
Radcliffe,andthe Editorandan anonymousrefereefor helpfulcomments.
Acting From Virtue 471