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David Trafimow
NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY
One of the most extensive and influential research programs in the history of
social psychology was spawned by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen’s theory
of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein, 1963, 1967, 1980;
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and its descendants such as Ajzen’s (1988, 1991)
theory of planned behavior. A cursory search of the citation index reveals
thousands of citations for each of these theories, thereby demonstrating that
this program of research has been extremely successful in terms of its influ-
ence on the field of psychology.
However, the fact that the theory of reasoned action has been influential
does not necessarily mean that it is a good theory. It has been subjected to
criticisms by several authors (e.g., Greve, 2001; Liska, 1984; Miniard &
Cohen, 1981; Ogden, 2003; Smedslund, 2000). The most important criticism,
and the one that inspired the present article, is that the theory of reasoned
action is not falsifiable (see Greve, 2001; Ogden, 2003; Smedslund, 2000, for
recent examples). Because a theory must be falsifiable to be a good theory, if
the theory of reasoned action is not falsifiable, then it is not a good theory
regardless of how many researchers believe it to be useful.
With this point in mind, I have two goals. The first goal is specific to the the-
ory of reasoned action: I wish to examine whether or not it is falsifiable under
reasonable criteria for falsification. In presenting my analysis, I will argue that
(a) it has survived some potentially rather destructive tests, (b) in some cases
it actually has been falsified, and (c) research emanating from the theory of
reasoned action can be used to falsify other theories that, in turn, also have
been criticized on falsificationist grounds. The second goal is more general and
stems from an observation that researchers who are not psychologists often
accuse psychologists of proposing theories that are not falsifiable. Even where
only psychologists are concerned, they often accuse theories that have sur-
vived for a long period of time as being unfalsifiable (see Betsch & Pohl, 2002;
Gannon, 2002; Hellberg, 2006; McGuire, 2006; Roth, Wilhelm, Pettit, &
Meuroet, 2005, for a few recent examples not pertaining to the theory of rea-
soned action). It is my belief that psychologists have not thought through the
issue of falsification in a sufficiently critical manner and that accusations of
unfalsifiability would be much less common if they did so. Worse yet, I believe
that much research of potential value is not performed because researchers
blindly assume that the relevant theories are not falsifiable and consequently
conclude that the research is impossible. So my second and more general goal
is to stimulate researchers to think more critically about falsification.
{1} If T then O
{2} O
{3} Therefore T (invalid conclusion)
In contrast, if the observation does not come out, one can validly draw a con-
clusion about the falsity of the theory by the logic of Modus Tollens as follows.
TRAFIMOW: THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION 503
{1} If T then O
{2} Not O
{3} Therefore not T
Thus, if one attempts to prove a theory to be true by experiment, then one nec-
essarily commits the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, whereas if
one wishes to disprove a theory by experiment, one can use the valid logic of
Modus Tollens. Therefore, Popper urged researchers to try to disprove theo-
ries rather than to try to prove them. But if one wishes to disprove theories,
then a prerequisite for doing so is that the theories make predictions that
might not be true. In short, the theories must be falsifiable.
Of course, as Popper was well aware, matters are not this simple. The com-
plexity was described particularly effectively by his student, Imre Lakatos
(1978). According to Lakatos, experimental predictions never come only from
a theory; they come from a combination of a theory and assumptions that
are outside the theory, which he termed auxiliary assumptions. Consider,
for example, predictions about the velocities and positions of the planets that
have been made from Newton’s Laws of Motion. To make such predictions,
it is not only necessary to have a theory such as that proposed by Newton, but
it is also necessary to make auxiliary assumptions about the current positions
of the planets and their speeds, and to make various other assumptions about
the presence or absence of additional astronomical bodies (and their posi-
tions, speeds, masses, etc.). Consequently, if obtained data contradict a the-
ory, it is not necessary to conclude that the theory is wrong because the
problem may reside in one or more of the auxiliary assumptions (Duhem,
1906/1954; Lakatos, 1978; Meehl, 1990, 1997; Quine, 1953/1980). The pos-
sibility of blaming an observational failure on one or more auxiliary assump-
tions rather than the theory means that the observational failure does not have
the power to unequivocally doom the theory.
The Lakatosian argument can be illustrated easily with the following syl-
logism, where A1, A2, and so on, refer to auxiliary assumptions.
Given that one appreciates how auxiliary assumptions complicate theory falsi-
fication, this appreciation does not, by itself, strongly imply that scientists should
not be concerned with falsification. It is possible to argue that Lakatosian diffi-
culties are just that—difficulties—and the fact that something is difficult does
not mean that it should not be attempted. Moreover, even though the necessity
of having auxiliary assumptions causes absolute falsification to be impossible
to attain, it might be possible to have less stringent criteria and argue for some
kind of “reasonable” falsification that would be possible to attain. Even if the
504 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(4)
his responsibility for creating an imperfect universe, or perhaps the being that
answered the prayer is not really God, and so on. But as I pointed out earlier,
this is a problem with any scientific theory—contradictory data can always be
attributed to wrong auxiliary assumptions rather than to wrong theories. The
point is that if one is sufficiently creative about auxiliary assumptions, it is
always possible to have tests of seemingly unfalsifiable theories.1 Ultimately,
when one decides how much to believe or disbelieve a theory, the issue is the
weight of the evidence, the plausibility of alternative explanations, presumptions
about the validity of auxiliary assumptions, and so on, rather than conclusive
proof or disproof.
Although falsification—or at least the naïve version presented here thus
far—is clearly an inadequate philosophy of science, a more sophisticated ver-
sion has some desirable characteristics. For example, Popper argued that
although theories cannot be proven, they can be corroborated (supported) to
a greater or lesser degree depending on their ability to make risky predictions,
which are predictions that are likely to be wrong if the theory is wrong. Of
course, as I explained earlier, all predictions, whether risky or not, come from
the theory and auxiliary assumptions. Consequently, if one theory makes
more risky predictions than another, it might be that the other theory would
have made more risky predictions in the context of more creative auxiliary
assumptions. Nevertheless, the fact that a particular theory has been shown to
make risky predictions is a point in its favour: the theory allows researchers
to predict something that they would be unlikely to predict without the
theory. Therefore, I will retain Popper’s assertion that, ceteris paribus, risky
predictions are a point in favor of the theories that have been demonstrated to
make them.
Because of the difficulty in evaluating theories without a supporting context
of auxiliary assumptions, Lakatos (1978) argued that whole research programs
rather than single theories should be evaluated. From a philosophical point of
view this is not very satisfying because it suggests that philosophers can deem
research programs to be successful only after they have demonstrated them-
selves to be so, and it would be desirable to be able to make these evaluations on
an a priori basis. But from a psychological perspective, particularly from the per-
spective of evaluating theory of reasoned action research, there has been over 40
years of research, and so it seems reasonable to inquire as to whether this
research program has led to risky predictions. If the answer is in the affirmative,
that would constitute a strong point in its favour, whereas if the answer is in the
negative, that would constitute strong support for its falsificationist critics.
This section contains a brief description of the theory of reasoned action fol-
lowed by two examples of risky predictions that have been made from the theory.
506 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(4)
In one case the risky prediction has been supported, but in the other case it has
not. These cases will be split into subsections dealing with the distinction between
attitude and subjective norm and whether attitudes have both a cognitive and
affective component.
This section expands on theory of reasoned action research in two ways. The
first subsection presents a risky prediction made by Ajzen’s (1988) theory of
planned behavior, which is an extension of the theory of reasoned action. The
second subsection shows how Fishbein’s distinction between attitudes and
subjective norms can be used as an auxiliary assumption to derive a risky
prediction from Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.
510 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(4)
Discussion
detail by Putnam (1975), Smedslund (1991), and Michael and Lise Wallach
(1998; also see L. Wallach & M.A. Wallach, 2001) is the issue of tautologies
and near-tautologies. Triandis (1980) pointed out an example of a tautological
proposition in the attitude area—specifically, that attitudes have often been
defined as predispositions for behavior. Given this definition, Triandis asserted
that the numerous tests that have been conducted of whether attitudes predict
behaviors seem misplaced because attitudes must predict behaviors by defini-
tion, regardless of any empirical findings. Less extremely, Michael and Lise
Wallach (1998) suggested that much research in social psychology involves
the use of near-tautologies—theories that “are so entrenched in the system
of assumptions implicit in social psychological thinking that they cannot be
disconfirmed” (p. 184). Because the system of assumptions in which social
psychology theories are entrenched is so strongly accepted, any deviations of
data from predictions would be deemed to be due to faulty auxiliary assump-
tions rather than due to the wrongness of the theory (or the wrongness of the
implicit assumptions to which the theory is tied). It might seem that tauto-
logical or near-tautological theories are not capable of being falsified.
It is true that falsification is an irrelevant consideration for tautological
propositions—there can be little doubt that definitions are not susceptible
to falsification (Putnam, 1975). But they are susceptible to considerations of
utility, as can be seen by examining the history of attitude research. It was
largely because of numerous demonstrations of low or nonexistent attitude–
behavior correlations (reviewed by Wicker, 1969) that Fishbein and Ajzen were
led to redefine attitudes as evaluations of behaviors rather than as predisposi-
tions to perform them, thereby rendering the predictive and causal effects of
attitudes on behaviors as empirical questions. By making this new definition
the centerpiece of their theory and by adding useful auxiliary assumptions in
the form of a measurement model, they were able to dramatically improve the
prediction of behaviors. Thus, the problem is not whether one definition or
another definition is true (“true” has no meaning in this context), rather it is
their relative utilities that are in question. The relative utility of definitions, in
turn, depends largely on the relative success of the theories in which they play
a role. Thus, although definitions themselves are not falsifiable, empirical
research can lead them to be changed for the better (Quine, 1953/1980). And
whatever the definitions are, the theories that contain them can be exposed to
risky predictions with the adroit use of auxiliary assumptions.
Let us now consider near-tautologies. I tend to agree with Wallach and
Wallach (L. Wallach & M.A. Wallach, 1998; M.A. Wallach & L. Wallach,
1998) that the particular examples of research they cite as near-tautological are
not major contributions to psychology. However, I disagree with them about
why this is so. According to Wallach and Wallach, the theories are not capable
of being falsified because they are too closely tied to the implicit assumptions
social psychologists have (O’Donohue, 1989, termed these “metaphysics”). But
I see nothing, in principle, that makes it impossible for researchers to make their
TRAFIMOW: THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION 513
Boundary Conditions
Greenwald, Pratkanis, and Leippe (1986) stated that social psychology theories
are overgeneralized: the boundary conditions are narrower than is apparent
from the writings of proponents of these theories. In addition, Greenwald et al.
pointed out that there is a confirmation bias that retards progress because
researchers are so busy looking for evidence that confirms their theories that
they may not find out what the boundary conditions are for decades. To address
this problem, Greenwald et al. suggested two research strategies that move
away from theory testing. The idea of the condition-seeking strategy is to search
for the conditions under which the predicted effect occurs or does not occur.
This strategy can be used iteratively to obtain increasingly precise results.
For example, one might find that result R occurs under condition C1 but not
under condition C2. In turn, further research might indicate that condition C1
produces result R only under condition C3, and so on. In contrast, the idea of
the design strategy is to try to find conditions under which one can obtain a
presently unobtainable result. Both strategies move the researcher away from
theory testing and towards obtaining a more detailed empirical picture.
As Greenwald et al. (1986) recognized, these strategies can be criticized.
They cited Cronbach (1975), for example, as arguing that strategies such as
these, rather than leading to more scientific progress, instead lead to an infinitely
lengthy process of accumulating increasingly trivial findings. Greenwald et al.’s
514 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(4)
Conclusion
Notes
1. The reader may consider the discovery of a crucial prayer of this sort to be unlikely.
But how unlikely would it have seemed to an 18th-century chemist if someone had
suggested the possibility that one day scientists would determine the chemical
composition of the stars from the light that they radiate?
2. It may be possible to save the concept of perceived behavioral control by treating
it as a superordinate concept that has distinct “control” and “difficulty” components.
However, this treatment of perceived behavioral control clearly differs from Ajzen’s
original (e.g., 1988) one.
3. I thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version
of this article.
4. Another problem with psychology theories is that they tend to be mere summariza-
tions of empirical findings rather than real theories. Although this issue is too tan-
gential to the main points of present concern for further elaboration, Stam (1992)
has discussed it in some detail.
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