Case # 28 – Icasiano vs.

Icasiano

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA

VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
Notes: (from business dictionary)

Definition of duplicate copy

The two classifications are: (1) copies produced for information purposes only and which may be
destroyed after use, and (2) copies that have administrative, fiscal, legal, or historical value.

Definition of duplicate original

A copy that has all the essential aspects of the original, including signatures.

Notes
A duplicate original of a letter may be created and sent by different routes to increase the
likelihood that at least one original copy arrives to the addressee.
FACTS:
1. JosefaVillacorta executed her last will and testament in duplicate on June 2, 1956 and she
died on Sept. 12, 1958. The will was:
* attested by three instrumental witnesses- Justo Torres Jr., Jose Natividad and VinicioDy
* acknowledged by the testatrix and the three instrumental witnesses on the same date
before Atty. Ong, Notary Public
* the will was actually prepared by Atty. Samson who was present during the execution
and signing of the decedent’s last will and testament.
* pages of the original and duplicate were duly numbered
* the attestation clause contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and
signed by the attesting witnesses
* will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix (Tagalog)
* will was executed in one single occasion in duplicate copies
* both original and duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before the Notary Public on
the same date.
2. The will consisted of five pages and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not
contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose Natividad on page 3 thereof;
but the duplicate copy attached was signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in
each and every page.
ISSUE: Does the failure of one of the attesting witnesses to sign on one page of the original
invalidate the will, and hence, denial of the probate?
HELD: NO.
1. The inadvertent failure of one of the witnesses to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify the denial of the probate. The impossibility of substituting this page is cured
since the testatrix and two other witnesses signed the defective page, and that the document bears
the imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by the
testatrix and all three witnesses.
2. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account
of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control, where the purpose
of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently
attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existence, and the evidence on record attests to the
full observance of the statutory requisites.
3. Despite the literal tenor of the law, the Court has held that in other cases that;
a. a testament with the only page signed at its foot by the testator and witnesses but not in the
left margin could be probated(Abangan vs. Abangan)
b. despite the requirement of correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the
first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro).
These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
order to guard against fraud and bad faith, but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
4. The appellants also argued that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed the probate of the original because of the
lacking signature on page 3, it is easily discerned that the oppositors-appellants run into a
dilemma. If the original is defective and invalid, then in the law, there is no other will but the
duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be
probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous
and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in
the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
Case # 29 - Cruz vs. Villasor

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
Civil Code Provisions:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the
last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them. (n)
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court
FACTS:
1. The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of this case hinges, is
whether the supposed Last Will and Testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Cruz) was executed in
accordance with:
Art. 805- which states at at least three credible witnesses must attest and subscribe to the
will and
Art. 806- requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
public.
2. Of the three instrumental witnesses on the supposed Last Will and Testament of Cruz, one of
them, Atty. Angel Teves (Teves), acted also as the notary public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. The petitioner argues that as a result thereof, the will has
only two witnesses who appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will.
3. The respondent, Lugay, who is supposed to execute the will, stated that there was substantial
compliance with the legal requirement of three attesting witnesses, even if one of them acted as a
notary public based on American jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Can the notary public be considered as the third attesting witness?
HELD: No. The probate of the Last will and Testament of Cruz is declared not valid and set
aside.
1. The notary public cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the
third witness is the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit as his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split
his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will.
2. The function of a notary public is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.
That would be defeated if he was also the attesting witness. He would be interested in
sustaining the validity of the will, as it directly involves himself and the validity of his
own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.
3. American jurisprudence cannot be used here for we are in Philippine jurisdiction. In the
U.S., the notary public and witnesses referred to in several jurisprudence merely acted as
instrumental, subscribing or attesting witnesses and not as acknowledging witnesses.
Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also as acknowledging
witness.
4. In allowing the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witness, would have the effect of only two attesting witnesses to the will
which is violative of Art. 805 requiring at least 3 witnesses and Art. 806 which requires
the testator and the required number of witnesses to appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will.
Case # 49 – Roberts v. Leonidas

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS V. HON. LEONIDAS, MAXINE TATE-GRIMM ET AL, 129

SCRA 33 (1984)

FACTS: Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was
survived by his 2nd wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children
from a 1st marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended in divorce

1. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January 1959. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his 2nd wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
2. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine in March 1978.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel
in January 1978. Subsequently, the Utah court admitted the two wills and a codicil for
probate in April 1978, and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the
lawyers fro Maxine and Ethel
3. In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into an agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement provided that
Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators)
of Grimm’s Philippine estate and that Maxine’s ½ conjugal share in the estate should be
reserved for her which would not be less than $1.5 million plus the homes in Utah and
Sta. Mesa.
4. Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the
opposition and motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record. The
estate was partitioned.
5. In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which was
already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside,
and that Maxine be named executrix, and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were
defrauded due to the machinations of the Ethel, that the compromise agreement was
illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so the partition
was contrary to the decedent’s wills.
6. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent Judge for
lack of merit

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethel’s motion
to dismiss
HELD: No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and
“no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.”

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

ROBERTS v LEONIDAS

No. L-55509, 27 April 1984

129 SCRA 33

Probate of a will is mandatory in order that the said will may pass property. In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled that "it is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding." Accordingly, the Court ordered the consolidation of the testate
and intestate proceedings, and for the judge hearing the testate case to continue hearing the
consolidated cases.

In de Borja v vda de Borja, infra, the Supreme Court allowed and in fact enforced the
compromise agreement between a stepson and his stepmother, despite the fact that the tenor of
the compromise agreement is not consistent with the tenor of the will of the testator. It is important
to distinguish the variance between the ruling in de Borja and the ruling in Roberts. Based on the
dictum of the Supreme Court in these two cases, is it lawful for the heirs to divide the estate in
accordance with a freely negotiated compromise agreement and in the process disregard the
terms of the will? Or will such a compromise agreement result in an "anomalous" situation
deplored by the Supreme Court in Roberts?

Aquino, J.:

x x x

Antecedents - Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati

Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm,
and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which
ended in divorce.
 He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed
of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife.
The second will deposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first
marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the
will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm
Morris, or my daughter Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar
Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County,
Utah. uanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California, and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon city were notified of the probate proceedings.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January 1978. In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate
the two wills and the codicil. It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 14, 1978
"by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E.
LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts.

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete, as the
first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm, as the
second parties, without knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. x x x.

Intestate Proceeding No. 113024 - At this juncture, it should be stated that forty-three days
after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughters of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through
lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court
of First Instance intestate proceedings no. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named
special administratrix.

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara Law Office, filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency in Utah of a
proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special
administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.
x x x.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new
lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg), withdrew the opposition and
motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

x x x

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers
Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in
his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate
and one eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12 1/2%. No mention at all was made of the will in
that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with
Octavio del Callar as their lawyer, who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of
partition. The court considered the motion moot and academic considering that it had already
approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition.

x x x

After November 1979, or a period of more than five months, there was no movement or
activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980, Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed
a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer, was notified of that motion.

x x x

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding no. 134559 - On September 8, 1980,
Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara Law Firm, in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38
of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah),
that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to
account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.
 Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that
the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to
the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his
order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court,
praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively, that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of annulment of the Utah compromise
agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.

Ruling - We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed."

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition
and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings
sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served
with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No

Costs.

Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and de Castro, JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr. and Abad
Santos, JJ., no part. Escolin, J., in the result.
Case # 50 – Nepomuceno v. CA

NEPOMUCENO V. CA, 139 SCRA 206 (1985)

DOCTRINE: While the general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry is limited to the
extrinsic validity of the will, practical considerations may compel the probate court to pass
upon matters of intrinsic validity. In particular, where a testamentary provision is void on its
face, a probate court, in accordance with the ruling in Nuguid v Nuguid, pass upon such
provision for the purpose of declaring its nullity

FACTS: In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the petitioner
Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will
that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate
children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded
wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria,
Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal
wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion
thereof to herein petitioner.

1. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the

Will, but the legal wife and children filed an opposition.
2. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the
ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting with
Nepomuceno. The will’s admission to probate was deemed an
idle exercise since based on the face of the will, the
invalidity of the instrinsic provisions is evident.
3. The appellate court, however, declared the will to be valid
except that the devise in favour of the petitioner is null
and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but such was denied.

ISSUES:

1. WON the respondent court acted in excess of its

jurisdiction when after declaring the last will and
testament of the testator validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision
in favor of herein petitioner.
2. Is the disposition in favor of the petitioner valid?
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: The court acted within its jurisdiction

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given the exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will.

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face, it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.

SECOND ISSUE: Validity of the disposition to the petitioner:

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of

adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the
same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.

The records of the case do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith on the part of
Nepomuceno:
 a. The last will and testament itself expressly admits its
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
between the testator and petitioner, the devisee
b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation of
evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil
status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence. In short, the parties
themselves duelled on the intrinsic validity of the
legacy given in the will to petitioner by the testator at
the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived with as a
husband, was already married was important . When the court ruled that Jugo and the
petitioner were guilty of adultery and concubinage, it was a finding that the petitioner was not
the innocent woman she pretended to be.

The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot given even
assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
Case # 51 – Pascual v. De La Cruz

PASCUAL V. DELA CRUZ, 28 SCRA 421 (1969)

DOCTRINE: Undue and improper pressure and influence as well as fraud are grounds to disallow a
will. These twin grounds were invoked in this case. While the Court considered only the issue of
improper influence and pressure, and summarized the rulings thereon, it is equally important to
consider the effect of alleging undue influence and pressure simultaneously with fraud.

FACTS: On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or
ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January
1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by
Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.

1. Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late

Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the
grounds that the formalities required by law were not
complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of
disposing of her properties by will at the time of its
execution; that the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through
fraud.

ISSUE: WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as well as
fraud are grounds to disallow a will.

HELD: No.

Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was
definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it
was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held
him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir
to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.

The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this
Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v
Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.

The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence
and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the
assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign
anything unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent
purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name
"Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true,
demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will
of the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent
pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the
instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of
the testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative
or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to
those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to
unpleasant importunity and recrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The
natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate
the testament during her lifetime.

Pedro de la cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina de la cruzfell short of
establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix
considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being
made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing
abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
The probate of the will was allowed.

Case # 56 – Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
33 SCRA 554 (1970)

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by
the contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should
be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir
and the testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an
act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in
full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature of devises.

The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads:
"Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition
"cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by
designating a beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion
of the estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of
the following decision) with Article 886.

FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate
children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the appellants

1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The beneficiaries
were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8 million)
which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central
Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the deceased’s
estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with her
testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real properties
comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition, Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
 a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised
of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the estate where
Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and 907
NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was upheld, it will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC

ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this case

HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting
a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the
intentions and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will, amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute
their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.

ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her
will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses
of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that
my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following,
whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her
seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a
valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC,
providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."

CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of partition as the oppositors were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and the
differential to complete their legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who
were obviously favored by the decedent in her will.

Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project
of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by
oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half
of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes
of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy
and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.

EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter,
and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law

DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs
cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions
by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will.
Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before
I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to
said deceased."

COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the entire
estate was made by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which
would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.

CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to
demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in
the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion
of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Case # 57 – De Roma v. CA

G.R. No. L-46903 July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian
of Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.

FACTS:

1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de
Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay
was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed
by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and
the fruits thereof, had not been included.1

2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth

P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is
whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims
she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation
was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should
be reduced as inofficious.

3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the petitioner. The donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters and such donation was imputed to the free portion of
Candelaria’s estate. The CA reversed the decision holding that the deed of donation contained
no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1962. It ordered the collation and the
equal division of the net estate of the decedent, including the donated property between Buhay
and Rosalinda.

4. The deed of donation stated:

“ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga

kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng
mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay,
ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking
ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat
magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na
ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion.”

ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate

HELD: No express prohibition to collate.

1. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and equivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Art. 1962. Anything less than such express
prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Art. 1062. The suggestion that there was
an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the
decedent’s estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious.

2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from
the collation required under Art. 1061. We surmise that We agree with the respondent court that
there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable
does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.

3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal
consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language
of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had
been the donor's intention.
4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Case # 60 – Aznar v. Duncan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD CHRISTENSEN,

ADOLFO AZNAR (EXECUTOR) V. LUCY DUNCAN AND HELEN CHRISTENSEN, 17
SCRA 590 (1966)

DOCTRINE: The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in this
case. While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsory
heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given
a legacy by the testator in the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory
heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.

One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testator was a citizen of the State
of California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration." (Article 16, Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the testator was
distributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account the fact that Article 854 was made
to apply. This point needs clarification.

FACTS: Edward Christensen was a citizen of California and was domiciled in the Philippines.
When he died he left a will which alleged that he had only one child (Lucy Duncan), and that he
was giving a devise of P3,600 to Helen Christensen (whom he alleged was not related to him).

1. In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was a natural child of the deceased
and that the properties of the decedent are to be divided equally between Helen and Lucy
pursuant to the project of partition submitted by the administrator.
2. Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Art 906 NCC which
states that: “Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same may be fully satisfied.” Moreover,
considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his
relationship with Helen, but left her to a legacy although less than the amount of her
legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Art 918 NCC.
Thus, under Arts 906 and 918, Helen is only entitled to her legitime, and not to a share
equal to that of Lucy

ISSUE: Whether the estate should be divided equally among the two children (Art 854) OR
whether Lucy’s share should just be reduced to meet the legitime of Helen (Art 906)

HELD: Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no preterition. Manresa defines
preterition as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not naming him at all, or while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, not assigning to him some part of the properties.

The decision in Neri v. Akutin is not applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left
all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to them, or at least, some of them." In
the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a
legacy of P3,600.00.
Case # 61 – Nuguid v. Nuguid

NUGUID V. NUGUID, 17 SCRA 449 (1966)

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the area of inquiry of a probate court is limited to the testamentary capacity
of the testator and the due execution of the will. However, if it should appear on the face of the will that the
sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity,
then a probe into the testamentary disposition, and the consequential invalidation thereof is justified for
practical considerations. While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the court is justified in
declaring the entire will void if the only testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the institution of
the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the
same as the nullification of the will itself.

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitime or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six (6)
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.

1. On May 18, 1963, petitioner RemediosNuguid filed in the Court

of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguidsome 11 years before her demise.
Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and
that letters of administration with the will annexed be
issued to her.

2. On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,

concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of
her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner RemediosNuguid as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of the
 deceased in the direct ascending line - were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

3. On August, 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition

for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

4. On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to

the motion to dismiss.

5. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in

question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and
dismissed the petition without cost.

ISSUE: WON the will is a complete nullity.

HELD: Yes.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,

having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise and bequeath
all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister
RemediosNuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I
have signed my name this seventeenth day of November, nineteen hundred and
fifty-one.

Sgd. (Illegible)

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
 ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. x xx

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect;

to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. (Citations omitted.)

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line - her parents, now
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them. They
thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were
they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anularasiempre la institucion de heredero, dandocaracterabsoluto a esteordenamiento,"
referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here
institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir - nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are
therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court says that the nullity is complete. Perforce,
Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

The statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, 'the devices and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Legacies and devices merit consideration only when they
are so expressly given as such in a will.

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as
universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits
their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in
which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition
The disputed order declares the will in question "a complete nullity." Article 854 of the Civil Code
in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will
is null.

Case # 62 – Reyes v. Barreto-Datu

REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU, 19 SCRA 85 (1967)

DOCTRINE: Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or born subsequent thereto. Among
other things, Reyes holds that omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must
be a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line received something from
the testator under the terms of the will, such heir cannot be considered preterited

FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a
vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.

1. When BibianoBarretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City

of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will
to SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, and
Lucia Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as
legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and
FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of
the fishpond situated in barrio San Roque, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his
widow, Maria Gerard. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was
appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a
project of partition, which was signed by her in her own
behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said
project of partition was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The distribution of the estate and the
delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a
consequence, SaludBarretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the original
certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her
own name.
 2. Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered
that she executed two will. In the first will, she
instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs. In the second
will, she revoked the same and left all her properties in
favour of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and
the first rejected.
3. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,
husband of the deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children,
it was determined by the lower court that Salud was not a
child of Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. This
ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed
the same.
4. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of
Maria Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,
plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of
the deceased BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct
to his widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence,
this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
5. Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the
Distributee, SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the
Sps. The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of
the Civil Code of 1889 which provided that :
“A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has
been been included, shall be null and void.”

The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under the project

of partition.

ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and that
Salud did not acquire title thereto

HELD: NO

1. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir in

the late BibianoBarretto's last will and testament together
with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was
not null and void under said article. The legal precept
(Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants,
but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary
or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to
 be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being
one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
BibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free portion
of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½)
assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary
heir of BibianoBarretto.
2. Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimate
daughter a share less than her legitime, such circumstance
would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an
heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of
the forced heir.
3. Where a partition was made between two persons instituted
as heirs in the will, and one of them was found out later
not to be the testator’s daughter, while the other was
really his daughter, it cannot be said that the partition
was a void compromise on the civil status of the person who
was not the testator’s daughter. At the time of the
partition, the civil status of that person was not being
questioned. There can be no compromise on a matter that
was not an issue. While the law outlaws a compromise over
civil status, it does not forbid a settlement by the
parties regarding the share that should correspond to the
claimant to the hereditary estate.
4. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the
distribution of the hereditary estate, which the court may
accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the
distribution of the estate and determines the persons
entitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree of
distribution that vests title in the distributees. If the
decree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by an
opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding
effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity
of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
5. A distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to
his will should be respected. The fact that one of the
distributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court
issued the decree of distribution does not imply that the
court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. The proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem. It is binding on
the distributee who was represented by her mother as
guardian.
 6. Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one of
them did not know that she was not really the child of the
testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the other
heir who was the testator’s daughter. At any rate, relief
on the ground of fraud must be obtained within 4 years from
its discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939,
when the fraud was allegedly perpetrated and she became of
age in 1944, and became award of the fraud in 1946, her
action in 1956 to set aside the partition was clearly
barred.

Case # 64 – Balanay v. Martinez

BALANAY, JR. V. MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA 454 (1975)

DOCTRINE: Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court. Unless the nullity of the will is
patent on its face, the probate court should first pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will
before passing upon its substantive validity. Hence, the distinction between this case and
Nuguid

Upon the other hand, while the court correctly modified the husband's right to waive his
hereditary right with respect to the estate of the deceased spouse, and his right to waive his half
share in the conjugal estate, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code,
the court was silent on the validity of the husband's conformity to the distribution of the conjugal
estate in accordance with the terms of the will of the wife. Obviously, the court assumed the
validity of the renunciation of the husband of his share in the conjugal estate. Such waiver,
however, may fall into one of two possible categories, i.e., inter vivos or mortis causa. If it was a
waiver effective inter vivos, then it would have amounted to a donation to inter vivos to the wife.
That would have been illegal under existing laws. On the other hand, if it was a waiver mortis
causa, then the formalities of a will should have been observed, failing which, the waiver would be
void. Furthermore, the waiver mortis causa would have required the wife to survive the husband.
In either case, the alleged waiver by the husband of his half share in the conjugal estate resulted in
a transmission of property to the wife. And consequently, a characterization of such waiver along
the parameters mentioned above is necessary and inescapable. The fundamental question,
therefore, that demands an answer is whether or not a husband or wife could waive his or her
share in the conjugal estate in favor of the other by an act inter vivos. We exclude, however, a
waiver resulting from a successful petition for separation of property, and the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership (or for that matter, the absolute community of property) resulting from the
issuance of a decree of annulment or a decree of nullity.

It may be surmised that the validity of the waiver had to be assumed, properly or
improperly, otherwise the case will fall under the provision of Article 784 which categorically states
that the making of a will is strictly a personal act, and that the exercise of testamentary discretion
cannot be delegated by a person to another. In any case, Balanay leaves many questions
unanswered. Let alone the fact that the decision did not discuss why the husband was not
preterited within the meaning of Article 854.

FACTS: Felix Balanay Jr. Appelaed the order of the CFI, declaring illegal and void the will of his
mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors

1. Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City
at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their
six legitimate children, namely, Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo,
Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
2. Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition.for the probate of his mother's
notarial will.
3. In paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two
years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as
"my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of
her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.
She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.
4. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate.
5. Felix Balanay, Jr. attached an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he
withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in
its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned
"Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he
manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced" his hereditary
rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
6. Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973
"denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the
affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr.
 7. Another lawyer appeared in the case, Atty. David O. Montana, claiming to be the lawyer of
petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to
withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed
by intestate estate proceeding." Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, thorugh Atty.
Jose B. Guyo, manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to
the creditor.
8. The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montana and Atty. Guyo assumed that the
issuance of a notice to creditors was in order. It adopted the view of Attys. Montana and
Guyo that the will was void. It dismissed the petition for probate and converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
9. Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated
April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28,
1974 on the ground that Atty. Montana had no authority to withdraw the petition for the
allowance of the will.

ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling
on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring the will void.

HELD:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

But the probate court erred in declaring in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and
in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in
its order of June 18, 1973 it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in
the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not
have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792,
Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will
be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator
or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is contrary
to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso
(Art. 143, Civil Code). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will.

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal
partnership (Art. 179(1) and 1041, Civil Code), but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a
donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1050(1), Civil
Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at
least his legitime should be respected.

The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice
the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon
the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among
the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his
renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased
wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the
will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory
heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of the will shall only
pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly
appear by the will that such was his intention." Under article 930 of the Civil Code, "the legacy of
devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the
thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he
made the will, afterwards becomes his by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the
conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose
of by will her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal
estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated. In the instant
case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated
in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973.

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.

Case # 66 – Acain v. CA

CONSTANTINO ACAIN V. IAC, VIRGINIA FERNANDEZ AND ROSA DIONGSON, 155 SCRA 100
(1983)

DOCTRINE: Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not a surviving spouse could
be preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain resolved that
an adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child (while given the same
rights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D. 603) could be preterited. It
must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is not entitled to the right of
representation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would seem, however, that with the
provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an adopted child, the preterition of an
adopted child finds greater support.

FACTS: In May 1984, petitioner Acain filed with RTC Cebu a petition for the probate of the will
of the late Nemesio Acain based on the premise that the decedent Nemesio left a will in which
petitioner and his siblings were instituted as heirs.

1. The will was allegedly executed by Nemesio in February 1960

which was written in Bisaya and was not opposed by private
respondents
2. In the will, Nemesio bequeathed all his properties to his
brother Segundo on the condition that if Segundo
predeceases Nemesio, said properties will be given to
Segundo’s children (herein petitioner)
 3. Segundo predeceased before Nemesio. Thus, it is the
children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
Constantino as petitioner
4. Private respondents, Virigina (legally adopted daughter of
the decedent) and Rosa (decedent’s spouse) filed a motion
to dismiss on the following grounds:
a. The petitioner had no legal capacity to institute said
proceedings
b. Petitioner is merely a universal heir
c. The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
5. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
6. On appeal, IAC granted private respondents’ petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate
of the will of Nemesio
7. Petitioner argues that:
a. The authority of the probate court is limited only to
inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will sought
to be probated, and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic
validity therof before it is admitted to probate
b. The preterition mentioned in Art 854 NCC refers to
preterition of “compulsory heirs in the direct line” and
does not apply to private respondents who are not
compulsory heirs in the direct line. Thus, their omission
shall not annul the institution of heirs

ISSUE: WON private respondents have been preterited

HELD: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited Insofar as the widow is concerned, Art 854 NCC
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator although she is a compulsory
heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir there is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the inheritance for she is not in the direct line. However, the same
thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the
testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Art 39 of P.D. No. 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code), adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopted and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that
both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession
the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado,
mejora o donacion" The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes
are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the
Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies nor devises having been
provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to
petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as
already stated above, be respected.

ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT

The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this state of
the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. For private respondents to
have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will
appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. The trial court have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will
was resolved

Case # 67 – Edroso v. Sabalan

EDROSO VS. SABLAN (1913)

Marcelina Edroso, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
Pablo and Basilio Sablan, opponents-appellees
DOCTRINE: A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just usufructuary in nature. The
reservor, having inherited the reservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof,
subject to a resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has a registrable title to the property, and may
institute land registration proceedings in the appropriate case.

It must be noted, however, that during the registration proceedings, the reservees should
intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properly
inscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuant to a decree of registration, may in the
proper case extinguish the reserva.

Mariano Ma. Rita

Victoriano Marcelina

Pedro
FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro
who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father.
1. Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance toh i s m o t h e r . H e n c e t h e h e r e d i t a r y t i t l e w h e r e u p o n i s
b a s e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r registration of her ownership.
2. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of
Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or
if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the
registration of each parcel.
3. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a
r e s e r v a b l e property.

HELD:

A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
(gratuitous title), and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which
he had acquired without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance from another ascendant,
his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them
intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that
they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.

The person required by article 811 to reserve the right, has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly, he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has
the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it,
although a limited and recoverable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hadn’t, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the rightis reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actuallyor constructively or
formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they haveno title of ownership or of the fee
simple which they can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die beforethem will they acquire it.

The SC reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the application, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her.

Case # 68 – Seines v. Esparcia

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellee

Doctrine:

The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2)
the survival of the reservee at the time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to
the first as a resolutory condition, it would seem more likely that the same is a term. In any
event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the reservees may alienate the
reservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will be determined by the timeliness or
untimeliness of the death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to herein
from the concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be clarified. It would seem
fairly clear that the reservor sold the reservable land in question, since at the time of the said sale,
she was the registered owner of the property and in fact in possession thereof. The sale executed
by the reservees may be viewed from a different perspective. Since the reservor was still alive at
the time of the said sale, it would seem that the reservees could not have validly sold the same
parcel of land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer to the parcel of land,
then the sale should properly be construed as a conditional sale - the condition being the survival
of the seller-reservees upon the death of the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to
construed this sale of the reservees as a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hence
the subject matter of the sale would not be the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees
thereto, which is conditional.

Teresa Saturnino Andrea Sps. Sienes

Agaton Francisco
Fernando
Paulina
Sps. Esparcia Cipriana

FACTS:

1. Lot 3368 originally belonged to SaturninoYaeso (origin). With his first wife, Teresa Reales,
he had 4 children, named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana.

2. With his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco (propositus).

3. Upon Yaeso’s death, said lot was left to Francisco and title was issued in his name. Because
Francisco was then a minor, his mother administered the property for him and declared it in her
name for taxation purposes.

4. When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, his mother, Andrea Gutang
(reservista) as sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale of the property in favor of
the Sps. ConstancioSienes and GenovevaSilay (Sps. Sienes).

5. Thereafter, the Sps. Sienes demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband, Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of the original certificate of title (which was in their possession). The latter refused.

6. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso (reservatorios), the surviving half-sisters of Francisco as such,
declared the property in their name and subsequently executed a deed of sale in favor of the Sps.
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Sps. Esparcia), who in turn, declared it in their name for tax
purposes and thereafter secured title in their name.

7. ConstancioSienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by
Paulina and Cipriana, the reconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.
8. Fidel Esparcia countered that they did not know any information regarding the sale by Andrea
Gutang in favor of the Sps. Sienes, and that if such sale was made, the same was void since
Andrea had no right to dispose of the property.

9. The trial court declared that the sale of Andrea Gutang to Sps. Sienes was void and that the
sale by Paulina and CiprianaYaeso to the Sps. Esparcia was also void. The land in question was
reservable property and therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve
it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, if any, survived her.

10. The records show that the lone reserve surviving was CiprianaYaeso.

ISSUE:

WON the lot in question is reservable property and if so, whether the reservoir or the reserve can
alienate the same

HELD: Yes, the lot is reservable property.

1. On Francisco’s death, unmarried and without descendants, the property was inherited by his
mother, Andrea Gutang, who was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any, survived her.

2. Being reservable property, the reserve creates two resolutory conditions:

a. the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and

b. the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which the property came.

In connection with this, the court has held that the reservista (reservor) has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. Hence, he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservista, the right acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatorios (reserves) at the time of the death of the reservista .

3. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, Andrea Gutang died, CiprianaYaeso was
still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor
of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive
ownership to Cipriana.

4. On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the
Sps. Esparcia was subject to a similar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale
was made by Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective because of
the occurrence of the resolutory condition.
Case # 69 – Florentino v. Florentino

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919

Doctrine:
Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the right of representation
accorded the reservee, the same may be exercised only by such person seeking to represent if he
himself is a relative within the third degree of the prepositus. Second, Florentino rejected the
theory that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of strangers, then the reserva is
not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable property was devised or willed by the
reservor to a relative of the prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, the reservable
nature of the property is not lost. From this principle arises an inference that the reservable
property is not part of the estate of the reservor upon his demise. Third, there is an affirmation
that the title of the reservor to the reservable property is not in the nature of full dominion, by
reason of the reservation provided by law. However, there is serious doubt as to the validity of
this proposition in the light of the more recent pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is
a mere usufructuary (as intimated in Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions characterizing
the title of the reservor to the reservable property as absolute but possessed with a resolutory
condition.
Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of this decision, committed an
error in the distribution of the reservable property.
Antonia Apolonio II Severina
 +Jose Mercedes
Ramon Apolonio III
Miguel
Victorino
Antonio
Rosario
Juan
+Maria
Encarnacion
+Isabel
+Espirita
Emilia
Jesus
Lourdes
Caridad
Dolores
Gabriel
+Pedro
Jose
Asunsion
Magdalena

FACTS:
1. ApolonioIsabeloFlorentino II married Antonia Faz, with whom he had 9 children. When his
wife died, Apolonio married Severina, with whom he had 2 children- Mercedes and Apolonio
III.
2. Apolonio II died and was survived by his second wife and the ten children, Apolonio III,
being born after Apolonio II died.
3. He was able to execute a will instituting as universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumous
Apolonio III and his widow, Severina, and declaring that all of his property should be divided
among all of his children in both marriages.
4. In the partition of his estate, Apolonio III was given 6 parcels of land and some personal
property of Apolonio II.
5. Apolonio III later died and his mother, Severina, succeeded to all these properties. She
subsequently died, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes.
6. As such heir, Mercedes took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
including the property inherited by Severina from Apolonio III, which is said to be reservable
property. Accordingly, Mercedes had been gathering the fruits of the parcels of land.
7. The children of Apolonio II by his first wife, as well as his grandchildren by the first
marriage, instituted an action for recovery of their share of the reservable property. The
defendants contend that no property can be reserved for the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is a
forced heiress and the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty to respect the legitime.
8. Also, the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of
strangers has been avoided.
ISSUE:
WON the property is subject to reserve troncal or not
HELD: Yes, it is subject to reserve troncal
1. Even if Severina left in her will said property to her only daughter and forced heiress,
nevertheless, this property has not lost its reservable nature. The posthumous son, Apolonio III,
acquired the property by lucrative title or by inheritance from his legitimate father.
2. Although such property was inherited by Severina, nevertheless, she was duty bound to
reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives within the third degree of the
line from which such property came. Ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment , use and trust merely for the reason that the law imposes the obligation to reserve and
preserve the same for certain designated persons, who on the death of said ascendants- reservoir,
acquire the ownership of said property in fact and operation of law in the same manner as forced
heirs.
3. There are then 7 reservees entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III,
to wit:
a. Apolonio II’s 3 children from his first marriage
b. The children of Apolonio II’s deceased children, 12 in all
c. Mercedes, Apolonio III’s sister.
All of the plaintiffs are relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree (four as half-
siblings and 12 as his nephews and nieces). As the first four are his relatives within the third
degree in their own right and the others by right of representation, all are entitled as reservees.
4. The properties in question came from the common ancestor, Apolonio II, and when, on the
death of Apolonio III without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his
legitimate mother, Severina; it became reservable property with the object that the same should
not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the origin of the property.
5. Severina could have disposed in her will all her own property in favor of her only living
daughter, Mercedes, as forced heir. But the provision concerning the reservable property
reducing the rights of the other reserves is null and void inasmuch as said property is not her own
and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the right to deliver the same to the
reserves.
6. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the absolute dominion of the ascendant
who inherits and receives the same from his descendant, therefore, it does not form part of his
property nor become the legitimeof his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case all
the relatives of his descendant died, in which case, the said reservable property loses such
character.

Case # 70 – Padura v. Baldovino

PADURA vs. BALDOVINO

No. L-11960
December 27, 1958

DOCTRINE: The division of the reservable property among the reservees is the subject matter of
the following decision. The court rejected the theory of reserva integral espoused by Spanish
commentators such as Scaevola, and categorically adopted the theory of delayed intestacy. The
reason for rejecting the first theory is clearly discussed below.

Gervacia Agustin Benita

Manuel Fortunato Candelaria

Dionisia Cristeta
Felisa Melania
Flora Anicia
Cornelio Pablo
 Francisco
Juana
Severino

FACTS: The lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction)
“co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcel of land” subject matter of the suit.

ISSUE: In a case of reserve troncal where the only reservatorios (reserves) surviving the
reservista and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?

HELD: The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the New Civil Code’s
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the
reserve vindal and the reversion legalof the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the
reservatarios, who are ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
thereservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right; and for this
purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the
reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultamar, Arts. 168, 199: Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but
from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject of
the condition that they must survive the reservista (Sanchez Roman, Vol. Tomo 2, p. 286:
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp274, 310). Had the nephews of whole and half blood
succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full- blood would undoubtedly receive a double share
compared to those of half blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.), why then should the latter
receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by interregnum
of the reserve? The decedent (causante), the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is
no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished
commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Roman (Estudios, Vol. 6, Tomo
2, p.1008) and MuciusScaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, p.342). The reason given by these
authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property because they
belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But the argument, if logically
pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all reservatarios,
as a class and in equal shares, regardless of line and degrees. In truth, such as the theory of
reserve integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ., p. 332 et seq.). But as we have seen, the Supreme Court
of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the reservable property
should be succeeded to by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules
of intestacy.

Case # 71 – Chua v. CFI

Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, petitioners,

vs.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V and Susana De La Torre, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre

DOCTRINE: The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the prepositus from the
origin of the reservable property was interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a
certain amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such payment
obligation was not imposed by the origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in nature.

Patricia Jose Consolacion

Ignacio Juanito
Lorenzo
Manuel
FACTS: Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage
with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
1. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
2. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.
3. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating,
among others, the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of
Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito;
P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio. By virtue of said
adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion
and Juanito.
4. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's
time, Consolacion executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her
favor the pro- indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the
whole lot was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion died
intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her
brother and sisters.
5. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the
first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint
before the respondent CFI of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot
No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the
latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question
was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.
6. The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the property in question as acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father,
Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not, in relation to first requisite of reserve troncal

HELD: Yes
The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of theperson m aking it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the
property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous.
In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came.

In the case at bar, all of the requisites are present: Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399
was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre, by operation of law. When Consolacion de la
Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is
essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving
the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity,
without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death
of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous
The obligation of paying the Standard is imposed upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally
by the deceased Jose in his last will and testament but by an order of the court. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased
himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. The order of the court
does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. As far as the
deceased Jose is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. This being
the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891.

Case # 72 – Gonzales vs. CFI

BEATRIZ GONZALES V. CFI MANILA, 104 SCRA 481 (1981)

DOCTRINE: Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and effects of reserva troncal.
Among other things, it stresses that the reservable property does not form part of the estate of the
reservor, if upon his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As such, the reservor
cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will, nor can the reservor choose who
or discriminate among the reservees should get the property. The reservees inherit the reservable
property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling in Padura
v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable
property among the reservees. It should be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in
Florentino and quotes substantially from the text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to
note the oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguish between full-blood brothers
from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost.
Benito Legarda Tuason

Consuelo
Rita
+Benito Legarda de la Paz Filomena Roces

Beatriz
Rosario
Teresa
+Filomena
Benito Carmen Legarda y Fernandez
Alejandro Ramon Legarda y Hernandez
Jose Filomena Legarda y Lobregat
Jaime Legarda y Lobregat
Celso Legarda y Lobregat
Alejandro Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Teresa Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Antonia Legarda y Lobregat
Jose Legarda y Lobregat
Rosario Legarda y Lobregat
Benito Legarda y Lobregat
Eduardo Legarda y Lobregat
Trinidad Legarda

FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon (Benito I), died
and was survived by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children. The real properties left by his
deceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3 equal parts by Benito II’s sisters and his heirs
pro-indiviso. One of his daughters, Filomena, died without issue and her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena vda de Legarda
1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties she inherited
from her daughter as a result of which she succeeded her deceased owner as co-owner of
the properties held pro-indiviso by her other 6 children. Later, Mrs. Legarda executed 2
handwritten documents disposing of the properties which she inherited from her daughter
in favor of her 16 grandchildren (the children of her sons). Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and
her 6 surviving children partitioned the co-owned property
2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her estate, Beatriz Gonzales, one of
her daughters, filed a motion to exclude in the inventory of the properties inherited from
Filomena, the deceased daughter, on the ground that said properties were reservable and
should be inherited by Filomena’s 3 sisters and 3 brothers, not by the 16 grandchildren of
Mrs. Legarda, or Filomena’s nephews and nieces. She also filed an action securing a
declaration that the properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her 6 chidlren
3. It is contended here than the properties in question are not reservable properties because
only relatives within the third paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda
willed the properties to her grandchildren, who are third degree relatives of Filomena and
 who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: “to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property
that should otherwise have remained therein.”

ISSUE: WON the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16 grandchildren (reservees
within the third degree) to the exclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree)

HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her 16 grandchildren the
reservable properties she inherited from her daughter because the reservable properties did not
form part of her estate. The reservoir cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservoir.

Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
within the third degree from prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda. She
could not select the reservees to whom to the reservable properties should be given and deprive
the other reservees of their shares therein. To allow the reservoir to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of Art
891, this cannot be allowed.

Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in her will even if the disposition is
in favor of relatives within the third degree from Filomena. The said properties, by operation of
Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda’s 6 children as reservees within the second degree from
Filomena. Reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.

The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda’s death. Since at the time of her death, there were reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of
the properties should be made in accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with the reservor’s
holographic will.

Case # 73 – De Papa v. Camacho

DE PAPA v CAMACHO
No. L-28032, 24 September 1986
144 SCRA 281

DOCTRINE: Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of the prepositus, and (b)
a niece of the prepositus, the latter is preferred to the exclusion of the former in the distribution of
the reversionary estate. This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary rules of intestate
succession which govern the distribution of the reversionary estate. Please note that brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces rank fourth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the
other hand, the uncles and aunts (collectively referred to as collateral relatives within the fifth civil
degree) rank fifth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Thus, following the
order of preference, those who rank fourth will exclude all those relatives who rank fifth. Again, this
is a reaffirmation of the theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura.

Marciana Balbino . . . . . Romana

Francisca
Manuel
Nicolas
Eustacio Toribia

Faustino Trinidad

Dalisay

Narvasa, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise:"

FACTS:

1. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs Francisca Tioco de Papa,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
grandaunt and granduncles.

2. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four(4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes "B", "B-1", and "B-2."

4. Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children and by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes "C' and "C-1" were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco,
the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.

6. In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio
Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes "B", "B-1",
"C" and "C-1."

7. In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land above-mentioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant
Primo Tongko.

8. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived by his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of
all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the
said seven parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the law on intestate succession; but the
plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited
by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels ofland, by
virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of
whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7)
parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino
Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share
therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three-eights (3/8) of said seven (7)
parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
collected by defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the
rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice
in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their
family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other
than legal interest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem
proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties.

ISSUE:

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower court,
all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

HELD:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted
by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his
rights as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right
of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x
x

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that
of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property
should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. x x x
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunts and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece,
the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. x
x x

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside, and the
complaint is dismissed with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

Case # 76 – Austria v. Reyes

AUSTRIA V. REYES, 31 SCRA 754 (1970)

DOCTRINE: The statement of a false cause in the institution of heirs shall be disregarded, unless it
is proved that the testator would not have made such institution had he been properly appraised
of the truth. Aside from the fact that the false cause must be stated in the will, the opponents of
the will are likewise mandated to prove by substantial evidence that the testator would not have
made such a disposition had he known the true state of affairs. Therefore, inferences and
conjectures are not sufficient to invalidate a provision which is challenged as one made on the
basis of a false cause.

Please note that the false cause which led the testator to make a particular testamentary
disposition is treated in the same way as a mistake, which in contract law, vitiates consent.

FACTS: On July 7, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the petitioners, Ruben
Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo and still others who, like petitioner are
nephew and nieces of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the probate of the will allowed
after due hearing.
1. The bulk of the estate of Basilia, was destined under the will to pass on to respondents
Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz – Salonga, all of
whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
2. April 23, 1959 – two years after the probate was allowed Basilia died. Perfecto Cruz was
appointed as executor without bond in accordance with the provisions of the decedent’s
will.
3. November 5, 1959 – Petitioner filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for
partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five
respondents, Perfecto Cruz, et.al, had not fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law. The court then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which
the court delimited to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the
will and disregarded the matter of the genuineness of adoption.
4. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the lower court’s
orders restricting their intervention.

ISSUE: WON the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the
adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

HELD: No
Article 850 of the Civil Code provides:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not
written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites:
1. The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will
2. The cause must be shown to be false
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause
Even if Basilia have used the terms “sapilitang mana” and sapilitang tagapagmana” there is no
indication that had she known that the respondents were not her adopted disposition of the free
portion was largely at Basilia’s discretion and she had given a large part to the respondents while
giving a relatively small legacy in favor of the petitioners. The decedent’s will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. The Court cannot annul the
same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

Article 850 of the Civil Code is positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may
have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one
is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the
institution of he had known the cause for it to be false.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it
effect.

The legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

Case # 78 – Palacios v. Ramirez

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

DOCTRINE: Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the opinion that a
fideicommissary substitution is in fact a disguised case of successive institutions. This is because
both the first and the second heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The
beneficial use and possession of the inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime at
most, and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The law requires that the first and second
heirs must be “one degree apart” from each other. This limitation became the objective of two
divergent views. One view holds that the “one degree” apart rule refers to one transfer. Ramirez
settled the controversy by holding the more restrictive view.

In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership
of land does not permit an alien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such a
ruling apply to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a compulsory
heir?

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only a widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila
1. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an
Austrian who lives in Spain
2. The administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow ‘en pleno
dominio” in satisfaction of her legitimee; the other part or “free portion” shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez “en nuda propriedad.” Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is
charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
3. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that the
fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Art. 863 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: WON the fideicommissary substitutions are invalid.

HELD: Yes, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void.
The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
“provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.”

The word “degree was construed as generation and this interpretation has been followed in the
present Code, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree “from the heir
originally instituted.” The Code this clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and
be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a
child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree
from the fiduciary.
There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits “that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties of
the subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners.

The Court ordered to distribute the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez as follows:
½ thereof to his widow as her legitime;
½ thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.

Case # 77 – Crisologo vs. Singson

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO V. MANUEL SINGSON, 4 SCRA 491
(1962)

DOCTRINE: Crisologo stresses that the essence of a fideicommissary substitution is the

imposition of an obligation on the part of the first heir to preserve and to transmit the
property to the second heir upon the former's death or upon the happening of a particular
event. The obligation to preserve and transmit must be done in an expressed manner
either by calling the substitution fideicommissary, or by imposing upon the first heir the
absolute obligation to preserve and deliver the inheritance to the second heir. In the
absence of either, the substitution would at best be considered simple or vulgar.

Two points raised in the decision should be noted. First, it inferred that if
Consolacion were instituted subject to a fideicommissary substitution, her rights would be
limited to that of a usufructuary. This is error, because the first heir in a fideicommissary
substitution acquires title to the property, subject merely to the resolutory term of the
substitution. Second, while the court ruled that the substitution is simple, it stated in the
penultimate paragraph that the substitution shall take place whether the death of
Consolacion takes place before or after the death of the testatrix. There seems to be
something wrong with the statement. Substitution was premised precisely upon the death
of Consolacion, and for no other cause. Therefore, if Consolacion survives the testatrix, as
in fact she did survive, then the substitution becomes academic. To allow the substitution
even if Consolacion were to survive the testatrix would be to give effect to a
fideicommissary substitution, which the same court overturned. The resulting conclusion
would be in contradiction with the finding that no fideicommissary substitution was
intended by the testatrix.

FACTS: Dona Leona Singson died testate, leaving a property in Ilocos Sur to her brothers
(Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Crisologo) and her niece, petitioner Consolacion Florentino.
1. Petitioners filed an action for partition against respondent Manuel Singson in connection
with a property located in Ilocos Sur. They alleged that the subject property was co-
owned in ½ share by both parties (Consolacion and Manuel) by virtue of the probated
will of the testator Dona Leona Singson.
2. Singson, on the other hand, contended that Consolacion was a mere usufructuary and not
a co-owner of the property, and hence, was not entitled to demand partition

ISSUE: WON the testamentary disposition in the testator’s will provided for sustitucion vulgar
(vulgar substitution) or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria (fideicommissary substitution)

HELD: The last will of the decedent established a mere vulgar substitution, the substitution
Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective upon the death of
Consolacion, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause shows that the substitution is not expressly made of
the fideicommissary kind, nor does not contain a clear statement that Consolacion, during her
lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, since naked
ownership was vested to the brothers of the testatrix. The provision in question merely provides
that upon Consolacion’s death, whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix, her share
shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN VULGAR SUBSTITUTION AND FIDEICOMMISSARY

SUBSTITUTION
If the clause in the will created a vulgar substitution, the result would be that Consolacion, upon
the death of the testatrix, becomes the owner of the undivided ½ of the property. But if the clause
provided for a fideicommissary substitution, Consolacion acquires only usufructuary rights over
the pro-indiviso share.
In fideicommissary substitution, the fiduciary does not acquire full ownership of the property
bequeathed by the will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to
deliver said property to the fideicommissary; it is obvious that the nude ownership is passed to
another person other than the fideicommissary.

To constitute fideicommissary substitution, there must be an obligation imposed on the first heir
(fiduciary heir) to preserve and transmit to another (fideicommissary heir) the whole or part of
the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For
this reason, Art 785 Old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no
effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first
heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir.
Case # 83 – De Los Santos v. De La Cruz

DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555(1971)

DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude the
more remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate
succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific instance, is
barred from exercising the right of representation.

FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance against Maximino de la Cruz, alleging
that she and several co-heirs, including defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement
over a portion of land and that the parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to the defendant in addition
to his share, on the condition that the defendant would undertake the development of the estate,
all expenses shall be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the 3 lots.

1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the agreement
was void with respect to her, since the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz,
deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement
by mistake.
2. Defendant’s counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiff had sold her share in the estate
and that extrajudicial partition agreement being void as to the latter, he is entitled to ¼ of
the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement,
was stopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent
Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter of the extrajudicial agreement was
Pelagia de la Cruz, who died instestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant is a nephew
of the said decedent; that plaintiff is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother,
Marciana de la Cruz, being niece of the decedent. Plaintiff’s mother died on September
22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de
la Cruz.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir of the decedent.

HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not
inherit from the latter by right of representation, much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit
in her own right.

Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court in Linarty y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Itturalde said:
 In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and cannot participate with a
niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant
grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain
beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters.

In the case at bar, the relatives “nearest in degree” to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is the defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial

partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action did not confer upon her
the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement,
as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
in representation of her deceased mother.

It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-
appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such heir,
the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner and
another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the
prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.

The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not
be heard to assert estoppels against defendant-appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated on a
void contract, or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy.
Case # 85 – Diaz v. IAC

DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 150 SCRA 645 (1987)

DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will be noted, the legitimate
collateral relative of the intestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. There was no
showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity. It
must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any other descendants other than
the illegitimate children who were excluded from her inheritance.

FACTS: The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present
controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
1. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD: No
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person
to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants
may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case at
bar, the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the
word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was
used in a more restrictive or limited sense.
Case # 86 & 92– Abellana-Bocayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo

ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986 (1965)

DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only in
the descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but only
in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are concerned. When such
nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that portion which their predeceased
or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to inherit. By right of
representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees remote from the
decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of representation is that the
nephews and nieces must concur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and nieces
will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the decedent.
It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree relatives,
nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are likewise
relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of intestate succession
which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of succession, whereas other
collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise
of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families
under Article 992.
In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice
Corona ruled that “(u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces),
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.”
Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of
representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In the
collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles and/or
aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up
to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she
has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateral relatives, namely Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and
by Gaudencia, Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surname Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia’s only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who predeceased the decedent.
 2. The trial court ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent,
exclude the aunt of the same decedent for the reason that the former are nearer in degree
(2 degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation,
while the aunt is 3 degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives
are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree of relationship as the oppositors
(3 degrees removed from the decedent) and that under 975 of the New Civil Code, no
right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do
not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former succeed in their own right.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her?

HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from
the decedent (3 degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and hen descending to the heir
(Civil Code, Art. 966). Also, nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e.. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided by Art.
975.

The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunt and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Art. 1009, the absence
of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.

Tolentino expressly states:

Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we
can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under
the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives,
for successional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.

Case # 87-88 – Corpus v. Corpus

TOMAS CORPUS V. ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF

TEODORO YANGCO, 85 SCRA 567 (1978)

DOCTRINE: Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child is excluded from the
inheritance of an illegitimate relative.

FACTS: Teodoro Yangco died with a will. He left no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
nearest relatives were: (a) his half-brother Luis Yangco; (b) half-sister Paz Yangco and wife of
Miguel Osorio; (c) children of his half-brother Ramon Corpus; and (d) Juanita Corpus; daughter
of his half-brother Jose Corpus

1. Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles (widow of Tomas
Corpus). Before her marriage with Luis Rafael, Ramona had 5 children with Tomas, 2 of
which were Pablo and Jose.
2. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted but this
was opposed.
3. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus and the estate of Luis
R. Yangco appealed. A compromise agreement was entered into thereafter
4. Based on the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt acknowledging that
he received from the Yangco estate P2,000.
5. Tomas, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action to recover the supposed share in
Yangco’s intestate estate. He alleged that the dispositions in Yangco’s will imposing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Art 785 Old Civil Code and
that the 1949 partition is invalid and as such, the estate should be distributed according to
the rules of intestacy

ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, mother of Tomas, was a legal heir of Yangco

HELD: No.To determine Juanita’s right to inherit, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco’s filiation.
Luis Rafael’s will states that Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate
child. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to
be legitimate following the principle of simper preasumitur pro matrimonio, “that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful
marriage.”
Since Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate) and Juanita was the legitimate
child of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus, petitioner-appellant Tomas has no cause of action
for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother in Yangco’s estate. Juanita was
not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.

Art 992 NCC provides that “an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child.” This rule is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and
seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.

Following the rule in Art 992, it was held that:

a. Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child

b. The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandfather
c. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother.
Case # 89 – Leonardo v. CA

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA CAILLES, 120

SCRA 890 (1983)

DOCTRINE: The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purpose of determining his
qualification to inherit from a deceased person. In Leonardo, the Court found after looking into the
birth certificate of the petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred by Article 992 to
claim a share in the inheritance of his great grandmother.

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1963. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and
Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter Pascuala who
predeceased her. Sotero died in 1944 while Silvestra died in 1949.

1. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero, filed a complaint

seeking to:
a. Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased Francisca, entitled to ½ share in the
estate of the deceased jointly with defendant Maria
b. Have the estate of Francisca partitioned between him and Maria
2. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and
alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation
3. The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision
and dismissed the complaint

ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal right to inherit by representation to Francisca’s estate

HELD: No.

To determine petitioner’s successional rights to the decedent’s estate, his filiation must first be
ascertained. Petitioner failed to prove his filiation; the name of the child described in the birth
certificate presented as evidence, is not that of the plaintiff but a certain “Alfredo Leonardo” who
was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Soccoro Timbol. Other than his bare
allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that “Alfredo Leonardo”
mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he still cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca considering that he was born outside of
wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were
not yet married; and his alleged father’s first marriage was still subsisting. As such, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca.

Case # 90 – Santillon v. Mirandan

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON V.

PERFECTA MIRANDA, 14 SCRA 563 (1965)

DOCTRINE: Santillon resolved the dispute regarding the intestate shares of a surviving spouse
concurring with one legitimate child. In addition to the arguments clearly stated in the text of the
decision, it may be stressed at this point that commentators who insist on a 3/4 - 1/4 sharing in favor
of the legitimate child adhere to the theory of preference. In short, there the order of intestate
succession listed the legitimate children as having first priority in the intestate estate of the deceased
parent, and the spouse as fourth, then the law must be interpreted as having given a preference to the
legitimate child or children with respect to the hereditary estate, after the legitime of all other
compulsory heirs shall have been paid. Obviously, Santillon rejected the theory of preference and
adopted the theory of concurrence. Accordingly, heirs who do not mutually exclude each other shall
ratably share the inheritance. Since preference is not inferred from the order of intestate succession,
then the free disposal (after payment of legitime to the compulsory heirs) must be distributed in a
manner that would result in the least disproportion between or among the respective shares of the
concurring intestate heirs.
Two other theories in relation to the disposition of the free disposal might be mentioned.
Under the theory of equality, the free disposal is divided equally among the concurring intestate
heirs, regardless of the order of intestate succession. Another theory advanced by other
commentators is that the free disposal must be proportionately distributed among the concurring
intestate heirs based on their respective legitime.

FACTS: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda.
During his marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land

1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration. His mother,
Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels which
Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her undivided share in most of the properties to spouses
Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouse’s estate
 2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to “declare shares of heirs” and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro
insisted that after deducting Perfecta’s ½ share from the conjugal property, the remaining
property shall be divided as: ¼ for Perfecta and ¾ for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to another ½ of
the remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse Perfecta is
entitled to ½ of Pedro’s estate and the remaining ½ is given to Claro

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child?

HELD: Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.

Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art 996 comes under
the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot
rely on Art 892 to support his claim to ¾ of his father’s share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime
of the surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession.
While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a
spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As such, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art 996.

In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, ½ of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes
to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to “children or descendants,” the rule in
statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in this case.

The theory of commentator’s sharing Claro’s position are premised on the following arguments:

a. Art 996 speaks of “children” therefore it does not apply when there is only one “child”
and as such Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial construction and
analogy
b. Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only ¼ while in testacy,
she would get ½ shares

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. As such,
“children” in Art 996 also refers to a “child.”

The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance whereas Art 834
Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing two
contingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b) where
the widow or widower survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for
the second situation, it can be deemed that the legislator’s intent was to promulgate only
one general rule applicable to both situations.

SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

Contents
HEIRS OF URIARTE V CA ......................................................................................................................................73
VIZCONDE V CA ...................................................................................................................................................74
TISON V CA ..........................................................................................................................................................78
PAVIA V UGARTE .................................................................................................................................................80
 SALAO V SALAO ...................................................................................................................................................82
DIAZ V PAMUTI ...................................................................................................................................................84
LEONARDO V CA .................................................................................................................................................85
ROSALES V ROSALES............................................................................................................................................86
RODRIGUEZ V RAVILAN .......................................................................................................................................88
ADOPTION ...............................................................................................................................................................92
SANTOS YNIGO V RP ...........................................................................................................................................92
MANUEL V FERRER ..............................................................................................................................................93
ACAIN V IAC.........................................................................................................................................................95
SUAREZ V CA .......................................................................................................................................................97
TEOTICO V DEL VAL .............................................................................................................................................98

HEIRS OF URIARTE V CA
The heirs of Uriarte claimed that they have a successional right over a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Surigaodel Sur
left by JustaArnaldoSering upon her death on March 31, 1989.

Half of this land (0.5 hectares), formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The
rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of
Justas property should be as follows as private respondent contends:

A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue
to petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.

B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated was consolidated with the
1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall
accrue to private respondent, who is the son of AgatonicaArreza, and who is only three degrees from JustaArnaldo,
whereas petitioners who are the children of PrimitivaArnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed
from JustaArnaldo

ISSUE:

Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearest relatives within
the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

The nephew who is the son of Justa’shalf sister is entitled to the property

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom
the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who
is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth
degree relatives of Justa.

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that
his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that
private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza.
They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her
estate.

Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private
respondent is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew is considered a
collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. [23] That private
respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt’s
heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or
half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.

VIZCONDE V CA
CHARACTERS:

PETITIONER LAURO G. VIZCONDE and his wife ESTRELLITA NICOLAS-VIZCONDE had two
children, viz., CARMELA AND JENNIFER.

SPOUSES RAFAEL NICOLAS AND SALUD GONZALES-NICOLAS (parents of Estrellita).

The other children of Rafael and Salud are:

o Antonio Nicolas;

o Ramon Nicolas;

o Teresita Nicolas de Leon;

 o Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent; and

o Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their
four children.

FACTS:

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter
Valenzuela property) for P135,000.00, evidenced by a LubusangBilihan ng Bahagi ng LupanaNasasakupan ng Titulo
TCT NO. T-36734. On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property for P3,405,612.00. In June of the
same year, Estrellita bought a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paranaque
(hereafter Paranaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was
deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner’s life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and
Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991. Petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud . The extra-judicial settlement
provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses
Rafael and Salud. The settlement gave 50% of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her
daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token
amount. The other 50% was allotted to petitioner. The Paranaque property and the car were also given to
petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said
properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding
listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be
appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate and sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now
senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Private respondent Ramon filed an opposition praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less P6,000,000.00 before her
gruesome murder. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition entitled In Matter Of The Guardianship Of
Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of
Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.

The RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the
Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs.
Neither was the Paranaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate. Subsequently, the
RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards
property without the courts knowledge and permission.

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days to file any appropriate
petition or motion related to the pending petition. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19,
1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion moved to include petitioner
in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paranaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated. Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March
10, 1994 granted the same.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision
respondent Court of Appeals denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the
title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the Order of the Probate Court. (NO!)

Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’s estate is
proper. (NO!)

RULING:

No. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. The probate court, as well as respondent Court of
Appeals, committed reversible errors

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner,
a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude
one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.

With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is
considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate
proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may
or may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court
went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela
property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned
parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be
ventilated in an appropriate action

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is premature. Records
indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that
the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a
reversible error in ordering collation of the Paranaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita,
by way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paranaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed
collation of the Paranaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the
Paranaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the
Paranaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present
owner of the Paranaque property is not one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein
petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paranaque property is
improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to
his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael,
in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir [38] in
the Paranaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought
to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. [39] Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela
property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been
returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid
and binding purpose.

The content of the Order: (ARON MAKA RELATE TAS PANGHITABO….)

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of
having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters
ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased
Rafael Nicolas. And LauroVizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime
and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from the late
Rafael Nicolas, LauroVizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business,
canteen concessions and garment manufacturing.However, no competent evidence has been submitted to
indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a
valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the
subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

TISON V CA
Facts:

The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of the deceased TeodoraDezoller
Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father HermogenesDezoller. TeodoraDezoller Guerrero died on
March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and
herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
TeodoraDezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to
herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter’s name. Martin
Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Teodoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon DezollerTison was presented as the lone witness, with documentary
evidences offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their
case and submitted a written offer of the exhibits. Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s
Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
Guerrero. The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the
petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.

Ruling:

1. NO. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There
is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases,
none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. The necessity of
an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article
335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies under our
Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the
legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed by law. Upon
the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer
be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned.
The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of
uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so
that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.

2. YES. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:"

"“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the
latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions.”

“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.”

“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”
Upon the death of TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are
entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided
three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of
an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively."

PAVIA V UGARTE
FACTS:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde
asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased.

The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were
instituted, and she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties,
to be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half
of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which this new relative did
notdeny — be required to render an account of the property of the estate.

PETITIONER'S CONTENTION:
What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana
Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by
representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as
the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.

COURT'S DECISION:
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled
to.

ISSUE:
WON herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo Linart and is entitled to half of the estate of the
deceased.

RULING:
NO.
the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown.
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled
to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of
the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been
quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would
have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff,
might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the
word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to
warrant such a conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not
applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to intestate successions.
In both cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code,
where a testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass to their
children, it was held that "Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in such a case
the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event
succeed the child in the natural and regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also
pointed out in the first decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the
complaint that the action was based upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a
right which he had under the terms of the will." The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary
succession, we must take into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the
children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the term
"children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be had to
the provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not
obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in
the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the
collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters,
which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

The court ordered the record be remanded to the court of First Instance from whence it came for execution of the
said judgment.
SALAO V SALAO

FACTS:

Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, their three children and 1 grandson partitioned her property. (pls.
see table below) Prior to Valentina’s death, her children Ambrosia and Juan Sr. secured a Torrens title, OCT No.
185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at
SitioCalunuran and they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao. Later,
Ambrosia and Juan Sr., acquired that Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the
Hermosa cadastre which adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. Said Calunaran and Lewa fish ponds are the bone of
contention in this case.

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's
death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated
her one-halfproindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time
she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having
inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property
owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of VictorinaSalao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed
Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession
thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which
allegedly amounted to P200,000.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any
interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in
the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952
in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked
for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond
as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and
aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral
damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and
reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S.
Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six
children and by the administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his
seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain under administration during
the pendency of this case.

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and
Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the
real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heir after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was
administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three
children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

Issues:

Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have successional rights over Ambrosia’s share.

Ruling:

Succession: Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to
Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third
degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his
first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to
the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a
grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

Table 1. Properties of Valentina Ignacio upon her death on 1914.

(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents,
Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was
owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 21,700

(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418

(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989 (VALENTIN)

(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469 (VALENTIN)

DIAZ V PAMUTI

FACTS:

Thee respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case
No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero," praying among other
things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.

It is undisputed: 1) that FelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of Simona PamutiVda. de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that
Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born FelisaPamuti and another child who died during
infancy; 3) that Simona PamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4)
that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents PascualSantero and Simona PamutiVda. deSantero; 5)
that PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the
time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared FelisaPamutiJardin as
the sole legitimate heir of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of PascualSantero;

c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero;

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.
Issue: whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate
child of Simona PamutiVda, de Santero.

who are the legal heirs of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero — her niece FelisaPamutiJardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Ruling:

Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, who is the
legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as
follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners
herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art.
992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is
in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona PamutiVda. deSantero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to
be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.

LEONARDO V CA
FACTS:

- Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and
SilvestraCailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who
predeceased her.

- Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while SilvestraCailles died in 1949 without any issue.

- On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased
Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
 respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the
complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the
income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.

- Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject
properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation.

- For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are
now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his
favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime
in September 1963.

- the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner finding the evidence of the private respondent
insufficient to prove ownership of the properties in suit.

- From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of
the trial court. Hence. This petition.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT
GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.

RULING:

1. NO. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found
again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born
on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more,
his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child
who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

ROSALES V ROSALES
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL

Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right of representation. Article 971 explicitly declares
that the representative is called to succession by law because of blood relationship. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. A widow of
the person represented cannot assert the same right of representation as there is no filiation by blood.

Facts: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband, their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the
following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio
Rosales son, 1/4.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.

Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated in Art. 887 being the widow or widower of the
son of the decedent and that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as her compulsory heir by right of representation together with
her son.

Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?

Held: NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law
either by her own right or by the right of representation.

The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code.

Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A
careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the
deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of
the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz—

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the
same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband
was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales
by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

RODRIGUEZ V RAVILAN
Facts:

JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina,
Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other things, that many years ago
Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana,
Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them
divided among themselves the said property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and several carabaos,
the legal portions which pertained to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained undivided, and
these latter continued to possess, in common, the property that fell to their shares, and were also associated in
business separately from their other coheirs.

The said property, as aforesaid, was administered by EspiridionBarte, in common accord with the others, and, he
having died without leaving heirs, by force of law the part that pertained to him passed to his brother Pedro and
his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said
brother and sisters continued their partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator;
that during the latter's administration, MateaBarte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by
his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in the
name of their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property mentioned and so stated, in February,
1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition,
on the pretext that, as the administratix of that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.

That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts having been settled, as admitted
by the defendant herself, the latter was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do,
and that she continued in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without the consent or
intervention of the plaintiffs; that JorgiaBarte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of MateaBarte, and the heirs of Pedro
Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were then entitled to the property in question, which
should be divided among them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to JorgiaBarte, another to Nicolas Mendoza,
and the other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.

Issue:

Whether or not partition should be granted.

Ruling:
No. Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real estate with others, in any
form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter prescribed."

Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for partition shall set forth the nature
and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded, and name each tenant in common, coparcener, or other person interested therein, as defendants."

So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of a coproprietor or coowner of
the property the partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that JorgiaBarte and the son of
MateaBarte, through his representative, aver that they are the coowners of the said Mandaue lands of others
situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their averment by titles which establish
the common ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant party,
representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the
complaint.

In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are all coowners or
coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of common ownership need not be gone
into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in what proportion the said property of common
ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of court.

Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the hereditary succession of
the deceased EspiridionBarte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at his death, should be divided among
his eight brothers and sisters who may have survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his
deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance,
according to the provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which prescribes:
"Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita
and the latter per stirpes," representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased.

The record does not show whether JorgiaBarte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, her
collateral relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law.

It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four brothers and sisters can not affect the
hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in interest successions.

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, to declare
and we do hereby declare, that the partition prayed for be denied

Vda de la Rosa v Vda Damian

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

BAR Q: Suppose that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and
sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
 FACTS:

Lucio
Felisa Ramon
Campo
Delgado Osorio

Sisters: Guillerm Josefa Luis

Roman Marciana Nazario Edilberta Jose Jacoba Gorgonio Delgado
o Rustia Delgado
Rustia Damian & Half- blood
(deceased) Hortencia sibling of
Cruz nephews Josefa
Illegitima
and
te child
nieces,
nephews Luisa
children and Delgado
de facto grandneph
nieces Adopted petitione
ews and
child grandniece r
s

Plaintiffs are the Delgados, half- blood sibling and decendants of Josefa Delgado while Respondents are the siblings
of Guillermo. This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups:

(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and

(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate
child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural
children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before
him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo
which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s
union is in dispute. The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives

ISSUE:

Who are the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and JosefaDelgado.

RULING:

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her half and full blood sibs, nephews and nieces may represent but
not the grandnephews and nieces. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA- his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.

1. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her half and full blood sibs, nephews and nieces may
represent but not the grandnephews and nieces.

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother
Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed. We hold that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent
Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent,
even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to
succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former,
would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that, succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families
does not apply to the case under consideration.

That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is
no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation.

We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to
them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the
time of her death on September 8, 1972.

They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for
the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the
time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance
with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

2. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA- his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.

Intervenor (now co-respondent) GuillermaRustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed
the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February
28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

IntervenorGuillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic
writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death
of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by
which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case,
intervenorGuillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia
on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case,
Guillermo Rustia). The report card in UST of intervenorGuillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no
participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted
the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that
published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and
signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript
was fatal to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, GuillerminaRustiaRustia, who was never adopted in accordance
with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her
a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenorGuillermaRustia and the ampun-ampunan GuillerminaRustiaRustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful
heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70

ADOPTION
SANTOS YNIGO V RP
G.R. No. L-6294 June 28, 1954

In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL
DE SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

PRINCIPLES:

ADOPTION; PURPOSE - The purpose of adoption is to afford to persons who have no child of their own the
consolation of having one by creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists
by blood relationship. This purpose reject the idea of adoption by persons who have children of their own, for,
otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise resulting from the infiltration of foreign element into a
family which already counts with children upon whom the parents can shower their paternal love and affection

ADOPTION; PERSONS WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN CANNOT ADOPT - There is merit in the contention that
the petition should not be granted in view of the prohibition contained in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil
Code.
This article provides that persons who have legitimate children cannot adopt, and there is no doubt about its
application because the petition was filed on June 24, 1952 and at that time petitioners had two legitimate
children, one a boy born on November 12, 1950 and the other, a girl born on April 13, 1952.

FACTS:

a. June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in CFI of Zamboanga by Santos and his wife for the adoption of a minor
named MarcialEleuterioResaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their
consent to the adoption.

b. It was also alleged that petitioners had reared and cared for the minor as if he were their own.

c. OSG filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners have 2 legitimate children who are still
minors, and as such they are disqualified to adopt under the provisions of the new civil code

d. Petitioners argue that their 2 LCs were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners
and the parents of the minor. Also the old code at the time of agreement contains no such prohibition.

ISSUE: Is the adoption valid even if the agreement to adopt was made before the spouses had legitimate children.

HELD:

No.

While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the
Rules of Court and that rule does not prohibit persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot
agree to the proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of paternity and filiation by
fiction of law without the sanction of court.

Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to adopt a minor shall present a petition to the court of
first instance of the province where he resides (section 1). This means that the only valid adoption in this
jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule, which shows
that the agreement under consideration can not have the effect of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.

MANUEL V FERRER
PRINCIPLE: A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal
heir. 13

FACTS: Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling are spouses. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-
marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, was executed in favor of Juan
Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel (WHO?). Juan and Esperanza tookModesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and
raised her as their own "daughter" (WARD).

In 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year
period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land.
Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also
passed away.

A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the
three parcels of land. Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of
Deeds, the three titles were transferred in Modesta’s name.

In 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and
Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under
the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners who
are the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling.

Petitioners SOUGHT TO ANNUL THE RENUNCIATION AND QUITCLAIM MADE BY MODESTA (WARD) argue that
they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's
surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving
spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.

In a summary judgment, the RTC dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of
their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.

ISSUE: WON the legitimate brothers and sisters can be an heir of their illegitimate brother who died intestate
survived by a spouse and a ward (ampon)

WON a ward can be an intestate heir

HELD:

1. NO!

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the
"principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects
succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary
dispositions.Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an
illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that
where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that
a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate
brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and
thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to
produce a harmonious whole.

2. NO!

Modesta is also not an heir of decedent. In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she
herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13

ACAIN V IAC
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs.IAC, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.

Principle:

Preterition applies to adopted children but not to spouses. (A spouse is not a relative in the direct line of the
other spouse. Adoption makes the adopted child the legitimate child of the adopter).

FACTS: (FYI: This happened in Cebu. They live in Sanciangko Street. The disputed properties are in Cebu City and
Bantayan)

Petitioner ConstantinoAcain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of
the will of the late NemesioAcain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the
premise that NemesioAcain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by NemesioAcain
on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a translation in English submitted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.

Part of the will:

“THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly with
my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and
presently residing…. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands,
houses…. which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion,
Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.

Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as
the petitioner.

The oppositors respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa DiongsonVda. deAcain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has
no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Appellate Court granted private
respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
NemesioAcain.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.

SC RULING:

Yes, on the part of the adopted child but NO on the part of the wife.

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without prejudice
to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend
or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by
the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without
any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. The effect
of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies
and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE MATTERS:

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called
upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left
by the deceased and Special Proceedings must be dismissed.

As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion
to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits
of the case. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its
face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal
heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could
have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved

Petition is hereby DENIED.

SUAREZ V CA
aPrinciple:Thelegitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their
deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction
sale to protect their own interests.
FACTS:
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several
valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’
widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for
damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig)
to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1

The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory, five (5)
valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution on
June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private
respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action 2
against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the
annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they
alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable
therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on
execution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and
registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father?

RULING:
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father
and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion
equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of
their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own
right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interests.

TEOTICO V DEL VAL

Teotico vs Ana Del Val
Adoption

Facts:

Maria Mortera y BalsalobreVda. de Aguirre made a will giving a legacy to Dr. Rene Teotico of P20,000. Dr.
Rene Teotico is the husband of Josefina Mortera, the testatrix's niece. The testatrix also instituted Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
The testatrix died on July 14, 1955.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as
an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2,
1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as
required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to
intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground
that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care
of the testatrix during her last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960,
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate
succession.

Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the
decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the
vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits
the will to probate.

Issue:

Whether or not an adopted child of the testatrix’s deceased sister (Ana del Val Chan) has the right to
intervene in the probate proceeding in this case.

Ruling:

NO.

The Supreme Court held that the oppositor (Ana del Val Chan) cannot derive comfort from the fact that
she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of
the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but
not of the relatives of the adopter.

The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to
his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative
of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after
the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between
the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).

Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of
either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and
Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate
proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

1. A) (Family Code) Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Section 16 of RA 8552 provides that except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall
then be vested on the adopter(s).

It is by this severance that an adopted child is not an intestate of either his biological parents or his blood
relatives. Adoption relieves the birth parents of the adopted person of all parental rights and
responsibilities and terminates all legal relationships between the adopted person and the birth parents
and other relatives of the adopted person. Thereafter, the adopted person is a stranger to the former
relatives for all purposes, including inheritance.

B) RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.

In other words, after adoption, the adopted person shall be treated as if he or she was born to the
adopting parents and shall have all rights and be subject to all of the duties arising from that relation,
including the right of inheritance. Thus, an adopted child is an intestate heir of the adopters.

As regards to the adopter’s blood relatives, he is not an intestate heir. The relationship established
by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives,
except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have
after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.
Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either.

2. No. RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. If the adopting
parent should die before the adopted child does, the latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance
from the parents or ascendants of the adopter.

In other words, the law does not create any relationship between the adopted child and the relatives of the
adopting parents, not even to the biological or legitimate children of the adopting parents.
3. Article 39 (2) PD 603 provides that adoption dissolves the authority vested in the natural parent or
parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent.

Article 342 NCC provides that parents by nature shall inherit from the adopted child and the adopter
shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person.

However, they were repealed by RA 8552 which states that in legal and intestate succession, the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
filiation.

Thus, an adopted child shall not inherit real or personal property from his or her birth parents or
their relatives when the relationship between them has been terminated by final order of adoption,
nor shall the birth parents or their relatives inherit from the adopted child. This means that the
adopter and adopted shall become intestate heirs as to each other.

4. Article 39 PD 603 provides that: The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose
parents by nature shall inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or
parents take the place of the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.

Article 342 CC provides: The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by
nature shall inherit from him.

However, Article 190(2) CC provides that when the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters.

But by the enactment of RA 8552, the birth parents of an adopted person are relieved of all parental
duties and responsibilities toward the adopted person, including the right of inheritance unless
specifically provided by will. Thus, adoptive parent is an intestate heir of the estate of the adopted
child.

 The adopter’s blood relatives shall not be entitled to inherit from and through the adopted
individual under the laws of intestacy in the absence of a will, unless expressly excluded. The
rationale for this is the relationship established by the adoption is restricted to the adopting parents,
and does not extend to his other relatives.

5. Both shall inherit.

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following
rules:

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted
concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the
parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters
 Vitug v. CA

G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990

DOCTRINE: A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable, and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take
effect after his death. The bequest or device must pertain to the testator

FACTS: Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank
of American National Trust and Savings Association. The said agreement contained the following
stipulations:

(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current account shall be
both their property and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them
during their lifetime; and

(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the surviving
spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor

Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion asking
authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover his advances to
the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from their savings account. Rowena
opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the
savings account were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be no
reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired
through the survivorship agreement. The trial court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the
motion to sell some of the property. The Court of Appeals however held that the survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will under
Article 805 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Survivorship Agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa, hence must
comply with the formalities of a will
HELD: No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement in the nature of an aleatory contract whereby
one or both of the parties reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of
what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time
or is uncertain, such as death. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable, and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death. The bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies
subject of the savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds, therefore not only belonging to one
party. Moreover, they did not dispose of the property in favor of the other, which would have been a
form of prohibited donation. The spouses merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-
making venture.

A survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may
be violative of a law such as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere cloak to hide an inofficious
donation; (2) it is used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a
compulsory heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently, the
Court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As such,
Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the amounts under the
savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the
survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are not conjugal partnership properties
and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

Balatazar v. Laxa

669 SCRA 249

TOPIC: Testamentary Capacity & Intent

FACTS:

Paciencia Regala was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on
September 13, 1981. Childless and without any siblings, she bequeathed all her properties to her nephew, respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa, with whom she had an undisputed filial relationship, and to his family. As ruled by the Court, the
Will was executed in faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. Six days after the execution of the
Will, Paciencia left for the USA where she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor. Petitioners Antonio Baltazar et al. filed an opposition, ultimately asking the RTC to deny
probation on certain grounds, among others being that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of
its execution; and that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and
improper pressure and influence, and fraud and trickery by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit.
Meanwhile, Lorenzo testified in the probation proceedings that, among others, at the time of Paciencia’s death, she
did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf, or mute. He belied and denied
having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion, or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the
Philippines when the same was executed.

The RTC disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia, giving considerable weight to the testimony of one of the
petitioners and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason
or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. However, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the
probate of Paciencia’s Will.

ISSUES: Whether Paciencia was of sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.

RULING: Yes, Paciencia was of sound mind.

The Court agrees with the position of the CA that the state of being magulayan or forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Aside from the petitioners’ testimony to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or
otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. More
credence is accorded to the testimony of Dra. Limpin, one of the instrumental witnesses, as to the soundness of mind
of Paciencia when the latter went to the judge’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are
truthful and intelligent. More importantly a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of
the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Under Art. 800 of the NCC, the presumption will
not apply if the testator was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Since this
was not shown in the case of Paciencia, the burden to prove that she was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of
petitioners. However, as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them.

Furthermore, Paciencia’s special request that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death, her statement on
how she acquired the properties from her parents, and how the same would be bequeathed in particular to
respondent and his family, have convinced the Court that she was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot
be used as basis to deny the probate of will.

Another essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator/testatrix to execute the
document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.

In determining the same, the Court took into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated
Lorenzo as her own son and that such love extended to his family. Paciencia cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived
with him both here and abroad even after the latter was already married and already has children. The unquestioned
relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against
petitioners’ bare allegations which are not supported by concrete, substantial, and credible evidence on record. Bare
arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the
Court to uphold said allegations. Furthermore, a purported will is not to be denied legalization on dubious grounds.
Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been
duly executed in fact, whether it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in
the estate of the decedent.
It bears stressing that irrespective of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of
the will in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or evidence that ought to
be before it that is controlling. The very existence of the Will is in itself a prima facie proof that the supposed testatrix
had willed that her estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the State that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby. This
coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies,
constrain the Court to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

The Court DENIES the petition for the reversal of CA’s decision. CA’s Decision granting the petition for probate
of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala

SUROZA VS. HONRADO (2012)

FACTS:

 Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will bequeathing her house and lot to certain Marilyn
Suroza. Marcelina died in 1974.

 Marina Paje was named as executrix in the said will and she petitioned before CFI Rizal that the will be
admitted to probate.

 Judge Honrado admitted the will to probate and assigned to Paje as the administratix. Honrado also issued
an ejectment order against the occupants of the house and lot subject of the will.

 Nenita Suroza, daughter in law of Marcelina, learned of the probate proceeding when she received the
ejectment order (as she was residing in the house and lot).

 Nenita opposed the probate proceeding. She alleged that the notarial will is void because of the following
grounds:

a. The instituted heir therein Marilyn Suroza is actually Marilyn Sy and she is a stranger to Marcelina;

b. The only son of Marcellina, Agapito, is still alive and is compulsory heir;

c. The notarial will is written in English, a language not know to Marcelina because the latter was illiterate
so much that she merely thumbarked the will; and

d. The notary public who notarized will admitted that Marcelina never appeared before him and that he
notarized the said will merely to accommodate the request of a lawyer friend but with the
understanding that Marcelina should later appear before him but that never happened.

 Honrado still continued with the probate despite the opposition until testamentary proceeding closed and
the property transferred to Marilyn Sy.

 Nenita then filed this administrative case against Honrado on the ground of misconduct.

ISSUE:

WON the will is valid.

HELD:
NO. The will is void. The mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code provides that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. In the case at bar, the will is written in English and was
thumb marked by an obviously illiterate Marcelina. This could have readily been perceived by Honrado that that the
will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known”
to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated
into Filipino language.” That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix

NOTE:

A judge may be criminally liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Administrative action may be taken against a
judge of court of first instance for serious misconduct or inefficiency.

The Supreme Court said in the case at bar that had Honrado been careful and observant, he could have noted not
only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting to Marilyn Sy
as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to Agapito who was still alive. Despite the valid claim raised by Nenita, he
still continued with the testamentary proceeding, this showed his wrongful intent. He may even be criminally liable
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or
interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino.

VICTORIO PAYAD, petitioner and appellant, vs. AQUILINA TOLENTINO, oppositor and appellant.

GR No. 42258 January 15, 1936

Doctrine: "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark."

Facts: Trial court denied the probate of the alleged will of deceased Leoncia Tolentino, on the ground that the
attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of law. It was not stated therein that the testatrix
caused Attorney Almario to write her name at her express direction. The court also found that the will was executed
on the date appearing thereon, September 1, 1933, which was a day before the death of the testatrix, contrary to the
contention of the oppositor that it was executed after her death.

Issue: Whether it was necessary that the attestation clause state that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her
name at her express direction? NO.
Ruling: The evidence of record establishes the fact that Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her
thumb mark on each and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate
the place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words, Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She
signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark." It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the
attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch
as the testarix signed will in question in accordance with law.

The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased, is hereby
admitted to probate with the costs of this appeal against the oppositor-appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF ANTERO MERCADO, DECEASED. ROSARIO GARCIA v. JULIANA
LACUESTA
G.R. No. L-4067
NOVEMBER 29, 1951

FACTS: Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino
Javier as he wrote the name of Antero Mercado and his name for the testatior on the will. HOWEVER, immediately
after Antero Mercado’s will, Mercado himself placed an “X” mark.

The attestation clause was signed by three instrumental witnesses. Said attestation clause states that all pages of the
will were “signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and
all and each and every one of us witnesses.” The attestation clause however did not indicate that Javier wrote Antero
Mercado’s name.

ISSUE: WON the will is valid.

HELD: NO. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino
Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

But is there really a need for such to be included in the attestation clause considering that even though Javier signed for Antero,
Antero himself placed his signature by virtue of the “X” mark, and by that, Javier’s signature is merely a surplusage? That the
placing of the “X” mark is the same as placing Antero’s thumb mark.

No. It’s not the same as placing the testator’s thumb mark. It would have been different had it been proven that the
“X” mark was Antero’s usual signature or was even one of the ways by which he signs his name. If this were so,
failure to state the writing by somebody else would have been immaterial, since he would be considered to have
signed the will himself.

G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912

PEDRO BARUT vs.

FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN, ET AL.

FACTS: Pedro Barut alleges in his petition to probate the last will and testament of Maria Salomon that Maria
Salomon died on the 7th day of November, 1908, in the pueblo of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, leaving a last will and testament
bearing date March 2, 1907.

Severo Agayan, Timotea Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa, and A. M. Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the
execution thereof. By the terms of said will Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedent's property.

The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate upon the sole ground that the handwriting of the
person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the
handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than that of the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be.

However, all the witnesses to the will attest that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan at her
(Salomon’s) request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the will.

ISSUE: Is a will, signed not by the testator, but by a witness at the testator’s request, valid?

HELD: Yes. with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the
testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed
at her express direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and
in the presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a practical matter that the one who
signs the testator's name signs also his own; but that it is not essential to the validity of the will. Whether one parson
or another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is
concerned. The plain wording of the statute shows that the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay
down, is absolutely unnecessary under the law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of the statute relating to
the execution of wills do not in any sense require such a provision. From the standpoint of language it is an
impossibility to draw from the words of the law the inference that the persons who signs the name of the testator
must sign his own name also. The law requires only three witnesses to a will, not four.

The name of a person who is unable to write may be signed by another by express direction to any instrument known
to the law. There is no necessity whatever, so far as the validity of the instrument is concerned, for the person who
writes the name of the principal in the document to sign his own name also. As a matter of policy it may be wise that
he do so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would enable a person proving the document to demonstrate
more readily the execution by the principal. But as a matter of essential validity of the document, it is unnecessary.

The main thing to be established in the execution of the will is the signature of the testator. If that signature is proved,
whether it be written by himself or by another at his request, it is nonetheless valid, and the fact of such signature can
be proved as perfectly and as completely when the person signing for the principal omits to sign his own name as it
can when he actually signs.

Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee, vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET
AL., oppositors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-5826 | April 29, 1953

DOCTRINE: The attestation clause must be signed at the bottom by the attesting witnesses.
FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Samar admitted to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who
died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.

The appellant’s main objection is that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause was not signed by the
attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective because the signatures of the witnesses did not appear at the
bottom of the page, despite the fact that the same page was signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

HELD: Yes, the will is fatally defective,

The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made
by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it
would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all
of the witnesses.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

DISSENTING OPINION OF J. ANGELO BAUTISTA

Justice Angelo Bautista said that:

1. The will in question has substantially complied with the formalities of the law and, therefore, should be admitted
to probate.

2. The will was signed by the testator and was attested by three instrumental witnesses, not only at the bottom, but
also on the left-hand margin.

3. The witnesses testified not only that the will was signed by the testator in their presence and in the presence of
each other but also that when they did so, the attestation clause was already written thereon.

4. The objection is too technical. In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, (40 Phil., 476), this court said that when the
testamentary dispositions "are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses (as the instant case),their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless."

5. The New Civil Code adopts a liberal trend in the matter of interpretation of wills, the purpose of which, in case of
doubt, is to give such interpretation that would have the effect of preventing intestacy.

DISSENTING OPINION OF J. TUASON:

The law on wills does not provide that the attesting witness should sign the clause at the bottom. In the absence of
such provision, there is no reason why signatures on the margin are not good.

Icasiano vs Icasiano

11 SCRA 422

Author: Al-khatib

Petitioner: IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE Jo SEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO
ICASIANO,

Respondent: NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO

Topic: Articles 805, 809 (Liberal interpretation of the Law)

DOCTRINE: The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due
to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of
probate.

FACTS :

 The true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano.

 Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition, she petitioned to have herself appointed
as a special administrator. Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his
own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.

 The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila, she
executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro
Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys
Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy.

 Witness Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed
in his presence.

 Filed a case that the will cannot be probated because page three of the original will was not signed by one of
the witnesses, making it defective.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION

The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting
of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three of the will makes the will invalid?
RULING + RATIO: NO

 The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory
requisites.

 That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by
his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in
every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise
evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

 This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied, Thus, despite the literal tenor of the
law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but
not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated and that despite the requirement for the correlative
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal
defect.

G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

FACTS:

- On September 19, 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this
decision the opponent's appealed.

- Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction
of the testatrix) and by three witnesses.

ISSUE: The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses.
Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters;
and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.

HELD: We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.

- In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and
three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has
for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby
changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed
at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of
said sheet would be completely purposeless.

- In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will
written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have
to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already
 signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures
must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the
signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be
unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add
nothing.

- In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has
been removed. Exception: when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only.

- What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause.

- Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second
contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants.
So ordered

Avera vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 15566 (1921)
Digest Author: Lucion

Signatures were written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.

Facts: Eutiquia Avera filed a petition for the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia. The petition was contested by
Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for minors Jose and Cesar Garcia. The
proponent of the will presented one of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all
necessary external formalities, and that the executor was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. The
witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator.

The opposition introduced a single witness who testified that at the time the will was made, the testator was so
debilitated as to unable to comprehend what he was about. The trial court admitted the will to probate.

Issues: 1.Whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting
witness?

2. Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the
three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin?

Held: 1. No. However, the probable reason why only one witness was produced is found in the fact that, although
the petition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set for the hearing,
which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the hearing; and it is probable that
the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with
only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously
permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the
attesting witnesses. Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not
in itself supply any basis for changing the rule; and were it not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would
probably be compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved by a
sufficient number of attesting witnesses.

It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of
the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly
it is insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now be raised for the first time in this court. We believe this
point is well taken, and the first assignment of error must be declared not be well taken.

In the present case, if the appellant had raised this question in the lower court, either at the hearing or upon a motion
for a new trial, that court would have had the power, and it would have been is duty, considering the tardy
institution of the contest, to have granted a new trial in order that all the witnesses to the will might be brought into
court. But instead of thus calling the error to the attention of the court and his adversary, the point is first raised by
the appellant in this court. We hold that this is too late.

2. No. It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left
margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that all statutory
requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is also deducible from cases
heretofore decided by this court. Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial it
would be absurd to suppose that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision
to the effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page - rather
than on the right margin - seems to be this character. So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every
part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or on the right margin,
provided they are on one or the other. The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every
page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the
right margin instead of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is
authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by
being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the slightest
difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.

The controlling consideration: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing
but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.

Nera vs. Rimando

Facts: At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway where a
curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were attaching their
signatures to the instrument.

Issue: Whether or not the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will shall sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them?

Ruling: No. The court held that "the true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is
not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to
do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature." It is suffiecient that at that moment existing conditions and the position of the parties,
with relation to each other, were such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen
each other sign. If one subscribing witness to a will is shown to have been in an outer room at the time when the
testator and the other witnesses attach their signatures to the instrument in an inner room, the will would be held
invalid—the attaching of the said signatures, under such circumstances, not being done "in the presence" of the
witness in the outer room. Hence, The position of testator and of the witnesses to a will, at the moment of the
subscription by each, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. Here, all the parties
were in the same small room when each other signed.

FELIX AZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, respondents.

Doctrine: The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw,
despite Article 809; The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages; There is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of.

Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite
that the will be “attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]”—the respective intents behind these two classes of
signature are distinct from each other; Even if instrumental witnesses signed the lefthand margin of the page containing the
unsigned clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do
appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.

Facts: The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo,
which was notarized. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.

The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact
of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. Oppositor Geralda Castillo argued that the will was not executed and
attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of
the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this
petition.

RTC- admitted the probate

CA- reversed

It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
and undeserving of probate.

Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that “the number of pages used in a
notarial will be stated in the attestation clause” is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to
what he termed as “the substantial compliance rule.”

Issue: Whether the will in question is void? Yes.

Held: A failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since
that fact can be checked by a visual examination, while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses
signed in one another’s presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee
of compliance.

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw,
despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is
written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment
on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement
if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada.
However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since
there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise
the will.

The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be “attested and subscribed by [the
instrumental witnesses].” The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other.
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page
they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is
separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even
if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the
page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. The
provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left
margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her
only signature appearing at the so-called “logical end” of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not
numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of
thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory. Taken in isolation,
these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not
decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack
of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.

CANEDA v CA

FACTS: Mateo Caballero, widower without any children, executed a last will and testament before 3 attesting
witnesses namely Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando, and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by
his lawyer and a notary public m in preparation of that last will. It was declared among other things that the testator
was leaving his real and personal properties by way of legacies and devises to Presentation Gaviola, Angel Abatayo,
Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, and Benoni Cabrera, and Marcosa Alcantara - all not related to the testator.

Four months later, the testator himself filed a petition seeking to probate of his last will. The petition was heard after
the testator died. Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second
petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of a
special administrator for his estate.
In the probate proceedings, the herein petitioners opposed the allowance of the will alleging that the testator was
already in poor health at the time and he could have not executed it. They also questioned the genuineness of the
signature of the testator therein. The probate court rendered its decision declaring that the will in question as the last
will and testament of Mateo Caballero.

The petitioners elevated it's the case to CA in which they asserted that the will is void on the ground that its
attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the witnesses witnessed the testator signing
the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and one another. The CA affirmed the decision of the probate court and also denied the reconsideration by the
petitioners. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero
complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code

RULING: The Supreme Court granted and reversed the decision of CA.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument
has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. It is a separate memorandum or record
of the facts surrounding the conduct of the execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact
that the compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. It is made for the purpose of
preserving in a permanent form a record of facts that the attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of
failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved.

Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of
the will, should state:

1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;

2. That the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the
presence of attesting witnesses; and

3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that the
said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for
the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed
by the testator and its witnesses.

Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due
execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the
testator, it need to be signed only by them. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as
it would be possible and easy to add the clause on the subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its
witnesses.
An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shoes that it is comprised of 3 sheets all of which
have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the
testator and the 3 attesting witnesses.

It should be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and one of another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to
know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but
to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole
purpose of identification.

In Taboada vs. Rizal, we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to
see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that
the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names
upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator.
As it involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical examination of the will
whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially
expressed in the attestation.

What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites
that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as
well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said
witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the
left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded
by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator
and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it
must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said
phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for
his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement
that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.

*NOTE: The Court also discussed the comments of JBL Reyes on defective will – saying that such defect does not
invalidate a will. However, such was not applied in this case because the will is not defective but it was rather
lacking of the elements of the attestation clause.

Lopez vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012

By: Nitro, Dustin P

DOCTRINE: The rule (in Art. 809) must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the
will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the
subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even
omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only
check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

FACTS: Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy, and their 4 legitimate children, namely, petitioner
Richard and the respondents Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory heirs. Richard filed a petition for the
probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila. Marybeth opposed the petition contending
that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard.

RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a
statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while
Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the
rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic
evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. The CA adopted the said findings of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the will of Enrique Lopez should be admitted to probate.

HELD: No, the will should not be admitted to probate. The Civil Code provides:

ART. 805. xxx The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written xxx

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose
of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise
failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it
"consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot
be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether
the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the
attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS ET AL VS COURT OF APPEALS

81 SCRA 393 - G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978

FACTS: The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista as one of the
instituted heirs. Nista petitioned before the court to admit the will to probate. The petition was opposed by
Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra. The two oppositors claimed that they were the legally adopted children
of Danila; that the said will sought to be probated by Nista was obtained through fraud.

The two parties talked and they came up with a compromise agreement which essentially stated that Nista is
admitting the invalidity of the will. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court BUT Rosario de
Ramos et al – the other instituted heirs and devisees – intervened. The trial court allowed the intervention and set
aside the compromise agreement. Rosario de Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they
abandoned Danila and committed acts of ingratitude against her.

Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was appealed by the Guerras. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. The CA ruled that there was a failure to prove that Danila was in
the presence of the instrumental witnesses when she signed the will – this was because two of the instrumental
witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz) testified in court that the will was already signed by Danila when they affixed their
signatures.

HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and who assisted in the
execution, vehemently assailed the testimony of the two witnesses. He affirmed Danila and the three instrumental
witnesses were in each other’s presence when the will was signed by them. Another lawyer, who was also present
during the execution of the will, corroborated the testimony of Atty. Barcenas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the
formalities of the law

HELD: There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince Us that the will and codicil were executed in accordance
with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that documents were prepared by a
lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero. The execution of the same was evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo
Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is
attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other than an
interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty
purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty.
Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned
documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While
the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no
question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the
three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the
attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the
presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was
all the time present during the execution.

The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not
easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see
the testatrix sigh the will. A negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and faced
with the convincing appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra care. For in this
regard —

“It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable
factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is
genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they
may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the
others. This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document. Both, albeit silent,
will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing.” 3

Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause which, significantly, is a
separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting
witnesses, it affirms that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. This Court had
previously held that the attestation clause basically contradicts the pretense of undue execution which later on may
be made by the attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the
testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their signatures following that of the testatrix show that they
have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of the testatrix’s signature but also to the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause. By signing the will, the witnesses impliedly certified to the truth of the facts which
admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence,
and the like.

In this jurisdiction, all the attesting witnesses to a will, if available, must be called to prove the will. Under this
circumstance, they become “forced witnesses” and their declaration derogatory to the probate of the will need not
bind the proponent, hence, the latter may present other proof of due execution even if contrary to the testimony of
some or all of the attesting witnesses. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due
execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may,
nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence
presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. Accordingly, although the
subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witnesses in connection with its due execution, to deserve full
credit, their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise, it may be overcome by any competent
evidence, direct or circumstantial.

In the case at bar, the records bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz
on one hand, and the Notary Public, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was
contradicted by his own admission. Though his admission to the effect that “when Eugenia Danila signed the
testament (he) and the two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and Calixto Azusada were present” (t.s.n., Feb. 12,
1970, p. 115) was made extrajudicially, it was not squarely refuted when inquired upon during the trial.

With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the declaration of Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas.
The records show that this attesting witness was fetched by Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as
witness to a will. Rosendo Paz did not know what the document he signed was all about. Although he performed his
function as an attesting witness, his participation was rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that his testimony,
“half-hearted” as that of Odon Sarmiento, be as candid and complete as one proceeding from a keen mind fully
attentive to the details of the execution of the deeds. Quite differently, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, more than a direct
witness himself, was purposely there to oversee the accomplishment of the will and codicil. His testimony is an
account of what he actually heard and saw during the conduct of his profession. There is no evidence to show that
this lawyer was motivated by any material interest to take sides or that his statement is truth perverted.

It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of a will. 10 In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have
warped his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in
the execution of a will deserves grave consideration. 11 An appraisal of a lawyer’s participation has been succinctly
stated by the Court in Fernandez v. Tantoco, supra, this wise:

“In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has been
charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than
the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that
should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those
incidents in his memory.”

One final point, the absence of a photograph of the testatrix, Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will. The fact
that the only pictures available are those which show the witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the will before the presence of the
witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and not of what they did
not speak of including the events they failed to capture. The probate of a will is a special proceeding not imbued with
adversary character, wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence “to the end that nothing less than the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible” should be presented to the court before a purported will may be
probated or denied probate. 12

We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the will does not serve any
persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been
acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special reason, the presentation of other competent evidence
intended to confirm a fact otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court
having satisfied itself that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, and
there being no indication of abuse of discretion on its part, We find no error committed or any exceptional
circumstance warranting the subsequent reversal of its decision allowing the probate of the deeds in question.