1

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991
Local Governments; Municipal Corporations; Civil Service; Appointments; The Department of Budget and
Management may appoint provincial budget officers, only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated
by the Governor.—When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial
Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of
meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back. The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which
states: “SEC. 6.0—The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the
local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.” is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM
may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he
must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask
for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications. The PBO is expected to
synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the
local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded
to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints
of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed
on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that
there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the
local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing
of power between the two levels of government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; National officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.—In his classic
work “Philippine Political Law” Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions
of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that “local
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. x x x A people may establish a system of free
government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” (Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706). Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
Disomangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203, G.R. No. 149848 November 25, 2004
Constitutional Law; Political Law; The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power; It
establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political
departments; Requisites for the exercise of judicial power.—The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the
scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. Jurisprudence has
laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
2

Same; Same; Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute; Grounds to strike down acts
of the political departments of government.—In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive
department on the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. As held in Tañada v. Angara, “where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.” But in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition questioning acts of the political departments of
government, the Court will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only
on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Definition of Legal Standing or Law Stands; Petitioner must show that he has been, or is about to
be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.—Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show “not only
that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.” He
must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
Same; Same; Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing when paramount interests are involved.—Following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take
cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests
are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where
the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
Same; Same; Petitioners can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.—
As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out
of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be
prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can
legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Same; Statutes; The organic acts are more than ordinary statutes hence the provisions thereof cannot be
amended by an ordinary statute such as R.A. 8999.—The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes
because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary
statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
Municipality of Sogod vs. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 38204, G.R. No. 38205 September 24, 1991
Administrative Law; Jurisdiction; Definition of; It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of commencement of action.—Jurisdiction has been defined as the power and
authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case (Herrera v. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil.
245; Conchada v. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 4). Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It
cannot be fixed by the will of the parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of the parties. In
3

determining whether a case lies within or outside the jurisdiction of a court, reference to the applicable statute
on the matter is indispensable. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force
at the time of commencement of action.
Same; Same; Same; The applicable laws necessary for the determination of the question of whether the trial
court has the authority to decide on the Municipal boundary dispute are 1) Republic Act No. 522, 2) Republic
Act No. 3590, and 3) Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1971.—At the time the civil actions
were filed with the trial court by petitioner municipality in 1970, the applicable laws necessary for the
determination of the question of whether the trial court has the authority to decide on the municipal boundary
dispute are the following: 1) Republic Act No. 522, creating the municipality of Bontoc; 2) Republic Act No. 3590,
the Revised Barrio Charter, revising Republic Act No. 2370; and 3) Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although Republic Act No. 522 is clear as to which territories shall belong to each
Municipality, the law is silent however as to the specifications of the boundary line which will separate the two
Municipalities.—Republic Act No. 522 defines the jurisdiction of the municipality of Bontoc. It clearly
enumerates the barrios which shall compose the municipality of Bontoc, to wit: Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu,
Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios. This means that all the other
barrios in Southern Leyte which are not included in the law creating the municipality of Bontoc are deemed to
remain under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sogod. Although the said law is clear as to which territories
shall belong to each municipality, the law is silent however, as to the specifications of the boundary line which
will separate the two municipalities.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the Revised Barrio Charter, barrios may be created and their boundaries
altered only by Act of Congress or by the corresponding provincial board.—With the passage of Republic Act
No. 2370 which took effect on January 1, 1960 as revised by Republic Act No. 3590 on June 22, 1963, known as
the Revised Barrio Charter, barrios may be created and their boundaries altered only by Act of Congress or by
the corresponding provincial board upon petition of the majority of the voters in the area affected and the
recommendation of the municipality in which the proposed barrios are situated. Thus, the provincial board was
empowered under the said law to determine and alter boundaries of municipalities and barrios.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The law vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities
on the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code.—Further, the law then
vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the provincial board pursuant to Section
2167 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the authority to hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes
belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts.—It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that
the authority to hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the
trial courts. The decisions of the boards are then appealable to the Executive Secretary.
Same; Same; Court finds that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want of jurisdiction.—
Considering the foregoing, We find that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want of
jurisdiction and in allowing the provincial board to continue with the pending investigation and proceedings on
the boundary dispute.
4

Same; Same; Under the 1987 Constitution, any alteration or modification of the boundaries of the municipalities
shall only be by a law to be enacted by Congress subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the barrios affected.—The 1987 Constitution now mandates that no province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Hence, any alteration or modification of the boundaries
of the municipalities shall only be by a law to be enacted by Congress subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government Code), Thus, under present
laws, the function of the provincial board to fix the municipal boundaries are now strictly limited to the factual
determination of the boundary lines between municipalities, to be specified by natural boundaries or by metes
and bounds in accordance with the laws creating said municipalities.
City of Pasig vs. Commission on Elections, 314 SCRA 179, G.R. No. 125646, G.R. No. 128663 September 10,
1999
Actions; Prejudicial Questions; Election Law; Plebiscites; Municipal Corporations; A case involving a boundary
dispute between local government units presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.—We agree with the position of the COME-
LEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City
of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the
proposed barangays may be held.

Same; Same; While it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action
and does not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the Supreme Court can
very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked
to the first.—The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil
and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this
may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of
good order, we can very well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.
Same; Same; Election Law; Plebiscites; Municipal Corporations; Where territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised
in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of
the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.—In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig
vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation
of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless
such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be
an exercise in futility.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare.—Not only
5

that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, we held that—“The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; Merely because a plebiscite had already been
held in regard to a proposed barangay does not necessarily render a pending petition for settlement of a
boundary dispute involving said barangay moot and academic.—Neither do we agree that merely because a
plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality
of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its
petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still
pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
Municipality of San Joaquin vs. Siva, et al., 19 SCRA 599, No. L-19870 March 18, 1967
Constitutional law; Municipal corporations; Creation of municipalities; Delegation of power to President is
unconstitutional.—Executive Order No. 436 of the President of the Philippines, creating the municipality of
Lawigan out of twenty-one (21) barrios theretofore forming part of the municipality of San Joaquin, is void ab
initio, on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order is based,
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines. Hence, it is
unconstitutional.
Prohibition; Writ lies against those appointed to act as officers of an illegally created town.—Prohibition lies
against persons appointed by the President of the Philippines as mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of a
municipality which was created under a void Executive Order.
Tobias vs. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 114783 December 8, 1994
Municipal Corporations; Highly Urbanized Cities; Congressional Districts; The statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city indubitably complies with the “one city-one representative” proviso
in the Constitution.—Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city-one representative” proviso in the
Constitution: “x x x Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the
aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Statutes; Titles of Bills; The creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of such conversion.—Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the creation
of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a
6

Highly Urbanized City of Manda-luyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under
Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been invariably
adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.—Moreover, a liberal construction of
the “one title-one subject” rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as
now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) “should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant
data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.—Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues
raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675.
The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including
due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all
relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congressional Districts; The present composition of Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.—As to the contention that the assailed law violates
the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.—
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it
was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Plebiscite; The inhabitants of San Juan, which used to be part of the
congressional district together with Mandaluyong, were properly excluded from the plebiscite on the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city since the matter of separate district representation was
only ancillary thereto.—Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate
in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is
bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district repre-sentation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Gerry-mandering,” Defined.—Similarly, petitioners’
additional argument that the subject law has resulted in “gerrymandering,” which is the practice of creating
7

legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former San Juan/ Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya, 166 SCRA 70, No. L-41322 September 29, 1988
Civil Law; Parties; Only entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.—Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that only “entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.” Now then, as
ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent
has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have
dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.
Cawaling, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 368 SCRA 453, G.R. No. 146319, G.R. No. 146342 October 26, 2001

Constitutional Law; Statute; Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; Court may
declare a law or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.—Every statute has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts.
The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny
to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions
thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt, for to doubt is to sustain, .
Administrative Law; Courts; The judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation; In the exercise of judi-cial power, Courts are allowed only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and may not annul an act of the political departments
simply because they feel it is unwise or impractical.—Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no
“compelling” reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of
Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component
city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that “the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.” In the exercise of judicial power, we
are allowed only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,”
and “may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.”
Mariano, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 242 SCRA 211, G.R. No. 118577, G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
Constitutional Law; Local Government Code; The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized.—The importance of drawing with precise
strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
8

conflicts in the exercise of governmen tal powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare. This is
the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government
unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Same; Same; Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.—Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive
how this evil can be brought about by the description made in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati.
In language that cannot be any clearer, Section 2 stated that the city’s land area “shall comprise the present
territory of the municipality.”
Same; Same; Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.—The
deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was
under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the
legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute
by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the
land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.
Same; Same; Considering the peculiar circumstances, Court is not prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. No.
7854 is unconstitutional.—We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of
the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional.
Same; Statutes; Requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-
delineated.—We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Same; Same; Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city.—These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district.
9

Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Same; Same; Court reiterated the policy favoring a liberal construction of the “one title—one subject” rule so
as not to impede legislation.—Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners’ contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case
of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit, we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the “one title-
one subject” rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, the Constitution does not command that the title
of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that “it should
be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such
general subject.”
Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte vs. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, 547 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 169435
February 27, 2008
Municipal Corporations; Boundary Disputes; Courts; Jurisdictions; It is not only the Regional Trial Court that has
appellate jurisdiction over judgment of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a boundary dispute—B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to
entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.—The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law.
Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it. Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, vests in the CA the
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others. B.P. Blg. 129 has been
further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of
appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for
certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Same; Local Government Code; Creation of Local Government Units; Plebiscite; Statutory Construction; If at the
time a local government unit was created a plebiscite was not required by law, then such local government unit
is validly created even without conducting a plebiscite; It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental
law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so
provided.—We agree with Nueva Era’s contention that Marcos’ claim over parts of its territory is not tenable.
However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the
Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below. At the time Marcos was created,
a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created
without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was
derived. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. It is the basic norm that provisions of
10

the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive
application is so provided.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expressio Unius; Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention
of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned—if a statute enumerates the things upon
which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.—Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s
territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to
operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human
mind. Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cassus Omissus; Where the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the
enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have
been done intentionally, a conclusion that finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally.—Since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of
which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This
conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object
or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
Statutory Construction; Statutes; Explanatory Notes; Where there is ambiguity in a statute, courts may resort
to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.—This
conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the
way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of
Marcos. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to
clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.
Same; Same; The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.—Only
Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of
Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering
that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be
interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras
only.
Miranda vs. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603, G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999
Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.—The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners
cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when
he filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the
11

consent of the city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago
from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and immediate and
not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other
petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right
to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this
right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.—The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially
in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including “the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” To be sure, the cut
between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify
us.
Same; Same; The petition at bar presents a justiciable issue.—Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable
issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or
disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or
not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress
comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The
proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be
the subject of a prolix explanation.
Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 93054 December 4, 1990
Constitutional Law; Autonomous Regions; Article X, Sec. 15, 1987 Constitution; The keywords—provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent
unit.—The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in
Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that: "Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Italics Supplied) The keywords—provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit.
The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by
P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
12

Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6766 infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of lfugao
constituting the Region; Article III, Secs. 1 and 2.—Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only
one province. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units.
It further provides that: "SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within
the Autonomous Region x x x." From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.
Same; Same; Same; Article V, Secs. 1 and 4.—Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative
power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned
among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region. If we follow the respondent's position, the
members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an
awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies—the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan—exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the
smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few
people.
Same; Same; Same; Article XII, Sec. 10.—Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and
Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their
representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The
Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The
Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the
Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337—Local
Government Code). If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the
other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean
that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region
being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Same; Same; Same; Article XXI, Sec. 13 (B) (c).—Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not
be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
Same; Same; Same; Other provisions which are either violated or which cannot be complied with.—There are
other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied with. Section
16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and six (6)
members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents' view, the
Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article
VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region.
Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the
Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based upon the various
languages and dialects in the region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
13

Same; Same; Decision in Abbas case not applicable in the case at bar.—Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC,
(G.R. No. 89651, November 10,1989), is not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary
of Justice. The Abbas case laid down the rule on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
xxx xxx xxx "xxx [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes approving
the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units." The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which
provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the
same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the
Abbas decision which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in eitherMuslim Mindanao or
Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constitute it. Stated in another
way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.
Statutory Construction; Constitution; Words used to be given their ordinary meaning.—The well-established
rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood
in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case. (See Baranda
v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-
423 [1970]).
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission on Elections, 643 SCRA 150, G.R. No. 176951 February
15, 2011
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Code (LGC); Local Government Units; Congress intended that those
with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income
requirement of P100 million imposed by Republic Act No. 9009.—Based on the above exchange, Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and
higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No.
9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in
the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and
12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC,
as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted.
The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to
exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power, which power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.—The
enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive.
The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
14

Same; Same; Same; Same; Without doubt, the Local Government Code (LGC) is a creation of Congress through
its law-making powers—Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted Republic Act No.
9009, and such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws;
Undeniably, Republic Act No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code (LGC), but it is also true that, in effect,
the Cityhood Laws amended Republic Act No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein.—Without
doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or
modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.
Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from
locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such
a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood
to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting
for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009
amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the
exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities
from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For
this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained
and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
Same; Same; Same; It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income
requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made—there was no evidence or empirical
data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount; The imposition of a very high income
requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities.—It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the
interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No
9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the
apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It should be
pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation of
component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation
rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million,
increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component
cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has,
in effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized cities under Section 452 of the LGC.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by Republic Act No.
9009, but by the very purpose of the Local Government Code (LGC)—Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws,
recognized the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by
the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the
present.—The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent
municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This
Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very
15

purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus—SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and
resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units. Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic
growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the
pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the
present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such
condition continues to exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities
covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income
requirement of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, acknowledging the “privilege” that they have already given to those
newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same
footing or “class” as the respondent municipalities.—The justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood
Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities
almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress
merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt
increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the “privilege” that they have already given
to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in
the same footing or “class” as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and
readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Courts; Judgments; While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is
nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and
doubt.—We should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental
interest of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment,
it is nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and
doubt, as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs: The right and power of judicial tribunals to
declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always
been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful
consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach
constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible
caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their
judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a
provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be
free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a
decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed
to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful
case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the
constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.
16

Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
Actions; Quo Warranto; Municipal Corporations; Parties; When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of
a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct
proceeding.—The special civil action of quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by which the Government can call
upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.”
When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding. It must be brought “in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines” and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal “when directed by the President of the
Philippines x x x.” Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action “at the request and upon
the relation of another person” with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to
commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be
“entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.” While the quo
warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality
of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or
Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
Same; Same; Same; A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision must be
timely raised.—Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August
1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso
finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later
the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created
local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right
of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not
indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Even if Executive Order No. 353 creating the Municipality of San
Andres is a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality
to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation.—Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result
of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly
could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.
Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez
v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain
governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out
in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
17

Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under
Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537.
Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
Same; Same; Same; Local Government Code; The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature; Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code converted municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders into regular municipalities.—At the present time, all doubts on the
de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986)
apportioning the seats of the House of Repre-sentatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of
the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that
municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would
succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when
it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Curative statutes are validly accepted in this jurisdiction,
subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.—Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving “validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied with,” are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification
against impairment of vested rights.
Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 530, G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995
Municipal Corporations; Local Governments; Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated
as the municipality of San Andres in the case of Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr. (239 SCRA
11 [1994]), it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and
should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.—Respondent municipality’s situation in the
instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and
therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And
various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgment of the
existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia
was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities
comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the
municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government
Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
Province of Camarines Norte vs. Province of Quezon, 179 SCRA 233, G.R. No. 80796 November 8, 1989
Administrative Law; Boundaries; Section 42 of the Revised Administrative Code, does not describe or define the
entirety of that line in such manner as to permit the whole boundary line to be located on the ground by a
surveyor.—Turning to the first issue, we note that Section 42 does set out a definition or description of the
boundary line between Ambos Camarines and Quezon Province. We note, however, that Section 42 does not
18

describe or define the entirety of that line in such a manner as to permit the whole boundary line to be located
on the ground by a surveyor. Close examination of Section 42 will show that it is not the whole boundary line
that is disputed but only a segment thereof. The boundary line from the peak of Mt. Cadig eastward to the peak
of Mt. Labo and from there to a stone monument at the headwaters of the Pasay River and thence along the
course of that river to the Gulf of Ragay, is described in terms which are sufficiently precise to permit a surveyor
to locate that boundary line on the surface of the earth. It is the western portion of the boundary line—from
the peak of Mt. Cadig westward to a point on the eastern shore of Basiad Bay—which is the subject of the
boundary dispute.
Same; Same; Same; The Chief Executive Bureau in rendering its decision did not, as he could not, purport to act
with unlimited discretion; Requirements of Sec. 42 which the portion of the Ambos Camarines-Tayabas
boundary must satisfy; Case at bar.—We consider next the second issue relating to the authority of the Chief of
the Executive Bureau to render his decision. It is important to stress that the Chief of the Executive Bureau, in
rendering that decision, did not, as he could not, purport to act with unlimited discretion. For Section 42 itself
established certain requirements which the disputed portion of the Ambos Camarines—Tayabas boundary line
must satisfy: 1. the (western) terminus point must be on the eastern shore line of Basiad Bay; and 2. the line to
be projected from that terminus point must proceed (eastward) to the peak of Mt. Cadig in such a manner as
to bring the territory of the barrio of Basiad entirely within the municipality of Capalonga in Ambos Camarines,
and to exclude the same from the territory of the municipality of Calauag in Tayabas. It is not disputed by
respondent Quezon Province that the line delineated by the Chief of the Executive Bureau in his decision in fact
complied with both the above general directions or descriptions prescribed in Section 42. The Chief of the
Executive Bureau did not, therefore, “alter” or “redefine” or “amend an existing provincial boundary,” the
boundary line between Ambos Camarines and Tayabas. All that the Chief of the Executive Bureau did was to
implement, upon the authority of the Secretary of Interior, Section 42 of Act No. 2711.
Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, No. L-28113 March 28, 1969
Constitutional law; Municipal corporation; Inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality reserved to the
State; Rule not applicable where municipal corporation a nullity.—An inquiry into the legal existence of a
municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding f or quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only
in a f ew exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing
collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is
neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned
collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby,
including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.
Same; Same; Where municipal corporation cannot be considered a de facto corporation.—In the cases where a
de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later
invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law
giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case ac bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was
organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto
corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute
to give color of authority to its creation.
Same; Unconstitutional act not a law.—An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no off ice; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.
19

Municipality of Kananga vs. Madrona, 402 SCRA 330, G.R. No. 141375 April 30, 2003
Courts; Jurisdiction; Local Government Units; Words and Phrases; Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the
power and the authority to hear and determine a cause.—Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power
and the authority to hear and determine a cause. It is a question of law. As consistently ruled by this Court,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. Because it is “a matter of substantive law, the established
rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of
the court.”
Same; Same; Same; Settlement of Boundary Disputes; Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code (LCC),
the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other—or between two or more highly urbanized cities—shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved.—Both parties aver that the
governing law at the time of the filing of the Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC),
which provides: “Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes.—Boundary
disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this
end: “(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. “(b) Boundary
disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. “(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities
of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
“(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city
on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the parties. “(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty
(60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter,
the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60)
days from the date of the certification referred to above.” Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other—
or between two or more highly urbanized cities—shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the local government units involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 451 of the LCC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized.—
Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an
independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte
in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code,
which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the
President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner
asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 118 of the LCC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent
component city.—Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks
to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While
Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in
Section 118 does not apply to them.
20

Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, it follows that
regional trial courts have the power and the authority to hear and determine such controversy.—Inasmuch as
Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should
then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this law provides: “Sec. 19.
Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x x x x x x x “(6)
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions[.]” Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the
settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same
province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have
general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers.
They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time,
but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also
exclusive.
Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA 700, G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008
Constitutional Law; Writs of Prohibition; The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the constitutionality of
election laws, rules and regulations.—The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion
by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of
Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act “which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty.” True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from
canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.”
These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also
prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.
Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units.—There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under
its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under
the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Same; Election Laws; Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least have one representative in the House of Representatives.—There is no provision in the
Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities
and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces
and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
21

Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province
that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”
Same; A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5(3), Article VI
of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.—A province cannot be
created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of
250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a
city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus,
the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
Same; Congress; Delegation of Powers; The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,
242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power
(of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
Same; Same; An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership
of the superior legislative body.—This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in
a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies
to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body,
created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
Same; Same; Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.—Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides,
“The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National
elections. x x x.” Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever
Congress enacts a law creat ing a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the “next
national elections” from the effectivity of the law.
Same; Same; The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must
be exercised by Congress itself.—Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in
Article X on regional autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous
22

consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly,
the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised
by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
Same; Local Autonomy; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); It is axiomatic that organic acts of
autonomous regions cannot prevail over the constitution.—It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous
regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that
the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself
states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
Same; Same; The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district.—We rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only
Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like
the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 declared unconstitutional insofar
as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities.—Wherefore, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
is VALID.
Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195, No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
Constitutional Law; Police power construed.—The broad and expensive scope of the police power, which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more
or less than, the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case
of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang
v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’
Shortly after independence in 1948; Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
23

referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ x x x The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague
and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen
or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

Same; Due process; Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring the installation of early warning devices to vehicles
is not repugnant to the due process clause. Conjectural claims of petitioner as to number of nighttime vehicular
collisions cannot be a basis for setting aside a requirement of law that was promulgated after a careful study by
the Executive Department.—Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted
presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer: “The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual
foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner’s naked assertion that early warning devices ‘are not too vital to
the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents’ because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed
26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved rearend collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner’s
statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: ‘Further: “It
admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here” ’ * * *. But even
assuming the verity of petitioner’s statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early
warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean that death of 390 or more Filipinos
and the deaths that could, likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?” It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by
the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction
to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader’s well-known penchant
for exaggeration.
Same; Same; The “early-warning device” requirement on vehicles is not expensive redundancy. Said device is
universally recognized.—The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: “Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking
lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3)
‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed
on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned
other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement
car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather
than decrease, the danger of collision.”
24

Same; Same; There is nothing in Letter of Instruction No. 229 which compels car owners to purchase the
prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can produce the device themselves with a little ingenuity.—
Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor
General: “There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative
Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed
thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles
with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In
fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce
this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said
letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning device requirement can neither be
oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said
devices ‘instant millionaires at the expense of car owners’ as petitioner so sweepingly concludes.
Same; Courts do not pass upon the wisdom of statutes.—It does appear clearly that petitioner’s objection to
this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality,
but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, to put it at its
mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating “that this Court,
in the language of Justice Laurel, ‘does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
Same; Delegation of Powers; To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of power, the legislature must set defined
standards. In the case at bar the clear objective is public safety.—The alleged infringement of the fundamental
principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support in well-settled legal doctrines.
Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he
would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An excerpt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta
sheds light on the matter: “To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies
at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be heard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected, It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may fee
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental roles and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector
Law, clearly, the legislative objective is public safety.
Same; International Law; The 2968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with the character
of “generally accepted principles of international law” which under the Constitution the Philippines adopts as
part of the law of the land.—The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: “[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road
safety signs and devices: * * *:” It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, * * *: The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged
25

its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war
with the principle of international morality.
Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508, G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporation; Police Power; The police power is a government function, an
inherent attribute of sovereighty which was born with civilized government.—The police power is a
governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is
founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas” and “Salus populi est suprema lex.” Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Same; Same; Same; Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power there must be a valid delegation
of such power by the legislative which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.—Police power is
inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182).
Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may
arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation;
and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of
their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential
to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The socalled inferred police
powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the
inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the
additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such
powers.
Same; Same; Same; Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.—Municipal
governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with
authority to “enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.”
Same; Same; Same; Police Power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.—Polica power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful
attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions, (Sangalang, et al.
vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort
of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial
use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests, (16 C.J.S., p.
896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting 011 past conditions; it must
follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.
Same; Same; Same; Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its allcomprehensiveness.—In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police
power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
26

future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Same; Same; Same; Power of a municipal corporation is broad and has been said to be commensurate with but
not to exceed the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and
convenience and consistently as may be with private rights.—The police power of a municipal corporation is
broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs
of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It
extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of
the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but
is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people
by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to
frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Same; Same; Same; Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons.—COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons, As correctly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, “the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, ibid)
social justice (Section 10, ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.—The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty, The support
for the poro has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
Local Governments; Constitutional Law; An ordinance of Quezon City requiring memorial park operators to set
aside at least six percent (6%) of their cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons is not a valid exercise of
police power, and one that constitute taking of property without just compensation.—There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
Same; Same; Same.—The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered
by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may
“provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
27

public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, No. L-81958 June 30, 1988
Constitutional Law; Labor Laws: Deployment Ban of Female Domestic Helper; Concept of Police Power.—The
concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defmed as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill ofRights.—It constitutes an
implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its governxnent limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly,
the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Same; Same; Same; Equality before the law under the Constitution; Requirements ofa valid classification,
satisfied.—The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under
the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classiflcations rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members
of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made—the preference for female workers—rests
on substantial distinctions.
Same; Same; Same; Valid Discrimination between female and male contract workers under Department
OrderNo. l,justified.—The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect
to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior
to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the
Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply
no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classification are concerned, this
Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
28

Same; Same; Same; Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel.—The consequence the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other
things, to the requirements of "public safety, "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes
that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself
is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Same; Same; Same; No merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power since the Labor Code itselfvests the DOLE with rule-making powers.—Neither is there merit in
the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
Same; Same; Same; "Protection to Labor" does not signify the promotion ofemployment alone.—Trotection to
labor" does not signify the promotion of einployment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly
is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to
send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under
these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate
protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an
evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispuce, of the lack or inadequacy of auch protection, and as part of its
duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
Same; Same; Same; Non-impairment clause must yield to the demands and necessities of State's power of
regulation to provide a decent living to its citizens.—The petitioner's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of
worker participation "in policy and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not
welltaken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's
power of regulation. The nonimpairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is
not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a
controlling economic-way of life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on
the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation.
The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in
tbis case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted witb a grave abuse of discretion
to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, No. L-74457 March 20, 1987
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality of
legislative measures.—This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
29

measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.—The closed mind has no place
in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed
or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the
other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of
the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the
arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective
only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.—In the light of the tests
mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen
in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another (E.O. 626-A), their
confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due process for lack of reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.—But
while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful
method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty
is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed
was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase
30

"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is
not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property conf iscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on
the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs immediate and
urgent correction.—It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It
is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action
calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order
No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by
a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after
trial and conviction of the accused.
Same; Same; Damages; A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation of E.O. 626-A is
not liable for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.—We agree with the
respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time
presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional
and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals
itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
Fabie vs. City of Manila., 21 Phil. 486, No. 6583 February 16, 1912
1.MANILA ORDINANCES; VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE REGULATING CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS.—The proviso
of Ordinance 124 of the city of Manila, amending section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of that city enacted
31

June 13, 1908, directing that new buildings "shall abut or face upon a public street or alley, or on a private street
or alley which has been officially approved," held to be valid and not to constitute an invasion of private property
rights without due process of law.
2.ID.; ID.; PROPER EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.—The police power of the state is properly exercised where it
appears (1) that the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference, and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFIED RIGHT OF USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY.—"It is a settled principle, growing out
of the nature of well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may
be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community." (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 53, 84.)
Macasiano vs. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
Civil Law; Property; Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress.—Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service
are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Same; Same; Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general
are outside the commerce of men and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons.—However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close
roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already
established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle
that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside
the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons.
Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park,
the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use
when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service.
When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local
government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474,
August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent municipality can “use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed”
in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use.—However, those roads and streets which are
available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
32

devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to
dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Constitutional Law; Local Government Code; Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 known as Local Government Code already
repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991.—The instant case as well as the
Dacanay case, involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in laws applicable
during its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local
Government Code, has already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of
1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations
existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation
involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said contracts
or the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
People vs. Chan., 65 Phil. 611, No. 45435 June 17, 1938
1.CRIMINAL LAW; POLICE POWER OF THE CITY OF MANILA.—The City of Manila exercises police power by
delegation and in the exercise of that power, it is authorized to enact ordinances for the regulation of the
operation of theaters and cinematographs (sec. 2444 [m] and [ee] of the Revised Administrative Code; U. S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil., 245).
2.VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCE OF CITY OF MANILA.—The ordinance prohibiting first run
cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity is neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional.
The prohibition applies with equal force wherever the same reason exists, that is, to first and second class
theatres which show films for the first time.
Arong vs. Raffiñan, et al., 98 Phil. 422, No. L-8673, No. L-8674 February 18, 1956
1.THEATERS; ADDITIONAL FEE ON PRICE OF ADMISSION TICKETS is TAXATION; ORDINANCE IMPOSING SUCH FEE
is ULTRA VIRES. In the cases of Eastern Theatrical Company, Inc., vs. Victor Alfonso, et al., 46 Off. Gaz.,
(Supplement) p. 303, and City of Baguio, vs. Jose Y. de la Rosa, et al., G.R. No. L-8288–70, this Court has held
that an ordinance enacted which imposes a fee on every price of admission tickets sold by cinematographs,
theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows and boxing exhibitions, in addition to other license fees paid
by the same enterprises is one which imposes a tax on business and is not merely regulatory. In the case at bar,
the City of Cebu enacted similar ordinance but as its charter gives only the City of Cebu power to regulate and
fix the amount of theaters, the said ordinances posed on the business of theaters, the said ordinances are ultra
vires and in violations in the City charter.
2.PLEADING, AND PRACTICE; RECOVERY OF FEE PAID; PROPER PARTY TO BRING ACTION.—The proper party to
recover the ,fees paid them—the public.
Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533, No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
Appeal; The appellee has no duty to make assignments of error.—The defendant-appellee submitted its
counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already had occasion to hold in Relativo v. Castro that “(I)t
is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position, and is seeking no affirmative relief,
to make assignments of error.”
Same; An assignment of error can include only questions that were raised in the trial court.—In the first place,
the validity of the said resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact
which may be included in the appellant’s assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the
33

court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties. The object of requiring the parties to present all
questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the
lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine whether or not such ruling
was erroneous.
Local Governments; Municipalities are empowered by law to adopt zoning ordinances and regulations.—Section
3 of R.A. No. 2264 otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council” to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations” for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of
the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is
a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word “regulation” under the provision. As a matter
of fact the same section declares that the power exists “(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding
x x x.”
Same; An exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of it’s powers
will conflict with vested rights arising from its contracts.—The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing
vested rights arising out of a contract between a “a province, City or municipality on one hand and a third party
on the other,” in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions,
clearly, do no apply in the case at bar.

Same; Police Power; Contracts; Land Registration; The police power is superior to contractual stipulations
between parties on the use of lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens
Title.—With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by
the defendant-appellee—referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee—it should be stressed, that while non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since has to be reconciled with
the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” Invariably described as “the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee.
Same; Same; Same; Same;—Resolution No. 27, S-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone,
was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are
located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished
about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila are, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power
to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.
34

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Foreign Jurisprudence; American decisions and authorities are not
per se controlling in the Philippines.—In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities
are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with
the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the
context of other local legislation related thereto.
Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568, No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
Statutes; Ordinances; Municipal Corporations; A city ordinance of Manila prohibiting barbershop operators from
rendering massage service to their customers in a separate room is a valid exercise of the police power.—Even
if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of
respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able
to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659
as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of
barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers.” This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on
the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm
made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to
a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in
its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to
recall, is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.” As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no
showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionally of such ordinance.
De la Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569, No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Municipal Corporations; Constitutional Law; When exercise of police power by a local government council is
valid.—Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: “General power of council
to enact ordinances and make regulations.—The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.” It is practically a reproduction of the
former Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland,
speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan “is valid, unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public
policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the
power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not
prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid.”
Same; Same; A local government council cannot prohibit the establishment of nightclubs and cabarets; it may
only regulate their operations.—If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well
as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
35

ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Same; Same; Courts; Judiciary may set aside legislation which clearly invades personal or property rights, e.g.,
prohibition on establishment of cabarets, dance halls and nightclubs.—The admonition in Salaveria should be
heeded: “The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation.” It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there
was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be
earned by those therein employed.
Statutes; Constitutional Law; Where title of a law empowers a local council to regulate places of amusement,
its amendment to include power to prohibit in the body of the law without change in title would give rise to a
constitutional question on titling of bills.—Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not
merely “the power to regulate, but likewise “prohibit * * *.” The title, however, remained the same. It is worded
exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act
were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all,
then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way
altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic
Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The Constitution mandates: “Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.” Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result
in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was
prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power “to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals,” in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence
extending to all “the great public needs,” to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or
enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by
such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would
affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again.
Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Under the Local Government Code (Batas 337), the Sangguniang Bayan
cannot prohibit establishment of cabarets.—It is dear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation
of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore,
an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses
could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no
more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees would undergo a period
of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be
susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a
mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable
consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is
36

to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and
reasonableness.
Balacuit vs. CFI ofAgusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182, No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Rule that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by local
government.—In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police
power by the local government. Thus, in People v. Chari, an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run
cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid
exercise of police power. Still in another case, the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting
admission of two or more persons in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket
was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as
municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the general welfare.

Same; Same; Same; Requirements in the exercise ofpolice power; Determinatiqn ofproper exercise ofpolice
power; Subject to the super vision of courts.—To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear
that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the
determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Ordinance No. 640 penalizing any person, group ofpersons, entity or corporations engaged
in busifiess ofselling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contest to require
children between seven (7) and twelve (12) topayfull payment oftickets intendedfor adults but should charge
only one-half ofthe said ticket, held unreasonable and notjustified by any necessity for public interest;
Reasons.—We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest.
The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation
must exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of
cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children,
as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not
only make petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
Furthennore, as peti tioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already
experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass
offtheir age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide
a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all
practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business
of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public
health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
37

Same; Same; Same; Same; Theater ticket, described and defined; Right ofthe proprietor of theater to fix the
price ofadmission ticket upheld as against the right ofthe state to interfere with it.—There are a number of cases
decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which upheld the right of the
proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in this
regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar. A theater ticket has been described to be either a
mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby,
for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the
performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, positive or
conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right
of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner
thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear
right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting
the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as
conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Ordinance No. 640, not a valid exercise ofpolicepower; Reasons.—Nonetheless, as
to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in
the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonable interfered with even by the exercise
of police power. A police ineasure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should
not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. The right of the
owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to
manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage,
and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the presumption is always in favor ofthe validity ofthe ordinance, such
presumption must be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonablcness appears on the face of the ordinance
itself.—Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
ordinance. This may be the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of
the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property
rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the
foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot,
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 112526 October 12,
2001
38

Police Power; Eminent Domain; The implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is an
exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain.—The importance of the first notice, that
is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State’s police power and the power of eminent domain. To the
extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation on the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.

Same; Same; Same; The law requires payment of just compensation in cash or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
bonds, not by trust account.—In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question.
However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law
required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that “The CARP Law, for its part,
conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner
of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.”
Same; Natural Resources; Watersheds; Words and Phrases; Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of
man; Watersheds may be defined as “an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary
or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds.”—Watersheds may be defined as “an area drained by a
river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds.”
Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of
SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
had not the declared the property as watershed area.
Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Zoning Ordinances; Police Power; Eminent Domain; The authority
of a municipality to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain.—The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as “PARK” by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by
the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5,
1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution voiding the Zoning classification of the
lands at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land was now classified as agricultural land. The authority
of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the
power of eminent domain. “A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs.”
Same; Same; Same; Lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be
compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.—In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian
Reform, we held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectively of the CARL, may not be
compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries. However, more than the classification of the
39

subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question
form a vital part of a watershed area.
Same; Same; Same; The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important
human necessity; Protection of watersheds is an “intergenerational responsibility” that needs to be answered
now.—The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a
watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures
an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property
but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an “intergenerational responsibility” that needs to be
answered now.
Fortich vs. Corona, 298 SCRA 679, G.R. No. 131457 November 17, 1998
Agrarian Reform; Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Local government units need not obtain the
approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use.—Regrettably, the
issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the
Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify
lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case
of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not
obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
Administrative Law; Technicalities and Procedural Rules; Pleadings and Practice; The DAR must develop a system
of procedure that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period for filing pleadings; The rules relating
to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative
body.—Contrary to the respondent’s submission, the late filing by the DAR of its motion for reconsideration of
the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable. The respondents’ explanation that the DAR’s office procedure
after receiving the copy of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision “made it impossible for DAR to file its motion for
reconsideration on time” since the said decision had to be referred to the different departments of the DAR,
cannot be considered a valid justification. There is nothing wrong with referring the decision to the departments
concerned for the preparation of the motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not disregard
the regle-mentary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. In other words, the DAR must develop a system of
procedure that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period for filing the said motion. For, the rules
relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an
administrative body. Otherwise, the noble purpose of the rules prescribing a definite period for filing a motion
for reconsideration of a decision can easily be circumvented by the mere expediency of claiming a long and
arduous process of preparing the said motion involving several departments of the administrative agency.
Same; Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities,
it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice; There have been some instances wherein the Supreme Court
allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was “never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.”—Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with
utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement
is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that “all persons shall have a
right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.” The
adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that
40

a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some
instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was “never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.” A liberal interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.

Same; Same; Judgments; A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is

declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure.—It must be emphasized that a
decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that
the same was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential
and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal
has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act
is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Vested Rights; After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights
are acquired by the winning party; Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.—It
should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights
were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and Development Corporation, and all others who should be benefited
by the said decision. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of technicality but that of substance and
merit. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in the case of Videogram Regulatory Board vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., “(j)ust as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.”
Actions; Intervention; A party who wishes to intervene must have a “certain right” or “legal interest” in the
subject matter of the litigation, an interest which must be “actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate,
and not simply contingent and expectant”; Persons who admittedly are not tenants but merely seasonal
farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the land which was under lease and which was subsequently sought
to be converted from agricultural to some other use have no right to intervene in said land use conversion
proceeding.—With respect to the motion for reconsideration filed by the applicants for intervention, we
likewise find the same unmeritorious. The issue of the applicants’ right to intervene in this proceedings should
be laid to rest. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who wishes to intervene must have a “certain right” or
“legal interest” in the subject matter of the litigation. Such interest must be “actual, substantial, material, direct
and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.” Here, the applicants for inter vention categorically
admitted that they were not tenants of petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation, but were
merely seasonal farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the subject land which was under lease for ten (10)
years to the Philippine Packing Corporation. Respondent, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, also admitted in
his Order of June 7, 1995 that “the subject land is neither tenanted nor validly covered for compulsory
acquisition x x x.”
41

Agrarian Reform; The right to own directly or collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, and in the case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled “to receive a just
share of the fruits” of the land.—Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly
or collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, and in the
case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled “to receive a just share of the fruits” of the land. The pertinent
portion of the aforecited constitutional provision mandates: “Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm-workers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
Administrative Law; Factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.—It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies
which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court, considering that the Office
of the President is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.
Courts; Rule of Law; For those who refuse to understand, no explanation is possible, but for those who
understand, no explanation is necessary.—We express our grave concern with the manner some sectors of
society have been trying to influence this Court into resolving this case on the basis of considerations other than
the applicable law, rules and settled jurisprudence and the evidence on record. We wish to emphasize that
notwithstanding the previous adverse comments by some columnists in the print media, the assailed Decision
was arrived at in the pursuit of justice and the rule of law.
Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992
Civil Law; Administrative Law; Local Government; Property; The property of provinces, cities and municipalities
is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.—The property of provinces, cities and
municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by the said provinces, cities or municipalities. They are governed by the same principles as
property of public dominion of the same character. Under the applicable law in this case, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, had the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws, and
to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or
placing of obstacles or encroachments on them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A camino vecinal is a municipal road.—A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It
is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the
Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a
zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained,
improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road.
Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 314, G.R. No. 78673 March 18, 1991
Local Government; The closure of city streets is within the powers of the city council; The closure of provincial
roads is within the powers of the provincial board.—In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the power of the City
Council of Baguio City to close city streets and withdraw them from public use was also assailed. This Court said:
x x x So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council’s act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at
42

its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the
ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to
determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a street or
alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent
a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that
some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. While it is true that
the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board, there is no reason for not applying the
doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the closure of provincial roads. The
provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of
the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.
Same; Same; Damages; One whose property does not abut on the closed section of the street has no right to
compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has access to the general system of streets.—
On this issue, the governing principle was laid down in Favis thus: x x x The general rule is that one whose
property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation
of the street, if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. The circumstances in some cases
may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner, even though his property does not abut on the
closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is
such that he has sustained special damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by
the public generally. This rule was based on the following observations made in Richmond v. City of Hinton
which were quoted with approval by this Court: The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property
owner the public maintenance of the most convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be cut
off from the public thoroughfares, but he must content himself with such route for outlet as the regularly
constituted public authority may deem most compatible with the public welfare. When he acquires city
property, he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. If, subsequent to his acquisition, the city authorities
abandon a portion of the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss because
of the inconvenience imposed, but the public treasury cannot be required to recompense him. Such case is
damnum absque injuria. Following the above doctrine, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to damages
because the injury he has incurred, such as it is, is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of
the entire community. This is not a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just
compensation. The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial
judge acutely observed, whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered “pales in significance compared to
the greater convenience the new road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down
to the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to the
town of Virac but also to the whole province of Catanduanes.” For the enjoyment of those benefits, every
individual in the province, including the petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 142, No. L-44178 August 21, 1987
Municipal Corporation; Mayor of Manila by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations and closure of
a public market, joint action of the board and the Mayor is necessary.—We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre
Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city's constant supervision.
The establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislative powers of the City of
Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and approved
43

by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a
public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by
himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market.
Same; Same; Secs. I, III (2) of Republic Act No. 6039 amending the Revised Charter of the City of Manila applies
to all privatelyowned public markets under government supervision and control; when a market is deemed a
"public market".—The petitioner alleges otherwise, stating that said provision is not applicable to the Padre
Rada Market, it being a privately-owned and privately-operated public market under the control and supervision
of the City of Manila. The fact that all privately-owned public markets are under government supervision and
control do not make them city-operated public markets. There is no question that the Padre Rada Market is a
public market as it was authorized to operate and it operates as such. A market is a "public market" when it is
dedicated to the service of the general public and is operated under government control and supervision as a
public utility, whether it be owned by the government or any instrumentality thereof or by any private
individual. It is a settled doctrine that a "public market may be the object of individual ownership or lease,
subject to municipal supervision and control." (43 C.J. 394). Thus, if a market has been permitted to operate
under government license for service to the general public, it is a "public market" whether the building that
houses it or the land upon which it is built is of private or public ownership. (Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente, 87
Phil. 343). The Padre Rada Market is, therefore, a public market which happens to be privately-owned and
privately operated.
Same; Same; Same; Dissolution of the Municipal Board of Manila did not vest legislative power upon the City
Mayor, The Metropolitan Manila Commission took over the legislative functions of the Municipal Board of
Manila.—The petitioner contends that even assuming arguendo that another resolution was necessary for the
withdrawal from use as a public market, the same could not be passed due to the dissolution of the Municipal
Board of Manila. The dissolution of the Municipal Board was among the measures which followed the
promulgation of martial law. It did not follow, however, that the City Mayor automatically became both
executive and legislature of the local government. He was never vested with legislative power. The answer to
the petitioner's arguments is found in Presidential Decree No. 824 enacted on November 7, 1975 creating the
Metropolitan Manila Commission. Section 4 (5) of said decree provides: "The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions: x x x x x x x x x "(5) To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions
and acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila." (Italics supplied). (Vital Legal Documents, Vol
29, pp. 26-27). Therefore, the Metropolitan Manila Commission took over the legislative functions of the
Municipal Board of Manila. It was not within the mayor's authority to allow the questioned withdrawal.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481, No. L-40474 August 29, 1975
Municipal corporations; Authority of city council to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from
public use discretionary.—The city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain
property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the
discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud
or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be
served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.
Property; Property of public dominion withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property.—Article 422
of the Civil Code expressly provides that “Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.” Besides, the Revised Charter of
the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: “Property thus withdrawn
44

from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
City may be lawfully used or conveyed.”
Same; Same; Patrimonial property can be the object of an ordinary contract.—Since that portion of the city
street subject of petitioner’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that
such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
In Muyot v. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on
Plaza Sta. Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. Property for public use is outside the commerce
of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract.
Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas and Tiung Siuko., 30 Phil. 602, No. 9069 March 31, 1915
1.MUNICIPALITIES; LEASES OF PUBLIC PROPERTY BY.—A municipal council cannot sell or lease communal or
public property, such as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, bridges, etc., because they are outside the
commerce of man; and if it has done so by leasing part of a plaza the lease is null and void, for it is contrary to
the law, and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. (Civil Code, arts. 344, 1271.)
2.ID.; ID.; RESTORATION BY LESSEE.—On the hypothesis that such a lease is null and void for the reason that a
municipal council cannot withdraw part of a plaza from public use, the lessee must restore possession of the
land by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him any sums it may have collected as rent.
(Civil Code, art. 1303.) Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas and Tiung Siuko., 30 Phil. 602, No. 9069 March 31, 1915

Xxxx vs IAC???