Topic: People / Citizens / Series of Conflicting SC Decisions re Citizenship

Jose Tan Chong vs Secretary of Labor

GR No. 47616
September 16, 1947

and

Lam Swee Sang vs The Commonwealth of the Philippines

GR No. 47623
September 16, 1947

Ponente: Padilla, J.

Facts:

Tan Chong (petitioner) – born in San Pablo, Laguna in July 1915 to a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother who were lawfully married. He left for China in 1925 and
returned to the Philippines on January 25, 1940.

Lam Swee Sang (applicant) – born in Jolo, Sulu on May 8, 1900 to a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother. It is not clear whether or not they were legally married. He
has been residing in the Philippines from his birth to his filing of his application for
naturalization on November 16, 1938. He speaks the local dialect, Spanish and
English. He is married to a Filipina and has three children by her.

October 15, 1941

 SC affirmed judgment of CFI (Manila) granting writ of habeas corpus
petitioned for by Tan Chong on the grounds that since he is a native of the
Philippines born of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, he is also a citizen
of the Philippines.
Commented [K1]: A writ of habeas corpus (which
literally means to "produce the body") is a court order
to a person or agency holding someone in custody
(such as a warden) to deliver the imprisoned individual
to the court issuing the order and to show a valid
reason for that person's detention
  SC also decided to dismiss the petition of Lam Swee Sang for naturalization
(filed in the CFI - Zamboanga) on the grounds that since he was born in Sulu
of a Chinese father and Filipino mother, he is also a citizen of the Philippines.
Dismissing the petition meant that there was no need to apply for
naturalization.

October 21, 1941

 Solicitor General filed for a motion for reconsideration for both cases –
SolGen contends that they were still not Filipino citizens because of the laws
in place at the time of their birth.
 He argued that common law principle of jus soli (14th amendment to the US
Constitution) did not apply in these cases because it was not extended to the
Philippines.

Principle of jus soli – “law of the soil” citizenship of a person is determined by the
place where a person was born.
 Jus soli was followed in the Philippines until Sept. 30, 1939 in the case of
Chua vs Secretary of Labor when the Court abandoned this rule under the
provisions of Sec 2 of the Jones Law.
 In the cases of Torres and Gallofin vs Tan Chim (Feb 3, 1940) and Gallofin vs
Ordonez (June 27, 1940) however, SC reverted to the rule of jus soli.

At the time of the petitioner and the applicant’s birth, the law in force and applicable
to their cases was sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 as amended by Act of 23
March 1912, which provides that only those “inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899;
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands.”

Issue: W/N the petitioner and the applicant are citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Held: No. Citizenship of the petitioner and the applicant should be determined from
the law in force at the time of their birth and circumstances of their birth. In Tan
Chong’s case, upon his birth he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father
(who was not a Spanish subject). In Lam Swee Sang’s case, besides the fact that his
father was a Chinese subject, there was no law on Philippine citizenship at the time
of his birth.

In both their cases, since their parents were not subjects of Spain, they both did not
acquire Philippine citizenship at birth by virtue of sec 4 of the Philippine Bill of
1902.

Ruling: SC’s decision in the first case of confirming the lower court’s judgment is set
aside, the judgment of the CFI of Manila appealed from is reversed and the
petitioner is recommitted to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration to be
dealt with in accordance with law.

SC’s decision in the second case is set aside, the decree of the CFI of Zamboanga
appealed from granting the applicant’s petition for naturalization is affirmed.

Notes: It is a case under the topic ‘conflicting decisions’ since these were the
decisions that came before it:
- Roa vs Collector of Customs, declared by court to be a citizen by jus soli.
- Paz Chua vs Secretary of Labor, not declared to be a citizen and held that jus
soli was never adopted in the Philippines.
- Torres vs Tan Chim, declared by court to be a citizen by jus soli.

TALAROC VERSUS UY
92 Phil 52

Application of res judicata [abandoned with finality in Tiao Tiam versus Republic 101 Phil 195

Facts: Alejandro Uy was elected as Municipal Mayor of Manticao, Misamis Oriental on Nov 13, 1951 .
One of the losing candidates (TALAROC) fild a petition for quo warranto vs. Uy [allegedly, Uy is a
CHINESE CITIZEN]. The court granted quo warranto petition and the position was deemed vacant.
Uy filed an appeal and alleged that:
(1) father was a subject of China (Uy Piangco) but had a Filipino mother
(2) born in Iligan, Province of Lanao in 1912 (so at the time this case was filed he was around 40 y.o.
(3) never been to China
(4) voted in previous elections, held offices in the government (inspector of Bureau of Plant Industry,
public school teacher, filing clerk, acting municipal treasurer)
(5) her mother was born a Filipino citizen but was only required to be a Chinese citizen by reason of
his father's national laws. Upon the death of Uy's father (in 1917), his mother reacquired her Filipino
citizenship

WON: Uy is a Filipino Citizen

HELD: YES

He was already a Filipino citizen by reason of his birth - he was born in RP, and jus soli was
followed at the time of his birth
Though his father is Chinese, his mother is Filipina. Upon death of his father, his mother
reacquired her Filipino citizenship and he thus followed the nationality of his mom.

He already exercised rights of a Filipino citizen

Teotimo Roriguez Tio Tiam Vs Republic

Facts: Teotimo Rodriguez Tio Tiam filed this petition for naturalization before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu praying that he be granted Philippine Citizenship. During the hearing, petitioner alleged that he was
born in Cebu City of Chinese parents on January 12, 1904 and has never left the Philippines since then. He
is married to a Chinese woman with whom he has eleven children. He considers himself Filipino and has
voted in the elections. On 1945, he took the oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. His wife and children never registered as aliens in the Bureau of
Immigration. During the occupation, he joined the Cebu Guerrilla Command with the rank of second
lieutenant. He finished first year high school while all his children are presently studying in schools
recognized by the Government. He is at present a businessman and is a registered owner of several real
properties situated in Cebu City. He has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipino people. He has never been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government nor is he affiliated with any person or association
with subversive ideas. He is not a believer in the practice of polygamy and is not suffering from any
mental ailment or any incurable contagious disease. He believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution and is able to speak and write English and Chinese languages and the Cebuano dialect. And
he was once brought to Camp Murphy, Philippine Army Headquarters, where he was investigated for the
charge of rebellion and multiple murder, but subsequently, however, he was cleared by the army
authorities. The Government contended that the petitioner shold be disqualified since he does not
possess good character. However, the reposndents did not introduce any evidence except the testimony,
Chief of National Bureau of Investigation to cover the case of petitioner and that said agent obtained a
sworn statement that petitioner had illicit relations with another woman. But the said woman failed to
appear to substantiate the charge.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is qualified for the benefit of naturalization law? -Yes
Held: Petitioner can be given the benefit of our naturalization law considering that, as his evidence shows,
he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed in the law for the
acquisition of Philippine ciaractertizenship.

The claim of the Government that petitioner is disqualified to be naturalized because he does not possess
good moral character or has not behaved in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, cannot therefore be sustained.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that petitioner is granted Philippine
citizenship subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 530.

Election Laws

MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999)

G. R. No. 135083

Facts:

•Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City during
the May 11, 1998 elections.

•A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano is an
American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent.

•COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on
May 7, 1998 on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local Goverment Code
from running any elective position.

•Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even
after the election.

•The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was opposed by the
private respondent.

•On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the decision of the
COMELEC's Second Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vicemayor
of Makati.

•Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of
canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.

•Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.

Issues:
 1.WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party
in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.

2.WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?

3.WON there was a valid election of citizenship?

Reasons:

1.Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to
File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's
purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local
position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Mercado since
the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage
of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from§6 of R.A. No. 6646 or
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en
banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying
this petition for certiorari.

2. NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Local
Government Code (which declares as “disqualified from running for elective local position… Those with
dual-citizenship”), Congress has “command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing
dual allegiance to hold elective office.”

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of
circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states.
Dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this
raises a question of which state’s law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a country’s
sovereignty. Hence, “dual citizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean “dual
allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

3. Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for
candidacy, such persons with dual citizenship have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their
dual citizenship. In private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath
on March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.Ruling:Petition is DISMISSED.

0
G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000
o Principle of jus sanguinis
o How Philippine citizenship is acquired
o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other
citizenship
 FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia
and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has
since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles
filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an
Australian.

ISSUE:
o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino- yes

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.

Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were
the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC (DIGEST)

23 July 2008

GR No. 182701

TOPIC:
Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship

FACTS:

Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of

Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on
October 29, 2007. He was eventually declared the winner.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before

the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for
the disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for
any public office.

Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the

Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he
possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the

petition for disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay
Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
elections, Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to

petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the
office of Barangay Chairman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for disqualifying petitioner.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC

committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as
candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.

Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American

citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became
a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who
re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the
Philippines.

Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those

who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines

shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
 citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles,
California; the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public
office.

Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the

absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this
Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive
mandate of law.

Jacot vs. Dal

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground
that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more
than one citizenship.

AAJS, CALILUNG VS. DATUMANONG

H. R. No. 160869, May 11, 2009

[Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; RA 9225 - Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003]

FACTS:

Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA 9225, or Act
Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending
for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that
said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.

RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-executing
provision.

What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance.

Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1

CO vs. HRET

Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,
Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from
China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private
respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984,
the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose
Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the
1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private
respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to
establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented
house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

Board of Commissioners vs. Judge De la Rosa 197 scra 853

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana
Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together
with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued
by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of
foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an
identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice
to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such
included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued
an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of William and
was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child.
Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the constitution.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan
Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation
Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime
now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988
after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for
self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with
NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation
proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause. -yes

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. -yes

(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of
petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126,
Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving
vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to
the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing
presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule
that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section
37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a
ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never
construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with
assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign
power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

ALVAREZ VS CFI

NARCISO ALVAREZ vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD
 G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

Facts: the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to
Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner
kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him
in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the
law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable
person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the
seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be
disposed of in accordance with the law.

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and
residence at seven o’clock on the night and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal
revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books,
four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-
eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit
receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan
contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.

As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the
petitioner filed a motion praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be
declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. Motion granted. Attorney
Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order be set aside
and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for
the necessary investigation.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the affidavit is valid for purposes in issuing a search warrant

2. Whether or not affidavit of witnesses is needed

3. Whether or not the constitutional mandate that the thing to be seized is particularly described is
violated

4. Whether or not fishing evidence is valid

Ruling:

1. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of
a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant
be held liable for damages caused

it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held
that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other
papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

2. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the
application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively
upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition
of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative
necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is
nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or
more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of
the search warrant.

3. These provisions of the constitution are mandatory and must be strictly complied with but where, by
the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The only description of the
articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: “that there are being kept in said
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law.” Taking into
consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed
description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the
officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the
articles, which he did.

4. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books
and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and
later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that
may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the
purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were
found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of
the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the
validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the
AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in
Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search warrants.

Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the
effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied
for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not
suffice.

People vs. Dichoso, GR Nos. 101216-18

Posted by Pius Morados on November 11, 2011
(Constitutional Law – Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, General Warrant,
Inadmissible Evidence)

Facts: A search warrant of marijuana and shabu in appellant’s residence was issued
after probable cause was personally determined by the judge after examination of
the applicant. Appellant contends that the search warrant is a general warrant
which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated, and the search
conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Held: No. The search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it

particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies the
offense involved. Items seized are admissible.

People vs. Salanguit

August 10, 2013
GR No. 133254-55, April 19, 2001

FACTS:

Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search the residence of accused-
appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua,
who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu
from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua
saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room.
The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued.

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody opened it.
They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and entered the house.

After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also
containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which
appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station
10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

HELD:

Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at
all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its
existence.

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable

cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items
not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search
for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and
possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of
R.A. No. 6425.

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and
defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which
belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus
be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.

The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or

shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the
ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This
is contested by accused-appellant.

Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a)
prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate
apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.

The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in
the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that
the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search
warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any
basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found.

A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and
the premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a
search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit
violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.

The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his depostion, was invalid. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint.
There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
 BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent
G.R No. 153087, August 7, 2003
FACTS:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser together with his witness Ruel
Nalagon applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of
petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as “Rumolo Nala
alias Long” of “Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.” The application was filed in
connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum
and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same day,
respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, issued Search and Seizure
Warrant .On July 4, 2001, at around 6:30 in the morning, Alcoser and other police
officer search the petitioner’s house and allegedly seized the following: (1) one piece
caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609; (2) one pc.
Fragmentation grenade (cacao type); (3) one pc. .22 long barrel; (4) 5- pcs live
ammunition for caliber .38 revolver; and (5) 4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and
unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu. Petitioner
questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash
but was denied by the judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition
and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who
personally conducted a surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon.
The fact that the items seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does
not invalidate the same because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime
of illegal possession of firearms. Respondent judge also found that petitioner was
sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously stated
therein as “Romulo” and not “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was couched in
terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner
and no other.
ISSUES:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant
against petitioner?
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioner’s
residence are admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms were
not listed in the search and seizure warrant. Immaterial due to a void search
warrant.
RULING:
(1) YES. the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first
name of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not
invalidate the warrant because the additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is
said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled
the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner. . What is prohibited is a
warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case,
contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused
without difficulty.
(2) NO. Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3
Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it
mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. PO3 Alcoser and his
witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal knowledge but only personal belief of
petitioner’s lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and did
not adduce the evidence required to prove the existence of probable cause. Hence,
the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented is void.

(3) The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was
gained by virtue of a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of
the search are inadmissible against the accused. Prohibited articles may be seized
but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was
no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the
petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to
seize the pistol and bullets.”

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Search and
Seizure Warrant is declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are
declared inadmissible in evidence.

G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988

20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE
LEDESMA, respondents.

FACTS:
On August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel,
in a letter-complaint, sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance
in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film
piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape
outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out
of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property).
The NBI, in response to the letter-complaint, conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed
three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants on the
basis of the statements of applicant NBI’s witnesses which were taken through
searching questions and answers. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents,
raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.
The lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private
respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the
said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and
its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have
been committed.
On October 8, 1985, the lower court issued an order in lifting the three search
warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
lower court in its order dated January 2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court.
The petition was dismissed. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are affirmed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier.
2. Whether or not respondent court did commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the questioned order.

RULING:
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
In the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49, the
copyright infringement law, the court lifted the three questioned search warrants.
NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject
matter. Of the three witnesses in the application of search warrant, only one of
them, who is the petitioner’s counsel, had the personal knowledge of the subject
matter. The lower court declared that the testimony of the petitioner’s counsel did
not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes
were not shown to the court during the application.
 A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders.
Grave abuse of discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders
were motivated by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so when the
erroneous findings collided with the constitutional rights of the private
respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even contest the righteousness and
legality of the questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged denial of
due process of law.
G.R. No. 11318, August 28, 1996
Columbia pictures Inc., petitioners
vs.
Court of Appeals, respondents

Facts:
The Petitioners with the National Bureau of Investigation filed a complaint
for violation of P.D. 49 and sought assistance with the NBI’S anti-film privacy against
Sunshine Home Video Inc. which is owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario. On
November 14, 1987 NBI Senior Agent Reyes applied for a search warrant with a
court a quo against Sunshine Home Video Inc. seeking the seizure, among others, of
pirated video tapes of copyrighted films and television sets, video cassettes, laser
recording equipments and other machines and paraphernalia used for the unlawful
exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videogram tapes in
the premises. The search warrant was served about 1:45 p.m. on December 14,
1987 and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films
owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants, machines and
equipments. On December 16, 1987 a RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT was filed
with the court and MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER OF SEARCH WARRANT for lack of
merit in which the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly copies
were never presented in the proceedings in the issuance of search warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a probable cause for the issuance of the Search
Warrant.

Ruling:
Probable cause for a search warrant has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be search. Hence, the applicant must present to the
court the copyrighted films to compare with the purchase evidence of the video
tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an authorized
reproduction of the owner. The judge bases for the issuance of the search warrant is
only the personal knowledge of the subject matter of NBI Agent Reyes, Atty. Rico
Domingo and Rene Baltazar and also their respective testimonies without stating
the fact by which these were pirated and it is a conclusion of facts without basis. A
search warrant not based on a probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the
issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation and arbitrary.