Preysler vs Manila Southcoast Dev.

Corp

Doctrine:

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in
the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its
authority

Facts:

On 15 January 2002, petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. (petitioner) filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Batangas a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation
(respondent).

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the Court of
Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration six days after
the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties.
Thus, it was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than sufficient time to
oppose petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to
Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial
compliance with procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based merely
on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.

Issue:

W/N the CA committed grave error in affirming the ruling of RTC that the three-day notice rule was violated

Ruling:

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in
the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its
authority.

Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules
of procedure are tools designed to facilitate... the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro,[12] the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice
of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion
was not... considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,[14] the Court held that despite the lack of notice
of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process
where the adverse... party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the
motion.

This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory
is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a
motion without a notice of hearing... is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended
for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung
upon the adverse party, who must be given time... to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution
of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x x x
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the
Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration six
days after the scheduled hearing on 26

February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6
August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly,... respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9
August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance... with
procedural due process. Instead of dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged
procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the merits.

the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioner's Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day
notice requirement.

ld that the service of the notice of hearing was one day short of the prescribed minimum three days notice.

petitioner's Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 was received... by respondent on 9
November 2004. The RTC hel

We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that "[e]very written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of the hearing, unless... the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice." Thus, the date of
the hearing should be at least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the
petitioner's Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to... comply with the notice
requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November
2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent's receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of
hearing of the Omnibus Motion which... was set to be heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required
minimum three-days' notice.

The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday at the latest, in order that the
requirement of the three days may be complied with.

If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed from the post office,
the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least five (5) days before Tuesday.

Dela Pena vs Dela Pena

Doctrine:

The requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that the notice shall be directed to the
parties concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously
complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the
running of the prescriptive period.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any
notice of hearing.
Facts:

A Complaint was filed against petitioner Purita de la Pea by Pedro R. de la Pea, Benjamin P. Briones, spouses Julia
de la Pea and Jose Alberto, Godofredo de la Pea, Virginia de la Pea and Maria de la Pea in the Regional Trial Court
of Balanga, Bataan, seeking (a) the annulment of the deed of sale and deed of extrajudicial partition executed
between Fortunata de la Pea and Purita de la Pea, (b) the partition of the estates of Fortunata de la Pea and Gavina
de la Pea, and (c) the award in their favor of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs of the suit.

Issue:

WON the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any notice of hearing

Ruling:

In fine, the above cited cases confirm that the requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the motion is a
useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any
notice of hearing. It was therefore pro forma, hence it did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The copy
of the decision was received on 2 July 1993.Consequently, respondents had until 17 July 1993 within which to file their
notice of appeal. Since they filed their Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal on 20 August
1993 or 49 days after receipt of the decision, the appeal was clearly filed out of time. On that date the decision of the
court a quo already attained finality 34 days earlier, hence, could no longer be reviewed much less modified on
appeal. The filing of the Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal was a futile exercise. There was no
longer any period to appeal nor a decision that could still be appealed.

Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
Doctrine:

Facts:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in
Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between
petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for
the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ
for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the
Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having
been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family
Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences,
petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the
effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.

Azajar vs. CA

Doctrine:

the notice in the motion which was addressed to the clerk of court asking him to submit the motion for the
consideration of the court is a substantial compliance with the provision of section 3 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Verily under the said rule, the Court has the alternative of either hearing the case or deferring the hearing and
determination thereof until the trial on the merits. Thus upon the filing of said motion the court should have set the
motion for hearing or outrightly deny the motion, or otherwise postpone the hearing until the trial on the ground that
the grounds thereof do not appear to be indubitable. The prompt filing and apparently valid grounds invoked in the
motion are not the acts and declarations of a defaulting party.

Even assuming that the declaration of default of the petitioner was in order we find that the trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for new trial that was filed by the petitioner not only on the
ground of excusable negligence we have above discussed but also on the ground that it has a meritorious defense.
and

Excessive damages have been awarded to the private respondent. In addition to ordering the petitioner to deliver to
the private respondent the nails ordered by the latter, the petitioner was also ordered to pay not only P15,000 actual
damages for profits that the private respondent could have earned but also consequential damages of P10,000 for
the unrealized profits that the said earnings and capital of the plaintiff could have earned, plus interest in both
instances, exemplary damages of P5,000 and P7,500 for attorney's fees and related expenses of litigation. Thus for
the capital of respondent of P18,100.00 in the purchase of the nails, the petitioner was ordered to pay damages of a
total of P37,500.00, which including the interest awarded can amount to over P40,000, more than double the value of
the said investment of respondent. Under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court award of excessive damages
could be a ground for new trial.

Facts:

Azajar purchased thru the agent of Cham Samco 100 kgs of nails of various sizes and paid P18,000 in full.
deliver, Cham Samco on delivered a part of the quantity ordered. Azajar filed a complaint before the court of Cam
Sur.

Instead of submitting an answer, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds ( failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action and that venue was improperly laid.).

The motion to dismiss contained a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court.

Contending that such notice as fatal " defective, Azajar filed a motion to declare Samco in default, which the court
granted. Azajar has allowed to present evidence ex parte and the court rendered judgment against Samco.

The TC justified its order of default in this wise : that instead of filling an answer to the complaint, Samco filed a
motion to dismiss which is not a motion at all because the notice/ is directed to the Clerk of Court instead of the part"
concerned (as required Sec. 5 Rule 15, RC) and is without the requisite notice of hearing directed to the CC and not
to the parties, and merely stating that the same be submitted for resolution. It is without the requisite notice of time
and place of hearing.

Aggrieved, Samco went to CA for recourse, but the CA affirmed the decision of the TC. However, on motion for
reconsideration, CA reversed itself and declared that technicalities should be brushed aside so that Samco can be
given a day in court.

Issue:

WON the failure of Cham Samco to set its motion to dismiss for hearing on as specified date and time and for not
addressing the same to the part" interested is fatal to his cause.

Ruling:

Yes. Although the Court sided with CA that technicalities should be set aside to Samco to $e afforded with his day in
court.

1.The law explicitly requires that notice of motion shall be served by the appellant to all parties concerned at
least 3 days before the hearing, together with a copy of the motion, and of an" affidavits and other papers
accompanying it; and that notices shall be directed to the parties concerned stating the time and place for the hearing
of the motion. failure to comply with the requirement is a fatal flaw.
2.Such notice is required to avoid surprises upon the opposite part" and give the latter time to stud" and meet the
arguments of the motion as well as to determine or make determinable the time of submission of the motion
for resolution.
3. without the notice, the occasion would not arise to determine with reasonable certitude whether and within that
time the adverse party would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved by the Court.
4. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant and not on the court

Sarmiento vs Zaratan

Doctrine:

Notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural
justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law
is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time
to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should
not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

Facts:

Petitioner Sarmiento filed a ejectment case against respondent Zaratan, in the metropolitan trial court of Quezon city.
On march 31, 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed her notice of appeal,
thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC Quezon City.

In the notice of appealed case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the
provision of Sec 7 of Rule 40 of the rule of court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from
receipt.

Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the
requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to
finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of
staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got
wet. But the motion remained unacted.

Issue:

Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal, such
that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper

Ruling:

In this case, the answer is NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of
Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a
worthless piece of paper with no legal effect. It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003
with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time
to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of five days within
which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997
Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written
motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice. As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion
is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. As a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand
that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not
for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and
meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected
without giving it an opportunity to be heard. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have
time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the
circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially complied with.

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e)
exist in the present case. The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not
affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required
extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded
by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As
it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was
subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that
we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse
party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court
in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other
party or parties." Asa general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by
the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard.
It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and
under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or
the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.

ANECO REALTY DEVT VS LANDEX

Doctrine:

Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should
be relaxed when they hinder rather than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as
much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities.

Facts:

Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots. It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to
petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots. To restrain construction
of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC in QuezonCity. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental
complaints seeking to demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.

Issue:

WON the court of appeals gravely erred in dismissing petitioners appeal and sustaining the trial courts order dated
31,, March 1997 granting respondents motion for reconsideration which is fatally defective for lack of notice of
hearing.

Ruling:

Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires a notice of hearing for a contested motion
filed in court. Records disclose that the motion for reconsideration filed by Landex of the RTC decision did not contain
a notice of hearing. There is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration is defective. The RTC and the CA ignored
the procedural defect and ruled on the substantive issues raised by Landex in its motion for reconsideration. The issue
before Us is whether or not the RTC and the CA correctly exercised its discretion in ignoring the procedural
defect. Simply put, the issue is whether or not the requirement of notice of hearing should be strictly or liberally applied
under the circumstances.

Aneco bats for strict construction. It cites a litany of cases which held that notice of hearing is mandatory. A
motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. It does not toll the running of the period to file
an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. It is argued that the original RTC decision is already final and executory
because of the defective motion.

Landex counters for liberal construction. It similarly cites a catena of cases which held that procedural rules
may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Landex asserts that the procedural defect was cured when it filed
a motion setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. It is claimed that Aneco was properly informed of the
pending motion for reconsideration and it was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard.

It is true that appeals are mere statutory privileges which should be exercised only in the manner required by
law. Procedural rules serve a vital function in our judicial system. They promote the orderly resolution of cases. Without
procedure, there will be chaos. It thus behooves upon a litigant to follow basic procedural rules. Dire consequences
may flow from procedural lapses.

Nonetheless, it is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder rather than promote substantial justice. Public
policy dictates that court cases should, as much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere
technicalities. Substantive justice trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla, this Court held:
 Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to
be final x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly
so as not to override substantial justice.

Here, We find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict
application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is
within the courts sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court
will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal construction of the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of due process of law. The notice
alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids
is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of
notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is
given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the
rule is substantially complied. In E & L Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held:

Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application of a rule
such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this includes the three (3) days
notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding (Section 2,
Rule 1, Rules of Court).In Case and Nantz v. Jugo (77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that lapses
in the literal observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced
the adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.

A party cannot ignore a more than sufficient opportunity to exercise its right to be heard and
once the court performs its duty and the outcome happens to be against that negligent party,
suddenly interpose a procedural violation already cured, insisting that everybody should again go
back to square one. Dilatory tactics cannot be the guiding principle.

The rule in De Borja v. Tan (93 Phil. 167), that what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard, is the
applicable doctrine. (See also Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Omico v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA
285; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488.) x x x

We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting
a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for
reconsideration but Anecos counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional time to file comment on the
motion for reconsideration.

Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose the motion for
reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment,
on the motion for reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the CA correctly
ignored the procedural defect.

PNB vs Deang Marketing Corp

Doctrine:

A motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. The court’s discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such motion’s timeliness, the
passing of which renders the court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the
lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.

Facts:

Deang Marketing Corporation (DMC), et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Philippine
National Bank (PNB) for reformation of contract and specific performance claiming that the dacion en pago
arrangement forged by them already transformed DMC‘s loan obligation.

Summons was served on PNB requiring it to Answer until May 5, 2006. DMC subsequently filed a Motion to Declare
PNB in Default. The RTC thereafter received a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. On May 16, 2006, RTC
granted PNB’s Motion. DMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of RTC‘s order denying their Motion to Declare PNB
in default. The RTC denied such motion. DMC subsequently assailed RTC‘s Orders of May 16, 2006 and August 9, 2006
via certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA annulled the RTC‘s orders.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in declaring PNB in default

Ruling:

PNB‘s Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer was laden with glaring lapses. It had, following the reglementary
15-day period after service of summons (unless a different period is fixed by the court), until May 5, 2006 within which
to file an Answer or appropriate pleading. It filed the Motion for Extension, however, via a private courier on May 14,
2006, which was received by the trial court on May 15, 2006 or ten days late.

It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended. The court’s discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such
motion’s timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for
extension was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.

PNB was not candid enough to aver in the Motion for Extension that the period had lapsed, as it still toyed with the idea
that it could get away with it. The allegations therein were crafted as if the said motion was timely filed. Notably, the
May 16, 2006 Order expressed no inkling that the motion was filed out of time. The trial court either was deceived by
or it casually disregarded the apparent falsity foisted by petitioner.

In denying DMC’s Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of PNB’s Motion for Extension, the RTC ruled that it
was inclined to reconsider or lift an order of default. By such ruling, the trial court preempted the dictates of orderly
procedure by unduly anticipating and signifying a slant toward the remedies and arguments yet to be availed of and
raised by PNB.

In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason
was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious. The Court thus finds PNB’s
negligence inexcusable, as the circumstances behind and the reasons for the delay are detestable

Areza vs Express Savings BVank

Doctrine:

A rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the adverse party has beensubstantially complied with when a copy
of the motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party, coupled with the fact that the trial
court acted on said notice of hearing

Facts:

Petitioners received an order for the purchase of a motor vehicle from Gerry Mambuay where the latter paid
petitioners with nine (9) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) checks payable to different payees and drawn
against the Philippine Veterans Bank (drawee), each valued at Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00).
Petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account with the Express Savings Bank which, in turn,
deposited the checks with its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank and the latter presented the checks to the drawee,
the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks. However, the subject checks were returned by PVAO to the
drawee on the ground that the amount on the face of the checks was altered from the original amount of ₱4,000.00
to ₱200,000.00. After informing Express Savings Bank that the drawee dishonored the checks, Equitable-PCI Bank
debited the deposit account of ESB in the amount of P1.8M. Express Savings Bank then withdrew the amount of
P1.8M representing the returned checks from petitioners saving account.

Issue:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law and grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion for Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 ofthe
Rules on Civil Procedure;

Ruling:

Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the adverse party as the
rules require. Petitioners add that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from
the date of filing.
As held in Maturan v. Araula, the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to the adverse party has been
substantially complied with when a copy of the motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse
party, coupled with the fact that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as prayed for, issued an order
setting the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004.
We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing Rule if a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party.
Now to the substantive issues to which procedural imperfection must, in this case, give way.
The central issue is whether the Bank had the right to debit ₱1,800,000.00 from petitioners’ accounts.
On 6 May 2000, the Bank informed petitioners that the subject checks had been honored. Thus, the amountof
₱1,800,000.00 was accordingly credited to petitioners’ accounts, prompting them to release the purchased cars to the
buyer.
Unknown to petitioners, the Bank deposited the checks in its depositary bank, Equitable-PCI Bank. Three months had
passed when the Bank was informed by its depositary bank that the drawee had dishonored the checks on the
ground of material alterations.

The return of the checks created a chain of debiting of accounts, the last loss eventually falling upon the savings
account of petitioners with respondent bank. The trial court inits reconsidered decision and the appellate court were
one in declaring that petitioners should bear the loss.

Microsoft Corp vs Farajallah

Doctrine:

three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the ruleis to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process.
Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict
compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed with.

Facts:

Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and existing under
the laws of the United States, while Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos
and Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia (respondents) are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a
domestic corporation with principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower, PhilippineStock Exchange Center, Exchange
Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing and using
unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc.(OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification
of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz)
were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect unauthorized copies of
Adobe and Microsoft software.

Issue:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Amor Reyes of Branch 21, Regional Trial Court of Manila
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders dated 29
June2010 and 27 August 2010, quashing Search Warrant Nos. 10-[1]5912 and 10-[1]5913 and directing the
immediate release of the items seized pursuant to the said warrants, despite the pendency of appellate proceedings.

Ruling:

We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case. However, we sustain
petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have
upheld the validity of both warrants.

Compliance with the three-day notice rule

In Anama v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the ruleis to
safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to
study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed with.

As correctly pointed out by the CA:

In the instant case, when the court a quoordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion toquash, it was, in
effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its
purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the
opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion

Barraza vs Campos Jr.

Doctrine:

"It appearing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the period for filing defendants' answer as
extended by the court, there was no legal reason for declaring defendants in default. "

Facts:

On October 3, 1978, private respondent filed a Complaint for damages based on defendants’ (petitioners herein) use
of plaintiff’s (now private respondent) trade name and style of “Gatchalian-The House of Native Lechon and
Restaurant”, with prayer for preliminary injunction.

After service of summons, petitioners as defendants therein filed an “Urgent Ex- Parte Motion” for extension of time of
15 days within which to file an Answer which the Court granted.

Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days, defendants filed through their counsel,
Atty, Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction”
which was one (1) day before the expiration of the period as extended by the court. Said motion moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That the complaint states no cause of action; (2) That venue
is improperly laid; and (3) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action.
Private respondent, then, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in Default” on the ground that the
defendants failed to file an answer within the reglementary period allowed by the Rules of Court. The defendants
were declared in default.

Issue:

Whether or not a motion to dismiss must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer.

Ruling:

A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 8 (now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of
Court, must be filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer including the extension of time
granted to file such answer.
There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the running of the period
within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the court, refers
only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the extension of time to file the answer as granted by the
court. It may be true that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is
deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received
notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.

This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not only within the
original fifteen (15) days period but also within “a different period (as) fixed by the court.”