Cold Reheat EPRI

Guidelines for the Evaluation of Cold
Reheat Piping
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Guidelines for the Evaluation of
Cold Reheat Piping
1009863
Final Report, March 2005
EPRI Project Manager

R. Tilley
EPRI • 3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304 • PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303 • USA
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CITATIONS
This report was prepared by
Bevilacqua-Knight, Inc.
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Principal Investigators
R. Myhre
E. Worrell
Electric Power Research Institute

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Charlotte NC 28262
Principal Investigator
R. Tilley
This report describes research sponsored by EPRI.
The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Cold Reheat Piping, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2005. 1009863.
iii
REPORT SUMMARY
Cold reheat (CRH) piping systems pose rare but significant safety concerns for aging fossil
steam plants. Although failures of CRH piping are not a widespread problem, catastrophic
ruptures at longitudinal seam welds have occurred, fortunately without the tragic loss of life that
accompanied two major hot reheat piping failures in the 1980s. This preliminary report compiles
the latest knowledge about CRH failures and their causes and recommends a stepwise condition
assessment approach to identify piping damage and its precursors.
Background
The two best-known CRH piping failures—in 1993 at Tampa Electric’s Gannon Unit 6 and in
2003 at Texas Genco’s W.A. Parish Unit 8—each resulted from a different confluence of
original construction and in-service factors considered unlikely to recur elsewhere. Still, the
individual risk factors are common enough; and other plants have experienced serious CRH
failures, including a circumferential weld rupture at Lansing Board of Water and Light’s
Erickson Station in 2001. As the current fossil fleet accumulates the operating cycles that
contribute to the relevant damage mechanisms, it behooves power generators to formalize a
strategy for assessing CRH piping condition.
Objectives
To help fossil power personnel develop appropriate inspection and life assessment programs to
balance the reliability of their cold reheat piping systems with operationally economic
opportunities such as cycling. The guideline applies to all fossil steam units and is intended for
plant and corporate-level personnel involved in equipment life/risk assessment and outage
planning.
Approach
The project team compiled past research conducted by EPRI’s Generation and Nuclear sectors
and findings from published technical papers, private correspondence, and discussions with
fossil power engineers and others in the industry. Although research specifically on CRH piping
damage has generally been limited to the few rupture incidents, the responsible damage
mechanisms—fatigue, corrosion pitting, and overstress—have been well studied in other plant
systems. The report applies the relevant lessons learned from EPRI condition assessment and
remaining life research for hot reheat piping and for headers and drums to cold reheat piping
systems. It employs EPRI’s three-level evaluation process to help engineers assess individual
unit risk, conduct initial inspections, and interpret results to make decisions regarding further
inspections and future inspection intervals.
v
Results
Although serious damage to CRH piping has not been widespread, the most common damage
observations have been corrosion pits and grooves, cracks from fatigue or corrosion-assisted
fatigue, and plastic yielding/deformation of piping due to overstress caused by water hammer,
thermal shock, or poor performance of piping supports. The risk of damage appears higher for
units with undesirable seam weld orientations, frequent startups and operating pressure changes
(cycling), frequent or poorly controlled attemperation, piping constrained from thermal
expansion, inadequate drainage, and inside wall stress concentrators such as geometric
discontinuities at weld toes or corrosion pits/grooves.
The guideline report begins with general background regarding CRH piping system components,
their fabrication, and operation. Tables summarize the possible damage mechanisms and risk
factors and for various CRH components and are followed by discussion of how risk is
influenced by plant design, fabrication, operation, and maintenance. Generalized decision-tree
flowcharts guide the reader through EPRI’s three-level evaluation process, beginning with self-
assessment of risk; continuing with basic inspections; and finally, if damage is discovered,
proceeding to more detailed inspections and analysis to support run/repair/replace decisions. The
latter chapters and appendices of the report provide references for the evaluation methodology,
including checklists for hot and cold walkdowns of piping support systems; discussion of
potential nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques—video/optical probe, penetrant testing,
magnetic particle testing, pulse-echo ultrasonic testing (UT), time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD)
UT, acoustic emission, strain gaging—and piping stress analysis to identify damage-susceptible
weld locations; considerations for developing remaining life assessments and longer-term O&M
strategies for CRH piping; and data on CRH failures.
EPRI Perspective
This guideline is a companion to EPRI report 1004329, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-
Welded High-Energy Piping, which covers seam-welded, hot reheat and main steam piping.
Keywords
Cold reheat piping
Attemperator (desuperheater)
Thermal shock
Thermal fatigue
Corrosion pitting
Water hammer
Condition assessment
NDE (Nondestructive examination)
Cycling
vi
EPRI Licensed Material
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank the following power generation personnel for discussing their
experience with cold reheat piping inspections and their findings: Andrew German of Duke
Power, Paul Waldrop of Entergy Services, Peter Boyles of Exelon Corp., Alan Waddingham of
First Energy Corp., Greg Heinz of Great River Energy, John Alice of the Salt River Project, Joe
Frey of Stress Engineering Associates, Vern Spangler of Tampa Electric, James Kessling of
Texas Genco, and Larry Heise of TransAlta.
Alan Grunsky of EPRI’s Fossil Maintenance Applications Center is gratefully acknowledged for
providing information on best practices for inspecting piping hangers and supports.
vii
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1-1
1.1 Purpose of This Guideline ...............................................................................................1-1
1.2 Report Organization ........................................................................................................1-2
2 BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................2-1
2.1 System Overview ............................................................................................................2-1
2.2 Design and Fabrication Overview ...................................................................................2-2
2.3 Piping Support System Overview....................................................................................2-3
2.4 Operational Issues ..........................................................................................................2-5
2.5 CRH Piping Ruptures ......................................................................................................2-5
2.5.1 Parish Unit 8,, ...........................................................................................................2-6
2.5.2 Gannon Unit 6 .........................................................................................................2-8
2.5.3 Erickson Station.......................................................................................................2-8
3 OVERVIEW OF COMMON DAMAGE MECHANISMS ..........................................................3-1
4 DESIGN, FABRICATION, AND O&M FACTORS RELATED TO CRH DAMAGE ................4-1

4.1 Risk Factors and Damage Mechanisms..........................................................................4-1
4.2 Overstress Mechanisms..................................................................................................4-9
4.2.1 Water Hammer ........................................................................................................4-9
4.2.1.1 Introduction and Background ...........................................................................4-9
4.2.1.2 Nature of Damage and Probable Locations...................................................4-10
4.2.2 Thermal Stress and Thermal Shock ......................................................................4-11
4.2.2.1 Introduction and Background .........................................................................4-11
4.2.3 Overstress from Pipe Support and Restraint Deficiencies ....................................4-12
ix
4.3 Fatigue Mechanisms on Pipe Interior............................................................................4-14

4.3.1 Internal Fatigue and Corrosion-Assisted Fatigue at Seam and Girth Welds .........4-14
4.3.2 Internal Fatigue and Corrosion-Assisted Fatigue at Through-Wall
Penetrations and Other Discontinuities ..........................................................................4-17
4.4 Fatigue Mechanisms on Pipe Exterior and Attachments...............................................4-18
4.4.1 Introduction and Background.................................................................................4-18
4.4.2 Nature of Damage and Probable Locations ..........................................................4-19
4.5 Corrosion Pitting............................................................................................................4-20
4.5.1 Introduction and Background.................................................................................4-20
4.5.2 Nature of Damage and Probable Locations ..........................................................4-20
4.6 Design and Fabrication Contributions to CRH Damage Mechanisms...........................4-21
4.6.1 Design and Fabrication Contributions to Damage Mechanisms Involving
Welds..............................................................................................................................4-21
4.6.1.1 Nature of Weld Defects..................................................................................4-22
4.6.1.2 Seam Welds ..................................................................................................4-24
4.6.1.3 Girth Welds ....................................................................................................4-24
4.6.1.4 Support Attachment Welds ............................................................................4-25
4.6.1.5 Branch and Instrumentation Attachment Welds.............................................4-25
4.6.1.6 Weld Properties .............................................................................................4-26
4.6.1.7 Weld Location ................................................................................................4-26
CRH Piping and Piping Support System ........................................................................4-27
Water ..............................................................................................................................4-28
4.6.3.1 Pooled Water Damage...................................................................................4-28
4.6.3.2 Water Sources ...............................................................................................4-29
4.6.3.3 Drainage ........................................................................................................4-30
4.6.3.4 Instrumentation ..............................................................................................4-30
Attemperators and HPT Bypass Control Valves.............................................................4-31
4.6.4.1 Attemperator Design ......................................................................................4-31
4.6.4.2 HPT Bypass Design.......................................................................................4-32
x
4.6.4.3 Attemperator Water Supply Temperature ......................................................4-33

4.7 O&M Contributions to CRH Damage Mechanisms .......................................................4-33
4.7.1 Startup, Shutdown, and Load Cycling ...................................................................4-34
4.7.2 Attemperator Operation and Maintenance ............................................................4-35
4.7.3 Low-Point Drains ...................................................................................................4-35
4.7.4 Instrumentation......................................................................................................4-36
4.7.5 Piping Support System ..........................................................................................4-36
5 CONDITION ASSESSMENT ROADMAP ..............................................................................5-1

5.1 Condition Assessment Fundamentals.............................................................................5-1
5.2 The Roadmap for CRH Piping System Evaluation..........................................................5-2
5.2.1 Step 1: Review Records ..........................................................................................5-4
5.2.2 Step 2A: Determine If Piping Is Seam-Welded........................................................5-5
5.2.3 Step 2B: Conduct Hot Walkdown ............................................................................5-7
5.2.4 Step 2C: Interview Personnel ..................................................................................5-7
5.2.5 Step 3: Conduct Risk Self-Assessment...................................................................5-8
5.2.6 Step 4A: Conduct On-Pipe Verification to Determine If Seam-Welded .................5-13
5.2.7 Step 4B: Perform Visual and NDE Inspections .....................................................5-13
5.2.8 Step 5: Interpret Findings ......................................................................................5-15
5.2.9 Step 6: Perform Additional NDE Inspections.........................................................5-16
5.2.10 Step 7: Interpret Findings and Make Disposition Decision ..................................5-17
5.2.11 Step 8: Establish Reinspection Interval for Run Decisions, Make
Repairs/Replacements, and Add New Instrumentation..................................................5-18
5.2.12 Step 9: Continue Routine Inspection and Maintenance Programs ......................5-18
6 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES .....................................................................................................6-1

6.1 Piping Support Systems ..................................................................................................6-1
6.2 Piping and Welds ............................................................................................................6-3
6.2.1 Visual Inspection .....................................................................................................6-4
6.2.1.1 Liquid Penetrant Testing ..................................................................................6-4
6.2.1.2 Magnetic Particle Testing.................................................................................6-4
6.2.1.3 Optical Probes .................................................................................................6-5
6.2.1.4 Hardness Testing.............................................................................................6-5
6.2.2 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) Techniques ........................................................................6-5
6.2.2.1 Locating Seam Welds ......................................................................................6-6
xi
6.2.2.2 Conventional Ultrasonic Testing ......................................................................6-6

6.2.2.3 Time-of-Flight Diffraction..................................................................................6-7
6.2.3 Acoustic Emission Testing.......................................................................................6-9
6.2.4 Strain Gaging...........................................................................................................6-9
6.3 Attemperators................................................................................................................6-10
7 CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISPOSITION DECISIONS ..........................................................7-1

7.1 Pre-Outage Planning.......................................................................................................7-2
7.2 Determining Crack Size and Characteristics...................................................................7-3
7.3 Estimating the Date and Location of Crack Initiation.......................................................7-3
7.4 Identifying the Key Crack Growth Drivers .......................................................................7-3
7.5 Predicting Future Influences on Key Drivers ...................................................................7-4
7.6 Predicting Stress-Driven Fatigue Crack Growth..............................................................7-5
7.6.1 High-Strain Fatigue (HSF) .......................................................................................7-5
7.6.2 Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) .............................................................7-6
7.6.3 Critical Distance Methods........................................................................................7-6
7.6.4 Stress Averaging Approach.....................................................................................7-7
7.7 Predicting Corrosion-Driven Growth................................................................................7-7
7.8 Remaining-Life Estimates and Reinspection Interval......................................................7-7
7.9 Perspective from Case Studies—Gannon and Parish ....................................................7-8
8 CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................................8-1
9 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................9-1
A FAILURE EXPRERIENCE WITH COLD REHEAT PIPING.................................................. A-1

A.1 Plant Name: W.A. Parish Unit 8 (Texas Genco, formerly Reliant Energy),, ................... A-1
A.1.1 Operating History ................................................................................................... A-1
A.1.2 Temperature/Pressure ........................................................................................... A-1
A.1.3 Repairs................................................................................................................... A-2
A.1.4 Dimensions ............................................................................................................ A-2
A.1.5 Hoop Stress ........................................................................................................... A-2
A.1.6 Attemperator Water................................................................................................ A-2
A.1.7 Manufacturing History ............................................................................................ A-2
A.1.8 Inspection/Analysis ................................................................................................ A-2
A.1.9 Metallurgical Analysis............................................................................................. A-3
xii
A.1.10 Mechanical Tests ................................................................................................. A-4

A.1.11 Disposition............................................................................................................ A-4
A.2 Plant Name: Gannon Unit 6 (Tampa Electric; repowered as Bayside Unit 2
combined cycle in 2004)....................................................................................................... A-5
A.2.1 Operating History ................................................................................................... A-5
A.2.2 Temperature/Pressure ........................................................................................... A-5
A.2.3 Dimensions ............................................................................................................ A-5
A.2.4 Hoop Stress ........................................................................................................... A-6
A.2.5 Manufacturing History ............................................................................................ A-6
A.2.6 Inspection/Analysis ................................................................................................ A-6
A.2.7 Metallurgical Analysis............................................................................................. A-7
A.2.8 Mechanical Tests ................................................................................................... A-8
A.2.9 Disposition.............................................................................................................. A-9
A.3 Plant Name: Erickson Station (Lansing Board of Water & Light)................................... A-9
A.4 Plant Name: O1 ........................................................................................................... A-10
A.4.1 Operating History ................................................................................................. A-10
A.4.2 Inspection/Analysis .............................................................................................. A-10
A.5 Plant Name: F1 ............................................................................................................ A-10
A.5.1 Operating History ................................................................................................. A-10
A.5.2 Dimensions .......................................................................................................... A-10
A.5.3 Manufacturing History .......................................................................................... A-11
A.5.4 Inspection/Analysis .............................................................................................. A-11
B TIME-OF-FLIGHT DIFFRACTION EXAMINATION PROCEDURE ...................................... B-1

B.1 Scope............................................................................................................................. B-1
B.2 References..................................................................................................................... B-1
B.3 Definitions ...................................................................................................................... B-2
B.4 Personnel..................................................................................................................... B-12
B.5 Equipment and Software Requirements ...................................................................... B-12
B.6 Setup and Calibration .................................................................................................. B-13
B.7 Examination ................................................................................................................. B-18
B.8 Recording and Evaluation of Indications...................................................................... B-19
B.9 Sizing of Indications ..................................................................................................... B-21
B.10 Acceptance/Rejection Criteria.................................................................................... B-22
B.11 Reporting ................................................................................................................... B-22
xiii
C ULTRASONIC FLAW-SIZING PROCEDURE ...................................................................... C-2

C.1 Summary ....................................................................................................................... C-2
C.2 Purpose ......................................................................................................................... C-2
C.3 Scope ............................................................................................................................ C-2
C.4 Equipment ..................................................................................................................... C-2
C.4.1 Ultrasonic Instrument ............................................................................................. C-2
C.4.2 Ultrasonic Search Units ......................................................................................... C-2
C.4.3 Calibration Blocks .................................................................................................. C-2
C.5 Length-Sizing Technique ............................................................................................... C-2
C.6 Height-Sizing Technique................................................................................................ C-2
C.6.1 High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Method.................................................................. C-2
C.6.2 Full-Vee Path Corner Reflection ............................................................................ C-2
C.6.3 Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method ................................................................................... C-2
C.7 Calibration Method......................................................................................................... C-2
C.7.1 Calibration for High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Method .......................................... C-2
C.7.2 Calibration for Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method............................................................ C-2
C.8 Size Determination ........................................................................................................ C-2
C.8.1 Confirming Results With Complementary Techniques .......................................... C-2
C.8.2 Preparation for Sizing ............................................................................................ C-2
C.8.3 Flaws Connected to the Inside Surface ................................................................. C-2
C.8.4 Flaws Connected to the Outside Surface .............................................................. C-2
C.8.5 Flaws Not Surface-Connected ............................................................................... C-2
C.9 Recording ...................................................................................................................... C-2
C.10 Evaluation .................................................................................................................... C-2
xiv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 5-1 Overall Roadmap for Cold Reheat Piping System Evaluation..................................5-3
Figure 5-2 Details of Step 1 of the Roadmap.............................................................................5-5
Figure 5-3 Details of Roadmap Steps 2A and 4A ......................................................................5-6
Figure 5-4 Details of Step 4B of the Roadmap ........................................................................5-14
Figure 5-5 Details of Step 5 of the Roadmap...........................................................................5-15
Figure 6-1 Piping Walkdown Checklist ......................................................................................6-2
Figure 6-2 Typical Probe Arrangement and Ultrasonic Wave Paths .........................................6-7
Figure B-1 Digitized A-Scan Slice Taken From the Cursor Position in the Corresponding
B-Scan Image ................................................................................................................... B-2
Figure B-2 Effects of Signal Averaging .................................................................................... B-2
Figure B-3 B-Scan Data Collection Mode ................................................................................ B-2
Figure B-4 Depiction of the Process of Converting A-Scan Waveforms to a B-Scan
Image ................................................................................................................................ B-2
Figure B-5 D-Scan Data Collection Mode................................................................................ B-2
Figure B-6 Digitization: Conversion of an Analog A-Scan Waveform Into a String of
Numbers............................................................................................................................ B-2
Figure B-7 Unrectified A-Scan Waveform With Theoretical Phase Changes .......................... B-2
Figure B-8 Pulse Width ............................................................................................................ B-2
Figure C-1 Example of Sizing Calibration Block ...................................................................... C-2
Figure C-2 High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Beam .................................................................... C-2
Figure C-3 Application Range for High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Beams ............................... C-2
Figure C-4 Application Range for Full-Vee Path Corner Reflection......................................... C-2
Figure C-5 Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method ................................................................................... C-2
Figure C-6 Application Range for the Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method.......................................... C-2
Figure C-7 Absolute Arrival-Time Technique........................................................................... C-2
Figure C-8 Relative Arrival-Time Technique............................................................................ C-2
xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1 Cold Reheat Piping System Components and Their Function ..................................2-1
Table 2-2 CRH Piping System Welds ........................................................................................2-3
Table 2-3 Piping Support System Components and Their Function ..........................................2-4
Table 2-4 Cold Reheat Piping Ruptures ....................................................................................2-6
Table 2-5 Factors Contributing to Parish CRH Piping Failure....................................................2-7
Table 3-1 Common Damage Mechanisms for Cold Reheat Piping ...........................................3-1
Table 3-2 Typical Damage Sites in Cold Reheat Piping Systems .............................................3-2
Table 4-1 Risk Factors for Damage in CRH Piping Systems.....................................................4-2
Table 4-2 Characterization of Weld Discontinuities .................................................................4-23
Table 5-1 Inspection Recommendations Based on Risk Self-Assessment Findings.................5-9
Table B-1 Setup Parameters ................................................................................................... B-2
xvii
1
INTRODUCTION
Historically, cold reheat (CRH) piping systems have been reliable. They have not ordinarily
warranted significant inspection beyond routine hanger/support walkdowns, safety relief valve
testing, and checks of attemperator nozzles for wear and attachment welds for cracking. Concern
about catastrophic failures at major welds has been reserved for hot reheat piping, which is prone
to creep cracking. However, a 2003 CRH piping rupture at Texas Genco (formerly Reliant
Energy) Parish Unit 8, which was attributed to fatigue cracking at the longitudinal seam weld,
has led many generating companies to reconsider their inspection programs for cold reheat
piping.
Although the Parish incident appears to be the result of an unlikely confluence of circumstances,
many of the individual contributing factors are not uncommon. Thus, the challenge for power
producers is to evaluate the degree of risk presented by their own combinations of adverse
design, fabrication, and operating and maintenance factors for each unit, and to use that
evaluation to develop a cost-effective program to identify, inspect, and remedy or monitor any
high-risk CRH piping runs or components.
1.1 Purpose of This Guideline
EPRI created this guideline to help fossil power engineers assess their cold reheat piping
inspection programs for the various units in their fleet, and to make refinements where needed.
The guideline uses EPRI’s three-level condition assessment approach, which controls cost by
staging inspection recommendations based on initial risk evaluations and the findings of any
initial inspections. The guideline encompasses all CRH piping system components, including
seam welds, girth (circumferential) welds, attemperators, and the pipe support system.
This guideline compiles past research conducted by EPRI’s Generation and Nuclear sectors and
findings from published technical papers, private correspondence, and discussions with fossil
power engineers and others in the industry. Because the available data on cold reheat piping
damage reflect the relatively few failure incidents, and because fatigue cracking in CRH piping
is less predictable than creep crack growth in hot reheat piping, this guideline concentrates on
risk self-assessment and inspection options rather than on quantitative remaining life estimation.
1-1
Introduction
1.2 Report Organization
The report is organized as follows:

• Chapter 2—Background provides a brief overview of CRH piping system components and
their function, as well as a summary of major CRH failures.
• Chapter 3—Overview of Common Damage Mechanisms lists the mechanisms most often
responsible for CRH piping failures and where they typically occur.
• Chapter 4—Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage provides
details on the precursors to CRH piping damage (risk factors) emanating from original design
and fabrication, operating conditions, and maintenance history.
• Chapter 5—Condition Assessment Roadmap provides a step-by-step approach for
assessing CRH piping damage risk, identifying high-risk locations/components, and
structuring an inspection program.
• Chapter 6—Inspection Activities summarizes visual and other nondestructive evaluation
techniques applicable to inspection of CRH piping systems (including hangers and supports),
with an emphasis on major welds.
• Chapter 7—Considerations for Disposition Decisions provides guidance on evaluating
indications of damage revealed by NDE tests and an overview of fatigue crack growth
prediction methods as input to run-repair-replace decision making.
• Chapter 8—Conclusions summarizes findings and remaining uncertainties in CRH
condition assessment.
• Chapter 9—References lists the source materials used in preparation of the guideline.
• Appendices cover CRH failure data, time-of-flight-diffraction (TOFD) inspection, and flaw-
sizing procedures.
1-2
2
BACKGROUND
This chapter provides an overview of cold reheat piping system components and their
fabrication, operational issues, and major failures.
2.1 System Overview
Cold reheat piping is typically designed for steam temperatures ranging from about 450°F to
750°F (230°C to 400°C) and pressures of 450 to 900 psi (31 to 62 bar). It returns high-pressure
turbine (HPT) exhaust to the boiler convective section for added degrees of superheat (i.e.,
reheating). Table 2-1 summarizes the major components of CRH piping systems.
Table 2-1
Cold Reheat Piping System Components and Their Function
Component Function
Stop (shutoff) valve at the high-pressure Used to isolate the high-pressure turbine from CRH piping during bypass
turbine exhaust operation.
Bypass steam inlet Receives high-temperature steam through an HPT bypass pressure
reduction valve from the main steam line. The HPT bypass typically has
a spray attemperator downstream of, or integral to, the bypass control
valve. When the bypass is functioning properly, the bypass steam will be
at approximately the same conditions as normal for the HPT exhaust.
Wye or tee downstream of the turbine Splits cold reheat steam flow to two branch pipes to provide balanced
stop valve and bypass inlet steam flow to both ends of the reheater inlet header.
One or more spray attemperators (also Reduces the temperature of steam exiting the reheater. The water
called desuperheaters) on each pipe supply for the attemperator is typically obtained via the main feedwater
branch line or an intermediate-stage extraction from the main feedwater pump.
Depending on the extraction point and system design, the attemperator
water temperature will be determined by the deaerator, feedwater heater,
or economizer outlet temperature.
The attemperator assembly includes an attachment flange through which

supply piping passes to one or more spray nozzles. An internal liner
protects the CRH pipe from direct impingement of spray water.
One or more condensate drains before or Prevents the accumulation of water in the pipes from condensation of
after the branch point steam after unit shutdown; allows for removal of condensate, especially
before restart or after an outage.
One or more safety relief valves Releases steam to reduce pressure in case of significant overpressure.
2-1
Background
Table 2-1
Cold Reheat Piping System Components and Their Function (continued)
Component Function
Pipe support and restraint system • Holds the weight of the piping system so that no part of the
CRH piping experiences excessive stress.
• Allows piping the freedom to expand and contract due to

dimensional changes between cold (shutdown) and hot (full
load) states so as to (1) prevent unnecessary forces that cause
excessive local stress and (2) minimize transmission of forces
to the turbine and reheater inlet header.
• Provides sufficient restraint so that momentum imparted by flow

transients is absorbed by the support system and not absorbed
by deformation of the pipe material.
Insulation—on CRH piping and fittings, Controls heat loss and is a primary factor affecting the temperature of
attemperator water supply lines, and piping components during operation. Insulation quality on attemperator
drain lines. water supply lines may have significant impact on thermal cycles.
In older plants, insulation may be asbestos or other fiber wrapped in a

cloth jacket. In newer plants, it is likely to be a lightweight, solid ceramic
with aluminum jacketing. Installation details and personnel safety
precautions determine the ease of removing insulation for performing
inspections.
Thermowells and radiographic testing Minor penetrations to allow “shielded” thermocouples to measure steam
(RT) plugs temperature and for original fabrication weld inspection by radiography
(X-ray).
2.2 Design and Fabrication Overview
Piping design normally follows ASME/ANSI B31.1 Power Piping Design code. Design and
operating temperatures for CRH piping are usually, but not always, below the threshold for
significant creep behavior (approximately 850°F, or 450°C). Where temperature exceeds this
threshold, it is still unlikely that the combination of temperature, pressure, and duration would
result in significant levels of creep.
Cold reheat piping is typically constructed of high-pressure, high-temperature carbon steel

(ASTM A155, Grade 70 is a common specification), with wall thickness ranging from about 5/8
inch to >1 inch (16 to 25+ mm), depending on line size and rated pressure. At the upper
thickness range, CRH piping may experience thick-walled behavior, which involves significant
thermally induced stress during startups and load changes. CRH piping is commonly fabricated
from plate that is rolled and longitudinally seam-welded to form piping spools. Elbows and tees
may be cast or may be fabricated using one or more seam-welded halves (i.e., clamshells) and
hot or cold bending. Newer plants, and retrofits in older plants, may use seamless CRH piping
and fittings, but new seam-welded CRH piping is still common (unlike new hot reheat piping).
Large piping branches, such as the HPT bypass inlet, will generally be made with full girth welds
using fabricated, forged, or cast fittings. Large branches will generally have been designed using
stress analysis similar to the CRH piping.
2-2
Background
Smaller branch connections, such as drains, extraction points, or attemperator inlets, will
generally be made with weld saddles or weldolet-type fittings. With the somewhat thick pipe
wall used for CRH piping, stub-ins similar to those used on boiler, reheater, and superheater
headers may be used. Smaller branch piping is likely to be field-routed.
Table 2-2 summarizes the types of welds and fabrication methods used in CRH piping systems.
Table 2-2
CRH Piping System Welds
Weld Type Application and Typical Usage
Seam welds (longitudinal) Seam welds are shop-fabricated by rolling metal plate until the two edges
match neatly. The edges are given a double-bevel weld groove and welded
from both inside and outside using full penetration welds—i.e., the base
metal and weld metal are fully fused by melting base metal through the full
thickness of the weld and by melting part of each weld pass by the next one.
The weld is built up from inside and outside, with the final pass showing as a
raised weld cap.
In past practice, the weld cap was sometimes left in place. As more has
been learned about stress concentration and crack initiation phenomena,
current practice entails grinding off the weld cap to leave the weld surface
flush with base metal (although this is not a code requirement).
Girth welds Girth welds connect piping spools to elbows, tees, flanges, and other fittings.
(circumferential) Girth welds can be made in a shop or in the field. Piping fit-up is subject to
the ovality of the two mating ends and limitations of the alignment jigs used
by the welder. In many cases they are welded only from the outside (with or
without backing rings) and may come short of full penetration at the inner
surface. The inside of the weld may be left in as-welded condition or ground
smooth.
Support attachment welds In many installations, pipe supports and restraints are attached to stanchions
welded directly to the pipe. These weldments introduce a stress
concentration that may become significant if the weld is in a different location
than evaluated during design, or if it is underdesigned, flawed, or subjected
to stresses not evaluated in the original design.
2.3 Piping Support System Overview
The piping support system is critical to the proper functioning of cold reheat piping and to the
prevention of damage. Key functions of the pipe support system include the following:
• To transfer the dead weight of the piping (pipe, valves, fitting, traps, etc.) and insulation, as
well as the live weight of the contained fluids, to a suitable support structure with an
appropriate margin of safety
• To maintain adequate slope for drainage in horizontal pipe runs
• To permit thermal expansion and contraction of the piping
• To withstand and, in some cases, dampen vibrational forces applied to the piping by flow
dynamics or from equipment such as pumps
2-3
Background
Table 2-3 provides an overview of piping system components and their role.
Table 2-3
Piping Support System Components and Their Function1
Component Function
Hanger Transfers the load (dead weight and live weight) of the piping to a
suitably placed structural member, generally a beam located
above the piping. Can be rigid, variable spring, or constant force.
Support Transfers the load of the piping to a suitably placed structural

member, generally located below the piping. Can be rigid,
variable spring, or constant force.
Anchor Provides an absolutely rigid restraint of all translateral and
rotational movement (six degrees of fixity).
Limit Stop Allows free movement of the piping in some direction(s), but to a
limited extent. Sometimes (especially when vertical movement is
involved) this device is referred to as a “travel stop.”
Strut A linear structural component that is attached to the pipe at one
of its ends and attached to an auxiliary structure at the other of its
ends. The strut has articulated end connectors that allow
relatively free rotation (little or no moment translated) while
stopping translational movements, thus transferring the forces
from the piping to the auxiliary structure.
Some special struts are designed to include springs that can
apply a predetermined amount of force to the piping. These are
sometimes referred to as sway braces or vibration dampeners
(also known as sway arrestors or sway suppressors).
Snubber Linear structural component that allows free movement of the
piping at the point of attachment. The snubber will allow steady,
relatively slow movement of the piping but will “lock up” to restrain
movement if any abrupt or sudden pipe movement occurs. The
purpose of the snubber is to allow free moment of the piping
during normal thermal expansion and contraction, but to stop
movement (thereby transferring the resulting force to the auxiliary
structure) if an impact-type event (e.g., steam hammer, water
hammer, or earthquake) occurs. Snubbers can be either
hydraulic or mechanical.
1
Adapted from FMAC Pipe Hanger/Pipe Support Webcast Training, Presentations, EPRI, Charlotte, NC: September
2004.
2-4
Background
2.4 Operational Issues
Operating practices vary widely, even among plants of the same basic design within the same
company. Plants in baseload service tend to have fewer fatigue issues because of the long
durations between shutdown with nearly constant CRH piping flow, temperature, and pressure.
Plants with one or more shutdown/startup cycles per day, or even per week, impart significant
thermally induced stresses on thick-walled piping components and increase the risk of water
hammer and other rapid pressure excursions. Temperature and pressure may also change
frequently due to load following, either by high-pressure-turbine throttling or through sliding-
pressure operation. In general, greater operational change produces more stress and a greater
likelihood of fatigue cracking in CRH piping.
Frequent attemperator operation has proven to be a risk factor for CRH piping damage (see
Chapter 4). Although some plants operate for long periods with little attemperator usage, in
many plants, attemperator operation is continuously changing along with load conditions and
changing heat transfer characteristics in the furnace and reheater. Some coal-fired plants use
attemperators as frequently as once or more per hour in response to changes due to
slagging/fouling and deslagging/sootblowing of heat transfer surfaces. Factors that influence
attemperator operation and attemperator impacts on CRH piping integrity include the following:
• Tube slagging and sootblowing, dependent on fuels and operating/maintenance practices
• Use of dampers and other reheater temperature controls
• Sliding-pressure operation and other load changes
• Other impacts on gas-side and steam-side temperature and flow
• On-off versus variable attemperator control (spray quality and volume)
• Pressure and temperature of the attemperator water supply
• Maintenance of attemperator supply valves (leakage)
• Frequency and duration of high-pressure-turbine bypass operation
2.5 CRH Piping Ruptures
Table 2-4 summarizes the most severe North American CRH piping failures over the past 15
years. Additional details on these failures are included in Appendix A. Until the incidents at
Texas Genco’s Parish Unit 8 and Tampa Electric’s Gannon Unit 6, conventional wisdom
suggested that a CRH piping rupture due to fatigue crack propagation at a seam weld was
improbable.
2-5
Background
Table 2-4
Cold Reheat Piping Ruptures
Year Plant Failed Component Type of Failure Location
2003 W.A. Seam weld Catastrophic failure Crack initiated on inside diameter
Parish 8 resulting from fatigue (ID) at toe of seam weld at the 2-3
crack o’clock position and propagated
radially and longitudinally. Point of
initiation located in area of high
stress due to nearby horizontal elbow
and pipe hanger weldment, 41 feet
(12.5 m) downstream of
attemperator.
2001 Erickson Girth weld Rupture due to Catastrophic failure of CRH piping
sudden stress initiated by water hammer on startup
1993 Gannon Seam weld Catastrophic failure Crack initiated at toe of seam weld
6 resulting from on ID and propagated radially and
corrosion-assisted longitudinally. Seam weld at 6
fatigue crack o’clock position in horizontal elbow.
Upstream of attemperator.
Two leakage incidents due to inside-wall-initiated fatigue cracking at girth welds, downstream of
attemperators, have also been recorded within the last five years. The available data are listed in
Appendix A. Parish investigators also found incidents of girth weld cracking in CRH piping
during inspections conducted after the rupture incident.
2,3,4
2.5.1 Parish Unit 8
On July 15, 2003, a seam-welded, 30-inch (76-cm) cold reheat pipe failed in Parish Unit 8
without advance warning, causing seven large, broken spool pieces to rip away and scatter
around the plant over a radius of approximately 1200 feet (370 meters). The attemperator liner
shot up out of the lower section of the vertical pipe, flew over an administration building, and
landed in the bed of an employee’s pickup truck. Fortunately, there were no injuries to plant
personnel.
In the wake of this incident, engineers at Texas Genco and throughout the power industry asked
themselves, “Why did this happen and how can we make sure it doesn’t recur elsewhere?” To
that end, Texas Genco performed a detailed analysis of the Parish failure to identify its root
cause. The analysis identified multiple factors that combined to produce the failure. These
2
Alexander, C., J. Frey, and S. Shin, Evaluation of the Failure in the Texas Genco W. A. Parish Unit #8 Cold
Reheat Line, Stress Engineering Associates, Houston, TX.
3
Correspondence from S. Shin on Metallurgical Analysis of Cold Reheat Pipe Failure at WA Parish Unit 8, Reliant
Energy Materials Analysis Group: October 6, 2003.
4
Harris, David O., Analysis of Fatigue Crack Initiation and Growth in Parish Unit 8 Cold Reheat Line, Engineering
Mechanics Technology, Inc., San Jose, CA: December 5, 2003.
2-6
Background
factors (see Table 2-5) included a seam weld with an unground weld cap, frequent attemperator
cycles, cyclic duty operation, and a change in operating practices. Additionally, the seam weld
orientation was coincident with a region of high stress caused by the influence of a nearby
horizontal elbow.
It has been theorized that a water hammer incident early in the unit’s life may have contributed
to crack initiation, in part because post-failure inspections at Parish found corrosion pitting in an
area on the bottom of low-point CRH piping (suggesting there had been standing water).
However, investigators concluded that water hammer was not a significant contributor to the
failure.
The Parish incident was disconcerting because there were no indications that the unit was
operating outside normal parameters at the time of the failure or that O&M practices were out of
the ordinary.
Table 2-5
Factors Contributing to Parish CRH Piping Failure
Contributing Factor Role
Unground weld cap Early in the life of the plant, a crack initiated at the toe of an unground
weld cap, which acted as a stress concentrator. It propagated over time
radially, through 0.77 inch (20 mm) of base and weld metal, and
longitudinally, for 35 inches (89 cm) along the weld.
Seam weld location Seam weld location at about the 2:30 position placed it coincident with a
region of high stress caused by the influence of a nearby horizontal
elbow. The crack initiation point was near the center of this high-stress
region and approximately 23 inches (58 cm) from a hanger stanchion
weldment.
Cyclic duty operation and Since entering service more than 18 years prior, the CRH piping had
frequent attemperation accumulated 145,000 operating hours, 235 starts, and an estimated
328,000 attemperator cycles (an average of one for every half hour of
plant operation). Sliding-pressure operation contributed twice daily
pressure transients in the line. The cyclic operation of the attemperator,
with 380oF (190oC) water sprayed into piping operating at 620 oF-675oF
(330oC-360oC), also was shown to have been a significant contributor to
fatigue crack propagation.
Change in operating practice Crack propagation apparently accelerated when operating pressure and
temperature were increased 26 months before the failure.
Possible water hammer Moderate water hammer, due to condensate puddling during
shutdowns, may have contributed to crack initiation and/or propagation,
but is not believed to have been a significant contributor to the failure.
2-7
Background
2.5.2 Gannon Unit 6
On September 2, 1993, without advance warning, a cold reheat line failure occurred in the
longitudinal seam weld of a horizontal bend of the 26-inch (66-cm) pipe, 12 feet (3.7 meters)
upstream of the attemperator. There were no injuries to personnel.
According to an analysis report by Failure Analysis Associates5, the crack initiated at the toe of
the seam weld and propagated by a “corrosion-assisted fatigue mechanism” until the remaining
ligament finally ruptured. Detailed metallurgical investigation showed clear evidence of
standing water on the bottom of the pipe where the seam weld was located. Corrosion pitting
extended beyond the corrosion-assisted fatigue crack that propagated to failure. A similar but
less developed crack was also apparent on the opposite toe of the weld cap.
The simultaneous presence of the stress concentrator at the weld toe, the influence of cyclic
pressure stresses on the elbow, and standing water on the bottom of the pipe caused the
corrosion-assisted fatigue cracking failure to occur here earlier than at other locations. It is
theorized that the crack may have been initiated by severe water hammer early in the life of the
plant. Trace contaminants indicated that a nearby spray attemperator might have contributed to
the standing water. Unlike the Parish failure, the attemperator was downstream from the failure
location and did not directly contribute to crack growth. At the time of the failure, the unit had
6
approximately 150,000 operating hours with 550 hot starts and 110 cold starts.
2.5.3 Erickson Station
During a restart on October 17, 2001, a 24-inch (61-cm) cold reheat line failed catastrophically at
Erickson Station, operated by Lansing (Michigan) Board of Water and Light (LBWL). The 159-
MW coal-fired unit had been in service for approximately 28 years, primarily in baseload
operation. In LBWL’s board minutes for October 23, 2001, the failure is attributed to water
hammer resulting from operator error during a routine startup. Any analysis of the piping
condition prior to failure is not described.
Although operator inexperience and inadequate training may well have contributed to the
incident, one of the noted precursors is not unusual. The LBWL board minutes state that “a
leaky valve problem allowed water to enter the line, and a misinterpretation of the readings by
7
the operating staff and the failure to drain the water subsequently caused the cold reheat failure.”
The role of the attemperator valve underscores the importance of good CRH piping system
maintenance.
5
Cold Reheat Elbow Failure, Tampa Electric Gannon 6: Investigation and Recommendations, Failure Analysis
Associates, Inc., Coral Gables, FL: December 1993
6
7
“Minutes of the Board of Commissioners’ Meeting,” Lansing Board of Water and Light: October 23, 2001.
2-8
3
OVERVIEW OF COMMON DAMAGE MECHANISMS
This chapter provides a simple tabulation of the most common damage mechanisms observed in
CRH piping. Table 3-1 provides basic information on specific damage mechanisms. Table 3-2
is organized by component and subclasses of potential damage mechanisms.
Table 3-1
Common Damage Mechanisms for Cold Reheat Piping
Damage Mechanism Comments
Fatigue cracking and corrosion- May initiate at fabrication flaws, corrosion pits, or other stress
assisted fatigue concentrators. May initiate and/or be driven by thermal,
pressure, or mechanical transients.
Corrosion pitting In carbon steel CRH piping, corrosion pitting is typically

associated with standing water. At welds, corrosion may form
long, narrow grooves rather than pits.
Overstress May be caused by water hammer or movement constraint due to

asymmetric quenching by water induction or inadequate
performance of pipe supports. Generally undocumented. Water
hammer appears to have been a key contributor to at least two
catastrophic CRH line failures.
3-1
Overview of Common Damage Mechanisms
Table 3-2
Typical Damage Sites in Cold Reheat Piping Systems
Component Damage Mechanism

Spool pieces and fittings Internal fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue at seam weld (if applicable)
Corrosion pitting and flow-accelerated corrosion
Oxide cracking
Tensile overload/deformation
Deformation due to differential heating/cooling/quenching
Thermal shock
Foreign object damage
Girth welds Tensile overload/deformation (outer diameter bending, stress-induced
cracking)
Corrosion pitting and flow-accelerated corrosion
External fatigue cracking
Internal fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue cracking
Thermal shock
Wye and tee bodies, valve bodies External fatigue cracking
Internal fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue cracking
Tensile overload/deformation
Valve internals Erosion/corrosion of seats and plugs
Deformation and binding due to differential heating/quenching
Attemperators and bypass valves with Thermal fatigue cracking of thermal shields
integrated attemperation High-cycle fatigue of attachment welds due to vibration
Thermal fatigue cracking of spray nozzles
Thermal and mechanical fatigue cracking of attachment welds to steam
piping
Attemperator damage due to leaking from eroded valve seats
Leaking due to interference with valve motion—this may be due to design
issues or related to other events
Performance changes (spray quality or flow rate) related to
corrosion/erosion of spray nozzles
Piping drains Plugging with corrosion products and other contaminants
Erosion/corrosion of valve seats
Performance failure due to mechanical or control failure
Performance failure due to inadequate design and/or fabrication
Drain line, pressure tap, safety relief valve, and Internal fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue cracking
attemperator penetrations and attachments Internal thermal shock cracking
Fatigue cracking at external attachment welds
Radiographic testing (RT) plug and thermowell With bimetallic welds, fatigue cracking
welds
Piping Support System Deformation of static supports due to overload
Failure of dynamic support mechanisms due to overload or environmental
factors
Functional failure of supports due to design issues or system changes
3-2
4
DESIGN, FABRICATION, AND O&M FACTORS
RELATED TO CRH DAMAGE
The design basis for a cold reheat pipeline appears to be simple and straightforward: convey
high-pressure-turbine exhaust to the reheater. In reality, cold reheat piping is a complex system,
subject to numerous external influences and, in turn, influencing other power plant elements.
Practically all significant damage observed in cold reheat piping can be attributed to factors in
the design, fabrication, or operation and maintenance of the piping system and other power plant
systems. This chapter discusses these factors and the mechanisms by which they contribute to
CRH system damage. The chapter begins with a table associating different CRH design,
fabrication, and O&M “risk factors” with relevant damage mechanisms. The remainder of the
chapter elaborates on Table 4-1, describing the various damage mechanisms (overstress, fatigue,
corrosion) and the risk associated with specific design, fabrication, and O&M practices regarding
each major component of CRH piping (as listed in Table 2-1). Identification and consideration
of the risk factors present in individual generating units constitutes the risk self-assessment
described in Chapter 5.
4.1 Risk Factors and Damage Mechanisms
This section tabulates specific precursors or risk factors that may be observed in CRH piping
systems and their associated possible damage mechanisms. Although not within the scope of
this guideline, portions of Table 4-1 also apply to superheater crossover piping and main steam
piping where attemperator operation creates similar conditions.
CRH piping system inspections have shown that the existence of a risk factor does not mean that
damage is in fact occurring, and if it is, that damage may or may not pose a serious concern.
When multiple risk factors are present, the interaction of the damage precursors can be complex
and is rarely obvious. In general, CRH piping systems have not been sufficiently studied to
enable quantitative correlations between the extent or degree of the damage precursor(s) and
damage accumulation.
Nonetheless, the risk factors that led to the Gannon and Parish failures are not uncommon. Both
failures shared several elements:
• Crack initiation and propagation at the unground toe of a seam weld
• Crack initiation and rupture near an elbow that created an additional source of stress
• Pressure and temperature cycling on a regular basis
4-1
Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage
More generally, each of these failures had a stress concentrator, a source of overstress to initiate
a crack, and more than one source of cyclic stress to propagate the crack through fatigue. At
Gannon, corrosion and water hammer are credited with playing significant roles. At Parish,
pressure cycles from cyclic operation and thermal stress cycles from frequent attemperation are
believed to have been significant contributors to crack propagation, whereas a water hammer
incident, in theory, could have assisted crack initiation.
By the nature of the function it performs, every CRH piping installation probably is likely to
have some of the damage precursors, or risk factors, listed in Table 4-1. Whether they are
significant enough to merit serious concern must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Table 4-1
Risk Factors for Damage in CRH Piping Systems
Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

or Indicator of and Comments
Possible Damage
Risk Factors Related to Design and Fabrication—Welds
Seam welds— Fatigue Catastrophic failures of seam welds have

orientation, finish details Corrosion resulted from placement of seam welds in
locations that subjected them to enhanced
Corrosion-assisted fatigue stress and/or corrosion. These locations
Rupture included the 6-o’clock position in
horizontal pipe and the 2:30 position in a
straight spool near the outside
circumference of a horizontal elbow.
Detailed stress analysis is required to
identify high-stress locations in a specific
piping system.
The vulnerability resulting from these
locations was amplified by stress
concentration at the toe of an unground
weld cap.
Welds performed with inadequate
procedures or inadequate pre and post-
weld heat treatment are more vulnerable
to overstress, fatigue, and corrosion
mechanisms.
Girth welds— Overstress mechanisms Unlike seam-welds, there is little option for
orientation, finish details Fatigue the placement of girth welds. Welds in
locations subject to high stress
Corrosion (particularly at elbows) are more likely to
Corrosion-assisted fatigue experience yield or fatigue from
overstress. Portions of welds exposed to
Leakage
standing water are more likely to
experience corrosion.
Welds performed with inadequate
procedures or inadequate pre and post-
weld heat treatment are more vulnerable
to overstress, fatigue, and corrosion
mechanisms.
4-2
Table 4-1
Risk Factors for Damage in CRH Piping Systems (continued)

Possible Damage
Support and branch Overstress mechanisms Fillet welds are typically used to attach
weld details Fatigue support stanchions and branch and
instrumentation fittings to the main CRH
Corrosion piping. Inadequate weld specification or
Corrosion-assisted fatigue quality for the applied forces may result in
damage mechanisms.
Welding defects or poor Crack initiation due to stress In, or adjacent to, seam or girth welds
repairs concentration adjacent to the defect
Fatigue/crack propagation in weakened
metal
Corrosion pitting, which may lead to crack
initiation due to stress concentration
Corrosion-assisted fatigue
Bimetallic welds Fatigue cracking Radiographic testing (RT) plug and
thermowell welds
Foreign object damage Stress concentration Can result from construction accident;
Corrosion pitting weld backing ring that comes loose during
operation; debris left in pipe
Risk Factors Related to Design and Fabrication—Piping Configuration and Supports
Inadequate pipe stress Overstress mechanisms Proper stress analysis is needed to

analysis Fatigue ensure that pipe supports are placed
properly and that pipe material thickness
Corrosion-assisted fatigue and geometry are sufficient for reasonable
foreseeable stressors. When seam welds
are used, finite-element analysis should
be used to determine lower-stress
locations.
Inadequate pipe support Overstress mechanisms Inadequate or incorrect supports can shift
specification and Fatigue piping stress and produce very high local
installation stresses (beyond design basis) that will
Corrosion-assisted fatigue lead to damage.
4-3
Table 4-1

Possible Damage
Horizontal piping with Internal/external tensile Water may pool in horizontal piping with
inadequate slope overload/deformation/rupture due to water inadequate slope.
hammer Water hammer may result if pooled water
Internal/external tensile is entrained by steam on startup.
overload/deformation due to asymmetric Asymmetric quenching may result if
quenching from pooling pooled water prevents the bottom of the
Damage to supports and restraints due to pipe from heating during startup, or if the
water hammer or asymmetric quenching water moves and quenches an already
Fatigue crack initiation and/or propagation heated section of pipe.
due to overstress Water hammer or quenching may cause
Fatigue crack initiation and/or propagation overstress deformation or initiate or
due to thermal stress and thermal shock propagate fatigue cracks.
Corrosion pitting/grooves in seam welds If pooled water has high oxygen levels,
corrosion may result and may assist
Corrosion-assisted fatigue of seam welds fatigue mechanisms.
Corrosion pitting/grooves in girth welds
Corrosion-assisted fatigue of girth welds
Sagging pipes Corrosion at point of puddling Internal damage most likely at, near, or
Quenching or water hammer due to downstream of low point in sag.
puddling May be caused by poor hanger design.
Internal thermal/corrosion-assisted fatigue May be caused by overload due to
at point of puddling external (impact, seismic, support failure)
External thermal/mechanical fatigue or internal (water hammer, differential
accelerated by support imbalance quenching) forces; construction accident.
May cause or be caused by pipe
deformation due to differential quenching.
Inadequate insulation Overstress mechanisms Insulation performance determines heat
Fatigue loss in different parts of the piping.
Increased thermal stress may result at
Corrosion-assisted fatigue areas that act as heat sinks.
Inadequate pipe support Deformation of static supports due to Failed supports or deformed piping may
design or installation overload indicate excessive movement or
(May be observed Failure of dynamic support mechanisms excessive restraint from movement, either
through support design due to overload or environmental factors of which can increase the magnitude of
documentation; failed, cyclic loads.
Functional failure of supports due to
distorted, missing, or design issues or system changes
maladjusted piping
supports; excessive or Plastic deformation of
overly restrained pipe/welds/attachments
movement during unit Fatigue of seam, girth, attachment welds
transients)
Accelerated thermal/corrosion/mechanical
fatigue due to stress
Piping overload/deformation due to
inadequately controlled external (impact,
seismic, support failure) or internal (water
hammer, differential quenching) force
4-4
Table 4-1

Possible Damage
Risk Factors Related to Design and Fabrication—Water-Related Damage
Design that encourages Mechanisms resulting from pooling in Numerous details involved in boiler
condensation and horizontal pipe(e.g., corrosion, water configuration and control design may
pooling during hammer) influence condensation rates and
shutdown locations.
Reheater design Thermal stress, thermal shock, and As the reheater cools more rapidly than
fatigue mechanisms resulting from CRH piping, water may accumulate and
quenching overflow back into the CRH piping.
Mechanisms resulting from pooling in Quenching could occur at the point of
horizontal pipe (e.g., corrosion, water overflow or water could pool (during
hammer) outages) at low points further down in the
piping.
Design of low point Mechanisms resulting from pooling in Pooling may result if low point drains are
drains horizontal pipe (e.g., corrosion, water unable to discharge water accumulated
hammer) from condensation during shutdown.
Instrumentation & Mechanisms resulting from pooling in Instrumentation and control systems
control system design horizontal pipe (e.g., corrosion, water should be designed so that a single
(startup) hammer) incidence of control system failure or
operator oversight will not lead to severe
water hammer during startup due to
significant pooled water in the piping.
Risk Factors Related to Design and Fabrication—Attemperators and HPT Bypass Control Valves
Attemperator Fatigue crack initiation and/or propagation The cyclic operation of attemperators
controllability (including corrosion-assisted fatigue) designed for on-off operation results in
Attemperator design for Thermal shock high thermal stress cycles downstream of
on/off operation the attemperator. When combined with
other vulnerabilities, this may lead to
fatigue or corrosion-assisted fatigue.
[In contrast, adjustable attemperator flow
avoids quenching and stress cycles by
gradually and properly adjusting steam
temperature.]
Attemperator Mechanisms resulting from pooling in Attemperator flow control or shutoff valves
control/shutoff valve horizontal pipe (e.g., corrosion, water are severe-duty valves, requiring the
specification hammer) durability to withstand high pressure
drops. Inadequate valve specification
may lead to leakage, which may result in
pooling in low spots in piping.
Attemperator water Fatigue crack initiation and/or propagation Attemperator water is typically taken from
supply; supply piping in seam welds (including corrosion- a source significantly cooler than CRH
design assisted fatigue) steam. It cools further when stagnant in
Thermal shock small-diameter supply piping during cyclic
or intermittent operation.
4-5
Table 4-1

Possible Damage
Attemperator design Thermal fatigue cracking of thermal At locations noted in damage mechanism
(and operation) shields description
High-cycle fatigue due to vibrations
Thermal fatigue cracking of spray nozzles
Thermal fatigue cracking of attachment
welds to steam piping
Attemperator damage that is related to
leaking due to erosion of valve seats
Leaking due to interference with valve
motion—this may be due to design issues
or related to other events
Performance issues related to
corrosion/erosion of nozzles
Risk Factors Related to Operation and Maintenance
Startup, shutdown, and Internal thermal/corrosion-assisted fatigue Will increase the number of thermal
load cycling—especially at welds, penetrations, other stress transients, and thus the cyclic loads
if unit has accumulated concentrators placed on massive CRH components and
a large number of External thermal fatigue their attachments
operating cycles
Conversion of the unit
to cycling operation or
an increase in the
number of cycles
Water hammer or Internal/external tensile Should be suspected if pipes have
severe quenching overload/deformation/rupture significantly shifted location. Seam, girth,
incidents Crack initiation/propagation and attachment welds are affected,
especially if subject to other damage risk
Damage to supports factors.
Damage to upstream, downstream, and Water hammer has been reported as an
attached components immediate or distant precursor to
catastrophic failure of CRH piping.
Cyclic (frequent) use of Internal fatigue, corrosion-assisted fatigue Will introduce high thermal stresses in
spray attemperators, and “quench” (thermal shock) cracking attemperator, attemperator shields, and
including attemperation External thermal fatigue cracking downstream CRH piping.
integrated with HPT Seam welds and girth welds are
bypass control valves particularly vulnerable to damage from the
attemperator. Wye and tee bodies and
valve bodies are also vulnerable.
Intermittent (less Internal fatigue, corrosion-assisted fatigue Same impact as cyclic use except initial
frequent) use of spray and “quench” (thermal shock) cracking temperature extremes are greater
attemperators (i.e., External thermal fatigue cracking because supply piping has had time to
allowing attemperation cool, possibly to ambient temperature.
water to cool in supply May also introduce high thermal stresses
line) in attemperator piping, control valve,
spray nozzle, and attemperator shield.
4-6
Table 4-1

Possible Damage
Excessive attemperator Corrosion Overattemperation may lead to
flow during normal Cracking/fatigue from quenching overquenching or even saturation of
operation (reheat or steam, leading to wet steam mechanisms.
HPT bypass lines) Pipe deformation due to differential
quenching, which may cause support Lower portion of nearby horizontal pipes,
damage, sagging, stress concentration especially at seam and girth welds; HPT
exhaust valve for HPT bypass
attemperators.
Attemperator control Mechanisms due to pooled water (e.g., Lower portion of nearby horizontal pipes,
valve leakage during corrosion, water hammer) especially at seam and girth welds; also
shutdown(reheat or HPT exhaust valve, if low point.
HPT bypass lines) Water hammer may impact whole CRH
line.
Water For water induction load transition and low When steam condenses in one part of the
induction/condensation load operation, cracking/fatigue from system during shutdown, startup, load
quenching or pipe deformation due to transition, or low load operation, it may
differential quenching, which may cause flow to another part of the system
support damage, sagging, stress because of gravity or pressure differential.
concentration Depending on piping configuration and
For outage condensation, mechanisms relative temperatures and cooling rates of
related to pooled water (e.g., corrosion, different parts of the system, possible
water hammer) sources are the reheater, HP bypass or
other branch piping, and drain piping.
Excessively high Thermal shock Indicative of likely cyclic thermal stresses
temperature ramp rates Internal thermal/corrosion-assisted fatigue that will drive damage. May affect any of
CRH piping, especially where subject to
External thermal fatigue cracking other risk factors.
Extensive operation Creep fatigue in girth and seam welds Unanticipated high temperatures may lead
above the design Creep fatigue of penetration welds to premature degradation by creep and
temperature, either creep-fatigue. Not likely in CRH piping,
globally or in localized Thermal fatigue in connections but possible with undetected leakage of
“hot spots” Oxide cracking, oxide notching, and/or HPT bypass valve.
(May be indicated by crack initiation Oxide cracking is more likely in hotter
excessive oxide in pipe See also consequences of increased areas where thicker brittle oxide scale can
or by temperature attemperator operation form. Oxide notching may occur, and lead
measurement) to fatigue crack initiation, with repeated
formation and cracking of oxide scale.
Overheating incidents Thermal fatigue Oxide cracking is more likely in hotter
resulting from Oxide notching/crack initiation areas where thicker brittle oxide scale can
inadequate/failed form. Oxide notching may occur, and lead
bypass attemperation Temper embrittlement to fatigue crack initiation, with repeated
formation and cracking of oxide scale.
4-7
Table 4-1

Possible Damage
Inadequate operation of Functional failures Drain line and pressure tap penetrations;
drains or drain valves Thermal shock /quenching lower portion of nearby horizontal pipes;
due to design, wye and tee bodies; valve bodies and
maintenance, or Internal thermal fatigue cracking internals.
operating problems: Internal thermal shock cracking Water from the blowdown tank can flow
Plugging Corrosion due to standing water back up into headers through the drain
Operator line and cause quenching of drain line,
Water hammer
inattention stub penetration, and CRH piping.
Quenching due to condensation
Undersized drains Water hammer may impact whole CRH
accumulation during load change
or valves line.
Quenching due to drain backflow
Control system
Pipe deformation due to differential
failure
quenching/temperature stratification
Support failure
Severe cases of quenching or water
hammer may cause support damage,
stress on other parts of system
Steam and attemperator Oxide cracking, oxide notching, crack Higher oxygen concentration may
water chemistry: initiation increase formation of brittle oxide scale.
Oxide cracking is more likely in hotter
• Contamination Corrosion/corrosion-assisted fatigue
areas where thicker brittle oxide can form.
• Air infiltration Oxide notching may occur, and lead to
during shutdown or fatigue crack initiation, with repeated
due to condenser formation and cracking of oxide.
leaks
Corrosion or corrosion-assisted fatigue is
• Condenser tube most likely to occur with confluence
leaks between these cycle chemistry problems
• Deaerator and pooled water.
operating problems
• Excess O2
scavengers
• Cycle chemistry
control problems
Evidence of poor Internal corrosion/pitting Throughout the CRH piping system,
chemical cleaning; Corrosion-assisted fatigue especially at low points
observed corrosion
4-8
4.2 Overstress Mechanisms
Some form of overstress is involved in practically all cold reheat piping failures. At one
extreme, a single event, such as severe water hammer or severe thermal shock, may inflict
significant damage. At the other extreme, temperature and pressure variations may subject a
small flaw to repeated stresses that are just high enough to cause a crack to grow. Failure results
if, after many years and many stress cycles, the crack grows large enough that the pipe material
can no longer sustain normal stress levels.
4.2.1 Water Hammer
4.2.1.1 Introduction and Background
Several fluid dynamic phenomena can impart high forces, localized pressure surges, and high-
momentum changes to piping. Any of these phenomena can create forces strong enough to
damage pipe supports. They may also create localized stresses that are capable of causing yield
or cracking in the welds or base metal of the CRH piping and attached piping. Subsequent
damage may result from fatigue mechanisms which are initiated by the event or are accelerated
by inadequate support of the CRH piping.
Steam hammer may cause violent movement along the longitudinal axis of piping when rapid
closing of a valve or some other event interrupts the high-velocity flow of steam within the pipe.
The resulting shock wave travels at sonic velocity through the system. Steam hammer can create
forces in the range of 80 to 100 kips and pipe displacements as much as 15 to 20 inches (38 to 50
cm) or more. Pure steam hammer is not likely within CRH piping systems because valves are
not located near enough the downstream end of the system.
However, CRH piping is commonly subjected to two forms of water hammer, either of which
can create greater forces and greater damage than pure steam hammer:
• Slug flow may result when water, accumulated in a low spot in the CRH piping, is picked up
and accelerated by steam flow to create high-velocity slugs of water. Varying degrees of
water hammer may result when the slug reaches the next elbow or other obstruction, such as
an attemperator assembly. If slug flow is initiated when flow is transferred to the high-
pressure turbine after a period of bypass (due to water remaining at a low point upstream of
the HPT bypass inlet), slug flow may also result in thermal shock and thermal fatigue as
relatively cold water contacts hot steel downstream of the bypass inlet.
• A much more violent form of combined steam and water hammer may result if there is large
temperature difference between flowing steam and pooled water, especially with superheated
steam contacting subcooled condensate.
4-9
• In this case, when the hot steam contacts cold water, it cools and contracts rapidly, causing a
rapid increase in momentum in the direction of the contraction. The hammering effect may
result from steam collapsing upon itself and/or high-momentum steam and water impacting
the solid wall of the pipe.
As with pure steam hammer or pure water hammer, the shock wave can travel down the
pipeline at sonic velocity. Damage to the pipe may result from the pressure of the shock
wave(s), from hammer when entrained water reaches elbows or other resistance, or from
secondary forces when the pipe moves violently and then is restrained.
Both slug flow and combined steam/water hammer are most likely to occur during unit startup,
just after flow through the high-pressure turbine or HPT bypass is initiated. In some cases, water
hammer may also result from significant load changes.
Several sources of standing water involving these failures are mentioned in the literature:
• As system pressure drops and the system cools during unit shutdown,
– Condensation may occur in the CRH piping
– Condensation may occur in the reheater and drain into the CRH piping
– Condensation may occur in the HPT bypass piping and drain into the CRH piping
– Condensate may backflow from low-point drains into the CRH piping
• Standing water in CRH piping may come from leaking attemperator water supply valves in
the CRH piping or HPT bypass piping.
• On initial startup or after a maintenance outage, water may be present in the system due to
inadequate drainage of hydrotest water.
Condensate may pool at a natural low point due to inadequate drainage, or at a sag in the piping
that results from inadequate support design. Pooling normally would only occur due to
condensation during unit shutdown, and, in some cases, at the beginning of startup.
4.2.1.2 Nature of Damage and Probable Locations
Steam and water hammer phenomena have been credited with causing or contributing to
significant, even catastrophic, damage in CRH piping systems:
• The shock wave or pipe movement from water hammer can initiate or propagate fatigue
cracking.
• Water hammer may rupture piping that has already been weakened by fatigue cracking or
corrosion.
• In an extreme case, water hammer may rupture piping that is previously undamaged.
• Local yielding of weld or base metal may result in minor or visible plastic deformation.
• Pipe supports and their supporting structures can be damaged or destroyed and loads
transferred to other supports, to branch lines, or to the turbine or reheater.
4-10
• Branch lines and their connections to the CRH piping can be stressed to the point they fail or
become more susceptible to fatigue.
• Unrepaired damage to supports may accelerate the accumulation of fatigue damage.
Damage may occur anywhere in the piping. It is most likely to be in places already subject to
high stresses and stress concentrators, especially at seam or girth welds in or near elbows.
Analysis of the Gannon failure suggested that crack initiation may have been related to several
instances of severe water hammer early in the life of the system. Crack propagation continued
over many years before the piping was weakened to the point of failure. Although it has been
theorized a similar early-life water hammer incident could have occurred at Parish, water
hammer is not thought to have played a significant role in crack growth.
In the case of Erickson, it was reported that operators misread or misinterpreted instruments that
indicated that, during a brief outage, water had entered the CRH piping due to a leaking
attemperator valve. The CRH piping was torn apart by water hammer when the unit was
restarted without the CRH piping having first been drained. The condition of the CRH piping
prior to the failure incident was not reported.
4.2.2 Thermal Stress and Thermal Shock
Thermal stress results when one area of a piping component changes to a different temperature
than nearby areas of the component. As that area heats or cools, the metal expands or contracts
and is restrained in expansion or contraction by the rest of the component. Thermal shock
occurs when temperature change occurs rapidly and very high stresses result from high
temperature differences over small distances.
Factors that can create thermal stress and thermal shock in cold reheat piping include:
• Modest temperature differences and stresses result because of differences in heat transfer
rates in uniformly insulated areas in the middle of pipe spools versus heat transfer rates in the
vicinity of bends, branches, support connections, and instrument connections.
• More significant temperature variations and stresses result during gradual startup, shutdown,
and load change operations.
• Large temperature differences result during rapid startup, shutdown, and load change
operations.
• Severe temperature differences result when hot fluid is introduced rapidly to cold piping,
such as when flow is first introduced to CRH piping during startup, or when cold fluid is
introduced rapidly to hot piping, such as during cyclic or intermittent operation of spray
attemperators.
4-11
When temperature changes occur symmetrically, such as with properly distributed attemperator
spray, little evidence may be seen external to the pipe. When temperature changes occur
asymmetrically, visible bowing may be apparent. If temperature stratification occurs rapidly,
violent movement may result.
In CRH piping, thermal stress and thermal shock are most likely to cause damage in the form of
high-cycle fatigue cracking on the interior of the pipe or in branch attachment welds on the
exterior of the pipe. Thermal-fatigue cracks are most likely to be seen in areas that are subject to
quenching or have some type of stress concentrator. These locations include the following:
• Piping downstream of attemperators, especially horizontal piping and horizontal bends where
water can pool and asymmetric temperature distribution is more likely to develop
• Branch penetrations at the entrance to drains that may have cold condensate backflow during
shutdown
• Piping close to the reheater if overflow of cold condensate is possible during shutdown
• Areas of stress concentration, e.g., at the toe of an unground weld cap or at the entrance to a
branch penetration
Because of the mechanics involved (expansion versus contraction on the interior of the pipe),
thermal shock due to rapid heating on startup or load change is unlikely to cause damage.
When CRH piping is operating under conditions that develop uniform oxide scale on the pipe
wall, thermal shock from quenching may also be seen as a crazing pattern where the scale has
fractured. While this is less likely to indicate serious damage than it is to serve as a signal to
examine more vulnerable areas, it possible that oxide cracking can become a point of initiation
for corrosion-assisted fatigue. Oxide notching, a mechanism that occurs when brittle oxide scale
repeatedly forms and cracks, may lead to fatigue crack initiation without any corrosion influence.
In cases where asymmetrical quenching or heating has occurred, pipe movement may be severe
enough to damage pipe supports and snubbers. In some cases, permanent bowing of the pipe
may occur due to small amounts of residual plastic strain. This effect is most likely to be seen in
horizontal piping with little or no slope.
4.2.3 Overstress from Pipe Support and Restraint Deficiencies
A system of pipe supports and restraints distributes and accommodates a variety of forces and
motions that may be experienced in the CRH piping system. These include the following:
4-12
• The weight of the piping system. Supports should be adjusted to bear weight evenly.
Special attention is needed to ensure that torsional stresses are not created at horizontal
elbows and tees.
• Relative movement between parts of the system due to thermal expansion and
contraction. Very high stresses can result if piping is restrained when it expands or
contracts due to temperature change.
• Forces and motion due to steam and/or water hammer. Steam or water hammer may
create a pressure pulse that tries to “open” elbows. If piping is not restrained adequately,
momentum transfer may cause rapid whipping or linear movement of the pipe. Severe stress
may result when one part of the pipe reaches a stop while another continues moving.
Snubbers are used to prevent rapid movement while allowing slower movement due to
thermal expansion and contraction.
• Forces and motion due to asymmetric quenching. Bowing of the pipe caused by rapid,
asymmetric quenching may cause movement and stresses similar to those caused by water or
steam hammer.
• Reaction forces and motion due to safety relief valve operation. On CRH piping,
multiple relief valves with incremental set pressures are generally installed, in close
proximity, near a high point in the piping. Short relief stacks discharge vertically or, through
an elbow, horizontally and perpendicular to the pipeline.
If pipe supports or restraints are inadequate:

• The safety relief valve attachment to the piping may be highly stressed by the reaction force
if the combined strength of the attachment and restraints is not sufficient. This may initiate
or propagate stress cracking or cause plastic deformation.
• The piping may move rapidly until limits are reached, at which point the piping stops
suddenly. This is likely to stress the attachment point more than did the reaction force. One
or more supports or restraints may also be damaged by this force.
• Forces and motions due to vibration. If pipe vibration matches the natural frequency of
one part of the piping system, a forced oscillation may build in amplitude to the point that
overstress is created. Although this is most likely to occur with inadequately restrained
branch connections, the main CRH piping can be affected.
When operating properly, the support system optimizes stress distribution in the CRH piping and
prevents excessive force from being applied to the turbine at one end of the piping system or the
reheater at the other end. If the support system does not perform adequately, excessive stress
may cause damage to the CRH piping. Also, forces developed in the CRH piping may cause
damage to attached components or nearby structures.
Inadequate design or maintenance of pipe supports and restraints may lead to overstress resulting
in plastic yield and/or fatigue crack initiation and/or propagation.
4-13
Damage may be anywhere within the CRH piping systems but is most likely to occur in the
following locations:
• Support attachment welds, if supports are welded to the pipe
• Exterior of the pipe, near supports or restraints, where maximum tensile stress from the
weight of the piping system is experienced
• Interior or exterior of the pipe, in areas with other stress concentrators such as unground weld
toes
• Welds and adjacent areas where metal properties are not uniform
• Near elbows or tees, where the pipe and support geometry is most likely to create high
torsional stress or bending stress
• Near the reheater and turbine, where external force or restraint is most likely to be applied
The supports themselves, along with adjacent structures, may be damaged if they are not strong
enough to resist movement of the piping. Supports may also be damaged if they are so rigid that
they resist thermal expansion of the piping.
4.3 Fatigue Mechanisms on Pipe Interior
Piping failure is rarely caused by a single event. More often, failure results from the slow
accumulation of damage over time. In CRH piping, the mechanism of greatest concern is fatigue
damage initiating on the interior of the pipe and propagating in the through-wall direction.
CRH piping downstream of attemperators, in particular, is subject to multiple stresses that may
contribute synergistically to the initiation or propagation of a fatigue crack. Corrosion may
promote fatigue crack initiation by creating a stress concentration through pitting, or may
accelerate fatigue by removing and/or weakening newly exposed metal.
4.3.1 Internal Fatigue and Corrosion-Assisted Fatigue at Seam and Girth Welds
The failure at Parish has been attributed to fatigue with a combination of thermal, pressure, and
vibrational influences that led to initiation and propagation of a crack along a seam weld. The
failure at Gannon has been attributed to fatigue crack propagation with a combination of thermal,
pressure, and corrosion influences. Less severe failures in CRH piping girth welds at other
plants have been attributed to thermal fatigue.
At Parish, thermal cycles due to attemperation spray were noted as a primary contributor to the
failure. Fatigue analysis also pointed to a significant contribution from daily load cycling, which
imparted a CRH pressure drop of nearly 50%. Vibration was a minor contributor to crack
propagation. The fatigue mechanism accelerated after operating pressure and temperature were
increased 26 months before the failure.
4-14
Unlike Gannon, where the six o’clock position of the seam weld resulted in significant water
exposure, corrosion is not deemed a significant contributor at Parish. The small amount of
corrosion on the fracture surfaces is seen more as a result of than a contributor to crack
propagation.
At Gannon, a fatigue crack is thought to have initiated with a water hammer event and to have
propagated through the influence of corrosion mechanisms and normal operating stresses,
combined with pressure and thermal cycles resulting from load changes, startup, and shutdown.
Corrosion acted to accelerate the propagation of fatigue cracking and may have been involved in
initiating cracking by creating stress concentrations through pitting. As the attemperator was
located downstream of the failure, it is not thought to have been a significant source of thermal
cycles, though pooled water from attemperator valve leakage during shutdown was a likely
contributor to corrosion and may have caused quenching.
In cases such as Gannon, where a water environment is also an influencing factor, the damage
has been attributed to mechanisms variously described as corrosion-fatigue, corrosion-assisted
fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, stress-assisted pitting, stress-induced corrosion cracking, and
strain-induced corrosion cracking. In many ways the distinction among various
stress/environment-driven failure mechanisms is artificial, characterized by whether the stress or
the environmental aspect seems to be predominant.
Fatigue is the phenomenon of damage accumulation caused by cyclic or fluctuating stresses. It

is manifested as the initiation and stable propagation of a crack. Failure ensues when a critical
crack size is reached and failure occurs by fracture or overload. Fatigue is dependent upon the
magnitude of the stress cycles, the mean stress, and the loading rate, and is generally independent
of stress duration.
Crack initiation is attributed to either (1) individual severe events, such as extreme cases of
water hammer or quenching or (2) accumulation of stress cycles at a point of stress concentration
or material weakness.
Stress concentrators may be created at the time of pipe manufacture, piping system fabrication,
or piping system repair. They may also result from corrosion or impact damage during pipeline
operation and maintenance. Pre-existing stress concentrators are typically located at a weld toe,
in the weld metal, or in the heat-affected zone of the base metal adjacent to the weld. They may
also occur in the bore or shoulder of a through-wall penetration of thick piping.
Corrosion-induced stress concentrators tend to appear in places where there is a difference in

metal properties due to an inclusion or in the weld metal or in the heat-affected zone of the base
metal adjacent to the weld. However, corrosion pitting may develop in carbon steel anywhere
that standing water with corrosive chemistry is present for sufficient duration. This is most
likely to result from air infiltration combined with condensation or attemperator valve leakage
during frequent or extended shutdowns.
4-15
Crack propagation can be influenced by a single stress mechanism, by a combination of stress

mechanisms, or by corrosion-assisted fatigue, where corrosion and stress phenomena combine to
accelerate crack growth.
In cold reheat piping cases that progress to failure, high-cycle fatigue (>104 cycles) appears to be
the dominant mode. Higher–frequency stress cycles are superimposed on lower-frequency
stresses creating a combined stress cycle that is large enough in magnitude to cause high-cycle
but not low-cycle fatigue.
Pure fatigue mechanisms result in thin cracks that follow a path determined by the direction and
location of applied stress, location of stress concentrators, and weaknesses in weld metal and
base metal. On a microscale, cracking tends to be transgranular and relatively straight. In high-
cycle fatigue, the crack walls tend to be fairly smooth. Where extended exposure has not worn
them smooth, beach marks illustrate the progression of the crack. Changes to rougher crack
surfaces may indicate periods of higher-magnitude stress cycles. Cracks are often oxide-filled
and sometimes widened at the mouth. Corrosion lobes along the sides of the crack develop after
cracking exposes the metal rather than being a part of the fatigue process.
Fatigue crack propagation leads to piping failure if either (1) pipe strength is reduced to the point
that it can no longer contain the normal pressure and thermal stresses, or (2) an upset event
creates abnormal stresses that exceed the remaining pipe strength.
Corrosion-assisted fatigue results from a combination of cyclic loading and a corrosive
environment. Cracks formed by corrosion-assisted fatigue mechanisms are wider and less
uniform in appearance because of the metal removed by corrosion. Initiation may occur at
multiple sites. Microscopically, the cracks are typically transgranular, usually wide, usually
oxide-filled, and blunt-tipped, with irregular crack profiles and signs of discontinuous
propagation. As with purely fatigue-driven cracks, orientation is generally normal to the
predominant stress field. However, corrosion-assisted fatigue cracks are more likely to form
branches that follow grain boundaries in the metal.
Fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue cracks on the interior of CRH piping tend to initiate at the
inner surface of the metal and to propagate lengthwise along the surface much more rapidly than
they propagate away from the surface of the metal. The largest cracks seen in CRH piping have
initiated and propagated for long distances along the toe-of-the-weld caps of longitudinal seam
welds on the pipe interior.
High-cycle fatigue cracks, including those with some corrosion contribution, may reach
surprisingly long lengths without reaching critical crack size. At critical size, pipe failure results
because remaining strength is inadequate to resist pressure and other stresses. In cases reported
to date, cracks at girth welds have progressed through the wall and caused leaks before
developing to critical size. When cracks are at seam welds, critical size is reached before the
crack progresses through the wall. There is a possibility that severe, localized corrosion pitting
may allow progression to leakage at a seam weld before critical crack size is reached.
4-16
The through-wall progression of fatigue cracks at seam welds tends to follow the direction of
stress, directly normal to the surface, through the heat-affected zone (HAZ), base metal, and
weld metal. Some degree of arrest may be seen when the crack reaches tougher metal in the
outer part of the weld.
Cracks can begin to form at any location in CRH piping where the combination of stresses is
sufficiently high. In extreme circumstances, damage may initiate at any surface. However, the
greatest damage is usually associated with areas where a physical feature, such as the toe-of-a-
weld cap or a corrosion pit, creates a high stress concentration that promotes crack initiation and
propagation. Cracking initiates and propagates in weld metal or base metal in the heat-affected
zone of seam or girth welds. Crack initiation may result from accumulated thermal and pressure
cycles due to cyclic operation of attemperators and of the boiler as a whole.
At Parish and Gannon, the point of initiation was at the toe of the seam weld cap and close to a
girth weld. In other CRH piping systems, thermal fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue have
been seen in girth welds. Location in or near an elbow adds to the combination of stresses that
cause the crack to initiate and propagate.
In the case of Gannon, cracking is thought to have initiated from a combination of corrosion
pitting and water hammer. The mechanics of the elbow combined with the stress concentration
of the seam weld to make it more vulnerable to stress. The seam weld orientation at the 6:00
position exposed it to standing water (condensate or excess attemperator spray) that made it
vulnerable to corrosion. Corrosion, in turn, made it more vulnerable to pressure and thermal
cycles. Crack propagation continued to expose more metal to corrosion. The same phenomenon
has been seen at the six o’clock position of girth welds.
Chemical examination of the crack surfaces for both Parish and Gannon showed presence of
water and steam contaminants (see Section 4.5 on corrosion pitting).
4.3.2 Internal Fatigue and Corrosion-Assisted Fatigue at Through-Wall

Penetrations and Other Discontinuities
Stress concentrations may exist at any location where a penetration has been made through the
relatively thick-walled CRH piping. These locations include attachment points for
attemperators, drain piping, safety relief valves, and instrumentation. Although an HP turbine
bypass will generally be connected with a full-diameter or reducing tee, weld saddles may be
used in some cases.
In addition to creating a stress concentration, these penetrations are often subject to greater
temperature variation than most of the piping. The attached piping, valves, or instruments may
act as heat sinks so the bore of the penetration cools much more rapidly than the surrounding
piping during shutdowns and load changes. Attemperator water flow may create a constant or
intermittent cooling effect around the attachment point as well as the nozzle assembly. Drainage
of condensate and leakage towards the drain point will cool the drain connection more rapidly.
4-17
Normally static conditions in HPT bypass piping may allow part of that piping to cool to
saturation temperature, if the piping run downstream of the bypass valve is long enough.
With greater exposed surface area, areas with higher stress concentration may heat up or cool
down more rapidly than the surrounding piping after changes in flow temperature or rate. This
could occur at the crotch corner of an inlet tee from the HPT exhaust or HPT bypass as well as at
instrumentation connections.
For through-wall penetrations, the primary damage mechanism is thermal fatigue, which may be
corrosion-assisted. Circumferential or axial cracking results from restrained thermal expansion
or contraction in the vicinity of penetrations, such as attemperator attachments, that respond to
temperature changes more rapidly than the remainder of the piping circumference. Cracking
may initiate or be accelerated by pitting due to standing condensate or attemperator leakage
resulting from cyclic operation.
Damage is typically initiated at stress concentrations associated with the penetration and the
external piping stub or weldolet-type attachment to the CRH piping. The first sign of damage
may be a pinhole leak in the piping stub at the toe of the fillet weld.
Damage manifests itself as multiple cracks oriented longitudinally along the penetration. The
cracks in the penetration will tend to appear around the full perimeter of the bore. Eventually
one crack may become dominant and break through the wall. Cracking can be in the axial
direction parallel to the main pipe or predominantly circumferential. Cracks are often oxide-
filled and sometimes widened at the mouth. They may contain corrosion lobes along the sides of
the crack, indicating potential corrosion assistance to this predominantly thermal-fatigue-driven
type of damage.
With some CRH piping systems, multiple safety (pressure) relief valves are installed in close
proximity along a horizontal run of the piping. In rare cases, these locations may experience
thermal fatigue effects similar to those seen in economizer and superheater headers, where the
stress concentration by the proximity of adjacent penetrations provides less material to resist the
stress concentration at each penetration.
4.4 Fatigue Mechanisms on Pipe Exterior and Attachments
4.4.1 Introduction and Background
CRH piping systems may experience external fatigue damage due to mechanical and thermal
stresses applied to girth welds joining pipe spools to elbows and other fittings and to attachment
welds to pipe hanger stanchions, attemperator installations, and other branch piping and
instrumentation attachments. External fatigue at seam welds or in piping base metal not
associated with welds is much less likely.
4-18
In exterior fatigue, a primary contributor is low-to-medium-frequency vibration due to flow and

other power plant dynamics. This is most likely to affect connections to branch piping or heavy
instrumentation that is not adequately restrained. Thermal expansion and contraction cycles, due
to unit cycling or attemperator operation may also contribute to damage at attachment points,
especially if pipe supports and restraints or branch piping resist the these dimensional changes.
Quenching due to cyclic flow at branch piping can be another significant driver of fatigue.
Operating pressure changes will have less effect on external fatigue mechanisms.
As with internal fatigue damage, water hammer and asymmetric quenching incidents may be
significant contributors. In some cases, corrosion from environmental exposure may also
contribute.
4.4.2 Nature of Damage and Probable Locations
The tensile stresses that drive external fatigue cracking of girth welds are most likely to occur
near the outside radius of an elbow. As with internal fatigue damage, crack initiation is
attributed to either (1) individual severe events, such as extreme cases of water hammer or
quenching or (2) accumulation of stress cycles at a point of stress concentration or material
weakness. The active stress concentrator is likely to be at the toe of an unground weld cap,
though cracking may initiate at corrosion pitting or where there are variations in properties of
weld metal or the heat-affected zone of the base metal.
Fillet welds to saddles, weldolets, or hanger stanchions tend to create more significant stress
concentrators and are less likely to be ground flush than girth welds. Despite these being
generally conservative in design, the combined forces applied to the weld joint by forced
vibration, water hammer, thermal expansion of the CRH piping, and excessive weight on the
branch or uneven loading of pipe hangers are sometimes able to create stresses that are able to
initiate and propagate cracks. Cracking may initiate in the CRH piping base metal at the toe of
the fillet weld and propagate along the weld. Where fillet welds are used in stub-in attachments,
or to connect branch piping to sock-o-lets, cracking may initiate in the branch piping at the toe of
the fillet weld. In some situations cracks may propagate radially through the weld metal.
When branch piping acts as a significant heat sink, especially when subject to cyclic flow of
colder fluid, thermal stress alone may be sufficient to cause fatigue cracking. This may be seen
as an array of radial cracks in the fillet weld metal of a stub-in connection or as cracking in the
CRH piping base metal at the toe of the weld.
Where bimetallic welds are used, generally for thermowell or radiographic test port installations,
the difference in thermal expansion coefficients, combined with the reduced strength of a
bimetallic weld, may be sufficient to cause fatigue cracking.
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4.5 Corrosion Pitting
Although it is unlikely that corrosion pitting would be the sole cause of a piping failure, it can
play a significant role in fatigue crack initiation and propagation.
4.5.1 Introduction and Background
In CRH piping, the most common form of corrosion damage is pitting, which is most likely to be
caused by exposure of carbon steel pipe to stagnant, oxygen-saturated water. In rare cases,
pitting may result from excessive exposure of the piping to chemical cleaning agents.
In ideal practice, CRH piping wouldn’t be exposed to the conditions that cause corrosion pitting.
However, in some plants condensation and air infiltration occurs during shutdowns, and piping
slope and low-point drains are not sufficient to remove all standing water.
Oxygen-saturated water may also be introduced by the attemperators if feedwater deaeration is

inadequate to overcome the effects of air infiltration to the condenser. In addition to
condensation of steam during extended shutdowns, water pooling in CRH piping may result from
attemperator shutoff valve leakage during shutdown, from excessive attemperation during
reduced-load operation, from water induction from the reheater when it cools off and overflows
with condensed water during shutdown, or from backflow from low-point drains.
4.5.2 Nature of Damage and Probable Locations
Corrosion pitting is most likely to occur anywhere that water can pool in the CRH piping—i.e.,
in horizontal piping runs without sufficient slope to ensure drainage or where low-point drains
are not fully effective during plant shutdown. In addition to the low point, which is often near
the outlet of the high-pressure turbine, horizontal elbows and piping spools downstream of
attemperators appear to be particularly vulnerable. Because a weld cap or irregularity in a weld
may hold enough water to support pitting, corrosion pitting may occur anywhere there is a girth
weld or seam weld at the bottom of a horizontal pipe.
Corrosion pits in CRH piping may be isolated or may be numerous and closely spaced. They
may have clean and jagged walls or be rounded and covered with corrosion products. At welds,
long narrow grooves may form where weld metal or heat-affected base metal is particularly
vulnerable to corrosion. The pitting may follow the region of vulnerable metal, with significant
undercutting that cannot be observed with direct inspection.
Although it is unlikely that corrosion pits in CRH piping would develop to the point that they
present a danger of pipe failure, it is possible that a single corrosion pit, or linked pits, could
create enough of a stress concentration to initiate fatigue cracking.
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4.6 Design and Fabrication Contributions to CRH Damage Mechanisms
A broad range of CRH piping design and fabrication factors have the potential to contribute to
damage mechanisms. These factors can be grouped, in different ways, under several broad and
overlapping categories. One set of groupings is seen in preceding sections discussing damage
mechanisms. Another set of groupings can be made as follows:
• Factors that create vulnerable areas with stress concentrators or material weakness
• Factors that place vulnerable areas coincident with locations that are subject to increased
stress and/or corrosion mechanisms
• Factors that cause high stress
• Factors that cause cyclic stress
• Factors that influence corrosion mechanisms
This section uses a third set of groupings. Each element of the previous two groupings is
covered in one or more of three broad categories:
• Welds
• Piping configuration and piping supports
• Attemperator design
These categories are arranged in a general progression from elements that make CRH piping
vulnerable to damage to elements that actively cause the progression of damage mechanisms.
Where possible, later categories refer to the earlier ones rather than repeating the previous
information:

Welds
Welds are the most likely locations to experience various damage mechanisms. In fact, two of
the most serious CRH piping failures appear to have been more closely related to the use of
seam-welded pipe and to the location and finishing details of those welds rather than to any
damage mechanisms due to weld deficiencies. Less serious damage mechanisms, in some cases
progressing to leakage but not to catastrophic failure, have been seen at girth welds (see
Appendix A).
Problems related to welds include the following:

• Weld defects in the initial manufacture
• Stress concentrations introduced by the geometry of the weld
• The typically less-ductile mechanical properties of the weld and heat-affected zone (HAZ)
• The effects of mismatch in properties between weld/HAZ and base material
• The potential for residual stresses in the weld
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Prevention of these problems through proper welding and weld repair procedures is key to CRH
piping reliability.
Most construction codes, such as the ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel Code and ASME B31.1
Code on Pressure Piping, recognize that limited amounts of weld defects are acceptable. These
construction codes are based on experience. This, in combination with improved sensitivity of
NDE techniques, may result in a situation where original weld defects that were acceptable when
components were fabricated in the 1950s or 1960s might be considered rejectable by today’s
inspections.
It is difficult to detect weld shortcomings once the joint has been placed in service. Avoiding
weld failures is therefore mostly preventive. Quality control measures include the following:
• Qualification of welding procedures and welders
• Certification of welding inspectors and nondestructive test examiners
• Calibration of welding equipment and testing devices
• Documentation of welding and test methods, materials, and equipment
• Proof tests
When considering repairs, it is important to bear in mind the service history of these components
and, where possible, assess original weld defects before executing repair, in part because the
stresses that accompany the weld repair activity may be more damaging than the porosity or slag
inclusion contained in the original weld.
4.6.1.1 Nature of Weld Defects
Table 4-2 lists potential weld discontinuities.
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Table 4-2
Characterization of Weld Discontinuities8
Weld Process and Procedure-Related

A. Geometric
• Misalignment • Overlap
• Undercut • Backing ring, lack of penetration
• Underfill • Backing left on
• Concavity or convexity • Insert ring, lack of penetration
• Excessive reinforcement • Incomplete penetration
• Excessive root concavity (suck back) • Burn through
• Poor reinforcement • Lack of fusion
• Poor reinforcement angle • Shrinkage
• Surface irregularity (ripples)
B. Other
• Arc strikes • Weld dressing
• Slag inclusions • Spatter
• Tungsten inclusions • Arc crater
• Oxide films
Metallurgical
A. Cracks or fissures
• Hot cracking • Reheat, stress relief, or strain age
• Cold or delayed • Lamellar tearing
B. Porosity
• Spherical
• Worm-hole
C. Heat-affected zone, microstructure
alteration
D. Weld metal and heat-affected zone
segregation
E. Base plate delamination
Design
A. Changes in section, stress concentration
B. Weld joint type
8
Header and Drum Damage: Theory and Practice: Volume 1: Information Common to All Damage Types, EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA: 2003. 1004313.
4-23
Not all weld defects or process shortcomings will evolve into a failure. Generally, planar or
“sharp” defects such as cracks, lamellar tears, lack of fusion, and lack of penetration are the most
likely to grow into cracks and propagate to final failure, particularly in the high-residual-stress
fields that remain after the welding process (in components not post-weld heat-treated).
It should be noted that a failure located at a weld is not necessarily due to a problem weld. For
example, the toe region of a fillet weld presents both a stress riser (stress concentration) and a
location with high residual stresses (in the non-post-weld heat-treated condition). It is therefore a
favored location for several types of failure to occur, even if the weld is “perfect.”
4.6.1.2 Seam Welds
For both Gannon and Parish, the key vulnerability resulted from the use of seam-welded pipe. In
both cases, a crack initiated and propagated along the weld cusp (toe of an unground weld cap)
where the geometry created a significant stress concentration. Also, in both cases, the pipe spool
was oriented such that the longitudinal seam weld was placed in location that increased its
vulnerability to damage:
• At Gannon, the seam weld in a horizontal elbow was placed at the six o’ clock position to
reduce its vulnerability to bending stresses. However, this made it vulnerable to corrosion
due to pooled water.
• At Parish, the seam weld was placed at approximately the 2:30 position, where it was not
vulnerable to corrosion but where it passed through an area of high stress caused by the
influence of a nearby elbow.
With current technology, this vulnerability can be avoided by specifying seamless piping spools.
Alternatively, if seam-welded pipe is used, vulnerability can be mitigated by:
• Specifying that the internal and external weld caps are to be ground flush with the base
metal, and
• Specifying the orientation of the seam weld in each piping spool or fitting based on a
complete finite-element stress analysis. This should include effects of elbows and other
fittings and support attachments along with bending stress that may result due to ovalization
on the neutral axis of an elbow. The seam weld should not be placed at the six o’clock
position in horizontal pipe spools or fittings, where it may be vulnerable to corrosion.
• Specifying weld materials, weld techniques, and pre- and post-weld heat treatment to
minimize conditions that could make the weld metal or heat-affected zone more vulnerable to
corrosion or fatigue mechanisms
4.6.1.3 Girth Welds
Fortunately, girth welds are more likely to leak before they fail catastrophically if they
experience severe damage from internal fatigue or corrosion-assisted fatigue. Although their
location can rarely be changed, their vulnerability to damage can be reduced by some of the
same design remedies that can be used with seam welds. Ensuring adequate drainage makes
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both types of welds less vulnerable to corrosion and corrosion-assisted fatigue damage.
Moreover, weld procedures can be specified to make the welds less vulnerable to damage:
• Drawings should clearly specify that the weld is to be full penetration with the internal
surface ground flush if possible.
• For larger-diameter pipe, it may be reasonable to specify use of a double bevel, with welding
on the interior and exterior.
• Weld materials, weld techniques, and pre- and post-weld heat treatment should be specified
so as to minimize conditions that could make the weld metal or heat-affected zone more
vulnerable to corrosion or fatigue mechanisms.
4.6.1.4 Support Attachment Welds

In many installations, pipe supports and restraints are attached to the stanchions welded directly
to the pipe. These weldments introduce stress concentrators that may become significant if the
weld is in a different location than evaluated during design, is underdesigned, is flawed, or is
subjected to stresses not evaluated in the design.
Even if the CRH piping has all factors well evaluated during design, the realities of field
construction may introduce unevaluated sources of stress. Support requirements change if
dimensions of components are changed to reflect as-built dimensions and locations of supporting
structures or the turbine or reheater.
4.6.1.5 Branch and Instrumentation Attachment Welds
Significant branches in CRH piping, such as at the entrance from the HPT bypass or at the split
between two CRH branches, will generally use a full-diameter or reducing tee or wye fitting.
For these fittings, the discussion on seam and girth welds is relevant.
Smaller branches and fittings for attaching instrumentation may use a weld saddle, a weldolet
fitting, or a stub-in connection. With these fittings, the connection to the main CRH piping is
made using fillet welds. The nature and locations of fillet welds on CRH piping makes them
significant sources of stress concentration. They are also subject to significant thermal and
mechanical stresses.
As with unground weld caps in seam and girth welds, the toe of a fillet weld is a significant
stress concentrator. It also provides a location for development of crevice corrosion if the weld
is exposed to water and air. Despite these welds sometimes being ground smooth, it is difficult
to fully eliminate this stress concentration. Whether the weld is ground smooth or not, it is
necessary to specify and perform the weld and post-weld heat treatment so as to optimize the
weld’s strength and ductility.
Because they are relatively far removed from the inner wall of the CRH piping, fillet welds, and
the fittings that they attach to the main piping, are much slower to heat up and cool down in
response to flow temperature changes. In many cases, the attached piping or instrumentation
also acts as a heat sink, further increasing the thermal stress on the fillet welds. The weld
specification needs to consider these stresses, particularly in the cases of dissimilar metal welds
used for thermowell and test port installations.
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Fillet welds may also have relatively small area to provide strength when compared to the forces
they may need to resist. This includes lever action on attached piping or instrumentation
resulting from relative movement between the main piping and fixed supports on branch piping.
Another possible source may be forced vibration resulting from movement of the CRH piping or
branch at a natural frequency of the branch piping or instrumentation assembly. Both of these
cases underscore the need to use a proper weld specification and, in some cases, to add stays or
other reinforcement to reduce the forces applied to the weld.
4.6.1.6 Weld Properties
Section 4.6.1.1 detailed flaws that may be introduced by less-than-ideal weld procedures. Even
when performed under near-ideal conditions, welds may include several factors that reduce their
integrity and make them more susceptible to thermal conditions, stress, and corrosion. Proper
weld procedures can minimize but not eliminate these vulnerabilities:
• The heat of welding changes the metallurgy of the base metal adjacent to the weld—the heat-
affected zone or HAZ. It also introduces thermal stresses in the weld and base metal. To the
extent practical, these effects are reduced by pre- and post-weld heat treating.
• The weld may contain porosity or slag inclusions that reduce the strength of the weld and
introduce stress concentrations and initiation sites for corrosion. Much of this risk can be
eliminated by using well-qualified welders and proven weld techniques.
• Grain structure may vary through the weld and the HAZ, introducing local hard and soft
spots as well as grain boundaries that are more susceptible to stress and corrosion.
To ensure the quality of the base metal and the weld, mechanical and chemical tests are
performed on metal samples when plate is formed and when spool pieces are fabricated. After
fabrication, various forms of NDE—including radiography and several different ultrasonic
detection techniques—are used to check for flaws in the weld.
4.6.1.7 Weld Location
As discussed earlier, the orientation of seam welds was a key factor in the failures at Gannon and
Parish:
• Pooled water at the bottom of horizontal pipe may lead to corrosion in pipe base metal, weld
metal, and heat-affected metal adjacent to the weld. Gannon experienced a corrosion-
assisted fatigue mechanism at the toe of a seam weld located at the six o’clock position.
Inspections of other CRH piping systems have found corrosion at the six o’clock position in
girth welds.
• In addition to being inherent stress concentrators, welds are often located where they are
vulnerable to high stress, as seen at Parish. Post-construction inspections should confirm that
welds, and seam welds in particular, are located exactly where they were assumed to be
during pipe stress analysis.
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CRH Piping and Piping Support System
While weld details and weld locations may create areas of vulnerability in piping, the overall
configuration of the piping and the design of the piping support and restraint mechanisms have
significant influence on where stresses are distributed during normal and upset operating
conditions. Plastic deformation and fatigue crack initiation may result from the more extreme
stresses, while the response of the piping to normal pressure and thermal cycles can drive fatigue
crack propagation.
• Pipe specification. The basic element in piping design is the pipe material specification.
Material strength and wall thickness must contain the normal operating pressure of the CRH
piping system and must include a reasonable safety factor to allow for foreseeable stresses
due to water and steam hammer. The material must be able to resist deformation and crack
initiation and propagation through the range of operating temperatures and pressures. The
material must also provide adequate resistance to internal and external corrosion
mechanisms.
• Pipe stress analysis. To ensure that the pipe material specification is adequate for all parts
of the piping system, pipe stress analysis is necessary to confirm that the piping and support
configuration (including attemperator, valve, and branch installations) do not cause
unexpected stresses. If seam-welded pipe is specified, finite-element analysis should be used
to confirm that the seam weld is not in a high-stress location. Stress analysis should be
repeated if the as-built piping configuration is different than the piping design.
• Insulation. Branch and instrumentation connections, if not insulated sufficiently, may act as
heat sinks and cause local cooling and overstress of the CRH piping.
• Pipe support specification. Pipe support design needs to account for hot, cold, and dynamic
conditions. Snubbers should be provided to allow thermal expansion of the pipe without
allowing uncontrolled movement due to water hammer. Pipe supports should be strong
enough to withstand the dynamic forces resulting from water hammer or severe asymmetric
quenching of the pipe.
Pipe that is over- or under-constrained by rigid supports or branch connections may
experience overstress during thermal expansion or contraction. Proper use of different types
of supports and restraints will allow or control reasonably foreseeable changes in loading
during system operation. The design should specify a range of adjustment from the nominal
design that will be adequate for any foreseeable weight variation in piping spools and other
components.
Stress analysis is necessary to confirm that the support configuration, including attemperator,
valve, and branch installations, does not cause unexpected stresses in the main or branch
piping. Special attention is needed if there are complex transitions, such as from a vertical
piping run to a horizontal spool followed by a horizontal elbow where torsional stresses may
create unexpected vulnerability.
• Drainage slope. If the support system design does not allow sufficient slope for drainage,
water may accumulate in unintended low points in CRH piping. Extra slope is needed to
allow for pipe movement and redistribution of weight on different supports over years of
operation.
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• Deviations from specifications. Altering pipe runs from the design specifications changes
significant variables in the pipe stress analysis. New stress analysis should be conducted for
differences in dimensions, pipe wall thickness, pipe material, and support design or location.
Similarly, pipe support installation and adjustment may create loads and stresses differing
from the design. Field-routing of branch piping and field changes in support and restraint
locations and settings can make piping more susceptible to stress due to restraint of thermal
expansion or contraction. Care should be taken to ensure that critical details are not left to
the discretion of the piping fabricator or installer, and that all details changed during
fabrication, due to field conditions, are subject to engineering review.
• Inaccurate documentation. When as-built documentation is incomplete or inaccurate,
failing to fully reflect any deviations from design, future operating and maintenance
decisions may be based on incorrect assumptions.
• Incomplete post-construction cleanup. Failure to remove weld slag, paint overspray,
temporary supports or restraints (such as for hydrotesting), and so on may create conditions
different from the design—again potentially subjecting the CRH system to greater damage.

Water
The presence of liquid water is a common theme in a variety of CRH damage and failure
mechanisms. Pooled water is involved in both violent and slow-acting damage mechanisms.
Water induction can cause quenching that leads to fatigue crack initiation and/or propagation.
Quenching also may cause bowing of the pipe with resultant forces strong enough to damage
pipe supports, branch piping, or the main CRH piping itself. Diligent monitoring and control of
water is one of the primary requirements for safe operation of CRH piping systems.
4.6.3.1 Pooled Water Damage
Pooled water has been credited as a key player in piping damage resulting from water hammer,
thermal fatigue, corrosion pitting, and corrosion-assisted fatigue:
• The catastrophic CRH failure at Erickson Station has been attributed to water hammer
resulting from failure to drain pooled water from the piping prior to startup.
• The Gannon failure resulted from a fatigue mechanism that was accelerated by corrosion
resulting from pooled water in the piping.
• Although corrosion was not involved in the piping failure at Parish, a thorough post-failure
inspection found corrosion pitting in base metal and corrosion grooves in girth welds
exposed to pooled water.
Water hammer and thermal fatigue are independent of water chemistry. Corrosion mechanisms
are most likely to progress if high levels of oxygen are present in the condensed steam or
attemperator spray water.
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During design and fabrication of CRH piping, risks of these types of damage can be reduced by:
• Designing the system to minimize possible sources of liquid water
• Designing and fabricating the pipe configuration and supports to ensure the piping system
will not develop undrained low spots where water can pool
• Designing and fabricating the drain system to ensure that drainage is reliable and does not
allow pooled water to remain in the piping.
4.6.3.2 Water Sources
There are typically six possible sources of liquid water in CRH piping, which are controllable to
different degrees during the design process:
• Water may condense in CRH piping during shutdown and at the beginning of startup. It may
be possible to change some design parameters to reduce, but not to eliminate, this
condensation. Correct design of CRH piping drainage should ensure that pooled water does
not accumulate.
• During shutdown, water may condense in the reheater and overflow into the CRH piping.
This “water induction” occurs because the reheater cools much more rapidly than the CRH
piping. The first point of approach to this water source is the drainage system for the
reheater. The CRH piping drain system should also have extra capacity to prevent pooling
from this water source.
• Water induction may result from a drainage system that is at higher pressure than the CRH
piping during shutdown. This may be due to pressurization from the main steam piping or
superheater drains during shorter shutdowns or elevation differences during shutdowns long
enough for thorough cooling of the CRH piping.
• Drainage system design should weigh the benefits of energy recovery from a higher-pressure
blowdown drum versus the risk of damage from backflow of water. Additionally, the CRH
piping drain(s) should include a check valve or other backflow preventer.
• Liquid water may leak from attemperator shutoff or control valves that do not shut off
tightly. Attemperator shutoff and control valves are severe-duty valves that require
appropriate valve specifications to ensure valve durability and performance. Leakage may
result if an inadequate valve specification is used. A secondary shutoff valve should also be
considered to allow maintenance of the control valve trim while the CRH piping is
pressurized.
• In rare cases, water may condense and flow from long, poorly insulated HPT bypass piping
during normal operation.
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4.6.3.3 Drainage
Water may accumulate in natural or unintended low points in CRH piping, and move from there
to piping that has already heated up during startup or not yet cooled down during shutdown.
Proper drainage is essential and includes attention to:
• Slope. To ensure sufficient slope for drainage at all times, extra slope is needed to allow for
pipe movement and redistribution of weight on different supports over years of operation.
Specification of durable, reliable, and adjustable supports ensures that this protection
endures.
• Adequacy. Low points should be able to be drained during any operating conditions that
could allow water to accumulate. The drain requires adequate capacity and a mechanism that
is resistant to debris accumulation and valve failure. Welding and fabrication details should
not introduce restrictions into drain connections and piping, restrict free flow from the pipe
into the drain entrance, or allow debris to accumulate. Use of a constant-flow orifice should
be considered as an alternative or bypass to a more complex and less reliable steam trap
design.
• Backflow. Relatively cold water may flow into CRH piping from several different sources
when the piping is at or near operating temperature. Water may backflow from drains that
are not adequately designed to prevent this. Such backflow may be caused by a blowdown
drum which is pressurized by the HP evaporator drains or superheater drains, or from static
head in the drain lines after pressures equalize throughout the boiler during an extended
shutdown.
If this is a possibility, the drain system should include a reliable check valve. Connecting the
drain to a location that will remain at lower pressure than the CRH piping should be
considered.
4.6.3.4 Instrumentation
Even the best plant designs may be subject to water-related damage. If—based on the frequency
of attemperation and the volume and temperature of the spray—there is reason to believe that
significant thermal quench downstream of the attemperator may be a concern, pipe OD
instrumentation may be installed to infer large thermal stresses. Options include the following:
• Thermocouple arrays upstream and downstream of attemperators
• Thermocouple arrays and flow detection instrumentation for attemperator water supply
piping
• Strain gauges at suspected thermal quench zones past the attemperator lining
Water accumulation at drains or other water accumulation points upon startup can also pose a
risk for water hammer. Instrumentation could be added to alert operators to such conditions, and
may include:
• Thermocouple arrays spanning the pipe top to the pipe bottoms at drains and at low, drainless
horizontal pipe runs
4-30
• Thermocouple arrays at possible condensate sources such as the HPT bypass and entrance to
the reheater
• Flow detectors in fixed-orifice bypasses around steam traps or drain valves
• Alarms in the plant control system

Attemperators and HPT Bypass Control Valves
In a number of CRH piping failures, failure occurred downstream from, or in close proximity
upstream to, a spray attemperator. In most cases, quenching of the inner surface of the CRH
piping, by cyclic operation of the attemperator, was the primary mechanism driving fatigue crack
propagation. In some cases, the peak stresses caused by attemperator operation may also have
been sufficient to initiate the fatigue crack. The attemperator spray may have exposed the pipe
steel to enough oxygenated liquid water to add significant corrosion influence to the fatigue
mechanism. In other cases, leakage from the attemperator during shutdowns may have been
sufficient to support corrosion or lead to water hammer.
4.6.4.1 Attemperator Design
Attemperator design has been a significant factor in reported CRH failures with thermal stress
and thermal shock contributions. Problems can result from a variety of shortcomings in
specification and installation of attemperator nozzles, attemperator control valves, and
attemperator piping. Design factors to consider include the following:
• General design elements. Most installations share a few general design elements:
– The attemperator assembly is attached to flanged nozzle that is installed with a weld
saddle on a piping penetration sized to allow clearance around the spray head.
– One or more spray nozzles are centered in the piping and supplied and supported by
perpendicular supply pipe passing through the flange connection.
– A thermal shield is welded inside the piping, extending from shortly upstream to well
downstream of the attemperator nozzle.
– The thermal shield may be a plane tube or may have a nozzle arrangement designed to
assist with mixing by accelerating the steam flow and placing it in closer proximity to the
spray nozzle.
– If thermal shielding is not matched properly with the spray pattern of the attemperator,
severe quenching of the pipe wall downstream of the shield may result.
• Location. The location of the attemperator significantly influences its impact on the piping.
Attemperators should be located in straight piping with sufficient distance downstream to
allow full evaporation of spray water. If unevaporated spray reaches an elbow, severe
asymmetric quenching may result.
4-31
• Controllability. Controllability of volume flow varies widely between different

attemperator designs. Attemperators are frequently specified with simple on-off controls,
even though reheater temperature normally varies continuously and gradually with slag
accumulation/removal and other boiler dynamics. The attemperator nozzle may require a
narrow range of flow and differential pressure for optimum spray quality. To keep the
reheater within its allowable temperature range, such a system may cycle continuously
between no flow and too much flow. As a result, the CRH piping (and the reheater inlet
header) may cycle between target operating temperature and severe quenching.
More sophisticated attemperator designs use a nozzle configuration that allows stepwise or
continuous variation in flow. Such systems may use multiple nozzles that are separately
piped, moving assemblies that vary the number of nozzles that are open to flow, or
sophisticated nozzle designs that provide more consistent spray quality over a range of flow
rates. Some installations may be able to use dispersion steam, as is used for attemperation in
HPT bypass piping. For more complex attemperator designs, benefits must be weighed
against durability and reliability.
Spray direction, velocity, and droplet size all influence the uniformity of evaporation.
Shortcomings in any of these can lead to impingement and quenching of the pipe wall.
• Durability and reliability. Attemperator control and shutoff valves are severe-duty valves.
If an inadequate valve design is used, rapid wear may result. This can lead to leakage, loss of
control accuracy, or partial or complete loss of attemperator flow.
Seat wear and valve leakage may result from using a simple shutoff valve or control valve
rather than a valve that is specifically designed to maintain controllability and tight shutoff
for many severe-duty cycles. A sophisticated multistage valve, designed for high pressure
drops, should be considered for the primary shutoff or control valve.
In addition, the attemperator piping should have a secondary shutoff valve to allow online
maintenance and to reduce wear on the control valve seat if a small leak does develop.
Attemperator nozzles are subjected to cycles of rapid heating and rapid cooling along with
high flow rates and high pressure drop. The metallurgy and geometry of the nozzle and the
piping to the nozzle must be able to handle these conditions without change in operating
characteristics.
4.6.4.2 HPT Bypass Design
In plants that have a high-pressure-turbine bypass from the main steam piping to the CRH
piping, the design of the bypass system may have significant impact on the rate of heating and
the temperature distribution in CRH piping during plant startup. To prevent thermal stress and
water accumulation, the HPT bypass requires the same attention to attemperator design as does
the cold reheat piping. The location and design of the bypass piping, bypass control valve,
bypass attemperator, and bypass inlet to the CRH piping all have influences:
• The configuration of the bypass piping and its connection to the CRH piping have significant
influence on the ability of both piping runs to respond to heating or cooling without
developing excessive stress.
4-32
• Attemperation may be integral to the bypass control valve or downstream of the valve. For
either location, adequate straight downstream distance is required to ensure even mixing and
cooling of the bypass flow.
• The attemperator control valve must be able to gradually, accurately, and reliably control the
introduction of steam to the CRH piping system.
• More up-to-date and sophisticated bypass designs use:
– Multistage, torturous path disk elements that allow high turndown
– Attemperation integral to the control valve, with steam energy used to atomize the spray
to obtain even cooling and highly responsive control of downstream temperature
4.6.4.3 Attemperator Water Supply Temperature
Several characteristics in the design of attemperator water supply piping can exacerbate thermal
stress cycles:
• Attemperator water supply is often taken from the high-pressure feedwater piping in the
vicinity of the pumps. At this location, the water has not yet been through the economizer
and is significantly cooler than the superheated steam at the exit of the high-pressure turbine.
• When attemperators are used cyclically, stagnant water in supply piping may cool further
below an already subcooled supply temperature. Because the attemperator piping is
relatively small in diameter, even thick insulation cannot prevent this cooling if the distance
to the source is significant.
• Possible remedies for these problems are:
• A continuous supply loop which bleeds water from the piping before it has a chance to cool
in stagnant supply piping
• Steam tracing to maintain or increase the supply line temperature
• A supply location downstream of the HP economizer
4.7 O&M Contributions to CRH Damage Mechanisms
Various operating and maintenance factors can contribute to water accumulation, and in turn to
water hammer or corrosion or thermal fatigue, which, in turn, make CRH piping more
susceptible to damage from future water hammer. Other changes in power plant operation effect
damage mechanisms in CRH piping in less direct ways. Many baseloaded and cycled units now
operate in off-design combustion modes to limit emissions and fire off-design fuels and/or
switch fuels more frequently. Changes in furnace heat absorption profiles, slag rates and
composition, fly ash properties, and sootblowing operation will influence the CRH piping
system, especially through changes in use of spray attemperators.
4-33
O&M practices for low-point drain systems may be the most significant contributor to the
likelihood and significance of water hammer incidents. The extreme case was seen at Erickson
Station, where the CRH piping failed catastrophically upon startup after operators failed to
recognize and remedy water accumulation, possibly due to a leaking attemperator valve.
Given the complexity of power plant systems and their operating environments, it is not possible
to predict each and every O&M contribution to damage mechanisms in CRH piping. Even in
plants with “identical” design, variations in fuel properties, environmental factors, and operating
history provide unique influences. Every startup, shutdown, and load change operation involves
a different thermal dynamic, especially in coal-fired plants where the heat transfer characteristics
of heat exchange surfaces are continuously changing. Nonetheless, risks involved with many
operating and maintenance practices are well understood.
4.7.1 Startup, Shutdown, and Load Cycling
In general, cold reheat piping systems in plants that are operated at constant, baseload conditions
will experience less damage from thermal stress, thermal shock, or other cyclic stressors than
will plants operated more cyclically. CRH piping subject to cyclic operation is likely to suffer
some degree of damage with every startup, shutdown, and significant load change. Startups and
shutdowns also provide opportunity for accumulation of standing water and air infiltration,
thereby placing the CRH piping at greater risk of damage from corrosion mechanisms, water
hammer, or quenching from water induction.
The following points should be considered:

• In general, the faster the load change, the faster the temperature change and the greater the
potential for damage. Rapid load changes may accelerate fatigue mechanisms.
• Rapid heating occurs upon introduction of hot steam from the high-pressure turbine or HPT
bypass. The location, design, controllability, and responsiveness of the bypass control valve
and bypass attemperator may have significant impact. The operation of these elements
depends on maintenance as well as on initial design, local control settings, and control
system logic.
• Water induction from cooler areas where it has condensed or pooled, or from drains subject
to backflow, can lead to thermal stress or thermal shock. Pooling also increases the
likelihood of water hammer resulting from contact of superheated steam with subcooled
condensate. Startup and shutdown sequencing may affect condensation or pooling of water
in CRH piping through the:
– Appropriate timing of checks for water and attention to drains on startup and shutdown
– Rate of pressure and temperature change in different boiler components, which affects
condensation rate and location
– Timing and settings of HPT bypass valve and bypass attemperation operation
• Part-load operation may affect condensation or pooling of water in CRH piping due to:
– Valve adjustments to balance flow in different parts of the boiler
4-34
– Excessive use of attemperators at partial load

– Condensation changes in branch piping, such as the HPT bypass, with changes in
proximity to saturation conditions
Pooling of condensed water or attemperator excess or leakage can lead to corrosion or thermal
fatigue that makes the piping more susceptible to future stress.
4.7.2 Attemperator Operation and Maintenance

• Excessive operation of attemperators can lead to water accumulation in CRH piping and to
thermal stress and thermal shock beyond expected levels or in unexpected locations.
• Frequent operation of attemperators can lead to fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue
mechanisms. Water flow rate or quality of spray (droplet size, direction, mixing,
evaporation, and carryover) may contribute.
• When attemperators are used intermittently, stagnant water in supply piping may cool further
below an already subcooled supply temperature.
• Where operator selection of attemperator supply source is possible, potential thermal stress
and shock impacts on piping should be considered along with other system impacts.
• Attemperator water flow rate and spray quality (droplet size, direction, mixing, evaporation,
carryover) can be different than expected because of wear or other damage to attemperator
nozzles and control valves. This may increase the magnitude of thermal stress cycles; in
addition, attemperator flow may increase enough to saturate the steam flow and create
pooling.
• Water may accumulate in the piping if a worn attemperator control valve does not shut off
tightly.
4.7.3 Low-Point Drains
Water pooling may result if automatic or manual operation of drain systems is inadequate. The
following points should be considered:
• Water hammer events are more likely to occur when operator attention and reliable sensors
are required to ensure purging of accumulated water prior to startup.
• Operator training or common practice may neglect CRH piping drains.
• Poorly maintained valves or steam traps may become inoperable and therefore unused.
• Drain requirements may change after changes in operating practices or as a result of changes
due to degradation in other equipment.
• Accumulation of scale or other contaminants may reduce the effectiveness of drain systems.
• Poorly maintained pipe supports may reduce the effectiveness of drain systems.
4-35
4.7.4 Instrumentation
Maintenance and use of instrumentation may be a significant factor in causing or preventing

water hammer and other damage mechanisms. Inadequate operator understanding of instrument
indications may lead to poor operating decisions. This appears to have been the key element of
the Erickson failure. Similarly, inadequate maintenance or improper settings of instrumentation
and control system inputs may lead to poor operating decisions or incorrect system response to
operator and computer inputs.
4.7.5 Piping Support System
The pipe support system requires a regular program of inspection and maintenance to ensure its
proper operation. Poorly maintained pipe supports (or other factors) may allow low spots to
develop where water can pool. O&M practices may contribute to damage caused by pipe
supports and restraints through the following:
• Changes in operating parameters (temperature, pressure, flow rate) that create conditions
outside the design settings of the support and restraint system
• Changes in insulation, valves, or other attached equipment or branch piping without review
of support requirements
• Failure to detect and correct slippage of adjustment devices or account for operating
experience different from expected support behavior or design conditions
• Failure to correct corrosion, seismic, or impact damage to support structures
• Neglect of routine maintenance including lubrication of support mechanisms
• Damage during hydrotesting after piping repairs due to improper installation and/or removal
of hydrotest limit devices
• Damage by paint overspray or impact damage during maintenance activities
• Damage to supports and restraints due to environmental factors such as foreign objects,
nesting wildlife (droppings may contribute to corrosion), and corrosion of springs and other
parts
Chapter 6 provides more information on routine inspection of piping support systems.
4-36
5
CONDITION ASSESSMENT ROADMAP
This chapter presents a stepwise procedure (“roadmap”) for evaluating cold reheat piping
systems using EPRI’s three-level evaluation methodology. This three-level approach, which has
been used successfully in other EPRI guidelines for evaluation of boiler components, controls
cost by staging inspection recommendations based on results of an initial assessment of risk and
the findings of initial inspections. Some steps of the roadmap refer to material in Chapters 4, 6,
and 7, and Appendices B, C, and D.
The guideline encompasses all CRH piping system components, from the high-pressure turbine
outlet to the reheater inlet header, including the piping runs and all major welds, piping supports,
branch connections, attemperators, and drains and instrument connections that affect CRH piping
behavior.
Emphasis is placed on the inspection and analysis of seam-welded piping spools and fittings
because ruptures from fatigue cracks initiating at seam welds have been the primary impetus for
preparation of this guideline. Longitudinal welds experience the higher “hoop” stress imparted
by internal steam pressure (relative to axial stress) and cracks have grown to a critical length
axially along the weld, as well as propagating in the through-wall direction, and produced
rupture failures of the pipe.
5.1 Condition Assessment Fundamentals
The underlying driver for evaluating cold reheat piping systems is the need to achieve plant
safety, reliability, and economic objectives. Recent changes in the power industry have
heightened the importance of these objectives, especially profitability at the plant level, and in
many instances, have renewed interest in comprehensive condition assessment and, where
warranted, condition monitoring. Trustworthy information about the condition of high-energy
piping and other key components is critical to making sound asset management decisions, such
as whether to cycle a unit or to extend the period between major maintenance outages.
In general, EPRI’s condition assessment procedure seeks the answer to three questions to enable
informed decision-making regarding run/repair/replace decisions and the safe operational
interval until the next inspection:
• What is the degree of damage already present in the component?
• What is the rate of damage accumulation, and is it likely to change?
5-1
Condition Assessment Roadmap
• What is the extent of damage required to cause failure, and how long will it be until that
occurs given the expected rate of future damage accumulation and an adequate margin of
safety?
The three-level condition assessment methodology is designed to determine the appropriate level
of effort (and tasks) to answer these questions with the necessary degree of confidence to permit
continued safe operation of the component. The product of the evaluation is an assessment of
the remaining life and/or failure risk of the component (qualitative rather than quantitative in the
case of CRH piping) and a plan for additional or future inspections.
The three-level approach is not rigid, and allows for engineering judgment. There may be
opportunistic times during earlier levels of inspection to acquire detailed information that might
not otherwise be specified at that level. Taking advantage of such opportunities may ultimately
speed the disposition decision process and reduce its cost.
Inspections of CRH piping systems, even seam-welded systems, have traditionally focused on
hanger and support failures that constrain thermal expansion, which imparts bending stresses that
exceed the yield strength of the outside surface of girth welds, thereby creating cracks. The
Parish and Gannon failures have underscored the need to also identify and assess damage
precursors that can initiate and propagate fatigue cracks on the inside of pipes, as well as the
other damage mechanisms described in Chapters 3 and 4.
Thus, for CRH piping systems, the three-level approach consists of the following:
• Level I provides for pre-outage information collection and risk self-assessment. It includes
gathering and reviewing records on design and fabrication, operation, and past
inspection/maintenance for the plant. Thorough information gathering, including conducting
a hot walkdown and interviewing current and retired staff is key to accurately determining if
the CRH piping system is subject to relevant risk factors.
• Level II entails the performance of visual and NDE inspections during an outage at priority
locations determined from the Level I risk assessment. Interpretation of findings will
determine whether additional inspections are warranted during the outage. Adequate
information may be obtained to make component disposition decisions with additional (Level
III) inspections.
• Level III provides for more detailed NDE testing and analysis to support run/repair/replace
decisions for damage found during Level II evaluation.
5.2 The Roadmap for CRH Piping System Evaluation
Figure 5-1 illustrates the suggested sequence of procedures for evaluating CRH piping systems
using the EPRI three-level condition assessment methodology. The sequence begins with
thorough information gathering and proceeds through a series of activities and decision points
that may lead to one or more levels of inspection and analysis. Additional figures and discussion
follow, elaborating upon some of the steps.
5-2
Step 1
Assemble and Review Inspection/Maintenance,
Design/Fabrication, and Operating Records
Level I: Pre-Outage
Step 2A Step 2B Step 2C
Conduct Hot OBSERVED Interview Current
Do Records Walkdown ANOMALIES and Retired Plant
NO
Indicate Seam Personnel to
Welds? Supplement
Records
YES Step 3
Risk Self- LOW (Conduct Routine Inspections;

SS/ Assessment Consider Added Inspection
L E When Convenient)
H
EAM OT
S MO M MODERATE/HIGH
A Step 4B
Step 4A S SE (Plan Inspection and Outage)
SEAM-
On-Pipe Perform Visual and
Level II: During Outage
WELDED
Verification NDE Inspections
Step 5
Interpret
Data/Indications;
Do Findings Warrant NO
Additional Inspections
Now?
Step 6 YES
Level III: Detailed Inspections
Perform Additional
NDE Inspections
Step 7
Interpret
Data/Indications;
Make Disposition
Decision Step 9
Continue
Routine
Step 8 Inspection
and
Run and Establish Reinspection Interval, Maintenance
Make Repairs*/Replacements, and Install Programs
New Instrumentation
*See EPRI weld repair and other guidelines
Figure 5-1
Overall Roadmap for Cold Reheat Piping System Evaluation
5-3
5.2.1 Step 1: Review Records
The evaluation process starts with the assembly of inspection and maintenance records for the
CRH piping system, design and fabrication information, and operational history of the CRH
components and the unit (see Figure 5-2). If available, relevant information on operating and
maintenance experience at similarly constructed and operated units should also be reviewed to
identify potential problem areas.
Maintenance history includes:

• Inspection records and recommendations
• History of failures, analyses performed, actions taken
Operating history includes:

• Operating hours, number of hot and cold starts, and duty history (if cycled, typical ramp
rates)
• Steam temperature, pressure, and flow rate records
• Boiler cycle chemistry records
• Unit trips and excursions (including water hammer log, if available)
• Attemperator cycle duration, flow rate, water supply temperature
Design and construction information includes:

• Specifications for piping materials and drawings for spool and fitting fabrication (especially
the presence and orientation of seam welds) [Note: Be sure to check records for both the
piping field-assembled by the piping fabricator and the reheater inlet header attachment
piping provided by the boiler OEM.]
• Weld radiographs and other certification records
• Support details for the CRH piping and branch piping
• Design parameters, including temperatures, pressures, and flow rates
• Piping flexibility (stress) analyses
5-4
Step 1.1
Assemble and Review Records of CRH Piping

Component/Support Walkdowns and Other Inspection
and Maintenance Records
Step 1.2
Assemble and Review Plant Operating Records

(Hours, Cold and Hot Starts, Attemperator Spray
Flow/Frequency, Water Hammer Log, etc.)
Step 1.3
Assemble and Review CRH Piping System Design
and Fabrication Records, Including As-Builts,
Modification Histories, and Piping Stress Analyses
Proceed to Steps 2A-C
Figure 5-2
Details of Step 1 of the Roadmap
5.2.2 Step 2A: Determine If Piping Is Seam-Welded
In some cases, plant documentation will not clearly indicate whether seamed or seamless CRH
piping was used. In that situation, follow the procedures shown in Figure 5-3 (Step 2A, pre-
outage, and if necessary, Step 4A, on-pipe verification during the outage) to ascertain whether
the piping is seam-welded or so smooth that it isn’t obvious whether it is seamed or seamless. In
the case of the latter, a precise determination may not be critical (as it is in hot reheat piping),
because highly finished, smooth seam welds do not offer the geometric discontinuities that act as
stress concentrators.
5-5
From Step 1, Assembly and Review of Plant Records
Do Plant Check Records/

YES
Records Indicate Radiographs for Grinding/
Seam Welds? Blending of ID Weld Caps
NO
Step 2A
Proceed to
Contact Corporate Engineering and/or Piping Step 3, Risk
Fabricator to See if Shop Records/Radiographs Self-Assessment
Show Seam Welds
Check Records/
Do Records Indicate YES Radiographs for Grinding/
Seam Welds? Blending of ID Weld Caps
NO
Step 4A
At Locations Identified for Inspection,

Conduct Visual/Physical Examination
YES,
Proceed to Step 4B,
Were Seam Welds SEAMED
Visual and NDE
Observed? PIPE
Inspection
NO, SEAMLESS OR
SMOOTH SEAMED
(Not Likely To
Concentrate Stress)
Proceed to Step 3,
Risk Self-Assessment
Figure 5-3
Details of Roadmap Steps 2A and 4A
5-6
5.2.3 Step 2B: Conduct Hot Walkdown
A hot walkdown inspection benchmarks the CRH piping system, supports, and attachments in
the hot conditions so that components can be checked again when cold to determine actual
deflections. It also reveals any current maintenance needs or potential underdesign issues. The
CRH piping system hot walkdown should include all supports, connections to the high pressure
turbine and reheater, the HPT bypass, if present, and all branch piping connected to the CRH
piping including piping attemperator water supply piping starting at its source, and drain piping,
ending at its final discharge point. For planning walkdown activities for piping supports, in
particular, review the checklist provided in Figure 6-1. Also, before conducting the walkdown,
copy and assemble relevant drawings and data sheets found in Step 1 into a binder that can be
easily referenced by inspectors.
During the walkdown, inspectors should complete the checklist and record hanger settings,
location of broken or abnormal hanger conditions, and any evidence of inadequate support.
Operating data at the time of the walkdown should also be recorded, especially temperature
readings throughout the CRH system to facilitate analysis of observations. If any strain gages
have been previously installed, their readings during the walkdown should also be recorded.
If unusual piping support positions or deflection are observed during the walkdown, estimate the
piping loads that would create this situation and compare them against the loads predicted by the
piping stress analysis. Significant disagreement is an indicator of a large displacement event
such as a water hammer episode.
5.2.4 Step 2C: Interview Personnel
In Step 2C, gaps in written documentation and questions raised by field observation are
addressed through interviews with current and former plant personnel.
Interview plant operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel to fill in gaps in recorded
documentation, and answer questions about any anomalies observed during the hot walkdown.
Conduct enough interviews of current and former employees to obtain multiple recollections
regarding key periods in the unit’s history.
Important questions to ask cover items that are often not present in plant records. Examples
include:
• Do they recall any movement or damage to CRH piping and supports that may have been
caused by water hammer or severe quenching?
• Do they recall any repairs, modification, or replacement of CRH piping system elements
(e.g., spool, fitting, or support replacements) that may not have been recorded in the central
filing system? Do they remember why they were made?
• Have they had any operating problems with piping drains?
• How frequently do attemperators operate, and have they been problematic?
5-7
• What changes in operating practices occurred over their tenure (e.g., pressure, temperature,
dispatch duty, startup/bypass procedures)?
5.2.5 Step 3: Conduct Risk Self-Assessment
The risk self-assessment is the culmination of the Level I condition assessment. It entails
reviewing all of the information collected in Steps 1 and 2 in light of its indication of the
presence and severity of damage precursors described in Chapter 4.
Findings of the risk self-assessment should be well documented to facilitate future reference and
periodic update in light of subsequent inspection data, operating changes, or equipment
upgrades.
At the completion of Step 3, conclusions are reached regarding the existence and significance of
risk factors that could lead to unacceptable damage in the CRH piping. A decision is made that
at this point—either no further investigation is needed beyond routine inspection and
maintenance procedures, or inspections are warranted during an upcoming maintenance outage
(i.e., proceed to Level II and Step 4).
If significant risk factors are identified, either through a review of the damage precursors or from
observations during the hot walkdown, Table 5-1 offers guidance on preparing the associated
outage inspection plan. Summaries of inspection procedures recommended for the various
“indicators of concern” are included in Chapter 6. In some cases, especially where prior
documentation is not adequate, it may be advantageous to conduct a piping stress analysis,
supplemented by any available on-line monitoring instrumentation (e.g., thermocouples or strain
gages) to prioritize welds and other CRH features to be inspected.
5-8
Table 5-1
Inspection Recommendations Based on Risk Self-Assessment Findings
Risk Factor Indicators of Concern Suggested Inspection/Evaluation
Overstress mechanisms, including Pipe displacements that bent or broke support and Inspect surfaces of girth OD welds and hanger
observed or suspected water restraint hardware or structures, fractured pipe support stanchion and branch piping welds in vicinity of support
hammer, severe quenching, welds, or otherwise appear to have exceeded about 6-12 damage using liquid penetrant testing (PT) and
restraint of thermal inches of abnormal travel. magnetic particle testing (MT.
expansion/contraction, imbalanced
supports, or external loading Significant imbalance in support loading. Inspect girth and seam welds in vicinity of support
damage using single-transducer pulse-echo ultrasonic
Operator recollection of events involving significant water testing (UT) and two-transducer time-of-flight diffraction
hammer, pipe bowing, or external loading (such as from (TOFD) UT.
reheater inlet header bowing or seismic events).
Perform stress analysis and inspect other major welds
in nearby areas with high bending stress when piping is
hot or cold.
Inspect pipe support/restraint mechanisms and

structures and associated welds in vicinity of support
damage using PT/MT.
Undesirable seam weld orientation Seams are in the 6 o’clock position at piping low points or Inspect 6 o’clock welds and HAZ transitions for
in horizontal spools/elbows with inadequate slope. corrosion pitting or grooving and presence of cracks
using UT/TOFD.
Seams aligned with locations known or suspected to have
high bending stress when piping is hot or cold (Locations Perform finite elements analysis, rather than simple
in or near horizontally oriented elbows are of particular pipe stress analysis, to evaluate stress fields around
concern). seam welds near elbows.
Inspect high-stress seam welds, especially adjacent to

girth welds, using UT/TOFD.
If access is sufficient, consider an initial video/optical
probe inspection.
5-9
Table 5-1
Inspection Recommendations Based on Risk Self-Assessment Findings (continued)
Stress concentrators on piping OD Unground weld caps Inspect areas surrounding OD stress concentrators or
bimetallic welds using PT/MT.
Corrosion crevices
Consider hardness testing to confirm weld and HAZ
Weld flaws (if significant based on a review of original properties.
radiographs or previous UT inspection)
Inspect crevices and flaws using UT/TOFD.
Bimetallic welds (such as at thermowells or radiography
ports)
Stress concentrators on piping ID Unground weld caps Inspect areas surrounding ID stress concentrators using
(if shown by radiography or a UT/TOFD.
video/optical probe) Weld flaws (if significant based on a review of
radiographs or previous UT inspection) Consider ID hardness testing to confirm weld and HAZ
properties (a Level III inspection requiring access to
History of hot dry steam conditions with low O2 (above pipe interior)
750°F, or 400°C) that could create thick, brittle oxide
scale, leading to corrosion pits/grooves upon flaking
(likely to only occur downstream of an HPT bypass
without integral attemperator)
Inadequate drainage Unintended low points, due to line sag, where condensate Inspect piping low points and areas adjacent drains for
can pool during outages. corrosion pitting or grooving and presence of cracks
using UT/TOFD.
Indications of inadequate drain design, maintenance, or
operation: If access is sufficient, consider an initial video/optical
probe inspection.
Operator reports of inoperable or unused drains
Consider disassembly and inspection of drain
Drain configurations and mechanisms known to mechanism and shutoff valve at each maintenance
have been problematic elsewhere shutdown.
Drain mechanism and piping configuration that Consider installing OD thermocouples at pipe tops and
can allow backflow due to pressure head or bottoms at low points and near drains for monitoring
blowdown vessel pressure during unit shutdown during startup.
Indications of thermal stratification in piping (visible
bowing) or thermocouple readings, if installed.
5-10
Table 5-1

Frequent startups, shutdowns, and Units with hundreds of starts and many more than comparable Inspect surfaces of girth OD welds using PT/MT.
load changes (cycling) units in the fleet. Inspect girth and seam welds using UT/TOFD (the most
Heat sinks due to gaps or thin insulation, especially at critical welds are at areas subject to corrosion or shown
branches. from a piping stress analysis to have high bending stress
when piping is either hot or cold).
Inspect pipe for corrosion at low points using UT/TOFD.
The most critical areas are seam and girth welds and drain
penetrations at low points
Inspect branch, instrumentation, and support attachment
welds using PT/MT.
Where heat sink effects could be an issue, inspect surface
welds of stub-in connections using PT/MT and penetration
boreholes (e.g., attemperator flange or thermowell port) for
evidence of thermal stress cracking using UT.
Frequent or poorly controlled A high number of accumulated water spray cycles (e.g., Inspect seam and girth welds downstream of attemperators
attemperation >100,000) using UT/TOFD:
Evidence of significant thermal quenching downstream of the The most critical welds are at low points subject
attemperator liner: water accumulation or locations shown from a
Temperature drop or high strain readings on pipe piping stress analysis to have high bending stress
exterior (instrumentation recommended for frequently when piping is either hot or cold
used attemperators with simple on-off controls) Upstream piping should also be inspected when
Thermal shock indications (alligator skin) on pipe attemperators are installed on poorly sloped
interior (via video/optical probe) horizontal pipe runs.
Indications of inadequate attemperator design, operation, or Inspect pipe for corrosion at low points using UT/TOFD
maintenance: (the most critical areas are 6 o’clock seam welds and girth
welds and drain penetrations)
Attemperator configurations and mechanisms known
to have been problematic elsewhere Inspect branch, instrumentation, and support attachment
welds at, and downstream of, attemperators using PT/MT.
Worn/damaged attemperator shutoff valves or spray
nozzles Consider disassembly and inspection of attemperator
spray mechanism (nozzle and integral control valve) and
Operator/mechanic reports of leakage due to poor shutoff valve at each maintenance shutdown.
valve shutoff; may be detected by sound or by
frequent operation of low-point drains Consider in service monitoring of quench-prone areas
using thermocouples, strain gages, and/or acoustic
Control/shutoff valve design inadequate for severe techniques.
duty service
5-11
Table 5-1

Water induction Long deadlegs, such as inactive high-pressure turbine bypass. Inspect CRH piping entrance/exit where thermal shock or
Reheaters with headers at low points and geometry that allows stress from quenching could occur, first via video/optical
condensate overflow (during outage) back into CRH piping. probe and with UT/TOFD if “alligator skin” observed.
Overheating Bowing of HPT bypass piping or CRH piping at entrance from Consider ID hardness testing, replication, or other tests to
HPT bypass. detect metal damage due to overheating (a Level III
Thick oxide scale/oxide cracking observed during internal inspection requiring access to pipe interior).
inspection.
5-12
5.2.6 Step 4A: Conduct On-Pipe Verification to Determine If Seam-Welded
If the inquiries conducted during Step 2A were unable to determine whether CRH piping spools
were seam-welded (either those by the piping fabricator or those by the boiler vendor), physical
on-pipe examination should be conducted after cooldown and insulation removal (see Figure 5-3
and procedural information in Chapter 6). As noted under Step 2A, if the pipe surface is very
smooth, precise determination of weld presence and position is not essential because highly
finished welds don’t provide stress concentrators.
Even if drawings were located in Steps 1 or 2A that showed seam weld presence and orientation,
limited spot verification of weld position and finish is recommended at locations where
insulation was removed for inspections. At least one location for spools provided by the piping
fabricator, and one for spools provided by the boiler vendor, should be included. It is also
advisable to examine at least one location for each pipe size and fitting type.
If seam welds are found, proceed to Step 4B and begin inspections. If no seam welds are
observed, re-evaluate any Step 3 risk determinations based on the assumption that spools were
seam-welded.
5.2.7 Step 4B: Perform Visual and NDE Inspections
After cooldown and removal of insulation, the cold walkdown inspection of the CRH piping
system is usually conducted first. The walkdown should cover all of the same components
covered in the hot walkdown (Step 2B), and incorporate the piping support inspection checklist
provided in Section 6.1. Because of the insulation has been removed, this walkdown also affords
the opportunity to visually inspect the exposed piping surface in general, as well as seam welds,
girth welds, attachment welds, and seal welds on radiography plugs and thermowells. Although
shown in Figure 5-4 as occurring before cleaning of the pipe surfaces, the cold walkdown can
also be conducted after cleaning if more convenient.
To prepare for NDE inspections, about 6 inches (15 cm) of the pipe surface should be thoroughly
cleaned on each side of the welds to be examined and at the bottom of the pipe at the low points
designated to be inspected.
Conduct liquid dye penetrant testing (PT) and/or wet fluorescent magnetic particle testing (MT)
of the selected girth welds, attachment welds, and other areas, as specified in the inspection plan.
A brief overview of these methods and basic application procedures is provided in Chapter 6.
Verify that spool piece numbers, inspection date and time, and the type/brand of the applied
NDE fluids are recorded along with locations and observations.
Examine selected seam and girth welds, adjacent heat-affected zones (HAZ), and piping wall
bottoms at low points, as specified in the inspection plan, using a combination of pulse-echo
ultrasonic testing (UT) and time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD) UT (see Chapter 6 and Appendix B
for procedural guidance). Use pulse-echo UT to also check piping wall thicknesses and pulse
echo or TOFD UT to estimate the depth and lateral extent of important surface cracks identified
by PT/MT. Verify that spool piece numbers, inspection date and time, weld orientations, and
instrument and examiner IDs are recorded along with collected data.
5-13
If specified in the inspection plan, conduct surface hardness testing of welds and HAZ in the
areas where significant UT indications were found. A reference to hardness testing equipment
and guidance is provided in Chapter 6.
From Step 3, Recommendations for Inspection

or Step 4A, On-Pipe Seam Weld Verification
Step 4B.1
Develop Inspection Plan, including selection
of priority locations (e.g., high-stress welds,
downstream of attemperator, low points, and
anomalies from hot walkdown) and NDE
methods
Step 4B.2
Remove Insulation
Step 4B.3
Conduct Cold Walkdown and Visual Inspection
(including video/optical probe)
Step 4B.4
Clean Surfaces
Step 4B.5
Conduct PT and/or MT Examination
for Priority Welds (major weld ODs and
attachment welds); Conduct any Hardness
Testing at Major Weld ODs/HAZ
Step 4B.6
Conduct Pulse-Echo UT for Low Point
Pitting Corrosion and Priority Major Weld ODs/IDs
Step 4B.7
Conduct TOFD UT for Major Weld IDs
Proceed to Step 5, Indication Interpretation

and Further Inspection Decision
Figure 5-4
Details of Step 4B of the Roadmap
5-14
5.2.8 Step 5: Interpret Findings
All UT indications identified during Step 4 inspections should be classified by likely type, sized,
and mapped (see Figure 5-5). Appendix C provides procedural guidance for UT instrument
calibration and flaw sizing. Chapter 7 summarizes the indicators that can be used to help
establish or estimate a fatigue crack’s locus of initiation and growth history.
If NDE indications suggest that damage of concern may be present in areas beyond those
prioritized in the inspection plan, a revised or supplemental inspection plan should be developed
for additional areas likely to be damaged. Further inspections may include inside wall hardness
testing and advanced NDE techniques if spools or fittings are removed.
Spools in the proximity of pipe wall or weld damage or other CRH components with welds
similar in function, orientation, or finish to those exhibiting damage would be logical choices for
additional inspection. A refined analysis of all loads and stress analysis by finite element or
other methods could also be used to identify other highly stressed regions. As with the initial
Level II NDE inspections, all findings should be properly recorded to facilitate revised risk
assessments and subsequent inspections.
From Step 4B, Visual and NDE Inspections
Step 5
Tabulate and Review PT/MT Observations

and UT/TOFD Indications:
• Sizing (depth, length)
• Location
• Probable Type (weld inclusion or porosity,
corrosion pit/groove, fabrication crack, fatigue
crack)
• Proximity of cracks and stress concentrators
Are Further Proceed to Step 8,

Inspections NO Run and Establish
Warranted Now? Reinspection Interval
or Repair/Replace
YES
Proceed to Step 6,
Additional NDE Inspections
Figure 5-5
5-15
5.2.9 Step 6: Perform Additional NDE Inspections
Procedurally, Step 6 is essentially identical to Step 4, except that it covers more welds, pipe
surfaces, and components, as specified in the revised or supplemental inspection plan (see Figure
5-6). It may also involve more sophisticated NDE and metallurgical analysis methods if a spool
or material sample is removed.
From Step 5, Determination of Need for Further Inspection
Step 6.1
Remove Additional Insulation, Inspect
Visually, and Prepare Surfaces
Step 6.2
Conduct PT and/or MT Examination
for Additional Welds
Step 6.3
Conduct Pulse-Echo UT and TOFD UT for
Additional Major Welds
Step 6.4
If a Spool Is Removed, Conduct Hardness
Testing/Replication at Priority Weld IDs/HAZ
Proceed to Step 7, Indication Interpretation

and Disposition Decision
Figure 5-6
5-16
5.2.10 Step 7: Interpret Findings and Make Disposition Decision
Procedurally, Step 7 is similar to Step 4, except that it may involve interpretation of more
sophisticated NDE and metallurgical analysis methods for removed materials and more
sophisticated crack growth and remaining life modeling (see Figure 5-7 and Chapter 7).
From Step 6, Additional NDE Inspections
Step 7
Tabulate and Review UT/TOFD Indications

and Hardness/Other Data:
• Sizing (depth, length)
• Location
• Probable Type (weld inclusion or porosity,
corrosion pit/groove, fabrication crack, fatigue
crack)
• Proximity of cracks and stress concentrators
• Metallurgical changes
• Consider applicability of crack growth algorithms
(HSF, LEFM, CDM, SAA, corrosion-driven) and
estimate remaining life
Proceed to Step 8,
Run and Establish
Reinspection Interval
or Repair/Replace
Figure 5-7
5-17
5.2.11 Step 8: Establish Reinspection Interval for Run Decisions, Make

Repairs/Replacements, and Add New Instrumentation
Chapter 7 provides an overview of disposition decisions involving run/repair/replacement

alternatives, remaining-life estimation, and the setting of reinspection intervals. Case-by-case
factors, both technical and strategic or economic, make generalizations on the subject difficult.
Nevertheless, the guidelines offer considerations for developing the technical input required for
the decision-making process.
Where the decision outcome calls for repairs, EPRI suggests consideration of innovative, code-
approved weld repair methods developed by its Fossil Repair Applications Center.
As noted in Chapter 7, adding thermocouples for monitoring pipe wall temperatures at key
locations (using the OD as a surrogate for the ID) can help plant engineers and operators gain an
understanding of thermal stress cycles as well as prevent water hammer and other damage
mechanisms related to pooled water. The most critical areas are downstream of attemperators
and HPT bypass valves (and upstream for reference). Thermocouples installed upstream and
downstream of drain valves and attemperator water supply valves can be used to check for
leakage. To check for water pooling and water induction during shutdown, thermocouple arrays
should be installed at the entrance to the reheater and around the circumference at low spots in
horizontal piping runs.
Strain measurements taken before a shutdown can help with expeditious decision making if
significant damage is found. If developmental work on acoustic emission (AE) testing proves it
to be applicable to fatigue crack detection in CRH piping (efforts and successes to date have
chiefly been on creep detection in hot reheat piping), it may also provide valuable guidance for
pre-outage planning. To accurately distinguish signals of concern from background acoustic
information, a significant data record will be needed for events during normal operation, load
changes, shut down and hot/warm starts, and outage cooldown.
5.2.12 Step 9: Continue Routine Inspection and Maintenance Programs
Routine inspection and maintenance programs for cold reheat piping systems are often part of a
generation company’s overall high-energy piping integrity program. EPRI recommends that, at a
minimum, the elements of such programs devoted to CRH piping systems should include:
• Routine hot walkdowns consistent in scope with the recommendations presented in Chapter 6
• Cold walkdowns during maintenance outages, attemperator inspection and maintenance
• Opportunistic inspections when access is provided by major maintenance on other
components (e.g., examination of piping low points for corrosion when the high-pressure
turbine casing is opened)
• Planned inspections whenever aging or operational changes cross the thresholds for
indicators of concern in Table 5-1
• Consideration of applying AE (if sufficiently demonstrated) during operation, especially
transient periods, to identify the presence and approximate location of fatigue cracks
5-18
6
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
This chapter summarizes recommended inspection procedures and NDE options for CRH piping
system components. The scope covers the Level I “hot walkdown” and Level II and Level III
inspections recommended by the CRH condition assessment roadmap (see Chapter 5). It covers
piping support systems, piping and welds, and attemperators.
6.1 Piping Support Systems
Pipe support systems should routinely receive both “hot walkdowns” (during operation or, at the
latest, at the beginning of a scheduled outage, before the equipment has cooled) and “cold
walkdowns” (after the piping has cooled during a scheduled outage). In addition, a walkdown of
the CRH piping and supports should take place after any “jolting force” event such as water or
steam hammer, or after any pressure excursion that “lifted” safety relief valves.
Improper piping support design or installation, or improper adjustment or maintenance, can

produce undue bending stresses on piping components as well as high loadings on mating high-
pressure turbine and reheater components.
When pipe support systems are routinely and skillfully examined—in both hot and cold states—
their condition and performance can provide valuable information regarding the overall
condition and performance of the CRH piping system and the equipment to which it is attached.
Aberrations in pipe support condition or position are an indication of excursions from normal
operating conditions.
In general, the goal of piping support walkdowns is to look for deviations (i.e., components not
in their correct “hot” or “cold” positions), damage (e.g., bent components, corroded or broken
springs, cracked welds, fluid leakage from snubbers), and dirt, debris, or excessive rust that
could impede motion. Data collected during these inspections provide input an NDE inspection
plan, schedule maintenance, or identify pipes that may be at risk from overstress damage. The
walkdowns also provide an opportunity to inspect the jacketed piping itself; inspectors should
look for indentations from significant movement events, leaks, or any other visual or audio
anomalies (e.g., high amplitude vibration, especially of drain piping and attemperator supply
piping).
The first step in preparing for the piping system walkdown is to review design records to
determine the intended function of each support type (otherwise, findings could be
misinterpreted) and to assemble relevant records from previous walkdowns. Next, it is important
to prepare a form to ensure inspection data will be recorded accurately. Figure 6-1 depicts a
sample walkdown checklist.
6-1
Inspection Activities
Figure 6-1
Piping Walkdown Checklist9
Inspectors may wish to consider the following questions for each pipe support:
• Is this the correct pipe support for this location?
• Is this the originally installed pipe support or is it a replacement?
• Is this a “temporary maintenance” pipe support?
• Is the manufacturer’s data plate (label) in place and readable? Is the plant’s ID (e.g., stencil)
intact and readable?
• Does the hanger location (or spacing) agree with the design drawing?
• Was the support installed according to the design and manufacturer instructions?
• Does support travel conform to assumptions in the design and stress analysis?
• Have previous adjustments or resets been made?
9
FMAC Pipe Hanger/Pipe Support Webcast Training, EPRI, Charlotte, NC: September 2004.
6-2
• Are all parts (e.g., nuts, cotter keys, snap rings, etc.) present?
• Are rods bent? How severely?
• Have limit stops (travel stops) been removed?
• Is a spring hanger “topped out” or “bottomed out”?
• Has debris collected on the hanger mechanisms (e.g., fly ash, coal dust, bird droppings or
nests)?
• Are hanger rods fully engaged (e.g., in turnbuckles)? How much engagement?
• Are there signs of the turnbuckle having been turned?
• Does anything interfere with the pipe support’s range of motion?
• Are there indications that heat has been applied?
• Do attachment welds meet requirements?
• Are there obviously cracked welds?
• Are any clamps damaged, load pins bent, etc.?
• Are there signs of dynamic impact damage (bent parts)?
• Are there any signs of pipe insulation damage from “collisions”?
• What is the “position” (“reading”) of the hanger or support spring/lever?
• How much corrosion is present?
• For snubbers, is the hydraulic fluid reservoir level correct?
• Is piping sloped correctly to all drains?
• Are there unusual levels of high amplitude vibration, especially with drain and attemperator
water supply branch piping?
In some cases, it may be useful to apply liquid penetrant or magnetic particle test materials to
pipe support welds, mechanical connections, springs, and other damage-susceptible elements to
more easily identify small cracks. (Note that careful cleaning is required first.)
EPRI’s Fossil Maintenance Applications Center offers extensive guidance on conducting pipe
support inspections and determining when it is advisable to apply NDE methods to pipe support
components.
6.2 Piping and Welds
In addition to inspection of pipe supports, the recommended Level I evaluation of piping

generally entails visual inspection, including measurement, where appropriate, of piping spools,
elbows/bends, tees, and wyes to confirm that the overall geometry remains as intended and has
not developed obvious damage, imbalance in weight distribution, low points in horizontal runs
where water can accumulate, or visible vibration that exceeds normal parameters.
6-3
The Level II evaluation uses a variety of nondestructive evaluation tools to more closely examine
the pipe, for exterior weld cracks and other flaws and, where possible, for crack and corrosion
damage on the interior of the piping.
In a Level III evaluation, NDE is performed in more areas and additional NDE methods may be
used, along with removal and testing of metal samples, if deemed necessary.
6.2.1 Visual Inspection
After removal of pipe insulation, and before and/or after removal of rust, scale, and any other
foreign material from the outside surface of the pipe, a quick visual inspection is recommended
to identify any obvious damage, such as line sagging or ovality, or telltale signs of pinhole leaks,
as well as weld finish anomalies that could serve as stress concentrators. Penetrating liquid dyes
and magnetic particles can make damage on pipe surfaces easier to see.
6.2.1.1 Liquid Penetrant Testing10
Liquid penetrant testing (PT) involves brushing, spraying, or dripping a dye onto the cleaned
surface of the metal component being tested (often a weld). After the test specimen has been left
for a short time (about 30 minutes to an hour) to allow the liquid to penetrate any cracks, the
surface is again thoroughly cleaned and an absorptive coating (developer) is applied to draw the
penetrant back out of surface defects. This process reveals the shape and length of any surface
cracks.
Different types of penetrating liquids are used for testing in visible and ultraviolet light. The best
results are frequently obtained using a fluorescent penetrant and ultraviolet light. The developer
consists of a fine powder in a liquid suspension.
6.2.1.2 Magnetic Particle Testing11
In magnetic testing (MT), magnetic particles applied to the surface of a magnetized test object
congregate around inconsistencies in the metal, indicating the location of surface discontinuities.
The magnetic particles can be applied dry or in a wet suspension of water or kerosene, depending
on the nature of the suspected defect and the finish of the component being tested. A wet
suspension can more effectively detect fine cracks in smoother surfaces, whereas a dry powder is
recommended when testing for subsurface cracks in rough surfaces. The use of fluorescent
particles and an ultraviolet light is popular because that method renders the most striking visual
indicator.
Various types of magnetic currents can be used to locate different kinds of anomalies.
Alternating, direct, or half-wave direct current are the best options for identifying surface
defects.
10
Adapted from Boiler Condition Assessment Guide, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009959.
11
Ibid.
6-4
6.2.1.3 Optical Probes
Where suitable access is available, video or fiber-optic probes can be used to view the inside of
piping to look for visible corrosion pitting or other pipe interior damage. Locations where use of
an optical probe is likely to be feasible and provide valuable information include:
• Low points in horizontal piping near the high-pressure-turbine exit (condensate may
accumulate in this location, leading to corrosion pitting)
• The attemperator lining and nozzle attachments (fatigue cracks may propagate rapidly in
these areas)
• Seam welds and girth welds downstream of the attemperator (frequent spray cycles can
accelerate thermal fatigue cracking; thermal shock can produce surface crazing)
6.2.1.4 Hardness Testing12
Material hardness testing is used on welds and the heat-affected zone to determine the
susceptibility of the metal to cracking (the harder the surface metal, the more brittle and apt to
crack under high localized stress). Hardness testing can be applied in situ or on removed
specimens. Portable hardness testing equipment includes Equotip, Tele-Brinell, Scleroscope,
and Microdur hardware. The ASM Metals handbook Section 8 on Mechanical Testing provides
specifics for each hardness test type.
Although it is one of the simplest mechanical tests, hardness testing can be quite informative.
The drawbacks to using hardness for damage assessment include:
• Uncertainty about the initial hardness of the material
• Sensitivity to local microstructural variation
• Strain-softening effects leading to erroneous results
Hardness testing can be applied on the outer diameter of the pipe (a Level II activity), or, if
warranted by Level II results, on the interior of the pipe (a Level III activity).
6.2.2 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) Techniques
Conventional pulse-echo ultrasonic testing (UT) and time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD) UT are
the NDE methods most frequently used to inspect cold reheat pipe wall condition, wall thickness,
and welds. Pulse-echo UT is typically used to identify pipe thinning, corrosion pitting, and other
types of damage that manifest near the pipe or weld metal surface. TOFD, using “S” or shear
waves, is usually applied to identify cracks that originate beneath the metal surface and run
perpendicular to the pipe wall.
12
Adapted from Header and Drum Damage: Theory and Practice: Volume 1: Information Common to All Damage
Types, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003. 1004313.
6-5
6.2.2.1 Locating Seam Welds13
To efficiently perform UT inspections, if may first be necessary to locate welds. After the
insulation has been removed and the pipe surface cleaned, the location of the longitudinal seam
welds may not be readily apparent (because the welds have been ground flush). For spools and
fittings where fabrication drawings showed a weld, viewing the segment axially down the length
of the pipe, at the indicated orientation, may be sufficient to locate the weld. A flashlight may
help if lighting levels are low. Feeling the pipe surface with bare fingertips may detect minor
changes from weld metal to base metal. If the location still cannot be ascertained, acid etching
can be used. If radiography (either isotope or high-energy radiation) is commonly used at the
plant, it too can usually locate the seam weld, even through insulation. Radiographic testing
index numbers, if visible, can facilitate visual verification in the near vicinity of the numbers.
Note that visual inspection cannot verify the absence of a seam weld (i.e., seamless piping),
however, highly finished seam welds do not present geometric discontinuities that can act as
stress concentrators.
Acid Etching. An acid etch enhances the visibility of a weld. Macro-etchants, such as a
saturated solution of ammonium persulfate or a 25% nitric acid-in-water solution, are usually
suitable. Surface preparation for acid etching requires grinding and polishing to a 600 grit finish,
using a progression of abrasive grits⎯e.g., 120, 180, 240, 320, 400, and 600. The etchant should
be swabbed uniformly on the pipe surface and allowed a dwell time of 15 to 90 seconds. This
procedure should make the weld apparent, if present. Post-etch cleaning should be performed
immediately following weld identification, and should consist of a surface water wash and
reagent-grade alcohol cleaning, followed by drying.
6.2.2.2 Conventional Ultrasonic Testing14
Ultrasonic testing is used to identify subsurface defects (particularly those running horizontal
relative to the pipe wall) and to measure pipe wall thickness. In cold reheat piping, specific
applications include inspecting seam and girth welds in “at-risk” areas (e.g., low-lying horizontal
runs), locating evidence of corrosion pitting or grooving in pipes, and measuring pipe wall
thickness.
UT employs a piezoelectric transducer to generate mechanical vibrations (signal or pulse), which

are transmitted through a coupling liquid into the component being tested. Because the velocity
of sound through a material is a function of its density and modulus, each material has a
characteristic response, and any changes in its properties will cause a change in the response
(reflected signal, or echo). Material flaws or discontinuities can be detected by measuring the
presence, position, and amplitude of returning signal.
13
Adapted from Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003.
1004329.
14
Adapted from Boiler Condition Assessment Guide, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009959.
6-6
Ultrasonic testing falls into two general categories: pulse-echo systems, which use a single
transducer, and through-transmission systems, which use both a sending and receiving
transducer. Pulse-echo is the predominant form of conventional UT used for CRH piping
inspections. The optimal frequency range varies depending on material properties. For example,
low frequencies (40 kHz to 1.0 MHz) are best suited for materials with low elastic modulus or
large grain size, whereas high frequencies (2.25 to 25 MHz) produce better results with small
defects, thin sections, and fine grain materials. Testers can confirm suspected results by
comparing received signals (visually or electronically) with reference blocks of similar
construction materials with known defects (e.g., voids or cracks).
6.2.2.3 Time-of-Flight Diffraction15
TOFD detects and sizes flaws based on analyzing the arrival time of diffracted sound waves
emitted from a flaw’s extremities (i.e., crack tips) as illustrated in Figure 6-2. Among the major
benefits of TOFD are its speed of operation, ease of application, reliable detection capabilities,
and accuracy of sizing.
Figure 6-2
Typical Probe Arrangement and Ultrasonic Wave Paths
15
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003. 1004329.
6-7
The TOFD method employs two angled L-wave transducers arranged symmetrically opposite
each other, straddling the weld. The transducers are located on the parent material, clear of the
weld crown, facing each other. One transducer acts as transmitter and the other as receiver. The
transducer and pulser/amplifier characteristics are selected to generate as broad a distribution of
energy as possible over the weld body, heat-affected zone, and adjacent parent material.
Unlike most pulse-echo UT techniques, accurate positioning of the TOFD probe array with
respect to the seam weld’s longitudinal centerline is not imperative. In practice, transducer
guides or tracks are affixed magnetically at approximately equal distance from the centerline on
each side of the weld. The transducer assemblies are then slid along the guides for the length of
the spool (or segment the length of the guides). The guides and assemblies are then lifted and
repositioned for next spool or spool segment.
Because echo amplitude is not used quantitatively for determination of flaw size, the normal
amplitude-based calibrations associated with conventional UT techniques are not required.
Calibration is composed, in part, of mathematically calculating the probe separation, setting the
transducers accordingly, and adjusting gain levels such that the scatter from the grain boundaries
can be observed between the lateral wave and direct L-wave responses.
The probe system generally has a large beam spread so most of the weld is insonified in one scan
pass. However, flaw type and location, weld joint geometry, and material thickness dictate to a
large degree the number of scans that should be performed to achieve full-volume coverage
while ensuring that the flaws of interest are detected. When possible flaw indications have been
detected, further scans should be carried out to define the flaws more accurately.
Once a flaw has been detected, the values for the ultrasonic velocity in the material, probe delay,
and probe separation distance (PSD) are used to calculate flaw depths and through-wall heights.
Once the system is properly calibrated, the analysis software automatically calculates flaw depth
measurements.
Time-of-flight accuracy, resolution, and other key parameters are normally established and
limited to the ranges dictated by the calculated PSD. However, improvement may be obtained in
the lateral and direct L-wave signal cycles and time-of-flight accuracy by altering the calculated
PSD to an optimum setting. Further, when performing a D-scan, valuable information relative to
flaw classification and lateral position/weld side location may be gleaned from the data presented
between the direct L-wave and the mode-converted waves. (See Appendix B for further
definition of scan and wave types.)
Discrimination and flaw classification are aided through the analysis of phase relationships,
signal shape and location, and relative amplitudes as compared with the lateral wave and back-
wall responses. Volumetric flaws, such as porosity or inclusions, produce characteristic echo-
dynamic patterns that are immediately identifiable in the TOFD B-scan image. Any flaw that is
a point source in its dimension parallel to the D-scan direction will give rise to a parabolic echo-
dynamic shape with minimal length and through-wall height. Conversely, any flaw that has
length parallel to the D-scan direction will produce a continuous indication pattern over its full
length.
6-8
When used with the appropriate imaging technology, TOFD generates images of the forward-
scattered ultrasonic energy from grain boundaries. This scattered energy manifests itself as
mottling in the B-scan image. Differences in metallurgical structure give rise to corresponding
changes in the mottling pattern. Such differences may be attributable to localized repair or heat
treatment locations as well as flaws (voids and cracks) related to in-service conditions.
Appendix B describes TOFD procedures in greater detail.
6.2.3 Acoustic Emission Testing
Acoustic emission detection (AE) has been used by a variety of industries, since the late 1970s,
for locating flaws in various types of material. AE uses sensitive transducers and electronic
signal processing equipment to detect, amplify, and filter the minute sounds created by damaged
areas acting under stress in materials. With proper selection and installation of an array of
transducers, current computer technology makes it possible (and affordable) to approximately
locate small flaws within large metal structures.
EPRI has been supporting the development of AE techniques for high-energy piping applications
since the mid-1980s. Two of its main advantages, of course, are that it can be installed without
removal of insulation except for transducer access and that it provides piping condition
information while the unit is on-line. To date, EPRI’s work has focused chiefly on detecting
creep and creep-fatigue damage in hot reheat piping and other piping and headers with
temperatures in the creep range. Under favorable conditions, AE has been capable of locating
even minute, early-stage creep damagei. Other indications during AE testing have pinpointed
damage in welds on pipe supports connected to hot reheat piping and high-temperature headers.
To date, AE has seen only modest use in evaluating cold reheat piping. This may be, in part, due
to the low perceived failure risk for CRH piping as opposed to that for hot reheat piping. Past
studies with CRH piping have also found that anomalous signals produced by oxide scale and
other non-flaw entities make positive identification of fatigue cracks more difficult. Fatigue
crack growth is also more episodic than creep crack growth. Nonetheless, organizations
confident in the use of AE techniques for hot reheat piping believe it can be successfully applied
to detect incipient damage in CRH piping in a timely manner. In the current competitive
environment for power generation, AE offers the promise of reduced inspection costs and the
flexibility of obtaining data during unit operation.
6.2.4 Strain Gaging
Strain gages can help engineers evaluate stresses in piping, and in CRH piping is most likely to
be employed downstream of the attemperator, where the most significant quenching, and
possible quench cracking, may be experienced. Strain gages are small devices that vary their
resistance when stress causes pipes to change shape slightly. A signal-processing device is used
to provide strain readings, based on the change in resistance. The strain readings can then be
used, along with pipe thickness, to calculate stress at the pipe’s outer surface, which can be an
indicator of stress on the inside surface.
i
J. Rodgers and R. Tilley, “Standardization of Acoustic Emission Testing of Fossil Power Plant Seam-Welded High
Energy Piping, for ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, San Diego, July 2004.
6-9
Traditional strain gages are constructed of wire filament bonded to a substrate. For CRH piping,
special high temperature gages should be used.
6.3 Attemperators
Damaged attemperators can increase thermal stresses on cold reheat piping through increased
water flow, misdirection of attemperator spray, or degradation of attemperator spray quality. If
attemperators fail to provide sufficient water flow, damage to the reheater and downstream
elements may result. Overheating of CRH piping can also result if the attemperator for the high-
pressure turbine bypass provides insufficient cooling. If attemperator water shutoff valves leak
during shutdowns, water pooling may lead to water hammer or corrosion.
Because the consequences of failure in the attemperation system may be severe, frequently used
attemperators should be inspected at each major maintenance outage, even if inspection of major
welds in cold reheat piping is not planned.
Attemperator inspection requires removal of the spray nozzle assembly so that the spray head
and welds on the nozzle assembly are visible. In addition to being critical to proper spray
dispersion, the nozzle(s) and nozzle support(s) are subject to the most severe thermal shocks of
any part of the CRH piping system. Although they are designed to withstand these conditions,
they still may experience cracking and should be examined, visually and by liquid penetrant to
ensure that any damage is remedied before nozzle performance can be compromised.
The liner and key supports can be examined with a video or fiber optic probe while the spray
head assembly is removed. If possible, a probe should be obtained that can extend well upstream
and downstream of the attemperator to enable examination of areas subject to quenching by the
attemperator spray (upstream observation serves as a reference) and to any areas of horizontal
piping subject to pooling and possible corrosion. For some attemperator liner configurations, it
may be necessary to remove radiograph plugs upstream and downstream of the attemperator to
better view critical liner attachment welds.
6-10
7
CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISPOSITION DECISIONS
This chapter briefly reviews how to evaluate NDE test results as input to disposition (run-repair-
replace) decisions. The techniques discussed are part of the formal condition assessment
roadmap for CRH piping systems, as discussed in Chapter 5. As a whole, they use retrospective
evaluation of observed damage mechanisms as input and validation for predictive techniques. A
comprehensive treatment is not provided, as generation companies often have in-house
procedures or expertise for disposition decisions based on in-service crack size, driver(s),
remaining life or failure risk algorithms, and the unit’s role in the generation fleet. For complex
decisions, generation companies may engage metallurgical and stress analysis consultants.
When damage is detected and evaluated during a Level II or Level III assessment, available
courses of action (disposition options) include:
• Run. A decision is made that the damage entails a minimal, acceptable, or manageable level
of risk and can be returned to service as-is. A plan is made to:
– Schedule a reinspection interval (likely to be concurrent with future scheduled major
maintenance outages)
– Repair or replace the damaged component at a future scheduled major maintenance
outage
– Repair or replace the damaged component at the earliest practical opportunity (e.g., a
weekend outage)
• Repair. A decision is made that the damage may entail an unacceptable level of risk and that
the involved piping system element can be satisfactorily repaired. A plan is followed to
repair the element before the unit is returned to service.
• Replace. A decision is made that the damage may entail an unacceptable level of risk and
that it is most cost-effective to replace, rather than repair, the component. A plan is followed
to replace the element before the unit is returned to service.
Steps that may be involved in analyses to inform disposition decisions include:

• Gathering records and securing additional on-unit data
• Determining crack dimensions, orientation, and characteristics
• Estimating the date and location of crack initiation
• Predicting stress-driven growth
• Predicting corrosion-driven growth
• Tabulating and/or predicting future influences on key drivers
7-1
Considerations for Disposition Decisions
• Formulating a conservative remaining-life estimate for the piping system element

• Comparing the remaining-life estimate with a reference benchmark
Even with the best information, remaining-life assessment for CRH piping is a challenging and
inexact endeavor. It is rare that complete documentation is available to describe each of the
multiple sources of stress involved in initiating and propagating a single fatigue crack. Some
assumptions are often necessary to formulate an explanation consistent with the evidence from a
ii
thorough investigation of a damage incident. As noted by Price, Kerezsi and Chang, much of
the guidelines for evaluating thermal shock cracking “contain values which must be estimated
from experiments” and have limited validity for conditions for which experimental data are
unavailable.
7.1 Pre-Outage Planning
Planning ahead is central to making timely disposition decisions within a fast-paced outage
schedule. In many cases, damage to CRH piping will first be discovered during a maintenance
outage. A run/repair/replace decision must be made solely with the information that can be
obtained before the plant is returned to service. Yet much of the required information is best
gathered while the unit is running. Thus, the EPRI condition assessment roadmap places great
importance on pre-outage planning and data collection.
Several types of information are particularly important. These include detailed histories of CRH
piping flow rates, inlet and outlet steam conditions, and records of attemperator flow rate,
temperature, cycle initiation time, and cycle duration. Records of water hammer or severe
asymmetric quenching events can help provide an understanding pipe deformation or crack
initiation.
As the area downstream of attemperators may be vulnerable to thermal quenching damage, any
specific information on steam temperature or pipe wall temperature or strain in this area is
especially useful. Instrumentation in this area is not common, and EPRI recommends that plants
with known indicators of concern (see Table 5-1) consider adding thermocouples and strain
gages at a range of distances upstream and downstream of the attemperators. Such
instrumentation can also be useful at the high-pressure turbine bypass inlet to CRH piping and
around drains believed to collect substantial quantities of condensate during outages. With
respect to the latter, an array of thermocouples installed on the outside of the pipe at the top,
bottom, and in-between can help indicate the presence of pooled water upon startup (and thereby
alert operators to drain the piping to prevent water hammer).
As described in Steps 2B and 4B of the CRH condition assessment roadmap, and in Chapter 6,
determining stress impacts resulting from pipe hangers and supports requires a hot walkdown,
while the unit is in service, and a cold walkdown, after the plant has had time to cool off.
ii
J. W. H. Price, B. Kerezsi and M. Chang, Thermal shock cracking guidelines for acceptance in service Engineering
Failure Analysis, Volume 11, Issue 2, April 2004, Pages 267-277.
7-2
7.2 Determining Crack Size and Characteristics
Non-destructive evaluation techniques applicable to CRH piping components are reviewed in

Chapter 6. Appendix C provides more detailed information on use of these techniques for
determining crack dimensions. For the most part, NDE techniques used in a Level II analysis
will only reveal crack length and depth. If video probe access to the inside of the pipe is
available, more detailed information about corrosion characteristics, scale formation, and surface
crazing may be obtained.
Additional information will be available if a sample is removed for micrographic study during a
Level III evaluation. This may include:
• Identification of coarse-grained, fine-grained, worn, and corroded surfaces within the crack
that give clues to the magnitude of stresses, speed of propagation, and timeframe for
particular periods in the crack’s growth history
• Scale thickness within the crack, which can be used for dating through comparison with
thickness of scale on undisturbed surfaces
• “Beach marks” and other markings that indicate the predominance of different drivers over
the course of crack propagation
7.3 Estimating the Date and Location of Crack Initiation
As presented above, certain indicators give clues to the age and progression of a fatigue or
corrosion-assisted fatigue crack. In some cases, the progression of these indicators defines the
location where the crack initiated—possibly the location with the thickest scale development or
the smoothest crack surfaces. Changes in crack characteristics may correlate closely with
changes in plant operation; for example, a coarser-grained crack surface may correspond to an
increase in the normal operating pressure of the system or a change to sliding-pressure cycling.
7.4 Identifying the Key Crack Growth Drivers
Once a crack has been initiated, there are three primary growth mechanisms that determine how
16
rapidly a crack will grow :
• Fatigue—the slow propagation of damage, generally single or multiple cracks, due to
repeated stress cycles
• Corrosion—the removal of metal by electrochemical mechanisms
16
Price, J.W.H., B. Kerezsi, and M. Chang, “Thermal Shock Cracking Guidelines for Acceptance in Service,”
Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol. 11 (2004) 267-277.
7-3
• Plastic collapse—the rapid failure mechanism that occurs when critical crack size is reached
and applied stresses exceed the strength of the remaining ligament between the crack tip and
the outer pipe wall
For analyzing the potential growth of a crack found in cold reheat piping, fatigue and corrosion
are the drivers to consider. Because fatigue and corrosion can work together, it is important to
consider both phenomena when assessing the future growth of an existing crack. In practice,
however, cracks driven by multiple factors are difficult to predict.
The primary step in analyzing fatigue crack growth is determining the type and magnitude of
stresses involved. Initial data will be obtained during Level I condition assessment activities, in
which forces, pressures, and thermal cycles that affect the piping are identified on the basis of
design and fabrication details and operating parameters. Analysis of stresses resulting from these
factors may be performed in conjunction with review of a piping stress analysis, in Level I, and
re-estimated after specific geometric data and flaws are identified in Level II.
A complete understanding of the type and magnitude of stresses involved may not be available
until material samples are removed and analyzed during Level III condition assessment. In some
cases, evidence of corrosion is easily visible (ID access via video camera or borescope) as pitting
on the ID surface. In others, its activity can be predicted by observing indicators such as piping
sag, or confirmed through microscopic or chemical analysis of the crack and adjacent metal.
7.5 Predicting Future Influences on Key Drivers
The goal in evaluating crack growth will generally be to determine the most economic solution
for continued safe operation of the CRH piping system. If substantial economic or operability
benefits may be realized by postponing repairs, a sophisticated crack growth analysis may be
warranted to confirm that safety criteria can be met with this approach or through continued
operation under more strictly controlled parameters. At the other extreme, a simplified approach,
with conservative assumptions, may be adequate to confirm that the system can operate
indefinitely without risk of rapid progression to failure.
For a conservative prediction of remaining life, one can assume that future plant operation will
follow the past pattern that correlates with the most severe damage mechanisms or be similar to
the worst-case cyclic operation experienced throughout the operator’s fleet.
For a more specific remaining-life analysis, it is helpful to know:

• Current, past, and planned future operating pressures and temperatures
• Likelihood of future upgrades or downgrades in plant capacity, pressure, or temperature
• Likelihood of changes in fuel source(s)
• Factors that indicate the likelihood and timing of future assignment to cyclic duty, such as:
– Suitability for cycling compared to other units in the fleet
– Variable production cost (usually proportionate to heat rate) compared to other units in
the fleet serving a given market
7-4
– Age and priority for replacement compared to other units in the fleet
– Trends toward cycling of similar units
7.6 Predicting Stress-Driven Fatigue Crack Growth
Predicting crack growth in cold reheat piping is a challenging exercise. Although a small
minority of cracks can progress to leakage or rupture, other cracks initiated by overstress and
thermal shock events can arrest at shallow depths and do not progress to failure. Likewise, there
is no single standard for predicting how fatigue and corrosion will affect CRH piping cracks over
time.
This section provides an overview of different fatigue crack growth prediction techniques for
thick-walled piping that can be considered as candidates for evaluating cracks found in cold
reheat piping. These methods include17:
• High-Strain Fatigue (HSF)
• Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM)
• Critical Distance Methods (CDM)
• Stress Averaging Approach (SAA)
7.6.1 High-Strain Fatigue (HSF)18
The “Thermal Shock Cracking Guidelines for Acceptance in Service,” compiled by Price,
Kerezsi, and Chang identify high-strain fatigue (HSF) as a mechanism, involving some degree of
plastic deformation, that occurs early in the life of a fatigue crack. As the crack grows, the stress
concentration affecting the crack tip decreases, and propagation continues in a form that is better
described by LEFM. Specifically, the authors note:
In the plastic growth zone the growth is covered by a growth law proposed, for example, by
Skelton19:
where “a” is the depth of crack (including starter notch), N is the number of thermal shock
cycles, and B and L are constants to be determined experimentally.
17
Crupi, G., V. Crupi, E. Guglielmino, and D. Taylor, “Fatigue Assessment of Welded Joints Using Critical
Distance and Other Methods,” Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol. 12 (2005) 129-142.
18
Price, J.W.H., B. Kerezsi, and M. Chang, “Thermal Shock Cracking Guidelines for Acceptance in Service,”
19
Skelton, R.P., “Growth of Short Cracks During High Strain Fatigue and Thermal Cycling,” Low Cycle Fatigue
and Life Prediction, ASTM STP 770. Philadelphia: American Society for Testing and Materials (1982) 337-381.
7-5
7.6.2 Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM)
LEFM is perhaps the most frequently used method for predicting fatigue crack growth. The
“Paris Law” provides a relatively simple method of calculating fatigue crack growth per stress
cycle:
n
CG = C(UK )
In this equation, UK is a range of fracture mechanics stress intensity factors and C and n are
material-specific constants describing crack growth behavior. Using this information plus the
number of “stress cycles” to date and existing crack size, engineers can estimate the remaining
cycles to failure.
Notch Stress Intensity Factor (NSIF)20 is a modified version of the LEFM approach. It defines
a new parameter, the NSIF, based on the definition of the stress field near the crack tip. This
method has been used successfully for estimating fatigue crack growth and initiation at notches
and weld toes.
7.6.3 Critical Distance Methods21
Critical distance methods define failure criteria based on the stresses within a critical region
surrounding the stress concentration, the size of which depends on the material. In “Fatigue
Assessment of Welded Joints Using Critical distance and Other Methods,” the authors note that,
according to Tanaka and Taylor, the value of the critical distance can be expressed in terms of a
material length parameter, L, which is defined in terms of the plain-specimen endurance limit 0
and the fatigue crack propagation threshold Kth:
The value of L is assumed to be a material constant, independent of both notch and specimen
geometry.
The two simplest critical distance methods are the point method (PM), which uses the value of
the stress at a distance equal to L/2 from the point of maximum stress, and the line method
(LM), which uses the average stress along a line, starting at the point of maximum stress and
terminating at a distance equal to 2L. The critical stress value is the plain-specimen endurance
limit.
Recent tests have indicated that the point methods—PM and LM—offer similar levels of
accuracy as NSIF while being significantly easier to implement.
20
21
Ibid.
7-6
7.6.4 Stress Averaging Approach22
This method is based on the addition of a “fictitious radius”: a root radius is added at the
expected location of cracking. The fictitious notch radius f depends on the original notch radius
, a microstructural length parameter * and a factor s dependent on the multiaxiality of the
notch stress state in combination with the strength criterion to be applied:
*
= +s
f
where s = 2.5 for plane strain conditions and the Von Mises criterion.
Tests of this method, which describes in greater detail, have so far been inconclusive with regard
its accuracy relative to other crack growth prediction methods.
7.7 Predicting Corrosion-Driven Growth
At present, there is no widely used method for predicting corrosion-driven crack growth. Price,
Kerezsi and Chang23 cite work by Gabetta, Rinaldi, and Pozzi24 that proposes equations
describing a corrosion-assisted growth region influenced by:
• Crack opening stress
• Crack depth (the deeper the crack, the more time the diffusion takes)
• Cycling time
• Concentration of species
Although the work by Gabetta, et al. indicates that corrosion influence decreases to zero in the
absence of stress, the photo record from Failure Analysis Associates’ investigation of the
Gannon failure shows a broad-tipped crack that would remain exposed to corrosion influence.
7.8 Remaining-Life Estimates and Reinspection Interval
Personnel experienced with the principles used in predicting the propagation of fatigue and
corrosion-assisted fatigue may be comfortable using these techniques to formulate a remaining-
life estimate as input to run-repair-replace decisions. In many cases, the prediction of future
crack propagation and remaining life will either spur a decision to repair or replace the damaged
22
23
J. W. H. Price, B. Kerezsi and M. Chang, Thermal shock cracking guidelines for acceptance in service
Engineering Failure Analysis, Volume 11, Issue 2, April 2004, Pages 267-277.
24
Gabetta G., C. Rinaldi, and D. Pozzi, “ A Model for Environmentally Assisted Crack Growth Rate,”
Environmentally Assisted Cracking: Science and Engineering, ASTM STP 1049. Philadelphia: American Society
for Testing and Materials: 1990, p. 266.
7-7
piping at the earliest practical opportunity, or provide adequate assurance that the damage will
not progress to failure before the next scheduled maintenance outage. At that outage, the
damage will be reexamined, along with the remaining-life estimate, and a similar decision
process will be followed. In some cases, a conservative remaining-life estimate may provide
sufficient assurance to allow Level II or Level III NDE inspections to be scheduled less
frequently than every major maintenance cycle.
In instances where inspections find no damage of significance, reinspection will be triggered by

results from periodic piping walkdowns or by significant changes in operating practices that
increase risk factors as determined by the self-assessment step of the condition assessment
roadmap (see Chapter 5).
7.9 Perspective from Case Studies—Gannon and Parish
The failure investigations that followed the incidents at Parish Unit 8 and Gannon Unit 6 provide
significant insight into the progression of fatigue and corrosion-assisted fatigue damage
mechanisms. Reports for both units provide information on the operating parameters and
number of startup and shutdown cycles (and attemperator cycles for Parish) that CRH piping
experienced before surprisingly large cracks propagated to failure.
The analysis of stress cycles for Parish, by Harris25, is perhaps most useful for placing
remaining-life assessment of cold reheat piping in perspective. Even with full benefit of detailed
retrospective analysis, significant exploration of assumptions was necessary to correlate the
observed timeframe with the predicted timeframe derived from available operating information.
With different, yet still plausible, assumptions, fatigue life calculations varied by a factor of two
or more.
25
Harris, David O., Analysis of Fatigue Crack Initiation and Growth in Parish Unit 8 Cold Reheat Line, Engineering
Mechanics Technology, Inc., San Jose, CA: December 5, 2003.
7-8
8
CONCLUSIONS
The two best-known cold reheat piping failures—ruptures from fatigue cracks initiating on the
inside wall at the toe of seam welds—occurred at Tampa Electric’s Gannon Unit 6 in 1993 and at
Texas Genco’s W.A. Parish Unit 8 in 2003. Analysis of each of these failures suggested that
they resulted from a combination of original fabrication and in-service factors (different ones for
the two cases), which have been considered atypical. And indeed, companies conducting CRH
weld inspections following these failures did not report widespread damage (although in some
cases, original weld flaws were common). Nonetheless, the individual contributing factors at
Gannon and Parish are not unique, and it seems likely that other combinations of “damage
precursors” could also present significant risk. As a result, EPRI recommends that power
generators conduct a self-assessment of risk for their units’ CRH piping systems as part of a
formal process using the evaluation roadmap presented in Chapter 5. Where multiple risk factors
are present at a power plant, EPRI recommends that inspections for actual damage be
undertaken. Information in Chapters 6 and 7 and Appendices B, C, and D supports such an
inspection effort.
The damage types most likely to be found in CRH piping include corrosion pits and grooves,
cracks from fatigue or corrosion-assisted fatigue, and yielding/deformation of piping due to
overstress caused by water hammer, thermal shock, or malfunctioning pipe supports. The risk of
damage appears higher for units with undesirable seam weld orientations (particularly in the
vicinity of horizontal elbows), frequent startups and operating pressure changes (cycling),
frequent or poorly controlled attemperation, piping constrained from thermal expansion,
horizontal piping runs with inadequate drainage, and inside wall stress concentrators such as
geometric discontinuities at weld toes or corrosion pits/grooves.
Cyclic thermal quenching from frequent attemperator sprays and sliding-pressure cyclic
operation appeared to play a significant role in propagating the fatigue crack at Parish. At
Gannon, water hammer incidents early in the plant life appear to have initiated a crack, which
then propagated primarily through the influence of cyclic operation and corrosion.
The EPRI guideline recognizes that some weld flaws may be tolerated, as they are in EPRI’s
guideline for seam-welded hot reheat piping, on the basis of pipe inspectability using established
NDE techniques. In many cases, NDE examiners can distinguish fatigue cracks from flaws that
are not service-related. Proper documentation of inspections can help examiners at future
inspections resolve any uncertainty. For service-related cracks, predictions of crack growth rates
and remaining life are less certain than those for hot reheat piping, where creep is the
predominant damage mechanism of concern and the driving function (time at temperature) is
better documented than the multiple and episodic stress drivers for fatigue.
8-1
Conclusions
The EPRI guideline also advocates routine, systematic evaluation of CRH piping supports.
Walkdowns are inexpensive and may provide an early indication of conditions that can cause
outside-wall-initiated cracks at girth welds as well as superimpose substantial stress on welds
(seam and girth) that also experience cyclic stress drivers, thereby initiating or growing inside-
wall fatigue cracks. These walkdown activities should be formally documented as part of the
overall program for cold reheat piping.
Finally, the evaluation roadmap must be viewed as an ongoing, periodic effort. As summarized
in the report, many of the factors potentially contributing to damage and failure are tied to
specific operating characteristics. In today’s market-driven environment for electric power, unit
dispatch parameters are frequently changed and may increase those factors contributing to
fatigue crack initiation and growth.
8-2
9
REFERENCES
“Acoustic Emission Linear Location Cluster Analysis on Seam-Welded Hot Reheat Piping,
Rev 1,” Acoustic Emission Consulting: October 1996.
Alexander, C., J. Frey, and S. Shin, Evaluation of the Failure in the Texas Genco W. A. Parish
Unit #8 Cold Reheat Line, Stress Engineering Associates, Houston, TX.
Barter, S., L. Molent, N. Goldsmith, R. Jones, “An Experimental Evaluation of Crack Growth,”
Boiler Condition Assessment Guide, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1009959.
Carlos, M., “Acoustic Emission: Heeding the Warning from Materials,” ASTM Standardization
News, October 2003.
Cold Reheat Elbow Failure, Tampa Electric Gannon 6: Investigation and Recommendations,
Failure Analysis Associates, Inc., Coral Gables, FL: December 1993.
Condition Monitoring for Boiler Availability Improvement: Final Report, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:
2003. 1004300.
Correspondence from S. Shin on Metallurgical Analysis of Cold Reheat Pipe Failure at WA
Parish Unit 8, Reliant Energy Materials Analysis Group: October 6, 2003.
Creep FatiguePro—An Online Creep and Fatigue Monitoring System,” EPRI Monitoring and
Diagnostic Center.
Crupi, G., V. Crupi, E. Guglielmino, and D. Taylor, “Fatigue Assessment of Welded Joints
Using Critical Distance and Other Methods,” Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol. 12 (2005) 129-
142.
D’Ambros, “Influence of Intermittent Operation on the Life of High-Pressure Steam Duct and
Superheater Headers of Recovery Boilers,” Cyclic Operation of Power Plants—Technical,
Operational, and Cost Issues, Proceedings of the International Seminar held at the Institute of
Materials, London: June 2001. Paper S6-4.
FMAC Pipe Hanger/Pipe Support Webcast Training, EPRI, Charlotte, NC: September 2004.
Frey, J., “W.A. Parish Unit 8 Cold Reheat Seam Weld Failure: Presentation,” Stress Engineering
Associates, Houston, TX: 2003.
Guidelines for Advanced Ultrasonic Examination of Seam-Welded High Energy Piping, EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA: 2000. 1000564.
9-1
References
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003.
1004329.
Harris, David O., Analysis of Fatigue Crack Initiation and Growth in Parish Unit 8 Cold Reheat
Line, Engineering Mechanics Technology, Inc., San Jose, CA: December 5, 2003.
Header and Drum Damage: Theory and Practice: Volume 1: Information Common to All
Damage Types, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003. 1004313.
Header and Drum Damage: Theory and Practice: Volume 2: Mechanisms, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:
2003. 1004313.
Hendrix, R., Condition Assessment Programs for Boiler and Piping Components at the Big
Cajun II Power Station, Babcock Power: Technical Publication RST-149.
Intelligent Sootblowing Demonstrations at Reliant Energy’s W.A. Parish Plant: Interim Report,
EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2003. 1004114.
King, J., Condition Assessment of Boiler Piping and Header Components, Babcock Power:
Technical Publication RST-164.
King, J., Current Experience in Typical Problems and Failures With Boiler Piping Components
and Supports, Babcock Power: Technical Publication RST-152.
“Minutes of the Board of Commissioners’ Meeting,” Lansing Board of Water and Light: October
23, 2001.
Morgan, B.C. and R. Tilley, “Inspection of Power Plant Headers Using Acoustic Emission
Monitoring,” NDR&E Journal, Vol. 32, No. 3 (April 1999) 165-172.
Nakoneczny, G.J., and C. Schultz, Life Assessment of High-Temperature Headers, Babcock and
Wilcox, Barberton, OH: 1995. BR-1586.
Nakoneczny, G.J., Boiler Fitness Survey for Condition Assessment of Industrial Boilers,
Babcock and Wilcox, Barberton, OH: BR-1635.
Nakoneczny, G.J., and M.N. Hovinga, Standard Recommendations for Pressure Inspection
During a Boiler Life Extension, Babcock and Wilcox, Barberton, OH: 2000. BR-1701.
Peet, W.J. and T.K.P. Leung, Development of a Dynamic Simulation Model for a Drum-Type
Boiler With a Turbine Bypass System, Babcock and Wilcox, BR-1588.
Price, J.W.H., B. Kerezsi, and M. Chang, “Thermal Shock Cracking Guidelines for Acceptance
in Service,” Engineering Failure Analysis, Vol. 11 (2004) 267-277.
Rodgers, J.M. and R. Tilley, “Standardization of Acoustic Emission Testing of Fossil Power
Plant Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping,” EPRI: To be presented at the ASME Pressure Vessel
and Piping Conference in San Diego, July 2004.
Rodgers, J.M. and A. Dietrich, “Acoustic Emission Monitoring of Fossil High-Energy Piping,”
Acoustic Emission Consulting, Inc., presented at Sixth EPRI Piping & Bolting Inspection
Conference.
9-2
References
Rosario, D.A. and R. Tilley, “Life Assessment of Critical Boiler and Turbine Components Using
EPRI’s Creep FatiguePro Software,” EPRI International Conference on Advances in Power Plant
Life Assessment, Orlando, FL: March 2004.
Stevens, G., A.F. Dearoff, D.A. Gerber, and S.T. Rosinski, Fatigue Monitoring for
Demonstrating Design Basis Compliance, EPRI NDE Center.
Stevens, G., D.A. Gerber, and S.T. Rosinski, “Latest Advances in Fatigue Monitoring
th
Technology Using EPRI’s FatiguePro Software,” Paper No. D3-A1-US, 15 International
Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology. Seoul, Korea: August 1999.
9-3
A
FAILURE EXPRERIENCE WITH COLD REHEAT PIPING
A.1 Plant Name: W.A. Parish Unit 8 (Texas Genco, formerly Reliant
Energy)26,27,28
A.1.1 Operating History

• Size: 650 MW, coal-fired
• Duration: 145,000 hours, 1982-2003 (7800 since rerate)
• Starts: 180 hot, 55 cold
• Operating Mode: Daily load cycle, start-stop on weekends
• Load Cycles: One or two load change cycles per day with 350 psi (24.1 bar) pressure drop.
Additional load cycles with relatively frequent relief valve lifting after upgrade—reduced by
increase in attemperator cycles.
• Attemperator Cycles: An estimated 328,000 over life of piping; reduced frequency when
started water lancing for deslagging in 1998; increased again after uprate in 2001, but not as
frequent as pre-1998
• Failure Date: July 15, 2003
• Component: South CRH piping—horizontal straight section near horizontal elbow.
A.1.2 Temperature/Pressure
• Design: 675°F/745 psi (357°C/51.4 bar)
• Unit Rating: 675°F/685 psi (357°C/47.2 bar)
• Actual: 675°F/685 psi (357°C/47.2 bar)
26
Alexander, C., J. Frey, and S. Shin, Evaluation of the Failure in the Texas Genco W. A. Parish Unit #8 Cold
Reheat Line, Stress Engineering Associates, Houston, TX
27
Harris, David O., Analysis of Fatigue Crack Initiation and Growth in Parish Unit 8 Cold Reheat Line,
Engineering Mechanics Technology, Inc., San Jose, CA: December 5, 2003
28
A-1
Failure Exprerience With Cold Reheat Piping
• Uprated (28 months before failure): from 625°F/660 psi (329°C, 45.5 bar)
A.1.3 Repairs
None noted
A.1.4 Dimensions
• Spool Length: approx. 30 foot (9.1 m) spool
• Outer diameter: 30 inches (76.2 cm)
• Wall: 0.636 inch (16.2 mm) minimum; 0.780 inch (19.8 mm) at failure location
A.1.5 Hoop Stress
Actual: 12.83 ksi (88.5 MPa)
A.1.6 Attemperator Water
75,000 lb/h (34,000 kg/h)
A.1.7 Manufacturing History

• Material: ASTM A155, Grade KC70, Class 1 Carbon Steel
• Weld Geometry: Double-V
A.1.8 Inspection/Analysis
• Detection Method: Ruptured
• Location of Crack: Inside wall, propagating from toe of seam weld, 20 inches (51 cm) from
top of pipe (approx. 2:30 position). Initiation point was 9 inches (23 cm) from girth weld on
horizontal elbow, 23 inches (58 cm) from weld to hanger stanchion. Crack located 41 feet
(12.5 m) downstream of spray attemperator.
• Crack Dimensions: 35 inches (90 cm) long on inner diameter; maximum depth 0.77%—i.e.,
92% of 0.84 inch (213 mm) wall thickness—prior to rupture.
• Inspections—Pre-failure: Not included in high energy piping program. No history of
serious water hammer or other known indicators. Pipe was well above code minimum wall
thickness and operated well below design pressure/temperature.
A-2
• Inspections—Post-failure: Inspected all CRH piping, looking in particular for (1) inner-
diameter-initiated cracking at toe of seam and girth welds downstream of attemperator, (2)
presence of seam weld at the six o’clock position where risk of corrosion-assisted fatigue is
high, (3) linked corrosion pits or grooves at welds on bottom of horizontal pipe, (4) slope of
horizontal pipe. Found linked pits and/or grooves on bottom of pipe at several girth welds.
• Replication: None. 3 inch (762 mm) diameter plug sample removed.
• Stress Analysis: Performed by Stress Engineering Services, Inc. (SES) and Engineering
Mechanics Technology (EMT) during incident investigation. Stress concentration at weld
toe coincided with stresses due to location of elbow along with pressure, cold spring/thermal
expansion, and thermal cycling due to attemperator. Nearby snubber was possibly
overloaded.
• Fracture Mechanics Analysis: EMT analysis correlated crack cycles to fatigue calculations
with operating history (pressure cycles) and observed stresses due to attemperator operation.
• Failure Consequences: Catastrophic—major collateral damage, large piping fragments
scattered over 1200 ft (365 m) radius.
• Visual Observations: Profile of weld toe was normal, not defective. Crack progressed
straight through wall (base and weld metal), not following heat-affected zone. Beach marks
near point of origin; smoother surface for first 76% of wall thickness, much rougher for
remaining 16% with abrupt smooth to rough transition, no fatigue crack at hanger to pipe
weld.
A.1.9 Metallurgical Analysis

• Performed by: Stress Engineering Services, Inc.
• Crack Origin: No unusual findings—weld and base metal in normalized condition (see
Hardness and Microstructure).
• Crack Path: Almost radial through base metal and weld metal from point of origin. Follows
weld toe longitudinally.
• Creep Damage: Not operating in creep region.
• Inclusions: None reported
• Chemistry: ASTM A155 Grade KC 70/Class 1 confirmed by optical emission
spectrographic chemical analysis.
A-3
Chemical Composition (Weight %)
Element Base Metal Weld Metal
C 0.27 0.13
Mn 0.81 1.52
P 0.005 0.010
S 0.026 0.020
Si 0.23 0.29
(Metallurgical analyses continued)
Hardness: Average microhardness readings taken with 500-gram load base metal/weld
metal/heat-affected zone: 83-86 HRB (base metal, weld metal, and HAZ in normalized material
condition)
Microstructure: Base metal, weld metal, and HAZ in normalized material condition
Oxide Dating: Date of crack origin close to date of plant startup—thickness of scale in fatigue
crack in area of origin similar to scale thickness on pipe inner diameter.
A.1.10 Mechanical Tests
Fracture Mechanics: Stress Engineering Services
Conclusions: The SES/Texas Genco evaluation concluded that primary/secondary contributors,

in approximate order of significance, were (1) stress concentration associated with internal weld
profile; (2) location of failure relative to elbow; (3) quenching effect due to cyclic operation of
attemperator, with the crack likely initiated after commissioning; (4) vibration of the piping
system. Tertiary contributors were (5) performance of snubbers and spring hangers in the
vicinity of the failure, and (6) size of droplets from the attemperator. It is highly unlikely that the
failure would have occurred if the weld cap had been ground smooth like other welds in the same
piping. The evidence that the crack most likely originated after commissioning is sufficient to
warrant the periodic inspection of all welds.
A.1.11 Disposition
7-1/2 week outage; replaced 280 feet (85 m) of CRH piping; replaced 60 supports. Several weld
repairs on pipe not replaced.
A-4
A.2 Plant Name: Gannon Unit 6 (Tampa Electric; repowered as Bayside Unit
2 combined cycle in 2004)29

• Size: 400 MW, coal-fired, Riley Stoker boiler (rerated several times during life)
• Duration: 150,000 hours 1967-199330
• Starts: 550 hot, 110 cold31
• Operating Mode: Daily load cycle, start-stop on weekends
• Load Cycles: Baseloaded when new. Over prior few years, operation had one load change
cycle per day—50% overnight, load-follow up to 100% load during day, load-follow back
down to 50% in evening; shut down some weekends and relight Sunday night.
• Attemperator Cycles: Not available
• Failure Date: September 2, 1993
• Component: West CRH piping run—five-diameter, hot bent elbow in horizontal orientation.
Elbow formed from two seam-welded spools—seam welds at about 12 o’clock on entrance
and six o’clock on exit.
A.2.2 Temperature/Pressure
• Actual: 650°F/590 psig (343°C/40.7 barg) nominal at full power; rerated several times
during lifetime. Pipe design far in excess of actual operating conditions.
• Repairs: Supports and snubbers added/upgraded in 1971 following water hammer incidents.
The December 4, 1970, incident moved the pipe “a couple of feet” in each direction.
A.2.3 Dimensions
• Length: Spool approx. 102 inches (2.6 m), girth-welded to similar spool and hot bent to form
elbow.
• Outer diameter: 26 inches (66 cm).
• Wall: 0.575 inches (146 mm) minimum.
29
Cold Reheat Elbow Failure, Tampa Electric Gannon 6: Investigation and Recommendations, Failure Analysis
Associates, Inc., Coral Gables, FL: December 1993.
30
31
Ibid.
A-5
A.2.4 Hoop Stress
Actual: 13.6 ksi (93.8 MPa) nominal

• Material: ASTM A155, Grade KC70
• Fabricator: Stone & Webster
• Architect-Engineer: Stone & Webster
• Weld Geometry: Double-V
• Heat Treatment: Near equal longitudinal and tensile test results indicate likelihood of over-
annealing during hot bending without subsequent normalization.
• Detection Method: Ruptured
• Location of Crack: Inside wall, propagating from toe of seam weld, located near bottom of
horizontally oriented elbow. Initiation point not noted. Crack extended from girth weld in
middle of elbow toward girth weld on downstream end of elbow. Snubber stanchion welded
to outside of elbow in horizontal plane. Location approximately 12 feet upstream of spray
attemperator in horizontal piping.
• Crack Dimensions: Subcritical crack growth prior to rupture was over 84 inches (213 cm)
long versus total weld length of approx. 102 inches (259 cm) on inner diameter. Maximum
depth of approx. 0.43 inches (1.09 cm), represented 75% of the 0.575-inch (14.6-mm) wall
thickness. Maximum crack depth on the other toe of the weld was about 0.2 inches (5 mm).
• Inspections—Post-failure: Inspected all CRH piping with attention in particular for (1)
inner-diameter-initiated cracking at toe of seam weld, (2) corrosion pitting at bottom of pipe,
especially at toe of seam weld. Stress analysis performed to determine stress on piping due
to failure.
• Replication: NA—actual samples examined.
• Stress Analysis: Analysis of stresses due to 320,000-lb (145,150-kg) reaction force
following failure indicated that every remaining weld in the CRH piping was overstressed
and required inspection or replacement. Maximum through wall bending moment, and
maximum hoop stress, occur 90 degrees from extrados and intrados of elbow—i.e. at top and
bottom where seam welds were located on neutral axis with respect to hot bending to form
elbow.
• Failure Consequences: Catastrophic—moderate collateral damage, large fragment of elbow
found 40 feet (12 m) from original location.
• Visual Observations: These include:
– Macroscopic corrosion pitting on bottom of pipe.
– Cracking on both sides of seam weld on bottom of pipe.
A-6
– Longitudinal watermarks indicate depth of water.

– Profile of weld toe was normal, not defective.
– Failure location had subcritical crack growth for over 7 feet (2 m) along weld on inside
of pipe. Crack face was essentially planar and oriented at 90 degrees to pipe surface.
Crack progressed straight through wall (base and weld metal), not following HAZ. The
final fracture appears to be a ductile tear at approximately 45 degrees to the surface.
– Minor weld toe cracking outside of corrosion pitting zone thought to have resulted from
abnormal stresses, probably water hammer early in life.
– Outlet pipe, downstream of elbow, had cracking for a few inches on both sides of seam
weld located near bottom of pipe. Almost whole length had corrosion pitting similar to
elbow.
– Small crack found in seam of inlet section of elbow, located on top of pipe. East elbow
did not show pitting corrosion of type pervasive in west elbow.
A.2.7 Metallurgical Analysis

• Performed by: Failure Analysis Associates
• Crack Origin: Not specified in FAA report.
• Crack Path: Almost radial through base metal and weld metal from point of origin. Appears
to have arrested when contacting weld metal at maximum depth of about 75% of wall
thickness. Follows weld toe longitudinally.
• Creep Damage: Not operated in creep region.
• Inclusions: None reported
• Chemistry: ASTM A155 Grade KC 70 confirmed by chemical analysis. (Herron Testing
Laboratories, Inc.) Energy-dispersive spectography used on inside surface of crack shows
trace elements from steel and water treatment as well as indications of water contamination
and possible condenser corrosion.
Chemical Composition (Weight %)
Element Base Metal Weld Metal

(avg. of 3)
C 0.24 0.13
Mn 0.80 1.22
P 0.007 0.015
S 0.021 0.017
Si 0.16 0.35
Cr 0.049 0.053
Mb 0.015 0.10
A-7
• Hardness: Average Rockwell hardness of 88.28 for base metal of outlet section of failed
elbow.
• Microstructure: Base metal relatively coarse grained, not typical of low-carbon steel,
indicating hot bending at over 2000°F (1100°C) without subsequent normalization. Weld
metal relatively fine grained. Both in annealed material condition.
• Oxide Dating: Date of crack origin close to date of plant startup—thickness of scale in
fatigue crack in area of origin similar to scale thickness on pipe inner diameter.
A.2.8 Mechanical Tests

Mechanical Test Results (Herron Testing Laboratories, Inc.)
Parameter Longitudinal Sample Transverse Sample
Diameter (inches) 0.348 (8.83 mm) 66,200(1681 m)

Yield Strength (psi) 63,100 (435 MPa) 88,600 (611 MPa)
Ultimate Strength (psi) 88,300 (609 MPa) 32.0 (0.22 MPa)
% Elongation in 1.4in 33.0 55.0
Parameter Longitudinal Sample Transverse Sample
% Reduction in Area 52.0 0.35
Impact Strength, V-Notch Charpy 13.7 ft-lb (18.6 Nm) 16.3 ft-lb (22.1 Nm)
Bars at 72°F/22°C (avg. of 3)
• Fracture Mechanics: Charpy test results should be at least 50 ft-lb (68 Nm) in normalized
condition. Deviation is likely due to over-annealed microstructure.
• Conclusions: Conclusions are:
– The FAA failure investigation report concluded that the failure resulted from a
combination of abnormal stresses, corrosion, and the presence of the seam weld at the
bottom of the elbow near the neutral axis. The longitudinal weld seams of the hot bent
elbow were located at the point of maximum stress with respect to flexure of the elbow.
Combined with the stress concentration at the weld toe, this may have been sufficient to
initiate cracking. Severe water hammer early in the life of the pipe may also have created
stress sufficient to initiate a crack.
– Repeated and significant pooling of water was experienced in this piping. Corrosion
pitting was seen at and around the crack and along the horizontal spool downstream of
the crack.
– A clear tendency towards corrosion pitting at the toe on either side of the weld cap was
apparent in several locations. Normal cyclic stresses, combined with stress concentrators
due to corrosion pits and prior cracking, may have contributed to corrosion by causing
flaking of protective oxide scale
A-8
– Any influence due to the attemperator is not noted, other than pointing to it as a possible
source of pooled (and contaminated) water.
– The over-annealed condition of the base metal of the elbow was not thought to have
contributed to crack formation or progression, but may have contributed to the
progression of the rupture at the time of failure.
A.2.9 Disposition
All CRH piping was replaced because stress analysis indicated overstress in all welds by reaction
forces following failure.
A.3 Plant Name: Erickson Station (Lansing Board of Water & Light)32
Size: 159 MW, coal-fired
Duration: 1967-2001
Operating Mode: Primarily baseload
Failure Date: October 17, 2001

33
Component: CRH piping—girth weld downstream of converging wye.
Dimensions: Outer diameter: 24 inches (61 cm)
Detection Method: Ruptured
Location of Crack: No preexisting crack reported
Failure Consequences: Catastrophic—major collateral damage, unit out of service for approx 4
months
Conclusions: Catastrophic failure of CRH pipe occurred when unit was being restarted after
brief outage. Severe water hammer occurred when operators started up unit without noticing or
draining a large amount of water that had accumulated in the CRH piping, presumably due to a
leaking attemperator supply valve. The piping separated at the girth weld on the downstream
end of a converging Y.
Disposition: Unit repair scheduled to complete in February 2002
32
“Minutes of the Board of Commissioners’ Meeting,” Lansing Board of Water and Light: October 23, 2001.
33
Personal communication from Rich Tilley, EPRI, February 22, 2005.
A-9
A.4 Plant Name: O134

• Duration: Approx. 125,000 h
• Starts: 2,800 total
• Component: Circumferential weld on reheat header where CRH piping connects to it with
tee.
• Detection Method: Girth weld leak
• Location of Crack: CRH piping girth weld connection to reheater inlet header (or header
weld—not clear). Inside wall, propagating from inner diameter weld root. Approx. 30 feet
(9 m) downstream of spray attemperator.
• Failure Consequences: Steam leak
• Crack Origin: Weld root on inner diameter of circumferential weld
• Conclusions: Fatigue cracking initiated from the inner diameter weld root, located
approximately 30 feet (9 m) downstream of the attemperator. Preliminary failure analysis
report attributed fatigue failure of the girth weld to leaking spray water isolation valves and
past operating practices using attemperation at low loads.
A.5 Plant Name: F135

• Size: 614 MW, coal-fired, Combustion Engineering boiler
• Duration: 164,000 h 1978-2002
• Starts: 246 hot, 62 cold
• Failure Date: August 5, 2002
• Component: Circumferential weld of a horizontal 90-degree elbow
A.5.2 Dimensions
• Outer diameter: 30 inches (76 cm)
• Wall: 0.692 inches (17.6 mm) minimum.
34
35
A-10

• Material: ASTM A155, Grade KC70 Carbon Steel
• Fabricator: Combustion Engineering?
• Architect-Engineer: Combustion Engineering?
• Detection Method: Pinhole leaks
• Location of Crack: Circumferential weld of a horizontal 90-degree elbow. Approx 20 feet
(6 m) downstream of spray attemperator
• Crack Dimensions: 25 inches (63.5 cm) long on inner diameter of circumferential weld,
pinhole leaks through wall (0.692 inches [17.6 mm] minimum).
• Stress Analysis: No failure analysis performed
• Failure Consequences: Steam leaks.
• Chemistry: ASTM A155 Grade KC 70
• Conclusions: No sample removal and metallurgical failure analysis performed.
A-11
B
TIME-OF-FLIGHT DIFFRACTION EXAMINATION
PROCEDURE36
B.1 Scope
1.1 This procedure defines the method and requirements for contact, automated, or
semiautomated ultrasonic time-of-flight-diffraction (TOFD) examination of cold
reheat piping longitudinal seam welds using ultrasonic acquisition and imaging
hardware and software.
1.2 This procedure is applicable to longitudinal seam welds in cold reheat piping (as
well as hot reheat piping) >16 inches (>41 cm) in outside diameter and having a
nominal wall thickness >0.50 inches (>12.7 mm).
1.3 The objectives for the techniques described within this procedure are to detect,
length-size, and depth-size flaws commonly associated with seam-welded cold
reheat piping. The procedure is applicable to discontinuities associated with the
fabrication process and cracking associated with service-induced fatigue damage.
1.4 This procedure is appropriate for weld crowns that are flat-topped, ground-flush,
or in the as-welded condition.
B.2 References
2.1 American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Recommended Practice SNT-TC-

1A.
2.2 Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping. EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA: 2003. Report 1004329.
2.3 British Standard BS 7706, Guide to Calibration and Setting-up of the Ultrasonic
Time-of-Flight Diffraction (TOFD) Technique for the Detection, Location, and
Sizing of Flaws. 1993.
36
Adapted from Appendix C of Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping, EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA: 2003. 1004329
B-1
Time-of-Flight Diffraction Examination Procedure
2.4 European Standard prEN 583-6, “TOFD Technique as a Method for Defect
Detection and Sizing.”
B.3 Definitions
3.1 A-Scan—an ultrasonic pulse in which signal amplitude is presented as a

displacement along one axis and the time of flight (travel time) is presented along
the other axis. In TOFD, unrectified A-scan waveforms are typically generated as
analog and then digitized for imaging. The ultrasonic signals in an A-scan display
typically correspond, in time, to the lateral wave, the top and bottom tip-diffracted
flaw signals (if present), and the longitudinal back wall. Further in time along the
A-scan waveform will be the much larger longitudinal-to-shear (L-S) wave and
shear-to-longitudinal (S-L) wave mode-converted back-wall signals. A digitized
A-scan slice taken from the cursor position in the corresponding B-scan image is
presented in Figure B-1.
Figure B-1
Digitized A-Scan Slice Taken From the Cursor Position in the Corresponding B-Scan
Image
3.2 Averaging (Signal Averaging)—averaging over n A-scans improves the

ultrasonic signal response to that of random noise signals by a factor that is the
square root of n, thereby enhancing the ability of typically weak diffracted waves
to be imaged. Signal averaging takes the total digitized (sample points) from each
A-scan slice, multiplies this value by the gated A-scan length in microseconds
(µsec), and adds them together to find the sum. The sum is then divided by itself
B-2
to find the average sample point value. The signal averaging value selected by
the user is then divided by the average sample point value. The square root of this
dividend provides the level of signal-to-noise improvement. Figure B-2 provides
an illustration of the effects of signal averaging.
Figure B-2
Effects of Signal Averaging
3.3 Back-Wall Signal Response—see Standing Wave Signals for definitions of L-L
and S-S back-wall signal responses as well as L-S and S-L back-wall mode-
converted signals.
3.4 B-Scan (also known as transverse, parallel, or lateral)—scan data collected while
the ultrasonic transmitting and receiving probes are deployed in tandem, adjacent
to but astride the weld, with scan motion progressing across the weld width; that
is, in the direction of sound transmission (see Figure B-3). The scan technique is
primarily used for evaluation and characterization procedures to determine flaw
lateral position and transverse-oriented flaw length and is known to provide the
greatest degree of through-wall depth-sizing accuracy. Unlike the D-scan mode,
data collection procedures may be compromised because of scan surface
geometrical discontinuities associated with weld cap reinforcement, convexity,
concavity, or near adjacent transitions.
B-3
Figure B-3
B-Scan Data Collection Mode
3.5 B-Scan Image—a digitized image generated during the performance of either D-
scan or B-scan data collection modes and recalled for subsequent data analysis
and reporting. The amplitude of an analog A-scan waveform is converted in
accordance with the user-defined digitization frequency to the appropriate gray-
tone shade. This gray-tone shade representation is then presented as one pixel
line on the computer screen display. As additional waveforms are acquired, they
are similarly gray-tone-coded and presented sequentially on adjacent pixel lines.
The resulting digital view is a two-axis plot in which time (that is, material cross-
sectional depth) is presented along one axis, and the transverse width (for B-
scans) or longitudinal length (for D-scans) of the scanned material is presented
along the other axis. In the B-scan display, all reflectors through the scanned
length of the weld or material are projected onto a single plane. In the D-scan
display, all reflectors through the width of the weld or material are projected onto
a single plane. Figure B-4 depicts the process of converting A-scan waveforms to
a B-scan image.
3.6 D-Scan (also known as linear, nonparallel, or longitudinal)—scan data collected

while the ultrasonic transmitting and receiving probes are deployed in tandem,
astride the weld, with scan motion progressing along the weld length; that is,
normal to the direction of sound transmission (see Figure B-5). The scan
technique is primarily used for initial detection procedures as well as evaluation
when subjective assessment of the lateral position/weld width location is required.
Unlike the B-scan mode, data collection procedures are not typically
compromised because of scan surface geometrical discontinuities associated with
weld cap reinforcement, convexity, or concavity.
B-4
Figure B-4
Depiction of the Process of Converting A-Scan Waveforms to a B-Scan Image
Figure B-5
D-Scan Data Collection Mode
B-5
3.7 Diffraction (also known as scattering)—the phenomenon in which small amounts

of acoustical energy are deflected out of the main ultrasonic beam, as may occur
in nonhomogeneous materials, as the front of the sound wave bends while passing
an edge of a reflecting surface (causing “forward scattering” facilitated when the
sound beam is much larger than the discontinuity), or as a reaction of an
impinging wave train upon an embedded flaw as it is caused to oscillate, radiating
waves from its edges or tips. The detection of these “diffracted” waves therefore
provides a mechanism through which the dimension of the reflector can be
directly measured. When operating in the pulse-echo mode, practitioners
normally utilize angled shear wave (S-wave) inspection to maintain the
conventional beam-directional, amplitude-based techniques while attempting to
add tip-diffraction detection to enhance sizing capabilities. However, because the
conventional S-wave techniques are intended primarily for the detection of
specular reflections, tips are often very difficult to isolate because they are often
washed out by the much stronger specular reflections. In addition, it has been
demonstrated that the strength of tip-diffracted signals is greatest when the
impinging wave front that causes the generation of diffracted waves is
longitudinal in mode rather than shear.
3.8 Digitizer Frequency (also known as sampling rate or sampling interval)—the

conversion of an analog A-scan waveform into a string of numbers is known as
digitization and consists of sampling the A-scan at a regular sampling interval or
rate, as shown in Figure B-6. The amplitude of each stored sample along with
position and phase information (sign) is passed to the computer for storage.
Therefore, the information stored in the computer is a string of numbers
representing a given A-scan, which can be recalled to reconstruct the A-scan for
an A-scan display. Alternatively, by stacking together the consecutive A-scans
collected during the course of conducting a B- or D-scan, a digitized B-scan
image of the examination can be displayed. The analog unrectified A-scan
waveforms are acquired and digitized at a rate sufficient to maintain the fidelity of
the waveforms. If the digitization rate is F MHz, then the interval between
digitization samples is S µsec, where S = 1/F. Therefore, the number of samples
in an A-scan length of t µsec is the number of samples to equal t/S or t*F. Setting
of the digitization frequency should be at least five times but not less that two
times the probe frequency.
B-6
Figure B-6
Digitization: Conversion of an Analog A-Scan Waveform Into a String of Numbers
3.9 Filters
3.9.1 High Pass—the main amplifier cutoff frequency for which signals are
filtered out (that is, not digitized), which is below the value selected by the
user.
3.9.2 Low Pass—the main amplifier cutoff frequency for which signals are
filtered out (that is, not digitized), which is above the value selected by the
user.
3.9.3 Rectifier—provides some degree of smoothing dependent on the value

applied when the rectified A-scan option is enabled.
3.10 Flaw Dimensions
3.10.1 Depth—the measured distance in the through-thickness or cross-sectional

plane from the scanned surface to the upper extremity of a flaw.
3.10.2 Height—the measured difference in distance in the through-thickness or

cross-sectional plane from the scanned surface between the upper and
lower extremities of a planar or volumetric flaw. Indications with
through-wall height are those that contain 1/2-cycle signals exceeding the
number of 1/2-cycles that comprise the lateral wave.
3.10.3 Length—the measured difference in distance in the parallel plane from

the scanned surface between the start and end of a flaw, usually
representing the flaw’s major axis.
3.11 Gain—the user-selected amplification applied from the ultrasonic system’s main
amplifier to the analog unrectified A-scan waveforms, expressed in decibels (dB).
B-7
3.12 Gates (A-Scan Collection)—the time (in µsecs) in which the analog unrectified
waveforms are digitized by the ultrasonic system. Because the entire waveform
amplitude falling within the time-gated region is digitized, gate-level amplitude or
screen height is inconsequential.
3.12.1 A-Scan Length (also known as gate length or gate width)—the length of the A-
scan that is digitized, expressed as length of time in µsecs.
3.12.2 Digitizer Start (also known as gate start)—the start of the gate in which the A-
scan is digitized, expressed as time in µsecs.
3.13 Material Velocity—the speed of propagation in the examination material for the
mode of ultrasound. Typically expressed in standard or metric units of distance
per second.
3.14 Nonparallel Scan—see D-Scan.
3.15 Parabolic Cursor—reproduces the TOFD response of a point source calculated

from within the gated region. The resulting parabolic-shaped characteristic
response is displayed on the B-scan image. The response from a point source will
vary with time (that is, depth) because of beam spread. Therefore, the shape of
the parabola changes as time (that is, distance) decreases or increases in through-
thickness/cross-sectional plane. The parabolic cursor feature must be calibrated
because the B-scan image is nonlinear with respect to depth. Ultrasonic velocity
in the material, probe delay, and probe separation distance (PSD) are required to
calculate flaw depths and through-wall heights. However, a more accurate
calculation of the depth can be made if the velocity and probe delay are found
from the measurement of the positions of the lateral wave and back-wall signals.
This procedure helps to reduce any systematic errors, such as an error in the probe
separation caused by probe movement.
3.16 Parallel Scan—see B-Scan.
3.17 Phase—phase is assigned to one period of time (for example, frequency) of an

unrectified waveform. The cycle within the period constitutes a positive node (+)
and a negative antinode (-) sign of amplitude, which equal the (+) and the (-) half
cycle, respectively.
3.18 Phase Change—simplistically, phase changes occur when interference patterns

of minimum and maximum intensity within the forward-scattered diffracted wave
fronts cause cancellation and reinforcement of the acoustical energy that
correspond to the roughness, size, and contour of the modifying interface
boundary. In general, as the roughness or faceted nature of the interface boundary
becomes greater, an increased potential for phase change/reversal is expected.
Conversely, smooth interface boundaries generate reflection and refraction, but
phase coherence is maintained, and less diffracted energy is expected. Figure B-7
depicts an unrectified A-scan waveform with theoretical phase changes.
B-8
Figure B-7
Unrectified A-Scan Waveform With Theoretical Phase Changes
3.19 Pre-Amplifier—a device used for amplification of the acquired ultrasonic

signals, especially the diffracted wave energy, which is commonly low in
amplitude. The pre-amplifier is typically placed near the receiving probe to
ensure minimal loss of signal to the ultrasonic system.
3.20 Probes (TOFD)—commonly called transducers, probes are electro-acoustical

devices incorporating one or more piezoelectric crystal elements intended for
transmission and/or reception of ultrasonic waves. For TOFD examination, time
resolution is essential. Therefore, probes designed (preferably of composite
construction) to produce short pulse lengths, broad bandwidths, and high-damping
characteristics for unrectified pulses are recommended.
3.21 Probe Angle—the effective refracted angle in the material under test, defined
with respect to the perpendicular (normal) to the scan surface, and typically
produced by probe shoes (wedges) constructed of plastic (for example, Lucite),
brass, or stainless steel of precise incident angles.
3.22 Probe Separation Distance—the distance measured or calculated between the

transmitting and receiving probes.
3.23 Probe Delay—the measured distance traveled through the wedge pair to/from the
probe face to/from the scan surface interface, usually expressed as time in µsecs.
B-9
3.24 Pulse Width—expressed in nanoseconds (ns) and equals the distance between the
edges of the negative rectangular transmitted pulse applied to the probe crystal
(see Figure B-8). Both edges of the pulse cause the probe crystal to oscillate, but
the resultant signals are 180° out of phase. The two bursts of ultrasound generally
overlap and interfere with one another. Altering the pulse width causes
cancellation or reinforcement of parts of the various cycles. A desirable feature is
to set the pulse width to 1 period of the wave frequency (1/F) (for example, 200
ns for 5 MHz). After one period, the two signals will be out of phase and a
smaller amplitude signal will be obtained, but the ringing will be reduced.
Resolution of closely spaced flaws and crack tips will be improved because of the
minimum number of cycles.
Figure B-8
Pulse Width
3.25 Pulse Repetition Frequency (effective)—the number of probe firings per second
divided by the number of averaged A-scan waveforms. It will generally be
necessary to set the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) for the data collection
system. This is the rate of firing the transmitter probe. If data are collected
manually, then the effective PRF should be set to coincide with the rate of moving
the probes so that the A-scans are collected at intervals of approximately 1 mm
along the scan. Because there is no information available to the computer system
on position of the probes, it can only collect A-scan data at the selected PRF. If
an encoder is attached to the scanner and the scanner is motorized, then the PRF is
not so important because the computer can work out the position of the probes
and only collect data at the specified A-scan sampling interval. If the scanning
speed is relatively fast, the PRF may have to be set as high as possible to ensure
that no time is lost between probe arrival at the required sampling position and the
availability of a firing pulse; that is, there must be sufficient time for the data to
be collected at the required scanning speed. If there is not sufficient time at each
sampling interval to collect the data, the data collection system will collect blank
A-scans. Methods of avoiding this include increasing the PRF and reducing the
scanning speed, the number of averages, the length of the A-scan to be digitized,
and the digitization rate. In certain circumstances (for example, with relatively
B-10
small, regularly shaped samples), the sound waves can be reflected around the
sample and appear at the receiver after the next successive transmission pulse.
This may give false signals, however, and must be avoided by reducing the PRF
appropriately. Such a situation is rare for TOFD inspections because the PRF
used is generally much lower than, for example, that used for pulse-echo
inspections where only the peak heights in a range gate above the threshold are
recorded.
3.26 Raster Spacing—the interval distance between successive A-scans fired along
the scan length.
3.27 Standing Wave Signals—in TOFD, denotes that several standing waves are
present in the display, giving immediate reference for position of indications
through the thickness of the weld or material.
3.27.1 Lateral Wave Signal—the first standing wave encountered. It has the
shortest transit time because it runs directly between the transmitting and
receiving TOFD probes on a flat or convex surface. On a concave surface,
the wave follows the surface profile and may be referred to as a creeping
wave.
3.27.2 Longitudinal Wave Signal—the second standing wave encountered. It

has a greater transit time than the lateral wave because it is the received
back-wall response of the angled transmitted longitudinal wave.
3.27.3 Shear Wave Signal—the third standing wave encountered. It has a

greater transit time because it is the received back-wall response generated
as a slower-velocity trailing wave from the transmission of the angled
longitudinal wave.
3.27.4 Mode-Converted Signals—as created by the selected longitudinal wave

angle, a slower-velocity trailing shear wave is generated. At some point
within the beam spread of the shear wave, the beam strikes the opposite
wall surface at an angle appropriate to generate a mode-converted
longitudinal wave. Similarly, at some point within the beam spread of the
transmitted longitudinal wave, the beam strikes the opposite wall surface
at an angle appropriate to generate a mode-converted shear wave.
Although the velocities are inherently different, the overall transit time for
the two mode-converted waves is often the same; consequently, they may
superimpose.
3.27.5 Ultrasonic Reflection and Transmission—occurs when the sound beam

strikes a boundary where the greater the acoustical mismatch, the greater
the difference in the acoustical impedance of two materials. The amount
of reflected energy is proportional to the increase in the ratio of acoustical
impedance while, conversely, ultrasonic transmission decreases.
3.27.6 Voltage—peak voltage of transmitter pulse.
B-11
B.4 Personnel
4.1 Personnel performing data acquisition and/or analysis shall have received
documented training in the use of the applicable ultrasonic equipment.
4.2 Personnel evaluating results shall be certified to at least UT Level II or Level III.
4.3 Additional requirements (such as performance demonstrations) for qualification

or certification of personnel responsible for data acquisition or analysis shall be at
the discretion of the owner.
4.4 Personnel whose involvement is limited to mounting tracks, scanner

manipulation, or marking of welds need not be certified.
4.5 Initial and final system setups and calibrations shall be verified by a UT Level II
or Level III.
B.5 Equipment and Software Requirements
5.1 The automated ultrasonic system shall be a multichannel data acquisition and
imaging system that generates, as a minimum, two-dimensional grayscale images
of the UT TOFD data in real time. The system shall include motion controls,
supporting pulser/receiver channels and digitizers, and UT signal preamplifiers
and peripherals including a hard disc drive, graphics display, and external disc
drive for data archival storage. The multichannel UT TOFD system shall provide
ultrasonic display-mode views of B-scan (parallel) and D-scan (nonparallel) in
real time, and an A-scan (unrectified as a minimum) display for use during the
setup/calibration and evaluation/analysis processes.
5.2 The TOFD UT system shall have a software modeling program to assist in
determining the approximate beam coverage on flat and curved surfaces using
various search unit frequencies, wedge angles, and PSDs.
5.3 The system shall have routines to aid in analysis of the acquired data. As a
minimum, the following routines shall be included in the analysis program:
• Linearization
• Zoom control
• A-scan view
• Cursors (calibrated as a minimum)
• Lateral wave or back wall: straightening and removal
• Synthetic aperture focusing technique (SAFT)
• Echodynamics
B-12
• Multiple scans mode

• Profiling
5.4 Scanners/manipulators shall be automated or hand-held semiautomated and of

various sizes to accommodate a variety of weld configurations. The
scanner/manipulator system shall be equipped with devices to correlate positional
references along the weld(s) to be examined (for example, optical encoders).
5.5 Preamplifiers providing approximately 30–60 dB amplification gain shall be used

to maintain adequate signal-to-noise ratio and to return the collected ultrasonic
data to the acquisition and imaging system for digitization and analysis.
5.6 The search units shall be longitudinal wave probes having bandwidth, dampening,
center frequencies, and element sizes designed for the UT TOFD technique.
Piezoelectric or composite elements may be used. Frequencies shall range from
1-15 MHz, as appropriate for the material acoustical properties and geometrical
shapes under examination. In general, high frequency and small-diameter search
units apply to thin materials while low-frequency and larger-diameter search units
are used for thicker materials. Similar to search unit selection, wedges
specifically designed for UT TOFD applications shall be used. Various angles,
such as 35°, 45°, 60°, or 70°, may be used to establish full examination coverage.
5.7 An approved couplant shall be used and documented on the appropriated

examination records.
5.8 Coaxial cables consisting of the minimum number of intermediate

cables/connectors not exceeding a total of 250 feet (76.2 m) may be used for
examinations unless signal degradation requires shorter distances.
B.6 Setup and Calibration
6.1 Calibration shall include the complete ultrasonic examination system. Any
change in search units, wedge angles or wedges, couplant, cables, preamplifiers,
PSD, or examination personnel shall be cause for a re-calibration.
6.2 Complete ultrasonic examination system calibration shall be performed within

one day prior to the examination for which the calibration is applicable, and at
least once each week during the examination period. Calibration shall be checked
on the adjacent weld base material and across the weld under examination on a
per-weld basis. This may be performed statically or dynamically.
6.3 Time-of-flight accuracy verification shall be performed on a basic reference

standard at the beginning of each shift of operation.
6.4 The calibration reference shall be the basic response at the material adjacent to
and across the weld.
B-13
6.5 The temperature of the reference standard and the examination surface shall be
within 25°F (14°C) of one another.
6.6 Calibration records of signal waveforms should be maintained prior to and after
each examination. The calibration scans can be performed dynamically or
statically by recording one or more waveforms.
6.7 If the specimen used for the calibrations does not ultrasonically match the
material under examination, it may be necessary to consider attenuation factors.
Such effects may be ascertained by comparing the lateral wave and back-wall
signal response shapes and amplitudes. Attainable distribution of ultrasonic
energy and frequency content of the beam may necessitate the use of two or more
probe configurations if such effects vary throughout the material to the degree that
flaw indications may not be resolved. The wedge angles, PSD, system bandwidth
(for example, filtering), and amplifier characteristics all influence the distribution
of energy in terms of amplitude and frequency content.
6.8 Verification of adequate volumetric coverage can be achieved either by referring

to the calibration scans taken on artificial flaws or by observing grain noise
throughout the region of interest.
6.9 The digitized extent of the A-scan waveforms (that is, time viewed on the image)
includes the period beginning slightly before the lateral wave and ending into or
shortly after the mode-converted waves. Time-of-flight accuracy, resolution, and
other key parameters are normally established and limited to within the ranges
dictated by the calculated PSD. However, improvement may be obtained in the
lateral wave and direct longitudinal wave signal cycles and time-of-flight
accuracy by altering the calculated PSD to an optimum setting. Furthermore,
when performing a D-scan, valuable information relative to flaw classification
and lateral position/weld side location may be gleaned from the data presented
between the direct L-wave and the mode-converted waves.
6.10 In order to resolve tip-diffracted signals between the lateral wave and back wall,
there must be time for several cycles defining the individual signals to occur and
for the signals to be sufficiently separated to be able to distinguish them. This
equates to time resolution. A cycle is the time equivalent to one wavelength of
the A-scan waveform and is simply the inverse of the probe frequency.
Experience has shown that if approximately 30 cycles occur between the lateral
wave and back-wall signals, the optimum resolution will be obtained. Using the
criterion that a minimum of 20 cycles must fit into the time window between the
lateral wave and back-wall signal, select the probes with frequencies nearest to
this criterion.
6.11 The type of probe should be chosen such that the pulse length for the lateral wave
and back-wall signals do not exceed two cycles measured at 10% of the peak
amplitude. Therefore, probes designed (preferably of composite construction) to
provide short-pulse-length; broadband, high-damping unrectified pulses are
recommended. The two probes in a TOFD array should have the same center
frequency within a tolerance of 20%.
B-14
6.12 Determination of the beam spread and the resultant inspection coverage may be
achieved via calculation and subsequent optimization of the PSD and/or plotting
with suitable modeling software. Because beam spread is a function of probe
frequency and diameter, selecting the smallest diameter in conjunction with the
lowest frequency probes to achieve adequate coverage must be balanced with
attenuation, time resolution, and sensitivity requirements. The larger diameter
probes provide greater energy in the material but have a smaller beam spread. For
B-scans, if the approximate depths of interest are known, the beam spread
restrictions may be relaxed.
6.13 The wedge angle should be determined after the PSD has been established. The
criteria for wedge angle selection are to direct the ultrasonic beams toward the
area of interest. Typical angles are 35°, 45°, 52°, 60°, and 70° from normal,
although higher angles tend to give rise to lateral waves of greater intensity,
thereby increasing the ability to recognize near scan surface flaws. Precise beam
angle is unnecessary because variations of ±5° from nominal do not appreciably
affect the quality of the data.
6.14 Flaw type and location, weld joint geometry, and material thickness dictate to a
large degree the number of scans that should be performed to achieve full volume
coverage while ensuring that the flaws of interest are detected. The inspection
procedure should also specify the required depth range and volume of interest. If
more than one TOFD probe pair is required, each can be optimized in that the
setups need not have the same probe frequencies, diameters, and PSD.
6.15 Probe frequencies, wedge angles, probe crystal sizes, and numbers of centered D-
scans shall be consulted for appropriate for angle, probe frequency and diameter,
and number of scans required for applicable thickness ranges (see Table B-1).
Table B-1
Setup Parameters
Thickness Range, mm Angle, degrees Frequency Crystal Size, Number of

(inches) (MHz) mm Scans
(inches) Required
5–12 60 or 70 15 3 or 6 1
(0.20–0.47) (0.118 or 0.236)
12–25 52 or 60 5 or 10 6 1
(0.47–0.98) (0.236)
25–50 52 or 60 5 6 or 12 1 or 2
(0.98–1.97) (0.236 or 0.472)
50–100 45 and 60 5 12 2
(1.97–3.94) (0.472)
Note: The correct choice of transmitting and receiving probes and wedge angles is the overriding factor in the
success of an inspection because of the quality of the ultrasonic signals. Overall, there must be sufficient power
and signal-to-noise distinction to obtain signals from the region of interest (pointing to larger diameters and
lower frequencies), which must be balanced against the need for large beam spreads. The effect of attenuation
in the specimen also needs to be considered and balanced against the need for adequate timing resolution.
B-15
6.16 Optimum theoretical PSDs for detection of diffracted signals from vertically
oriented planar flaws are a 120° included angle of the probe beam axes at the flaw
tip. However, a setting to focus the probes at two-thirds of the material thickness
with an included angle of 110° is suggested for initial D-scan examinations.
Equation B-1 is given for calculation of PSDs (2s) for initial D-scan setups to
focus the beams at two-thirds of the material thickness (t) on essentially flat
surfaces:
2s = 1.33t(tan θ)
Equation B-1
Probe Separation Distance for Initial Detection D-Scans
Equation B-2 is given for calculation of PSDs for focusing at a specific depth (d),
as may be used for B-scans or evaluation D-scans:
2s = 2d(tan θ)
Equation B-2
Probe Separation Distance for B-Scan and Evaluation D-Scans
Equation B-3 is given for calculation of PSDs for initial D-scan setups to focus
the beams at two-thirds of the material thickness on curved surfaces:
2s = 2(Ro)(sin β)
where:
Ro = outer radius
β=γ-θ
γ = sin 1[(Rosinθ)/(Ro - d)]

-
d = depth at beam intersection point
Equation B-3
Probe Separation Distance for D-Scans on Curved Surfaces
6.17 Select the digitization frequency consistent with the need to optimize the timing
accuracy to provide the appropriate amplitude resolution of 5 times the nominal
probe frequency with a minimum sampling rate of 2 times the probe frequency.
6.18 Select the high- and low-pass filter settings to give the best signal-to-noise ratio
while maintaining a minimum bandwidth between 0.5 and 2 times the nominal
probe frequency. Higher bandwidth ranges should be allowed if signal quality is
not degraded or signal-to-noise ratio reduced. Clipping is not permissible.
B-16
6.19 Select the pulse-width setting of the firing pulse to obtain a minimum number of
cycles with no more than 2 cycles or 4 half-cycles. Initial selection should equal
1 period of the wave frequency (1/F). In practice, however, a probe produces a
range of frequencies (bandwidth) and the optimum pulse width should be
determined by trial.
6.20 Set the signal averaging to the minimum value required to provide a reasonable
signal-to-noise ratio. Using a minimum averaging number also allows for faster
data collection speeds.
6.21 Set the timing gates to collect the portion of the analog A-scan waveform to begin
before the start of the lateral wave, include the longitudinal wave back wall, and
terminate into or just past the mode-converted L-S/S-L back-wall responses. In
this manner, quantitative data for detection, sizing, and characterization are
captured as well as qualitative information regarding flaw type and location.
6.22 The pulse repetition frequency should be set as high as practicable to ensure that
A-scan waveforms are not missing in the collected data. The setting should match
or exceed the data collection speed.
6.23 Echo amplitude is not used quantitatively for determination of flaw size. The
normal amplitude-based calibrations associated with other UT techniques are
therefore not required. However, diffracted signals are often lower in amplitude
than reflected signals, necessitating sufficient gain levels to ensure that the TOFD
standing waves and diffracted signals are collected and displayed in the B-scan
image.
6.24 Experience has shown that the amplitude of diffracted signals generated at crack
tips depends on factors such as compressive forces on the crack face, crack
orientation with respect to the TOFD probes, the nature of the crack tip itself, and
the general noisiness of the material under examination. Each of these factors
often means that higher gain is required.
6.24.1 There are four suggested methods of establishing examination gain level
settings:
6.24.1.1 Representative flaw sample.
6.24.1.2 Diffracted signals from notches (for example, slits and

slots) using acoustically similar calibration blocks
containing upper surface-connected V or EDM slots.
Width should not be greater than 1/4 wavelength when
using EDM notches, while the maximum depth should not
exceed 50% of the block thickness. Gain may be set to
provide signals from the bottom of the slots at
approximately 60% FSH.
B-17
6.24.1.3 Reflected signals from cross-drilled holes (for example,

side-drilled holes).
6.24.1.4 Material grain noise with the probe pair placed across the
weld and on the adjacent parent material. The gain level
may be set to an average noise level of 5 to 10% of FSH.
B.7 Examination
7.1 The examination test surface shall be free of irregularities, loose foreign material,
or coatings that might interfere with the ultrasonic signal integrity to the point of
test degradation. Any scans in which the lateral wave and/or back-wall signals
are not maintained at significant and uniform levels are unacceptable and shall be
repeated. If the repeated scans are not acceptable, the unacceptable scan regions
shall be documented in the examination records.
7.2 All ultrasonic data collected for examination shall be traceable to an appropriate
reference point or “zero-datum.” For seam welds, this should generally be some
length reference point, for example, the downstream toe of the upstream
circumferential weld. For circumferential welds, this should be a specified
circumferential zero-datum reference point, for example, the outside radius of the
upstream elbow, the outside radius of the downstream elbow, top dead center, or
North. In all cases, the scan segments shall be marked on the component for use
in establishing the search unit position for the start of each scan and for verifying
comprehensive encoder operation over the full length of each scan. Reference
points used shall be recorded on the applicable examination data sheets.
7.3 Scans should be conducted over limited lengths, which provide relative ease of
scanning and produce images that can be readily interpreted. Extremely short
scans (typically less than 6 inches [152 mm]) should be avoided unless conditions
dictate. The scan start position should reflect the actual dimension relative to the
zero-datum rather than starting each scan at zero. Reported scan length should
reflect the actual scan length and not a scan length in excess of the actual, such
that the termination of the scan relative to the marked component can be used as
an ongoing check of the quality of the encoder engagement and the completeness
of the scan. Scan rate shall not exceed the point of data degradation contingent on
the key parameters employed.
7.4 Flaw type and location, weld joint geometry, and material thickness dictate to a
large degree the number of scans that should be performed to achieve full volume
coverage while ensuring that the flaws of interest are detected. If more than one
TOFD probe pair is required, each can be optimized in that the setups need not
have the same probe frequencies, diameters, and PSDs.
7.5 Centered D-scans shall be conducted along the length of the weld with the search
units straddling the weld and equally spaced on either side of the weld. In
addition, two offset scans, each with the 1/2-PSD point centered over the
B-18
clockwise and counter-clockwise weld toes, shall be performed. Care should be

exercised to maintain contact of the encoder over the entire scan. Any
appreciable slip of the encoder shall be cause to repeat the scan. The scan
operator shall verify that the scan is initiated at the marked start point and that it
ends as the search unit passes the marked end point.
7.6 All scan obstructions and/or limitations to the examination shall be reported in the
examination records.
7.7 For difficult, complex, or nonparallel geometrical shapes, scan plots may be used
to show beam coverage and incident wedge angles. In such cases, these coverage
plots shall be part of the examination records.
7.8 Couplant is to be applied either manually or with the aid of an automatic feed
system. In either case, the operator shall observe the recorded data standing-wave
pattern to ensure that the appropriate standing-wave responses are being received.
Areas that are determined to have insufficient coupling shall be reexamined after
more couplant is applied and/or the cause for the insufficient coupling is
determined.
B.8 Recording and Evaluation of Indications
8.1 All digitized data from the gated region of the A-scan shall be permanently
recorded and stored for archival purposes. Length of archival storage shall be in
accordance with the contract and/or internal specifications.
8.2 All indications should be evaluated for depth, length, through-wall dimension
(height), and flaw type (typically parabolic or linear). Depth, length, and height
shall be evaluated using the calibrated parabolic cursor feature in the UT TOFD
system.
8.3 Additional UT TOFD examinations and/or conventional ultrasonic pulse-echo

examinations may be performed for the evaluation and characterization of
apparent flaw indications identified during the initial detection scans. Because the
position of the flaw is now approximately known, some of the requirements can
be relaxed (for example, wide beam spread) and parameters optimized to obtain
the most accurate results (for example, higher frequency, larger diameter, better
timing resolution, and closer PSD). The examinations shall be performed at the
discretion of the NDE data acquisition operator or data analyst. The evaluation
and characterization methodology shall include one or more of the following
techniques:
8.3.1 TOFD UT D-scans where the probe pair is offset to either side of the
weld. (This technique assists in the determination of the lateral location of
the flaw, for example, weld or side-wall/fusion zone.)
B-19
8.3.2 TOFD UT B-scans where the scan data were collected in the parallel mode
with the probes deployed in tandem, astride the weld, with scan motion
progressing across the weld width. This technique assists in the
determination of the lateral location of the flaw, for example, weld, or
side-wall/fusion zone as well as nature of the flaw (longitudinal or
transverse) and the flaw’s through-wall extent. Note: This technique is
extremely sensitive to outside diameter transition changes, such as the
presence of weld cap reinforcement, concavity, and adjacent transitional
obstructions.
8.3.3 Manual or automated pulse-echo ultrasonic techniques using dual- or

single-element 0°, 45°, 60°, and 70° focused or nonfocused beam probes
to assist in the characterization of the flaw. These techniques may include
but are not limited to:
8.3.3.1 Conventional 0° longitudinal wave straight beam
8.3.3.2 Conventional shear wave angle beam
8.3.3.3 Conventional refracted longitudinal wave angle beam
8.3.3.4 ID and OD creeping wave
8.4 Data analysis shall be performed by a UT Level II or Level III meeting the
personnel requirements described in Section 4 of this appendix.
8.5 If the presence of an internal or near-surface flaw is suspected, a postprocessing

lateral wave straightening and subtraction routine may be used to reveal the
underlying signals. Moreover, by reducing the probe separation, increasing the
incident wedge angle, and/or using higher-frequency probes, much more of the
near surface region is available for analysis. Use of composite element probes
further reduces the width of the lateral wave, thereby spreading the effective
image depth range to provide the data analyst with additional information on the
remaining material volume and inner surface.
8.6 Any suspect indication(s) that appear crack-like or service-induced may be further
evaluated using additional examination techniques not described in this
procedure. All evaluation techniques applied for resolution of relevant
indications shall be fully documented in the report of results.
B-20
B.9 Sizing of Indications
9.1 Length sizing of indications is possible if the length is larger than the transducer
crystal diameter. If the indication has a length equal to or less than the transducer
crystal diameter, the indications will be as one parabola-like figure.
9.1.1 Depending on the type of indication, a technique shall be selected from the
following:
9.1.1.1 Technique for length sizing of linear indications: This type of

indication does not change position significantly in the
through-wall direction. A cursor, shaped to fit the arc
produced by a point flaw, is fitted to the echo from the
indication. If the flaw is linear and has a finite length, this will
only be possible at each end. The distance moved between
acceptable fits at each end of the indication is taken to
represent the length of the indication.
9.1.1.2 Technique for length sizing of parabola-like (parabolic)

indications: This type of indication does change position
significantly in the through-wall direction. A cursor, shaped to
fit the arc produced by a point flaw, is positioned at either end
of the indication at a time delay of one third of the indication
penetration. The distance moved between the cursor positions
at each end of the indication is taken to represent the length of
the indication.
9.2 Depth and through-wall height-sizing of indications shall utilize the calibrated
parabolic-shaped cursor on the raw data in order to obtain accurate depth
estimates.
9.2.1 Depth shall be measured at the signal location nearest the scan surface at
the 1/2-cycle crossover point where the respective signal transitions from
the positive phase to the negative phase or vice-versa, regardless of phase
reversal.
9.2.2 The signal corresponding to the deepest point shall also be measured to
determine through-wall height.
9.2.3 For indications that exhibit phase reversal, the corresponding opposite 1/2-
cycle crossover points shall be selected.
9.2.4 For indications that exhibit no apparent through-wall height regardless of

phase reversal, the corresponding 1/2-cycle crossover point nearest the
scanning surface shall be selected. Indications with through-wall height
are those that contain 1/2-cycle signals exceeding the number of 1/2-
cycles that comprise the lateral wave.
B-21
9.2.5 For indications that exhibit no apparent through-wall height (regardless of

phase reversal) but vary in depth, representative points along the length of
the indication shall be obtained.
9.3 If calibrated cursor routines are unavailable, Equations B-4, B-5, and B-6 shall be
used to determine depth positions. They are given for flaws situated
symmetrically beneath the transmitting and receiving probes.
The distance traveled in millimeters between the probe pair is a function of flaw
depth position (d) and one-half the PSD (s), and equals:
2(s2 + d2)1/2
Equation B-4
Flaw Depth as a Function of Distance Traveled Between the Probe Pair
Therefore, to determine time (t) in µsec along an A-scan to the flaw depth
position, the ultrasonic material velocity (c) in units of mm/µsec must be known,
and equals:
t = 2(s2 + d2)1/2/c
Equation B-5
Flaw Depth as a Function of Time in µsec Along an A-Scan
Flaw depth can be expressed as a function of measured time by rearrangement of

Equation B-5, as given below:
d = [(ct/2)2 • s2]1/2
Equation B-6
Flaw Depth Position as a Function of Measured Time
B.10 Acceptance/Rejection Criteria
10.1 The owner shall specify acceptance/rejection criteria.
B.11 Reporting
11.1 All appropriate calibration and examination report data sheets shall be completed
by the examiner immediately following the applicable examinations. Data sheets
shall be prepared for each weld with the results documented and reported as NRI
(no relevant/reportable indications), RI (relevant/reportable indications), or SRI
(significant reportable indications). The reporting level is established based on
the judged severity of the detected indications and may be defined as follows:
B-22
11.1.1 NRI will be assigned to a weld or scan segment when no indications or

indications of typically little significance (for example, isolated point
sources) are identified.
11.1.2 RI will be assigned to a weld or scan segment when an indication or

indications of measurable size (singly, grouped, or clustered) are identified
and they do not indicate a service-induced mechanism unless otherwise
specified. Examples include fabrication or welding flaws such as
inclusions (grouped, clustered, or aligned), porosity (grouped, clustered, or
aligned), slag inclusion lines, lack of fusion, lack of penetration, and
generalized change in graininess shown in the UT TOFD digital image.
11.1.3 SRI will be assigned to a weld or scan segment when an indication or

indications of measurable size (singly, grouped, or clustered) are
identified, when some or all of the characteristics of the indication(s) may
be related to a service-induced mechanism, and/or the number, size, and/or
location of the indication(s) in or adjacent to the weld warrants concern.
Typical indications include cracks, fabrication, or welding flaws that
exhibit other extending features characteristic of or associated with
cracking and localized change in grain structure or mottling shown in the
UT TOFD digital image. Such change(s) could indicate previous repair
zones, change in heat treat condition, or low-level damage potentially
associated with creep (although the latter is unlikely in cold reheat piping).
11.2 A summary report shall be compiled from the examination scans and analysis
results to document the ultrasonic inspection. The report summary shall contain
gray-tone image printouts, which specifically display reportable indication
locations, and the following:
11.2.1 A description of the work performed
11.2.2 A diagram showing the location and orientation of each weld examined
11.2.3 A diagram showing the location of all relevant indications per piping
system
11.2.4 The acceptance criteria or standards used
11.2.5 A disposition, interpretation, and recommendation for all SRIs
11.2.6 Reference data used, if applicable
11.2.7 Calculations used, if applicable
11.2.8 Calibration and examination records
B-23
11.3 In addition to the documented reports generated, the recorded (digitized)

ultrasonic data collected during the examination shall be archived to an
appropriate media in accordance with the owners’ requirements.
Records shall be maintained in accordance with the owners’ requirements.
B-24
C
ULTRASONIC FLAW-SIZING PROCEDURE37
C.1 Summary
The flaw-sizing guidelines given in this procedure have been demonstrated successfully as one
possible way of combining planar flaw-sizing techniques based on flaw tip diffraction. Other
combinations of the techniques more appropriate to a given situation may perform as well.
Using multiple flaw-sizing techniques may be time consuming; however, the information
obtained through the application of multiple techniques will allow the examiner to determine the
flaw size with a greater degree of confidence. In fact, the use of complementing techniques may
be the only way to positively identify the flaw tip signal from other signals caused by weld
geometries, grain structures, etc. Ultimately, the techniques selected by the examiner will be
determined by the surface and geometrical conditions of the weldments.
C.2 Purpose
This procedure provides guidance for estimating the size of surface-connected and non-surface-
connected flaws in cold reheat piping by means of manually performed ultrasonic examination
techniques.
C.3 Scope
This procedure is applicable to thick-walled (>0.5 inch, 12.7 mm) cold reheat piping (and hot
reheat and main steam seam-welded piping) containing indications of flaws with known position.
C.4 Equipment
C.4.1 Ultrasonic Instrument
The ultrasonic instrument should be of the pulse-echo type, capable of generating and receiving
frequencies in the range of at least 1 to 5 MHz. The instrument should provide screen width
linearity within 5% of full screen width.
37
Adapted from Appendix E of Guidelines for the Evaluation of Seam-Welded High-Energy Piping, EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA: 2003. 1004329
C-1
Ultrasonic Flaw-Sizing Procedure
C.4.2 Ultrasonic Search Units
Search units may be either single- or dual-element, producing shear waves or longitudinal waves
in the nominal frequency range of 1 to 5 MHz. Nominal angles in the range of 45 to 70 degrees
for shear and even higher for longitudinal waves have been shown to be successful. Various
search unit designs with different element sizes and arrangements can be used. It must be
pointed out that the individual search unit design parameters have great influence on their
effectiveness. For flaw tip diffraction methods using relative arrival time, highly damped (to a
maximum pulse length of two cycles at the 6 dB down points) search units are to be applied.
C.4.3 Calibration Blocks
The basic calibration block in accordance with the detection procedure should be used for
verifying the location and extent of the flaw. It may also be used for sizing, especially if it is
equipped with additional reference reflectors.
In addition to the basic calibration block, there is a need for additional blocks with or without
welds containing special reference reflectors (e.g., side drilled holes or notches in various depths
for calibrating the specific sizing methods). A 1-inch-thick (25.4 mm) flat plate of material
similar to the component to be investigated, with notches from 10% deep to 90% deep in steps of
10 percentage points, should be used to calibrate the time base. Other block thicknesses might
be appropriate for specific sizing methods.
Figure C-1 shows a typical sizing calibration block consisting of a series of opposite surface
notches to be used for sweep distance calibration.
Figure C-1
Example of Sizing Calibration Block
C-2
C.5 Length-Sizing Technique
Flaw length measurement is performed using the same technique that was used to detect the
flaw. Once the flaw is detected, the search unit is moved parallel to the flaw, maintaining the
signal on the instrument screen, until the signal disappears completely. The signal is followed
until it disappears into the ambient noise. The position of the center of the search unit is marked,
denoting one endpoint of the flaw indication. The process is repeated in the opposite direction to
locate the other endpoint. The separation between these two points represents the length of the
flaw.
C.6 Height-Sizing Technique
Flaw height measurement is more complex and requires that the examiner be familiar with
various flaw-sizing methods. The height measurement techniques based on a specific decibel
drop that have traditionally been used in similar ultrasonic applications have been abandoned for
the proven flaw tip diffraction techniques. These various flaw-sizing methods are based on
certain physical principles of ultrasound and are described in the following sections.
Characterization of individual search units and their correct application are most important for
effectively sizing flaws.
C.6.1 High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Method
The high-angle longitudinal wave method is a sizing technique that is useful only for those flaws
that have extremities suspected to be near the contact surface. The principle of the high-angle
longitudinal beam is shown in Figure C-2. Ultrasonic longitudinal waves refracted at a high
angle are used to detect either diffracted waves from the tip of the flaw or reflected waves from
the near-surface extremities of the flaw face. The pulse transit time indicates the ligament above
the flaw measured from the contact surface. This value is then subtracted from the local
thickness of the component to find the flaw height.
Depending on the selection of the search unit, the morphology of the flaw, and the surface
geometry of the weldment, the accuracy of the height measurement may range from a very good
quantitative measurement to just a qualitative determination (a yes/no determination of whether
the flaw is large). Height determinations made by this method should always be confirmed using
a complementary method appropriate for flaws near the contact surface (i.e., the full-vee path tip
diffraction method).
The principle of this method relies on the insonification (i.e., the act of producing ultrasound in a
material) of only the outer “skin” of the pipe wall. This will determine whether the flaw has
propagated into this outer layer.
The effectiveness of sizing with high-angle longitudinal wave search units is strongly dependent
on selection of a search unit that produces a beam shape appropriate to the problem.
C-3
The shape of a high-angle longitudinal beam is strongly dependent upon several search unit
parameters such as frequency, element size, and element arrangement (roof angle, etc.). It is
essential to investigate the beam shape using known reflectors. Significant variations may be
experienced between search units having identical faceplate parameter values, even if they are
from the same manufacturer.
Either single- or dual-element search units may be used; however, it is difficult to eliminate
internal wedge reflections and entry surface noise when using a single-element search unit for
high-angle longitudinal wave examination.
The refracted longitudinal beam is accompanied by a shear wave at about 30 degrees. This shear
wave is not used in this part of the sizing technique. Further, it can be detrimental, presenting
the examiner with high-amplitude signals from irrelevant sources at the opposite surface and
potentially complicating the correct interpretation of longitudinal wave signals.
Figure C-3 shows the application range of the high-angle longitudinal wave sizing method.
C.6.2 Full-Vee Path Corner Reflection
For very deep cracks that extend near the outer surface, a corner reflection at the full-vee path
position might be obtained similar to that at the half-vee path position. A part of the ultrasonic
beam is reflected at the crack face and is reflected via the outside surface back to the search unit.
The position of the outside surface reflection can be established by finger damping. Figure C-4
depicts the application range of the full-vee path corner reflection technique.
Figure C-2
High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Beam
C-4
Figure C-3
Application Range for High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Beams
C-5
Figure C-4
Application Range for Full-Vee Path Corner Reflection
C-6
C.6.3 Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method
This method relies on the fact that, for some flaws, a portion of the energy striking the tip of a
flaw will be scattered by the flaw tip. This circumferentially scattered wave will find its way
back to the search unit. The height of the flaw can be derived by comparing the arrival times of
the reflected pulse and the scattered pulse. (The principle of flaw tip diffraction is also applied in
the high-angle longitudinal wave method.)
Although the flaw-tip diffraction concept sounds simple enough, there are many other signals
that can complicate screen interpretation. Therefore, it is important that ultrasonic examiners be
adequately trained to become familiar with tip diffraction techniques.
Variations of this method include its use at both the half-vee and full-vee paths. When applied at
both vee paths, the method is effective for a broad range of material thicknesses.
The diffracted pulse signal is a low-amplitude signal with respect to the primary indication. As
such, it is easy to miss entirely or to be confused with other signals on the CRT. Indications
from other than the flaw tip can be falsely called. If a unique tip-diffracted signal cannot be
identified, the flaw height should be measured by observing where the signal starts to drop
rapidly, indicating that the tip has passed through the central part of the ultrasonic beam.
Figure C-5 outlines the principles of the flaw-tip diffraction method. Figure C-6 shows its
application range.
C-7
Figure C-5
Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method
C-8
Figure C-6
Application Range for the Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method
C-9
C.7 Calibration Method
C.7.1 Calibration for High-Angle Longitudinal Wave Method
Calibration is performed using a flat calibration block with reflectors placed at known depths
below the sound entry surface. Using a suitable calibration block design that contains deep
notches placed to 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 inch (2.5, 5.1, 7.6, 10.2, and 12.7 mm) below the
entry surface, perform the following steps:
• Set the screen distance such that full screen width represents 1 inch (25.4 mm) of depth.
With the coarse range control set to the 0.5 or 1.0 inch (12.7 and 25.4 mm) setting, adjust the
delay to display the main bang at the left side of the screen.
• Obtain a signal from the end of the calibration block with the index point placed very near
the block end. This will not be a corner reflection from the bottom of the block; it will be a
reflection from the top part of the end face. Verify that the correct signal is obtained by
finger-damping near the top of the end face.
• Adjust the delay and range controls to place the main bang signal at 0 horizontal divisions
and place the end-of-block signal at 2 divisions. These settings put the range in proximity to
the eventual calibrated position.
• Place the search unit index point directly above the calibration notch tip, 0.1 inch (2.5 mm)
from the examination surface. Move the search unit backward, slowly. First, one or more
signals from the shear wave component may appear. Continue to move back until a separate
signal appears. This will be the high-angle longitudinal wave signal. It can be recognized by
the fact that it usually travels along the CRT baseline more than the shear signals. When the
signal is maximized, visually verify that the search unit index point is in the proper position
to detect the reflector with a high beam angle. Adjust the delay and range controls to place
this signal at 3 divisions and the end-of-block signal at 2 divisions.
• Obtain and maximize the high-angle longitudinal wave signal from the notch tip located 0.2
inch (5.1 mm) below the outside surface. Adjust the delay and range controls to place this
signal at 4 divisions and place the signal from the notch tip located 0.1 inch (2.5 mm) below
the surface at 3 divisions.
• Continue with the other notch tips until they are too far from the examination surface to be
detected with a signal-to-noise ratio of at least 3. Increase instrument gain as necessary.
Noise at the extreme left and right sides of the screen will have no effect.
When measuring crack height from the weld crown using the high-angle longitudinal wave
technique, use the confirming measurement from the pipe base metal. If the weld crown is in the
as-welded condition, it is still sometimes possible to couple adequately. Some roughness can be
tolerated if the crown is still nominally flat, but if the crown is too rounded, coupling will be
impossible. This method will also work for planar flaws within the weld metal, provided that the
weld crown surface is well prepared.
C-10
C.7.2 Calibration for Flaw-Tip Diffraction Method
The flaw-tip diffraction method depends primarily on the arrival time of the flaw-tip signal and
in some cases on the arrival time of the crack opening signal, if applicable.
For the absolute arrival-time technique, as shown in Figure C-7, use the following procedure to
calibrate the screen:
• Select a suitable calibration block with at least two notches of known heights, bracketing the
flaw height range of interest.
• Alternately peak the notch tip signals from a shallow and a deep notch while using the
material calibration and delay control knobs to adjust the arrival-time distance so that the
signals appear at the correct number of screen divisions from the left of the screen. The
screen should be calibrated so that the extreme left represents a through-wall flaw and the
extreme right represents a convenient dimension below the outside surface. Flaw height can
now be read directly. Note that the notch base reflection signals are not used at all.
The relative arrival-time technique, as shown in Figure C-8, may be used whenever the flaw is
open to the inside surface. In these instances, the following steps should be used to calibrate for
a direct flaw height reading:
• Select a calibration block with at least two notches of known height. The notch heights
should bracket the range of interest to assure that the appropriate search unit is used.
• Obtain notch corner and tip echoes simultaneously as shown in Figure C-4. Once both
signals are present, keep the search unit stationary.
• Use the material calibration control (fine range) to separate the signals on the screen and
obtain a convenient height/division scale. Keep the search unit position fixed; do not
alternately peak the signals. For example, using a 0.2-inch-high (5.1 mm) notch, separate the
peaks of the notch base and tip echoes by one screen division. The screen is now calibrated
for 0.2 inch (5.1 mm) per screen division. The screen distance between the inside-surface
reflection and the flaw tip is a direct reading of flaw height.
• The instrument delay position must display the doublet on the instrument screen but
otherwise is unimportant.
C-11
Figure C-7
Absolute Arrival-Time Technique
Figure C-8
Relative Arrival-Time Technique
C-12
C.8 Size Determination
C.8.1 Confirming Results With Complementary Techniques
The various sizing techniques have certain limitations that prohibit their application to all sizes
of flaws. Techniques must be combined to produce confidence in the flaw size measurement.
The methodology described in this procedure assumes that all of the necessary search units are
available to combine the techniques in the prescribed manner. The extent to which
complementary flaw-sizing techniques may be useful in a field environment will depend on the
physical conditions of the weldment (and adjacent HAZ and base metal), the flaw morphology,
and the search unit selection.
With each technique, flaw height measurements are made at several locations along the flaw
length in order to increase confidence levels and to increase the chances of finding the largest
point of the flaw. Still, whatever results are obtained must be confirmed with a complementary
technique.
If two or more techniques produce different estimations of flaw height, the examiner must be
knowledgeable enough to distinguish which technique is correct. This requires the examiner to
understand the theory behind each technique as well as the limitations of each technique.
C.8.2 Preparation for Sizing
To provide optimum conditions for sizing, the weld crown shall be ground flush with the pipe for
the entire flaw length. Prior to attempting to size a flaw, the examiner must first verify its
location, orientation, and extent. This is typically accomplished with the original equipment
used for detection. During this evaluation, it is also very important to determine whether the
flaw is surface-connected or buried in order to choose the most appropriate sizing technique.
C.8.3 Flaws Connected to the Inside Surface
If it is determined that the flaw is connected to the inside surface, the following activities should
be accomplished in any order:
• Search for evidence of a very deep flaw using:
- High-angle longitudinal wave
- Full-vee path corner reflection
- Flaw-tip diffraction
If evidence of a deep flaw exists, confirm with a complementary technique and prove that a
shallow flaw does not exist.
• Search for evidence of a shallow flaw using flaw-tip diffraction techniques. If evidence of a
shallow flaw exists, confirm with a complementary technique and prove that a deep flaw
does not exist.
C-13
• Confirm results by using a different angle of incidence or by the opposite direction of

incidence.
• If two or more techniques give differing results, eliminate those results with lowest
confidence based on range of applicability or repeatability or result. If doubt still exists, take
the value, which indicates the greater height.
Be aware of possible indications from weld fabrication flaws that can lead to significant errors in
reported measurements.
C.8.4 Flaws Connected to the Outside Surface
For flaws that are determined to be connected to the outside surface, the following activities
should be accomplished in any order:
• Use high-angle longitudinal wave techniques to identify crack depth.
• Use full-vee path flaw-tip diffraction to confirm flaw depth.
• Confirm results by investigating the flaw from the opposite direction of incidence.
C.8.5 Flaws Not Surface-Connected
For flaws that are not connected to the inside or outside surface (i.e., buried flaws), it may be
possible to identify both the upper and lower flaw tips, especially for vertical flaws. The
following sizing activities are recommended for buried flaws:
• Search for evidence of flaw extremities using flaw-tip diffraction techniques. It is very
important that this search be accomplished from two directions.
• Search for evidence of a very deep flaw using high-angle longitudinal wave and full-vee path
corner reflection.
• If a diffracted tip signal is identified, attempt to confirm using a complementary technique or
by a different angle of incidence or from the opposite direction of incidence.
• When a unique tip-diffracted signal cannot be identified, measure the flaw height by
observing where the signal starts to drop rapidly, indicating that the tip has passed through
the central part of the ultrasonic beam.
C.9 Recording
The examiner should record the techniques utilized, the greatest through-wall dimension, the
remaining ligament above and/or below the flaw, and the flaw location for each individual flaw.
The height of a flaw should be verified by recording data from two directions and by using
multiple techniques.
At a minimum, the following information should be recorded on the examination data sheet:
• Data sheet identification and date and time period of examination
C-14
• Names and certification levels of examination personnel

• Examination procedure number and revision
• Calibration sheet identification
• Identification and location of the weld or volume scanned (for example, marked-up drawings
or sketches)
• Surface from which the examination is conducted
• Examination results including search unit location, orientation, and basis for disposition for
each flaw indication
C.10 Evaluation
All through-wall measurements should be evaluated and reported in accordance with the plant-
specific requirements.
C-15
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Final Report, March 2005

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3 OVERVIEW OF COMMON DAMAGE MECHANISMS ..........................................................3-1

4 DESIGN, FABRICATION, AND O&M FACTORS RELATED TO CRH DAMAGE ................4-1

4.3 Fatigue Mechanisms on Pipe Interior............................................................................4-14

4.6.4.3 Attemperator Water Supply Temperature ......................................................4-33

5 CONDITION ASSESSMENT ROADMAP ..............................................................................5-1

6 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES .....................................................................................................6-1

6.2.2.2 Conventional Ultrasonic Testing ......................................................................6-6

7 CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISPOSITION DECISIONS ..........................................................7-1

A FAILURE EXPRERIENCE WITH COLD REHEAT PIPING.................................................. A-1

A.1.10 Mechanical Tests ................................................................................................. A-4

B TIME-OF-FLIGHT DIFFRACTION EXAMINATION PROCEDURE ...................................... B-1

C ULTRASONIC FLAW-SIZING PROCEDURE ...................................................................... C-2

1.1 Purpose of This Guideline

1.2 Report Organization

The report is organized as follows:

2.1 System Overview

The attemperator assembly includes an attachment flange through which

• Allows piping the freedom to expand and contract due to

• Provides sufficient restraint so that momentum imparted by flow

In older plants, insulation may be asbestos or other fiber wrapped in a

2.2 Design and Fabrication Overview

Cold reheat piping is typically constructed of high-pressure, high-temperature carbon steel

Weld Type Application and Typical Usage

2.3 Piping Support System Overview

Support Transfers the load of the piping to a suitably placed structural

2.4 Operational Issues

2.5 CRH Piping Ruptures

Year Plant Failed Component Type of Failure Location

Contributing Factor Role

2.5.2 Gannon Unit 6

2.5.3 Erickson Station

Damage Mechanism Comments

Corrosion pitting In carbon steel CRH piping, corrosion pitting is typically

Overstress May be caused by water hammer or movement constraint due to

Overview of Common Damage Mechanisms

Component Damage Mechanism

4.1 Risk Factors and Damage Mechanisms

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

Seam welds— Fatigue Catastrophic failures of seam welds have

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

Inadequate pipe stress Overstress mechanisms Proper stress analysis is needed to

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations

Design, Fabrication, and O&M Factors Related to CRH Damage

Risk Factor Possible Damage Mechanism Potential Damage Locations