EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT Art VI Sec27, 1987 v Art VI
Sec20,1935 Consti
Bolinao Electronics Corporation vs Brigido Valencia
11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to
an Item
Facts: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-
petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and
Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own
television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of
Communications, for operating even after their permit has
expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued
operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that
any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease
operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the
appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget
of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations
for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there
are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom.
And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this
provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not
legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it
follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains
Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig
Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an
Appropriation Bill
Facts: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY
’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when
she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section
25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted
in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The
SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo
that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions”
in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate
provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon
208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic
Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former
President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the
constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these
laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed
the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should
not give preferential treatment to certain or select government
officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition
with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished
PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the
repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect,
RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted
their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional
budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the
government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which
provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges
and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by
the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of
the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the
accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act
1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to
set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional
since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items
in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part
of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion
of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the
Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this
case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general
adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained
to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
THE PRESIDENT
Singular Executive
CARMEN PLANAS v. JOSE GIL
Facts: Petitioner , a member of the municipal board of the City of
Manila, criticized the acts of certain government officials in
connection with the general election for Assemblymen held on
November 8, 1938 in one of the local dailies. The statement as
published in the issue of La Vanguardia of November 17, 1938,
included the following statements:
“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8
elections, but lost instead because of a disastrous
division due to people who commercialized their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisel
y so that the President maydevote all his time to the administratio
n of public affairs for the welfare of the people, but thePresident w
as the first to play politics. Publicly expressing his preference for
candidates of his liking; and with the President all other officials of
the government also moved, taking part in electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten t
he opposition and preventcandidates supported by the people fro
m going to the National Assembly, and with frauds and violations
of all rules of the civil service to push to victory the candidates of
the Nacionalista Party and the administration, all constructive
opposition in the country is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe
that the President is from this moment paving the way for hisreele
ction. It is to be feared that the new National Assembly will change
this wise provision of our Constitution to permit the reelection of
President Manuel L. Quezon."
The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the
petitioner received a letter, where she is informed that she needs
to appear before the Commisioner of Civil Service to prove her
statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed from
office.
At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel,
appeared at the office of the respondent and delivered to him a
letter, Annex B, in which she voiced objection to the authority of
the respondent to conduct the investigation. The respondent
Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the
investigation, but announced before adjourning the hearing of
November 22nd that he would decide the question raised as to his
jurisdiction on November 26, 1938.
It was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in
this court her original petition for prohibition of November 25,
1938, in which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent
commisioner from continuing with the investigation.
Issues:
1. WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
2. WON the president has the power to order the
investigation
3. WON the investigation is in accordance with the law
Ratio/Holding: The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner.
1. Yes.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding.
The Commissioner of Civil Service is the party respondent and the
theory is advanced by the Government that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the
President of the Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the
present proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen
Planas. The argument is farfetched.A mere plea that a subordinate
officer of the government is acting under orders from the ChiefExe
cutive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor c
onclusive upon this court.Like the dignity of his high office, the rel
ative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicialinterference is
not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate off
icials andemployees of the Executive Department to the extent tha
t at the mere invocation of the authoritythat it purports the jurisdi
ction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an execu
tiveorder is necessarily abated or suspended.
Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the ord
erly administration of justice,or to prevent the use of the strong ar
m of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or amultiplicit
y of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922]) This
court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and
will accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
controversy.
2. Yes.
It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the
order, but it is contended "that the said investigation with a view
to petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article VII, sec. 11
(1) of the Constitution of the Philippines and is not warranted by
any statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.) It,
therefore, becomes necessary to inquire into the constitutional
and legal authority of the President to order the investigation
which has given rise to the present controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show
that extensive authority over the public service is granted thePresi
dent of the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in its
section 1 with thedeclaration that "The Executive power shall be v
ested in a President of the Philippines." Allexecutive authority is th
us vested in him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VIII, sec. 11, sub
sec. 1, last clause.) In thefulfillment of this duty which he cannot ev
ade, he is granted specific and express powers andfunctions. (Art.
VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express powers and f
unctions, hemay also exercise those necessarily implied and includ
ed in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926]) The National
Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly or impliedly
diminish the authority conferred upon the President of the
Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes
[1921]) The Constitutionprovides that the President "shall have co
ntrol of all the executive departments, bureaus, andoffices" (Art. VI
I, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general supervision o
ver all localgovernments as may be provided by law" (Ibid, second
clause). This power of control andsupervision is an important cons
titutional grant. The President in the exercise of the executivepow
er under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executi
ve departments.
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the
President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this
proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the
executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercisegener
al supervision over all local governments and to take care that the
laws be faithfullyexecuted must be construed to authorize him to o
rder an investigation of the act or conduct, ofthe petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is c
ertainlynot without limitation, but it at least implies authority to in
quire into facts and conditions in orderto render the power real an
d effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and
not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of
actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation.
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief
Executive by our Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield to
the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is
endowed with broad and extraordinary powers by our
Constitution, and who is expected to govern with a firm and steady
hand without vexatious or embarrassing interference and much
less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power to order
the investigation of the petitioner in this case. We should avoid
that result.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the
grant of the supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard
was in the nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of
views in that body, mainly between the historical view which
recognizes the right of local self-government (People ex rel. Le Roy
vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and the legal theory which sanctions the
possession by the state of absolute control over local governments
(Booten vs. Pinson,
[1915]). The result was the recognition ofthe power of supervision
and all its implications and the rejection of what otherwise would
be animperium in, imperio to the detriment of a strong national go
vernment.
Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows:
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-
General (President) shall have such specific powers and duties as
are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in
particular, the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*******
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any
person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of
the Constitution, still subsists. It is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and has not been abrogated or repealed by the
National Assembly. (See sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)
3. Yes.
The interest of the public service requires that these charges be
investigated, so that, if found to be true, appropriate action may be
taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty of illegal acts,
and if found untrue and made without justifiable motives, the
party making them may be proceeded against in accordance with
section 2440, in connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised
Administrative Code." Assuming that this is not one of the grounds
provided by law for which the petitioner may be investigated
administratively (sec. 2078, Rev. Adm. Code), there is weight in the
argument that the investigation would still be in order
if for no other purpose than to cause a full and honest disclosure of
all the facts sothat, if found proper and justified, appropriate actio
n may be taken against the parties alleged tohave been guilty of th
e illegal acts charged. The enforcement of the law and the
maintenance of peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should "takecare tha
t the laws be faithfully executed" is more an imposition of an oblig
ation than aconferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithful
ly and conscientiously fulfill" his duties asPresident, "preserve and
defend" the Constitution and "execute" the law. This duty of theEx
ecutive to see that the laws be faithfully executed is not limited to t
he enforcement oflegislative acts or the express terms of the Const
itution but also includes the due enforcement ofrights, duties, obli
gations, prerogatives and immunities growing out of the Constituti
on itself andof the protection implied by the nature of the governm
ent under the Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle)
We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and protecti
ng the constitutional guarantyof freedom of speech and of the pres
s, no less than the right of assembly and petition which,according t
o Stimson (The American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights
, 152), is its originrather than its derivation. In the present case, ho
wever, the petitioner is not denied the right, nor is shebeing invest
igated because she had exercised that right. She has a perfect right
to criticize theGovernment, its administration, its policies and offic
ials, but she may not, on the plea of freedom ofspeech and of the pr
ess, impute violations of law and the commission of frauds and the
reafter fold herarms and decline to face an investigation conducte
d to elicit the truth or falsity of the charges formulatedby her. Othe
rwise, the guarantee which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "
at once the instrument,and the guarantee, and the bright consumm
ate flower of all liberty" would degenerate into an unbridledlicens
e, and render the Government powerless to act.
Carmen Planas vs Jose Gil
67 Phil. 62 – Political Law – Separation of Powers – Rule of Non-
Interference
Facts: In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board
member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of
certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a
newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from
Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president
directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of
the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is
accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless
such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and
not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to
which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her
statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen
and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions
and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice
in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of
the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil,
however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing
that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution,
the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief
Executive which are of purely administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders
issued by the President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits
of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct
nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-
interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the
validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political
philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more
truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding.
He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way.
The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the
Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is
directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has
no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas.
The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer
of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive
may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor
conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the
relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference
is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate
official and employees of the executive Department to the extent
that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the
jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of
an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the
case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but
since she made allegations against the administration it is but
right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to
elicit the truth.