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Jack Downey

Within the context of 1474-1598 to what extent did Ferdinand and Isabella lay
the foundations for a Golden Age?

Spain’s perceived “Golden Age” is a broad classification unconfined to a


specific era. The Golden Age has long been affiliated with the growth of a uniquely
Spanish identity that arose with the flourishing of arts, architecture and literature
expanding notably in the years of Phillip II, and flourishing in the 17th century – the
same century traditionalist historians identify as the decline of Spain. To consider the
golden age of Spain on a purely art and literature basis however misses the point, the
Golden Age in all contexts appeared from the development of the Spanish Empire. On
the European stage Spain appeared at the height of its “Golden Age” during the reign
of Phillip II, Spain was the centre piece of the world’s greatest power controlled by
the Hapsburg dynasty. Outwardly Spain was a religiously unified nation of great
power, wealth and honour. Yet the “Golden Age” was of little substance on a
domestic scale, built on a perceived vision of what Spain was like, whilst its periodic
decline was built upon greater understanding of what Spain was. There was little to
show of a “Golden Age” outside the confinements of the inner aristocracy in the 16th
century, it’s so called decline thereafter were the true colours of Spain shining though.
Failure at a domestic level inevitably brought down the golden era of foreign policy.
The Catholics Kings role in this dramatic rise and fall in the Golden Age was limited,
yet essential. As the founders of Spain, they set the tone of foreign and domestic
policy, religion and most importantly (although indirectly), the succession.
Ferdinand and Isabella presided over the making of Spain; as young heirs and
monarchs they united Aragon and Castile under one crown. For Aragon this was
overwhelmingly desirable, for political reasons more than any imperialistic view of
unification and described by Lotherington as “Undoubtedly the most politically
effective partnership”1. In Aragon expansion in Italy had stalled and she was
threatened by the French in both the Mediterranean and to the north in Navarre. In
Castile there was much opposition to the marriage; as noble factions of great power
and influence were split over the two potential Castilian heirs Juana and Isabella.
Alfonso the archbishop of Toledo proposed Isabella’s marriage to Ferdinand in search
of allies, and despite her young age Isabella herself proved to be influential in the
decision making. Unification had been attempted before as both monarchs where
cousins, yet their marriage in 1469 would be of deciding significance in the making of
Spain in the Golden Age to come.
The Peninsula was the bedrock of the Catholic Kings foreign policy. For
Isabella “Her greatest ambition was to carry to completion the reconquista of the
peninsula”2 ,thus naturally Portugal was the first choice of succession for the
monarchs of both kingdoms, but their fortunes were not to be fulfilled due to the
misfortune of the deaths of their two children. This dream of a united Peninsula was
not lost however, and stayed in the minds of Castilians and was notably evident in the
demands of the Comuneros revolt “They should choose her (Isabella of Portugal),
according to the desire of his kingdoms”3 The Catholic Kings influential desire of a
united peninsula had worn off on future generations and laid the foundations for their
great great grandson Phillip II to unite Hispania under one monarch.
1
John Lotherington – Years of renewal 1470-1600
2
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
3
demands of the comuneros rebels – 1520
. The foundations of a united Spain however where no more than a “dynastic
bundle of states”4 and lay in the balance following Isabella’s (of Castile) death in
1504. Despite the unity the Catholic kings displayed swearing to the Cortez of Aragon
and Castile and administrating both kingdoms together such unity always was a one
sided arrangement. Ferdinand under the marriage arrangements was contracted to live
in Castile and govern Aragon though the newly formed Councils of state, Kamen
explains “The Marriage treaty drawn up for Ferdinand laid down the basic limits to
Ferdinand’s future authority”5 Economically and in governance the two remained
separate entities in all but foreign policy.
Some Historians consider Isabella’s decision to pass the crown to the
Hapsburgs rather than Aragon as evidence of Isabella’s disunity. Lockyer claims;
“she showed how little she appreciated the concept of Spanish unity”6 . This theory is
supported by Historian Lotherington and Kamen, the latter who comments “the
achievement of a united Spain was never an objective of the Catholic Kings”7
However this is too simplistic a view; because Isabella knew that the Castilian nobles
would not accommodate for an Aragonese king, and the crown must rest upon the
spouse of Aragon and Castile if unification was to be a realistic goal. Elliot suggests
this when he speaks of a “Spanish inheritance”8 when referring to the Burgundian
inheritance and Rady explains “Ferdinand held such influence in Castile this
kingdom also might have been wrenched away from the new heir (Charles)”9.
Likewise J.Jones identifies “national unification”10 as a key policy of the Catholic
Kings.
It was therefore not “entirely by accident”11 that Spain was united under the
same realm but the death of the Catholic Kings Portuguese dynastic ties that meant
the Hapsburg dynasty and not the Portuguese dynasty was united under the Spanish
crown, which as Isabella had predicted caused friction amongst Cisneros and Castilian
nobles who resented Ferdinand fruitless attempts to produce an alternative Spanish
heir. failing to promote his more desirable Spanish grandson; Ferdinand to the throne,
they knew like Isabella that the “Old interfering Catalan” – which they referred to
him as, would eventually deliver his kingdom into their new crown if he was unable
to establish a strong foreign dynastic alliance, of which he reluctantly did. The
Hapsburg succession was “the last thing that Ferdinand and Isabella would have
wished”12, for Ferdinand only a last resort to an uncompromising Castile. But it was
the road, if bumpy, to a Golden Age for Spain.
When the Burgundian Charles first succeeded to the throne of Spain there was
no sign of a Golden Age in Spain. Charles rejected the realm, considering Spain
simply another of his territories in the Holy Roman Empire. In Brandi’s words his
succession – “Hopelessly miscarried”13. The young and shy king arrived, (overdue)
illiterate in Spanish and assuming the offices of the land for Burgundian friends and
for money, Charles made the worst possible impression. Thus without the attentive
eye of the Catholic Kings the nobility grew in strength and confidents under a
4
Martyn Rady – The Emperor Charles V
5
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
6
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
7
Henry Kamen – Spain 1416-1714 A society in conflict
8
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
9
Martin Rady - The Emperor Charles V
10
J.A.P.Jones – Europe 1500-1600
11
Spain 1469-1714 – A society in conflict
12
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
13
Karl Brandi – The Emperor Charles V
tentative government; “reopening old feuds”14, the revolt of the Germania,
Comuneros and in the Balearic Islands were a direct result of Charles neglect of
Spanish affairs and could have been prevented. When Charles left Spain in September
1519 Spain was part of Charles Burgundian Empire
The monarchy created by the Catholic Kings was a personal monarchy ruled
in an absolute style, and therefore totally ungovernable in the way Charles had
attempted to rule when he first arrived in Spain. The theory of new monarchy
endorsed by historians such as Katherine Leach and Geoffrey Parker has been largely
rebuked, particularly in the case of the monarchy Ferdinand and Isabella founded.
What Elliot adequately identifies in the case of “new monarchy is Spain created by
Ferdinand and Isabella must be entirely excluded from the European model, or
alternatively the model itself is at default”15. Absolutism was what the Catholic Kings
more defiantly moved towards, this change from feudal to “absolute” and was
characterised by subsequent weak and strong monarchs all across Europe. What is
evident is that there was no “new monarchy” in such developments. Henry IV
Isabella’s father was a “weak” monarch, his reign characterised by “a period of
instability which the great nobles exploited freely”16. The New Monarchy is mistaken
for a period after 1500 where by “the monarchies of England, France, the
Netherlands and Spain had all emerged victorious from long periods of civil wars
with over mighty subjects”17.
In this context the Catholic Kings had succeeded not in the stripping, but the
“taming”18 of the aristocracy. The Catholic Kings had tackled the political aspect of
the nobility; denying them the right to vote in the Consejo Real – (Council of Castile),
expanding the use of Corregidors and letrados – (civil servants trained in law) staffed
by the “lesser nobility”19 to encourage political neutrality. The revolts Charles I faced
when he left Spain in May 1520 were a reminder of the type of monarchy Ferdinand
and Isabella’s had created. It was personnel, and required a decisive and affirmative
monarch, as the Comenros rebels identified “it is not custom of Castile to be without
king”20. Perhaps this was the most important foundation of the Golden Age that the
Catholic Kings created. By transferring political power from the nobles to the
monarch they created a new form of national identity. The period of September 1517
– May 1522 was a time of “nationalism and revolt”21 and thus the Golden Age was
established not in the Netherlands or any other part of the Empire, but in Spain.
When Charles returned to Spain in July 1522 he adapted to the unique
requirements of Spanish monarchy. He was freed of the influence of the Golden
Fleece, upon the deaths of the unpopular statesmen Chievres in 1521 and Sauvage in
1518 Charles turned to Gattinara, an Italian statesman who Brandi identifies as “an
influence to Charles Character as only Chievres had done before, as no one was to
do again”22. Yet from 1521 on the news of the revolts on Spain Charles began to rely
more on Francis Cobos a Spaniard and ex-bureaucrat for the Catholic Kings and

14
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
15
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
16
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
17
H.Koenigsberger/George Mosse – Europe in the sixteenth Century
18
Henry Kamen – The Golden Age of Spain
19
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
20
Demands of the Communeros rebels - 1520
21
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
22
Karl Brandi – The Emperor Charles V
“thereafter the star of Cobos rose while that of Gattinara waned”23 . When Charles
returned to Spain as Holy Roman emperor with his prestige greatly increased, Charles
had matured, (now aged 22) and the more experienced personality of Charles the man;
no longer strangled by his Burgundian advisers showed though. Lockyer is only half
right to comment “Charles never became a prisoner to his ministers”24 because it was
a lesson he learnt that coinciding with the fall of Gattinara, whom when he died in
1530, Charles did not replace with a new chancellor.
Importantly, the Emperor rebuked the Spanish offices he had given to
Burgundians, made some attempt to learn Spanish and created new councils of state
run by Spaniards. Charles, “gradually”25 extended the use of these councils
expanding the centralized government the Catholic Kings had created. It remains
telling that royal authority was never to be challenged in Charles reign, although as
Kamen correctly identifies “it would be a mistake to regard it as a triumph for
absolutism, like the Catholic Kings before him, Charles sustained his authority over
the aristocracy and the towns only by collaborating with them and making it
unnecessary for them to claim more power than they already had”26. The governance
of Spain was, as it always had done, relied on Venality. By running his administration
in the form of a pyramid, with the king at the apex27, decisions appeared to have had
the authority of the king, without the necessity of him being present. Charles paid far
more attention to the administration of Spain than the rest of his realms as Holy
Roman Emperor. Above all he showed his commitment to his Spanish subjects by
marrying Isabella of Portugal and educating his son Phillip in Spain. “With the
support of his universal theories, the architect of that national state for which
Ferdinand and Isabella had laid the foundation. Charles completed it”28 The style of
government that the Catholic Kings created – for better or worse “helped to
transform Charles V Empire into Phillip II Spanish empire”29
Under Phillip II the Empire was undoubtedly centred on Spain. It was
governed by what Braudel describes as “a metropolitan power, a policy initiated by
Charles as well as his predecessors”30. This description could not be more right in the
light of Phillip II. When Phillip succeeded to the throne in 1556, “the Spanish
monarchy came home”31. The Spanish king relived himself of the burden of touring
his Empire and ordered the building of the great El Escorial – a monumnet of Spain’s
golden age, completed in 1584 some 21 miles from Madrid; where he spent much of
his reign. After his return from Flanders in 1559 – Phillip never again left the
Peninsula; “Friend or foe; they saw him as a spider, sitting motionlessly in his
web”32. In an accurate portrayal of Phillip the Venetian Ambassador reported “The
King, has no regard but for Spaniards”33, so widespread was the “hatred of the
Spaniard34” that it began to spread everywhere in Europe, a sign of the times and a

23
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
24
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
25
Stephen J Lee – {citation on title}
26
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1716
27
H.Koenigsberger/George Mosse – Europe in the sixteenth Century
28
Karl Brandi – The Emperor Charles V
29
H.Koenigsberger/George Mosse – Europe in the sixteenth Century
30
Fernand Braudel – The Mediterranean and the Medditerranean world in the Age of Phillip II
31
Stephen J Lee – {citation on title}
32
Fernand Braudel – The Mediterranean and the Medditerranean world in the Age of Phillip II
33
Venetian Ambassador - 1584
34
Fernand Braudel – The Mediterranean and the Medditerranean world in the Age of Phillip II
warning of what lay ahead. “Yet for a few glorious decades Spain was to be the
greatest power on Earth”35 under a Spanish Monarch.
Phillips personal role in the government of Spain far outstripped that of his
father. Taking word from a letter from his father warning him of “falling under the
influence or becoming the instrument of feuds”36 he involved himself personally in
affairs of government in an isolated manner. In 1583 the Venetian Ambassador
argued “The whole Spanish Monarchy is held together by the authority and wisdom
of the king, if he were to die everything would fall into confusion and danger”37,
Geoffrey Parker may have gone to far too suggest “Phillip ruled absolutely”38, a
concept rebuked by historians Elliot, Woodward, Lockyer and Kamen who identify
Phillips ability to “control”39 rather than canon the Castilian aristocracy, as his
predecessors had done similarly. Yet what remains broadly undisputed, is Phillip in
character and policy was Spanish; and any Golden Age in the reign of Phillip, was a
Golden Age for Spain.
An evident development of the Golden Age of Spain was the emergence of a
cultural identity which the Catholic Kings laid foundations for. Importantly however
such developments where confined to the aristocracy of Castile, which estimates
suggests concerned roughly 10% of the population40. When Historians speak of a
Golden Age they acknowledge it did not concern the majority of Spaniards during this
period and it would be naïve to think otherwise. Although this arguments perhaps
grows in weight as it was during the Golden Age that the laity experienced a decline
in living standards. To the majority of Spaniards living on the great enclosures of the
nobility there was no Golden Age, and the Cultural Revolution of empire and
Catholicism did little to affect them positively. The case of Charles I and the peasant
(who did not recognise him) expressed what much of the laity felt like under the
monarchy of Charles; describing him as the worst of his five predecessors of Castile
since his taxes where ruining them, and all the wealth from the Indies and Castile was
being sent abroad. But for the elite few the Golden Age was tangible in existence, and
what it meant to be a Spaniard, or more accurately a Castilian was precious to them, a
cultural flair the Catholic Kings had reimbursed.
Isabella and Ferdinand greatest cultural success was the renewal of the
reconquista in a ten year war that brought the final defeat of the moors and the end of
the 800 year reconquista in Granada in 1492. It was this achievement that earned them
the title “The Catholic Kings”. Long centuries of fighting against the moors in the
peninsula had led to the “glorification of military virtues”41 and the concept of the
“Hidalgo” the knight who lived for war and glory was widely accepted as the ideal for
a Spaniard. 16th century literature such as the “cantar de gesta” (songs of heroic
deeds) tells the story of the legend of El Cid, a Castilian nobleman and mercenary
from the 12th and 13th century who became the national hero of Spain and the cultural
aspiration of this period.
By completing the reconquista the Catholic Kings had “united the Castilian
nobles under the banner of Christianity”42 and tapped into Spain’s cultural ideal,

35
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1716
36
Charles I – Private letter to his son Phillip May 1543
37
Venetian Ambassador 1583
38
Geoffrey Parker – The Grand Strategy of Phillip II
39
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
40
J.P.Cooper – The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War 1609-48/59
41
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
42
Lotherington – European History 1470-1600
doing much to; “enhance the power and prestige of the monarchy”43 both
domestically and on the world stage. The Catholic Kings were responsible for
ensuring the crusading ambitions of Spain never lost momentum and continued an
active foreign policy throughout their reign. Only weeks after victory in Granada,
Isabella had announced her wish for a crusade on the shores of Africa and in 1494 she
persuaded Alexander VI to grant her the Cruzada tax for such a campaign. Her dying
wish to her husband was to devote himself “unremittingly to the conquest of Africa
and to the war for the faith against the moors”44. In Italy Ferdinand gained a fierce
reputation following significant victories against the French that made Spanish troops
“feared throughout Europe”45, more importantly he seized control of Navarre uniting
the state into Spain and pursuing the reconquista into Africa at the dying request of
Isabella capturing a thin coastal strip along the southern African coast including the
potent city of Oran.
The acquisition of the New World was beginning to expand so by the reign of
Charles I “Spain possessed an extensive overseas empire”46. An achievement often
dismissed as a lucky acquirement by historians such as Kamen and Pendrill,
describing the expedition as “reluctantly backed”47 and “Spain did not have any
distinctive expertise in seafaring”48. What perhaps is forgotten is the immense cost of
any such expedition and the annual allowance of 12,000 maravedis along with other
Benefits that Columbus received in 1486 from the Catholic Kings in order to keep his
offer confined to Spain. Whilst the French, Portuguese and English Courts had
dismissed Columbus, the Catholic kings spotted potential, but restricted by their
finances in 1486 because of the war against the Moors they delayed (but secured) any
future expedition. As Elliot explains Spain had a “tradition of maritime
experience”49, acquired from her overseas territories in the Mediterranean and the
Canaries. The Foundations of the New World provided by the Catholic Kings where
created on a deeper basis than simply luck.
The foreign policy of the Catholic Kings formed a solid foundation for the
Golden Age. They had refused to accept 1492 as the end of the military values for
Spaniards; ushering in a less hostile and inward looking society. Instead reconquista
was marked by the beginning of “Castilian imperialism”50, a nation ready to embark
upon the European, African and world stage where it had already made a significant
impact. It was with justification that Ferdinand could remark “For over 700 years the
crown of Spain has not been as great or as resplendent as it is now, both in the west
and the east, and all, after God, by my work and labour”51 - Indeed Spain was greater
than it ever had been and was certainly looking outwards; confirmed by Isabella’s
opportunistic succession plans. In decades to come Spain was to become the
aggressor asserting its authority across Europe and the World.
A Spanish Golden Age in foreign policy can however be considered exempt
from the reign of Charles I. As Karl Brandi explains;” the emphasis laid on the
primacy of the emperor in Europe, was in direct contradiction to the theory of the

43
Colin Pendrill – Spain 1474-1700
44
Isebella I of Castile - 1504
45
Lotherington – European History 1470-1600
46
Colin Pendrill – Spain 1474-1700
47
Colin Pendrill - Spain 1474-1700
48
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
49
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
50
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
51
Ferdinand I of Spain – 1516
national state”52 Charles was the Holy Roman Emperor, of which Spain played a
significant but not central part. Attempts to pin a nationality on Charles during his
reign as Charles V are futile as “he was essentially a man of universal outlook53.
Historians such as Rady and Brandi give emphasis to Charles V the Burgundian,
commenting in 1520 to the states-general (Netherlands); “His heart had always been
among them (literally no their side)”54. However Kamen and Lockyer tend to lay
weight on Charles the Spaniard. Rebuking a French clergyman who denounced him
speaking Castilian Charles replied “do not expect me to speak any other language but
Spanish, which is so noble that it should be learned and understood by all Christian
people”55. It was in fact the official language of his cortege in the latter part of his
reign although Charles spoke more fluently in Dutch and French. Historians generally
accept that Charles made neither the Low Countries nor Spain the capital of his
Empire.
As monarch of each realm Charles cleverly adjusted himself to appear
favourably to each of them. Evidence lies in the many letters he sent to his realms
explaining his reason to depart Spain for Italy in the summer of 1529, he tailored each
correspondence differently. To Castile his argument was centred on the church and
“visiting subjects”56, To his sister Mary, regent of the Netherlands (bordering France)
suppressing “France”57 and his commanders Philibert of Orange and Gerard de Rye
for “honour and reputation”58. Charles was “a lord of many states: a Burgundian
among the Burgundians; a Spaniard in Castile and Aragon; an Italian among the
Italians”59. Therefore in policy Charles loyalties lay with all his Empire; and troubles
in his Northern territories most notably against the French, Turks and German
Lutherans kept him occupied in Mainland Europe. Spanish interests, especially in the
Mediterranean against the Turkish Navy and in Africa were neglected for problems in
the rest of his realms that were not “self supporting”60.
There can be no doubt that Spaniards “basked in the reflected sunlight of
Imperial glory”61, of which they shared amongst his other realms. Over his reign
Charles entourage was transformed from the “myriad formalities of the Burgundian
court to the solemnity of a Spaniard”62, and as David Lockyer identifies “throughout
his reign more Imperial titles where granted to Spaniards than any other
nationality”63, an extraordinary feat considering the circumstances of the dominant
role of the Burgundian court at the beginning of his reign. Likewise the extensive
amount of Spanish troops used on the battlefield of the Holy Roman Emperor gave
Charles Imperial army the distinct recognition of a Spaniard. Although Henry Kamen
appears to dismiss the role of Spanish troops as; “acting only as contingents in a
larger force”64, based on the evidence that Spanish contributions in numerical terms
were limited to selective enterprises it was the case that the Spanish presence was
recognisable enough so that (as described by Lotherington and Elliot) “the rest of
52
Karl Brandi – The Emperor Charles V
53
Karl Brandi – The Emperor Charles V
54
Charles V to the Estates in the Netherlands 1520
55
Charles V to a French Prelate in Rome 1536
56
Charles to the Castilian Council of State, November 1528
57
Charles to Mary of Hungary, October 1528
58
To Philibert of orange and Gerard de Rye, September 1528
59
Fernandez Alvarez
60
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
61
Karl Brandi – The Emperor Charles V
62
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
63
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
64
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
Europe feared and respected her power”65 and “the influence of Spaniards became
resented and then hated”66 across Europe.
When assessing Charles in relation to the Golden Age of Spain it is important
to identify that “Spain became a great power in its own right only under Phillip II67”
and “Charles presided over the start of Spain’s golden age”68 rather than being part
of it. Yet like the Catholic Kings Charles contributed to the rise of the golden age by
expressing Spain’s cultural identity though his Imperial Empire. And when in 1556 he
abdicated, he retuned not to his birth place in the Burgundies but to Spain, passing the
heart of his Empire into the hands of his Spanish son Phillip. “Charles born a
Burgundian became a Spaniard by choice, and this, more than any formal act of
policy, made him loved and respected by his Spanish subjects”69. Charles had put the
“imperial” into Spain’s Empire a unique foundation of the Catholic Kings that they
had ultimately founded by succession.
From the foundations of the Catholic Kings and Charles I, Phillip II was
handed a vast and impressive domain, and although the title does not fully
acknowledge the diversity of her territories “contemporaries knew it as the
monarquia Espanola (Spanish Monarchy)”70 . Generally, although not exclusively
historians i.e. Lotherington, Kamen, Elliot and Cooper agree that that the peak of the
Golden Age came in the reign of Phillip II. Lotherington and Elliot also identify the
“crisis of the 90’s”71 as the war in France, England and the Netherlands intensified
and the domestic scene turned to revolt in Aragon. John Cooper and Elliot point
towards the death of Phillip II as the decline where Spain, or rather Castile was “by
1600 a country that had suddenly lost its national purpose”72 Kamen on the other
hand takes issue with the decline itself as a “historical myth”73 but at least
acknowledges “Spain under Phillip II attained the heights of imperial authority”74.
Historians such as Parker and Lockyer suggest that a decline in the 1590’s was
“to simplistic”75 and that “The Spanish Empire appeared far stronger at the death of
Phillip III, than at the death of Phillip II” 76 . Although Parker and Lockyer hold some
weight in their argument, such a claim is difficult to grasp when considering that by
1621 Spain had withdrawn itself from all its conflicts in Europe, unable to support
itself and forced into the humiliation of “making peace with rebels and heretics”77.
Likewise the “failed leadership”78 of the king Phillip III (who passed effective
responsibility onto the corrupt Duke of Lerma, his “valido”/Favourite) failed to make
use of more than a decade of peace to mend the structural failings at home. Phillip II
who knew his son well once commented “I am afraid they will govern him”79he had
been right to fear the worst. By 1598 the Golden Age of foreign policy had been and
gone.
65
Lotherington – European History 1470-1600
66
J.H.Elliot – Europe divided 1559-1598
67
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
68
Lotherington – European History 1470-1600
69
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
70
J.H.Elliot – Europe Divided 1559-1598
71
J.H.Elliot - Imperial Spain 1469-1726
72
J.H.Elliot – Europe divided 1559-1598
73
Henry Kamen – The Decline of Spain: a historical myth?
74
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
75
Geoffrey Parker – Europe in Crisis 1598-1648
76
Geoffrey Parker – Europe in Crisis 1598-1648
77
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
78
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
79
Phillip II to Don Cristobal de Moura (supporter and friend of Phillip)
Ironically it was in the 17th century, as Spain “slowly abandoned its military
imperialism”80 , The Golden age of Arts and Literature flourished under the very
decline of Spain. The cultural aspirations that the Catholic Kings had preserved,
become imperialised under Charles and began under Phillips Spanish Empire
blossomed in an era that, for the first time in modern Spanish history, Spain was
turning in on itself in agony of self appraisal. Accompanying the glorification of
Spain’s Art and Literature in a bygone period of world dominance forth came the
myth of the “Golden Age” visible in the arts, architecture and literature. Miguel de
Cervantes Saavedra, regarded as a great Spanish novelist in the early 17th century
wrote of “happy times and ages where those which the ancients termed the golden
age”81 only seven years after Phillips death – evidently the majority of Spanish
society did not experience a Golden Age under Phillip, similarly to the peasant
Charles had met decades before.
Religion was a key theme of the Golden Age of arts, architecture and
literature; it is estimated that around 90%82 of Spanish Renaissance paintings where of
religious subject. “The Burial of the Count of Orgaz”, the work of El Greco is typical
of the period, as the painting adopts both cultural aspects: the legend of “Don
Gonzalo Ruiz”, (known for his religious piety) in the theme of a miracle, as the knight
ascends into heaven. Phillip II’s evident love for artwork greatly contributed to
Spain’s Golden Age of Art and Literature; firstly many of his paintings where
imported as the greatest art works remained Flemish and Italian, but by the 17th
century Spain began to contribute to some of the greatest artworks of the age. One of
the great Spanish artist, Diego Velazquez composed Spanish concepts of honour and
dignity in the painting “the surrender of Breda” – a great victory for the Spanish in
the Netherlands. As the victor; General Spinola is seen placing his arm on the
shoulder of the defeated Dutch commander Justin sympathetically. Architecturally the
great El Escorial, completed in 1584, was by far the most symbolised of Spain’s
Golden Age; a palace, a monastery and a tomb all the Hapsburg monarchs of Spain.
Such grand structural designs had actually begun under Ferdinand and Isabella. In the
city of Granada the Royal Chapel, the burial place of the Catholic Kings and the
Cathedral built in the centre of the Moorish palace in Cordoba to show Catholic
dominance over the Islamic world were symbolic of the cultural success of the
Catholic Kings and the success of the reconquista. The painting competition in
Madrid in 1627 was arranged by Phillip IV to display the expulsion of the Moriscos,
embodied the religious intolerance and the Spanish notion for purity of blood. Aside
from the vast cultural contributions the Catholic Kings made to the art and literature
of the17th century, its development largely arose from the imperial concepts of
Charles and Phillip, the latter having dedicated himself to it.
The contribution the Catholic Kings made to religion was far more substantial
than that of art, literature and architecture. The work of the Catholic Kings in the
Spanish church enabled the clergy to adapt to the ideals of the Spanish monarchy and
lay the foundation for one of the main defences against the reformation; The
Inquisition. It is commonly accepted that the Catholic Kings did not significantly
reform the church although changes did occur. The Collage of Valladolid 1484 and
the University of Alcada 1508 was founded to encourage new learning and Alexander
VI gave Ferdinand permission to reform the monastic orders in 1491, which Cisneros
80
J.Cooper - The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Year War
81
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra - “Don Quixote” 1605 (Part 1)
82
John Lotherington – Years of renewal 1470-1600
carried out with “characteristic energy”83. Although “the impact of these reforms
should not be exaggerated”84 the extent to which is debated. J.Elliot suggests that the
reforms under the Catholic Kings “gave the church a new strength and vigour at the
very moment the church was everywhere under heavy attack”85whilst Kamen; who
made extensive research into the Spanish church at this time argues “nothing
remotely resembling a reformation of the church occurred in Spain”86. What Kamen
fails to emphasis is Ferdinand and Isabella’s considerable achievement in creating; as
Lockyer describes a “national Spanish Catholic Church”87 with reforms that took the
church into “royal control”88
In 1486 effective control over the appointment of clerics was granted to the
Spanish crown. The crusada tax was renewed in 1494 and successfully renewed
throughout the reigns of Charles and Phillip accompanied with further grants.
The new world was granted all major benefices in 1508 and the inquisition from the
moment of its foundation “identified itself in a particularly way with the Spanish
Church”89. Nationalism, a key cause of the reformation in the 16th century particularly
in Germany, England and the Netherlands had no effect in Spain because their Church
had effectively been nationalised. It is certainly telling that as Kamen points out “The
gains that the English monarchy made though the reformation were already achieved
completely in Spain without any change of religion”90 . Ferdinand and Isabella did not
reform the church from abuses and corruption, they brought it under” royal control”91
helping to unify Spain under one religion; uniformity of the Catholic faith that to
become a key concept of the Golden Age of Spain in Foreign Policy.
Catholicism was chief to Spain’s golden age but a good relation with the pope
was not a necessity. Charles sack of Rome in 1527 was perhaps the most evident
example, as Spanish soldiers amongst other nationalities devastated the Holy City. As
one eye witness reported “we took Rome by storm, killed 6000 men, plundered the
houses carried of what we found in churches and elsewhere”92. Likewise the “most
Catholic King”93often faced “strained relations”94 with the papacy; accusing the
papacy if “failing in your duty towards God”95 in 1589, “God is Spanish”96, Phillip II
once commented. It was the Catholic Kings who had culturally reimbursed the
Catholic faith so that “Catholicism and national interests where so closely
interwoven in Spain that it soon became impossible to distinguish one from
another”97. Catholicism soon became symbolic of Spain’s Golden Age as Spanish
monarchs became engulfed in Europe’s religious conflict.
Charles I against the Schmalkaldic League in Germany and Phillips II
conflicts with the Turks, Dutch rebels, French wars and the war with England. Even

83
J.H.Elliot - Imperial Spain 1469-1726
84
Colin Pendrill – Spain 1474-1700
85
J.H.Elliot - Imperial Spain 1469-1726
86
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
87
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
88
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
89
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
90
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
91
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
92
An anonymous leader of the Imperial army
93
Geoffrey Woodward – Phillip II
94
Geoffrey Woodward – Phillip II
95
Phillip II to Pope Sixtus V - 1589
96
Phillip II - 1596
97
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
the Duke of Parma’s pleas that religious concessions could “pacify the Dutch
states”98 where ignored by Phillip who persisted “they are all to embrace the Roman
Catholic Faith and the exercise of that alone is to be permitted”99. Phillip writing as
early as 1562 explained “neither my welfare nor that of my states will allow me to
neglect helping the Catholics”100. Phillip II “an unquestionably loyal son of the
Catholic Church”101 certainly makes Jonathan Lewis doubts of Phillip II religious
piety appear doubtful.
The religious unity which the Catholic Kings established had devastating
effects for minorities living in Spain, a policy which Historians have widely criticised
the Catholic Kings for by establishing the inquisition and increasing hostility to Jews,
Conversos and Moors. Henry Kamen famously coined the phrase “society in
conflict”102 to describe amongst the reigns of their successors greater social divisions
as a result of the Catholic Kings religiously intolerant polices. Writer Chris Stewart
suggests Ferdinand and Isabella “put the closing word on convirencia”103, although in
the case of the Jews, their persecution had become increasingly evident from the late
14th century (Black Death) onwards. As historian Elliot explains the expulsion of the
Jews was a” Final act in a tragedy that had began long before”104, even the medejares
(moors living under a Christian monarch) faced “a continuous erosion of their
rights”105 during the 14th century. The medejares forced conversion in Castile in 1502,
Navarre in 1512 and in Aragon in 1525 (under Charles I) laid strong foundations for
the unification of Spain under one religion, leading to the more significant and
economically damaging expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609. The suppression of
Moors, Jews and eventually new Christians from the late 15thcentury onwards
certainly “weakened the economic foundations of the Spanish monarchy at the very
outset of its imperial career”106 and began a period of intolerance that would continue
to have far reaching economical consequences. Yet, as Historian John Edwards
identifies such policies were; “necessary to remove a genuinely mortal danger from
Spanish society”107
Historians such as Hermann Kesten who suggest “1492 might have marked
the ending to conflict between the moors and Christians”108 are unconvincing. A more
contemplative view suggest that such intolerance was a necessity to ensure the
religious piety that greatly contributed to the unification of Spain and its cultural
contributions to the Golden Age. It is entirely unrealistic to suggest a nation bound for
imperialistic world power could tolerate religious division on such widespread scale
both for unitary and social reasons. As Lotherington explains “in Early Modern
Europe it was a sign of weakness for states to permit more than one religion inside
their borders”109. In Spain this was a genuine weakness; the Moorish revolt of 1499-
01 and the Moriscos revolt in 1568-73 highlighted the ability of a population of
hundreds of thousands; to unite in arms and revolt. The prospect of a coalition of
rebels, estimates of 30,000 in 1568 and an overseas super-power such as the Muslim
98
Duke of Parma - 1584
99
Phillip to the Duke of Parma - 1584
100
Phillip to Margaret of Parma - 1562
101
David Mckinnon-Bell – Profiles in power: Phillip II of Spain Champion of Catholicism
102
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
103
Chris Stewart – As Islamic History of Europe BBC Documentary
104
Henry Kamen - Spain Imperial 1469-1714
105
David Abulafia – Spain and 1492
106
J.H.Elliot - Imperial Spain 1469-1726
107
John Edwards - Ferdinand and Isabella (Profiles In Power)
108
Hermann Kesten -Ferdinand and Isabella
109
John Lotherington – Years of renewal 1470-1600
Turks made the suppression and final expulsion of minorities even the more
necessary.
The suppression of new Christians was also widely encouraged and supported
by the old Christians, this was most evident though the activities of the Inquisition
that “relied on informers to hunt out their victims”110. Drawn to their discrimination
by a mixture of fear and jealousy of minorities, the Inquisition flourished. The
suggestion put forward by J.LMortey that the inquisition “froze Spain into
orthodoxy”111 is unlikely, and built upon a perceived myth of the “Black Legend”112
that was largely the making of protestant propaganda such as the Englishmen John
Foxes who describes the inquisition as a “dreadful engine of tyranny in his book of
Martyrs”113. Protestant rebels in the Netherlands such as William of Orange wrote of
“the horrible persecution that I witnessed by fire, sword, and water”114 under the
Spanish Inquisition. Circulating pamphlets and popular culture abroad painted a
blown up interpretation on the inquisition tainting its image. In fact “there were so
few Protestants in Spain that widespread persecution of Protestantism was not
physically possible”115. Estimates suggest that no more than a few hundred protestants
where executed from 1500 to 1660116 in Spain, the majority of it’s activities where
concerning new Christians. Unsurprisingly the inquisition was “most endangered
during the first years of Charles V”117 when the majority of those tried (77%118) were
old Christians. Despite some of its criticisms the Inquisition in Spain remained a
“largely popular institution”119 particularly when minorities where persecuted. It
remains telling that it was the Catholic Kings who were at first cautious in
establishing the inquisition but the “tide of popular anti-Semitism that grew in Spain
pushed Ferdinand and Isabella into establishing it”120. Likewise it was the popular
demands of anti-Moorish and anti-Moriscos movements that created a cultural instinct
of purity of blood that grew stronger in the later years. The Catholic Kings and their
successors did not establish a “society in conflict”121. They followed religiously
intolerant policies politically desirable that helped unite old Christians. It was
“regarded a price worth paying to rid their kingdom of religious heresy”122
Whilst Spain had been experiencing a Golden Age on the foreign stage the
realm of Castile had long been suffering under its strain. Outside the great aristocratic
families who had alone benefited from the offices of Spanish Imperialism lay a nation
lacking the ability to support itself. Yet this was not a new development, it was a
reality that had long been ignored by the imperialist attitudes of the Emperor Charles
and King Phillip and this had allowed the problem to escalate until the “grim
realties”123could no longer be ignored. This moment came with the death of Phillip in
1598, Kamen states that “Given Spain’s limited resources, debts and commitments, it

110
Colin Pendrill – Spain 1474-1700
111
J.LMortey - Spanish nation formation: An introduction
112
Julián Juderías - The Black Legend and Historical Truth - 1914
113
John Foxes - book of Martyrs
114
William of Orange – Apology - 1580
115
Henry Kamen – The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision
116
Henry Kamen – The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision
117
Juan Antonio Llorente –The history of the inquisition, from the time of its establishment
118
Colin Pendrill – Spain 1474-1700
119
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
120
Colin Pendrill – Spain 1474-1700
121
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
122
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
123
J.Cooper - The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Year War
is astonishing that Spanish imperialism lasted as long as it did”124. Yet it did, and
because such superficial glory had continued for so long, a problem had turned into a
crisis. Spain’s golden image of new outward looking nation that the Catholic Kings
had imagined was rotting from the inside.
The Catholic Kings policies caused the least damage to the Castilian economy,
whilst those of their successors where far greater. By forming a united nation state,
involving themselves in European affairs and placing it in the hands of the future
Holy Roman Emperor, they where ultimately responsible for the consequences of
imperialism under the reign of Charles I and his son Phillip II. The evident result of
the imperialistic polices followed by Charles and Phillip was that domestic policy
within Castilian was ultimately rejected over foreign policy. Spain described a “dry
and impoverished land”125 and it was to suffer greatly during the Golden Age of
foreign policy.
The plains of Castile were by far the most difficult to cultivate, and only “In
the face of hardship, the peasants of Castile, though techniques of dry farming,
extensive fallowing, transhumerance, and above all laborious toil Castilians
managed to produced just enough food and generate enough taxes to enable the
Castilian monarchs to pursue their polices of expansion within the peninsula”126.
Economically“Castile was ill-suited for its international role; and its inhabitants
paid a heavy toll for the hegemony in Europe”127. The lack of economic unity by the
Catholic Kings meant the burden fell on Castile whilst in essence Aragon and Navarre
played no greater role than the rest of “Spain’s” overseas territories. “As Spain’s
significance declined in Europe, Castiles significant declined in Spain”128.
Besides the difficulties of unproductive soils the Catholic Kings faced a
second fundamental economic problem; in Castile the aristocracy had an unhealthy
dominance over the economy particularly agriculture. Castile was divided into “an
extreme contrast of rich and poor”129 facing, as Kamen suggests a “structural
crisis”130.At the start of the 16th century 95% of the land was in the hands of the
aristocracy, who under law where entirely exempt from taxation except from the
“Alcabala”; sales tax that amounted to 5% of all trades, (10% in 1574 and 7.5% in
1577131) All other ordinary revenues including the “servicios” where financed by
taxing the laity which doubled in real terms between 1500-1600132. When Phillip told
his father in 1545 “the common who have to pay the subsidies are reduced to such
distress and misery that many of them walk naked” he blamed the “ordinary and
extraordinary taxes”133 it was to no avail to the common man who saw even harsher
taxes under his Phillip II reign.
The Catholic Kings like their successors made no attempt to reform a tax
system that was both inefficient and socially unjust. The only significant social-
economic reform was the abolishment of the six evil customs, in Aragon that
weakened the “economic domination of ruthless lords with extremely fractured land

124
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 a society in conflict
125
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
126
Teofilo Ruiz – Spanish Society 1400-1600
127
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
128
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
129
Gonzalez de Cellorigo - Spanish economist - 1600
130
Henry Kamen – Golden Age Spain
131
J.H.Elliot –Europe divided 1559-1598
132
J.E.Hamilton - War and Prices in Spain, 1651-1800
133
Phillip too Charles I – 1545
holdings”134. Yet no such changes occurred in Castile where by the nobles, “despite
their enormous wealth did not make any contribution towards the cost of
government”135. In fact many of there polices can be blamed on worsening the
situation. The “de-politicisation” of the noble class had the adverse effect of
alienating the aristocracy from the laity as they no longer felt enthused to help their
lesser subjects. The aristocracy where pacified as a political threat, but economically
contributed to the disease of the age; the craze for hidalguia, which “dominated the
social aspirations of the inhabitants of Castile”136. These titles which bought nobles
their way up the social ladder as well as an exception from taxation where in broad
supply, Charles’s role as Holy Roman Emperor as well as Phillip II’s vast Spanish
Empire meant there were no shortages of titles and offices, and whilst running vast
government deficits there was certainly an incentive to sell them. The benefits of the
de-politicisation of the nobles indeed pacified a nation (excluding the Morisco
problem) but also helped perpetuate a social outlook ill equipped to cope with Spain’s
economical structural problems and those the empire brought with it.
Adding to this structural problem was that Castile, (in line with Poland as of
1569) had the greatest numbers of noble class; 10%, hugely disproportionate to
Europe (England 2-3%, France 1%) and the rest of the peninsula i.e. Catalonia (only
0.33%137).This “craze for hisalguia”138 on such a wide scale therefore helped remove
vast quantities of wealth from the productive side of the economy so that Spain lacked
“people of the middle sort”139, as a result, lacking investment both privately and from
the “public sector” output suffered. This is best indicated in the agricultural industry
where Labour productivity fell by around 15% to just over half that of the
Netherlands, and less than even Italy between 1500-1600140. Government debts only
worsened this problem by both draining wealth from the country and crowding outi
investment in the Spanish economy. As the council of finance once commented
“censos and juros offer better interest rates than those gained from investment in
trade, agriculture or industry”141. Even under the Catholic kings it was quite possible
for wealthy nobles to live off interest earning juros.
The Catholic kings, like their successors borrowed huge amounts to fund
government expenditure amounting to roughly 650,000 ducats in 1516 (including
grants and pensions) which considering inflation would have filled even the largest of
annual deficits in the late 16th and early 17th century under Phillip II and III142143.
However these figures where dwarfed by that of Charles I and Phillip II, it was a
substantial figure and showed that the Catholic Kings like their successors where
prepared to borrow to finance an extensive foreign policy. The Catholic Kings had
established the practise of borrowing that would become far more damaging in the
reign of Phillip II. In the five years prior to the first royal bankruptcy in 1557 the
average rate of uncollateralized borrowing was at 48.8%144, and under Phillip this

134
Teofilo Ruiz - Spanish society, 1400-1600
135
Roger Lockyer - Hapsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720
136
J.Cooper - The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Year War
137
J.Cooper - The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Year War
138
J.Cooper - The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Year War
139
Gonzalez de Cellorigo - Spanish economist - 1600
140
Robert C. Allen - Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes in England and the Yangtze Delta , c.
1620-1820
141
Council of Finance – September 1617
142
John Lotherington – Years of renewal 1470-1600
143
Geoffrey Parker – Europe in Crisis 1598-1648
144
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
reached as high as 109%145. Prior to the final bankruptcy of Phillips reign in 1596
68% of ordinary revenue146 was devoted to interest payments benefiting largely
foreign bankers from Genoa, Italy, Netherlands and Germany whilst Spanish Bankers
financed less than 10% of Phillips debts147. It was only because of bullion imports
from the new world that enabled Phillip to borrow at his height in 1598 roughly seven
times the annual income of his empires148. Yet the relationship between Spain and her
colonies was “unnatural and damaging”149, an opportunity laid out by the Catholic
Kings for the Golden Age to bring prosperity to all orders of society was
fundamentally wasted. Instead of using the expanding markets in the new world to
develop the domestic economy, merchants and traders imported foreign goods
because of the “inelastic supply of domestic production”150 at home. This “Dutch
disease”ii ultimately led to a reduction in the manufacturing industry.
The royal share of the new world, collected though the royal fifth (20% tax on
the monopolise port of Seville) – most notably bullion (accounting for 80% of exports
from the new world, and peaking at 95.6%151.), was spent on building monumental
monasteries, pursuing a string of wars all over Europe and running up unprecedented
amounts of debt. Under Charles bullion contributions where small; less than
3,000,000 Ducats annually whilst under Phillip they reached above 12,000,000152 or
29% of royal expenditure – this was significant because unlike taxation it was reliable
collateral for lenders. By mortgaging imports of bullion Phillip and Charles were able
to shore up their lenders to continue lending. Between 1580-1626 roughly a third of
all bullion imports where directly exported to foreign bankers. Whilst the royal share
was racking up debts, the private sector was being no more responsible. The Castilian
economy was running a severe misbalance of payments being supplemented by
bullion imports which caused severe inflation that further derailed the domestic
economy. Between 1500-1600 inflation was at roughly 400%153 due, as Hamilton’s
work suggests; bullion imports. Naturally those most affected by the price rise were
the lower orders of society who relied heavily on foodstuff products that were most
affected by the price rise; between 1500 and 1600 wheat prices quadrupled. The
bullion of the new world, a golden opportunity for Spain economically had been
turned into a “resources curse”iii As a Spanish economist of the time, Gonzalez de
Cellorigo identified in 1600: “Our Spain has set her eyes so strongly on the business
of the Indies, from where she obtains gold and silver, that she has forsaken the care
of her own kingdoms; and if she could indeed command all the gold and silver that
her nationals keep discovering in the New World, this would not render her as rich
and powerful as she would have otherwise been”154. The discovery of the new world
inevitably bankrolled the Golden Age of foreign policy for Phillip, but like many of
the Catholic Kings foundations contributed to the economic decline that brought
home the crushing reality that in the eloquent words of J.H.Elliot; “by the end of the

145
Geoffrey Parker – Europe in Crisis 1598-1648
146
Henry Kamen - Spain 1469-1714 A society in conflict
147
Geoffrey Parker – Europe in Crisis 1598-1648
148
Miguel Artola – Spanish Historian 1982
149
Stephen Lee – Aspects of European History 1494-1689
150
Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain - Mauricio Drelichman & Hans-Joachim
Voth
151
J.H.Parry – The Spanish Seaborne Empire
152
Hamilton - American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650
153
Hamilton - American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650
154
Gonzalez de Cellorigo - Spanish economist - 1600
reign (of Phillip II) it was apparent that one monarch remained to few, that the one
empire was a divided empire, and that the sword was fatally blunted”155.
The Catholic Kings laid the foundations for the Golden Age in Spain though
unification in foreign policy and absolute monarchy within Castile. By dynastic ties
with Aragon, the completion of the reconquista and the conquest of Navarre, Spain
was transformed into a strong federation of states. On the European Stage; Castile,
Aragon and Navarre would be known as Spain. The stronger foundations however
were to lie in the state of Castile where the monarchies long struggle against the
aristocracy was transformed from factional division and infighting into an absolute
monarchy suited too the role of leading an empire. The Catholic Kings last and most
important foundations was the succession of Charles who would lead a great cultural
regeneration of Spain bringing the imperial experience home to the Spanish
aristocracy. The most important regional assets of a universal empire where left to his
Castilian son Phillip, who for a few glorious decades ruled over the greatest power on
earth; imperial Spain. Inevitably the seeds of decline were sown as soon as Castile
embarked on its imperial role. The new world was typical, founded by the Catholic
Kings it bankrolled Phillips lavish military expenditure whilst contributing to the
decline of the domestic economy. The Golden Age was intangible to the common
man who worked the land whilst facing rising inflation, food shortages,
unemployment and poverty. For the aristocracy it was an age of wealth, glory,
religious zeal and the sauntering of a truly Spanish identity which survived though the
great art, architecture and literature of the 17th century.

155
J.H.Elliot – Imperial Spain 1469-1726
i
Crowding out: reduction in private consumption or investment that occurs because of an increase in government
spending
ii
Dutch disease: apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the
manufacturing sector; Max Corden and Peter Neary - 1982.
iii
Resources curse: the paradox that countries and regions with an abundance of natural resources, specifically point-
source non-renewable resources like minerals and fuels, tend to have less economic growth and worse development
outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources; Richard Auty -1993

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