JURIS RENIER C.

MENDOZA
SUCCESSION MON(6:30-9:00PM) TUE(7:30-9:00PM)

CARMEN LINART Y PAVÍA, plaintiff and appellee, vs. MARÍA JUANA UGARTE É
ITURRALDE, defendant and appellant.
G.R. No. 2599. October 27, 1905

Principle: The intestate left as heirs T., the daughter of a sister of the deceased, and C.; a
granddaughter of another sister of the deceased: Held, That C. was entitled to no part of the inheritance.
The word children in intestate estates can not include "grandchildren."

Facts:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzales died intestate on December 28, 1900. Maria Ugante e Iturralde asked the
court that she’d be declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the
estate in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, Carmen Linart, the petitioner, presented
herself as the collateral descendant (the legitimate niece of the deceased). The petition of Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and
she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to
be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia,
claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the
same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased
— a fact which this new relative did notdeny — be required to render an account of the property of the
estate.

It is the contention of the petitioner that what she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the
line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the
estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation — that is to say, that even
though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde.

The trial court held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was
entitled to.

Issue:
Whether or not herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo Linart and is entitled to half of
the estate of the deceased.

Ruling:
NO.
the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown.
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was
entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place
in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a
daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a
sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo
Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of
the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the word "children" in this
connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant
such a conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31, 1895, relied upon,
are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to
intestate successions. In both cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to
the operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing,
that the property should pass to their children, it was held that "Grandchildren" were necessarily
included in the word "children," and that in such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking,
inherit by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed the child in the natural and
regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first
decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint that the
action was based upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which
he had under the terms of the will." The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession,
we must take into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the
children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the
term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should
only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the
collateral line do not obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with
a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is
excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of
the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had
survived his deceased uncle.

The court ordered the record be remanded to the court of First Instance from whence it came for
execution of the said judgment.
 Benita Salao vs Juan Salao
G.R. No. L-26699. March 16, 1976

Principle: In the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. The nephew excludes a grandniece or great-
grandnephews.

Facts:
Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, their three children and 1 grandson partitioned her
property. (pls. see table below) Prior to Valentina’s death, her children Ambrosia and Juan Sr. secured a
Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-
hectare fishpond located at SitioCalunuran and they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion
of their nephew, Valentin Salao. Later, Ambrosia and Juan Sr., acquired that Pinanganacan or Lewa
fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre which adjoins the Calunuran
fishpond. Said Calunaran and Lewa fish ponds are the bone of contention in this case.

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's
death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died),
she donated her one-halfproindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S.
Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the
other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed
of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the
usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of VictorinaSalao in a letter dated January 26, 1951
informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when
Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third
share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not
have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of
Ambrosia's one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on
January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on
January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the
reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the
145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by
his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims,
he asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less
than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting
of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his
widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were
adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain
under administration during the pendency of this case.

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia
Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-
ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heir after her death in 1914;
that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her
estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have successional rights over Ambrosia’s
share.

Ruling:
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to
Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within
the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal
heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not
represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation
takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is
(Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like
the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
 LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998

Principle: With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into
the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no
personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.

Facts:
Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde (wife of
herein petitioner LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon; and
Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June 30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters were killed. In an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita, Rafael and Salud, together with
petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellita’s estate.

Subsequently, when Rafael died in 1992, an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by one of the
heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among other things, averred that petitioner should be
impleaded as one of Rafael’s children “by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate
daughter Estrellita.” Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner filed a Manifestation
contending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest
to participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramon’s motion. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’s
estate is proper.

Ruling:
No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is exclusive, which negates
the rulings of the RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included in the proceeding as a compulsory heir for
he is only a son-in-law of decedent Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of
decedent is considered a third person or stranger. Petitioner may not be dragged into the proceeding
herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the
said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.
 LANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO
SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN,
G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987

Principle: Illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.

Facts:
Thee respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in
Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona PamutiVda.
deSantero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in
her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
PamutiVda. De Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that FelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of Simona PamutiVda. de Santero who together

with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born FelisaPamuti
and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona PamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of
PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of
his parents PascualSantero and Simona PamutiVda. deSantero; 5) that PascualSantero died in 1970;
Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared
FelisaPamutiJardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona PamutiVda. DeSantero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo
Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of
PascualSantero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person,
Simona PamutiVda. deSantero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona PamutiVda.
deSantero.

Issue:
Whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Ruling:
Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, who
is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil
Code which reads as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona PamutiVda. deSantero as the word "relative"
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona PamutiVda.
deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir
to the intestate estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and
ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

Principle: When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of
the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil
Code.

Facts:
The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present controversy is confined solely
to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece
1. of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child
who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

RULING:
No The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother."
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles,
however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised
where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an
illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however,
if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because
the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason
of the barrier imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case at bar, the only parties
who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti
Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit
any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. According to
Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and
intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law
intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when
used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken
of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.
 SANTILLON VS MIRANDA
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his
marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land
1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration. His mother, Perfecta
and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels which Perfecta
claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her undivided share in most of the properties to spouses Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouse’s estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to “declare shares of heirs” and resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro insisted that after
deducting Perfecta’s ½ share from the conjugal property, the remaining property shall be divided as: ¼
for Perfecta and ¾ for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to another ½ of the
remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse Perfecta is entitled
to ½ of Pedro’s estate and the remaining ½ is given to Claro

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the
spouse and one legitimate child?

RULING:
Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.
Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art 996 comes under the
chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on
Art 892 to support his claim to ¾ of his father’s share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the
surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may
indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when
they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled
to when intestacy occurs. As such, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art
996.
In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, ½ of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the
surviving spouse. Although the law refers to “children or descendants,” the rule in statutory
construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in this case.
The theory of commentator’s sharing Claro’s position are premised on the following arguments:
a.Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not apply when there is only one “child” and as such
Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial construction and analogy
b.Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only ¼ while in testacy, she would
get ½ shares
It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. As such, “children” in
Art 996 also refers to a “child.”
The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance whereas Art 834 Spanish
Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing two contingencies: (a)
where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b) where the widow or widower
survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for the second situation, it can be
deemed that the legislator’s intent was to promulgate only one general rule applicable to both
situations.
 SUAREZ V CA
G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992

FACTS:
• Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of
several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission
of contract and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate
principal amount of about P70,000 as damages.
• The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and
executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were
levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder
for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was
subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
• On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory
action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil
Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied
pieces of property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against
their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are
co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by
petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father?

RULING:
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the
case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of
the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of
the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse
to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but
through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any
way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interests.