G.R. No. 179408. March 5, 2014.*

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. ABIGAIL R. RAZON
ALVAREZ and VERNON R. RAZON, respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Personal Properties;

Telecommunication Industry; Taking off from the basic rule
that penal laws are construed strictly against the State, the
Supreme Court ruled that international long distance calls
and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone
services by Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) are not personal properties that can be the subject of
theft.—Taking off from the basic rule that penal laws are
construed strictly against the State, the Court ruled that
international long distance calls and the business of
providing telecommunication or telephone services by PLDT
are not personal properties that can be the subject of theft.
One is apt to conclude that “personal property” standing
alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and are
subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words
“Personal property” under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word “take” in the law. The
statutory definition of “taking” and movable property
indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the
proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only
movable properties which have physical or material existence
and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of
theft.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and
Seizures; Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.— Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 2. The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the

_______________ 

* SECOND DIVISION.

55

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the

place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purposes of the constitutional provision against unlawful
searches and seizures are to: (i) prevent the officers of the
law from violating private security in person and property
and illegally invading the sanctity of the home; and (ii) give
remedy against such usurpations when attempted or
committed.

Same; Same; Same; Search Warrants; The constitutional

requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is reiterated
under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.—The constitutional requirement for the
issuance of a search warrant is reiterated under Sections 4
and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
These sections lay down the following requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined personally
by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. Should any of these requisites be
absent, the party aggrieved by the issuance and enforcement
of the search warrant may file a motion to quash the search
warrant with the issuing court or with the court where the
action is subsequently instituted.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A search warrant proceeding

is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a writ of
discovery; Since it is at most incidental to the main criminal
case, an order granting or denying a motion to quash a search
warrant may be questioned only via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.—A search warrant proceeding is a special
criminal and judicial process akin to a writ of discovery. It is
designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only
to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most
incidental to the main criminal case, an order granting or
denying a motion to quash a search warrant may be
questioned only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
When confronted with this petition, the higher court must
necessarily determine the validity of the lower court’s action
from the prism of whether it was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. By grave abuse of discretion, jurisprudence

56

refers to the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or to the exercise of power
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility or in a manner so patent and gross as to
amount to an invasion of positive duty or to the virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of the law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the constitutional

requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it
must be issued based on probable cause which, under the
Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense.—One
of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search
warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause
which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one
specific offense. In search warrant proceedings, probable
cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In the determination of probable cause, the court
must necessarily determine whether an offense exists to
justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because
the personal properties that may be subject of the search
warrant are very much intertwined with the “one specific
offense” requirement of probable cause. Contrary to PLDT’s
claim, the only way to determine whether a warrant should
issue in connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose
the facts and circumstances presented by the applicant with
the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the
search warrant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; If the offense for which the

warrant is issued is subsequently decriminalized during the
pendency of the petition for certiorari, then the warrant may
be quashed.—If the offense for which the warrant is issued is
subsequently decriminalized during the pendency of the
petition for certiorari, then the warrant may be quashed. For
another, a subsequent ruling from the Court that a similar
set of facts and circumstances does not constitute an offense,
as alleged in the search warrant application, may be used as
a ground to quash a warrant. In both instances, the
underlying reason for quashing the search warrant is the
absence of probable cause which can only possibly exist when
the combination of facts and circumstances points to the
possible commission of an offense that may be evidenced by
the personal properties sought to

57

be seized. To the CA, the second instance mentioned justified

the quashal of the search warrants.

Civil Law; Statutes; Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the

decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the country’s
legal system. While these decisions are not laws pursuant to
the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the law’s
meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same
binging force as the laws themselves.—Under Article 8 of the
Civil Code, the decisions of this Court form part of the
country’s legal system. While these decisions are not laws
pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they
evidence the laws’ meaning, breadth, and scope and,
therefore, have the same binding force as the laws
themselves. Hence, the Court’s interpretation of a statute
forms part of the law as of the date it was originally passed
because the Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law
carries into effect.

Same; Same; Stare Decisis; Article 8 of the Civil Code

embodies the basic principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
established matters) that enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents embodied in the decision of the Supreme Court.—
Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle of
stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle established matters) that enjoins
adherence to judicial precedents embodied in the decision of
the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in
the land. The doctrine of stare decisis, in turn, is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. The doctrine of (horizontal) stare decisis is one of
policy, grounded on the necessity of securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Final

Judgments; In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet
acquire the status of a “decided” case that is “deemed settled
and closed to further argument” if the Supreme Court’s
decision is still the subject of a motion for reconsideration
seasonably filed by the moving party.—In the field of
adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a
“decided” case that is “deemed settled and closed to further
argument” if the Court’s decision is still the subject of a
motion for recon-

58

sideration seasonably filed by the moving party. Under the

Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed to file a motion
for reconsideration of the Court’s decision within 15 days
from notice. Since the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on
the necessity of securing certainty and stability in law, then
these attributes will spring only once the Court’s ruling has
lapsed to finality in accordance with law.

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and

Seizures; Search Warrants; Aside from the requirement of
probable cause, the Constitution also requires that the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.—Aside from the requirement of
probable cause, the Constitution also requires that the
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. This requirement of
particularity in the description, especially of the things to be
seized, is meant to enable the law enforcers to readily
identify the properties to be seized and, thus, prevent the
seizure of the wrong items. It seeks to leave the law enforcers
with no discretion at all regarding these articles and to give
life to the constitutional provision against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In other words, the requisite sufficient
particularity is aimed at preventing the law enforcer from
exercising unlimited discretion as to what things are to be
taken under the warrant and ensure that only those
connected with the offense for which the warrant was issued
shall be seized.

Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the tests to determine

the particularity in the description of objects to be seized
under a search warrant is when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.—The requirement of
specificity, however, does not require technical accuracy in
the description of the property to be seized. Specificity is
satisfied if the personal properties’ description is as far as
the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be so described.
The nature of the description should vary according to
whether the identity of the property or its character is a
matter of concern. One of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the primary objective of

applying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used
in a subse-

59

quent prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant

was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must
satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant
establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this
specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued.—
The Rules require that a search warrant should be issued “in
connection with one specific offense” to prevent the issuance
of a scatter-shot warrant. The one-specific-offense
requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant should issue only on the basis of probable
cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a search
warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent
prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant was
applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy
himself that the evidence presented by the applicant
establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this
specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued.
Accordingly, in a subsequent challenge against the validity of
the warrant, the applicant cannot be allowed to maintain its
validity based on facts and circumstances that may be
related to other search warrants but are extrinsic to the
warrant in question.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
petitioner.
  Alexander B. Soriano for respondents.

 
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari[1] assailing the decision[2] dated August 11,
2006 and the resolution[3] dated August 22, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in

_______________
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, and
concurred in by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired
member of this Court) and Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas; Rollo,
pp. 60-81.
[3] Id., at p. 84.

60

CA-G.R. SP No. 89213 on the validity of the four

search warrants issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 115.
The CA rulings (i) quashed the first two search
warrants, similarly docketed as Search Warrant No.
03-063, issued for violation of Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and (ii)
declared void paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the other two
search warrants, also similarly docketed as Search
Warrant No. 03-064, issued for violation of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 401.[4]

Factual Antecedents
 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) is the grantee of a legislative franchise[5]
which authorizes it to carry on the business of
providing basic and enhanced telecommunications
services in and between areas in the Philippines and
between the Philippines and other countries and
territories,[6] and, accordingly, to establish, operate,
manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications system for both domestic and
international calls.[7] Pursuant to its franchise, PLDT
offers to the public wide range of services duly
authorized by the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC).
PLDT’s network is principally composed of the
Public Switch Telephone Network, telephone handsets
and/or telecommunications equipment used by its
subscribers, the wires and cables linking these
handsets and/or equipment, antennae, transmission
facilities, the international gateway facility (IGF) and
other telecommunications equipment providing

_______________
[4] Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical
or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical
Meters and Other Acts.
[5] Republic Act No. 7082.
[6] Id., Section 1.
[7] Rollo, p. 90.

 
61

interconnections.[8] To safeguard the integrity of its

network, PLDT regularly conducts investigations on
various prepaid cards marketed and sold abroad to
determine alternative calling patterns (ACP) and
network fraud that are being perpetrated against it.
To prevent or stop network fraud, PLDT’s ACP
Detection Division (ACPDD) regularly visits foreign
countries to conduct market research on various
prepaid phone cards offered abroad that allow their
users to make overseas calls to PLDT subscribers in
the Philippines at a cheaper rate.
The ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid card
— a card principally marketed to Filipinos residing in
the United Kingdom for calls to the Philippines — to
make test calls using two telephone lines: the dialing
phone — an IDD-capable[9] telephone line which
makes the call and through which the access number
and the PIN number printed at the back of the card
are entered; and the receiving phone — a caller
identification (caller id) unit-equipped telephone line
which would receive the call and reflect the incoming
caller’s telephone number.
During a test call placed at the PLDT-ACPDD
office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone
number (2-8243285) as the calling number used, as if
the call was originating from a local telephone in Metro
Manila. Upon verification with the PLDT’s Integrated
Customer Management (billing) System, the ACPDD
learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone
number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with address at
17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don
Bosco, Parañaque City. It further learned that several

_______________
[8] Id., at pp. 807-808.
[9] International Direct Dialing. An IDD capable phone enables
the caller to access the toll-free number of the prepaid card.

 
62

lines are installed at this address with Abigail and

Vernon R. Razon (respondents), among others, as
subscribers.[10]
To validate its findings, the ACPDD conducted the
same test calls on November 5, 2003 at the premises of
the NTC in Quezon City (and in the presence of an
NTC representative[11]) using the same prepaid card
(validation test). The receiving phone at the NTC
premises reflected the telephone numbers registered in
the name of Abigail as the calling number from the
United Kingdom.[12]
Similar test calls subsequently conducted using the
prepaid cards Unity Card and IDT Supercalling Card
revealed the same results. The caller-id-equipped
receiving phone reflected telephone numbers[13] that
are in the names of Experto Enterprises and Experto
Phils. as subscribers, with a common address at No. 38
Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision, Barangay
Don Bosco, Parañaque City. It turned out that the
actual occupant of these premises is also Abigail.
Subsequently, a validation test was also conducted,
yielding several telephone numbers registered in the
name of Experto Phils./
Experto Enterprises as the calling numbers supposedly
from the United Kingdom.[14]
According to PLDT, had an ordinary and legitimate
call been made, the screen of the caller-id-equipped
receiving phone would not reflect a local number or
any number at all.

_______________
[10] Teresita S. Alcantara, Dante S. Cunanan and Abigail; Rollo,
p. 94.
[11] Engr. Policarpio G. Tolentino, Jr.; ibid.
[12] The following are the telephone numbers and their
subscribers: 2-8222363 – Abigail; 2-8210268 – Vernon; 2-7764922 –
Abigail;
2-7764909 – Abigail; 2-8243817 – Abigail; and 2-8243285 – Abigail;
id., at p. 95.
[13] 2-8245911 and 2-8245244; Id., at pp. 95-96.
[14] The following are the telephone numbers and their
subscribers: 2-8245056 – Experto Phils.; 2-8224192 – Experto Phils.;
2-8247704 – Experto Enterprises; 2-8245786 – Experto Enterprises;
and 2-8245245 – Experto Enterprises; id., at p. 97.
  
63

In the cards they tested, however, once the caller

enters the access and pin numbers, the respondents
would route the call via the internet to a local
telephone number (in this case, a PLDT telephone
number) which would connect the call to the receiving
phone. Since calls through the internet never pass the
toll center of the PLDT’s IGF, users of these prepaid
cards can place a call to any point in the Philippines
(provided the local line is NDD-capable) without the
call appearing as coming from abroad.[15]
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr.
Lawrence Narciso of the PLDT’s Quality Control
Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection
at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No.
38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision — both in
Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City — and
discovered that PLDT telephone lines were connected
to several pieces of equipment.[16] Mr. Narciso
narrated the results of the inspection, thus —
 

10. During [the] ocular inspection [at 17 Dominic Savio St.,

Savio Compound], Ms. Abigail Razon Alvarez allowed us to
gain entry and check the telephone installations within their
premises. First, we checked the location of the telephone
protectors that are commonly installed at a concrete wall
boundary inside the compound. Some of these protectors are
covered with a fabricated wooden cabinet. Other protectors
are installed beside the said wooden cabinet, x  x  x. The
inside wiring installations from telephone protectors to
connecting block were routed to the said adjacent room
passing through the house ceiling.
11. x  x  x. Upon entering the so-called adjacent room, we
immediately noticed that the PLDT telephone lines were
connected to the equipment situated at multi-layered rack.
The equipment room contains the following:

_______________
[15] Id., at p. 98.
[16] Id., at p. 811.

64

a. 6 Quintum router;
b. 13 Com router;
c. 1 Cisco 800 router;
d. 1 Nokia Modem for PLDT DSL;
e. 1 Meridian Subscriber’s Unit[;]
f. 5 Personal Computers[;]
g. 1 Computer Printer[; and]
h. 1 Flat-bed Scanner[.]
12. We also noticed that these routers are connected to the
Meridian’s subscriber unit (“SU”) that has an outdoor
antenna installed on the top of the roof. Meridian’s SU and
outdoor antenna are service components used to connect with
wireless broadband internet access service of Meridian
Telekoms.
x x x x
18. During the site inspection [at No. 38 Indonesia St.,
Better Living Subdivision], we noticed that the protector of
each telephone line/number x  x  x were enclosed in a
fabricated wooden cabinet with safety padlock. Said wooden
cabinet was situated on the concrete wall inside the
compound near the garage entrance gate. The telephone
inside the wiring installations from the protector to the
connecting blocks were placed in a plastic electrical conduit
routed to the adjacent room at the second floor.[17]
 

On December 3, 2003, Police Superintendent Gilbert

C. Cruz filed a consolidated application for a search
warrant[18] before Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of the
RTC, for the crimes of theft and violation of PD No.
401. According to PLDT, the respondents are engaged
in a form of network fraud known as International
Simple Resale (ISR) which amounts to theft under the
RPC.

______________
[17] Id., at pp. 122-124; citation omitted.
[18] Id., at pp. 206-214. The application attached the affidavits of
Wilfredo Abad, Jr., a Section Supervisor of the PLDT’s ACPDD, and
of Mr. Narciso, a Revenue Assurance Analyst of the PLDT’s ACPDD.

65

ISR is a method of routing and completing

international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae and/or wave frequencies which are connected
directly to the domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined (terminating
country); and, in the process, bypassing the IGF at the
terminating country.[19]
Judge Mendiola found probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants applied for.
Accordingly, four search warrants[20] were issued for
violations of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of
the RPC (SW A-1 and SW A-2) and of PD No. 401, as
amended (SW B-1 and SW B-2) for the ISR activities
being conducted at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio
Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living
Subdivision, both in Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque
City. The four search warrants enumerated the objects
to be searched and seized as follows:
 

1. MERIDIAN SUBSCRIBERS UNIT AND PLDT DSL

LINES and/or CABLES AND ANTENNAS and/or similar
equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as a Meridian Subscriber’s Unit, Broadband
DSL and telephone lines;
 2. PERSONAL COMPUTERS or any similar equipment
or device capable of accepting information applying the
prescribed process of the information and supplying the
result of this process;
3. NOKIA MODEM or any similar equipment or device
that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to
communicate with other data terminal equipment via a
telephone line;
4. QUINTUM Equipment or any similar equipment
capable of receiving digital signals from the internet and
converting those signals to voice;

_______________
[19] Rollo, p. 92.
[20] Id., at pp. 358-369; Search Warrant No. 03-063 covering two different
places and Search Warrant No. 03-064 covering, as well, two different
places.

66

5. QUINTUM, 3COM AND CISCO Routers or any

similar equipment capable of switching packets of data to
their assigned destination or addresses;
6. LINKS DSL SWITCH or any similar equipment
capable of switching data;
7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any
similar equipment or device used for copying and/or printing
data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or subscription
agreements or contracts, communications and documents
relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment[.][21]
 On the same date, the PNP searched the premises
indicated in the warrants. On December 10, 2003, a
return was made with a complete inventory of the
items seized.[22] On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and
the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a joint
complaint-affidavit for theft and for violation of PD No.
401 against the respondents.[23]
On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with
the RTC a motion to quash[24] the search warrants
essentially on the following grounds: first, the RTC had
no authority to issue search warrants which were
enforced in Parañaque City; second, the enumeration
of the items to be searched and seized lacked
particularity; and third, there was no probable cause
for the crime of theft.

_______________
[21] Id., at p. 360.
[22] Id., at pp. 371-375.
[23] Id., at pp. 438-446.
[24] Subsequently, the respondents also filed an Amended Motion
to Quash Search Warrants; id., at pp. 391-401.

67

On March 12, 2004, PLDT opposed the respondents’

motion.[25]
In a July 6, 2004 order,[26] the RTC denied the
respondents’ motion to quash. Having been rebuffed[27]
in their motion for reconsideration,[28] the respondents
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.[29]

Ruling of the CA
On August 11, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed
decision and resolution, granting the respondents’
petition for certiorari. The CA quashed SW A-1 and
SW A-2 (for theft) on the ground that they were issued
for “non-existent crimes.”[30] According to the CA,
inherent in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of search warrant is the accompanying
determination that an offense has been committed.
Relying on this Court’s decision in Laurel v. Judge
Abrogar,[31] the CA ruled that the respondents could
not have possibly committed the crime of theft because
PLDT’s business of providing telecommunication
services and these services themselves are not personal
properties contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC.
With respect to SW B-1 and SW B-2 (for violation
of PD No. 401), the CA upheld paragraphs one to six of
the enumeration of items subject of the search. The CA
held that the stock phrase “or similar equipment or
device” found in paragraphs one to six of the search
warrants did not make it suffer from generality since
each paragraph’s enumeration of items was sufficiently
qualified by the citation of the specific

_______________
[25] Id., at pp. 405-435.
[26] Id., at pp. 455-459.
[27] Id., at p. 479.
[28] Id., at pp. 461-464.
[29] Id., at pp. 481-502.
[30] Id., at p. 66.
[31] 518 Phil. 409; 483 SCRA 243 (2006).

68

objects to be seized and by its functions which are

inherently connected with the crime allegedly
committed.
The CA, however, nullified the ensuing paragraphs,
7, 8 and 9, for lack of particularity and ordered the
return of the items seized under these provisions.
While the same stock phrase appears in paragraphs 7
and 8, the properties described therein — i.e., printer
and scanner, software, diskette and tapes — include
even those for the respondents’ personal use, making
the description of the things to be seized too general in
nature.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,[32]
PLDT went to this Court via this Rule 45 petition.
 
The Petitioner’s Arguments
PLDT faults the CA for relying on Laurel on three
grounds: first, Laurel cannot be cited yet as an
authority under the principle of stare decisis because
Laurel is not yet final and executory; in fact, it is the
subject of a pending motion for reconsideration filed by
PLDT itself; second, even assuming that Laurel is
already final, the facts in Laurel vary from the present
case. Laurel involves the quashal of an information on
the ground that the information does not charge any
offense; hence, the determination of the existence of
the elements of the crime of theft is indispensable in
resolving the motion to quash. In contrast, the present
case involves the quashal of a search warrant. Third,
accordingly, in resolving the motion, the issuing court
only has to be convinced that there is probable cause to
hold that: (i) the items to be seized are connected to a
criminal activity; and (ii) these items are found in the
place to be searched. Since the matter of quashing a
search warrant may be rooted on matters “extrinsic of
the search warrant,”[33] the issuing court does not need
to look

_______________
[32] Rollo, pp. 614-637.
[33] Citing  Abuan v. People, 536 Phil. 672, 692; 505 SCRA 799,
816 (2006).

69
into the elements of the crime allegedly committed in
the same manner that the CA did in Laurel.
PLDT adds that a finding of grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of search warrant may be
justified only when there is “disregard of the
requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant[.]”[34] In the present case, the CA did not find
(and could not have found) any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC because at the time
the RTC issued the search warrants in 2003, Laurel
had not yet been promulgated.
In defending the validity of the nullified provisions
of SW B-1 and SW B-2, PLDT argues that PD No. 401
also punishes unauthorized installation of telephone
connections. Since the enumerated items are connected
to the computers that are illegally connected to PLDT
telephone lines, then these items bear a direct relation
to the offense of violation of PD No. 401, justifying
their seizure.
The enumeration in paragraph 8 is likewise a
proper subject of seizure because they are the fruits of
the offense as they contain information on PLDT’s
business profit and other information relating to the
commission of violation of PD No. 401. Similarly,
paragraph 9 specifies the fruits and evidence of
violation of PD No. 401 since it supports PLDT’s claim
that the respondents have made a business out of their
illegal connections to PLDT lines.

The Respondents’ Arguments

The respondents counter that while Laurel may not
yet be final, at least it has a persuasive effect as the
current jurisprudence on the matter. Even without
Laurel, the CA’s nullification of SW A-1 and SW A-2
can withstand scrutiny because of the novelty of the
issue presented before it. The nulli-

_______________
[34] Citing Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 903;
344 SCRA 36, 49 (2000).
  
70

fication of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW B-1 and SW B-

2 must be upheld not only on the ground of broadness
but for lack of any relation whatsoever with PD No.
401 which punishes the theft of electricity.
 

Our Ruling
We partially grant the petition.
Laurel and its reversal
by the Court En Banc
Before proceeding with the case, a review of Laurel
is in order as it involves substantially similar facts as
in the present case.
Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) sells prepaid cards, “Bay
Super Orient Card,” that allow their users to place a
call to the Philippines from Japan. PLDT asserted that
Baynet is engaged in ISR activities by using an
international private leased line (IPL) to course
Baynet’s incoming international long distance calls.
The IPL is linked to a switching equipment, which is
then connected to PLDT telephone lines/numbers and
equipment, with Baynet as subscriber.
To establish its case, PLDT obtained a search
warrant. On the strength of the items seized during
the search of Baynet’s premises, the prosecutor found
probable cause for theft against Luis Marcos Laurel
(Laurel) and other Baynet officials. Accordingly, an
information was filed, alleging that the Baynet officials
“take, steal and use the international long distance
calls belonging to PLDT by [ISR activities] x  x  x
effectively stealing this business from PLDT while
using its facilities in the estimated amount of
P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of
PLDT[.]”[35]
Laurel moved to quash the information on the bold
assertion that ISR activities do not constitute a crime
under Phil-

_______________
[35] Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, supra note 31, at p. 422; p. 255.

71

ippine law. Laurel argued that an ISR activity cannot

entail taking of personal property because the
international long distance telephone calls using PLDT
telephone lines belong to the caller himself; the
amount stated in the information, if at all, represents
the rentals due PLDT for the caller’s usage of its
facilities. Laurel argued that the business of providing
international long distance calls, i.e., PLDT’s service,
and the revenue derived therefrom are not personal
property that can be appropriated.
Laurel went to the Court after failing to secure the
desired relief from the trial and appellate courts,[36]
raising the core issue of whether PLDT’s business of
providing telecommunication services for international
long distance calls is a proper subject of theft under
Article 308 of the RPC. The Court’s First Division
granted Laurel’s petition and ordered the quashal of
the information.
Taking off from the basic rule that penal laws are
construed strictly against the State, the Court ruled
that international long distance calls and the business
of providing telecommunication or telephone services
by PLDT are not personal properties that can be the
subject of theft.
 

One is apt to conclude that “personal property” standing

alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and are
subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words
“Personal property” under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word “take” in the law. The
statutory definition of “taking” and movable property
indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the
proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only
movable properties which have physical or material existence
and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of
theft. x x x.
x x x x

_______________
[36] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

72

x  x  x. Business, like services in business, although are

properties, are not proper subjects of theft under the Revised
Penal Code because the same cannot be “taken” or
“occupied.” If it were otherwise, x  x  x there would be no
juridical difference between the taking of the business of a
person or the services provided by him for gain, vis-à-vis, the
taking of goods, wares or merchandise, or equipment
comprising his business. If it was its intention to include
“business” as personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Philippine Legislature should have
spoken in language that is clear and definite: that business is
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.
x x x x
The petitioner is not charged, under the Amended
Information, for theft of telecommunication or telephone
services offered by PLDT. Even if he is, the term “personal
property” under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code cannot
be interpreted beyond its seams so as to include
“telecommunication or telephone services” or computer
services for that matter. xxx. Even at common law, neither
time nor services may be taken and occupied or appropriated.
A service is generally not considered property and a theft of
service would not, therefore, constitute theft since there can
be no caption or asportation. Neither is the unauthorized use
of the equipment and facilities of PLDT by [Laurel] theft
under [Article 308].
 If it was the intent of the Philippine Legislature, in 1930,
to include services to be the subject of theft, it should have
incorporated the same in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Legislature did not. In fact, the Revised Penal
Code does not even contain a definition of services.[37]

_______________
[37] Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, supra note 31, at pp. 434-441;
p. 275; citations omitted, underscore ours.

73

PLDT[38] moved for reconsideration and referral of the

case to the Court En Banc. The Court’s First Division
granted the referral.
On January 13, 2009 (or while the present petition
was pending in court), the Court En Banc unanimously
granted PLDT’s motion for reconsideration.[39] The
Court ruled that even prior to the passage of the RPC,
jurisprudence is settled that “any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable
of appropriation can be the object of theft.”[40] This
jurisprudence, in turn, applied the prevailing legal
meaning of the term “personal property” under the old
Civil Code as “anything susceptible of appropriation
and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real
property).”[41] PLDT’s telephone service or its business
of providing this was appropriable personal property
and was, in fact, the subject of appropriation in an ISR
operation, facilitated by means of the unlawful use of
PLDT’s facilities.
 

In this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the

offense by making it appear that what [Laurel] took were the
international long distance telephone calls, rather than respondent
PLDT’s business.
              x x x x
Indeed, while it may be conceded that “international long distance
calls,” the matter alleged to be stolen xxx, take the form of electrical
energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls
were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could
not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely

_______________
[38] Rollo, pp. 640-717. Joined by the Office of the Solicitor General.
[39] In its Urgent Manifestation and Motion with Leave of Court, PLDT called the
Court’s attention of this recent ruling; id., at pp. 872-875.
[40] Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009, 576 SCRA 41, 50-51.
[41] Id., at p. 51, citing Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain.

74

encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using

its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not
being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly
claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is
the use of these communications facilities without the consent of
PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the

telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of
“subtraction” penalized under said article.[42]

The Court En Banc’s reversal of its Laurel Division

ruling during the pendency of this petition
significantly impacts on how the Court should resolve
the present case for two reasons:
First, the Laurel En Banc ruling categorically
equated an ISR activity to theft under the RPC. In so
doing, whatever alleged factual variance there may be
between Laurel and the present case cannot render
Laurel inapplicable.
 Second, and more importantly, in a Rule 45 petition,
the Court basically determines whether the CA was
legally correct in determining whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion. Under this
premise, the CA ordinarily gauges the grave abuse of
discretion at the time the RTC rendered its assailed
resolution. In quashing SW A-1 and SW A-2, note that
the CA relied on the Laurel Division ruling at the time
when it was still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration. The CA, in fact, did not expressly
impute grave abuse of discretion on the RTC when the
RTC issued the search warrants and later refused to
quash these. Understandably, the CA could not have
really found the presence of grave abuse of

______________
[42] Id., at pp. 55-57; underscores ours.

 
75

discretion for there was no Laurel ruling to speak of at

the time the RTC issued the search warrants.
These peculiar facts require us to more carefully
analyze our prism of review under Rule 45.
 
Requisites for the issuance of
search warrant; probable cause
requires the probable existence
of an offense

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The purposes of the constitutional provision against

unlawful searches and seizures are to: (i) prevent the
officers of the law from violating private security in
person and property and illegally invading the sanctity
of the home; and (ii) give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted or committed.[43]
The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a
search warrant is reiterated under Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
These sections lay down

_______________
[43] Silva v. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,
G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 140, 144.

 
76

the following requirements for the issuance of a search

warrant: (1) the existence of probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.[44]
Should any of these requisites be absent, the party
aggrieved by the issuance and enforcement of the
search warrant may file a motion to quash the search
warrant with the issuing court or with the court where
the action is subsequently instituted.[45]
A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal
and judicial process akin to a writ of discovery. It is
designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has
already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof.
Since it is at most incidental to the main criminal case,
an order granting or denying a motion to quash a
search warrant may be questioned only via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.[46]
When confronted with this petition, the higher court
must necessarily determine the validity of the lower
court’s action from the prism of whether it was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of
discretion, jurisprudence refers to the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or to the exercise of power in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility or in a manner so patent and gross as to
amount to an invasion of positive duty or to the virtual
refusal to per-

_______________
[44]  Abuan v. People, G.R. No. 168773, October 27, 2006, 505
SCRA 799, 822.
[45] Rules of Court, Rule 126, Section 14.
[46] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 670; 427 SCRA 658
(2004).

 
77

form the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation

of the law.[47]
In a certiorari proceeding, the determination
translates to an inquiry on whether the requirements
and limitations provided under the Constitution and
the Rules of Court were properly complied with, from
the issuance of the warrant up to its implementation.
In view of the constitutional objective of preventing
stealthy encroachment upon or the gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution,
strict compliance with the constitutional and
procedural requirements is required. A judge who
issues a search warrant without complying with these
requirements commits grave abuse of discretion.[48]
One of the constitutional requirements for the
validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued
based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must
be in connection with one specific offense. In search
warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.[49]
In the determination of probable cause, the court
must necessarily determine whether an offense exists
to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant[50] because the personal properties that may
be subject of the search warrant are

_______________
[47] Dra. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 304, 307-308;
303 SCRA 679, 682 (1999).
[48] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 46, at p. 686; p. 670;
and Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, supra note 34, at p. 906; p. 49.
[49] Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012, 664
SCRA 430, 438-439.
[50] Solid Triangle Sales Corp. v. Sheriff, RTC, Q.C., Br. 93, 422
Phil. 72; 370 SCRA 491 (2001); and  Manly Sportwear Mfg., Inc. v.
Dadodette Enterprises, and/or Hermes Sports Center, 507 Phil. 375;
470 SCRA 384 (2005).

78

very much intertwined with the “one specific offense”

requirement of probable cause.[51] Contrary to PLDT’s
claim, the only way to determine whether a warrant
should issue in connection with one specific offense is
to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by
the applicant with the elements of the offense that are
alleged to support the search warrant.
 
Reviewing the RTC’s denial of the
motion to quash SW A-1 and SW A-2
a.     From the prism of Rule 65
The facts of the present case easily call to mind the
case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA[52] involving
copyright infringement. In that case, the CA likewise
voided the search warrant issued by the trial court by
applying a doctrine that added a new requirement (i.e.,
the production of the master tape for comparison with
the allegedly pirate copies) in determining the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of search
warrant in copyright infringement cases. The doctrine
referred to was laid down in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 20th Century Fox,
however, was promulgated more than eight months
after the search warrants were issued by the RTC. In
reversing the CA, the Court ruled:

Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of

stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our
considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be
retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal
of Search Warrant No. 87-053. [The] petitioners’ consistent
position that the order of the lower

_______________
[51] Under Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the personal properties that may be subject of seizure under a
search warrant are the subject, the fruits and/or the means of committing
the offense.
[52] 329 Phil. 875; 261 SCRA 144 (1996).

79
court[,] xxx [which denied the respondents’] motion to lift the
order of search warrant[,] was properly issued, [because
there was] satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing
standards under the law for determination of probable cause,
is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have
expected more evidence from petitioners in their application
for a search warrant other than what the law and
jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required
with respect to the finding of probable cause.[53]

Columbia could easily be cited in favor of PLDT to

sustain the RTC’s refusal to quash the search warrant.
Indeed, in quashing SW A-1 and SW A-2, the CA never
intimated that the RTC disregarded any of the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant as these
requirements were interpreted and observed under the
then prevailing jurisprudence. The CA could not
have done so because precisely the issue of whether
telephone services or the business of providing these
services could be the subject of theft under the RPC
had not yet reached the Court when the search
warrants were applied for and issued.
However, what distinguishes Columbia from the
present case is the focus of Columbia’s legal rationale.
Columbia’s focus was not on whether the facts and
circumstances would reasonably lead to the conclusion
that an offense has been or is being committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense
were in the place to be searched — the primary points
of focus of the present case. Columbia’s focus was on
whether the evidence presented at the time the
search warrant was applied for was sufficient to
establish the facts and circumstances required for
establishing probable cause to issue a search warrant.
Nonetheless, Columbia serves as a neat guide for
the CA to decide the respondents’ certiorari petition. In
Columbia, the

_______________
[53] Id., at p. 905; pp. 165-166; italics supplied.
 80

Court applied the principle of non-retroactivity of its

ruling in 20th Century Fox, whose finality was not an
issue, in reversing a CA ruling. The Court’s attitude in
that case should have been adopted by the CA in the
present case a fortiori since the ruling that the CA
relied upon was not yet final at the time the CA
resolved to quash the search warrants.

b.        Supervening events

justifying a broader review
under Rule 65

Ordinarily, the CA’s determination under Rule 65 is

limited to whether the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in granting or denying the motion to quash
based on facts then existing. Nonetheless, the Court
recognizes that supervening facts may transpire after
the issuance and implementation of the search
warrant that may provide justification for the quashal
of the search warrant via a petition for certiorari.
For one, if the offense for which the warrant is
issued is subsequently decriminalized during the
pendency of the petition for certiorari, then the
warrant may be quashed.[54] For another, a
subsequent ruling from the Court that a similar set of
facts and circumstances does not constitute an offense,
as alleged in the search warrant application, may be
used as a ground to quash a warrant.[55] In both
instances, the underlying reason for quashing the
search warrant is the absence of probable cause which
can only possibly exist when the combination of facts
and circumstances points to the possible commission of
an offense that may be evidenced by the personal
properties sought to be seized. To the CA, the second
instance mentioned justified the quashal of the search
warrants.
We would have readily agreed with the CA if the
Laurel Division ruling had not been subsequently
reversed. As things turned out, however, the Court
granted PLDT’s motion for

_______________

[54] See  Savage v. Judge Taypin, 387 Phil. 718, 728; 331 SCRA
697, 699 (2000). 
[55] CIVIL CODE, Article 8.

81

reconsideration of the Court First Division’s ruling in

Laurel and ruled that “the act of engaging in ISR is
x  x  x penalized under x  x  x article [308 of the
RPC].”[56] As the RTC itself found, PLDT successfully
established in its application for a search warrant a
probable cause for theft by evidence that Laurel’s ISR
activities deprived PLDT of its telephone services and
of its business of providing these services without its
consent.
 
b1.   the stare decisis aspect
With the Court En Banc’s reversal of the earlier
Laurel ruling, then the CA’s quashal of these warrants
would have no leg to stand on. This is the dire
consequence of failing to appreciate the full import of
the doctrine of stare decisis that the CA ignored.
Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of
this Court form part of the country’s legal system.
While these decisions are not laws pursuant to the
doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the
laws’ meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have
the same binding force as the laws themselves.[57]
Hence, the Court’s interpretation of a statute forms
part of the law as of the date it was originally passed
because the Court’s construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted law carries into effect.[58]
Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle established
matters) that enjoins adherence to judicial precedents
embodied in the decision of the Supreme

_______________
[56] Laurel v. Abrogar, supra note 40, at p. 57.
[57]  People v. Jabinal, 154 Phil. 565, 571; 55 SCRA 607, 612
(1974), cited in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, supra note 52, at pp.
906-908; p. 166.
[58] Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, Volume I, Arturo M. Tolentino, p. 37.

82

Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be

followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
The doctrine of stare decisis, in turn, is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.[59] The doctrine of
(horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded on
the necessity of securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions.[60]
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet
acquire the status of a “decided” case that is “deemed
settled and closed to further argument” if the Court’s
decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party.
Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
decision within 15 days from notice.[61] Since the
doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of
securing certainty and stability in law, then these
attributes will spring only once the Court’s ruling has
lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In Ting v.
Velez-Ting,[62] we ruled that:
 The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.

_______________
[59] Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010, 619 SCRA
585, 594-595.
[60] Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine
Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 159422, March 28,
2008, 550 SCRA 180, 197-198.
[61] RULES OF COURT, Rule 52, Section 1, in relation to Rule 56,
Section 1.
[62] G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 704;
citation omitted, italics supplied, emphasis ours.

 
83

In applying Laurel despite PLDT’s statement that

the case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration,[63] the CA legally erred in refusing to
reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a non-final
ruling of the Court. While the CA’s dutiful desire to
apply the latest pronouncement of the Court in Laurel
is expected, it should have acted with caution, instead
of excitement, on being informed by PLDT of its
pending motion for reconsideration; it should have
then followed the principle of stare decisis. The
appellate court’s application of an exceptional
circumstance when it may order the quashal of the
search warrant on grounds not existing at the time the
warrant was issued or implemented must still rest on
prudential grounds if only to maintain the limitation of
the scope of the remedy of certiorari as a writ to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment.
 Still, the respondents attempt to justify the CA’s
action by arguing that the CA would still rule in the
way it did[64] even without Laurel. As PLDT correctly
pointed out, there is simply nothing in the CA’s
decision that would support its quashal of the search
warrant independently of Laurel. We must bear in
mind that the CA’s quashal of SW A-1 and SW A-2
operated under the strictures of a certiorari petition,
where the presence of grave abuse of discretion is
necessary for the corrective writ to issue since the
appellate court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction in
this case. We simply cannot second-guess what the
CA’s action could have been.
Lastly, the CA’s reliance on Savage v. Judge
Taypin[65] can neither sustain the quashal of SW A-1
and SW A-2. In Savage, the Court granted the
certiorari petition and quashed the search warrant
because the alleged crime (unfair competition involving
design patents) that supported the search warrant had
already been repealed, and the act complained of, if at
all,

_______________
[63] See PLDT’s motion for reconsideration before the CA;  Rollo,
p. 616.
[64] Memorandum of Respondents; id., at p. 865.
[65] Supra note 54.

 
84

gave rise only to civil liability (for patent

infringement). Having been decriminalized, probable
cause for the crime alleged could not possibly exist.
In the present case, the issue is whether the
commission of an ISR activity, in the manner that
PLDT’s evidence shows, sufficiently establishes
probable cause for the issuance of search warrants
for the crime of theft. Unlike in Savage, the Court in
Laurel was not confronted with the issue of
decriminalization (which is a legislative prerogative)
but whether the commission of an ISR activity meets
the elements of the offense of theft for purposes of
quashing an information. Since the Court, in Laurel,
ultimately ruled then an ISR activity justifies the
elements of theft that must necessarily be alleged in
the information a fortiori, the RTC’s determination
should be sustained on certiorari.
 
The requirement of particularity
in SW B-1 and SW B-2
On the issue of particularity in SW B-1 and SW B-2,
we note that the respondents have not appealed to us
the CA ruling that sustained paragraphs 1 to 6 of the
search warrants. Hence, we shall limit our discussion
to the question of whether the CA correctly ruled that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion insofar as it
refused to quash paragraphs 7 to 9 of SW B-1 and
SWB-2.
Aside from the requirement of probable cause, the
Constitution also requires that the search warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. This requirement of
particularity in the description, especially of the things
to be seized, is meant to enable the law enforcers to
readily identify the properties to be seized and, thus,
prevent the seizure of the wrong items. It seeks to
leave the law enforcers with no discretion at all
regarding these articles and to give life to the
constitutional provision against
85

unreasonable searches and seizures.[66] In other

words, the requisite sufficient particularity is aimed at
preventing the law enforcer from exercising unlimited
discretion as to what things are to be taken under the
warrant and ensure that only those connected with the
offense for which the warrant was issued shall be
seized.[67]
The requirement of specificity, however, does not
require technical accuracy in the description of the
property to be seized. Specificity is satisfied if the
personal properties’ description is as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be so
described. The nature of the description should vary
according to whether the identity of the property or its
character is a matter of concern.[68] One of the tests to
determine the particularity in the description of objects
to be seized under a search warrant is when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.[69]
Additionally, the Rules require that a search
warrant should be issued “in connection with one
specific offense” to prevent the issuance of a scatter-
shot warrant.[70] The one-specific-offense requirement
reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant should issue only on the basis of probable
cause.[71] Since the primary objective of applying for a
search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a

_______________
[66] Hon Ne Chan v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 565 Phil. 545, 557;
541 SCRA 249, 261-262 (2007).
[67] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 46, at pp. 686-687;
p. 671.
[68] Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550, 568-571; 438
SCRA 224, 240-241 (2004).
[69] Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, No. L-32409, February 27,
1971, 37 SCRA 823, 835, cited in Al-Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, 416
Phil. 759, 771; 364 SCRA 363, 372-373 (2001).
[70] Tambasen v. People, 316 Phil. 237, 243-244; 246 SCRA 184,
190 (1995).
[71] See Stonehill v. Diokno, No. L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA
383, 391-392.

 
 86

subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the

search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a
particular warrant must satisfy himself that the
evidence presented by the applicant establishes the
facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense
for which the warrant is sought and issued.[72]
Accordingly, in a subsequent challenge against the
validity of the warrant, the applicant cannot be
allowed to maintain its validity based on facts and
circumstances that may be related to other search
warrants but are extrinsic to the warrant in question.
Under the Rules, the following personal property
may be subject of search warrant: (i) the subject of the
offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. In the present case, we sustain the CA’s ruling
nullifying paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW B-1 and SW B-2
for failing the test of particularity. More specifically,
these provisions do not show how the enumerated
items could have possibly been connected with the
crime for which the warrant was issued, i.e., P.D. No.
401. For clarity, PD No. 401 punishes:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water,

electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without
previous authority from x  x  x the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, x x x, tampers and/or uses
tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other
devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen;
steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water,
electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or
conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water,
electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water,
electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and
conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision
correccional in its minimum period or
_______________

[72] See Tambasen v. People, supra note 70.

87

a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or

both.[73]

Paragraphs 7 to 8 of SW B-1 and SW B-2 read as

follows:

7. COMPUTER PRINTERS AND SCANNERS or any

similar equipment or device used for copying and/or printing
data and/or information;
8. SOFTWARE, DISKETTES, TAPES or any similar
equipment or device used for recording or storing
information; and
9. Manuals, phone cards, access codes, billing
statements, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or subscription
agreements or contracts, communications and documents
relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment[.][74]

 
 
According to PLDT, the items in paragraph 7 have a
direct relation to violation of PD No. 401 because the
items are connected to computers that, in turn, are
linked to the unauthorized connections to PLDT
telephone lines. With regard to the software, diskette
and tapes in paragraph 8, and the items in paragraph
9, PLDT argues that these items are “fruits of the
offense” and that the information it contains
“constitutes the business profit” of PLDT. According to
PLDT, it corroborates the fact that the respondents
have made a business out of their illegal connections to
its telephone lines.
We disagree with PLDT. The fact that the printers
and scanners are or may be connected to the other
illegal connections to the PLDT telephone lines does
not make them the subject of the offense or fruits of
the offense, much less could they become a means of
committing an offense.
It is clear from PLDT’s submission that it confuses
the crime for which SW B-1 and SW B-2 were issued
with the

_______________
[73] Emphases and underscores ours.
[74] Supra note 21.

 
88

crime for which SW A-1 and SW A-2 were issued: SW

B-1 and SW B-2 were issued for violation of PD No.
401, to be enforced in two different places as identified
in the warrants. The crime for which these search
warrants were issued does not pertain to the crime of
theft — where matters of personal property and the
taking thereof with intent to gain become significant —
but to PD No. 401.
These items could not be the subject of a violation of
PD No. 401 since PLDT itself does not claim that these
items themselves comprise the unauthorized
installations. For emphasis, what PD No. 401 punishes
is the unauthorized installation of telephone
connection without the previous consent of PLDT. In
the present case, PLDT has not shown that connecting
printers, scanners, diskettes or tapes to a computer,
even if connected to a PLDT telephone line, would or
should require its prior authorization.
Neither could these items be a means of committing
a violation of PD No. 401 since these copying, printing
and storage devices in no way aided the respondents in
making the unauthorized connections. While these
items may be accessory to the computers and other
equipment linked to telephone lines, PD No. 401 does
not cover this kind of items within the scope of the
prohibition. To allow the seizure of items under the
PLDT’s interpretation would, as the CA correctly
observed, allow the seizure under the warrant of
properties for personal use of the respondents.
If PLDT seeks the seizure of these items to prove
that these installations contain the respondents’
financial gain and the corresponding business loss to
PLDT, then that purpose is served by SW A-1 and SW
A-2 since this is what PLDT essentially complained of
in charging the respondents with theft. However, the
same reasoning does not justify its seizure under a
warrant for violation of PD No. 401 since these items
are not directly connected to the PLDT telephone lines
and PLDT has not even claimed that the installation of
these items requires prior authorization from it.
89

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
89213 are hereby MODIFIED in that SW A-1 and SW
A-2 are hereby declared valid and constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and

Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition partially granted, judgment and resolution

modified.

Notes.—A search warrant proceeding is not a

criminal action, much less a civil action, but a special
criminal process. (HPS Software and Communication
Corporation vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company [PLDT], 687 SCRA 426 [2012])
A search warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is
considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by
both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution. (Id.)
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