Grassroots Activism and Political Participation of the Urban Poor:

A Comparison of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Santiago, Chile

Group 11
John Barbieri
Edgar Zapata
Jane Zaretskie

Abstract
It is often widely assumed that the urban poor constitute an uneducated and inactive part of
representative politics. This article will attempt to combat this myth by looking at ways that the Latin
American poor organize and participate in democracy. Specifically, the article will compare how the
urban poor are organizing themselves and making demands to local governments in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil and Santiago, Chile. The two cities are compared by analyzing data on local organizations and
political involvement within the “shantytowns” of the cities. After analyzing data, it is determined that
the urban poor in both cities effectively organize in multiple ways to make coherent demands, but
political structure and culture skews how this is achieved in each city. This study helps to further
debunk the myth of the “marginalized urban poor”, and succeeds in elaborating on their increasingly
complex and important role in Latin American politics.

Introduction

Urbanization has brought in immense numbers of migrants into city centers and outlying areas.
Migrants from rural areas have been lured into urban life through family members, agricultural
downturns, and the illusion of a better life. Upon reaching the cities the new migrants have found work
difficult and living opportunities hard to attain. The solution, then, was often the erection of makeshift
houses on squatted land, eventually developing into established communities now called “shantytowns”.

Many common misperceptions still exist about the urban poor living in these shantytowns in Latin
America. As Pino (1997) says the urban poor have been forced to wear many masks: “outlaw,
sociopath, leech, bum, scavenger, and other labels of abuse.” (p. 161) At best these stereotypes have
glimpses of truth, but many are simply based on outsider judgments with no desire to fully address the
complexities beyond their assumptions. Expert and lay opinion have looked in fear at the squatter
settlements and have insisted that they be demolished either because of their unaesthetic obtrusion or
for the “poor’s welfare”. These opinions further compound the “backwardness” of the urban poor and
espouse their dehumanization. When actually studied, these myths severely misrepresent the urban
poor, dismissing them as a fragmented and incoherent group. Our thesis is, despite the still often
pervading wisdom, the urban poor have achieved unique and effective ways of organizing and actively
participating in the political process.

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In order to address how the poor organize and are politically active in Latin American democracies we
focus on a comparison study between the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Santiago, Chile. These
two cities share similarities of recent authoritarian regimes, colonial pasts and strong ties with US
neoliberal interests. However, the countries also have many cultural and political differences between
them. In order to complete a comparison we look at several different studies and recent programs that
have been enacted on the urban poor’s behalf. Also we look at how the urban poor are politically active
in their respective cities; analyzing how they exert political demands and their relationship with
political parties.

The next section will provide a small literature review of issues related to the urban poor in Latin
America. Then this will be followed by a case study of Santiago, Chile, and then a case study of Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. The following section will highlight the similarities and differences between the two
case studies. The last section will provide conclusions of the findings of this paper and suggestions on
areas that could be further looked into.

Brief Literature Review

The “myth of marginality” in Latin American slums is debunked by arguing that: socially, residents are
well organized and cohesive; culturally, they share middle-class values; economically, they are
productive; politically, they are neither apathetic nor radical. (Perlman, 1976) Much of the past
literature relating to our thesis discusses how urbanization correlates positively to political mobilization.
(Deutch, 1961) Mobilization in the form of neighborhood associations in Rio de Janeiro is thought to
be the most important player in making demands on behalf of the urban poor; the growth in their
strength is tied to the growth of popular protests against the authoritarian regimes in the 1970’s and
80’s. (Gay, 1990) In Santiago, neighborhood associations grew more so in the pre-authoritarian
democracy, with strong political institutionalization being a galvanizing factor. (Leiva & Peitras, 1986)
Also, it is claimed that the shantytowns themselves are not the actual problem, but rather they are the
solution Industrial elites have used to incorporate migrants in their need for cheap labor. (Pino, 1997)
Furthermore, it is argued that the source of political dissidence in the shantytowns is often a result of
corruption within political parties. (Posner, 2004)

Santiago

Santiago is the capital of Chile and its largest commercial, industrial and administrative center. It
boasts a population of 5 million inhabitants, 39% of the total population of Chile. In 1970, 29% of
Santiago’s households were classified as poor. Today that number has risen closer to 46% (UN.org).
With almost 2.5 million residents classified as urban poor, the local government of Santiago is under
extreme pressure to address their demands.

The urban poor are a direct effect of a rapid migration to Santiago in response to a declining agrarian
industry. Many believe that a new and better life can be acquired in the city. Santiago as well as other
cities in Latin America was not prepared for such growth and unlike the United States during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was no industrial boom to accompany the swift resettlement.
(Wiarda & Kline, p. 73) As a result migrants started to build makeshift housing or shantytowns, locally
called poblaciones. Also, “many of the migrants swelling the cities have little or no education and few
skills.” (Nelson, p. 394) This results in a huge number of unemployed and a labor intensive workforce;
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the problem being that “labor-intensive techniques in industry often imply high unit costs of
production.” (Nelson, p. 394) Higher prices benefit neither the urban poor nor the rest of the population.
With rampant unemployment and dire living conditions for many, the urban poor are trying to organize
themselves and make a stand to the local government.

To look at how the urban poor organize is a feat in itself. There are many ways to approach this task.
However, this case study focuses on the popular participation after the re-democratization of Chile.
Since the threat of authoritarian regime no longer looms, the people of Santiago can now elect their
local officials. Unfortunately, “the administrative and financial structures of local government remain
essentially the same as they were under the dictatorship, giving local leaders little discretionary control
over resources or policy design and implementation. Therefore, municipal residents have little initiative
to participate in local government, levels of participation are quite low, and local democracy remains
weak.” (Posner, p. 67).

What do the urban poor of Santiago do to organize themselves? Political parties and grassroots
organizations are two of the main forms of organization. Traditionally, it has been the political parties’
duty to be the champions of the underprivileged, but this is becoming less and less the case. Pact
arrangements now characterize the municipal electoral system. “This is because only parties or
candidates who have pacted with either the major right-wing pact (which includes the RN and the UDI)
or the center-left Concertacion (which includes the PDC, PPD, PS, and PRSD) have a reasonable
chance of winning seats on municipal councils” (Posner, p. 67). This puts the urban poor at a strong
disadvantage. Those who do try to remain politically active are now shying away from the conventional
political parties and moving toward grassroots organizations.

Grassroots organizations are the small organizations that begin in the poblaciones of Santiago and work
to have their voices heard. By campaigning and reaching out to the mass media, grassroots members
are able to implement their goals. They affect who is elected in municipal government and what their
agenda will be. Organizing themselves in this manner is helping to change the image of the urban poor
with more people trying to get involved and make a difference.

Some of the most important local organizations are the neighborhood associations, called ‘juntas de
vecinos’ or Juntas for short. Juntas have a long history in Santiago, having been set up in the 1960’s
prior to Pinochet’s authoritarian regime. They were established under Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
President Eduardo Frei Montalvo. Frei and the Christian Democrats sought to form a corporatist
network of community organizations coordinated at the national level that would dramatically increase
their political support and enable them to the push through their ideological platform. Their plan,
however, backfired and instead the pobledores were given a new voice in local and national politics.
This voice, though, was not to last long as all political power vested in the Juntas was effectively
relinquished under the military regime. Also, the military supported the development of multiple
neighborhood associations within a single territory. The result of this is that currently “it is not
surprising that grassroots leaders characterize the neighborhood associations as lacking resources and
deeisionmaking authority and incapable of overcoming factional divisions or motivating pobladores to
participate.” (Posner, p. 70) Given the military’s ploys, after re-democratization when the Juntas came
back into legal recognition, they continued to lack the political power that they once enjoyed. Junta
participation then is on the wane, as many of the pobladores no longer see them as a viable resource to
make their demands heard.

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“The shantytown has eclipsed the factory and neighborhood organizations have displaced trade unions
as the locus of political action.” (Leiva & Petras, p. 5) New grassroots movements are now the central
method of trying to influence the local government. Other neighborhood organizations are being started
by leaders who increasingly feel disconnected with the political process due to the detachment of the
political parties from their constituents. Recently, women are leading the trend by orchestrating
grassroots movements. With the authoritarian rule a thing of the past, developing grassroots
organizations is a much easier task, and some find it a necessity given the current disconnect between
parties and constituents.

So, what sort of impact has the urban poor made on the local government? Are their demands being
met? Are they any better off than they used to be? First, let’s examine the employment situation of the
urban poor. The Programa de Empleo Minimo (PEM) and Programa de Ocupacion Jefes de Hogar
(POHJ) are both intended to lower the unemployment statistics. They offer subsidies to those who are
not working, but the subsidies are very small and not enough to survive. Also, the PEM-POHJ
programs offer no education or workshops to those without jobs. Thus, these programs are not truly
benefiting the urban poor. The local government considers all of the people under the PEM-POHJ
program to be now employed because they are receiving subsidies, and this falsely lowers their
unemployment statistics. (Levia & Petras, p. 11)

Housing in the poblaciones also still remains a concern. These shantytowns can be very unsanitary and
unsafe to live in. There is a program to assist these residents called the Chile Barrio, set up in 1997.
This is a program that intends to move thousands of people out of the slums of Santiago into “small but
solid new buildings.” (Vergara, p. 22) Although these families may have newer and safer places to live
in, they are still just as poor as ever. And not only that, they now face financial burdens they did not
used to have. The local government is trying to attack this issue as well. Those who participate in the
program are forced to complete job-training workshops. This way people can acquire the skills they
need to get a well paying job, so that they do not lose their home because they cannot pay the water or
electric bill.

Although, the urban poor of Santiago have not made significant progress in all of the issues that they
face, they are working hard to amend their quality of life. It takes time to make the improvements that
they desire and implement the goals they wish to achieve. “Through their ability to develop new types
of organizations, actions, and mobilizations, the chronically unemployed and urban poor-women, men
and youth- have been at the forefront of the popular struggle challenging authoritarian rule,
transforming themselves from victims to protagonists, from social outcasts to social actors.” (Levia &
Petras, p. 5)

Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro is simultaneously one of Brazil’s most well known tourist attractions and home to some
of the largest “favelas” (shantytowns) in the world. Historically the favelas of Rio de Janeiro present an
unusual case because rather than being out of sight they are often located in very close proximity to
middle and upper class areas. Further contradicting patterns elsewhere, the favelas are often located on
the hilltops offering a panoramic view of the city and the ocean while the upper class resides in the low
lying areas. As the favelas indicate Rio is suffering, specifically from three important trends: consistent
urbanization, growth in income disparities, and regional economic decline due to financial relocation in
Sao Paulo. (Barke and O'Hare, 2002)

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In many of the favelas, neighborhood associations constitute the epicenter of political and social
activities. In Portuguese these associations are called ‘associaco de moradores’, or AM’s for short.
Samba blocks also hold a high social significance, being responsible for orchestrating neighborhoods to
participate in Carnival. Neighborhood associations are responsible for performing many different tasks
in the favela including: education programs, day care services, mutirao (self-help projects), organizing
social and cultural activities, public meetings, waste disposal, medical centers, and other social services.
(Gay, 1994) Participation, efficiency, and structure of AM’s vary from favela to favela, however almost
all provide at the very least basic educational and social service functions.

Members of neighborhood associations usually have to pay dues to support the organization’s activities
and its board of directors. Many of the AM’s, however, are run singularly by a president of the
association whose expenses are then paid for by the members. Often the case is that the president has
supreme power over the AM and the possibility to run it almost single-handedly. The president, then, is
sometimes able to enforce his/her will over the community.

The authoritarian like power of AM presidents aids to one of the chronic problems of AM’s and of
democratic goal seeking in general: clientielism. Clientielism is very much a part of Latin American
political culture in general, but it has often had a particular stranglehold over Brazilian political culture.
The president of the AM often may only be interested in partaking in ventures in which he or she is
guaranteed some rewards for their participation. For example presidents will agree to campaign for
candidates in the understanding that the neighborhood association will be rewarded if the candidate
wins. (Arias, 2004) To keep presidents and AM’s free from political manipulation it is written in nearly
all neighborhood association’s statutes that they cannot be used as tools for party politics. (Gay, 1990)
This prevents neighborhood presidents from getting too close with particular parties or individual
candidates.

The strength of the AM’s is in jeopardy, though, due to the rising gang violence in the favelas,
revolving largely around the illicit drug trade, particularly of cocaine. This rise in gang violence was
displayed on a wide international audience in the critically acclaimed film City of God, released in
2002, which depicted the hard reality of the urban slums. Ironically, though, one of the local actors in
the film was caught a year later attempting to steal a woman’s purse in downtown Rio. (BBC News
Online) The rise in gangs, then, has had a two-pronged effect: on the one hand it has brought about
stronger identification within the favelas due to the polarization of gang violence, and on the other hand
it has aided in the rise of rightist politicians to adopt more severe measures to crack down on crime.
Furthermore, the rise in police presence, and subsequent brutality, in the favelas has resulted in the
increased credibility of the gangs as de facto protectors from the police. The gangs, however, put a
hamper on political organization within the favelas, due not only to violence, but also increased drug
abuse.

One of the largest favela schemes is the ongoing ‘Favela-Bairro’ neighborhood improvement program.
The program, starting in the 1990’s under Mayor Cesar Maia, has attempted to improve favelas
throughout the city, rather than the usual (and malicious) policy of tearing them down. The program
seeks to improve living conditions in neighborhoods by providing them with basic infrastructure and
social services, and it seeks to decrease unemployment by providing adult education and job training.
(Bótas, 2003) The program has met with mixed success, especially regarding job training, but still it is
largely seen as a successful step in the right direction for favelados.

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Religion also plays an increasingly important factor in organizing the favelados. Historically the
Catholic Church has dominated the religious consciousness after colonialism, and thus has played a
crucial role in developing as well as undermining urban poor movements. As a rejection of Catholic
colonialism, Evangelicalism is sharply on the rise and historically was maintained as a sly affront to the
Church elites. Evangelicalism has spread rapidly throughout the favelas and has brought with it mostly
Pentecostal Churches. (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, 2003) These churches and their leaders have been
largely unconcerned with social or political matters and promote devout religious participation and
livelihoods. Conversely, the Catholic Church has adopted the ‘Charismatic Renewal’, which in many
ways imitates the successes of the Pentecostal movement. Nevertheless, the Catholic alternative also
remains primarily a religious base with no concern for addressing social and political matters. The
Church, though, has been active in urban campaigns such as the ‘Campaign Against Hunger’.

The Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker’s Party, PT), was one of the main parties that championed the
urban poor movement starting in the 1980’s. Despite urban support seen in Lulu’s presidential election
under the PT party, the PT has not fared as well in Rio de Janeiro as it has elsewhere, particularly in
Sao Paulo. This is because unlike in Sao Paulo, where the PT had a flare for populism, the PT in Rio de
Janeiro represented more of an elitist group with ties to the middle class, intellectuals, professionals,
and radical students. On the other hand, the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Labour
Party, PDT) has enjoyed a large amount of success in favelas throughout Rio. The PDT represents a
more centered stance compared to the more leftist PT, but the PDT is also a coalition with the PT in the
current national government.

Locally the current mayor, Cesar Maia, is serving his third term where he won a convincing majority in
the first round of the 2004 mayoral elections. He has shuffled back and forth among centrist and right
parties throughout his political career, realigning himself with the center right Partido da Frente
Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front, PFL) in 2000. He has taken hard stances on squatting and the urban
poor, even suggesting the streets be doused at night with toxic solution to keep away street sleepers and
allowing the military to play a role in trying to re-establish law and order in the crime-ridden favelas.
He is also a potential leading candidate in the 2006 presidential elections.

The rise in evangelical religious importance in Rio de Janeiro can be seen politically in the rise of the
Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party, PSB). This left leaning social democratic party
has achieved a stronghold in Rio largely due to the party’s evangelical support from favelados. PSB
and other smaller parties have gained influence because in Rio’s electoral system proportional
representation in the legislative branches enables a wide array of political parties representing specific
interests. Also, there is usually high voter turnout due to the fact that it is compulsory for voters
between 18-70 years old to vote.

Favelas in greater Rio de Janeiro also constitute an overlap of race and class movements, with the
favelados often having a significantly high African background. Also, increasingly local environmental
organizations have been found. Many of these organizations arose out of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro, which helped to popularize sustainable development programs throughout the area. (Jacobs,
2002) Though, the most profound effect has been on movements in the rural areas, such as Landless
Workers' Movement.

Analysis

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Historically the neighborhood associations have been a critical part in the organization of the urban
poor in both cities. However, both cities are seeing a decline in the importance of AMs and Juntas. In
Rio, AMs are declining due to the rise in the power of gangs and drug traffickers, while in Santiago the
Juntas were stripped of much of their real power under Pinochet and have yet to regain effective power.
The neighborhood associations were created in both cities in the 1960’s, and “with the help of external
actors (political parties in Chile, the Catholic Church in Brazil), they filled the [political] vacuum and
became organizers of social life in their neighborhood.” (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, p. 103) While the
AMs in Rio de Janeiro increasingly suffer from the political culture of clientelistic relations, the Juntas
in Santiago have been effectively eliminated as representatives of pobledores due to their absorption
into the bureaucratic state structure. Generally in both cities, and especially in Rio de Janeiro, “since
the disappearance of the common enemy – the military dictatorship – isolationist and individualistic
tendencies have increased.” (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, p. 109) Also, in reaction to the declining
support for Juntas, Santiago has seen more of an increase in other local social groups, such as
Homeless Committees.

The rise in gang violence and drug trafficking is another distinguishing difference between the two
cities. The gangs in Rio de Janeiro, which although can (and do) act as political players themselves,
generally make it harder for the favelados to participate in the democratic process. Furthermore, the
increased presence, brutality, and corruption of the police in the favelas only helps to further exacerbate
tensions between the residents and the local government; conversely it then acts to encourage support
for the gangs as protectors from the police. Also, as mentioned earlier, the gangs “paralyze the
activities of the AMs and/or considerably limit their possibilities of gaining influence in their respective
neighborhoods.” (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, p. 108)

The increase in local religious organizations is a trend found in both favelas and poblaciones.
Especially the growth of evangelical churches has caught on strongly in both cities. Specifically Rio de
Janeiro is seeing a growth of Pentecostal churches, which are having a dramatic effect on favelados.
Also, unlike in Santiago, religious groups in Rio de Janeiro have a greater ability to compete with AMs
and other groups in the neighborhood, effectively competing for members (and money).

Electoral differences in the two countries partly account for differing political cultures within the cities.
Chile’s municipal elections essentially resemble a winner take all two party system, because they must
mostly choose between the two party pacts. In Brazil, on the other hand, true proportional elections
enable a wider array of political parties that can be more tailored to the poor’s interests. Regardless,
voter turnout of the urban poor, though lower when compared with the rest of the population, is kept
quite high in both cities due to compulsory voting.

Clientelism and personalism have had a much larger affect on Brazilian politics than in Chile. This has
led the urban poor in Rio to be alienated by local and regional elites who will trade personal favors for
programs that could actually help their constituents. The high amount of personalization has also
helped to make the political system very unstable, with parties constantly rising, falling, and merging
together. The PT is the only political party started at the bottom level that has lasted in Brazil. This
process can lead to the increased disillusionment of the urban poor as they see politics as a means for
only benefiting people in power. However, the favelados have used the unstable political atmosphere
and personalistic nature of politics to their benefit by promoting competition between parties. Also, due
to personalism and clientelism, politicians frequinetly visit favelas making them relatively well-known
in the area.

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Conversely, in Santiago political culture has taken a much more professional and less charismatic
approach. The “Chilean party system is, in contrast to the Brazilian one, highly consolidated and has a
high level of institutionalization.” (Berg-Schlosser & Kersting, p. 157) Despite this fact,
disillusionment remains high due to the continued presence and distrust of the ex-military regime. Also,
“Chile has suffered from political and party apathy because political parties are increasingly perceived
as representatives of particular interests, rather than transmitters between the state and society.” (Berg-
Schlosser & Kersting, p. 96)

In both cities participation in unions is also quite low. This can be accounted for because most
shantytown residents in Rio de Janeiro and Santiago are either unemployed, seasonally employed, self-
employed, or employed in very small enterprises. All of these factors, then, make it quite difficult to
acquire the worker solidarity needed in neighborhoods to form vocational associations.

The pobladores in Santiago are also generally more educated than their counterpart favelados in Rio de
Janeiro. Pobladores enjoy higher literacy rates and demonstrate greater respect for democratic rights in
society. Also, due to a stronger democratic past prior to authoritarian rule, pobladores generally expect
more from their ruling government in terms of improving the living conditions of the population and
overcoming poverty and unemployment.

Programs in each city often share similar goals, such as the Barrio programs. The Favella-Barrio
program started in Rio de Janeiro and has spread to many other Latin American countries. The Chile
program has differed from the Rio one in that it has focused on tearing down shantytowns and
relocating the poor into sturdier housing settlements. The effect of the Earth Summit logic, though, can
be seen in the stated goal of the Chile program: “to achieve a substantial improvement in the housing
situation, the environmental quality and opportunities for social and involvement and employment for
families living in precarious settlements.” (SIRG, 2000) Santiago now seems to be aligning with the
current Rio program in the goal to build infrastructure and strengthen employment possibilities within
the already existing neighborhoods.

Conclusion

The urban poor in Santiago and Rio de Janeiro are different due to many factors, but in many ways they
are very similar. Combined, the two cities give a broad overview of the urban poor in Latin America;
an urban poor that is characterized by makeshift housing, but underneath that façade exists an historical
and complex political relationship with government at all levels. Unfortunately, the stereotypes in some
cases are holding true as Rio de Janeiro plunges into a violent gang ridden atmosphere, and Santiago is
an example of an ex-authoritarian state reluctantly decentralizing power and struggling to be
‘democratic’. The favelados and pobladores who are stuck in the middle of these scenarios, violence
and poor representation, are emblematic of the urban poor in Latin America. Yet hope can be found in
the continued existence of political involvement, the adaptive ability of the urban poor, and in the
Barrio programs that perhaps demonstrate changing policies between the cities and the poor. Future
research can focus on more efficient ways for the urban poor to participate and on the developing
relationship between the urban poor and outside groups, such as NGOs and international organizations.
It remains to be seen if neighborhood associations will be able to continue to represent the urban poor’s
best interest, but what is certain is that urbanization remains a strong trend and as long as these
countries maintain legitimate democracies then the urban poor will increasingly be major political
players.

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