Breaking Barriers Report

BREAKING
BARRIERS
A Report on
Cyber Abuse Among
New Zealand Workers
Prepared by:
Dr Natalia D’Souza
Dr Kate Blackwood
Dr Darryl Forsyth September 2018
1
2
Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge NetSafe for funding this project through the
NetSafe Online Safety Partnership Grant. We also acknowledge the
respondents who participated in this survey.
For more information about this research study please contact:
Dr Natalia D’Souza
Email: N.J.DSouza@massey.ac.nz
Ph: (09) 414 0800 extn: 43406 Facebook.com/healthyworkgroup
Breaking Barriers Report 2018

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Table of Contents
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
2. INTRODUCTION 5
3. METHOD 6
4. FINDINGS 7
4.1 SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS 7
4.2 EXPERIENCES OF CYBER ABUSE 9
4.3 RESPONSES TO CYBER ABUSE 13
4.4 COPING WITH CYBER ABUSE 17
4.5 INTERVENTION 18
5. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22
6. REFERENCES 25

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1. Executive Summary
While workplace cyber abuse presents a growing challenge for organisations, many employers remain
ill-equipped to manage the issue. Furthermore, targets of such cyber abuse are often reluctant to report
incidents. Therefore, in order to intervene effectively it is important to understand the main barriers to
reporting and resolution of workplace cyber abuse, as well as factors that may be helpful in coping with
or facilitating a successful intervention.
The current project – funded by NetSafe’s Online Safety Partnership Grant – investigated New Zealand
adults’ experiences of workplace cyber abuse (N=205), including the types of abuse experienced; target
and organisational responses; reasons for non-reporting, where applicable; as well as barriers and
facilitators to resolution. The vast majority of targets (84.4%) had experienced repeated cyber abuse,
with 48.3% experiencing more than one form of cyber abuse (such as cyber bullying, cyber
discrimination, cyber sexual harassment, or cyber stalking). In 65.9% of cases, the cyber abuse had
occurred on a public forum, and a third of incidents were perpetrated anonymously.
The most common response from targets (43.4%) was to ignore or block the perpetrator and/or content,
and worryingly 75.6% of the sample did not report the cyber abuse to their organisation, believing that
the organisation could not or would not do anything to intervene. A number of other barriers to reporting
were also identified that could potentially inform organisational policy and procedures. For respondents
who did report their cyber abuse internally, the most common organisational intervention was informal
mediation between the parties involved (31.9%) as well as counselling or coaching for the target
(29.8%). Unfortunately, 21.3% of respondents reported that there was no organisational response.
In general, nearly half of respondents who reported their cyber abuse (46.8%) were happy with the
overall outcome, although over half (55.1%) of the sample were still experiencing some form of cyber
abuse at the time of completing the survey. A number of barriers to successful intervention were
identified at the individual, organisational, and national level, most commonly reflecting the difficulties
in managing anonymous cyber abuse, organisational inaction, and a lack of awareness of worker rights
and helpful resources. However, the ability to block the abuse/perpetrator as well as social support were
the two highest-rated factors in coping with and successfully resolving workplace cyber abuse.
The findings reflect the importance of reporting incidents of workplace cyber abuse, both within the
organisation and externally to NetSafe, in the case of organisation inaction. From an organisational
perspective, having a clear stance (and policy) against workplace cyber abuse as well as having
appropriate reporting channels in place would greatly alleviate the problem of underreporting. Although
reporting and intervention in cases of anonymous cyber abuse appears to be particularly challenging,
it is essential that organisations provide adequate support for targets, and seek external advice from
NetSafe in resolving these incidents. However, anonymous cyber abuse is a key issue that warrants
further attention and more research is required in this area to inform intervention. Finally, it is imperative
that those tasked with the intervention of workplace cyber abuse – at the organisational and national
levels – have the required training, competencies, and resources to be able to intervene effectively.

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2. Introduction
A growing body of research links various forms of cyber abuse to detrimental outcomes for individuals
who experience the abuse (targets) (Baruch, 2005; Ford, 2013), as well as significant costs for
organisations involved (Van Gramberg, Teicher, & O'Rourke, 2014). Although previous research has
investigated specific forms of cyber abuse within the work context, such as workplace cyberbullying in
New Zealand (D’Souza, Forsyth, Tappin, & Catley, 2017a; D’Souza, Tappin, Forsyth, & Catley, 2017b)
the broader phenomenon of workplace cyber abuse remains relatively unexplored, particularly in New
Zealand.
Cyber abuse is “an umbrella term that encompasses online abusive interpersonal
behaviours including online bullying, stalking, sexual solicitation, and problematic
exposure to pornography” (Mishna, Cook, Sain, Wu, & MacFadden, 2011, p5)
Like with traditional forms of workplace ill-treatment such as bullying and harassment, underreporting
of such incidents continues to remain a challenge (Addington, 2013; Blizard, 2015) despite the digital
trail left by cyber abuse. This digital evidence can be extremely beneficial, both for targets in reporting
the incidents (D'Cruz & Noronha, 2013) and for managers in handling such cases (D’Souza et al.,
2017a). Yet, previous research on workplace cyberbullying among nurses has indicated that despite
having digital evidence of this cyberbullying, many targets were unable to use this effectively in resolving
the incidents due to factors such as organisational unfamiliarity with cyberbullying, the lack of a visible
representative to report to, and anonymous perpetrators (D’Souza et al., 2017b). Thus, there are
significant barriers to reporting and consequently, effective intervention of workplace cyber abuse.
However, when such incidents of cyber abuse are reported, NetSafe remains a particularly effective
intervention agency, and through their relations with commercial providers, are able to get harmful or
distressing content taken down in 9 out of 10 requested cases (NetSafe New Zealand, 2016). Thus, it
becomes imperative to identify the various barriers to the reporting and effective management of
workplace cyber abuse, as well as facilitators that may enable a successful resolution.
Accordingly, this project funded by NetSafe New Zealand was aimed at exploring barriers to the
reporting and effective resolution of cyber abuse, with a view to informing effective intervention at the
organisational and national levels.

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3. Method
The findings presented in this report are informed by 205 New Zealand adults who believe that they
have been the victim of workplace cyber abuse in the past 12 months. For the purpose of this research
cyber abuse can manifest in four forms:
Cyberbullying – unwanted or hostile behaviours that may be repeated, and can harm,
threaten or demoralise the recipient
Cyber sexual harassment - inappropriate or unwanted comments that are sexually

offensive or have a sexual connotation, unwanted sexual solicitation, promises of better
treatment (implied or explicit) in exchange for sexual activity, threats of differential
treatment (implied or explicit) if sexual activity is not offered, or problematic exposure to
pornographic material
Cyber discrimination - behaviour that is prejudiced or biased against your age, race,
ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religious or spiritual beliefs,
marital or family status, employment status, or political opinion
Cyber stalking - stalking, harassing, intimidating, or threatening behaviours
Respondents completed an online survey that asked about their experience of cyber abuse and their
responses to such incidents, including whether they reported the abuse within their organisations;
organisational interventions; as well as barriers and facilitators to effective interventions. Respondents
were sourced from Qualtrics data panels based in New Zealand. Data was collected between 30th May
and 14th June 2018.
The project received full ethics approval from the Massey University Human Ethics Committee
(application NOR 18/21).
Note: Where applicable, findings report on:

n = numbers and % of the total sample
M = means
SD = standard deviations

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4. Findings
4.1 Sample Demographics
4.1.1 GENDER AND AGE
Respondents identified as male ( n=92); female (n=103); and gender variant/non-binary (n=10), as
indicated in Figure 1 below. The vast majority (90%) of respondents were aged between 18 and 38
years, with the mean (M) age being 28.33 years (SD=12.17).
Gender of Respondents
5%
45%
50%
Male Female Gender variant/non-binary
Figure 1. Breakdown of Respondents' Gender
4.1.2 EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND INDUSTRY

Participants were asked about their terms of employment during their experiences of cyber abuse, with
the option of selecting more than one form of employment 1. Most respondents were employed in a
permanent, full-time (n=102, 49.8%) or part-time (n=40, 19.5%) position. A further 17 (8.3%)
respondents also indicated they were self-employed. Fewer respondents were employed on fixed-term
(n=14, 6.8%) or casual/temporary ( n=12, 5.9%) contracts, and a small subset (n=7, 3.4%) worked
multiple jobs. Three participants (1.5% of the sample) also indicated they engaged in flexi- or remote-
working for their job. Interestingly, 13.2% of the sample were unemployed or currently seeking a job at
the time of experiencing cyber abuse.
The breakdown of respondents by industry sector is illustrated in Figure 2. As evident, respondents who
experienced cyber abuse were most represented in Retail Trade and Accommodation ( n=35), Education
and Training (n=31), Arts, Recreation and Other Services ( n=26), and Construction (n=25). Within the
two highest-represented sectors (indicated in orange below), respondents were mainly in customer-
focused roles (such as customer service representatives, cashiers, waitstaff, and sales assistants) or
teaching-related roles (teachers, teacher aids and assistants, or trainers).
1
Total percentages reported on in Section 4.1.2 equate to more than 100% because respondents could choose more than
one response.

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Breakdown of respondents by industry sector

Retail Trade and Accommodation
Education and Training
Arts, Recreation and Other Services
Construction
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
Financial and Insurance Services
Manufacturing
Transport, Postal and Warehousing
Professional, Scientific, Technical, Administrative and…
Health Care and Social Assistance
Information Media and Telecommunications
Public Administration and Safety
Wholesale Trade
Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services
Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services
Mining
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Figure 2. Breakdown of respondents by industry sector

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4.2 Experiences of Cyber Abuse

4.2.1 TYPES OF CYBER ABUSE EXPERIENCED
Responses indicated that cyberbullying was the most common form of cyber abuse experienced
(n=122, 59.5%); followed by cyber discrimination ( n=91, 44.4%); cyber sexual harassment (n=76,
37.1%); and other forms not clearly specified (n=11, 5.4%).
However, when these responses are broken-down by gender, as per Figure 3 below, more males (n=61)
than females (n=54) tend to experience cyberbullying, while female respondents consistently
experienced more cyber-sexual harassment (n=51), cyber discrimination (n=53), and cyber stalking
(n=37). These figures underscore the fact that experiences of cyber abuse are very much gendered,
mirroring patterns of physical violence and ill-treatment ‘offline’ (Lindsay & Krysik, 2012).
Forms of Cyber Abuse Experienced by Gender

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Cyber bullying Cyber sexual Cyber Cyber stalking Other
harassment discrimination
Male Female Gender variant/ non-binary
Figure 3. Forms of cyber abuse experienced by gender
4.2.2 POLYVICTIMISATION
Approximately half the sample experienced more than one form of abuse ( n=99, 48.3%); a term referred
to as polyvictimisation (Finkelhor, Ormrod, & Turner, 2007). We asked these respondents to select the
one form of cyber abuse that had the biggest impact on them. Controlling for varying reported rates of
the four different forms of cyber abuse, the biggest impact was seen for cyber sexual harassment, where
50% of respondents who reported it as one of the forms they were exposed to reported that it had the
biggest impact on them. This was followed by cyberbullying (37%), cyber stalking (30.8%) and lastly
cyber discrimination (25.7%).
When examining impact by gender, it appears that cyber sexual harassment had a bigger impact on
female (57.9%) than male (33.3%) respondents, whereas cyberbullying had a bigger impact on males
(46.9%) than females (28.6%). Cyber stalking also had a bigger impact on female respondents (37.5%
versus 22.2% for male respondents).

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4.2.3 PROXIES FOR HARM

Participants were asked whether their cyber abuse was repeated, occurred on a public platform, and
invaded their work-home boundaries. These three elements were investigated as proxies for harm, and
the findings are reported in the sections below.
REPETITION
A majority of the sample in this study experienced repeated cyber abuse from the same perpetrator(s),
as depicted in Figure 4 below. Specifically, 10.2% (n=21) of the sample reported that the cyber abuse
behaviours were repeated “many times’, while nearly three-quarters (n=152, 74.1%) reported the
behaviours were repeated “a few times”. Only 15.6% of the sample ( n=32) reported that the cyber abuse
behaviour was not repeated on more than one instance.
Most respondents who had experienced repeated cyber abuse (either a few or many times, n=173)
reported that these behaviours spanned “a few days” (35.9%) or “a few weeks to a month” (35.9%).
Some 8.3% of this group (n=13) experienced cyber abuse for longer than a year and 55.1% (n=113)
were currently still experiencing some form of cyber abuse at the time of completing the questionnaire.
The duration of repeated cyber abuse is depicted in Figure 5 below.
Was the cyber abuse repeated more than once

by the same perpetrator(s)?
16% Yes, a few times

Yes, many times
10% No
74%
Duration of cyber abuse

Figure 4. Repetition of Cyber Abuse
8%
A few days
5%
A few weeks to a 36%

month 15%
Between 1 to 6
months
Between 6 months to
a year
More than a year
36%
Figure 5. Duration of Cyber Abuse

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PUBLIC NATURE OF CYBER ABUSE

Worringly, nearly two-thirds of respondents (n=135, 65.9%) reported that these cyber abuse behaviours
had occurred on a public platform (such as social media, blogs, or forwarded emails) or were visible to
the general public. A further 37 (18%) indicated the cyber abuse was not publicly visible as far as they
were aware (see Figure 4 below).
Was the cyber abuse publicly visible?
18%
16%
66%
Yes No Not that I am aware
Figure 4. The publicity of the cyber abuse
PHYSICAL AND TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES

Figure 5 represents the locations of the cyber-abuse; the blue bars indicate that the cyber abuse
occurred during work hours, while the orange bars indicate that it occurred after work hours. Most of the
cyber abuse was experienced outside of work hours (64.8%): either work-related (n=45, 21.9%) or not
(n=117, 57.1%). However, as indicated by the figure, a substantial portion of cyber abuse was also
experienced during work hours or while on the work premises.
Main 'Location' of the Cyber Abuse

140
120
117
100
80
60
40 51
45
37
20
0
During work hours, During work hours but After work hours, but After work hours, but
within work premises outside the work related to work not related to work
premises
Figure 5. Predominant location of the cyber abuse experience

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4.2.4 PERPETRATORS
It should be noted that out of the 117 respondents who had indicated they had experienced cyber abuse
outside of work hours but not related to work, more than half ( n=70) could not identify the perpetrator(s):
either did not know them or the perpetrator(s) was anonymous. Thus, it is likely these respondents could
not state definitively that the abuse was work-related.
Most perpetrators of cyber abuse in this study tended to be anonymous or unidentifiable to the target
(n=86, 30.5%), followed by a co-worker (n=43, 15.2%); friend or acquaintance outside the organisation
(n=42, 14.9%); customer/student/patient/or member of the public ( n=37, 13.1%); supervisor or direct
manager (n=20, 7.1%); a member of senior management ( n=19, 6.7%); and a subordinate (n=15, 5.3%).
Fifteen respondents (5.3%) also indicated experiencing ‘domestic’ forms of cyber abuse from a spouse,
relative, or partner. These numbers are illustrated in Figure 6 below.
Perpetrators of Cyber Abuse

Anonymous/unidentifiable
Co-worker
Friend or aquiantance outside organisation
Customer/student/member of the public
Supervisor or direct manager
Member of senior management
Spouse, relative, partner
Subordinate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Male Female Gender variant/non-binary
Figure 6. Perpetrators of Cyber Abuse
Of interest, is the fact that 27 respondents – eighteen of whom identified as female – indicated they were
unemployed or seeking a job at the time of experiencing cyber abuse. These individuals primarily
experienced cyber abuse from unidentifiable and/or anonymous individuals ( n=20); as well as
acquaintances (n=8) and members of the public ( n=4). Alarmingly, three times as many female
respondents reported experiencing cyber abuse from a member of senior management ( n=13),
compared to male respondents ( n=4). In addition, nearly twice as many female respondents reported
experiencing cyber abuse from customers/students/patients or members of the public, as well as from
friends or acquaintances outside the organisation, than males. However, this pattern was reversed for
cyber abuse perpetrated by a subordinate.

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4.3 Responses to Cyber Abuse

The main focus of this study was to explore target and organisational responses to cyber abuse. The
questionnaire asked respondents about their ideal outcomes of the cyber abuse as well as their actual
responses to this, particularly whether they reported such incidents. Reasons for non-reporting were
further investigated since they present barriers to effective intervention.
4.3.1 TARGETS’ IDEAL OUTCOMES

Respondents were given the opportunity to elaborate on their ideal outcome, in free-text boxes, and
responses were coded qualitatively. Although some respondents were unsure of their ideal outcome
(n=23), in general respondents’ ideal outcomes of cyber abuse reflected three broad themes: (i) the
abuse stopping; (ii) perpetrator facing consequences; and (iii) acknowledgement of the abuse.
Unsurprisingly, most respondents indicated that their ideal outcome was for the cyber abuse behaviour
to stop, as indicated by the orange bar in Figure 7 below.
Ideal Outcomes for Targets

Abuse stops
Uncertain of ideal outcome
Perpetrator leaves them alone
Report the perpetrator
Perpetrator faces prosecution or jail time
Perpetrator banned from platform/internet acess
Perpetrator is fired
Perpetrator apologises
Perpetrator reforms or changes
Perpetrator faces disciplinary action
Identify anonymous perpetrator
Access to social support or comfort
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Figure 7. Targets' Ideal Outcomes of the Cyber Abuse
4.3.2 TARGET S’ RESPONSES TO CYBER ABUSE

This study investigated how targets themselves responded to the cyber abuse, with respondents being
able to select multiple options 2 and add their own open-ended responses. Responses are illustrated in
Figure 8 below. Interestingly, the most common response was to ignore or block the perpetrator and/or
abusive content (n=89, 43.4%). Respondents also frequently told others about the abuse, such as a
friend or relative outside the organisation (n=66, 32.2%); a co-worker (n=48, 23.4%), or their supervisor
or manager (n=40, 19.5%). While fewer respondents reported the abuse formally within the organisation
(n=19), to a union representative ( n=15, 9.3%), or an external agency such as NetSafe or the
Employment Relations Authority (n=14, 6.8%); 19 respondents (9.3%) indicated seeking help or advice
from sources outside the organisation (i.e.; a counsellor, lawyer, Citizens Advice Bureau, or EAP
services). Twenty nine respondents (14.1%) indicated they did nothing, while nine (4.4%) left their job
or organisation as a result of the cyber abuse. Finally, a single respondent who provided an ‘other’ open-
ended response indicated that they “shrugged it off”.
2
Total percentages reported on in Section 4.3.2 equate to more than 100% because respondents could choose more than
one response.

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The findings reflect a very real problem of underreporting of workplace cyber abuse. Indeed, in
approximately 75.6% of cases (n=155), the organisation would have been unaware of the abusive
situation (i.e.; it was not reported internally, either to a manager or via formal reporting channels);
although these respondents may have directly confronted their perpetrator, sought help from an external
agency or union representative, or told a co-worker or family member about their abuse. Reasons for
non-reporting are discussed in section 4.3.3.
Target Responses by Gender

Ignored or blocked perpetrator and/or abuse
Told a friend/relative
Told supervisor/manager
Talked to/confronted perpetrator
Did nothing
Sought advice/help from outside organisation
Reported it formally
Reported to union
Reported to external agency
Left job/organisation
Other
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Male Female Gender variant
Figure 8. Target Responses by Gender
When responses to the cyber abuse are broken down by gender, certain patterns become evident. First,
although the most common response across all genders was to ignore or block the perpetrator and/or
content, the second most common response for female targets was to tell a friend or relative outside
the organisation about their cyber abuse ( n=45), whereas male targets were more likely to tell their
supervisor or manager about the abuse ( n=23). With regard to help-seeking, female respondents also
tended to report their abuse to unions more than males, while male respondents tended to seek external
advice (such as from a counsellor, lawyer, Employment Assistance Programmes, or other). Further,
female respondents were also more likely to leave their job or organisation ( n=7) compared to males
(n=2). Finally, it is worth noting that respondents who identified as gender variant/non-binary tended to
not report their cyber abuse within their organisation or seek external advice.
CAPTURING EVIDENCE OF CYBER ABUSE

One potential advantage that cyber abuse has over traditional ‘offline’ forms is the digital trail that is
sometimes left behind. Research has suggested that targets can often use this digital evidence as proof
in reporting the behaviours (Borstorff & Graham, 2006; D'Cruz & Noronha, 2013). In this study, nearly
half of all respondents (n=100, 48.8%) indicated that they were able to capture digital evidence of their
cyber abuse, although most had since deleted or lost it, with only 44 (21.5%) currently still possessing

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this. It should be noted that one of these respondents mentioned that while they were potentially able to
capture digital evidence of their cyber abuse, they “didn’t think to” at the time. The remainder of the
sample were unable to capture digital evidence of their cyber abuse for varying reasons. While
approximately 10% of the sample simply could not do so ( n=21), 18% (n=37) indicated that it had also
not crossed their mind, while many also did not want to capture this (n=47, 22.9%).
DIRECTLY CONFRONTING PERPETRATOR

It should also be noted that 34 respondents talked to or confronted the perpetrator about the abuse.
While, for some targets, this strategy either improved (n=10, 29.4%) or resolved the cyber abuse
completely (n=5, 14.7%), in most cases this strategy was ineffective (n=13, 38.2%) or made the situation
worse (n=6, 17.6%). Interestingly, all six respondents who reported a worse situation after talking to the
perpetrator were male.
4.3.3 REASONS FOR NON-REPORTING OF CYBER ABUSE

As noted earlier, approximately three-quarters of the sample did not report the cyber abuse behaviour
within their organisation. These respondents (n=155) were asked to indicate their main reason for not
doing so, as illustrated in Figure 9 below. Interestingly, most respondents did not think the organisation
could do anything to intervene in their situation ( n=32, 20.6%). Other frequent reasons for non-reporting
included respondents not believing the organisation would do anything to deal with the situation ( n=26,
16.8%); unclear reporting channels ( n=24, 15.5%); fear of further victimisation ( n=22, 14.2%); the lack
of someone to safely report the abuse to (n=13, 8.4%), and concerns that the manager/HR/organisation
would not have believed them (n=13, 8.4%). Finally, 25 respondents (16.1%) selected ‘other’ reasons
for not reporting.
Reasons for non-reporting within organisation
I didn't think they could do anything
I didn't think they would do anything
Reporting channels were unclear
Feared further victimisation
Didn't think they would have believed me
No one to safely report it to
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Figure 9. Targets' Reasons for Not Reporting their Cyber Abuse
Respondents were also asked to expand further on their reasons for non-reporting in free-text boxes.
These qualitative responses were coded and are presented in Table 1, along with some illustrative
quotes.

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Table 1. Reasons for Not Reporting Cyber Abuse
Key factors Description Quotes

Cyber abuse “If I told someone about it they might say it was outside work
occurring outside of hours and so it’s not their problem”
work
Cyber abuse not “It happened outside of work hours and did not directly relate
Temporal and directly related to to work, I thought it would be considered slightly irrelevant
work-related work and would just be an embarrassment for me to report it”
boundaries External or “They [perpetrator] were not from my organisation, so it’s
anonymous pointless to report”
perpetrator
“I couldn’t really determine if it was someone from work or
someone random”
Respondents not “I was only a sub-contractor”
feeling like they
Precarity of
would be ‘protected’ “We [respondent and perpetrator] were both outside
employment
due to employment subcontractors”
terms
Poor reporting culture “I didn’t want to cause any trouble”
“The worry of losing a job”
“If I had told someone they might think I’m making it up”
Perceived “I didn’t feel like it was something [the organisation] would
organisational take action against”
Organisational inaction
climate “no clear rules around cyberbullying were in effect and the
people in charge wouldn’t have viewed it as a work problem”
Fear of further “sexual/gender minority and temporary nature of my job made
victimisation me fear losing my job and further discrimination, or the
harassment being blown off”
“being classed as a whistle-blower would result in more

abuse, from more people”
Cyber abuse not “It [abuse] wasn’t bad enough to”
warranting reporting
“It was not worth the trouble”
“I didn’t feel I needed to”

Individual-level Minimal or no impact “The abuse didn’t bother me that much”
factors on target
Stigma around cyber “I felt embarrassed to talk about it… I began to think that
abuse everyone thought about me in that way”
“It’s bad enough that I was bullied online, I don’t want people
to judge me further based on the experience”

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4.4 Coping with Cyber Abuse

Respondents were asked to rate the helpfulness of a number of factors in coping or dealing with the
cyber abuse, on a five-point scale. While all offered factors were perceived as somewhat helpful, the
relative order of this is presented in Table 2 below, with factors ranked in descending order from most
to least helpful.
Table 2. Usefulness of factors in coping with cyber abuse

Most helpful
Factors Helpful in Coping with Cyber Abuse
Ability to block the abuse
Support from family, friends, pets
Having digital evidence of the abuse
Legal resources
Support from supervisor/manager
Support from co-workers
Self-help techniques
Seeking information about cyber abuse
Religious or spiritual beliefs
Organisational policy/programme
Least helpful
It is also worth noting, that respondents who identified as gender variant/non-binary rated support from
their supervisor, manager, or someone higher up in the organisation as being the most helpful coping
resource, above being able to block or electronically stop the abuse. Support from their partner, family,
friends or pets was also highly rated.
Respondents were also asked about other resources that may have been helpful in terms of coping with
their experience of cyber abuse. Although many could not provide any suggestions or were unclear
themselves about the resources available to them, the most frequently noted resources were having a
“support person” as a confidant or counsellor; reporting the abuse to the police; having a “clearer stance
from the employer… [and] guidelines for how to deal with” the cyber abuse; having someone with
required “experience” or competencies in managing the situation; and ignoring the abuse or “taking a
break from social media”.

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4.5 Intervention
Organisational responses or ‘interventions’ are crucial in determining whether the cyber abuse is
resolved effectively. The following section outlines the various organisational interventions that occurred
as a result of respondents either telling their supervisor or manager about the cyber abuse or reporting
it formally via Human Resources, Health and Safety unit, or other organisational reporting channels.
Respondents were also asked about their satisfaction with organisational interventions, and where
relevant, barriers and facilitators to successful interventions were also investigated.
4.5.1 ORGANISA TIONAL INTERVENTIONS

Despite three-quarters of the sample not reporting the cyber abuse within their organisation, those who
did report this behaviour (n=47, 22.9%) were asked about the action(s) taken in response by the
organisation. These are illustrated in Figure 10 below.
Organisational Interventions to Reported Cyber Abuse

Informal mediation between parties involved
Counselling or coaching for target
Formal/informal warning for perpetrator(s)
Policy/training around appropriate work behaviours
No response as far as respondent is aware
Counselling or coaching for perpetrator(s)
Formal investigation
Formal mediation by external facilitator
Implementing anonymous reporting channel
Training sessions (e.g.; resilience or stress management)
Consulting an external advisor (legal or other)
Team- or morale-building interventions
Monitoring/filtering tool against abusive communications
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Figure 10. Organisational Intervention Approach
As evident, the two most common organisational interventions (indicated by orange bars) were informal
mediation between the two parties involved, facilitated by a manager or colleague ( n=15, 31.9%) and
counselling, coaching, or debriefing for the target ( n=14, 29.8%). The least common organisational
response (n=3, 6.4%) was to implement a monitoring or filtering tool against abusive electronic
communications. Of particular note, is that in ten cases (21.3%), there was no organisational response
to their reported cyber abuse, as far as the respondent was aware.
TARGET SATISFACTION WITH ORGANISATIONAL INTERVENTION

Respondents were also asked about their satisfaction with the organisational response, or lack thereof.
Nearly half of respondents who reported their cyber abuse were happy with the overall outcome ( n=22,
46.8%), while 17 were “somewhat” happy (36.2%), and seven were not happy with the outcome (14.9%).
One respondent was currently awaiting an outcome or decision.

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4.5.2 BARRIERS TO A SUCCESS FUL RESOLUTION

Respondents who were either unhappy, somewhat happy with the overall outcome of the organisation’s
response or who were currently awaiting an outcome (n=25), were asked to outline some of the main
barriers they believed were preventing a successful resolution. These barriers have been coded into
three broad categories at the micro (individual), meso (organisational) and macro (national) levels, as
represented in Figure 11 below.
Figure 11. Socio-ecological model of barriers to successful resolution
At the micro level, participants identified individual- and interpersonal-related factors that prohibited a
successful resolution of their cyber abuse. One prominent factor identified was the ‘distance’ which
represented both the physical distance of the perpetrator, which may have prevented them from being
held accountable, as well as proximity to the perpetrator, since one respondent perceived working in
the same environment as the perpetrator a major impediment toward resolution of the cyber abuse.
Other barriers identified included the judgement from others as well as possible threats to reputation,
and a power differential in favour of the perpetrator – such as the perpetrator being more “successful”.
Interestingly, most barriers were identified at the meso or organisational level, and primarily revolved
around organisational inaction. Indeed, this was the single most common barrier to resolution, as
identified by respondents. Relatedly, one respondent also noted that there was a pervasive and “very
harsh” culture of cyberbullying within their organisation, combined with a ‘harden-up’ mentality.
Together, these factors remain barriers to the successful resolution of workplace cyber abuse, often by
deterring its reporting in the first instance.
Finally, at the wider national or macro level, legislation and lack of proof were identified as key barriers,
along with the fact that many workers were often unaware of their rights. This latter factor often overlaps
with poor working conditions, preventing vulnerable workers from taking steps to alleviate or resolve
their cyber abuse.

20
4.5.3 FACILITATORS FOR SUCC ESSFUL INTERVENTION

Respondents who were happy with the outcome of the organisational intervention (n=22) reported that
the intervention has “stopped the person contacting [them]”, “there was good communication”, and the
complaint was “handled fair and professionally”.
4.5.4 STOPP ING THE CYBER A BUSE

Respondents who had noted they were not currently experiencing ongoing cyber abuse (n=92) were
asked to rate the helpfulness of factors in stopping or resolving the abuse, on a five-point scale. The
relative order of these factors is presented in Table 3 below, in descending order from most to least
helpful.
Table 3. Factors helpful in stopping cyber abuse

Most helpful
Factors Helpful in Stopping Cyber Abuse
Ability to block abuse or perpetrator
Support/advice from family, friends, pets
Leaving the job or organisation
Informational resources
Doing nothing
Having digital evidence of abuse (in reporting)
Legal resources
Organisational policy/programme
Support or advice from co-workers
Organisational intervention
Least helpful
When asked to identify other resources that were helpful in stopping their abuse, respondents identified:
“ignoring” or “de-activating” their social media; “WorkSafe New Zealand” guidelines; and support from
others (co-workers, family, pets). Unfortunately, a number of respondents also noted that the cyber
abuse stopped when either they or the perpetrator left the job or “ended up moving towns”.
For respondents who indicated that they were still experiencing ongoing cyber abuse at the time of
completing the survey, additional resources they believed could be helpful in resolving their abuse
included: “blocking” or “ignoring” the perpetrator; “detailed company policy”; “better laws and police
training”; increased awareness of the issue and “to recognise cyberbullying as a legitimate problem”;
keeping detailed records of the abuse and “reporting” the behaviours; as well as having a support person
or “someone to talk to”.
4.5.5 ORGANISA TIONAL POLICY AND GUIDELINES

A key factor in the effectiveness of organisational response and intervention, is their preparedness to
do so, as indicated in existing policy or guidelines. This study examined if respondents were aware of
whether their organisations had any guidelines pertaining to harassment as well as appropriate online
communications and behaviours, at the time of experiencing cyber abuse. Responses are illustrated in
Figure 12 and Figure 13 below.

21
Guidelines on bullying and harassment
15% No, but they have since

implemented a policy/guidelines
26%
No, and they still do not have any
20% Yes, they did but this does not

cover cyber abuse
Yes, they did and this covers cyber
forms of abuse
21%
I was not/am not aware of this
18%
Figure 12. Prevalence of organisation guidelines around workplace bullying and harassment
Responses indicate that while approximately two-fifths (n-80, 39%) of organisations had existing
guidelines around workplace bullying and harassment, only half of these ( n=43, 21%) covered forms of
cyber abuse as well. Although a further third of organisations did not have existing guidelines around
workplace bullying and harassment (cyber or otherwise) at the time respondents had experienced cyber
abuse, it is promising that some (n=30) of these organisations have since taken steps toward this. Yet,
this is an area that requires further effort as a little over a quarter of respondents ( n=54, 26.3%) were
unaware of such guidelines in their workplace.
Did organisations have guidelines on social media or

appropriate online behaviours and communications?
17%
No, but they have since
28% implemented such guidelines
No, and they still do not have any
Yes, they did

29%
I was not/am not aware of this
26%
Figure 13. Prevalence of organisation guidelines around social media or online behaviours
This picture remains bleak when examining organisational guidelines around the use of social media or
appropriate online behaviours or communications. While a quarter of respondents ( n=53, 25.9%)
reported the existence of such guidelines in their organisation, nearly half of all respondents indicated
that their organisation lacked such guidelines at the time of their cyber abuse, with only 37% of this
subset (n=35) having implemented such guidelines since. Once again, more than a quarter of
respondents were unaware of guidelines pertaining to the use of social media, electronic
communications, or appropriate online behaviours in their organisation ( n=57, 27.8%).

22
5. Discussion and Recommendations

Based on the findings presented in this report as well as best-practice evidence from the research, we
propose the following recommendations for the effective reporting and intervention of workplace cyber
abuse.
INDIVIDUAL TARGETS
The most common response for targets was to ignore or block the perpetrator, and this was also rated
as the most effective strategy in both coping with and stopping cyber abuse. Additionally, seeking social
support and/or advice from family, friends, and partners may be particularly helpful in coping with or
putting an end to cyber abuse. Capturing evidence of the cyber abuse may also be helpful in reporting
the incidents, however, many respondents in our sample had lost or deleted this evidence. Finally,
although majority of respondents in our sample did not report their cyber abuse within their organisation,
many still sought help or advice from external sources.
Accordingly, we recommend that targets of workplace cyber abuse:

 Block the harmful content and/or perpetrator(s), if possible and appropriate
 Seek assistance from NetSafe in getting harmful content taken down from a public platform
 Speak to or confide in a trusted individual about their experience of cyber abuse
 Capture and save evidence of the cyber abuse, if possible, and use this in reporting incidents
 Report the cyber abuse within their organisation AND to NetSafe
 Seek external advice and information from counsellors, lawyers, the Police, WorkSafe New
Zealand, Employment Assistance Programmes, or the Citizens Advice Bureau
Incidentally, directly confronting the perpetrator(s) about the cyber abuse does not appear to be a
particularly effective strategy, as in most cases this did not change anything or made the situation worse.
M ANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATIONS

Non-reporting or underreporting of workplace cyber abuse emerged as a key issue within this sample,
with nearly three-quarters of respondents not reporting the cyber abuse within their organisation. This
is consistent with research on workplace ill-treatment more broadly (Addington, 2013; Carter et al.,
2013). The main barriers to organisational reporting reflected perceptions that the organisation would
not or could not intervene effectively; the lack of clear reporting channels; as well as fears around
retribution, further victimisation, or not being believed. Several individual-level factors were also
highlighted including: the stigma around being a victim of cyber abuse; the cyber abuse not being
substantial enough to warrant reporting; perceptions of reporting as a “hassle”, and power differences
between targets and perpetrators that presented additional barriers to reporting.
Together, these factors reflect organisational cultures that tolerate and facilitate the occurrence of
workplace ill-treatment – electronic or otherwise (D’Cruz, 2016; Georgakopoulos, Wilkin, & Kent, 2011)
- by failing to acknowledge workplace cyber abuse as a concern, being apathetic to the issue, and being
unable to deal with it effectively (Georgakopoulos et al., 2011). The lack of effective interventions in
itself results in secondary victimisation for targets (Citron, 2009), resulting in further violation of their
rights and traumatising them (Halder & Jaishankar, 2011). Indeed, the most common organisational
approach to intervention was to use informal mediation – a strategy severely critiqued within the
workplace bullying literature (Saam, 2010), for its potential to further reinforce power imbalances
between targets and perpetrators and its ineffectiveness in the long-term.

23
The precarious nature of certain work – in particular those who were self-employed or subcontractors –
presented another barrier to reporting. Due to the blurred lines of responsibility around employment and
social protections, many subcontractor workers (and other non-standard workers) may feel they are
unable to report their cyber abuse to anyone. It is not difficult to envision how a poor reporting culture
within an organisation could further exacerbate such concerns that the organisation is unlikely to listen
to their complaint.
Finally, certain cyber-specific features around anonymity and the ability to permeate work-home
boundaries posed additional barriers to the reporting of workplace cyber abuse. First, a third of the cyber
abuse experienced by respondents in this study was carried out anonymously, making it difficult to
determine the perpetrators’ identity and hold them accountable. This prevented respondents from
definitively identifying the cyber abuse as being “work-related”, and was a significant deterrent for
reporting it within the organisation. Second, several respondents indicated they did not report because
they had experienced the cyber abuse outside of work hours or the location. Thus, counter to prevailing
employment legislation, targets may have misconceptions about what does and does not qualify as
“work-related” abuse.
In line with this, we recommend that organisations and those tasked with the management of workplace
cyber abuse:
 Have a clear stance on what constitutes workplace cyber abuse and incorporate this into
organisational policies around workplace bullying and harassment
 Incorporate training and awareness around what constitutes workplace cyber abuse for
employees, along with clear communication around acceptable and unacceptable (online)
behaviours – regardless of whether this is from organisational members or members of the public
 Implement clear channels for reporting of such incidents, along with visible representatives
 Take all complaints seriously and ensure that they are handled fairly and professionally
 Ensure that those tasked with the management of workplace cyber abuse possess the required
skills and competencies in handling such cases
 Ensure the target is adequately supported within the organisation, while facilitating access to
help and resources from external sources such as NetSafe, particularly in cases of anonymous
cyberbullying that might be difficult to resolve
 Aim to create an organisational climate and culture that is encouraging of reporting behaviours
– a strong ‘reporting culture’ (Reason, 1998)
NATIONAL AGENCIES
Lastly, several barriers to the effective resolution of workplace cyber abuse were identified at the wider
national level. This predominantly involved targets being unaware of their rights or resources that were
available to them in coping with or resolving their cyber abuse. Legislation in particular was mentioned
by some respondents, as a barrier, with some advocating for “better laws”. Interestingly, owing to the
diverse range of cyber abuse behaviours, various forms may be covered by different legislation. For
instance, workplace cyber sexual harassment and cyber discrimination violates the Human Rights Act
1993 and the Employment Relations Act 2000, whereas workplace cyber bullying may be better covered
under the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, legislation
around employment protections for non-standard workers also warrant investigating.
Further supporting organisational initiatives, more widespread education and awareness on the issue
of workplace cyber abuse is also required. Although NetSafe plays a key role in championing this, it is
essential that other national agencies such as WorkSafe New Zealand, the Police, the legal profession,

24
unions and professional groups are also more actively involved in supporting these efforts. Relatedly,
these groups will also require further training, education, and allocation of resources in order to be better
equipped to intervene effectively.
As a result, we recommend that the aforementioned national agencies:

 Promote a better awareness of workplace cyber abuse, including educating organisations and
the general public on what it is, and what resources are available to targets of such abuse
 Receive further training and allocation of resources, particularly for those agencies tasked with
managing or resolving reported incidents of workplace cyber abuse
 Review current legislation in consultation with subject matter experts to determine whether
certain individuals or groups fall outside the scope of protection, for the varying forms of cyber
abuse

25
6. References
Addington, L. A. (2013). Reporting and Clearance of Cyberbullying Incidents: Applying "Offline" Theories to Online
Victims. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 29(4), 454-474.
Blizard, L. M. (2015). Faculty Members' Experiences of Cyberbullying by Students at One Canadian University: Impact
and Recommendations. International Research in Higher Education, 1(1), 107-124.
Borstorff, P., & Graham, G. (2006). E-Harassment: Employee Perceptions of E-Technology as a Source of
Harassment. Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship, 11(3), 51-67.
Carter, M., Thompson, N., Crampton, P., Morrow, G., Burford, B., Gray, C., & Illing, J. (2013). Workplace bullying in
the UK NHS: a questionnaire and interview study on prevalence, impact and barriers to reporting. BMJ Open,
3(6), 1.
Citron, D. K. (2009). Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment. Michigan Law Review, 108(3),
373-415.
D'Cruz, P., & Noronha, E. (2013). Navigating the extended reach: Target experiences of cyberbullying at work.
Information and Organization, 23(4), 324-343.
D’Cruz, P. (2016). Cyberbullying at Work: Experiences of Indian Employees. In J. Webster & K. Randle (Eds.), Virtual
Workers and the Global Labour Market (pp. 239-259). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
D'Souza, N., Forsyth, D., Tappin, D., & Catley, B. (2017a). Engaging industry specialists on the issue of workplace
cyberbullying - A New Zealand study. Journal Of Health, Safety And Environment, 33(2), 105-124.
D’Souza, N., Tappin, D., Forsyth, D., & Catley, B. (2017b). Workplace Cyberbullying in New Zealand Nursing – A
Report for Participants and Professional Bodies. Retrieved from
http://www.massey.ac.nz/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=D5ECA077-0C0D-4603-894F-
AC2EBADE3FBE
Finkelhor, D., Ormrod, R. K., & Turner, H. A. (2007). Poly-victimization: A neglected component in child victimization.
Child abuse & neglect, 31(1), 7-26.
Georgakopoulos, A., Wilkin, L., & Kent, B. (2011). Workplace bullying: A complex problem in contemporary
organizations. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(3), 1-20.
Halder, D., & Jaishankar, K. (2011). Cyber Gender Harassment and Secondary Victimization: A Comparative Analysis
of the United States, the UK, and India. Victims & Offenders, 6(4), 386-398.
Lindsay, M., & Krysik, J. (2012). Online harassment among college students. Information, Communication & Society,
15(5), 703-719.
NetSafe New Zealand. (2016). Digital challenge and New Zealanders: A focus on the incident reports and queries
made to NetSafe in 2015. Retrieved from https://www.netsafe.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Digital-
challenge-and-New-Zealanders.pdf
Reason, J. (1998). Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice. Work & Stress, 12(3), 293-306.
Saam, N. J. (2010). Interventions in workplace bullying: A multilevel approach. European Journal of Work and
Organizational Psychology, 19(1), 51-75.
Van Gramberg, B., Teicher, J., & O'Rourke, A. (2014). Managing electronic communications: a new challenge for
human resource managers. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 25(16), 2234-2252.

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5. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 22

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Cyber sexual harassment - inappropriate or unwanted comments that are sexually

Cyber stalking - stalking, harassing, intimidating, or threatening behaviours

Note: Where applicable, findings report on:

Breaking Barriers Report 2018

Male Female Gender variant/non-binary

Figure 1. Breakdown of Respondents' Gender

4.1.2 EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND INDUSTRY

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Breakdown of respondents by industry sector

Figure 2. Breakdown of respondents by industry sector

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4.2 Experiences of Cyber Abuse

Forms of Cyber Abuse Experienced by Gender

Male Female Gender variant/ non-binary

Figure 3. Forms of cyber abuse experienced by gender

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4.2.3 PROXIES FOR HARM

Was the cyber abuse repeated more than once

16% Yes, a few times

Duration of cyber abuse

A few weeks to a 36%

Figure 5. Duration of Cyber Abuse

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PUBLIC NATURE OF CYBER ABUSE

Was the cyber abuse publicly visible?

Yes No Not that I am aware

Figure 4. The publicity of the cyber abuse

PHYSICAL AND TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES

Main 'Location' of the Cyber Abuse

Figure 5. Predominant location of the cyber abuse experience

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Perpetrators of Cyber Abuse

Friend or aquiantance outside organisation

Customer/student/member of the public

Supervisor or direct manager

Member of senior management

Spouse, relative, partner

Male Female Gender variant/non-binary

Figure 6. Perpetrators of Cyber Abuse

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4.3 Responses to Cyber Abuse

4.3.1 TARGETS’ IDEAL OUTCOMES

Ideal Outcomes for Targets

Figure 7. Targets' Ideal Outcomes of the Cyber Abuse

4.3.2 TARGET S’ RESPONSES TO CYBER ABUSE

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Target Responses by Gender

Talked to/confronted perpetrator

Sought advice/help from outside organisation

Reported to external agency

Male Female Gender variant

Figure 8. Target Responses by Gender

CAPTURING EVIDENCE OF CYBER ABUSE

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DIRECTLY CONFRONTING PERPETRATOR

4.3.3 REASONS FOR NON-REPORTING OF CYBER ABUSE