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IREN G.

PEPITO

CERTIORARI

Mendez v. People, 726 SCRA 480

BAR EXAM QUESTION

An information was filed against X CTA for violation of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of for
failure to file an income tax return during 2001-2013 to which he pleaded not guilty. After
arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information. The CTA ruled that
the prosecution's amendment is merely a formal one. Petitioner now files a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the CTA resolutions. The
respondents claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in questioning the CTA
resolutions. Under Rule 9, Section 9 of the Revised Rules of CTA, the remedy of appeal to
the CTA en banc is the proper remedy, to be availed of within fifteen days from receipt of
the assailed resolution. Is the remedy of certiorari proper?

Suggested Answer

Yes.The petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari.

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the case at bar, after failing in his bid for the CTA to reconsider its admission of the
amended information, the only remedy left to the petitioner is to file a petition
for certiorari with this Court.

Nonetheless, while we rule that the petitioner availed of the correct remedy, we resolve
to dismiss the petition for failure to establish that the CTA abused its discretion, much less
gravely abused its discretion.
IREN G. PEPITO

CERTIORARI

Teroso v. Metro Manila Retreaders, Inc. (BANDAG), 718 SCRA 538

BAR EXAM QUESTION

X, Y and Z, former salesmen of Bandag entered into a franchise agreement with “Bandag”.
Thereafter, they defaulted on their obligations to submit periodic liquidations of their
operational expenses in relation to the revolving funds Bandag provided them.
Consequently, Bandag terminated their respective SFA. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of wages, incentive pay, 13th month pay
and damages against Bandag with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioners contend that, notwithstanding the execution of the SFAs, they remained to be
Bandag's employees, the SFAs being but a circumvention of their status as regular
employees.

Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, dismissing the complaint on the ground that no
employer-employee relationship existed between Bandag and petitioners which
subsequently affirmed by the NLRC. It also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
(CA) ascribing grave abuse of discretion. On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a
Decision, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Is the dismissal of the petition proper?

Suggested Answer

Yes.

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is available when the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, the franchisors may impose guidelines that somehow restrict the
petitioners' conduct which do not necessarily indicate "control." Petitioners cannot use the
revolving funds feature of the SFAs as evidence of their employer-employee relationship
with Bandag. These funds do not represent wages. The rule in labor cases is that the findings
of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are to be accorded with respect, even finality,
if supported by substantial evidence. This is particularly true when passed upon and upheld
by the CA.

Therefore, there is no grave abuse of discretion.


IREN G. PEPITO

FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESATE MORTGAGE

Robles v. Yapcinco 739 SCRA 292

BAR EXAM QUESTION

X argues that the non-registration of the certificate of sale did not affect the title acquired
by Y as the purchaser in the judicial foreclosure of mortgage and that the finality of the
judgment rendered in the judicial action for foreclosure of mortgage was valid and binding
on the respondents as the successors-in interest of the judgment debtor. In contrast, the
respondents maintain that they were lawfully entitled to the property in litis because there
was no registration of the certificate of sale or confirmation from the court and that with
the release of mortgage being validly registered in the Office of Registry of Deeds, thereby
rendering the title free from any lien and encumbrances, they already had the right to
transfer the property in their names. Is non-registration of property after judicially
foreclosure and sale had the effect of invalidating the foreclosure proceedings, such that
ownership reverts to the original owner?

Suggested Answer

No.

The law provides that the registration of the sale is required only in extra-judicial
foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise
of the right of redemption.

In the case at bar, the effect of the failure of the purchaser to obtain the judicial
confirmation was only to prevent the title to the property from being transferred to him. For
sure, such failure did not give rise to any right in favor of the mortgagor or the respondents
as his successors-in-interest to take back the property already validly sold through public
auction. Nor did such failure invalidate the foreclosure proceedings.