Definite Descriptions and Self-Identity

Author(s): Jaakko Hintikka

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 15, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Feb., 1964), pp. 5-7
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318462
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 DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AND SELF-IDENTITY 5

terpretation. I hope to have provided arguments in favor at least of (i) and

(iii). As for (ii) we may note that the internal interpretation of belief opera-
tors appears in most cases to be the "natural" one, whereas the external inter-
pretation has an air of "philosophical sophistication" about it. When we
say "I believe that p," the intention is ordinarily, I think, to express our be-
lief that p, not to express the proposition that we believe that p. Indeed, it
seems to me that sentences of form (A) would not appear absurd unless the
belief operators involved (explicitly or implicitly) were interpreted in this
internal and natural manner.

Received September 15, 1962

NOTES
1 See for instance M. Black, "Saying and Disbelieving," Problems of Analysi
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 46-57, where further references may b
2DL is identical with the deontic system D2 described in E. J. Lemmon
Foundations for Lewis Modal Systems," Journal of Symbolic Logic, 22:176-86 (1957).
3 "Interpretations of Deontic Logic," forthcoming in Mind.
' It may be noted that rigorous semantical foundations of a "model-theoretical" kind
are available for the respective senses of belief operators discussed in this section. As for
the external one, see S. Kanger, "The Moming Star Paradox," Theoria, 23:1-11 (1957),
and for the internal one, Kanger, New Foundations for Ethical Theory (Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1957).
'Another formalization of (A) that might suggest itself is 'L,oKpLNp' which is
equivalent in BL to 'KL1opL1oL5Np.' If BL is equipped with suitable reduction theses for
iterated belief operators, the latter formula becomes equivalent to (A2), so (A) will still
be a contradiction of BL.

Definite Descrittions and Self Idetdity

by JAAKKO HINTIKKA
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI AND BROWN UNIVERSITY

IN A recent note in this journal' Karel Lambert has pointed out that the
suggestions made in my paper "Towards a Theory of Definite Descriptions"2
stand in need of revision. I wish to submit that mine is a case of a misplaced
reservatio mentalis rather than of a downright inconsistency. Making this
point goes beyond the purposes of mere self-defense, for what it gives us is
a way of handling definite descriptions different from those discussed by
Lambert.
My original suggestion was that while there are many things about def-
inite descriptions that we may be uncertain about, in any case we seem to
know what it means for an individual to be the individual satisfying an open

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6 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

sentence p (whose only free variable is, say, x): it means satisfying p, and
being the only individual to do so. In short, I suggested trying

(1) y (tx)xO -.: y (x)(x D x =y)

as a basis for a theory of definite descriptions.*
It is easy to see why (1) might give rise to trouble. If we substitute (
for y in (1), we see that we can prove

(2) (tx) Ox
and

(3) (x) (Ox D x =(a) )

provided that we have

(4) (tx) x = (Lx) >x.

Now Lambert deduces a contradiction from (2). And (3) is also quite dis-
concerting: it implies that there cannot be more than one individual satis-
fying our arbitrary sentence q5.
If the origin of trouble is as obvious as this, a remedy is also close at hand.
Why should we accept (4)? It results from the familiar identity axiom y - y
by substituting a description for the free variable y. But need the substitu-
tion be allowed? I do not see any compelling reasons why it should. Even
if definite descriptions are normally substitutable for free variables, as we
assumed in my original paper, some restrictions may still be in order. Un-
fortunately, these restrictions were left unexamined in my paper. Unfortu-
nately so, because we can apparently rid ourselves of all difficulties if we
merely disallow substituting definite descriptions for y in the identity axiom
y y of my paper, leaving everything else intact.
In some other systems, this restriction implies further restrictions as to
what can be substituted for free individual variables elsewhere. For instance,
we may have to say that no definite description is substitutable for a free
individual variable in an argument in which this variable has been earlier
substituted for y in the identity axiom y y (or (y) (y - y) ).
This course may seem strange, for self-identity may seem to be the one
thing we are justified in asserting of everything whatsoever. But if we forget
our metaphysical ideas about self-identity, by which we so easily entrance
ourselves anyway, the strangeness can perhaps be made to disappear. If you
look instead at the semantical rules which govern the interpretation of our
formulas, I think you can see that the main purpose of the axiom y y is
to make sure that our singular terms refer to one and the same individual at
all their occurrences (instead of merely referring to individuals with the
* EDITORS' NOTE: Limitations of the Linotype font have made it necessary to use the
regular instead of inverted iota.

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 FORMAL RESULTS IN THE LOGIC OF EXISTENCE 7

same properties and relations). And if so, there need not be anything very
strange about giving up this requirement in the special case of definite de-
scriptions. For if there is no unique object meeting a description, there
perhaps need not be anything perverse in the idea that the different occur-
rences of this description may refer to different individuals. After all, dif-
ferent occurrences of an indefinite description like "some man" may very
well refer to different individuals at their different occurrences (as, for ex-
ample, in "some man is as tall as some other man"). Is it so very strange
to assimilate definite descriptions to indefinite ones in those cases in which
there exists no unique object answering to the description?
The restriction I am proposing may thus be much more natural than first
appears. Because the restriction is a very limited one, the resulting theory
of definite descriptions has most of the features we should like it to have.
For instance, Lambert's (23) and (26) are still available. In fact, the re-
striction I am proposing is in certain respects less restrictive than the one
advocated by Lambert. He in effect restricts (1) by requiring that y must
be a term whose bearer really exists; and this restriction affects other singular
terms in addition to definite descriptions. Under the course I am suggest-
ing, only definite descriptions are affected. As a consequence, for free in-
dividual variables we readily have some results, for example, y - (Lx) (x - y)
which Lambert would like to have but does not have without additional as-
sumptions.

Received September 24, 1962

NOTES
Karel Lambert, "Notes on 'E!': III," Philosophical Studies, 13:51-59 (1962).
' K. J. J. Hintikka, "Towards a Theory of Definite Descriptions," Analysis, 19:79-85
(1959).

Formal Results in the Logic of Existence

by ROBERT MURRAY JONES

DOCUMENTATION INCORPORATED

RESCHER' has pointed out certain results that are obtainabl

logic of singular existence,2 and both Rescher and Lambert3
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The research for this paper was supported in part by
fice of Scientific Research, Contract No. AF49(638)-1146, Directorate
Sciences.

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