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VOL. 53, OCTOBER 23, 1973 309

Impeachment of Witness

ANNOTATION

IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS
By
DOMINGO LUCENARIO

§ I. Concept, p. 309.
§ 2. Statement of the Rule, p. 310.
§ 3. Subject Matter, p. 310.
§ 4. Modes of lmpeachment, p. 310.

1. Contradictory Evidence, p. 310.

2. Questions Relating to Character, p. 313.
3. Evidence of falsehood or Perjury, p. 314.
4. Exaggeration, p. 314
5. Grievance. p. 315.

§ 5. Laying Foundation for Impeachment, p. 315.

________________

§ 1. Concept

„Impeach‰, as applied to the contradiction of a witness in a

legal proceeding, is capable of two significations. One is the
charge or accusation of want of veracity, and the other is
the establishment of the charge (White v. McLean, N.Y., 47
How. Prac. 193, 199). Impeachment imports destruction of
the witnessÊ testimony, but, as generally used, it

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comprehends also the attempt to establish such a charge,

whether unsuccessful or successful in whole or in part. It
not only means destruction, but it means attack, and it
includes disparagement and discredit (Commonwealth v
Welch, 63 S.W. 984, 986). It is an attack against the
credibility of a witness (Sheppard v. State, 145 S.E. 654;
Words & Phrases, 1940 ed., Vol. 20, pp. 195, 196). It
constitutes then a grave challenge to a witnessÊ veracity

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(People v. Kali, 82 Phil. 461).

§ 2. Statement of the Rule

A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he

was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by
evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be
shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of
the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense (Sec.
15, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court).

§ 3. Subject Matter

A witness may be impeached only on matters which are

material, competent, specific, and relevant. He may not be
impeached on matters which are immaterial and only
collateral to the real issue (UnderhillÊs Criminal Evidence,
4th ed., pp. 848–849).

§ 4. Modes of Impeachment

1. Contradictory Evidence.·A witness may be impeached

by evidence contrary to his testimony or by involving him
in material or serious contradiction (U.S. v. Lozada, 18

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Phil. 90; De los Reyes v. Leonardo, 57 Phil. 407; U.S. v.

Pala, 26 Phil. 127). Serious contradictions in a witnessÊ
testimony constitute a grave challenge to his veracity
(People v. Kali, supra).
For the testimony of a witness to merit credit, it is
indispensable that it be not incompatible with his other
statements made on other occasions concerning the same
fact (People v. Capua, 47 O.G. 3516; People v. Ramos, 41
SCRA 19). A witness who changes his name and
statements, like a chameleon that changes its color. does
not inspire confidence. and when his testimony is likewise
incompatible with his conduct immediately after the crime
in question, it has little probative value (People v. Go Lee,
L-2462, March 6, 1950, 48 O.G. 5997). Inconsistency in the
accounts by two alleged eyewitness of the incident cannot
but create doubt as to their

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truthfulness and sincerity (People v. Lacsamana, 35 SCRA

312).
Exceptions:

a. Where contradictions are natural concomitants to

human limitations.·Where the contradictions are
natural concomitants to human limitations and
were elicited in the course of a long and extensive
cross-examination, such contradictions on minor
matters are not sufficient to destroy the effectivity
of the witnessÊ testimony. As the sun, although
appearing to us as the greatest miracle in the
universe, is not spotless, human beings cannot
absolutely be free from faults. This is true even
with the choicest paragons of the human species
(People v. Ordonio, L-1774, Dec. 14,1948).

Time has an unfortunate tendency to obliterate occurrences

from a witnessÊ memory and recollections are apt to be
blurred (Montalban v. Maximo, L-22997, March 15, 1968).

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b. Where contradiction is overcome by the probable

nature of the witnessÊ story.·It is true that
witnesses may be impeached by evidence that they
have made at other times·statements inconsistent
with their present testimony. But this character of
evidence, which is introduced for the purpose of
impeaching the witnesses, is not conclusive. It may
be overcome by the probable nature of the story the
witnesses may tell on the trial of the case, their
seeing and knowing the matters concerning which
they testified, and, if from all the circumstances the
court is satisfied that the statements of such
witness are true, it has the right to accept them
(U.S. v. Lazaro, 34 Phil. 871).
c. Contradiction of aged and ignorant witnesses.·
Aged and ignorant witnesses usually contradict
themselves in a long series of tedious questions on
cross-examination, and their testimony must not be
discredited for that reason alone, especially if the
principal point has been corroborated by other facts
contained in the record (People v. Limbo, 49 Phil.
94). To the same effect is the following observation
in People v. Provo: „Well settled is the rule that
inconsistencies and contradictions incurred by an
illiterate witness in the course of a lengthy
examination will not affect the credibility of her
testimony.‰

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d. Contradiction in details by confusion, excitement,

and fright.·On this point the Tribunal in People
vs. Escosura (82 Phil. 41) made this observation:
„The contradictions pointed out in the witnessesÊ
statements are of the nature that would not tend to
impair their credibility. They were details which, in
the confusion, excitement and fright the horrible
incidents brought about, could very well have

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impressed the witnesses in different manners or

escaped the attention of some but not of the others .
. . Far from being evidence of falsehood, these
contradictions constitute a demonstration of good
faith and a confirmation of the truth of the
appellantÊs participation‰.
e. Where discrepancies refer to minor details.·Where
the discrepancies or contradictions of a witnessÊ
testimony are more apparent than real, and they
refer to minor details, the same do not affect the
merits of the case. Instead of adversely affecting the
credibility and weight of said testimony, they tend
to bolster up the same, for experience has time and
again shown that persons who witness the same
occurrence seldom, if ever, have identical
impressions about the details thereof (People v.
Otto, L-29651, Jan. 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 306, 315–
316).

WitnessesÊ testimony need not be considered incredible

because the witnesses differ as to certain details, where it
is apparent that some of the questions were not understood
and because witnesses react differently as to what they see
and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind,
furthermore, absolute uniformity in details is a badge of
untruthfulness (People vs. Pascual, L-4801, June 30, 1953).
In Maravilla v. Maravilla (L-23225, Feb. 27, 1971, 37
SCRA 672), it was also held that the variation in the
expressions used by a witness is the best evidence that he
was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of
truthfulness rather than the reverse.

f. Where contradictions are satisfactorily explained.·

The theory that a witnessÊ previous testimony is
false, simply because he subsequently declared it to
be so, is as illogical as it is dangerous. Merely
because a witness says that what he had declared is
false and that what he now says is true, is not

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Impeachment of Witness

sufficient ground for concluding that the previous

testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever
crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is
that a witness may be impeached by a previous
contradictory statement (Sec. 16, Rule 132); not
that a previous statement is presumed to be false
merely because a witness now says that the same is
not true. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
has always been otherwise, i.e., that contradictory
testimony given subsequently does not necessarily
discredit the previous testimony if the
contradictions are satisfactorily explained. (U.S. v.
Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U.S. vs. Briones, 28 Phil.
362; U.S. v. Dasiip, 26 Phil. 503; U.S. v. Lazaro, 34
Phil. 871). It was also held that if a previous
confession of an accused were to be rejected simply
because the latter subsequently makes another
confession, all that an accused would do to acquit
himself would be to make another confession out of
harmony with the previous one (U.S. v. Acasio, 37
Phil. 70). Similarly, it would be a dangerous rule for
courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who
had given them later on change their mind for one
reason or another, for such rule would make solemn
trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth
at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. (People v.
Ubiña, et al., 97 Phil. 525).

A contradiction may be explained by the fact that an

affidavit will not always disclose the whole facts, and will
oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe, without
the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences,
narrated and being taken ex parte, and is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his
memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs

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to the subject (People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337). Cited in People

v. Tiongson, L-29569, Oct. 30, 1972, 47 SCRA 279, 284).
2. Question relating to character,·A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he has been called
by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty,
or

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integrity is bad (U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127). However,

evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached (Sec.
17, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court).
3. Evidence of falsehood or perjury.·Deliberate and
studied perjury on the part of an accused, even on nonvital
particulars, can mean troubled and uneasy conscience and
an endeavor to cover up incriminating facts. Subterfuge is
not a resort of defendants who have nothing to hide (People
v. Llaneta, et al., 86 Phil. 219).
The presumption that the witness will declare the truth
ceases as soon as it manifestly appears that he is capable of
perjury. Faith in a witnessÊ testimony cannot be partial or
fractional; where any material fact rests on his testimony,
the degree of credit due to him must be ascertained, and
according to the result his testimony is to be credited or
rejected (Starkie, Evidence, Vol. I, p. 583; Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. III, 3rd ed., p. 675).
But the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not an absolute one, and it is perfectly reasonable to believe
the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People v. Dasig, et
al., 49 O.G. No. 8, p. 3338). In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No.
7, pp. 3222–3223, the following excerpt was quoted with
approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p.
23:

„Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has
said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject
other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts

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and circumstances, to be the truth . . . Even when witnesses are

found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the
jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem worthy of
belief‰ (People v. Li Bun Juan, et al., L-11077, Aug. 23, 1966, 17
SCRA 934, 945). 945).

4. Exaggeration.·Exaggerations or fantastic details in the

testimony of a witness may be fatal to his credibility
(People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 365). But the witnessesÊ

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exaggerated statements on other matters should not

preclude the acceptance of such of their evidence as is
relieved from any sign of falsehood (People vs. Refuerzo, 82
Phil. 576, 580).
5. Grievance.·The story of a witness with a grievance,
like the testimony of a discharged servant or employee,
must be taken with extreme caution (Moore on Facts, Vol.
2, p. 1253).

§ 5. Laying Foundation for Impeachment

For the purpose of clarifying the practice in respect to the

proper mode of proceeding where a party wishes to get
before the court contradictory statements made by a
witness who is testifying for the adversary party a few
words may be given. For instance, if the attorney for the
accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro
Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before
the fiscal materially different from that given in his
testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the
attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his
attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not
make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did
not there make a statement different from that delivered in
court. If the witness admits the making of such
contradictory statements, the accused has the right to
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prove that the witness did make such statement; and if the
fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof
would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a
witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is
called in the practice of the American courts „laying a
predicate‰ for the introduction of contradictory statements.
It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is
thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory
statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the
discretion of the court. (People v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 733–734).
To the same effect is the following ruling:

„The alleged discrepancies between the witnessesÊ testimony in the

case at bar and their testimony in another case can not be
entertained. We do not have before us the latter testimony except

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counselÊs summary of it in his brief in the case mentioned.

Moreover, granting the alleged contradictions, the statements in the
other case can not serve as basis for impeaching the witnessesÊ
veracity unless their attention was directed to the discrepancies
and they were given an opportunity to explain them. This has not
been done.‰ (People v. Escosura, 82 Phil. 41, 45).

In impeaching a witness by showing that he has made

statements in writing inconsistent with his testimony, it is
sufficient if the writing is shown to him and full
opportunity is given him to examine it before answering
any question concerning the same; and it is not essential
that the statement be read or related to him orally unless
he so requests (People v. Somonte, 48 Phil. 894, 48 J.F.
943). However, if the previous statements of a witness are
offered as evidence of admission and not merely to impeach
him, there is no need of laying a predicate (Ysmael & Co. v.
Hasmin, 50 Phil. 132).

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