Article 11 - Accountability of Public Officers : Case Digest
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
Francisco vs House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Ccarpio Morales, j.:
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The
complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint
was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on
June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on
October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
Facts:
1. On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint
(First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution.
2. On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al.
against the same respondent also based on betrayal of public trust
and culpable violation of the Constitution.
3. On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the
House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time.
4. On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First
and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010,
 the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints
were sufficient in form.
5. On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the
Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment
proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner: She invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to
"determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before
public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner
filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone
beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance
of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
6. The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14
September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status
quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against
petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the
Court that all the Justices should have been given time, at least an
hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of
the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)
7. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine
whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in
the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?
Held: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the
Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the
Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
Held: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on
the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on
the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules)
present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely
when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable
officer within a period of one year.
Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?
Held: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint:
the filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House
Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period.
Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance?
Held: YES. Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules
are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the
substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee.
In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is
made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article
XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that
a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment
complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process,
hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Issue #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis petitioner’s submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints?
Held: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of
Representatives.)
Issue #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay
in the publication of the Impeachment Rules?
Held: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between
publication and promulgation.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on
August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on
September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially
identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general
circulation.
Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of
due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the
sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention
on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that
"Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section."
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to
"the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily
in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there
is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses
the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances involves
the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating
from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as
well as other constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms
"promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules
for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to
the clerk of court for filing and publication.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understood—that is, to make known. Since the Constitutional
Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former
should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate
its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver
the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for
the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific
method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode
of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is
a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does
not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where
impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would
already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day
period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules.
In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its
inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion
of the publication requirement. (Just like what happened in this
case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15th Congress
open its first session)
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the
rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the
purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse
of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt
the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency
in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In
other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress’
Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects
of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner fails
to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is
primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for
the punishment of the offender.
Issue #7: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?
Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Held: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file
the complaint and referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is
reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is
referred to the House Committee on Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of
initiation because "something prior to that had already been done.”
This is wrong. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification
of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps
done prior to the filing – would already initiate the impeachment
proceedings.
Issue #8: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one
impeachable offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion
when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, which provides that
"the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far
as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."
Petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure on one offense per complaint rule. To petitioner,
the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance
since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will
confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers
of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a
whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official
functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent
from completing its report within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the
Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one
offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the
broad terms cannot be defined with the same precision required in
defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for
impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue
respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which
the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and
not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the
complaint or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike
an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People
of the Philippines.
Held: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment
offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment,
assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It,
therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense.
Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant
constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on
Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application
of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which
must be made by the House93 which has yet to pass upon the question,
the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of
Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution
allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
known as the "Articles of Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an
impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable
offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In
rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution
allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.
Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need
to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation
depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation
may come today or may come later on after determination of the
sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of
consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioner’s
petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely
"contemplated."96
Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not
yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a
determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
anticipatory.97
Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two
impeachment complaints were deemedconsolidated,98 her claim that
consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory obviously
springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court
already brushed aside.
REPUBLIC VS SERENO
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor
General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent
Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and
to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom.
Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of
Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009.
On July 2010, Respondent submitted her application for the position
of Associate Justice of the SC.
Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to
2006 and despite having been employed as legal counsel of various
government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP Human
Resources Development Office, Central Records Division of the Office
of the Ombudsman, and the Office of Recruitment Selection and
Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that
the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
available on record and filed by Respondent were those for the years
1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and
2002, or only 11 out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No
SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal
counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned
from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and when she supposedly
re-entered government service as of 16 August 2010.
Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August 2010 by
President Benigno Aquino III.
When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the
JBC announced the opening for applications and nominations,
requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December
2011 (instead of the usual last two years of public service) and stating
that, “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”
Respondent accepted several nominations for the position of Chief
Justice, and submitted requirements in support thereof.
On 20 July 2012, the JBC in a special meeting en banc deliberated on
nominees with incomplete documentary requirements. The minutes of
the deliberation show that Respondent has not submitted her SALNs
for a period of ten years, from 1986 to 2006, the duration for which,
according to Senator Escudero (ex officio member of the JBC), she
was a professor in UP and was therefore required to submit SALNs.
Apart from Respondent, several other candidates had incomplete
documents such that the JBC En Banc agreed to extend the deadline
for submission. It also delegated to the Execom the determination of
whether or not the candidate has substantially complied, failure to do
so resulting in the exclusion from the list of candidates to be
interviewed and considered for nomination.
Pursuant to this, the OSRN required Respondent to submit her SALNs
for the years 1995-1999, the period within which she was employed by
UP. Respondent replied through a letter that considering that such
government records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is reasonable
to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also assured
OSRN that UP has cleared her of all responsibilities, accountabilities,
and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly, she emphasized that her
service in the government was not continuous, having had a break
between 2006 (when her service in UP ended) and 2010 (when she
was appointed to the SC).
Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the JBC. Neither
can the JBC Execom produce minutes of the deliberations to consider
the issue of substantial compliance with documentary requirements.
However, despite having submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the
Report regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates
shows that her name was annotated with “COMPLETE
REQUIREMENTS”, noting her letter that it was infeasible to retrieve all
files. The same annotation was found in another list regarding SALN
submissions of 20 candidates, including Respondent.
Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25
August 2012. Five years later, an impeachment complaint was filed by
Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice. Included in
the complaint was the allegation that Respondent failed to make a
truthful statement of her SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House
spawned a letter dated 21 February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the
OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against
Respondent.
Case for the Petitioner:
The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available remedy
in questioning the validity of Respondent’s appointment, and that the
one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It also argues that
the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The petition alleges that the
failure of Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC
disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the position
of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of SALNs, Respondent
has not proven her integrity, which is a requirement under the
Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since Respondent is
ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity,
she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo
warranto.
Case for the Respondent:
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may only
be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis of the Constitution
and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively, she argues that the
present petition is time-barred, as it should have been filed within one
year from the cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the
disqualification.
It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers without
pay or those who do not receive compensation are not required to file
a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that she was on
official leave without pay, she was actually not required to file any
SALN. She adds that to require the submission of SALNs as an
absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided by the
Constitution.
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of
Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as sufficient and
acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she consistently
filed her SALNs.” Respondent argues that the Court’s rationale in
Doblada that one cannot readily conclude failure to file SALNs simply
because these documents are missing in the Office of the Court
Administrator's files should likewise be made applicable to her case.
In Respondent’s Reply, she also raised the issue of forum-
shopping against Petitioner.
Motions for Inhibition:
Respondent filed motions for the inhibition of five Justices (Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo- de Castro), imputing actual
bias for having testified in the House Committee for Justice on the
impeachment complaint and on Justice Tijam for allegedly stating, in a
Manila Times article, that Respondent is in culpable violation of the
Constitution if she continues to ignore the impeachment process. She
alleged that their testimonies show that they harbored personal
resentment and ill feelings towards her, and that she has already been
pre-judged by some as having committed a culpable violation of the
Constitution for having failed to submit her SALNs, among others. She
also sought to disqualify Justice Martires for his insinuations during the
Oral Arguments questioning her mental and psychological fitness.
Issues:
A. Preliminary Issues
1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.
2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the Associate
Justices on the basis of actual bias is proper.
B. Substantive Issues
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to
the instant petition for quo warranto against Respondent who is an
impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has
already been filed with the House of Representatives;
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of
prescription;
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination
is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC, and whether such
determination partakes of the character of a political question outside
the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and
regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the
nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice;
c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs
as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs
to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as
Chief Justice; and
d. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold the position
of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and
the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.
Ruling on the Preliminary Issues:
1. Motions for Intervention
The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the
motions for intervention filed by several other groups. It observed that
intervention is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion; that
movant- intervenors have no legal interest in the case, as required in
order to qualify a person to intervene; and that the remedy of quo
warranto is vested in the people, and not in a particular group. Lastly,
such individuals do not claim a right to the questioned position, which
is the only time when an individual himself/herself may commence an
action for quo warranto. In this case, the movants-intervenors are
neither individuals claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor
are they the ones charged with the usurpation thereof.
2. Motions for Inhibition
There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant must
prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify
a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a whole, was only to prod
the Respondent to observe and respect the constitutional process of
impeachment. It does not appear that there are grounds for
compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that
some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the
Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the
impeachment of Respondent does not disqualify them to hear the
instant petition. Their appearance was in deference to the House of
Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the
impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not be
doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme
Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the
Court set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing should be
carefully viewed within this context, and should not be hastily
interpreted as an adverse attack against Respondent.
Ruling on the Substantive Issues:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course
to the instant petition for quo warranto against Respondent who
is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of
Representatives. YES
a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original
jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue
for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when
commenced by the Solicitor General.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified
considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in
question, and the issue is of public concern.
The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The
instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance
to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and
appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the
Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.
b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such
that a quo warranto petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the
origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are
materially different. While both impeachment and quo warranto may
result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially
differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in
nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding
traditionally lodged in the courts.
Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the
Respondent, because quo warranto and impeachment can proceed
independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction
(2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. The causes of action in the two
proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of
action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or
exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission
of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two
proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction
shall result in the removal of the Respondent from the public office that
he/she is legally holding. Furthermore, the impeachment case is yet to
be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the
Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case
against the Respondent. The proceedings in the House are merely in
the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is
sought to be determined.
c. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed
from office. Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules
expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this
would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo
warranto petition against an impeachable officer (see cases of Estrada
v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal- Arroyo where SC took
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against former President
Macapagal- Arroyo considering whether former President Estrada’s
act of resignation ended his official status as President).
Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution
does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers:
“[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office ...” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which, in
statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment
admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute
such that only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment does not mean that it is to be taken as a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. The word “may” cannot
also be understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because it
would lead to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may be
imposed — a situation not contemplated in the language of the
Constitutional provision.
The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments
even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd
situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned, on the basis of citizenship or membership in the Bar, for
example. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds for
impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging
the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from
holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible
public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising
sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from
office through impeachment.
d. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto
petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. At the
outset, an action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of
an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto
conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude the
House of Representatives from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the
Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising
its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed
part of the allegations in the Articles of Impeachment, which in itself is
a Constitutional requirement, the violation of which constitutes
culpable violation of the Constitution. But unlike other impeachable
officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance with the
qualifications of having to be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence — and the failure to submit SALNs goes
into the very qualification of integrity.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obviate confusion in
the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible
public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court’s
function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution,
the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior
to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. On the
contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise.
e. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced. An outright dismissal of
the petition based on speculation that Respondent will eventually be
tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle
an actual controversy squarely presented before it. There is also no
possibility of a constitutional crisis upon which an abdication of such
duty is to be premised because, as discussed, it is within the Court’s
judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies
involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is
not arrogating upon itself the power to impeach, which is a political
exercise.
f. Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary
appearance. Respondent cannot now be heard to deny the Court’s
jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an impeachable
official because Respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative
relief from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members
of this Court and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments,
albeit ad cautelam.
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of
prescription. NO
a. Prescription does not lie against the State. The one-year limitation
is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a mere private individual
pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief
for a public wrong and suing for public interest. In the three
instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is
mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo
warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili
v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary
statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.” In effect,
when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding
mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground
of laches or prescription.
Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie against
the State” which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil
Code, applies in this case.
b. Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the
prescriptive period. That prescription does not lie in this case can also
be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto, which
is to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted.
The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning Respondent’s
qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.
Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should
not be required to submit the said documents as she was considered
to be coming from private practice; that it was not feasible to retrieve
most of her records in the academe considering that the same are
more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of “all
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges”. She has never been
clear on whether she had filed the required SALNs or not. Given the
foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on
the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its
right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public
interest.
c. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the
novel issues imbued with public interest presented before Us than to
dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief
Justice. NO
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for
nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC and
whether such determination partakes of the character of a
political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review
powers. NO
The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that
the JBC complies with its own rules. In interpreting the power of the
Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the
Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Furthermore, while a
certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements. The question of whether or not
a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based
on facts and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of
discretion on the part of the nominating body. Proceeding from this,
qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained
away by the JBC — one such qualification is the requirement of
possession of proven integrity required not only in the Constitution, but
also mentioned in administrative cases, in the Canons of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the Code of
Professional Integrity, and in the JBC- 009 Rules.
b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by
the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing
rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs
voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief
Justice. YES
i. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing
of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity. Contrary to
Respondent’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no relation to
the requirement of integrity, the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional
and statutory requirement, under Section 17, Article XI of the
Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful compliance with
the requirement of the filing of SALN is rendered even more exacting
when the public official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.
ii. Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a
person’s integrity. To be of proven integrity, as required by
qualifications under the Constitution, means that the applicant must
have established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical
principles. In this line, failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of
the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the
ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards
the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption.
For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the
requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity
and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public
office.
Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate
integrity does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent accumulated
unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but whether she, in the
first place, complied with the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs.
iii. Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated
the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member
of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be
a person of proven integrity. Respondent could have easily dispelled
doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by
presenting them before the Court. Yet, Respondent opted to withhold
such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Her
defenses do not lie: 1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade
because in that case Doblada was able to present contrary proof that
the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA, thus
rendering inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file SALNs for a
number of years, as opposed to the present case where no proof of
existence and filing were presented; 2) Being on leave from
government service is not equivalent to separation from service such
that she was still required to submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While
Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her SALNs, logic
dictates that she should have obtained a certification to attest to the
fact of filing; 4) That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply
with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to comply with such is
incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for
the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that
time; 5) That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement
was reflected in the matrix of requirements and shortlist prepared by
the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes into her
qualifications which were mistakenly believed to be present, and that
she should have been disqualified at the outset.
iv. Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in
violation of the Constitutional and statutory requirements. The SALNs
filed by Respondent covering her years of government service in U.P.
appear to have been executed and filed under suspicious
circumstances; her SALNs filed with the UPHRDO were either
belatedly filed or belatedly notarized, while SALNs filed as Chief
Justice were also attended by irregularities. This puts in question the
truthfulness of such SALNs, and would amount to dishonesty if
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements.
c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of
SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to
submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment
of Respondent as Chief Justice. YES
i. The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the
applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. The established and undisputed fact is
Respondent failed to submit the required number of SALNs in violation
of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination. The
JBC determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006
and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during
those years was already required. There was no indication that the
JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011)
submitted by Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P.
College of Law and two years as Justice, as substantial compliance.
Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants
for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of
service in the U.P. College of Law.
In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require only the
submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for
applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En Banc
did not do away with the requirement of submission of SALNs, only
that substantial compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of the
SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs,
was deemed sufficient. Records clearly show that the only remaining
applicant-incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En
Banc to have substantially complied was Respondent, who submitted
only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of
the deadline for the submission to do so. Her justifications do not
persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs are old and are
infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able to retrieve some of the
SALNs dating back to 1985.
Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as having
complied with the submission of the SALN by submitting a Certificate
of Clearance issued by the U.P. HRDO. This clearance, however,
hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs.
Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such
failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the
JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the
Supreme Court.
For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered
Respondent for interview as it already required the submission of, at
least, the SALNs corresponding to the immediately preceding 10 years
up to December 31, 2011.
ii. Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several
years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her
application. Contrary to Respondent’s argument that failure to submit
her SALNs to the JBC is not cause for disqualification, the requirement
to submit the SALNs, along with the waiver of bank deposits, is not an
empty requirement that may easily be dispensed with, but was placed
by the JBC itself for a reason — in order to allow the JBC to carry on
its mandate of recommending only applicants of high standards and
who would be unsusceptible to impeachment attacks due to
inaccuracies in SALNs. Without submission of such requirement, the
JBC and the public are without opportunity to measure the candidate’s
fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. Respondent’s
failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not able
to prove her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
d. Whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the
appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
i. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured
by her nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. As
the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set
forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the
subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify
an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of
Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President
cannot override the minimum Constitutional qualifications.
The Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without
the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the Office of the
Executive Officer (OEO), as regards the circumstances relative to the
selection and nomination of Respondent submitted to this Court.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify
Respondent. The action of the JBC, particularly that of the Secretary
of Justice as ex-officio member, is reflective of the action of the
President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted
and nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in
the JBC, commits the same mistake and the President’s subsequent
act of appointing Respondent cannot have any curative effect.
While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the
President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-
negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other
legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the
appointment is susceptible to attack.
ii. The Court also took into account, while conceding that the petition
is not an administrative case nor an inquiry into tax evasion against
her, that Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts and
omissions demonstrating dishonesty and lack of forthrightness are
discordant with any claim of integrity. In addition to the suspicious and
highly questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of her
SALNs, the following untruthful statements and dishonest acts
ultimately negate Respondent's claim that she is a person of proven
integrity:
a. She engaged in private practice even if she had no permit from U.P.
to do so while she was in government service.
b. She represented that after her resignation from U.P. in 2006, she
was engaged, full time, in private practice. However, in her Personal
Data Sheet (PDS), it was stated that she was engaged as counsel by
the government in the PIATCO cases from 1994 up to 2009.
c. She claims that it is the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to
ensure that the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and
accomplished. However, U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to
perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Respondent
because such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
d. Her PDS shows that she was Deputy Commissioner of the
Commission on Human Rights only later to be disclaimed by her during
the Oral Argument stating that it was only a functional title.
e. In her Letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, respondent
represented that her SALNs were infeasible to retrieve when the
SALNs that she selectively filed were available all along in U.P. and in
fact the OSG was able to get copies of the same.
f. In the Letter, the Respondent reasoned that it is "infeasible to
retrieve" all her SALNs because of the age of said documents, i.e., that
they are more than fifteen years old. However, during her Oral
Arguments, she explained that it was "infeasible" to retrieve them only
because of time constraints.
g. She claims that the other candidates for the Chief Justice position
did not comply with the SALN requirement for the application, when it
was only she who did not comply.
h. She committed tax fraud when she failed to truthfully declare her
income in her income tax returns for the years 2007-2009 and in her
value-added tax (VAT) returns for the years 2005-2009.
iii. Further, Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit
dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested through her
subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice,
which are now matters of public record and also determined to be
constituting probable cause for impeachment:
a. Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth
at least Php5,000,000.00;
b. Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public
bidding and who received excessive compensation amounting to more
than Php 11,000,000.00;
c. Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel
accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN
Chief Justices meeting;
d. Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of
reopening the Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) without
being sanctioned by the Court En Banc;
e. Issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC
contrary to the Supreme Court's internal rules misrepresented that the
TRO was issued upon the recommendation of the Member-in- charge;
f. Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue
of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao;
g. Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of
survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of
survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices;
h. Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay
Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of the Philippine Mediation Center Office
(PMCO) without the approval of the Court En Banc;
i. Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several high-
ranking positions in the Supreme Court;
j. Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what
transpired during the Supreme Court En Banc deliberations in A.M.
No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent
judges in illegal drugs and undermined the co-equal power of the
Executive Department by ordering the Executive Secretary himself to
file cases against the judges;
k. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor
General, now Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza, by using highly
confidential document involving national security against the latter;
l. Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate
Justice in the Sandiganbayan without legal basis and in so doing,
impaired the power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary;
m. Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that
there were Justices who requested to do away with the voting of
recommended applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme
Court;
n. Manipulated the processes .of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta from the shortlist of
nominees for the position of Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals;
o. Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of
Representatives on the alleged misuse of the tobacco funds in the
Province ofllocos Norte by unilaterally preparing a Joint Statement,
asking the House of Representatives to reconsider its show cause
order against the Justices of the Court of Appeals, and then pressuring
then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. to likewise sign the same; and
p. Undermined and disrespected the impeachment proceedings
conducted by the House of Representatives against her.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer. DE FACTO
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible
therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of
title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title
thereto. As such, Respondent has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at
the instance of the State is proper to oust Respondent from the
appointive position of Chief Justice.
Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position
of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such
public office, the consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court is the ouster and exclusion of Respondent from holding
and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief
Justice.
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance of the Sub Judice Rule:
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of
the Government and even men and women learned in law had
succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to divert the instant quo
warranto action from its primary purpose. Even worse, Respondent
and her spokespersons chose to litigate Respondent's case, apart
from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the Court, before several media-
covered engagements. Through her actuations, Respondent appears
to have forgotten that this is a court action for quo warranto, and as
such, the concomitant rule on sub judice applies.
Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues on
hand, camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to judicial
independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind that this is a
fight for democracy. Once and for all, it should be stated that this is not
a fight for democracy nor for judicial independence. This is an
undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is called for by the Republic, to
judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the qualification, or
otherwise, of Respondent to occupy the highest position in the
Judiciary.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from
and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared
vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action
from the Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and
for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
Article XII - National Economy and Patrimony
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Facts: Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel
the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It
invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.”
Issue/s:
1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing,
whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence,
mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give
preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not
to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision
so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of
Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If
the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by
the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing
as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to
give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in
one part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists
in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained
to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of
the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is
mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes
the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state
action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered “state action”
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is
a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of “state
action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to
the people but also to the government as elements of the
State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions
of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction
is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in
the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules
expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared
the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not
to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest,
bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid
in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give
life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
FACTS: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC),
now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of
Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI for the transfer
of its proposed plant site from Bataan to Batangas and the shift
of the plant’s feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant from
“naphta only” to “naptha and/or liquefied petroleum gas. In
February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in
Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site
transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous
opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others,
the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating
that the investors have the final choice as to where to have
their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for
the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion
in yielding to the application of the investors without
considering the national interest
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave
abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original
application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the
product naphta as feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s
judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by
Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he
wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion.
He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action
in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by
our own government, could have been very beneficial to the
State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to
wit: “.. he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.
Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the
petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code
does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as
any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application.
She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does
not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner
should have appealed to the President of the country and not
to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987
Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated
that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to
enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
TELEBAP VS COMELEC
Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to
challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said
provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of
law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or
information during election period.
Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting,
whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by
the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated
as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amended by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision
that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by
amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast
stations and, until the present case was brought, such
provisions had not been thought of as taking property
without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution
authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common
good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not
only of candidates but even more of the public,
particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed
of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount."
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the
requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in
the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe
that government controls on broadcast media can
constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and
attention to public affairs to further the system of free
expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be
required to give free air time to candidates in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service.
PLDT VS NTC
In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by
Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as
to include telephony). FACI later changed its name to Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was
granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a
provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts
of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT)
opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is
not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated
when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in
1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCI’s shares
of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders
(Cellcom, Inc.? – not specified in the case); that such transfer
involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a
transfer of franchise which is void because the authorization of
Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT’s petition should prosper.
HELD: No.
1. PLDT cannot attack ETCI’s franchise in a petition for
certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be
directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto
which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a property
right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due
process of law. The determination of the right to the
exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo
warranto. Further, for any violation of the franchise, it
should be the government who should be filing a quo
warranto proceeding because it was the government
who granted it in the first place.
2. The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is
not tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a
distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization
of Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks.
Shareholders can transfer their shares to anyone. The
only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than
40% of the corporation’s stocks, it should be approved
by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have
been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization
from Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the
person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee
(ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of
stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of
which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise
 itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee
thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires
Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the
shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they
see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the
property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other
words, even if the original stockholders had transferred
their shares to another group of shareholders, the
franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as
the corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The
franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of the
shares. A corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of
continuity or perpetual succession.
TATAD VS SECRETARY OF ENERGY
Facts: Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history
shows that the government has always been finding ways to
alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such
law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180.
This law allows that “any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from
a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such
crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,” subject only
to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the
constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the
imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products violates the equal
protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff
differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream
oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to
source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be
taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude
products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180
because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly
which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that
our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other
players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of
their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new
players. New players that intend to equalize the market power
of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge
disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will
be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective
players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The
first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted
by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it
discriminated against the “new players” insofar as it placed them
at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already
being observed by the latter.