Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 237428

represented by SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA,
Petitioner, Present:
SERENO, CJ.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
- versus - LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,
MARTIRES,
TIJAM,
REYES, JR., and
GESMUNDO, JJ.

Promulgated:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Respondent.

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DECISION

20152734309.:

This is a petition for quo warranto against the incumbent Chief

Justice, for her failure to regularly file her assets, liabilities and net worth
thereby being construed to have been ineligible to occupy the highest seat in
the Judiciary.

The Facts
On August 2012, herein respondent, Maria Lourdes Sereno (Sereno)
was appointed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Prior thereto, she served as member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006, and was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations,
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights.

During her employment with UP, the Human Resources Development

Office of UP (UP HRDO) only had nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALN) in the records of Sereno out of her 20 years of
employment. Further, in her manifestation a 10th SALN was attached she
supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets of UP”. The Ombudsman
likewise categorically stated that: “ based on records on file, there is no
SALN filed by Sereno for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending
December 1998.”

On 2012, when the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announced the opening for application and
recommendation of the position of Chief Justice, and directed the applicants
to submit pertinent documents which include: “all SALNs up to December
21, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31,
2011” for those from the private sector. Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC
that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private
practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only
submitted three (3) SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice.
Further, she contended, that, considering that most of her government
records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files.” However, despite the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to
have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed
Chief Justice.

The constitution mandates in Section 1 , Article XI of the Constitution

that by all public officers and employees upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law; and Republic Act No. (RA)
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, likewise requires the
filing of the SALN by every government employee not only upon
assumption of office and every year thereafter, but also upon the expiration
of his term of office or upon his resignation or separation from office. The
importance of filing a SALN for all public officials and employees is
furthermore emphasized in RA 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the latest law on the matter
and which has a more detailed provision of the SALN requirement.

As such, being an indispensable requirement which Sereno failed to

satisfy, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), invoking the Court’s
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in
relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic through the
OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because

what is being sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while the
impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera.
OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be
removed through modes other than impeachment.
 Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted
through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, and
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive
category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and
not otherwise. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of
Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial,
i.e., removal from office.

Moreover, OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-

year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s
transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings.
Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo
warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time
runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. The State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those who
partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-
year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not
published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the
disqualification.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours
with the present case because the President and the Vice President may, in
fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section
4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be
the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President
and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other impeachable
officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no
mention that quo warranto may be allowed.
 Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M.
No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and
corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending
that this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved
through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC
rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed
before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower
court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in
rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution
which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all
courts and the personnel thereof.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that
Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an
indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section
7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her
integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a
legal obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate;
therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be
considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the
concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11,

Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one
(1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she
failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the
presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to
overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that
she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her
integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and
the President.
The Issues
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the
instant petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable
officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed
with the House of Representatives;
2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of
prescription;
3. Whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination
and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

RULING

Annent the 1st issue: subjecting an impeachable officer to quo

warranto as a method to oust the same is not proper.

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land shall be adhered.

One of its provisions expressly mandates the method of ousting the members
of the judiciary and such is only through impeachment as laid down in
Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution provides that, "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment." Likewise, Section 3(6) of the same Article provides that,
"The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide cases of
impeachment." This is to specifically protect the integrity of the judiciary as
a constitutional body. The judiciary as a constitutional body shall be clothed
with protection especially in maintaining its character and reputation. Thus,
only impeachment is the only method allowed.

Relative thereto, this court is in the negative as to subjecting the Chief

Justice in a quo warranto proceeding whereby lower courts have jurisdiction
over. Subjecting an officers seated in the highest post – as those impeachable
officers, will give the judges of the lower courts the confidence and power to
easily oust such officers and would eventually deprive the congress and the
president – which the constitution granted power to hear and determine to
remove officers – such power and thereby would defeat the purpose of the
law creating such protection and standard.

Hence, the hearing and determination of such writ against the Chief
Justice will be a grave violation of the constitution and an apparent insult to
the judiciary.

Annent the 2nd issue: the contention of the OSG raising the principle
that prescription does not run against the state, applies to was limited to
actions of reversion to the public domain of lands which were
fraudulently granted to private individuals and not in all actions
instituted by the State, as the majority has mistakenly concluded.

The subject matter of Article 1108(4) of the Civil Code focuses only
to whom Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, as regards the
acquisition or ownership of real rights, and not prescription in general. Thus,
the OSG displaced in the application of such principle as it cannot and
should not be raised in the case at bar.

Moreover, Section 2 of Act No. 332620 which specifically provides

when prescription shall begin to run for offenses penalized by special laws,
provides that, “Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at that
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.” Thus, in the foregoing facts, the
controversy should have been raised by the time Sereno was still in the
course of applying for the post. JBC which is an instrument of the
government as to determining the qualifications of applicants for a post in
the judiciary have right there and then knew about the controversy with
regard the incomplete SALNs of Sereno, thereby constituting her lack of
integrity and as such, a sufficient disqualification of her appointment. The
vigilance as to defining the moral conduct of government officials shall not
be reposed upon the OSG only (as petitioner) but must be observed in every
office, department, agency or instrumentality of the government. Thus, the
discovery of the JBC of Sereno’s incomplete SALN should be the reckoning
point of the prescription, and not on the time the impeachment case was
filed.

Annent the 4th issue: the failure of the Chief Justice to submit SALN to
the JBC is a sufficient ground for her denial to the post.

Filing of SALN as a constitutional mandate is worthy of being

complied upon especially in the application of a Chief Justice where one is
expected to religiously follow rules and regulations reposed in every person.
As such, one should prove moral ascendancy through obedience of what the
basic constitutional provisions require.

Considering the foregoing facts, the repeated failure of the Chief

Justice to submit her SALNs evidently and apparently shows that she is not
circumspect as to the adherence of the standard of integrity and confidence
to the post granted to her. Thus, as Justice Leonen posits, such act is a
culpable violation of the constitution. From thereon, she shall not be validly
nominated to the post.