Persons and Family Relations
The New Civil Code took effect last August 30, 1950.
The Family Code of the Philippines took effect last August 3, 1988.
Definition of the Civil Code:
- Is a collection of laws, which regulates the private relations of the members of
civil society, determining respective rights and obligations, with reference to
persons, things, and civil acts.
Effectivity of Laws (Executive Order No. 200, dated June 18, 1987)
- When a statute does not explicitly provide for its effectivity, it shall have the
effect only after the expiration of the 15-day period following the completion of
its publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.
Non-Retroactivity of Laws:
EXCEPTIONS:
1. When the law expressly provides for its retroactivity;
2. When the law is curative or remedial;
3. When the law is procedural;
4. When the law is penal in character in so far as it favors the accused who is
not a habitual criminal, even though at the time of the enactment of such law
final sentence has already been rendered.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Courts have the principal function of not only resolving legal controversies but
also of interpreting and construing vague provisions of law relative to a particular
dispute. Construction, verily is the art or process of discovering and expounding
the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application
to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
(Caltex vs. Palomar, 15 SCRA 247)
Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
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Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations. (Art. 14 CC)
Nationality Rule
A Filipino citizen regardless of his / her location will be governed by Philippine
Laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status,
condition and legal capacity. (Art. 15 of CC)
Law Governing Real Properties
General Rule: The law of the country where the real property is situated shall
be the governing law over such property.
Exceptions : National Law of the deceased in cases of
a. Order of succession;
b. Amount of successional rights whether intestate or testamentary succession.
In Bellis vs. Bellis (20 SCRA 358), where a foreigner executed a will in the
Philippines but, who at the time of his death, was both national of the United
States and also domiciled in the United States.
“The parties admit that the decedent Amos G. Bellis
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas laws, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.”
The law provides clearly that the forms and solemnities of public
instruments, wills and contracts shall be governed by the laws of the country
where they are executed.
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Persons and Family Relations
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Elements of Abuse of Rights: (Art. 19)
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith;
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
ANSWER:
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. To be
actionable, there must be some act independent of the breach of promise to
marry such as carnal knowledge.
Case: Constantino vs. Mendez, G.R. No. 57227, May 14, 1992.
Facts:
Constantino filed a case for damages against Mendez which is based on Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through his promise of marriage,
she surrendered her virginity to him for the first time sometime in August 1974.
She came to know that he is a married man after her first sexual intercourse
with him. They repeated their sexual intercourse in the months of September,
October and November 1974.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court ruled that damages could not be awarded if sexual
intercourse is a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met
Mendez at Tony’s Restaurant, Constantino was already 28 years old and she
admitted that she was attracted to Mendez. Her attraction to Mendez is the
reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Has she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately
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severed her relation with Mendez when she was informed after the first sexual
contact sometime in August 1974, that she was a married man. Her declaration
that they repeated their sexual intercourse in the month of September, October
and November 1974, indicate that passion and not the alleged promise of
marriage was the moving force that made her submit to Mendez.
“Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21, not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.” (Baksh vs. CA, G.R. No. 97336,
February 19, 1993)
Case: Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals et. al. (G.R. No.
81262, August 25, 1989)
Facts:
Globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions. Tobias, Globe Mackay’s purchasing agent and administrative
Assistant, discovered anomalies and reported them to Hendry, his immediate
superior and Executive Vice-President. Hendry confronted Tobias and told him
that he is the number one suspect.
Despite the two police reports and the results of the lie detector test showing
that Tobias is innocent, he was terminated by Hendry.
Tobias applied for employment with Retelco but Hendry wrote a letter to Retelco
stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe due to dishonesty, hence, a
complaint for damages was instituted by Tobias against Globe Mackay.
ISSUE: Is Globe Mackay liable for damages?
DECISION:
The high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was uncalled for.
This reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when Tobias returned
Persons and Family Relations

to work. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said
“Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company.” Considering that the
first report by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10,
1972, the statement made by Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt
without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigation of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code.
therefore be compelled to file a case if in its honest evaluation, there is no
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.
Instances when there can be an INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION:
1. Article 32, In case of violation of the rights and liberties, as therein
enumerated;

Hendry’s threat that the company would file a hundred of cases against Tobias
until the latter landed in jail, adding that “You Filipinos cannot be trusted,”
unmasked his bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. The scornful
remark about Filipinos are clear violations of Tobias’ personal dignity. The
tortious act committed by petitioners by writing a letter to Retelco stating that
Tobias had been dismissed due to dishonesty, because of which letter, Tobias
failed to gain employment renders the petitioners liable for damages consistent
with Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.
SOLUTIO INDEBITI
- legal basis of the principle are Articles 22 & 23 of the New Civil Code in relation
to Art. 2154.
“Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return arises.”
2. Article 33, in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries;
3. Article 34, in case of refusal or failure of a member of a city or municipal force
to render aid or protection;
4. Article 2177, in case of quasi-delict.
Article 32 allows the aggrieved party to file an independent civil action, whether
or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense.
The aggrieved party may ask for moral and exemplary damages but in the latter
case, it is subject to the discretion of the court.
What is the nature of the civil action under Article 33?

Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during 1. It is a civil action for damages which is entirely separate and
a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the distinct from the criminal action;
courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution.
2. It shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution;
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant
or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty 3. It shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.”
Who is liable for damages under Article 34?
QUESTION:
Can the Office of the Ombudsman be compelled by mandamus to file a case The member of the police force who refuses or fails to render aid or protection
against a town mayor for a crime committed? is PRIMARILY LIABLE for damages.

ANSWER: The city or municipality concerned is SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE in case of

The filing of a case depends on whether there is a probable cause or whether insolvency of said police officer.
there is a prima facie case, based on the evidence in its possession. This is a
discretionary function, not a ministerial function, and the Ombudsman cannot

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Persons and Family Relations

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (Art. 36) Circumstances which modify or limit Capacity to Act;
Definition: is one which must be decided first before a criminal action may be 1. Age;
instituted or may proceed because a decision therein is vital to the judgment in
2. Insanity;
the criminal case.
3. Imbecility;
Elements of Prejudicial Question:
4. The state of being deaf-mute;
a. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; 5. Penalty;
6. Prodigality;
b. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
7.Family relations;
Zapanta vs. Mendoza (L-14534, February 28, 1962)
8. Alienage;
Accused was the one who was intimidated of forced by the second
spouse to enter into the bigamous marriage, his consent to the second marriage 9. Absence;
would be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for bigamy and,
10. Insolvency;
in which case, the civil case for the annulment of the second marriage is a
prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy. 11. Trusteeship;
12. A married woman, 21 years of age or over for all acts of civil life, except in
cases specified by law.
Beltran vs. People (G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000)
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
When does the civil personality begin in natural person?
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
ANSWER:
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception
the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
Civil Code. (Art. 5 of PD No. 603)
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
For civil purposes , the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
concubinage.
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than 7 months it is not deemed born if it dies within 24
CIVIL PERSONALITY
hours after its complete delivery from the natural womb.
JURIDICAL CAPACITY – is the fitness to be subject of legal
relations, it is inherent in every natural person
Case: Quisumbing vs. Icao, 34 SCRA 132.
and is lost only through death.
“A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has
Capacity to Act - Is the power to do acts with legal effects, is acquired and
a right to support from its progenitors, particularly the defendant-appellee
may be lost. May be lost not only by death but by any valid cause
(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss),
provided by law.
even if the said child is only “en ventre de sa mere” just as a conceived child,
even if as yet unborn may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the
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Persons and Family Relations
same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil
Code).”
Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The following are juridical persons:
1. The State and its political subdivisions;
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose, created by law, their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
2. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct
from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
As held in the case of Roldan vs. Philippine Veterans Board (105 Phil. 1081)
“Juridical person is a being of legal existence susceptible of rights and
obligations, or being the subject of juridical relations.”
Political Subdivisions – are municipal corporations, and in the Philippines
consist of the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Corporation – is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right
of succession and the powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized
by law or incident to its existence.
Partnership- two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money,
property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves.
Citizens of Philippines; (Art. 48)
(1) Those who were citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution of the Philippines;
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(2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of said Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippines;
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine Citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual
residence.
DOMICILE - Denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one
has the intention of returning. It is residence coupled with the intention to remain
for an unlimited time.
RESIDENCE – Indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary.
Case of Marcos vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 300)
“The Court upheld the qualification of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, despite
her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the
district for only 7 months, because of the following: (i) A minor follows the
domicile of his parents; Tacloban became Mrs. Mrs. Marcos’ domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (ii) Domicile of
origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bonafide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive
proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue; (iii) The wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile
because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
Political Law; when Mrs. Marcos married Mr. Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium; (iv) Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one after her husband died,
her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.”
Persons and Family Relations
MARRIAGE
Definition:
Is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with the law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulations, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
“A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations, it is a part
of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. There is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex re-assignment and its effects.” (Silverio vs. Republic,
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007)
Essential Requisites of Marriage:
(1) Legal Capacity of the contracting parties who must be male and a
female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
Garcia vs. Recio (G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001)
“A Filipino was divorced by his Australian spouses prior to his acquiring
Australian citizenship.. To enable him to validly remarry a Filipino, he was
required to either present proof of his legal capacity issued by his Embassy or
have the Australian divorce decree recognized by a Philippine court, otherwise
his second marriage is void-bigamous.”
Catalan vs. Lee ((G.R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012)
“Under the principle of comity, a valid divorce obtained by a spouses of foreign
nationality recognized in the Philippines. However, the validity of that foreign
divorce must be proven in a court of competent jurisdiction in the Philippines
otherwise, a second marriage is void-bigamous.”
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Corpus vs. Sto. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571, August 11,2010)
“A former Filipino, naturalized as a Canadian, was not advised to present a
certificate of legal capacity to contract a second marriage after he had divorced
his first Filipino spouse. Extraordinarily, while the Supreme Court ruled that
Article 26 paragraph 2 was not applicable to foreigners, the Court still required
the foreigner to seek recognition of his divorce decree before the same could
be registered with the civil registrar as a “matter of housekeeping”. Further, for
recognition of a foreign divorce decree, the following documents must be
submitted: a copy of the divorce decree, the required certificates proving its
authenticity, and a copy of the foreign law on divorce.”
Republic vs. Albios (G.R. No. 198780, October 16,2013)
Where the Court discussed the “marriage for immigration purpose” and ruled
that under Article 2 for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective
by nay of the vices of consent under Article 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Conent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their acts. Their understanding should not affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs and hypnotism. Based on the above, consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. In fact there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. That their consent was
freely given is best evidence by their conscious purpose of acquriing American
citizenship through marriage.
Such an act plainly demonstrate that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage
There was clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.
Formal Requisites of Marriage:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing Officer;
Persons and Family Relations

(2) A valid marriage license except for the following;
a. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death,
marriage is till valid if the ailing party subsequently survives (articulo mortis);
b. residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation
to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar;
c. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members of a
ship or a plane while at sea or in flight and during stopovers at ports of call.
d. Marriage in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians, to be
solemnized by a military commander of a unit who is a commissioned officer;
e. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural
communities provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs,
rites and practices;
f. Marriage between a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other.
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age.
c. administratively liable.
Authorized Solemnizers of Marriage:
(1) Any incumbent member of; the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his
church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship or airplane captain with respect to marriage in articulo mortis in a
ship or a plane;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned in the
absence of the latter during a military operation with respect to marriage
in articulo mortis;
(5) Any consul general, consul or vice-consul as regards to marriage
between Filipino citizens abroad.
Aranes vs. Occiano (A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11,2002) & Navarro vs.
Domagtoy (A.M. MTJ-96-1088, July 19,1996)
“The authority of judges to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is an irregularity in a formal requisite of marriage.”

General Rule: ABSENCE of any of the Essential or Formal requisites of Place of Issue of Marriage License:
marriage shall render the marriage void ab initio; From the Local Civil Registrar of the City or the Municipality where either of them
resides.
Exception:
Though the solemnizing officer is not legally authorized to perform marriages, VENUE of the solemnization of Marriage:
either or both parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the (a) Chamber of the judge or in open court;
legal authority to solemnize their marriage. (b) Church , chapel or temple;
(c) Office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul;
DEFECTS in the essential requirements / requites of marriage make the (d) In a house or place designated by parties, provided a written request
marriage merely annullable or voidable. be made to the solemnizing officer

An IRREGULARITY in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the Exception: Marriage in articulo mortis or in remote places.
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be;
a. civilly liable; Morigo vs. People (G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004)
b. criminally liable; and

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Persons and Family Relations
“No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The parties merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute as ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contacts a subsequent marriage.”
De Castro vs. De Castro (G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008) & Republic vs.
Dayot (G.R. Nos. 175581 and 179474, March 28, 2008)
“The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of cohabitation, which would have qualified a marriage as an exception to the
requirement for marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to
by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if
there was no affidavit at all.”
Requirements in the marriage application before the local civil registrar in case
either of the contracting parties has been previously married:
(a) Death Certificate of the deceased spouse;
(b) Judicial decree of the absolute divorce;
(c) Judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage;
(d) Affidavit setting forth the circumstance of the current status of the
applicant and date of death of the deceased spouse just in case the Death
certificate cannot be secured.
PARENTAL CONSENT – Contracting parties between 18 years old and above
but below 21 years of age must obtain consent of the parents. Non-compliance
with this requirement, however, does not make the marriage invalid or void but
merely annullable.
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PARENTAL ADVICE – Any contracting party between 21 and 25 shall be
obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon intended marriage;
Failure to obtain an advice or an unfavorable advice will defer the issuance of a
marriage license till after 3 months from the completion of the publication of the
application;
This does not affect the marriage.
INVESTIGATIVE POWER OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND COURT
INTERVENTION:
In case of knowledge of any impediment relative to the application for a marriage
license by either the contracting parties, the local civil registrar must note down
the particulars thereof and his findings in the application for a marriage license.
He / she is nonetheless duty bound to issue said license after payment of the
necessary fees unless exempted due to indigence, the completion of the period
of publication, or after a period of 3 months from the completion of publication
in case where parental advice was not secured.
Only court intervention directing the non-issuance of the marriage license can
empower the local civil registrar to validly refused to issue a marriage license,
Marriage license is valid only within the Philippines and not abroad. It is good
for 120 days from the date of issue. The date of the signing of the local civil
registrar of the marriage license is the date of the issue.
Citizens of any foreign country may contract marriage in the Philippines
provided that before they can secure a marriage license they must submit a
legal capacity to contract marriage issued by their respective diplomatic or
consular officials.
If they are stateless persons or refugees, they shall be required to file an affidavit
stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage in lieu of
the certificate of legal capacity.
Lex Loci Celebrationis Rule;
Persons and Family Relations

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they are solemnized, and valid there as such, shall VOID MARRIAGES
also be valid in the Philippines except for the following; 1. Contracted by any party who is below 18 years old;
1. If either or both contracting parties are Filipinos and they are below 2. Solemnizing officer is without authority unless either or both parties believed
18 years old; in good faith that
2. Bigamous and polygamous marriage; the solemnizing officer has authority;
3. Marriage thru mistake as to the identity of the other; 3. Marriages without marriage license;
4. Non-compliance with the recording in the civil registry and the 4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages;
registry of property of the judgment of annulment or of 5. Marriage thru mistake of identity;
absolute nullity of marriage and the partition and distribution, 6. Subsequent marriage which failed to comply with the recording in the civil
as well as delivery of presumptive legitimes of common children in the registry and the
prior marriage, hence, subsequent marriage is null and void; registry of property of the judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of
5. Marriage contracted by a party who is psychologically incapacitated; marriage and the
6. Incestuous marriage; partition and distribution, as well as delivery of presumptive legitimes of
7. Marriages which are void by reason of public policy. common children in the
prior marriage;
7. Where either or both party is psychologically incapacitated;
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated 8. Incestuous marriage;
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse 9. Marriages which are void by reason of public policy.
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the 10. Subsequent marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity of the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. previous marriage;
11. Subsequent marriage without a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of either party in the
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III (G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005) previous marriage.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases QUESTION:
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino Is good faith or bad faith material in the determination as to whether or not a
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and marriage is null and void?
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. ANSWER:
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import As a general rule, good faith and bad faith are immaterial in determining whether
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the or not a marriage is null and void. Hence, even if a woman believed in good faith
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, that she married a man not related to her but who in truth and in fact was her
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore long-lost brother, her good faith will not cure the infirmity even if she willingly
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they and freely cohabited with him for a reasonable length of time after discovering
come within its spirit or intent. the relationship.

EXCEPTIONS:
VOID MARRIAGES

Page 9 of 73
Persons and Family Relations
(1) If either of the contracting parties is in good faith in believing that a
solemnizing officer has authority to solemnize a marriage though he or she
actually has none, the marriage will be considered valid;
(2) In case of a person whose spouse disappeared for 4 or 2 years and
he / she was able to secure a judicial declaration of presumptive death.
1. Contracted by any party who is below 18 years old.
An individual below 18 years old is declared by law as not possessing the legal
capacity to contract marriage. The consent of the parents is immaterial in the
sense that, even if present, it will not make the marriage valid. Neither can
subsequent parental consent ratify such a void marriage.
2. Solemnizing officer is without authority unless either or both parties believed
in good faith that the solemnizing officer has authority;
If the marriage were contracted with either parties believing in good faith that
the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so when in fact he or she
has none, then the marriage shall be considered valid.. The good faith is clearly
addressed to the contracting parties and not to the solemnizing officer.
3. Marriage without marriage license;
A marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage, the absent of which makes
the marriage void, however, there are exceptions.
Alcantara vs. Alcantara (G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007)
“The certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either contracting
party, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication, or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication, are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any
of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
Page 10 of 73
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.”
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.
Abbas vs. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013)
“It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.”
Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013)
“The Court found “no inconsistency” in declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license
was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the
month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35
which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was also non-existent . Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.”
4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages;
The law prohibits a married man or woman from contracting another bond of
union as long as the consort is alive(US vs. Ibanez, 13 Phil. 686) Thus, a
Persons and Family Relations
subsequent marriage contracted by a wife during the lifetime of a former
husband , with any person other than such former husband, is illegal and void
from the beginning.
QUESTION:
Is it necessary that for a subsequent marriage to be considered bigamous,
the first marriage must be valid?
ANSWER:
If the first marriage is in itself void and a subsequent marriage is contracted
without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, the subsequent
marriage is also void because it violates Article 40 in relation to Articles 52 and
53 of the Family Code. Essentially, Article 40 states that a judicial declaration of
nullity must first be obtained before any of the contracting parties is to remarry
and, in accordance with Article 52, such judicial declaration of nullity must be
recorded with the local civil registrar also before any subsequent marriage. Non-
observance of Article 40 in relation to Article 52 shall make the subsequent
marriage void pursuant to the express provision of Article 53.
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy (G.R. No. L-53703, August 19, 1986)
“There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be
so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable, and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID. There is likewise no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the
time they married each other, for then such marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded woman at the time she contracted her marriage; accordingly,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.”
Terre vs. Terre (A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992)
Page 11 of 73
“Dorothy was married to her first cousin and had been persuaded by
Jordan that the marriage was void; thus, he and Dorothy could marry. Jordan
sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his
prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and
that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary. The Court
considered this as “a spurious defense”. Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case
law of the Court, which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. His second marriage must be
regarded as “bigamous and criminal in character.”
Mercado vs. Tan (G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000)
“A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as “void’. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. The Court said that the crime had
already been consummated by then.
Tenebro vs. CA (G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
“The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned.
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.”
Morigo vs. People (G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004)
Here, both marriages were performed during the effectivity of the
Family Code; the first in 1990 and the second in 1992. prior to being charged
with bigamy, Morigo filed a petition to declare his first marriage void for lack of
Persons and Family Relations
a marriage ceremony. Morigo was convicted of bigamy. Overturning the
conviction, the Supreme Court ruled:
“The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But, in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage
to speak of.”
EFFECTS OF TERMINATION OF SECOND MARRIAGE:
(1) The children of the second marriage conceived prior to its termination
shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community or conjugal partnership of the second marriage
shall be dissolved and liquidated. If either spouse acted in bad faith, his / her
share in the net profits shall be forfeited;
(i) in favor of the common children; (ii) if none, in favor of the children of
the guilty spouse by previous marriage; or (ii) in default of children in favor of
the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of the marriage remain valid – Exception: if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith in which case the donation shall be
considered revoked.
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the spouse in bad
faith as the beneficiary in any insurance policy;
Page 12 of 73
(5) The spouse who contracted the second marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate
succession.
5. Mistake in Identity;
This ground goes into the very essentials of a valid marriage as there is
complete absence of consent, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio. The
important thing to be remembered here is that the contracting party absolutely
did not intend to marry the other, as the same is not the person he or she intend
to marry the other, as the same is not the person he or she actually knew before
the marriage. Mistake in identity as a ground for nullity covers only those
situations in which there has been a mistake on the part of the party seeking the
nullity of marriage as to actual physical identity of the other party. It does not
include mistake in the name, the character of the person, or in his or her
attributes, his age, religion, social standing, pedigree, pecuniary means,
temperaments, acquirements, condition in life or previous habits.
6. Subsequent marriage which failed to comply with the recording in the civil
registry and the registry of property of the judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of marriage and the partition and distribution, as well as delivery of
presumptive legitimes of common children in the prior marriage;
Non-compliance with these requirements will render any subsequent marriage
void.
For persons whose marriages have been annulled or declared null and void to
be able to validly marry again, they must undertake the liquidation, partition and
distribution of their properties, if any and only in proper cases the delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitimes and thereafter all these requirements, including
the degree of annulment or nullity, should be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and the registries of property. Non-compliance with these requirements
will render any subsequent marriage void. (Arts. 52 & 53 of FC)
7. Psychological Incapacity;
The ground is restricted to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The malady must be such as to seriously and effectively
prevent them from having a functional and normal marital life clearly conducive
to bringing up a healthy personal inter-marital relationship within the family
Persons and Family Relations
which is necessary for its growth. It involves a senseless, protracted and
constant refusal to comply with the essential marital obligations by one or both
of the spouses although he, she or they are physically capable of performing
such obligations (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 325)
Unlike other grounds for declaration of nullity and the grounds for annulment
and legal separation which generally constitute clearly definable physical acts
or situations such as impotency, below 18 years of age, physical violence,
infidelity, etc. psychological incapacity is psychosomatic and deals with a state
of mind and thus, can only be proven by indicators or external manifestations of
the person claimed to be psychologically incapacitated.
Case: Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia – Santos (G.R. No.
112019, January 4, 1995)
Facts:
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel Santos, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. On 20 September 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia
lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City.
However, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over
a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment
on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a
nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate,
or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
Page 13 of 73
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed
the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report
to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit
unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that
she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
DECISION:
The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
Persons and Family Relations
This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina (G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997)
Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in
February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was
estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went
to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
Page 14 of 73
Roridel thereafter filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start. In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to
(1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the RTC's decision.
DECISION:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as
legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Persons and Family Relations
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Page 15 of 73
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non- complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
Persons and Family Relations
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant
the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
CHI MING TSOI vs. CA (G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997)
“The Supreme Court ruled that one of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is to procreate children through sexual cooperation and the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.”
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano (G.R. No. 149498, May 20,2004)
There is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse, Hence,
the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any
person, regardless of nationality.
Antonio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, March 10,2006)
“Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of the constitutional protection of marriage because there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to
promote family life; that the personal examination of the subject by the physician
is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated; and
that inveterate pathological lying is psychological incapacity, as a person unable
to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of marital bond.”
Pesca vs. Pesca (G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001)
The wife filed her petition for nullity of marriage in 1994, long before Santos vs.
CA and Republic vs. Molina had been decided. The Supreme Court denied her
petition on the doctrine of stare decisis, ruling that she had failed to comply with
the requirements in those cases. Her husband was cruel, violent and a habitual
drinker.
Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009)
The Supreme Court opined that “it may have been inappropriate for the Court
to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity”; that “the unintended consequences of Molina has
taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity
and sociopathic personality anomaly”; that “the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
Page 16 of 73
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage.” The Court suggested the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages an
option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist /
expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state
of the parties to assist the courts, who are not experts in the field of psychology;
and declared that dependent personality disorder and antisocial personality
disorder are psychological incapacity. Here, the Court apologized for Pesca.
Republic vs. Galang (G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011)
While the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not
be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent before arriving at a
conclusion, the incapacity should be proven by independent means. The
psychologist must identify the types of psychological tests administered on the
respondent and the root cause of the psychological condition; she must show
that the mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage, why and to
what extent the disorder is serious, and the particular type of personality
disorder found.
Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012)
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring;
and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving
that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
Republic vs. CA (G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012)
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring;
Persons and Family Relations
and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving
that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
NO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IN THE FOLLOWING CASES:
(1) Mere personality disorder without showing how it affects the ability to perform
marital
obligations;
(2) Constant quarrels and irreconcilable differences;
(3) Mere womanizing or sexual infidelity;
(4) Mere financial difficulties;
(5) The wife allegedly had the habit of frequently gossiping with neighbors,
leaving the house
without the husband’s consent, refusal to do household chores and to take
care of their
adopted daughter;
(6) gambling.
8. Incestuous Marriage;
Incestuous marriage have been universally condemned as grossly indecent,
immoral and inimical to the purity and happiness of the family and the welfare
of future generations.
This covers relationship between parties whether legitimate of illegitimate:
(a) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(b) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.
9. Void Marriages by reason of public policy;
1.Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
2.Between step-parents and step-children;
3.Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
4.Between adopting parent and the adopted child;
5.Between surviving spouse of the adopting parents and the adopted child;
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6.Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
7.Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8.Between the adopted children of the same adopter;
9.Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.
10. Subsequent marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage;
If a marriage between two contracting parties is void ab initio, any one of them
cannot contract a subsequent marriage valid marriage without a previous
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous void marriage.
11. Subsequent marriage without a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
either party in the previous marriage;
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
A judicial declaration of presumptive death is mandatorily required by law to be
obtained by the present spouse only for the purpose of capacitating the present
spouse to remarry. For purposes of remarriage, the period of absence to be able
to presume an absentee dead is 4 consecutive years and 2 consecutive years,
if the disappearance occurred under the following circumstances;
a. A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which
is missing, who has not been heard for four years since the loss of the vessel
or aeroplane;
b. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
c. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and
his existence has not been known for 4 years.
AFFIDAVIT OF REAPPEARANCE:
If the absent spouse reappears, such spouse can easily terminate the
subsequent marriage by executing a sworn statement or affidavit of the fact and
circumstance of such reappearance and recording the same with due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage. The subsequent marriage is
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage. Also
any interested party may file this affidavit of reappearance. This includes their
parents, their children, the present spouse and even the subsequent spouse.
Persons and Family Relations
If the reappearing spouse or any interested party does not file any affidavit of
reappearance, the subsequent marriage remains validly subsisting, while the
first marriage is likewise considered subsisting not having judicially nullified or
annulled.
EFFECTS IN THE TERMINATION OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE BY VIRTUE
OF REAPPEARANCE OF THE ABSENT SPOUSE;
1. Children conceived prior to the termination will be considered as
legitimate;
2. The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated,
but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community property or the conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or; if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse;
3.Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee
are revoked by operation of law;
4 The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
5. The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate
succession.
STATUS OF THE CHILDREN
Children conceived during the subsequent marriage in cases of presumptive
death of one of the spouses and before termination of the same shall be
considered legitimate.
The status of the children will be maintained even if one of the contracting
parties is in bad faith. It must be noted that such subsequent marriage in cases
of presumptive death can only be considered void if, both spouses were in bad
faith in contracting the subsequent marriage (Art. 44). If only one is in bad faith,
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the marriage would still be valid and hence, the children born inside such
marriage are legitimate.
TERMINATION OF THE PROPERTY REGIME
The property regime shall be dissolved and liquidated. After payment of all debts
and obligations of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, the spouses
shall divide the property equally or in accordance with the sharing stipulated in
a valid marriage settlement, unless there has been a voluntary waiver of share
by either of the spouses upon judicial separation of the property.
For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, the said profits
shall be increase in value between the market value of the community property
at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
of its dissolution.
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE
Donations are essentially gratuitous, hence, if both parties are in good faith, the
donation by reason of marriage shall be valid even in the event that the
subsequent marriage has been terminated. It shall also be valid even if the
donor acted in bad faith in contracting the marriage.
VOIDABLE / ANNULLABLE MARRIAGES
1. Without parental consent;
2.Either party is of unsound mind;
3.Consent of one party is obtained through fraud;
4.Consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence;
5.Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable;
Persons and Family Relations
6.Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease and appears
to be incurable.
1. NO PARENTAL CONSENT;
The law considers persons of the age of at least 18 years and below 21 years
as not possessing that degree of maturity to be able to comprehend thoroughly
the consequences and serious responsibilities of marital relations. Any
marriages contracted by persons of these ages are considered annullable at the
instance of the party whose parent, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority did not give his or her consent and of the parents, guardian
or person having substitute parental authority over the party in that order.
2. UNSOUND MIND
To successfully invoke unsoundness of mind as a ground for annulment, there
must be such a derangement of the mind to prevent the party from
comprehending the nature of the contract and from giving to it free and
intelligent consent.
Ordinarily, the mental incapacity must relate specifically to the contract of
marriage in order to affect it, and therefore any form of mental disease that does
not render the afflicted party incapable of understanding or assenting to the
marriage contract cannot be used as a basis for attacking the validity of the
marriage.
It is generally held that the burden of proof of insanity rests upon him who
alleges insanity, or seeks to avoid an act on account of it, and it devolves upon
him to establish the fact of insanity by a preponderance of evidence.
If however, a previous state of insanity is proved, the burden of proof is then
usually considered to shift to him who asserts that the act was done while the
person was sane, though it has been frequently held that insanity which is not
shown to be settled or general as contradistinguished from a mere temporary
aberration or hallucination will not be presumed to continue until the contrary is
shown. A lucid interval is in its nature temporary and uncertain in its duration,
and there is no legal presumption of its continuance.
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Lim vs. CA (G.R. No. 91114, September 25, 1992) & Suntay vs. Suntay-
Cojuangco (G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998)
The Supreme Court inferred that “schizophrenia” is considered “unsound mind”
and a ground for annulment of marriage.
Antonio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006)
The Supreme Court discussed the difference between mental incapacity, a
ground for annulment of marriage being a vice of consent , and psychological
incapacity, “a ground for nullity of marriage….novel in our body of laws,” which
does not affect the consent to the marriage
3. FRAUD;
Refers to non-disclosure or concealment of certain circumstances which
materially affects the essence of marriage. Hence, there is no fraud when there
is no concealment or there is disclosure.
THE FOLLOWING SHALL CONSTITUTE FRAUD:
1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by a final judgment of the other
party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature,
existing at the time of the marriage;
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality
or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.
Anaya vs. Palaroan (G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970)
Persons and Family Relations
The enumeration constituting fraud is exclusive and that non-disclosure of a
husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment.
Buccat vs. Buccat (G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941)
The advanced stage of pregnancy (seven months) of the woman at the time of
the marriage should have been obvious to a first year student of law.
Aquino vs. Delizo (G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960)
When a woman was only four months pregnant at the time of her marriage, her
pregnancy would not be readily apparent, especially since she was “naturally
plump” or fat and because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of
affairs.
Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by a final judgment of the other party of
a crime involving moral turpitude:
Moral turpitude includes everything which is contrary to justice, honesty, or good
morals. Generally, the crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code are
crimes involving moral turpitude.
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
The concealment must have been done in bad faith. Mere pregnancy
alone at the time of the marriage is not sufficient to successfully annul a
marriage on this ground. There must be concealment of such pregnancy by the
wife. However, if the woman did not expressly inform the man of her pregnancy
but such physical condition was readily apparent to the man, he cannot claim
lack of knowledge of such pregnancy. (Buccat vs. Buccat, 72 Phil. 19)
Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing
at the time of the marriage;
The nature of the gravity is irrelevant in order to invoke this ground. It is enough
that there was concealment of the sexually transmissible disease at the time of
the marriage ceremony to warrant annulment of such marriage on the ground
of fraud.
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Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or
lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage;
Habitual alcoholism have been defined as the persistent habit of becoming
intoxicated, and that the nature and extent of drunkenness must be such that
the person by frequent indulgence may be said to have a fixed and irresistible
habit of drunkenness, whereby he has lost the power or will to control his
appetite for intoxicating liquor, as where he indulges in the practice of
intoxicated whenever the temptation is presented and the opportunity offered.
Habitual drunkenness is a ground to sever the marriage relations not merely
because it disqualifies the party from attending to business, but in part, if not
mainly, because it renders him unfit for the duties of the marital relation and
disqualifies him from properly rearing and caring for the children born of the
marriage.
Concealment of drug addiction is another situation constituting fraud. The
deleterious and evil effects resulting from the continued and excessive use of
drugs, such as opium or morphine, are well known, and that they interfere as
much, to say the least, with the happiness of married life, and produce other
effects upon the marriage relation as deplorable, as those resulting from use of
intoxicating liqours.
Concealment of homosexuality and lesbianism. Homosexuality and lesbianism
indicate that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the most
basic elements of marriage which is the exlcusive sexual bond between
spouses.
Almelor vs. RTC-Las Pinas (G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008)
It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that
vitiates the consent of the innocent party.
4. VITIATED CONSENT;
It is not necessary that the coercion or force be such as a person of ordinary
physical and mental stability would be unable to resist, and that if either party is
mentally incapable of resisting the improper pressure applied, there is no
consent such as the law requires. Violence constituting duress may be physical
or moral – that is, it may consist of the coercion of the person continuing down
Persons and Family Relations
to the moment of the celebration of marriage, or of the coercion of the will by
antecedent threats of bodily harm. In the latter case, the person is forced to elect
between consenting to marry and exposure to the threatened evils.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of imminent and grave evil upon his person
or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or
ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of intimidation, the
age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
5. INCAPACITY TO CONSUMMATE;
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of one of
the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.
Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the
wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one
of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising
in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may also be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of
making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act. Al so, it
has been held that excessive sensibility, if medically and sufficiently proven on
the part of the wife, rendering sexual intercourse practically impossible on
account of the pain it must inflict, may be sufficient to show incapacity.
RULE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
This rule postulates that if the wife remains a virgin for at least 3 years from the
time that spouses started cohabiting, the husband must show that he was not
impotent during the said period and the burden will upon him to overcome the
presumption of impotence.
Alcazar vs. Alcazar (G.R. 174451, October 13, 2009)
Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity
to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to
perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a
marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused
by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may
be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
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psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where
such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically
incapable of performing the marriage act.
STERILITY
Sterility is not impotency. A sterile person can successfully engage in sexual
cotion. Sterility does not imply want of power for copulation. Hence, sterility is
not a ground for annulment.
6. SEXUALLY TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASE;
If the sexually transmissible disease were concealed at the time of the marriage
ceremony, it constitutes fraud. Sexually transmissible disease in cases of fraud
need not be incurable. If the sexually transmissible disease is not concealed, it
can still be a ground for annulment of marriage but, to successfully invoke this
ground, the sexually transmissible disease, unlike in the case of fraud must be
found to be serious and incurable.
If the venereal disease or sexually transmissible disease were obtained after
the marriage ceremony, it cannot be a ground for annulment. However, it can
be a ground for legal separation considering that generally, such disease is
communicated through sexual contact.
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999)
There can be no annulment of a marriage on the ground of disease under Article
46, par. 3, when the “gonorrhea” was transmitted 5 years after the marriage was
celebrated in 1981. The law would require the existence of this ground (fraud)
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
ARE ANNULLABLE MARRIAGES SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION?
HOW?
ANSWER: YES.
The following are instances of ratification of an annullable marriage:
a) In case of absent of parental consent. – No petition for annulment if after
attaining the age of 21, he or she freely cohabited with the other and lived
as husband and wife. However, if he or she were between 18 and 21 years of
age, even if he or she freely cohabited with the other, this will not constitute
Persons and Family Relations
ratification. It is only the free cohabitation after reaching the age of 21 that will
constitute ratification;
b) In case of insanity – If the contracting party with unsound mind, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife,
ratification has set in. Only the insane spouse can ratify by free
cohabitation. It must be noted that the sane spouse who knew of the insanity
of the other at the time of the marriage ceremony cannot ratify. Also
the subsequent cohabitation of a sane person, who had no knowledge of
the insanity of the other at the time of the marriage ceremony but who later
found out such insanity after the marriage ceremony, will not constitute
ratification and he or she can still file an action for annulment.
c) In case of fraud – If the injured party, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife, there is
likewise ratification;
d) In case of vitiated consent – If the injured party, after the disappearance
or cessation of the force, intimidation or undue influence, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife, there is also ratification.
NOTE: If the ground relied upon is either the incurable physical incapacity to
consummate the marriage by either party or the affliction of either party with an
incurable sexually transmissible disease, both existing at the time of the
marriage ceremony, the mere free cohabitation as husband and wife of the
parties will not ratify the annullable marriage.
Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006)
In adopting the appellate court ruling, the Supreme Court implied that “a span
of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious
steps to have the same marriage annulled results in prescription.
RULES ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES
AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
March 4, 2003)
Who may file?
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A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. [Sec. 2(a)]
What to allege? [Sec 2 (d)]
A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege the complete
facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriage
based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the
period herein indicated:
(1)The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising
substitute parental authority did not give his or her consent, within 5 years after
attaining the age of 21 unless, after attaining the age of 21, such party freely
cohabitated with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person
having legal charge of the contracting party, at any time before such party
has reached the age of 21;
(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any
relative, guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid
interval or after regaining sanity, provided that the petitioner , after
coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;
(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within 5 years after
the discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;
(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or
undue influence, within 5 years from the time the force intimidation, or undue
Persons and Family Relations
influence disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or
undue influence having disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such incapability continues
and appears to be incurable, within 5 years after the celebration of marriage;
and
(6) The injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within 5
years after the celebration of marriage.
Venue.
The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
Contents and form of petition
(a) Complete facts constituting the cause of action;
(b) Names and ages of the common children;
(c) Regime governing property relations;
(d) List of properties involved;
(e) Verified by client, with certificate against forum-shopping.
Service of Summons:
With leave of court
Publication once a week for two consecutive weeks;
Service by registered mail at last known address.
NOTE: No Motion to Dismiss is allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties.
Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court
shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between
the parties.
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Investigation report of public prosecutor.
(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the
finding of collusion within 10 days from receipt of a copy of a report The court
shall set the report for hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion,
it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
State at the pre-trial.
Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.
(a) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed
unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court
and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall
proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate
the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter
a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion
between the parties. If there Is no collusion, the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
Trial.
The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation
of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.
Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court.
Persons and Family Relations
(a) In case a party dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry
of judgment, the court shall order the case closed and terminated, without
prejudice to the settlement of the estate in proper proceedings in
the regular courts.
(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment,
the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest
in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage."
(a) The court shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was
celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is
located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are
located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or
sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment
entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.
LEGAL SEPARATION
What is LEGAL SEPARATION?
ANSWER: A decree of legal separation or relative divorce does not affect the
marital status, there being no severance of the vinculum. It does not dissolve
the marriage. A legal separation decree involves nothing more than bed-and-
board separation of the spouses. However, the decree is terminable at the will
of the parties by merely filing a manifestation in court, the marriage continuing
in regard to everything not necessarily withdrawn from its operation.
Espinosa vs. Omana (A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011)
Page 24 of 73
The extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void . A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extra-judicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership.
LEGAL SEPARATION
Grounds:
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct;
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel change of religion or political
affiliation;
3. Attempt to corrupt or induce the other spouse, a common child, or a child of
the other spouse, to engage in prostitution or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
4. Final judgment involving crime with a penalty of imprisonment of more
than 6 years;
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism;
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality;
7. Subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines or abroad;
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion;
9. Attempt to life of the other spouse;
10 Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
than 1 year.
The grounds may or may not exist at the time of the marriage ceremony. As a
general rule, they usually occur after the celebration of the marriage. No other
grounds can be invoked by any party other than those stated under the law.
1. REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE OR GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT;
Physical violence connotes the infliction of bodily harm. Although the physical
infliction must generally cause a certain degree of pain, the frequency of the act
and not the severity of the same is the determinative factor under this ground.
Indeed , the act may involve some form of violence although the same is not
that severe. However, it must be inflicted with bad faith and malice.
The frequency of physical violence inflicted upon the following;
a. petitioner;
Persons and Family Relations
b. a common child;
c. or a child of the petitioner
warrants a decree of legal separation.
This ground however does not include repeated physical violence upon the child
of the respondent or the guilty spouse. However, such repeated physical
violence may be a cause to suspend or terminate, depending on the severity of
the violence, the parental authority of the respondent upon his or her own minor
child with another person.
However, even if an act is not repeated or does not involve physical violence,
such act may nevertheless constitute grossly abusive conduct on the part of the
respondent which may warrant the issuance of a legal separation decree.
Grossly abusive conduct has no exact definition and therefore is determined on
a case to case basis. Hence, a singular but serious act of squeezing of neck,
pulling of hair and the like without the intent to kill may be included. Also, the
continued manifestation by one spouse of indifference or aversion to the other
coupled with persistent neglect of the duties incident to the marital relation has
been declared by American jurisprudence as cruelty enough to warrant a decree
of divorce. In the same vein, this may be an example of grossly abusive conduct
as a ground for legal separation.
Ong vs. Ong (G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006)
Repeated acts of physical violence are grounds for a legal separation.
2. COMPULSION BY PHYSICAL VIOLENCE OR MORAL PRESSURE TO
CHANGE RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS;
Physical violence or moral pressure are employed in order for the spouse to
change his / her political affiliation and / or religious conviction.
3. CORRUPTION OR INDUCEMENT TO ENGAGE IN PROSTITUTION;
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The immoral and corrupt act referred to is prostitution only. The inducement
likewise refers to prostitution only. It cannot be any other immoral or corrupt
act.
It must likewise be observed that a mere “attempt” is enough to be aground for
legal separation. It is not important that the respondent successfully corrupted
or induced the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner to engage
in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement.
The ground however, does not include as the subjects of such an “attempt” the
child of the respondent or the guilty of the spouse with another person
4. FINAL JUDGMENT INVOLVING A CRIME WITH A PENALTY OF MORE
THAN SIX YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT;
The offense for which the spouse is sentenced by final judgment of more than
six years of imprisonment need not necessarily be against the other spouse,
their common children or the petitioner’s children. The offense could have been
committed against anybody. This ground can be invoked even if the convicted
party has been validly pardoned.
5-6. DRUG ADDICTION, HABITUAL ALCOHOLISM, LESBIANISM AND
HOMOSEXUALITY;
The extent and nature of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism and
homosexuality as grounds for legal separation are the same as those in
annulment of cases. However, in annulment of cases, the drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism and homosexuality are instances of fraud which
must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. In legal separation, such
grounds can exist even after the marriage ceremony.
Campos vs. Campos (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012)
The fact that respondent got married and had children is not proof against his
claim of homosexuality. As pointed out by the investigating judge, it is possible
that respondent was only suppressing or hiding his true sexuality.
7. BIGAMY;
Persons and Family Relations
Bigamy is the act of illegally contracting a second marriage despite knowledge
that the first marriage is still valid and existing or without obtaining the needed
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the first spouse who was absent for
four or two consecutive years.
Whether the illegal subsequent marriage has been solemnized in the Philippines
or abroad is immaterial. So long as there has been a second bigamous
marriage, wherever celebrated, a legal separation decree may issue.
8. SEXUAL INFIDELITY OR PERVERSION;
Although adultery and concubinage are included in acts of sexual infidelity, other
acts of sexual infidelity short of adultery and concubinage are enough so long
as the said acts committed by one spouse would constitute a clear betrayal of
the trust of his or her spouse by having intimate love affairs with other persons.
Hence, even a husband’s single act of sexual intercourse with a woman other
than his wife may warrant the issuance of a decree of legal separation. This is
true even if the husband and the woman did not commit concubinage. This is
drastic departure from the requirements of the Civil Code where, in so far as the
husband is concerned, he must have committed concubinage which is done in
any of the following manner, to wit: (a) maintaining a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling; (b) sexual intercourse with another woman under scandalous
circumstances; and (c) cohabiting with her in any other place.
As to sexual perversion, this would include engaging in such behavior not only
with third persons but also with the spouse.
Gandionco vs. Penaranda (G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987)
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead
of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil
action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof, such as dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
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gains, custody of offspring, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse.
9. ATTEMPT TO LIFE;
A criminal attempt to kill a spouse is clearly an act of moral depravity which
warrants a decree of legal separation.
QUESTIONS:
1. Is criminal conviction necessary before the ground for Attempt to Life can
prosper?
2. A husband saw his wife having carnal knowledge with another man inside
their house and attempted to kill her but failed. Can this be a ground for legal
separation by the wife against the husband?
ANSWERS:
1. No previous criminal conviction is required for the legal separation case to
prosper. The criminal attempt can be proven by preponderance of evidence in
the civil case for legal separation.
2. An attempt on the life of the spouse must proceed from an evil design and
not from any justifiable cause like self-defense or from the fact that the spouse
caught another in flagrante delicto having carnal knowledge with another man
or woman.
10. UNJUSTIFIED ABANDONMENT;
The abandonment or desertion must be willful. The act is willful when there is a
design to forsake the other spouse intentionally, or without cause and, therefore,
break marital union; deliberate intent to cease living with the other spouse;
abnegation of all duties of the marriage relation, not to return. Mere severance
of the relation is not sufficient. There must be a wrongful intent to desert,
continued for the statutory period.
Persons and Family Relations
Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term abandonment, if
the husband or the wife , despite his or her voluntary departure from the society
of his or her spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal
partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife or her husband.
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF LEGAL SEPARATION;
1. The aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
2. The aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or the
act complained of;
3. Connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or the act
complained of;
4. Both parties have given ground for legal separation;
5. There is collusion between parties;
6. The action has prescribed. (Shall be filed within 5 years from the time of the
occurrence of the cause / ground).
1. CONDONATION;
Condonation is the act of forgiving the offense after its commission.
Does this mean that condonation precludes the aggrieved spouse from raising
the subsequent offense which is the same offense previously committed by the
offending spouse as a ground for legal separation?
ANSWER:
It has been held that condonation implies a condition of future good behavior by
the offending spouse. Condonation of the violation of the marital duties and
obligations being conditional on the future good conduct of the offending
spouse, subsequent offense on his or her part revokes or nullifies the
condonation and revives the original offense.
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People vs. Schneckenberger (G.R. No. L-48183, November 10, 1941) and
Matubis vs. Praxedes (G.R. No. -11766, October 25,1960)
There being condonation and / or consent in writing, no legal separation on the
ground of adultery or concubinage may be granted.
2. CONSENT;
There is consent when either of the spouses agreed to or did not object, despite
full knowledge, to the act giving rise to a ground for legal separation, before
such act was in fact committed. Hence, an agreement between the parties that
they agree to live separately from each other, and that they will not object to the
other’s act of sexual infidelity, adultery or concubinage has been declared by
the Supreme Court as void but, though void, is nevertheless an expression of
their clear consent to the commission of the offense.
People vs. Sensano (G.R. No. L-37720, March 27, 1933)
By his long absence, despite his knowledge of the adultery of his wife, a
husband is deemed to have consented to the adulterous relations of his wife
and is barred from instituting a case for adultery, since the sole purpose of filing
the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation.
Bugayong vs. Ginez (G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956)
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation.
3. CONNIVANCE
Connivance, or procurement, denotes direction, influence, personal exertion, or
other action with knowledge and belief that such action would produce certain
results and which results are produced. The basis of the defense of connivance
is the maxim “volenti non fit injuria” or that one is not legally injured if he has
consented to the act complained of or was willing that it should occur. It is also
said that the basis of the defense of connivance is a doctrine of unclean hand.
4. EQUAL GUILT
Persons and Family Relations
The reason for this rule lies in the equitable maxim that he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. Also, it is also a rule that, when two persons acted
in bad faith, they should be considered as having acted in good faith. They are
in pari delicto. Hence, the plaintiff-spouse cannot invoke the guilt of the other if
such plaintiff-spouse is guilty of giving grounds for legal separation.
5. COLLUSION;
Although collusion and connivance are closely related, it has been held that the
distinction between them is that collusion is a corrupt agreement, while
connivance is a corrupt consenting.
There would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties
had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds
therefore. (Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35)
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano (G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960)
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively and mainly on
defendant’s confession. Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the
agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear
to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial
offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling
the other to obtain a divorce.
6. PRESCRIPTION
An action for legal separation must be filed within 5 years from the occurrence
of the cause. After the lapse of the 5-year period, the legal separation case can
no longer be filed.
No legal separation may be decreed unless the court has taken steps toward
the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts , that
reconciliation is highly improbable. (Art. 59)
No decree of legal separation shall be based upon stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. (Art. 60)
A cooling-off period equivalent to 6 months from the date of the filing of the
petition is provided wherein no hearing on the merits within the said period.
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The court in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community
or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall
have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian.
EFFECTS OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION;
1. Spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bond shall not be severed;
2. The absolute community or conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the
net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership;
3. The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent
spouse subject to the provisions of Art. 213 of the FC;
4. The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the
innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the
offending spouse in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by
operation of law.
Laperal vs. Republic (G.R. No. L-18008, October 30, 1962)
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal
separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname
before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected
by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the
policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her
unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio (G.R. No. L-30977, January 31,1972)
An action for legal separation, which involves nothing more than the bed and
board separation of the spouses, is purely personal. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death
of the action itself: actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Persons and Family Relations
If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath
duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal
separation. (Art. 65 of FC)
EFFECTS OF RECONCILIATION:
1.The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall be terminated in
whatever stage;
2. The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation
of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected
shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property
regime.
RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION
(Supreme Court En Banc Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, March 4, 2003)
Who may and when to file.
A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as
the case may be within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the
causes enumerated.
Venue.
The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing "or in The case of a non-resident respondent, where he may
be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however,
that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised
as an affirmative defense in an answer.
The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from receipt of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of
service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by respondent
himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him in default.
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Where no answer is filed/or if the answer does not tender an issue the court
shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between
the parties.
Within one month after receipt of the court order, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court on whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies on the parties and their respective counsels.
Participation of a Social Worker.
The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and to submit
the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may
also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary,
Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial.
(1) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed
unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court
and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.
(2) If the respondent filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed
with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-
appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days a report to
the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion between
the parties/ If there is no collusion the court shall require the public prosecutor
to intervene for the State during the trial on the.merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence.
Prohibited compromise.
The court shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the
following:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; and
Persons and Family Relations
(6) Future legitime.
Trial.
(a) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(b) The grounds for legal separation must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed.
(c) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons,
including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the
case. Such an order may be made if the court determines on the record
othat requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the
ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability
to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity;
would violate the party's right to privacy; or would be offensive to decency
(d) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the
case or parts thereof be made by any person other than a party or
counsel of a party, except by order of the court.
If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that
the Decree of Legal Separation shall be issued by the court only after full
compliance with liquidation under the Family Code.
However, in the absence of any property of the parties, the court shall forthwith
issue a Decree of Legal Separation which shall be registered in the Civil
Registry where the marriage was recorded and in the Civil Registry where the
Family Court granting the legal separation is located
Registration and publication of the Decree of Legal Separation; decree as best
evidence.
(a) Registration of decree.-The prevailing party shall cause the registration of
the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, in the
Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National
Census and Statistics Office. He shall report to the court compliance with
this requirement within thirty days iron receipt of the copy of the Decree.
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(b) Publication of decree.-- In case service of summons was made by
publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in
a newspaper of general circulation.
(c) Best evidence.-The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to
prove the legal separation of the parties and shall serve as notice to third
persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent.
Petition for revocation of donations.
(a) Within five (5) years from the date the decision granting the
petition for legal separation has become final, the innocent
spouse may file a petition under oath the same proceeding for legal
separation to revoke the donations in favor of the offending spouse.
(b) The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the
Register of Deeds of Deeds in the places where the properties are
located.
(c) Alienations, liens, and encumbrances registered in good faith. before
the recording of the petition for revocation in the registries of property
shall be respected.
(d) After the issuance of the Decree of Legal Separation, the
innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the offending
spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation or
change shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the
insurer.
Decree of Reconciliation.
(a) If the spouses had reconciled, a joint manifestation under oath, duly
signed by the spouses, may be filed in the same proceeding for legal
separation.
(b) If the reconciliation occurred while the proceeding for legal separation is
pending, the court shall immediately issue an order terminating the
proceeding.
(c) If the reconciliation occurred after the rendition of the judgment granting the
petition for legal separation but before the issuance of the Decree, the spouses
Persons and Family Relations
shall express in their manifestation whether or not they agree to revive the
former regime of their property relations or choose a new regime.
The court shall immediately issue a Decree of Reconciliation declaring that the
legal separation proceeding is set aside and specifying the regime of property
relations under which the spouses shall be covered.
(d) If the spouses reconciled after the issuance of the Decree, the court, upon
proper motion, shall issue a decree of reconciliation declaring therein that the
Decree is set aside but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the
share of the guilty spouse already effected subsists, unless the spouses have
agreed to revive their former regime of property relations or adopt a new
regime.
(e) In case of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d). if the reconciled spouses
choose to adopt a regime of property relations different from that which they
had prior to the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses
shall comply with the requirements for the revival of property.
(f) The decree of reconciliation shall be recorded in the Civil Registries
where the marriage and the Decree had been registered.
Revival of property regime or adoption of another.
(a) In case of reconciliation, the parties shall file a verified motion for revival of
regime of property relations or the adoption of another regime of property
relations in the same proceeding for legal separation attaching to said motion
their agreement for the approval of the court.
(b) The agreement which shall be verified shall specify the following:
(1) The properties to be contributed to the restored or new regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses, and the amounts
owing to each.
(c) The creditors shall be furnished with copies of the motion and the agreement.
(d) The court shall require the spouses to cause the publication of their verified
motion for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
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(e) After due hearing, and the court decides to grant the motion, it shall issue an
order directing the parties to record the order in the proper registries of property
within thirty days from receipt of a copy of the order and submit proof of
compliance within the same period.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Personal obligations of spouses to each other:
1. To live together;
2. To observe mutual love, respect and fidelity;
3. To render mutual help and support.
SSS vs. De Los Santos (G.R. No. 164790, August 29, 2008)
Although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, she is still
disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SSS Law if she fails to fulfill
the requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto
from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the
husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be
safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it
is shown that she is capable of providing for herself
SSS vs. Favila (G.R. No. 170195, March 28, 2011)
A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary
under the Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1)
that he/she is the legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the
member for support.
Who shall fix the family domicile?
ANS. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile and in case of
disagreement the court shall decide.
Persons and Family Relations
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.
Spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family.Expenses for
support shall be taken from the following;
1. Community property;
2. Income or fruits of separate property;
3. Separate property.
Source of payment are made in the aforementioned order.
Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid,
serious and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1) The objection is proper, and
2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter, If the
benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. (Art.
73)
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by the
following;
1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
2) By the provisions of this Code; and
3) By the local customs.
Matrimonial property Regime which may be agreed upon by parties before
marriage;
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1) Absolute Community;
2) Conjugal Partnership of Gains;
3) Complete Separation of property;
4) Any other regime as may be agreed upon by parties.
Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012)
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets
are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights
in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend
to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property
relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting
only those with prenuptial agreements.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage
between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified
except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a)
the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated
upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated
reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial
separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the
other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d)
there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses
jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in the case
of Efren and Melecia.
THE MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
A Marriage settlement or a pre-nuptial agreement, is an agreement executed by
the future husband and wife concerning their future property relations.
Requisites of Marriage Settlements or any modifications thereof;
Persons and Family Relations
1) Must be in writing and signed by the parties;
2) Must be executed before the celebration of marriage;
3) Shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local
civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper
registries of property;
4) It must not be contrary to law and public policy and is within the limits provided
in the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, the requirement that an ante-nuptial agreement must
be in writing is mandatory not only for purpose of enforceability but, more
importantly, for its validity. An oral marriage settlement, therefore is void and
cannot be ratified by any claim of partial execution or absence of objection.
Can parties stipulate in the pre-nuptial agreement as to the date of effectivity of
their property regime, whether conjugal partnership of gains or absolute
community of property?
ANSWER:
NO, parties cannot stipulate that the conjugal partnership of gains or absolute
community of property will start at a time other than the precise moment of the
celebration of marriage because such agreement is void under Articles 88
(Absolute Community of Property) and Art. 107 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains).
The arrangement, as agreed upon by the parties, may stipulate that the conjugal
partnership of gains, the complete separation of property or any other regime
shall govern the marital property relationship. If there is no marriage settlement
agreed upon or if the same is void, then the absolute community property will
prevail.
In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property
relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence;
EXCEPTIONS:
1) Where both spouses are aliens;
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2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not
situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is
located; and
3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into the Philippines
but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different
formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Everything stipulated in the settlements or contract referred to in the preceding
articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the
prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does
not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration
of the marriage shall be valid. (Art. 81 of the FC)
DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS
Also known as Donation by reason of marriage or those which are made before
its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the
future spouses.
Excluded:
1) Made in favor of the spouses after the celebration of marriage;
2) Executed in favor of the future spouses but not in consideration of
marriage; and
3) Granted to persons other than the spouses even though they may be
founded on the marriage.
Giving a donation propter nuptias to a would-be spouse prior to the marriage is
useless if the property regime that will govern their marriage is the absolute
community of property. This is so because generally, in an absolute community
of property, the spouses become co-owners of whatever each of them owns
before the marriage and whatever each of them acquires after the marriage.
Thus, if one would-be spouses wants to validly make a donation propter nuptias,
the following requisites must concur:
1) There must be a valid marriage settlement;
Persons and Family Relations
2) The marriage settlement must stipulate a property regime other than the
absolute community of property;
3) The donation contained in the marriage settlement must not be more
than one-fifth of his or her present property;
4) The donation must be accepted by the would-be spouse;
5) It must comply with the requisites established in Title III of Book III of the
Civil Code on donations.
DONATION WITH ENCUMBRANCE
If the object of the donation is subject of an encumbrance, the donation is still
valid. However, the donee’s rights are subject to the encumbrance. Hence, if
the object of the donation has been foreclosed to answer for the unpaid debt of
the donor, the donee shall not be liable for any deficiency in the event the
amount obtained as a result of the foreclosure is less than the amount of the
debt of the donor which was supposed to be satisfied by the foreclosure.
However, if the property is sold and the resulting money obtained is more than
the amount of the liability of the donor, the excess shall properly go to the donee.
Grounds for the Revocation of Donation Propter Nuptias by the DONOR:
1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio;
2) Marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian,
as required by law;
3) Marriage is annulled and the donee acted in bad faith;
4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as
specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in
general.
1) MARRIAGE NOT CELEBRATED
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In the event the marriage is not celebrated, the donor has the option to revoke
or maintain the donation. If, however, the donation propter nuptias is contained
in a marriage settlement executed prior to the marriage and the marriage
ceremony does not take place, such donation shall be considered void. If the
donation is void as it is contained in a marriage settlement, the period within
which to declare the donation void does not prescribed.
MARRIAGE JUDICIALLY DECLARED VOID
The mere fact that a marriage is provided by law as void is not enough for the
donor to have the right to revoke the donation. There must first be a judicial
declaration that the marriage is void.
Exceptions:
a. A subsequent marriage contracted buy a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void, the donation shall be revoked by
operation of law if the donee- spouse contracted the subsequent void
marriage in bad faith;
b. In case there is bad faith in the part of both of the contracting parties in a
subsequent marriage where one of them previously obtained a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to be able to remarry. Article 44 of the FC
provides that such subsequent marriage is void and all donations by reason of
such marriage shall be revoked by operation of law;
c. In all other cases where marriage has been judicially declared void on
grounds other than Article 40 in relation to Arts. 52 & 53 and under Art. 44. In
this case good faith or bad faith of the donee is irrelevant. The donor, after
finality of judicial declaration of nullity of marriage, shall have the option to
revoke or not to revoke the donation, whether or not the donee is in bad faith in
pursuant to Art. 86 (1);
d. Donation propter nuptias made in a bigamous marriage or a marriage of
parties who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
e.If a subsequent marriage was contracted by a man and a woman without
complying with the mandatory recording and distribution requirements under
Art. 52, believing in good faith that the marriage is valid as they have
respectively procured their nullity decrees from their separate
former spouses, the subsequent marriage will still be void and can be
judicially declared as such. However, upon the finality of the judicial
Persons and Family Relations
declaration of nullity, any donation propter nuptias given by one party to another
may or may not be revoked by the donor as both of them were in good faith in
contracting the marriage.
2. NO CONSENT OF PARENTS OR GUARDIAN
The FC requires that contracting parties 18 years old and above but below 21
years must obtain the consent of the parents, guardians or persons having
substitute parental authority before getting married. If the consent of the said
persons is not obtained, the marriage becomes annullable and the donation
propter nuptias may be revoked by the donor. This does not require that the
marriage must first be annulled before the donor may revoke the donation.
3. ANNULLED MARRIAGE AND DONEE ACTED IN BAD FAITH
The particular spouse who acted in bad faith in procuring the marriage,
therefore, should not be allowed to profit or gain, by any means whatsoever,
from his act of bad faith which precipitated such an annullable marriage
considered by society itself as inimical to it very own interest. Thus, it is more in
keeping with the spirit of the law to considered any donation propter nuptias as
revoked by operation of law where the marriage is annulled and the donee acted
in bad faith. Such ipso jure revocation would be consistent with the fact that,
had the innocent party known of the guilty party’s bad faith prior to or even at
the time of the marriage ceremony, he or she would not have entered into such
an annullable marriage or would not, in the first place, have even made such
donation.
4. LEGAL SEPARATION
A legal separation decree does not terminate the marital bond between the
husband and wife. Since there is a probability that the spouses may reconcile,
the donor is given the option to revoke the donation or maintain it. However,, if
the ground for legal separation is sexual infidelity in the form of adultery on the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, the donation between
persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation
shall be void.
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5. RESOLUTORY CONDITION
The happening of the future or uncertain even which constitutes the resolutory
condition operates to extinguish the right or the obligation. If the donor decies
to revoke the donation, the said donor must do so within 5 years from the
happening of the resolutory condition as it is only from that time that the right of
action accrues. If the donation is validly made by one spouse in favor of the
other spouse and the resolutory condition happens the donor-spouse can
recover what is donated anytime without any prescriptive period.
6. ACTS OF INGRATITUDE
Acts of ingratitude under Art. 765 of the Civil Code:
a) Donee should commit some offense against the person, honor or
property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental
authority;
b) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act
involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless
the crime or the act has been committed against the donee
himself, his wife or children under his authority;
c) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound
to give support to the donor.
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouse may give to each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage. (Art. 87 FC)
Ching vs. Goyanko Jr. (G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006)
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage. Otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out
better than those in legal union. Article 2012 of the NCC provides that any
person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot
be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make
any donation to him according to said article.
Arcaba vs. Vda. De Batocael (G.R. No. 146683, November 22,2001)
Persons and Family Relations
The term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely
spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has
considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations
between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of legitimate
children.
Consequently, the donation made by the patient to his caregiver is void,
pursuant to Art. 87 of the FC.
SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
All properties owned by the contracting parties before the marriage ceremony
and those which they may acquire thereafter shall comprise the absolute
community of property regime. Also, in a partial separation of property regime,
the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute
community of property. The spouses become co-owners of all the properties in
an absolute community of property regime. However, no waiver of rights,
interests, shares and effects of the absolute community of property can be made
except upon judicial separation of property.
The absolute community of property commences at the precise moment of the
celebration of the marriage. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void.
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PROPERTIES EXCLUDED FROM THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY:
1. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse,
and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is
expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of
the community property;
2. Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However,
jewelry shall form part of the community property;
3. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any
of such property;
4. Properties that are excluded in the marriage settlement entered into by the
contracting parties prior to the marriage ceremony.
1. GRATUITOUS TITLE
It must be a valid gratuitous acquisition during the marriage. Hence, a donation
by a spouse made to the other spouse involving substantial amount of separate
properties, which, in the marriage settlement, has been agreed upon as not to
be included in the community property, is not a valid transfer by gratuitous title
because any donation between spouses, direct or indirect, is void except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of family
rejoicing.
2. PERSONAL AND EXCLUSIVE USE
These personal and exclusive properties may either have been brought inside
the marriage or were acquired during the marriage. The only exception is jewelry
which must involve a substantial amount. This exception highlights the fact that
the property for personal and exclusive use referred to in the general rule must
be interpreted in terms of value.
3. PROPERTY FROM PREVIOUS MARRIAGE
Persons and Family Relations
It must be noted that the law uses the word “descendants”, not merely children.
Hence, it would include grandchildren, great-grandchildren and all other
descendants. Likewise, the descendants must be legitimate. In this case, the
property acquired by the spouse who has children of a previous marriage shall
not belong to the absolute community of the subsequent marriage. The property
shall belong to the spouse who had legitimate children by a previous marriage
or it shall already belong to the children of the previous marriage as presumptive
legitime in the proper cases.
Abrenica vs. Abrenica (G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012)
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992
and 1997, as well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part
of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code
excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage;
and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles
nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
4. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
This is in accordance with Article 1 of the FC, which pertinently provides that
“marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by this Code.”
Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community,
unless it I proved that it is one of those excluded. (Art. 93)
CHARGES UPON AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
1. Support of the spouses, their common children and legitimate children of
either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by
the provisions on support;
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2. All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by
both spouses or by one spouse with the consent of the other;
3. Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have been benefitted;
4. All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs,
upon the community;
5. All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon
the separate property of either spouse used by the family;
6. Expenses to enable spouse to commence or complete a professional or
vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement;
7. Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
8.The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing
or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement;
9.Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under par. 7,
the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the
share of the debtor spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
10.Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be
groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except
those falling under par. 9, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate property.
Persons and Family Relations
1. SUPPORT
Support comprises of everything indispensable for the sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be
supported shall include his or her schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, and to and from the place of work.
Support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of Support
under the FC. The support of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the
separate property of the parent-spouse. In this regard, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the parent of the illegitimate children,
the absolute community property shall pay such support but the payments shall
be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the parent
concerned upon liquidation of the community.
2-3. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
If the administration of the property has been delegated to any one of the
spouses and he or she, as the administrator contracted a debt or obligation for
the benefit of the family, the absolute community of property shall be liable for
the same. The consent of the other spouse is not needed in incurring the
obligation. However, there must be proof to show that the obligation incurred by
the designated administrator redounded to the benefit of the family.
Even if the debt or obligation were not for the benefit of the community, the
absolute community of property shall be liable if such debt or obligation were
contracted during the marriage by both spouses or by anyone of them with the
consent of the other. Consent may be express or implied.
4. TAXES, LIENS, CHARGES & REPAIRS
All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon
the community property shall be chargeable to the absolute community of
property. This can be done even without the consent of the other spouse
following the general rules on co-ownership.
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5. TAXES, EXPENSES FOR PRESERVATION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
The accountability of the absolute community of property for expenditures
incurred for purposes of preservation of the separate property of any of the
spouses is premised on the fact that such separate property has been used or
is being used by the family during the marriage.
6. EXPENSES OR DONATION FOR SELF-IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITIES
Essentially, expenses given to either spouse for education and training are
within the ambit of support for which the absolute community of property is
likewise liable. Likewise, the law provides that the value of what is donated or
promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the
exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
course or other activity for self-improvement shall be chargeable to the absolute
community of property. The donation must be made by both spouses. If only
one of the spouse donate, this may fall under the prohibition making donation
between spouses, direct or indirect void. Except for moderate gifts which
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
9. LIABILITIES BY REASON OF A CRIME OR QUASI-DELICT
The absolute community property shall not be liable to pay the obligation or debt
arising from crime or quasi-delict of a particular spouse. The separate property
of the erring spouse shall be liable. However, in case of absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the absolute community of
property shall pay but such payments shall be considered as advances to be
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the
community.
10. EXPENSES OF LITIGATION
Persons and Family Relations
Provided, that the suit is between the husband and wife and that the case is not
groundless, the absolute community of property may be liable for the expenses
of litigation. The absolute community of property may be liable for expenses of
litigation is a suit not involving a case between husband and wife for as long as
the suit benefits the family.
Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting,
sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by
law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but
the winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. (Art. 95 of the
FC)
JOINT ADMINISTRATION AND ENJOYMENT
GENERAL RULE:
Administration and enjoyment belongs to both spouses.
EXCEPTION:
In case of disagreement, the husband will prevail subject to the recourse to the
court by the wife for the proper remedy. (Prescriptive period is 5 years from the
date of the contract implementing the husband’s decision.)
In cases of one spouse is incapacitated or unable to participate:
1. other spouse may assume sole powers of administration;
2. powers of disposition or encumbrance needs;
2.a. Written consent of the other spouse;
2.b. Authority from the court.
Joint management or administration does not require that the husband and the
wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.
Thus, while as a general rule the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in a petition or complaint filed in court must be signed by all the
petitioners in a case, the signature of the husband or wife alone is substantial
compliance with this requirement in cases involving community or conjugal
property, even if both parties are petitioners in the case.
Dar vs. Alonzo-Legasto (G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000)
Page 39 of 73
Here, the petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and Mrs. over a property in
which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of
them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of
non-forum shopping.
This is because with respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader
may prepare, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. While
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requires that the rule pertaining to the said
certification be strictly complied with, it merely underscores its mandatory nature
in that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded, but it does not thereby prevent substantial compliance on this
aspect
of its provisions under justifiable circumstances. Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should be interpreted with such absolute literalness
as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
DISPOSITION BY WILL
Considering that an absolute community of property is a co-ownership, the
spouse can only dispose his or her interest in the community property and not
in a specific property.
Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the
other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make
moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of
family rejoicing or family distress. (Art. 98 FC)
Whether a donation is moderate or not depends upon the financial situation of
the spouses and the absolute community of property regime.
DISSOLUTION OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY REGIME:
1. Upon the death of either spouse;
2. When there is a decree of legal separation;
3. When the marriage is annulled or declared void;
Persons and Family Relations
4. In case of judicial separation of property.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Judicial separation of property may be voluntary or involuntary. If it is voluntary,
the parties can file the agreement for separation of property in court to obtain
the necessary court approval. After approval the parties can nevertheless file a
revival of their property regime but once revived, no voluntary separation of
property may thereafter be granted. If the separation of property is involuntary,
it must be for a sufficient cause and must likewise have court approval.
Sufficient Cause for Judicial Separation of Property;
a. Spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
b. Spouse judicially declared an absentee;
c. Loss of parental authority thru the court;
d. Abandonment by one spouse;
e.Spouse abused the power of administration under the marriage
settlements;
f. Spouses have been separated in fact for at least 1 year.
EFFECT OF SEPARATION IN FACT:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein,
without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;
3. In the absence or sufficient community property, the separate property of
both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The
spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be
given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific
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separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
1. SUPPORT
In this case fault must always be proven. The mere fact of separating from the
conjugal roof, which cannot be presumed culpable, when there is no evidence
of any fault or guilt on the part of the one who so separates, does not constitute
a reason of annulling the right of support.
2. COURT AUTHORIZATION
Any of the spouses, whether or not he or she was the one who left the conjugal
home without a valid cause, can seek judicial relief. Hence, if for example, a
spouse who left in bad faith and without valid cause needs money in order to
have funds to pay the school matriculation fees of a common child for the latter’s
education and the only way to have money is to sell a car which belongs to the
absolute community of property , such spouse can seek judicial authorization if
the innocent spouse does not want to give his or her consent to the sale or such
consent cannot be obtained.
3. SOLIDARY LIABILITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
It must be noted that only the present spouse is given standing by the law to file
a petition. The authority granted to the present spouse, however, is limited to
only one purpose, namely: to enable the present spouse to satisfy the other
spouse’s share in the obligations used to support the family which should be
totally paid by the absolute community of property had it not been for its
insufficiency.
REMEDIES of the present spouse in case of abandonment by the other spouse:
1. Petition the court for receivership;
2. Judicial separation of property;
3. Authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
Persons and Family Relations
The obligations to the family refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without the intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
dwelling for a period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to give
any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to
have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to
financial and moral desertion.
PROCEDURE UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
REGIME:
1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of
the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse;
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of
its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties;
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them;
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall
constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in the FC. For purpose of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution;
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition;
6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties,
the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to
the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
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Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such
majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of
said children.
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six
months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage. (Art. 103 FC)
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
The husband and the wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of the marriage
or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses
shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage
settlements.
De la Pena vs. Avila [ G.R. No. February 8, 2012 (665 SCRA 553)]
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who
invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing
as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
Persons and Family Relations
convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses.
Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peñas
insist that the registration thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela Peña, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" should have already
sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the same issue in
the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, (401 SCRA 410, 2003) this Court ruled,
however, that the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered
owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife
while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would
registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired
during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.
"Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired,
the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature
as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."
Should the spouses agree upon the conjugal partnership of gains, its application
shall commence at the precise moment when the marriage ceremony is
celebrated.
As in the case of the absolute community regime, no waiver of rights, interests,
shares and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains can be made during the
marriage except upon judicial separation of property.
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF EACH SPOUSE:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange
with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
(1) PROPERTIES BROUGHT INTO MARRIAGE
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All properties brought into marriage by the contracting parties belong to each of
them exclusively. The partnership does not produce the merger of the properties
of each spouse. Hence they can exercise all rights of dominion or of ownership
over these exclusive properties. The said properties cannot be encumbered,
alienated nor disposed of by the other spouse without the consent of the owner
spouse. The nature of the property as separate property shall remain unless the
contrary is proved by positive and convincing evidence.
Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals (No. L-25788, April 30, 1980)
Estoppel is effective even on successors in interest. Moreover, when
the question is exclusively between husband and wife, or between one of them
and the heirs of the other, the admission or acknowledgment of one spouse that
the money used to purchase the property came from the other spouse, is
evidence against the party making the admission or his heirs. Likewise, where
the husband has been a party to an act of purchase of immovable property in
the name of his wife, which recited that the purchase was made with
paraphernal funds, and that the property was to be and remain paraphernal
property, neither he nor his heirs can be permitted to go behind the deed and
contest the wife's title to the property by claiming that it is conjugal. Since the
property is the paraphernal property of Isidra, the same having been acquired
by her prior to her marriage with Agripino and having been purchased with her
exclusive or private funds any declaration to the contrary made by her, as well
as that of her child, cannot prevail nor change the character of the property in
question.
CASE: Plata vs. Yatco [G.R. No. L-20825, December 28, 1964, (120Phil. 1515)]
In the event that the property was purchased by a spouse previous to the
marriage and it was only after the marriage that the said property was registered
under the name of the owner-spouse but together with the other spouse as co-
owner, such property is still the exclusive property of the spouse who bought it
by his or her exclusive funds prior to the marriage and the registration after the
marriage of the certificate of title under co-ownership of the spouses to both
spouse creates a trust, thereby necessitating the restoration to the real owner-
spouse of the subject property upon liquidation.
Persons and Family Relations
2) PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY GRATUITOUS TITLE
Anything received by each spouse from any source by way of an act of liberality
of the giver, such as a donation or a gift, shall belong exclusively to the spouse-
recipient and will not belong to the conjugal partnership property. It must be
observed that, in the conjugal partnership property regime, the income and the
fruits of the property acquired by gratuitous title shall be considered conjugal.
3) REDEMPTION, BARTER AND EXCHANGE
In case of redemption, the property shall belong to the spouse who has the right
to redeem regardless of whether or not he or she uses personal funds. However,
when the conjugal funds are used to effect the redemption, the spouse making
the redemption through conjugal funds shall be liable to the conjugal partnership
for the reimbursement of the amount used to redeem his or her exclusive
property.
Similarly, property acquired by exchange made by one spouse using his or her
exclusive property shall remain the separate property of such spouse. However,
if the separate property of a spouse is used as part of the purchased price of a
new property in addition to the conjugal funds spent for the said purchase, the
new property shall be considered conjugal.
CASE: Abella de Diaz vs. Erlander S. Galinger Inc. [G.R. No. L-38052,
December 23, 1933, (59 Phil. 326)]
While it may be true that at the time of their marriage, the wife had an
automobile, that automobile has long since passed out of existence, and the
mere fact that each successive car was turned in as part of the purchase price
of a new car, would not make every automobile in the future paraphernal, but
on the contrary, it becomes conjugal and responsible for the debts of the
partnership.
4) PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH THE EXLCUSIVE MONEY OF EITHER
SPOUSE
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Property purchased using the exclusive money of one spouse shall belong to
such spouse. However, when property is purchased using the exclusive money
of one spouse but the title is taken in the spouses’ joint names, the
circumstances shall determine whether it shall result in a gift from the spouse
whose money was used to effect the purchase, or a trust in favor of such
spouse.
ADMINISTRATION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES
Administration shall include entering into contracts regarding the use of the
property, engaging in litigation, and the collection of fruits, profits, and income
arising from the separate property. The owner-spouse may, during the marriage,
transfer the administration of his or her property to the other spouse provided
the proper recording in the civil registry is made. Even when there is a transfer
of administration, the owner-spouse may still donate, encumber, or otherwise
alienate the property. he or she may also transfer administration to a stranger,
even without the sonsent of the other spouse.
PROPERTY DONATED OR LEFT BY WILL TO SPOUSES
A donor or testator may donate or provide in a will property to the spouses
jointly. The donor or testator may likewise designate the respective determinate
share of each of the spouses and , in the absence thereof, share and share
alike. The property of the donation will then be considered separate property of
the spouses.
ACCRETION IN CASE OF DONATION
Accretion is the incorporation or addition of property to another property. As a
general rule in a joint donation, one could not accept independently of his co-
donee, for there is no right of accretion unless expressly so provided. One of
the exception is when the joint donation is in favor of the husband and wife.
Thus, is a valid donation has been given to the husband and wife jointly where
the donor provided that ¼ of the property will go the wife and ¾ will go to the
husband, each of them shall onw such portions given as their respective
separate properties. However, if the wife does not accept her part of the
Persons and Family Relations
donation, accretion will set in favor of the husband. In this case the ¼ donation
that should go to the wife will go to the husband.
ACCRETION IN CASE OF PROPERTY LEFT BY WILL
In case the property is left by will and for accretion to apply, it shall be necessary
that the husband and wife should be called to the same inheritance, or the same
portion thereof, pro indiviso; and that one of the spouses thus called dies before
the testator or renounces the inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it.
NATURE OF PENSIONS, ANNUITIES & GRATUITIES
Generally a gratuity is an act of pure liberality. It is acquired by lucrative title like
a donation or a gift.
An annuity is not a gratuity if the recipient thereof is entitled to it as a matter of
right.
Pensions are in the nature of compensation for services previously rendered for
which full and adequate compensation was not received at the time of the
rendition of the service.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses,
is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (Art. 116)
Sps. Castro vs. Miat (G.R. No. 143297, February 11,2003)
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require
proof that the property has been acquired with funds of the partnership. The
presumption applies even when the manner in which the property has been
acquired does not appear.
Jocson vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989) & Spouses
Estonia vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111547, January 27, 1997)
To be able to validly invoke the presumption of conjugality, proof must be
presented that the dispute properties were acquired during the marriage.
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Go vs. Yamane (G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006)
The nature of a property – whether conjugal or paraphernal – is determined by
law and not by the will of one of the spouses. Thus, no unilateral declaration by
one spouse can change the character of a conjugal property.
Dimayuga-Laurena vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 159220, September
22,2008)
A transfer of a property by the husband’s parents, which was merely an
accommodation so that husband petitioner could acquire loan for a special rate
and then use the property as collateral, does not form part of the CPG.
THE FOLLOWING SHALL CONSTITUTE AS PART OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP PPROPERTIES.
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage
from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property
of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to
the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the
number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or
betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-
spouse.
(1) ACQUISITION BY ONEROUS TITLE FROM COMMON FUND
Persons and Family Relations
Properties which are acquired with money or funds of the conjugal partnership
belongs thereto or forms part thereof. This is true even if the acquisition be for
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses.
Zulueta vs. Pan-American World Airways, Inc. (G.R. No. L-28589, January 8,
1973)
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach
of plaintiffs contract of carriage with the defendant, for which the plaintiffs have
paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, said
damages fall under the classification of conjugal property that has been
acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
(2 & 5) PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH INDUSTRY, LABOR AND
PROFESSION AND TRHOUGH OCCUPATION.
The law also provides that anything obtained from the labor, industry, work and
profession of either or both of the spouses is conjugal. It likewise provides that
those acquired through occupation. It likewise provides that those acquired
through occupation such as fishing or hunting are conjugal.
(3) FRUITS AND EARNING FROM PROPERTIES
Fruits of the common property and net fruits of the exclusive property belong to
the conjugal partnership. “Net fruits” are referred to because the fruits of the
separate property will be applied first to the expenses of administration of the
separate property and the remaining balance of the said fruits which constitute
the net fruits shall be considered conjugal.
4) HIDDEN TREASURE
The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the
finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found is conjugal
partnership property. Hidden treasure contemplates artifacts or objects which
have undergone transformation from their original raw state such as earrings,
necklace, bracelets and the like.
(6) LIVESTOCK
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Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the
number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse shall be conjugal.
(7) CHANCE
Those obtained through chance are considered conjugal. Losses from gambling
or betting shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
INSTALLMENT PURCHASES
When property is bought on installment basis partly by exclusive funds of either
or both spouses and partly by conjugal funds, the ownership of the property is
determined by the time when the title is vested. If ownership is vested before
the marriage, it belongs to the class of properties exempted from the conjugal
partnership as property brought to the marriage by the spouses. If, however,
ownership is vested upon the buyer-spouse after the marriage ceremony, it shall
form part of the conjugal partnership. In this instance, the spouse who
contracted the purchase shall have the right to be reimbursed by the
partnership.
Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of
the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial
payments or by installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of
the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal
shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (Art. 119)
Munoz Jr. vs. Ramirez (G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010)
Article 120 of the FC, which supersedes Art. 158 of the NCC, provides for the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the
separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost
of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value
of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of
the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement.
Persons and Family Relations
Otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through
the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal
partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of
the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall
be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. (Art. 120)
CHARGES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP (ART.
121 of FC)
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be
governed by the provisions of the FC on Support;
(2)All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains,
or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs
upon the conjugal partnership property;
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(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional,
vocational, or other activity for self- improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing
or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.
The conjugal partnership is liable for the personal debts, fines and indemnities
of either spouse only after payment of all the liabilities of the conjugal
partnership as enumerated under Art. 121 of the FC and when the separate
property of the spouse is insufficient.
Personal obligations of either of the spouses incurred during the marriage which
do not redound to the benefit of the family or do not have the consent of the
other spouse shall be borne only by the spouse-debtor and his or her separate
property.
Francisco vs. Gonzales (G.R. No. 177667, September 17, 2008)
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when;
a. She purchases things necessary for the support of the family;
b. She borrows money for that purpose upon her husband’s failure to deliver the
needed sum;
c. Administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts or by the husband; and
d. She gives moderate donations for charity.
Persons and Family Relations
Buado vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009)
Article 122 of the FC explicitily provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouses by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the ACP, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains
(CPG). The CPG has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Mariano vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-51283, June 7, 1989)
The husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against the wife. Considering that the wife had
engaged in business with her husband’s consent, and the income derived
therefrom had been expended , in part at least, for the support of her family, the
liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife’s obligations in the
premises cannot be disputed.
Ong vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 63025, November 29, 1991)
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal,
the same may still be held liable for the debts incurred by the wife in the course
of her business. After all, whatever profits earned by the wife from her business
go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the
obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be
chargeable not only against her paraphernal property, but also agianst the
conjugal property of the spouses.
Ayala Investment and Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
118305, February 12, 1998)
Where the husband contracts obligations in behalf of the family business, the
law presumes and rightly so, that such obligations will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. It is immaterial if, in the end, his business or profession
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would fail or not succeed. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract.
Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (ART. 124 of the FC)
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank vs. Dailo (G.R. No. 153802, March
11,2005)
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and
the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who has
contracted the sale. For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the late husband must have redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then that some
advantage which clearly accrues to the welfare of the spouses. The burden of
proof that the debt has been contracted for the benefit of the CPG lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.
(he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove)
Villanueva vs. Chiong (G.R. No. 159889, June 5, 2008)
Respondent’s separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot
not prejudiced the wife’s interest over it. The sale by the husband without the
wife’s consent is not, however, void ab initio. Without the wife’s consent , the
Persons and Family Relations
husband’s alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is not void, but merely voidable.
Ravina vs. Villa Abrille (G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009)
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the
FC on Aug. 3, 1988, is governed by Art. 124 of the same that now treats such
disposition to be void if done:
a. Without the consent of both the husband and the wife; or
b. In case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
The particular provision in the NCC giving the wife 10 years to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over the FC. It is thus clear that
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband
without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Fuentes vs. Roca (G.R. No. G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010)
In contrast to Art. 173 of the NCC, Art. 124 of the FC does not provide a period
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the
real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent
or a court allowing the sale, the same would be void.
Aguete vs. PNB (G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)
Under the NCC, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real
property without the consent, express or implied of the wife. Should the husband
do so, then the contract is voidable.
This case was decided under the provisions of the NCC. The husband cannot
alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent of the wife.
Titan vs. Manuel (G.R. No. 169548, March 10, 2010)
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that "[a]ll property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved."
We are not persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s
exclusive property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof
of his income in 1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to
contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted
that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. In
consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required
to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather,
the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was
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acquired does not appear. Here, we find that Titan failed to overturn the
presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses’ marriage, was
part of the conjugal partnership.
Siochi vs. Gozon (G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010)
Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo
still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Envira or the authority
of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. Even if the other
spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that the
other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.
Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the
consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the
other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for
charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (ART. 125 of the
FC)
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles
134 to 138
EFFECT OF SEPARATION IN FACT
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary
proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family.
The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given
Persons and Family Relations
judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of
the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's
share.
LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal
debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds
in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property,
the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of
the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from
the conjugal funds, if any.
(7)The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
the partition in accordance with Article 51.
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(9)In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed
to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two
or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this
Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of
each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered
according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the
existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
Heirs of Go vs. Servacio (G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011)
Persons and Family Relations
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving
spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the FC is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or
extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the
requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
EFFECT OF PROPERTY RELATIONS ON MIXED MARRIAGES
Matthews vs. Taylor (G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009)
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as
more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or
indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens
wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father’s estate; that
they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name
of another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor; and that a
contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.
By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no
capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the
alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
Frenzel vs. Catito (G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003)
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands
or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have
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been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have
also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by
him as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution;
hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and
the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract,
cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out.
One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or
transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action
for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is
unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement;
it leaves the parties where it finds them.
Muller vs. Muller (G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006)
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted
his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His
attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot
be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and
resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save
for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Borromeo vs. Descallar (G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009)
Jambrich, an Austrian, cohabited with Opalla-Descallar, a Filipino and
separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress. During their
coverture, Jambrich bought a house and lot. His name was erased from the
Deed of Absolute Sale when the Register of Deeds refused registration on the
ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquired alienable lands of
public domain. Jambrich in a Deed of Assignment, sold his rights and interests
Persons and Family Relations
on the properties to Borromeo. When Borromeo sought to register the Deed of
Assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots had been transferred in
the name of Descallar, and had already been mortgaged. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that Borromeo had a better right over the properties. The
Court ruled that the transfer of land from
Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would
have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the
properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. Here, the Court reiterated the
consistent ruling in a number of cases, that if land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the transfer
of the transferee is rendered valid.
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSE AND ADMINISTRATION OF
COMMON PROPERTY BY ONE SPOUSE DURING THE MARRIAGE
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be
voluntary or for sufficient cause. (ART. 134 of FC)
Maquilan vs. Maquilan (G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007)
Under Article 143 of the FC, separation of property may be effected voluntarily
or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. In this case, the SC held that
the questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved, is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceeding for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
still pending. However, the Court stressed that this voluntary separation of
property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Art. 136 of the FC.
SUFFICIENT CAUSES FOR THE JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY;
1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
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(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed
by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply
with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for
at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the
final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the
grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
(1) CIVIL INTERDICTION
The accessory penalty of civil interdiction deprives the offender during the time
of his or her sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either
as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to dispose such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos. The final decision of the court rendered against the
erring spouse embodying the penalty of civil interdiction is enough for the court
to approve a judicial separation of property.
(2) DECLARATION OF ABSENCE
The spouse present, the heirs instituted in a will who may present an authentic
copy of the same, the relatives who may succeed by the of intestacy, and those
who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the
condition of his or her death, may ask for the judicial declaration of the absence.
The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until 6 months after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The final decision of the court
declaring the spouse absent is enough for the court to approve judicial
separation of property.
(3) LOSS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Persons and Family Relations
In the event that loss of parental authority has been judicially decreed against a
spouse over a common legitimate or illegitimate child with the other spouse, the
latter can seek for the judicial separation of property so that his or her interest
in the community property or the partnership assets can be immediately
allocated to him or her. Since the relationship of the spouses is already
damaged, there is a need to protect his or her interest in the assets by way of
partition lest the guilty spouse undertakes an act very prejudicial to the innocent
spouse’s property rights in the community property or the conjugal partnership.
Also in the event that loss of parental authority has been judicially decreed
against a spouse in connection with his or her legitimate child of a previous
marriage, or an illegitimate child with another person, it is but proper to allow the
other spouse to immediately ask for judicial separation of property so that his or
her share and interest in the absolute community property or the
Conjugal partnership property can be immediately allocated to her, thereby
removing it from further exposed to liability in favor of the children who are not
even related to him or her. But to be able to do so, the petitioner spouse must
show prior judicial declaration of loss of parental authority of the other spouse.
(4) ABANDONMENT AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS TO
THE FAMILY
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other spouse when he or she has
left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning and with an intent to
absolutely forego his or her family duties.
(5) ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATION
In case a spouse abuses his or her power of administration, judicial separation
of property may be availed of by the aggrieved spouse to avoid further depletion
of his or her interest in the properties. For “abuse” to exist, it is not enough that
the spouse granted the power of administration performs an act or acts
prejudicial to the other spouse. Nor is it sufficient that he or she commits acts
injurious to the community property or the conjugal partnership property, for
these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse
connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced
by a repetition of deliberate acts and / or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
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(6) SEPARATION IN FACT
At the time of the petition, the spouses must have been separated in fact for at
least 1 year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Can spouses jointly agree to dissolve their property regime and have it approved
by the court without any justification?
ANSWER:
The spouse may agree on the separation of their absolute community of
property regime or their conjugal partnership of gains. Before being effective,
such separation must have court approval. Otherwise, it shall be void. The
petition to be filed in court need not state any reason for the conversion. The
agreement of the parties is enough. But if the reason is against public policy,
the court may reject the agreement.
The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same
shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property.
The recording in the civil registry of the petition of the separation of property and
the final judgment is to aid present and future creditors in determining whether
an asset of a spouse is conjugal or separate.
Spouses may terminate the judicial separation of property in any of the following
manner:
(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power,
authorizes the resumption of said administration;
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal
separation resumes common life with the other;
Persons and Family Relations
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously
deprived thereof;
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year,
reconcile and resume common life; or
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the
spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No
voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted.
The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be
transferred by the court to the other spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an
accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of
interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be
the administrator.
REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be
total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall
pertain to the absolute community. (213a)
Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her
own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse
shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all
Page 53 of 73
fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or
her separate property.
Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or,
in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their
separate properties.
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be
solidary.
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE;
The property relation between parties who are living together as husband and
wife without being lawfully married or under a void marriage is a special kind of
co-ownership.
Requisites:
1) The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3) Without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
The structure of the property relationship;
1) Salaries and wages shall be owned by them in equal shares;
2) Property acquired by either of the parties exclusively by his or her fund belong
to such party provided that there is proof that he or she acquired it by exclusive
funds;
3)Property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Consequently, either spouse may
alienate in favor of the other his or her share in the property;
4) Property acquired while they live together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
Persons and Family Relations
in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household;
5) The fruits of the couple’s separate property are not included in the co-
ownership;
6) Property acquired by any of the parties after separation shall be
exclusively owned by the party who acquired it;
7)Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share
in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. However,
either spouse may alienate in favor of the other his or her share in the
property co-owned. But no one can donate or waive any interest in the
con-ownership that would constitute an indirect or direct grant of gratuitous
advantage to the other which shall be considered void.
8) When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong
to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
Valdes vs. RTC (G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996)
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Page 54 of 73
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
In cases of cohabitation not falling under Article 147, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
both faith.
Relationships contemplated under Art. 148 inlcude the following;
(a) a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, without the benefit
of marriage but are not capacitated to marry;
(b) an adulterous relationship;
(c) a bigamous or polygamous marriage;
(d) incestuous void marriages under Art. 37 of FC; and
(e) void marriages by reason of public policy under Art. 38.
Carino vs. Carino (G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001)
Persons and Family Relations
During his lifetime, the late SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages –
one with petitioner Susan Nicdao in 1969 and the other with respondent Susan
Yee in 1992. Before Santiago Carino passed-away, it was Yee who took care
of him and shouldered his medical costs and when he died, it was also Yee who
covered the burial expenses. Both Susans filed and successfully received
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government
agencies. Feeling aggrieved, Yee filed a collection case against Nicdao to
recover the death benefits the latter received.
To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, Yee contended that the
marriage of Nicdao and Carino was void ab initio because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. The RTC ruled in favor of Yee and granted her right
to half of what Nicdao received as detah benefits
The Supreme Court held that the Carino-Nicdao marriage is void ab initio on
account of the absence of a marriage license. Thus, the property regime of
Nicdao and the deceased is governed by Art. 147 of the FC. This article applies
to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like absence of a marriage license.
The marriage of Carino-Yee was likewise declared void, the Court declaring it
to be a bigamous marriage under Art. 40 of the FC. For purposes of remarriage,
the deceased should have first secured a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of his marriage. Though his first marriage is void for lack of marriage license,
his failure to have obtained a prior judicial declaration of nullity rendered his
second marriage void. Their
Marriage being voi-bigamous, the property relationship between Yee and the
deceased is Art. 148 of the FC.
THE FAMILY
Definition of a FAMILY:
It is a natural and social institution founded on the conjugal union, binding
together the individuals composing it, for the common accomplishment of the
individual and spiritual ends of life, under the authority of the original ascendants
who heads it.
Page 55 of 73
Article II Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution;
“The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic social institution.”
Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood.
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. (Art. 151)
Esquivias vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997)
The reason for Art. 222 of the NCC (now Art. 151 of the FC) is that a lawsuit
between family members generates deeper bitterness than one between
strangers. Hence, it is necessary that every effort should be made towards a
compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family.
The requirement applies only to suits between or among members of the same
family. A brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration of who are members
of the same family. Consequently, in so far as he is concerned, he is a stranger
with respect to the family of his wife and as such, the mandatory requirement of
“earnest effort toward a compromise” does not apply to him.
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Acuna (G.R. No. 154132, August 31,
2006)
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be
made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. Thus, Art. 151 of
the FC applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family
members.
Persons and Family Relations
FAMILY HOME
What is a Family Home and how is it constituted?
The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated.
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
A family home is deemed constituted on a house and land from the time it is
actually occupied as a family residence. The requirement of house and land as
constitutive of a family home stresses the element of permanence. Hence, a
boat on water cannot be constituted a family home.
A family home cannot be constituted by a husband or a wife alone. Constitution
must be done jointly by both husband and the wife. An unmarried head of the
family, however, can constitute by himself or herself. The occupancy of any of
the beneficiaries can likewise constitute a home as a family home.
Actual occupancy is the operative act of constitution
The beneficiaries of a family home are: (Art. 154)
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of
family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home
and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
The occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its
beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is “actual” is something real, or
actually existing as opposed to something which is presumptive or constructive.
Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically.
Rather, the property may be occupied by the beneficiaries enumerated by Art.
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154 of the FC. “Parents-in-law may be considered as beneficiaries. Maids and
overseers are not.” (Manacop vs. CA, G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997)
The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen
and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction
of the building.
Oliva-De Mesa vs. Acero Jr. [G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012(663 SCRA
40)]
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially
or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing
family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.
a While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption
from execution, could be summarized as follows: (Oliva-De Mesa vs. Acero Jr.)
(a) Family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
Persons and Family Relations
(b) Family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt
from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;
(c) Family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.
A family home can be sold, alienated, donated, assigned and disposed provided
consent of the following must be obtained:
1) person constituting the same;
2) the latter’s spouse;
3) majority of the beneficiaries of legal age.
In case of conflict the court shall decide.
Patricio vs. Dario (G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:
(a) They must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of
the FC;
(b) The live in the family home; and,
(c) They are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Here, the grandchild sought to be referred to as the minor beneficiary does not
fulfill the requisite of support. He cannot demand support from his grandparents
when he has parents capable of supporting him. Pertinently, the law first
imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents,
especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Cabang vs. Basay (G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009)
Page 57 of 73
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from
execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that
the family home must be constituted on property owned by the persons
constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.
"[T]he family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the
latter’s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family." In other
words:
The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute
community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either
spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held
in co-ownership with third persons. However, it can be established partly on
community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property
of either spouse with the consent of the latter. (Cabang vs. Basay )
The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever
owns the property or constituted the family home. (Art. 159 of the FC)
When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155
obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent
voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be
considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in
Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The
excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor
Persons and Family Relations
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Refer to the relationship or tie which exists between parents and their children.
Filiation of children may either be:
a) By nature;
b) or by Adoption.
Natural children are considered legitimate if they are conceived or born during
a valid marriage of the parents. While illegitimate children are those conceived
and born outside a valid marriage or inside a void marriage.
STATUS OF ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATED CHILD
The law declares the status of a child, who is a product of artificial insemination,
as a legitimate child of the husband and wife provided that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and
signed by them before the birth of the child and that instrument is recorded in
the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. If the written
authorization or ratification contained in the public instrument was obtained
through mistake, farud, violence, intimidation or undue influence, the husband
may impugn the legitimacy of the child on these grounds.
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse;
Page 58 of 73
(2)That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the instance of artificial
insemination; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
The aforementioned ground presupposes the existence of a valid marriage
between the husband and the wife. Only the husband and the heirs can invoke
the enumerated grounds (Art. 166 of the FC)
In the event that any of the grounds enumerated in Art. 166 of the FC is proven,
the child will neither be legitimate nor illegitimate in so far as the husband is
concerned. Simply, the husband and the child will not be related to each other
in any manner considering that the husband did not participate in any way as to
the child’s procreation. In so far as the mother is concerned the child is
illegitimate.
120-300 DAY PERIOD
The law in effect, states that when a child is born inside a marriage, sexual
intercourse or access is presumed to have occurred between the husband and
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of
the child and that any day within the 120-day period is deemed as the possible
conception of a child. The time span between the 120th day and the 300th day
is 180 days or 6 months. Experience shows that a child may be born without
any defect whatsoever even if the gestation period is only 6 months.
PHYSICAL INCAPACITY
The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that evidence must be so convincing
and persuasive to justify the bastardization of the child.
LIVING SEPARATELY
To rebut the presumption of legitimacy, the husband and the wife must have
lived separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible.
SERIOUS ILLNESS
Persons and Family Relations
The illness of the husband must be serious and must be such as to absolutely
prevent him from engaging in sexual intercourse.
BIOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC REASONS
Paternity can be successfully impugned if, for biological and scientific reasons
the offspring could not have been that of the husband.
If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within
three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules
shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the
former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of
the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during
such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage. (ART. 168 of the FC)
The rules will not apply in case there are convincing proofs of filiation that the
father of the child is the previous husband or the subsequent husband.
The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following
the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such
legitimacy or illegitimacy.
The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband
or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality
where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be
two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If
the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
Page 59 of 73
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva (G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006)
Angelina Villanueva is not the daughter of Pacita Gonzales and Romualdo
Villanueva, whether illegitimate or adopted. The alleged mother, Pacita, was
already 44 years old at the time of the alleged birth. Pacita had also been living
childless with Romualdo for 20 years.
The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed
for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having
desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
PROOF OF FILIATION
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
1) RECORD OF BIRTH
A record of birth appearing in the civil register is good proof as it proceeds from
an official government source. It is considered a public instrument and is prima
facie evidence of facts therein contained.
FINAL JUDGMENT
A final judgment, upon the other hand, is a judicial decision bearing on the status
of the children as legitimate and hence, binding and conclusive
Persons and Family Relations
Perla vs. Baring [G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012 (685 SCRA 101)]
It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.“
Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in
the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to
prove paternity. And "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament
on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same."
SSS vs. Aguas (G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006)
Only the daughter Jeylnn sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
She presented her birth certificate which bears the signature of the deceased
SSS member Pablo Aguas. A birth certificate signed by the father is competent
evidence of paternity. She also presented a certification from the Civil registry
showing that she was born during the marriage of Pablo and her mother
Rosanna.
2) ADMISSION IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN DOCUMENT
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public instrument or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned is a complete act of recognition
without need of court action.
Case: Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 1.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no doubt that the petitioner was the
father of his illegitimate child because the evidences convincingly show this.
Hence, it was the petitioner who paid the bills for the hospitalization of the
mother when she gave birth. He was the one who caused the registration of the
name of the child using his surname in the birth certificate. He also wrote
handwritten letters to the mother and the child stating his promise “to be a loving
and caring husband and father to both of you.” When the mother was pregnant
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of the child, he advised her in a letter to take a lot of rest “especially in the
situation you’re now” clearly referring to the mother’s pregnancy relative to the
child. There were also pictures of the petitioner on various occasions cuddling
the child.
1) OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF LEGITIMATE STATUS;
In the case of Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 675), the Supreme
Court explained what continuous possession means to wit:
“continuous” does not mean that the concession of status shall
continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character
while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father
has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others,
spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity xxx.
There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous
and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.”
2) EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAW;
In the same case of Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that in view of the fact that filiation may be proved by “any means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws,”” this may consist of baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses and such other kinds of proof admissible under the Rules of Court.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY
The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of personal
character and generally pertains to him. Only the child may exercise it at any
time during his lifetime.
EXCEPTIONS: It can be transmitted to the heirs of the child.
1) If he or she died during his or her minority;
2) or died while insane;
Persons and Family Relations
3) after action had already been instituted.
Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases,
their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on
Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rightsgranted to them
by the Civil Code.
Go vs. Ramos (G.R. No. 167570, and 171946, September 4, 2009)
The Supreme Court reiterated in this case that only legitimate children follow
the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of the mother and her nationality. Also, an illegitimate child of a Filipina
need not perform any act to confer upon him or her all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he or she automatically becomes a citizen
himself.
Republic vs. Sagun [G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012 (666 SCRA 321)]
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who
is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship
of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the
mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in
the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must
have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
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with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."
Republic Act No. 9255, February 24 2004.
AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF
THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Briones vs. Miguel (G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004)
This is a Petition for Habeas Corpus case filed by the father of an illegitimate
child against the mother of the child and her relatives to obtain custody of the
child. It was ruled that having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is
deemed an illegitimate child and shall: use the surname, be under the parental
authority of the mother, and be entitled for support. The mother cannot be
deprived of that right and she may not renounce it or transfer it “except in cases
authorized by law.”
David vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995)
An illegitimate child as in the case at bar is under the parental authority of the
mother, who as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have the custody
of the child. The fact that the father has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for giving him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody
of the child. Nor is the fact that the father is well-off a reason for depriving the
mother of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been
able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. That the mother
receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children
should be taken against her.
Heirs of Maramag vs. Maramag (G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009)
In an insurance policy where the beneficiaries designated are the concubine
and the illegitimate children, the SC ruled that the revocation of the concubine
as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of
no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries in Loreto Maramag’s insurance policies remain valid. No legal
Persons and Family Relations
proscription exists naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by
the insured. The shares of the concubine in the insurance proceeds, whether
forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Art. 739 of
the NCC or by the insurers themselves for easons based on the insurance
contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of the wife and legitimate children. It is only in
cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the
insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the
insured.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who,
at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between
parents. The annulment of a viodable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth
Essential and Mandatory requirements that must be present in the process of
legitimation:
1. The parents do not suffer any legal impediment to marry each other at the
time of the conception of the child by the mother;
2. The child has been conceived and born outside of a valid marriage. This
is the rule because, if the child is either conceived or born within a
particular valid marriage, the said child is declared by law as legitimate;
3. The parents subsequently enter into a valid marriage. It is step which by
operation of law will finally legitimate the child. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect legitimation.
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The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall
benefit their descendants.
Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights,
within five years from the time their cause of action accrues
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005)
In a support case, the alleged father of the child disputes the filiation and refused
DNA testing. In ruling in favor of DNA testing, the SC elaborated that,
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose
to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology
finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned
progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.”
Herrera vs. Alba (G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005)
In an action for compulsory recognition and support, DNA Testing was ordered
by the Court. The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.
Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities
of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject
to the limits established by the law, rules and jurisprudence.
Estate of Ong vs. Diaz (G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007)
In a complaint for compulsory recognition of a minor, the SC ruled that the death
of the putative father does not preclude DNA testing for as long as there are
biological samples available. The term “biological sample” was defined in the
decision as any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found
in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other bodily fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Persons and Family Relations
Lucas vs. Lucas (G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011)
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to
establish his filiation to the respondent. It states the cause of action of (1) the
legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The SC
declared that as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. When a party contests paternity and refuses to undergo
a blood test, the court may conduct a show-cause hearing to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper
showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of
the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures
which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing. (Lucas vs. Lucas )
ADOPTION
REPUBLIC ACT 8552
“DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998”
“Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
"A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily
or involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited
child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his/her
biological parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption.
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"Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly
relinquishes parental authority to the Department.
"Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has
been permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to
abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or
incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.
"Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or
guardianship or whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least
six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such.
"Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker
oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and
adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.
"Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the
birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her
biological mother, causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen who is;
a.1. of legal age;
a.2. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights;
a.3. of good moral character and has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude;
a.4. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position
to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter
and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent.
(b) Any alien who;
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b.1. possess the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals;
b.2. That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines;
b.3. That he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered;
b.4. That he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office
or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country;
b.5.and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country
as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree
of consanguinity or affinity of theFilipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto;
or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses.
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In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim (G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)
Monina Lim simulated the birth certificate of Michelle and Jude Lim and made it
appear they are their children (with her husband). Monina’s husband died and
she remarried an American citizen (Olario). At the time of the filing of the
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old. During the amnesty period for
simulated birth certificates, she filed a petition for adoption. The case was
dismissed because her second husband did not join the petition. Even if the
children were already of age, there was still a need for joint adoption. Even if
Monina’s husband had already filed for divorce, for as long as there was no
decree yet, the Court ruled that they should file jointly.
The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively
or judicially declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status
to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own
child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That
no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of
death of said parent(s).
Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
Persons and Family Relations
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,
of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter
if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
(a) Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
(b) Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter
of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family. Section 18.
(c)Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Rivera vs. Ramirez (G.R. No. 189697, June 27, 2012)
The late Rosita Rivera, a physician, adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted
child is deemed legitimate child of the adopter. This being the case, Raymond’s
presence barred Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives from inheriting
intestate from her.
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION.
The adopted or the adoptee does not have the right of representation in the law
of succession. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living
or if he could have inherited. It must be importantly emphasized however that
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the representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
In so far as the adoption is concerned, it is a rule that successional rights of the
adopted and the adopter are purely statutory and therefore limited by statute.
Unless provided by the adoption statute, the adopted child does not inherit from
the lineal or collateral kindred of the adoptive parents.
Grounds for Rescission of Adoption.
Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor
or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel,
the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by
the adopter(s):
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone
counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
1) MALTREATMENT
This ground connotes the incorrigible nature of the adopter’s character
considering that, having undergone counseling, the adopter still continues to
maltreat the adopted in such tormenting and injurious manner. The adopted is
entitled to have a wholesome family life. Corollarily, he or she is entitled to be
removed from a destructive environment induced or created by the adopters.
2) ATTEMPT TO LIFE
Attempt to life of the adoptee is a very serious ground. It is criminal. It endagers
the life of the adoptee. An adopter who commits an act designed to terminate
the life of his or her own adopted child directly contravenes the purpose of
adoption which is to provide the adoptee with a family environment that will
ensure a productive life on the part of the adoptee.
Persons and Family Relations

3) SEXUAL ASSAULT OR VIOLENCE
Sexual assault or violence by the adopter on the adopted is a perverse act and
the adopted must be immediately removed from an environment that easily
subjects him or her to such assault or violence.
Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the
following documents must be submitted to the Board:
(a) Child study;

(b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;

4) ABANDONMENT
(c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death
Abandonment and failure to comply with parental duties also directly negate the certificate of parents;
purpose of adoption of providing the adoptee with a wholesome and productive
family life. Abandonment connotes a willful and deliberate act of foregoing all (d) Medical evaluation /history;
parental duties. Failure to comply with parental duties may be intentional or a
result of negligence. (e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and

(f) Recent photo of the child.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the
necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to
be adopted;
Effects of Rescission.
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under
(a) The parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide
legal custody of the DSWD shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
incapacitated;
(b)The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to (h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations
each other shall be extinguished. and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and
accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national
(c) The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of laws; and
birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate. (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws.
(d) Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of
the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial
rescission shall be respected. SUPPORT

AMENDMENT: Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,

clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION financial capacity of the family.

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Persons and Family Relations
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
The following are obliged to support each other :
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
Support is a mandatory obligation. The very nature of support as a mandatory
and essential obligation demands that the same cannot be waived, renounced,
transmitted or compensated as such obligation is necessary for the existence,
survival and well-being of the individual ought to be supported.
De Asis vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999 (303 SCRA
176)]
A mother in a previous support case manifested that it was useless to claim
further support for her son from the defendant who denied paternity and where
she agreed to the dismissal of the said case provided the defendant did not
pursue his counterclaim, the Supreme Court held that such manifestation did
not bar the mother from filing a subsequent case for support on behalf of the
same child against the same defendant because such manifestation and
agreement to dismiss the case on condition that the defendant did not pursue
the counterclaim against the mother constitute a form of renunciation as they
severed the vinculum that gives the child the right to claim support from the
putative parent. Such agreement is likewise in the nature of a compromise which
cannot be countenanced as it violates the prohibition against any compromise
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of the right to future support. The Supreme Court likewise stated that if paternity
is at issue in a case, its existence or absence must be judicially established and
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
1) BETWEEN SPOUSES
The duty to support and the right to be supported presuppose a valid marriage
between parties. The right to support between spouses proceeds from the law
and is based also on their obligation to mutually help each other, created by the
matrimonial bond.
It has been held that the adultery of the wife is a valid defense against an action
for support. Also a spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported from the
conjugal properties or the absolute community property.
2) BETWEEN ASCENDANTS AND DESCENDANTS
All members of the family in the direct legitimate ascending and descending line
are obliged to support each other. The purpose of the provisions on support is
to ensure that members of a family do not allow any member of the same family
to become a burden to society. If the relationship between the one to be
supported and the one to support is in issue, the status of the parties should be
established first before support can be made.
3) BETWEEN PARENTS AND THEIR LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND THE
LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF THE LATTER.
Parents are obliged to support their children and their grandchildren whether
legitimately or illegitimately related to their legitimate children and vice versa.
This is premised on the principle that as long as one is related by blood to the
person who is supposed to give support, there is no reason why the obligation
to support him shall fall on society and not on his family. However, the persons
obliged to support each other are limited from the grandparents to the
grandchildren only and vice-versa.
Persons and Family Relations
4) BETWEEN PARENTS AND THEIR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND THE
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF THE LATTER.
Parents are likewise obliged to support their illegitimate children and their
grandchildren whether legitimately or illegitimately related to their illegitimate
children and vice versa.
5) BETWEEN LEGITIMATE BROTHERS AND SISTERS WHETHER FULL OR
HALF-BLOOD.
The collateral blood relatives obliged to support each other are limited to
legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. Hence, uncles,
aunts, nephews and nieces are not obliged to support each other.
Brothers and sisters, illegitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are
also entitled to support each other. However, if an illegitimate brother or sister
is of age and the need for his or her support is due to his or her fault or
negligence, support does not become a demandable right and , therefore, may
not be given at all.
In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately
related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall
be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall
advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse
obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership. (Art. 197 of the FC)
During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and
for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of
mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal
separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the
innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (Art. 197 of the FC)
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Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (Art. 199 of the
FC)
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment
of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of
each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may
order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to
his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the
same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means
to satisfy all claims, the order established in Art. 199, unless the concurrent
obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which
case the child shall be preferred.
SUPPORT MUST BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:
1) Based on the necessities of the recipient;
2) mean of the person obliged to give support.
Payment of the amount of support starts only from the time support has been
judicially or extra-judicially demanded.
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation
either (a) by paying the allowance fixed, or (b) by receiving and maintaining in
Persons and Family Relations
the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give
support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish
support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support. This particularly applies when the father or mother of a
child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support
to the child when urgently needed
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental authority or patria potestas is defined as the mass of rights and
obligations which parents have in relation to the persons and property of their
children until their emancipation, and even after this under certain
circumstances (2 Manresa 8)
It is the right and duty of parents under the law of nature as well as the common
law and statutes of many states to protect their children, to care for them in
sickness and in health, and to do whatever may be necessary for their care,
maintenance and preservation (59 Am. Jur. 97)
INCLUDED IN THE EXERCISE OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY:
Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property
of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall
include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.
Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred
except in the cases authorized by law.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and
are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
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DEATH OF A PARENT AND REMARRIAGE:
The death of one of the parents will not terminate the parental authority of the
surviving parent over their children. Upon remarriage of the surviving parent, the
parental authority over the children shall likewise not be affected. The new
spouse, by virtue of his or her marrying the surviving parent does not
automatically possess parental authority over the children of the surviving
parent unless such new spouse adopts the children.
Upon remarriage of the surviving parent, the court may appoint another person
to be the guardian of the person or property of the children if it is clearly shown
that, by reason of the remarriage, the surviving parent cannot undertake the
necessary devotion, care, loyalty and concern toward the children.
In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order toherwise.
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OF GRANDPARENTS:
In the absence or incapacity of the parents, the grandparents are the most
natural, suitable and logical persons to exercise parental authority. Hence,
grandparents have the legal preference in the matter of substitute parental
authority.
FILIAL PRIVILEGE:
No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his
parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a
crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY:
In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214 of the FC;
Persons and Family Relations

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship
unfit or disqualified; and and understanding;

(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in
unfit or disqualified. them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate
their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child of citizenship;
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them
LIABILITY OF PERSONS POSSESSING SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY: from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their
health, studies and morals;
Persons and entities given by law special parental authority are the school, its
administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
child care. Special parental authority can be exercised only over minors while
under their supervision, instruction or custody. The authority and supervision (6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
also attach to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the school, entity
or institution. (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the
circumstances; and
They are civilly liable for acts and omissions of the unemancipated minor.
However, the liabilities shall not apply if it proved that they exercised the proper (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
diligence required under the particular circumstances. parents and guardians.

LIABILITY OF PARENTS OR PERSONS EXERCISING SUBSTITUTE
PARENTAL AUTHORITY:
Parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising parental authority over the
minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The liability is subsidiary because, while in
school or in an institution engaged in child care, the said persons do not have
the direct custody of their children. They shall be liable only if the persons with
special parental authority cannot satisfy their liability.
The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY:
Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and (2) Upon the death of the child; or
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (3) Upon emancipation of the child.

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Persons and Family Relations
1-2) DEATH OF PARENT OR CHILD
Civil personality is extinguished by death as provided under Art. 42 of the Civil
Code. It likewise provides that the effect of death upon the rights and obligations
of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. The Family Code
provides the effect of death of the parents or of the children relative to parental
authority. Expressly, such death terminates parental authority.
3) EMANCIPATION
A child is emancipated upon reaching the age of majority which is 18 years.
Emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the
child and she or he is thereby qualified to do all acts of civil life save for
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also
terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for
the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of
parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person
exercising parental authority.
1) ADOPTION
Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and
the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s) upon the finality of the judicial
decree
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2) GUARDIANSHIP
A guardian appointed by the court shall generally have the care and custody of
the person of his or her ward and the management of his or her estate.
3) JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABANDONMENT
Abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations
of care and support which parents owe to their children.
4) DIVESTMENT BY FINAL COURT JUDGMENT
The court may divest the parents of their parental authority over their children if
the welfare of the children demands. However, the court must proceed with
utmost caution in proceeding with a case involving the severance of parental
authority. A decree of termination must be issued upon clear, convincing and
positive proofs.
5) JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABSENCE OR INCAPACITY
Parental authority cannot be expected from an absentee or one who is
incapacitated. The paramount consideration is the best interest of the child.
Hence, once a judicial declaration of absence or incapacity has been decreed
by the court and has become effective, this is a valid ground for terminating
parental authority.
GROUNDS FOR THE SUSPENSION AND DEPRIVATION OF PARENTAL
AUTHORITY:
1) Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the
person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty
of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.
2) The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may
also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:
(a) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
Persons and Family Relations
(b) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(c) Compels the child to beg; or
(d) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of
lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated are deemed to include cases which have resulted
from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental
authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands,
the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other
measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority
revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court
finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated.
3) If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed
him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently
deprived by the court of such authority.
1) CIVIL INTERDICTION
Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty imposed on an accused found guilty of
certain crimes. It involves the deprivation of the offender during the time of his
or her sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to
the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage
his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or
conveyance inter vivos.
2) EXCESSIVE HARSHNESS OR CRUELTY
While parents have the duty to discipline their children which authorizes them
to inflict some form of corporal punishment, the same should not be excessive.
Parents likewise should not treat the children with cruelty whether or not they
have any ostensible reason to do so. For instance, severely beating a child to
allegedly teach him or her a lesson is no excuse for terminating parental
authority.
CORRUPTING ORDERS, COUNSEL OR EXAMPLE:
It is the duty of the parents to provide the children with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity and self-discipline and stimulate
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them in their interest in civil affairs. Hence, if the parents themselves are the
ones who teach the children how to steal, rob, lie, hurt people and other negative
traits, suspension or, in case of grave acts, termination of parental authority is
but proper considering that by their actions they show their unfitness to provide
the children with the upbringing that is due them under the law.
COMPELS THE CHILD TO BEG
It is the duty of the parents to inculcate in the children self-reliance through lawful
activities. If a parent teaches a child to beg, he or she thereby destroys the very
potential of the child to be a productive citizen of the country. Such parents
likewise cannot be expected to uplift the sense of worthiness of the child.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
For a parent to make the child the object of his or her prurient behavior can
cause great emotional, psychological and physical harm to the victim-child. A
parent subjecting his or her children to acts of lasciviousness manifests a
perverse, morally depraved and highly repugnant attitude destructive of the well-
being of the children and the family as well.
CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE
An example is when the stepfather forces his stepson to beg and the mother
acts indifferently or does not care about such act of the stepfather, she can be
considered culpably negligent, warranting the suspension of parental authority.
3) SEXUAL ABUSE
For a parent to sexually abuse his or her child or allow the said child to be
subjected to sexual abuse is clearly a serious act of moral depravity and
corruption. Such parent cannot be expected to rear his or her children in a
healthy, wholesome and upright way and can even rise to serious traumatic and
psychological problems on the part of the children.
EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY
Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years.
Persons and Family Relations

RA No. 10165 or the Foster Care Act of 2012

Under the Foster care Act of 2012, foster parents have substitute parental
authority over the children under their foster care. But they cannot inflict corporal
punishment like people who exercise special parental authority over children
(i.e teacher). Substitute parental authority in case the parents of a child die,
become absent, or unsuitable, while special parental authority is temporary, as
when parents leave their children in school during school days and authorized
field trips.

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