11. Idonah Slade Perkins vs. Mamerto Roxas, et. al.

G.R. No. 47517, June 27, 1941

Facts:
Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI-Manila against Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends was being withheld by the company and
for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of shares to the exclusion of all others. The
company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s right to the disposal and control
of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by Idonah Perkins, and
by one Engelhard. Thereafter, Eugene modified his complaint and prayed that Idonah and
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any
claim they assert thereon. Idonah filed her answer with a cross-complaint in which she sets up a
judgment allegedly obtained by her against Eugene, from the Supreme Court of the State of New
York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and
control of the shares of stock in question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company. Idonah filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New
York is res judicata.

Issue: Whether or not the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

Held:
Yes. By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of
the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is
to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. Idonah Perkins
in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York and asked the court below
to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a
form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39,
Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI-Manila, to adjudicate, settle
and determine.
Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and
efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that
goes to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other,
and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal
has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong.
If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the
question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court
and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.

12. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST) vs CA and C.F. Sharp & Company Inc.
(SHARP)
G.R. No. 112573, February 9, 1995

Facts:
Northwest, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A and
Sharp, a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws, through its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell
its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by Sharp on
behalf of Northwest under the said agreement, the latter sued defendant in Japan for collection of
the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages. After the two attempts of service
were unsuccessful, director of the Tokyo District Court requested the SC of Japan to serve the
summons through diplomatic channels upon the defendant’s head office in Manila. Defendant
received the writ of summons. Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff’s complaint and rendered
judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff with damages for delay. Defendant not having
appealed the judgment upon notice, the same became final and executory. Plaintiff was unable to
execute the decision in Japan, hence, Northwest sought to enforce in the RTC-Manila judgment
rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against Sharp. Sharp contended averring that the judgment
of the Japanese Court is null and void for want of jurisdiction and the said judgment is contrary to
Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not the Japanese court acquired jurisdiction over Sharp, a Philippine Corporation

Held:
Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and
the giving of due notice therein. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, Sharp had the duty to demonstrate
the invalidity of such judgment.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case,
it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of
the extraterritorial service of process on Sharp. As to what this law is, is a question of fact, not of
law. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural
law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly,
the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must stand. Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof
regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual
presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar
with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines.
While it may be true that service could have been made upon any of the officers or agents of
SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would not preclude
service upon the proper government official. As found by the respondent court, two attempts at
service were made at Sharp’s Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. The Tokyo District Court
requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal
documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons
together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn,
forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were
delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the CFI
of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff to serve the same on Sharp at its principal office in
Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, Sharp’s
contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.

13. Emilie Elmira Renee Boudard, et.al. vs. Stewart Eddie Tait
G.R. No. L-45193, April 5, 1939

Facts:
Emilie Boudard, in her capacity as widow and as guardian of her co-appellants, her children
born during her marriage with the deceased, obtained a judgment in their favor from the civil division
of the CFI of Hanoi, French Indo-China for a sum, plus interest. The judgment was rendered against
Stewart Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before said court.
The judgment, was based on the fact that Marie Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of
Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of said Tait, although “outside of the fulfillment
of a duty”. Philippine trial court dismissed the action for enforcement of the Hanoi decision based
principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Hanoi to render the judgment in question, for the
execution of which this action was instituted in this jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was
discovered in the decision itself of the Court of Hanoi which states that the appellee was not a
resident of, nor had a known domicile in, that country. The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively
proves that neither the appellee nor his agent or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China;
and that the deceased had never, at any time, been his employee. The appellee’s first intimation of
his having been sued and sentenced to pay a huge sum by the civil division of the CFI of Hanoi was
when he was served with summons in the present case.

Issue: Whether or not the decision in Hanoi can be executed here.

Held:
No. The appellants failed to show that the proceedings against the appellee in the Court of
Hanoi were in accordance with the laws of France then in force; and as to the second point, it
appears that said documents are not of the nature mentioned in sections 304 and 305 of Act No.
190. They are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings against the appellee in the Court
of Hanoi, duly certified by the proper authorities there, whose signatures should be authenticated
by the Consul or some consular agent of the United States in said country. Moreover, the evidence
of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time mentioned in the complaint of
the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives. The rule in matters of this nature is that
judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a
party if summons is duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings. It cannot
be said that the decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should be conclusive to such an extent that
it cannot be contested, for it merely constitutes, from the viewpoint of our laws, prima facie evidence
of the justness of appellants’ claim, and, as such, naturally admits proof to the contrary.

14. Gerbert R. Corpuz vs Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner, a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization,
married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now
loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the
petitioner lacked locus standi.

Issue: Whether or not aliens have the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.

Held:
No. The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code
because the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code. The unavailability of the second
paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a
naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of
foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law. The registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.
 15. Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad vs. CA and Philippine National Construction
Corporation, G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

Facts:
High Court of Malaysia issued two separate orders directing Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), a Filipino company, to pay Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, a
Malaysian company, a sum for PNCC’s failure to complete a construction project. PNCC failed to
comply with the judgment, prompting Asiavest to institute a complaint in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of a foreign court may be enforced in the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a judgment against
a person of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

16. Leviton Industries, et.al. vs Hon. Serafin Salvador

G.R. No. L-40163, June 19, 1982

Facts:
Private respondent filed a complaint for unfair competition against petitioners Leviton
Industries before the CFI of Rizal, presided by respondent Judge Salvador alleging that the plaintiff
is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, and long
subsequent to the use of plaintiff’s trademark and trade name in the Philippines, defendants (Leviton
Industries) began manufacturing and selling electrical ballast, fuse and oval buzzer under the
trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co. Domingo Go, partner and general
manager of defendant partnership, had registered with the Philippine Patent Office the trademarks
Leviton Label and Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse, which registration was violative of
plaintiff’s right over the trademark Leviton, that defendants not only used the trademark Leviton but
likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark; and that the use thereof
by defendants of its products would cause confusion in the minds of the consumers and likely to
deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling defendants to pass off their products as
those of plaintiff’s. Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed
for damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit defendants from using the
trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark Leviton.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, drawing
attention to the plaintiff’s failure to allege therein its capacity to sue under Section 21-A of Republic
Act No. 166, as amended. After the filing of the plaintiff’s opposition and the defendant’s reply, the
respondent judge denied the motion on the ground that the same did not appear to be indubitable.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) herein respondents, failed to allege the
essential facts bearing its capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

Held:
Yes. Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had failed to allege the essential facts bearing upon its
capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, grants
to a foreign corporation, whether or not licensed to do business in the Philippines, the right to seek
redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts. But the said law is not without qualifications.
Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the registration of the trade mark of the suing
foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office or, in the least, that it be an asignee of such
registered trademark. The said section further requires that the country, of which the plaintiff foreign
corporation or juristic person is a citizen or domicilliary, grants to Filipino corporations or juristic
entities the same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty, convention or law,
Private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a
law which, as pointed out, explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the successful
prosecution thereof. It is enough that foreign corporations are allowed by law to seek redress in our
courts under certain conditions: the interpretation of the law should not go so far as to include, in
effect, an inference that those conditions had been met from the mere fact that the party sued is a
foreign corporation.

17. The United States vs. H. N. Bull

G.R. No. L-5270, January 15, 1910

Facts:
A steamship vessel was engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford commanded
by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng,
Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable
means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to have
died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it
said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say
about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue: Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship
while inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance
of Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply.
A crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship
was within the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the
ship settled from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas.