GARCIA v.

MATA
Facts
 Eusebio Garcia was a reserve officer in the AFP with the rank of captain.
 1969: Garcia brought an action to the CFI of Quezon City to reinstate him in active
service, readjust his rank, and to pay emoluments due to him from the time of his
reversion to inactive status  DENIED; Par. 11 of Special Provisions for AFP (RA
1600) is invalid.
 Garcia only rendered 9 years and 4 months of active service; thus, short of minimum
requirement (10 years) for reversion exemption pursuant to RA 1382.
 Petitioner argues that his reversion to inactive status was in violation of Par. 11 of RA
1600.
Issue
 W/N Par. 11 of RA 1600 is constitutional and a source of rights.
Held
 NO. Par. 11 fails to disclose its relevance to the Appropriation Act.
 While RA 1600 appropriated money for fiscal year 56-57, Par. 11 pertains to policy
matters of the activity or inactivity of reserve officers.
 Subject of RA 1600 is restricted to appropriation of funds for the operation of
government.  Par. 11 is unconstitutional and confers no right and affords no
protection.

BELGICA v. OCHOA
Facts
 Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System which refers
to an appropriation of government spending meant for localised projects and
secured primarily to bring money to a representative’s district. Such funding has
been known as the Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) and is integrated in
the General Appropriations Act.
 In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that the government has been
defrauded of PHP 10 billion over the past decade by a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel.
 Six whistle-blowers declared that JLN Corporation had facilitated the swindling for
billions of pesos from public officers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20
NGOs. CoA later released a report revealing irregularities in the disbursement and
utilisation of PDAF by Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.
 As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that at least PHP 9000
million from royalties of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Issue
 W/N the Pork Barrel is unconstitutional and is violative of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI.
Held
  Yes.
o It violates the separation of powers when it allows the Congress to intrude in
the execution of the project. This is done in the form of project lists,
consultations, programme menus.  Legislators are allowed to control the
release and realignment of funds, pseudo-assuming the role of the executive
department.
 Under Section 25, the Constitution requires that special appropriation bills shall
specify the purpose for which it is intended. Moreover, said funds shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be subject to guidelines prescribed by law.
o Under the 2013 PDAF, about PHP 25 billion appears only as a collective
allocation which would be further divided among individual legislators who
could effectively appropriate funds based on their own discretion. This
means that actual items of appropriation would not have been written in the
General Appropriations Bill.
 Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.

DEMETRIA v. ALBA
Facts
 Assailed in the petition is the constitutionality of Sec. 44(1) of Budget Reform Decree
of 1977 insofar as it allows the president to override the procedures prescribed by
the Constitution in approving appropriations.
 The instant case was prior to the official convention of the new Congress; Supreme
Court had every reason to decide on the case.
 There is conflict between said provision and Sec. 16(5), Art. VIII of 1973 Constitution.
o Sec. 44(1): President shall have the authority to transfer any fund to any
programme, office, etc.
 No law shall be passed authorising any transfer of appropriations, except for
augmentation of items.
 Sec. 44(1) unduly overextends the privilege granted under 1973 Constitution. 
Disregards the standards set in the fundamental law.
 Such power opens the floodgates for financial abuse and diffuses accountability for
expenditures.
 PD No. 1177 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SANCHEZ v. COA
Facts
  In 1991, Congress passed RA 7180 (GAA of 1992) which provided PHP 75 million for
the DILG’s Capacity Building Programme.
 Atty. Mendoza, Project Director for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local
Autonomy proposed the creation of a task force to aid local autonomy. Such
proposal was accepted by DILG Secretary Sarino who issued for the transfer and
remittance to the Office of the President of PHP 300 000 for the operational
expenses. The amounts were disallowed upon post-audit.
Issue
 W/N there is legal basis for the transfer of funds of the Capacity Building Programme
fund from the DILG to the Office of the President.
Held
 No. There are two essential requisites that validates a transfer of appropriation:
First, there must be actual savings in the programmed appropriation of the
transferring agency; and second, there must be an existing item with an
appropriation in the receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred.
o “Actual” denotes that something is real or exists in fact.
 The records of the case point out that there were no savings at the time of the
transfer. Two deposits were made during 31 January and 28 April of 1992. No
savings could have existed given the short amount of time as the GAA took effect
thirty days prior to the initial deposit.

ARAULLO v. AQUINO
Facts
 The Disbursement Acceleration Programme was President Aquino’s response to the
sluggish economic growth of the country and allowed the Executive to allocate
public funds from unreleased appropriations from Personnel Services,
unprogrammed funds, and appropriations from the previous year, and budgets for
slow-moving items which have been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
 Senator Estrada claimed that some Senators have been allotted an additional budget
of PHP 50 million as an incentive to oust Chief Justice Corona. Secretary Abad
rebutted that the funds came from the DAP and were requested by the Senators
themselves.
Issue
 W/N the DAP and other issuances implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI.
Held
 Yes. Sec. 25(5) is used to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the transferring of
funds. Generally, the amounts contained in the appropriations bill must be regarded
a sufficient for the proponent agencies. Exceptions are made pursuant to Sec. 25, in
which the President has the power to transfer funds within his office.
o GAA of 2011 and 2012 omitted the phrase “for their respective offices”
which, subsequently, authorises the President to liberally transfer funds from
 savings to augment any item in the GAA despite not belonging in the
Executive.
 There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the DAP. Savings refer
to funds which were actually implemented and completed, or finally discontinued or
abandoned; to excess money after the necessary items have been funded.
o The fact that such appropriations were unreleased or not allotted means that
they have not been ripened into categories of items from which savings can
be generated.
 The President also violated Sec. 25 when funds from savings were transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items not provided in the GAA. An appropriation must
first be determined deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Such
deficiency was not found in any project; hence, the addition of the President to
cover “personnel services and capital outlays” exceeded the original amount.

PHILCONSA v. GIMENEZ
Facts
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 3836 (An Act Amending Subsection C
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 186) insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to
the elective officials of both houses.
 It allows members and officers of Congress to retire after 12 years of service and
gives them gratuity equivalent to one-year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement of re-election of the retiree; while
all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least 20
years of service and are given a gratuity which is equivalent only to one-month salary
for every year of service.
o UNCONSTITIONAL. RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of
Senators and Representatives upon the approval of said Act on 1963.
Retirement benefits were immediately available thereafter, without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress.
o It violates as well the equal protection clause as members of Congress are
afforded two retirement benefits instead of one.
Issue
 W/N the title of RA 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the Act.
Held
 NO. The RA 3836, which amended the Commonwealth Act 186, states that the
retirement benefits are granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered at least
20 years of service regardless of age. However, the succeeding paragraph refers to
members of Congress who are not members of the GSIS.
o To provide retirement benefits for these officials would relate to a subject
matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186.
o The subject of an Act should be expressed in its title to: 1) prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislature; and 2) fairly apprise the people in order that they
may have the opportunity of being heard.