In sum, Webor sacs the growth of bur@aucracies as associated with

intoroots, even though in contingent terms. Moreover, t u him

bureaucratization as a general phenomenon is an unavoidable structural

tendency of capitalism, simultaneously manifested through the consolida-
tion of large production units and through the expansion of the state

specialized apparatuses. Thus, although public bureaucracy is a neutral

professional organization, it has been historically associated with cer-

tain clusters of interests from civil society.
In Uarx*s work this relationship becames a necessary one in all

levels--either at the more general level, in which the expansion of

bureaucracies appears as a result of the processes of capital accumulation

and division of labour, or at the more specific one, in which there is a

general association of interests between the state bureaucracy and the

capitalist class. In short, the state is always a clasa state. This

. much we have already seen. Let us now see the immediate determinants of
bureaucratization in Marx's theory.
The emergence of large corporations is directly associated with

the movement of capital itself. Likewise, the increasing complexity of

tasks and the technical refinement required bL this movement suppose the
simultaneous growth of the state machinery, for the state expresses,
though contradictorily and in a relatively autonomous way, the trans-

formatio~.r,and the structural processes taking place in civil society.

Thus, to Mam the advancement of accumulation calls for new forms and

_ means for the organization of labor and the diffusion of technical instru-

Jnents of management and production. His discussion of capital centraliza-

tion and concentration is quite clear orr this matter: .
 14

through political transactions. Anyhow, as the etata is horo conceived

both a permanent apparatus and a social rolation of domination, it
could hardly be viewed as sanething entirely separated from society, as

an entity above and beyond civil society. The point is that from the
above comparison between Marx and Weber theories one could say that

capitalist developmcni recreates, on a higher level of complexity, the

connections between the public and private realms through the political
association between social interests and state actions. There is a

dialectical movement that leads simultaneously to the separation between

state and society, the public and private spheres, on the one hand, and

to the interprenetration between public and private interests on the

other. In other words, the separation betweon the worlds of public and

private affairs is modified by the movement that reconciles the workings

of the state apparatuses with the interests of dominant groups in society.

The state a8 both an apparatus and a relation of domination creates and

recreates the political, organizational and economic conditions for the

maintenance oS the accumulative process. Moreover, as an expression of

the sum total of the social relations that give form and content t o

civil society it also expresses the conflicts'and contradictions among

all social forces having, somehow, to tackle the whole spectrum of active

social interests.

It should be emphasized that, f x m this standpoint, the growth of

the state and the unfolding of its roles in economy and society are

structural correspondents, in the public sphere, to the development

- -
of largeunits of production, in the private one, both resulting from the

expansion of capitalist economics. Thcy are structural rcquisitcs of

change and their form of dcvclopmont is intimately related to the concrete
 the particular interests of classes, tractions of classes Br

groups tends to increase. The political dynamice that the state intbrnal-

iges due to its double character--baing at the same time an apparatus and
a social relation of domination--favors the emergence of frictions and

between its concrete actions and immediate class interests.

1t is this structural ambiguity, which can only be resolved in the last

instance, that turns this enlarging state bureaucracy, with its several

apparatuses and instruments, into a divided entity. The complex articula-

tions between the state and society, the internalization of several com-

peting clusters of social interests by the state apparatuses, the seeming

contradiction between its general role as the political guardian of the

capitalist system and its more specific roles in interest mediation and

interest selection are joined together to draw the picture of a "divided

Loviathan." This huge bureaucracy, divided in its loyalties and roles,

this diqided Leviathan can be simultaneously benevolent and arbitrary,

lit~raland interventionist. Whether it shows its benevolent, arbitrary,

liberal, or interventionist face will depend upon the specific social and

political dynamics of each socioeconomic foxmation.

Theso remarks on the relationships between capitalist expansion

and bureaucratization refer to very general and encompassing transforma-

tions in the course of capitalist development. As such they refer to the

"general movement" of society. Many thcories on state and capitalism

have followed this line of reasoning and were developed in the same degree

of abstraction and gonerality, It sccms, however, that if one is inter-

--

Cstcd in more concrete studios of particular capitalist states in action,

these gcncral formulations arc not sufficient. They do not provide the
analytical instruments that would allow us to ascertain how these
 This io clearly the caso of "late-peripheralH formations in which

a dominant class was able to impose its interests on society as a whole,

either legitimately or by force, but was itself fragmented and incapable

of hegemonically establishing political direction or of effectively control-

ling the state apparatuses. The main structural determinants of this

peculiar situation are to be found in the heterogeneity pervading bath

the productive and the class structures. Classes in these societies are

highly heterogeneous and segmented formations. Furthermore, heterogeneity

and fragmentation tend to determine class fractionalization, i.e., the

internal division of classes into fractions and groups with diverging

interests. As the productive structure is itself a segmented one, sectoral

interests tend to emerge, cutting across the basic class structure. These

fractions of classes, these sectoral aggregates of particular interests

become the effective political actors. Thus, the political dynamics of

class interests are qualified by cleavages among different sectors and

fractions of the same class. It should be noted that these cleavages are
based upon competing, though not irreconcilable, class interests. The

fact is that internal class solidarity is low and would only be strengthened
if social hegemony were threatened by actual revolutionary crises. That is
to say, as far as class domination is not facing a real threat, and thus

the long-range political interests of the dominant class are secure, it

tends to be divided into fractions or sectoral groups, aiming at the

realization of more specific material interests that are, at times, in con-

flict with the interests of other fractions and groups own material inter-

ests. tionce, social hcgemony is attained through some political arrange-

monts that, while uniting these fractions and groups around common broad

political interests, arc based upon an interest dynamics characterized

end actions based upon the definition of "equality areas* aim at tho nega-
tion of inequirlitics within tho prevailing order vis-a-vis the agents
involved. They often lead to attcmpts at transforming tho rules for tho
.#location of resources in the economic, social, and political spheres.
..This com#tment to "equality areas* can also operate as a powerful con-
@train+ to particularist actions by any of the participants, preventing
one side from going against shared interests in order to promote particular
interests of its own.
Bureaucratic organizations or state apparatuses, though developing
interests of their own, are always associated with broader clusters of
sacially determined interests. In this sense, there is no state apparatus
that is completely "alienated" from society. State bureaucracies inter-
vene in the processes through which ihterests are translated into actions
and decisions, mediating the actualization of the interests of groups and

fractions of classes. Bureaucratic mediation can, and often does, change

demands an8 interests in their extent, scope, and, partially, in their

content while.stil1 being the means for the expression of these inter-
eats within the state. That is to say, the mediation of state apparatuses
often changes the structure of demands, but always maintaining the
scieence of primary interests in their concrete decisions.
Bureaucratic schemes are conceived as means for the organization
of decisional spaces within the state, with m r e or less defined con-
tours, having forbidden and obligatory directions, bifurcations and dead-
-ends. In most cases, the impression of complete freedom 00 action and
bureaucratic discrotion and of complete autonomy in the internal flux of
demands and decisions is an illusion reinforced by tho rccnactmcnt of
routina. Docision paths ara already determined. Bypaths, shortcuts,
 I

and course altarations represent political breaks of bureaucratic

58
mutine. The subversion of routine by creative political action.

m e s e schcmes, and especially those set forward by very powerful techno-

bureaucracies, work as the means for both interest representation and

tnterest selection within the state and the maintenance of previously

established patterns of action.

The monopoly of strategic information by decisionmakcrs or state
apparatuses and their specific insertion in the power system of the state

@Ilwthe technobureaucracy to attend to its politico-ideological cornit-

MsntS as well as to promote the interests to which it is more closely

associated. Through the political manipulation of resources and bureau-

cratic schemes state apparatuses can articulate, organize, and select

fnterests, processing them through certain decisional patterns, specific

arrangements, and discarding alternative courses of action that would be

more valued by other ihterest coalitions. Individuals inside the state

do not always abide by ihese procedures consciously since their actions

are determined by internalized patterns of behavior, "organizational

ideolcrgiesw or ideological orientations pertaining to a specific "equality

area.* Moreover, there are constraints on individual actions, that depend

, - --
upon the particularconfiguration of the state, political direction, and
-- - ___ _ - -- -

rngime form. Objectively, they operate institutional mechanisms to pro-

m i s o c i a l l y determined interests. Many times, the structure of demands

is actually changed within the state, decisions are made that do not

correspond to any particular cluster of interests in society, but they

pplicd by Pierre Bourdieu to the academic

cmcnt et systhncs de ~cnsEs," Revuc In-
198 3 (1967)r 367-368.
the emergence of ncw segments of the national bourgeoisie and thb growth

of state intervention in the economy as planncr, banker and entrepreneur,

the first attempts at tho institutionalization of planning with the crea-

tion of many agencies of which the first and most important until the

late sixties was the Birnco Nacional do llesanvolvimento ~consmico(1952).

Intense negotiations betwcen the three main economic agents found institu-

tional arenas that had both the power and flexibility to produce working
decisions. Among these agencies the most outstanding were the "executive

groupsw: corporatist-like entities in which representatives of state

agencies, the techno-bureaucracy, and foreign and national private sectors

joined together to discuss, decide, and implement working solutions for

their projects. These groups had a very flexibile and informal structure,

and controllcd important power resources. Vargas had already used the
idea of executive groups back in the 1940s, but Kubitschek would furthe=

institutionalize them from 1957 on. In a sense they combined the techni-
cal and political resources needed for policy-furnation, at tbc sm.e time
baing paral.le1 agencies to the traditional burcaucracy, the Congress and
the parties. Techno-political arenas with minimal bureaucratic fonnali-

ties and maximum political freedom to manoeuver.

These new agents immediately occupied the most central decisional

arenas, but were unable to organize a hegemonic directorate, thus lcgiti-

mately imposing their interests on the other dominant fractions and on

society as a whole. The populist pact (from 1950 to 1964) was character-

ized by thc confrontation of these forces and, %s development progrcssed,

interests became increasingly diversified. '$ 7rowth of popular par-
ticipation was furtherod by the constant appcal of some sectors of the
block in power to tho subordinated classes in order to amass sufficient
jurisdictions. From a legal and institutional point of vicw, the Groups

were conceived as an instrument of the Executive for the achievement of

greater articulation, coherence, and efficiency a m n g its own agencies.
Hence, a5 creatures of the Executive, they became independent of Congress,
of Judicial oversight, and even of the direct influence of the political
organizations of civil society.

This new form of state policymaking apparatuses had some other

important features. The participation of representatives of a11 state

agencies with some jurisdiction over a Group's "policy space*' allowed

the immediate assessment of resources available for the projects and

policies under analysis. As an arena for policy negotiation, the Group

could also function as an instrument for arbitration and resolution of

conflicts among state agencies or among them and entrepreneurial groups.

Ideally any policy approved by a Group would either express a consensus

among all participants or the opinion of a winning coalition. Hence, their

importance as arenas for interest organization and selection. Executive

Groups were enabled to overcome political and institutional rigidities and

to minimize the negative effects of interest fragmentation and state

segmentation. Through their actions, the conversion of interests and

initiatives into effective policy decisions could be substantially

accelerated. First of all they could pronote greater articulation among

the activities of several state agencies. Secondly, a higher level of

administrative flexibility and their prominent role in interest organiza-

tion and selection augmcntcd the Executive Groups* political leverage within

the state bureaucracy. Rs both administrative agencies, i.e., executive

instruments, and political arenas inside thc state apparatus, they had

indeed some chance to break through the cxistinq institutional and political

obstaclcs.
 It should be clear, thus, that the Executivo Groups wero not only

administrative mechanisms but also (and probably mainly) political arenas.

F i r ~ tof all, because of their role in interest organization and selection.

As such, they providcd the several economic agents with an institutional

-
locus where they could negotiate the implantation and/or the development

of their sectors of activitiesj to resolve conflicts and to manage sec-

toral oligopolistic arrangements. Second, because they actually worked

as substitutes for other mechanisms of interest representation, providing

a direct, *officialn access for private interests into the state apparatuses.

The participation of representatives of the private sector in the Groups'

decisionmaking process promoted a closer relationship between state and

private agents, thus facilitating a greater compatibility between

"burea~cratic*~
and private ends and the consolidation of a common view of

sectoral needs. Moreover, this rapport allowed a better articulation

between state policies and entrepreneurial strategies. This was perhaps

the single most important feature of the Executive Groups: to work as

channels for a more efficient insertion of entrepreneurial interests into

"state politics." In practice, the Executive Groups have indeed functioned

(during the 1950s and early 1960s) as both a means for policymakers to

evade the "clientelistic" and conservative orientations of the state

central bureaucracy, and as a "driving belt" for private interests to

come into the state's most central decisionmaking arenas. It should be

noted that although it is argued here that tho executive group arrange-

ment was more flexible and informal than tha Council solution and implied

loss bureaucratic restrictions to the free interplay of interests, it does

not follow that this formula was more "dcmocratic." In fact, both

arrangcmullts gcnerato restrictions over $ha inEluencc of other sectors of

civil society in policymaking. Many investment decisions, technological

choices, scale requirements, have impact upon the employmcnt level, the

wage structure, and many other elements that directly interest workers,

for instance. Howcver, in spite of the clear importance of the Executive

Groups' decisions to tho conditions of the working class, it was never

allowed to participate in the Groups' decisionmaking process. On the

few occasions when labor unions had a iormal representation in Executive

Groups it Was largely symbolic. These Groups are a part of "state" or

nclosedn politics, thus no matter how flexible and informal they are,

there are always explicit and implicit restrictions regarding the agents

who are admitted to their complicity.

The first and most successful experience with such arrangement was
the "Executive Group for the Automotive Industry" (GEIA), created by

President Kubitschek in 1956 to implant the automobile industry in Brazil.

The GEIA had as its main resources the administration of very compensating

incentives and the legal power to supervise the implementation of its

policy decisions. Direct private participation was restricted to the

"consulting" level. The representatives of the entrepreneurial sector

were not given voting power in the Group's decisionmaking process. They

had a voice, though, and have certainly exerted some degree of influence.
m e state technobureaucracy concentrated all the voting capacity and was

represented by the directors of the four most important state agencies

controlling the inccntivcs to be granted to the new industry: SUMOC

(which performed the nonnative functions of a Central Bank)j CACEX (Dank

of Brazil's Department of Forcign trade)^ Bank of Brazil's Department

of Forcign Exchange and, finally, the National Dcvclopmcnt Dank (BNOE)

(which would provide financial and credit support). It was chaired by

of the system of social relationships through which accumulation is
achieved. The state expresses, at the same time, this basic unity, intra-

bourgeois conflict and the broader class conflict that characterizes

capitalist society. In other words, the state as the official expression

of civil society reflects simultaneously the political unity which makes

bourgeois domination viable and the plurality of interests which charac-

terizes the competition for power and resources among the several blocs

of capital. It is the concrete expression of both unity and conflict,

domination and competition. As the political ncondensation" of a social

relation of domination it expresses the correlation of forces prevailing

in society, the diversity of interests, the stresses and contradictions

embedded in the movement of civil society. Hence its relative autonomy

vis-8-vis civil society. As a political and bureaucratic apparatus the

state becomes a most strategic agent in interest intermediation, articu-

lating, organizing and selecting socially determined interests. It follows

that as the state is tho official (or politicaij expression of the sum

total of social relations which constitute civil society, it has somehow

to tackle the whole spectrum of actual social interests. This is accom-

plished both through effective policymaking and ideology formation.

This conception of the state allows the analyst to study alloca-

tion, regulation and planning as political processesz as a part of

state/civil society relationships and, therefore, undissociable from

the prevailing pattern of domination and organization of political

direction. They are the means through which the state articulates,

organizes and selects the interests of the classes and fractions of

classes. Therefore, policy formation couid be conceived as the means

through which the state realizes its strategic role in interest intcrmedia-
permanent military surveillance upon state and society. The result was

not, however, greator interest organization nor the emergence of a

stronger and more homogeneous political coalition. Instead, interest

fragmentation increased, the crisis of hegemony became deeper and the

organization of political direction more and more unstable. Under the

apparent, artificial stability imposed by repressive authoritarianism a

major political crisis was developing: a crisis of organization of poli-

tical direction that well might reveal the limits to authoritarian rule.

3. The study of concrete state actions in the context of the

prevailing pattern of development revealed the divided, fragmented

nature of the Brazilian state. This divided nature is expressed by the

fragmentation of the state apparatus into several relatively autonomous,

competing, overlapping jurisdictions. State politics is characterized

by constant inter- and intra-bureaucratic disputes and power struggle.

The fragmentation of the state is accompanied by increasing centraliza-

tion, concentration and personalization of power. This contradictory

movement can be explained by the need to counteract fragmcntation and

to ensure some unity in the operation of the state as a whole. Hence

the constant Gearch for new and higher intermediatory and arbitrating

levels inside the state structure. However, as these jurisdictions

attain increasingly higher degrees of autonomy and base their political

support on different blocs of interests, power centralization and con-

centration tend to exacerbate inter-jurisdictional competition and to

further jeopardize the attcmpts to homogenize state policies. This

process of fragmcntation cum centralization and concentration of

power is at tho basis of state politics and of tho actions of the several