PCGG vs Sandiganbayan, et al

G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005

FACTS

On February 1991, Former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoz, who has currently resumed the private
practice of law, was sought to be disqualified from representing the Lucio Tan group, in the 1987 case
involving General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) as one of those properties subject to a writ of
sequestration by PCGG being alleged to be ill –gotten wealth acquired during the Marcos Regime. It was
averred by the PCGG that there exists an adverse interest on Mendoza since he was the one who filed a
petition praying for assistance and supervision of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK when he was
still a Solicitor General, which bank was subsequently owned by the Lucio Tan group when it submitted
the winning bid.

PCGG invokes Rule 6.03of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.”

Sandiganbayan rejects PCGG’s motion by arguing that CGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group and that Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986.

ISSUE

Whether or not Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza

RULING

No, Rule 6.03 of the CPR is inapplicable in the case. Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service. The motion for disqualification should be dismissed for the
following reasons:

1) After discussing the history of the present Code of Professional Responsibility which revealed
that the word “intervene” is applicable to both adverse interest conflicts and congruent interest
conflicts, it has been found that neither of these conflicts exists in the liquidation case and the
sequestration case.

2) The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.

The “matter” where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided
by law to liquidate GENBANK through the courts and in filing the necessary petition in the then Court of
First Instance. The subject “matter” of the special proceeding, therefore, is not the same nor is related
to but is different from the subject “matter” in the civil case. The civil case involves the sequestration of
the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-
gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the
Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers.

3) Mendoza’s intervention in the liquidation of Genbank is not substantial and significant to

warrant disqualification.
The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, the
petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.

It is worthy to note that in construing the words of such rule in this case, the Court balanced the two
policy considerations of having a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent and the
use of former government employment as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel.
 LOTHAR SCHULZ vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES

A.C. No. 4219, 8 December 2003

FACTS

Lothar Schulz, a German national filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Marcelo G.
Flores. He alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purposes of filing a complaint
against Wilson Ong for revocation of contract and damages for the latter’s failure to deliver the jeep he
sold to complainant within the stipulated period. Respondent advised him that there was no need to
refer the complaint for barangay conciliation. Three months later, respondent instructed him to file his
complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa of Tabuc-tubig, Dumaguete City. Wilson Ong refused to appear
at the conciliation hearings, arguing that the Lupon of Tabuc-tubig had no jurisdiction over his person
because he was a resident of Barangay Banilad. Complainant thus brought the complaint before the
Barangay Captain of Banilad. By that time, however, complainant learned that Wilson Ong had already
filed a case for Specific Performance against him before the RTC. Complainant argued that respondent’s
inordinate delay in acting on his case resulted in his being defendant rather than a complainant against
Wilson Ong.

Complainant also charged respondent with collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and of
unjustifiably refusing to return his files. He undertook to pay respondent attorney’s fees of P5, 000.00 if
the case does not reach the court, and P10, 000.00 attorney’s fees and P500.00 appearance fees if it
reaches the court. This notwithstanding, respondent alleged in the Answer with Counterclaim which he
prepared on behalf of complainant that his attorney’s fees was P50,000.00 and appearance fee was
P1,000.00 per hearing. When complainant questioned him about this, respondent explained that it was
Wilson Ong who will be made to pay for the said fees. This, complainant claimed, showed respondent’s
deceit and lack of candor in his dealings with his parties in court.

Further, complainant alleged that since he suspected respondent of not protecting his interest. He
instructed respondent to withdraw his appearance as his counsel after the filing of the
answer. Thereafter, he asked respondent to return the amount of P12, 000.00 out of the total of P17,
000.00 that he has paid to the latter, inasmuch as the amount of P5, 000.00 should be sufficient
compensation for the minimal services rendered by him. Respondent, however, refused to return the
amount to complainant and, instead, demanded additional fees. Complainant’s new counsel wrote a
formal demand letter to respondent which, however, was ignored. This prompted complainant to file a
complaint with the LuponTagapayapa of Barangay Bantayan where respondent resided. After the
parties failed to reach a settlement, complainant instituted an action for sum of money against
respondent.

ISSUE

Was there failure on respondent’s duty to his client?

RULING

Respondent was presumed to be knowledgeable on the laws, but in this case, it turned out that Atty.
Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all disputes,
except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included),
between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first under the system
of barangay conciliation. He was not all certain if the complaint of Lothar Schulz falls under PD No. 1508
or not. As Lothar Schulz narrated, Atty. Flores told him at first that there was no need for his complaint
to be coursed through the barangay authorities.

Furthermore, Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member
of the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:

CANON 17. – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Likewise, respondent erred in not returning complainant’s money despite demands after his failure to
file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no
financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainant’s papers. This conduct
violated the following Canon:

CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

Rule 16.03. – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand.

Wherefore, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Atty. MARCELO G. FLORES is found guilty of
negligence and incompetence, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately. He is ordered to RETURN to complainant Lothar Schulz the amount of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12, 000.00) with legal interest from the date of promulgation of this Resolution, and
all papers which came into his custody as a result of having served as counsel for said
complainant. Respondent is further STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
 In re: Integration of the Bar of the PH

49 SCRA 22, 9 Jan 1973

FACTS

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on
the proposed integration.

ISSUES

1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional
authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as
well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax.
The Court held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to
become a member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to
 provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend
meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court
held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state”

2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer
may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make
every government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out
his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.

3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.
 Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo

A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012

FACTS

This is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Bernardo. Complainants alleged that Atty. Bernardo willfully
and with intent to defraud the complainants. Atty. Bernardo, with one Magat, connived in defrauding
the Bengcos to give the former P495, 000.00 for them to be able to expedite the titling of the land of the
Miranda’s in Tagaytay. Atty. Bernardo even represented that he had connections in the CENRO, DENRO,
NAMREA and Register of Deeds that will help them expedite the titling. A further representation made
by Atty. Bernardo was that he was, according to him, the lawyer of Wiliam Gatchalian who was the
prospective buyer, after the land would already have a title. All the representations were allegedly made
with the knowledge of it falsity. In the said disbarment case, Atty. Bernardo requested multiple times to
extend his period to answer but when, finally, a mandatory conference was called by the Commissioner,
Atty. Bernardo never showed up.

Simultaneous with the disbarment case was a criminal case filed in court for Estafa, which ended with
the conviction of Atty. Bernardo and Magat.

One of the defenses of Atty. Bernardo was that the action was already prescribed because the alleged
act was committed in 1997 but the action was only filed in 2004.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Bernardo is liable for the acts committed.

RULING

The SC emphasized the duty of every lawyer not just to maintain legal proficiency but also high
standards of morality, honesty and integrity, since in that case the people’s faith and confidence of the
legal system is ensured. Under Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
should not do acts primarily to solicit legal business and a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services, respectively. The act of Atty. Bernardo in making
representations that he can expedite the titling of the land for P495, 000.00 is a blatant violation of the
rule. Much more, the wilful act of deceiving the Bengcos is an express violation of the rule.

SC said that the practice of law is not an enterprise. It is primarily for public service, more than anything.
Furthermore, the SC took the failure of Atty. Bernardo to immediately file his answer and his failure to
appear in the mandatory conference is showing of his little regard to the legal system, a system that he
took oath to protect. The SC suspended Atty. Bernardo for 1 year.
 JOSELITO F. TEJANO vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA

A.C. No. 8235, 27 January 2015

FACTS

Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court against his counsel, Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his] cause”, and Judge
Dominador Arquelada of acting in conspiracy to take possession of his property, which was the subject
matter of litigation in the judge’s court.

The Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on the complaint to which he explained that he had
been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint.

The Court, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory” and admonished him “to be more
heedful of the Court’s directives” and referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation, which found sufficient ground for disciplinary action against Atty. Baterina.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty Baterina liable for gross negligence in his duty as counsel to his client

RULING
The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers’ states:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client
with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him.”25 A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly
stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.”