Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
PEOPLE V BIRUAR
Narciso Bauyot who was sleeping in the dining room, ran to the
kitchen upon hearing the gunfire and hid in anaparador. But,
when the toilet of the main house of George Kalitas was set on
fire, he left his hiding place and went out of the house, passing
through a small window in the kitchen. He landed safely on the
ground only to fall into the hands of the accused Romualdo
Raboy who pointed a gun at his abdomen telling him: "you
surrender, if you will not surrender, I will kill you." The accused
Edgardo Señeres also told Narciso to surrender and raise his
hands, which Narciso did. Señeres then continued firing at the
house of George Kalitas. Another armed man, later Identified as
the accused Saturnino Galliano, also approached Narciso and
threatened to pour a can of kerosene on him. But, Narciso
pleaded: "Don't pour it on me because I might be burned," and
was spared. The accused Saturnino Galliano, instead, poured the
can of kerosene on the walls of the kitchen of the house and
ignited it with some dried fronds. 7
The robbers then started to break open the main door of the
house with an axe. 8 After the robbers had broken the door and
gained access to the sala, George Kalitas fired at them with his
"Stevens" 12-gauge shotgun, 9hitting one of them. George
Kalitas had crawled with his wife and grandchildren after Jessie
Renopal and Babbadon Odal were hit by bullets. The armed men
fired back, hitting George Kalitas, who dropped his shotgun. His
grandson, Bebot, picked up the shotgun, but, when the robbers
shouted: "surrender, surrender, throw that gun to us; throw the
gun below, by the stairs," he panicked and threw the shotgun to
them.
After getting the money, the robbers left.14 The inmates of the
house also went out because of the fire and brought the wounded
to the hospital. But, George Kalitas died before they could reach
the hospital in Mati.
Issue: WON all the accused are guilty of the crime charged.
Issues:
PEOPLE V MANGULABNAN
PEOPLE V. CALIXTO
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
PEOPLE V. FAIGANO
FACTS:
HELD:
PEOPLE V. PECATO
FACTS:
Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, Arturo Pecato, Felix
Pecato, Victoriano Leyros and Ereneo Peruda, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, and armed with the
following deadly weapons to wit: One revolver Cal. 22; two sharp
pointed instruments; two shotguns, with intent of gain and by
means of violence and intimidation on persons that is shooting
Felix Larong and manhandling Uldarica Larong, his daughter, the
latter sustained injuries in the different parts of her body, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, from
Felix Larong and Luciana Larong, husband and wife respectively,
the amount of Three Hundred Fifty (P350.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, belonging to Felix Larong, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the amount aforestated.
Of the four accused, only three, Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, and
Ereneo Peruda, were arrested. Victoriano Leyros went into
hiding, evaded arrest, and has remained at large.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The trial court is correct in ruling that there was treachery in the
commission of the crime. Felix Larong was shot to death while
he was lying face down on the floor, 88 without any warning and
thus was not able to defend himself at all.
PEOPLE V. TAPALES
FACTS:
PEOPLE V. QUINONES
FACTS:
HELD:
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with
robbery with multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly
sentenced by the trial court. The reason is that there is no crime
of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code.
The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only
regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the
commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the
number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the
penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code. The penalty
prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion
perpetua, to be imposed only once even if multiple killings
accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the
trial court of the attendant circumstances was unnecessary
because Article 63 of the Code provides that when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied without
regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the crime.
The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is reduced to
P30,000.00, to be paid to their respective heirs. The heirs of
Alexander Sy are also awarded the additional sum P330,000.00,
representing the value of the articles taken from him by the
accused.
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
PEOPLE V. PATOLA
FACTS:
Patola's defense was that at the time the robbery with rape was
committed he was in Barrio Tuganay, Carmen, Davao del Norte.
Sangayon's alibi was that he was in Panabo, Davao.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in disregarding the alibi of the
accused, in convicting them of rape in the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carnal
intercourse with Mila and Elena against their will and in relying
on Sangayon's confession and on Dalogdog's testimony.
HELD:
The trial court applied in this case article 335. It regarded article
294[2] as having been "amended" by article 335. That is why it
imposed the death penalty. If article 294121, before it was
amended, is to be applied, the penalty is only reclusion perpetua.
At any rate, for lack of the necessary ten votes, the death
penalty cannot be imposed.
FACTS:
Upon complaint by Marilyn Caldosa, the appellant-accused
Emeterio Dinola was charged before the Circuit Criminal Court,
13th Judicial District, Palo, Leyte with the crime of robbery with
rape under the following information: That on or about the 21st
day of October, 1977 in the Municipality of Alangalang, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon,
and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge with one Marilyn
Caldosa, and that on the occasion thereof, the said accused, by
the use of force upon the same Marilyn Caldosa, and with intent
to gain, did then and there wilfully and feloniously take and carry
away the wrist watch of Marilyn Caldosa, to her damage and
prejudice in the amount of P300.00, the money value of the
watch.
RULING:
In People v Garcines, the Court has already ruled that rape may
be committed even if no force was used, intimidation being
sufficient. Intimidation includes the moral kind such as fear
caused by threatening the girl with a knife. The Court has
likewise held that the admission of the victim that her hands
were on her sides while the accused was on top of her does not
mean that she consented to the act. The complainant in this
case, is a seventeen (17) year old lass while the accused is a
thirty-four (34) year old laborer. In complainant's words: "he is
bigger and I am small." Considering, the size, age and strength
of the accused, coupled by his use of a bolo to threaten the
complainant, the Court rules that the complainant's failure to
resist the accused does not detract from the fact that the latter
employed intimidation in order to have sexual intercourse with
the latter. The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim
to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the
prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in
having sexual intercourse with the victim.
However, it does not appear from the record of the case that
when the accused entered the house of the complainant, he
already had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact, the
complainant testified that after she was raped by the accused,
the latter lit a candle, saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to
kill her if she did not give it to him and forcibly took it from her.
Hence, the taking of the watch by the accused was more of an
afterthought, even accidental. If the intention of the accused was
to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the
robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed. However,
if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after
committing rape also committed robbery because the
opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed
as two distinct offenses.
ISSUE:
RULING:
This court has frequently held that in rape cases, the conduct of
a woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost
importance. In this case, MARITES immediately reported the
incident to the police, accompanied them in looking for her
assailant, and upon seeing him she immediately identified him
as her rapist. Thereafter, she underwent police investigation and
submitted to a physical examination of her private parts by a
medico-legal officer. Her conduct negated fabrication or
prevarication on her part. However, ROGELIO’s conviction of
robbery with rape cannot be sustained. The special complex
crime of robbery with rape defined in Article 293 in relation to
paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, employs the clause "when the robbery shall have been
accompanied with rape." In other words, to be liable for such
crime, the offender must have the intent to take the personal
property of another under circumstances that makes the taking
one of robbery and such intent must precede the rape. If the
original plan was to commit rape, but the accused after
committing the rape also committed robbery when the
opportunity presented itself, the robbery should be viewed as a
separate and distinct crime. Significantly, the constitutive
element of violence or intimidation against persons in robbery
was not present at the time of the snatching of the shoulder bag
of MARITES. The force or intimidation exerted by ROGELIO
against the victim was for a reason foreign to the fact of the
taking of the bag. It was for the purpose of accomplishing his
lustful desire. Accused-appellant may thus be held liable for
simple theft only, in addition to the crime of rape. It is doctrinally
settled that alibi and denial are worthless and cannot prevail over
positive identification that is categorical, consistent and without
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the witness. However,
the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For nocturnity to be
properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the
commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought for by
the offender. By and of itself, night time is not an aggravating
circumstance. In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was
offered to prove that ROGELIO deliberately sought the cover of
darkness to accomplish his criminal design. In fact, the victim
testified that there were streetlights and lights from the ABC
Commercial Complex. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity was not alleged in the information. Section 8 of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on 1December 2000, requires that the complaint or
information must specify the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime charged.
This provision being favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive effect. The issue of failure by the arresting officers to
inform ROGELIO of his constitutional rights and to afford him the
benefit of counsel during the custodial investigation requires
strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that
the law enforcers acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. Besides, even granting arguendo that the
constitutional requirements were not observed, the same is of
no significance because it does not appear that ROGELIO
executed a statement or confession. Then, too, as correctly
pointed out by the OSG, the conviction of ROGELIO was not on
the basis of any extrajudicial confession but on the testimony of
MARITES and other evidence.
FACTS:
They went inside the office and the petitioner pointed his gun at
Severino Choco, the owner, and his two daughters, Maryand
Mimmie. They informed Severino that all they needed was
money. Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein he
placed P20,000 cash (P5000 acc to the defense) and handed it
to the petitioner. Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and
wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his 2 daughters
and Rodita were kept inside the office.
Issues:
Ratio:
Yes. The robbery shall be deemed consummated if the unlawful
“taking” is complete.
Held:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did
nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The
shooting frightened Gorriceta who immediately started the truck
and drove straight home while Jaranilla kept on firing towards
Jabatan.
ISSUE:
HELD:
PEOPLE VS LOPEZ
FACTS:
HELD: Yes, the trial court erred in granting the accused’s Motion
to Quash.
RATIO: Article 304 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
FACTS:
Held: Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters,
in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on
one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the
accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to
two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the
accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was
consummated, and which determines the existence of only one
crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on
the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two
separate crimes.
Carnapping
RA 6539
AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING
Section 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972."
Section 19. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Incised wound 2 cm. long and 2 cm. deep lateral aspect upper
third arm right. Incised wound 2 inches long between thumb and
index finger left Abrasion sternoclavicular function along 6 rib
left. Linear abrasion 3 cm. long level of 7th rib, anterior axillary
line right.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Highway Robbery
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
Facts:
-He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to
Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his
place
-When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde
in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo
driving
-Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the
accused
-The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where
Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000
-Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later,
he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
Pampanga
-He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until
he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
-He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway
Issue:
Ruling:
2. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car
which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD
No 532 applicable to the case
Apart from the fact that they situated themselves in places not
too far from the crime scene, there was no proof that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the locus criminis
during its commission. Most of all, their respective alibis collapse
in the face of the positive identification of them as the
perpetrators of the crime.
Cattle Rustling
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
FACTS:
Facts:
Held:
FACTS:
While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up
and shot him on the head at close range with the .45 caliber
pistol. When Gulinao was about to leave the disco house, he
turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded
with 12 diamonds. Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco
house to the car of Dr. Chua.
Poking the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car, Gulinao
ordered the former to leave the car. While Caguioa was getting
out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed. On the other
hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire at Gulinao with the Ingram
machine pistol, but the Ingram jammed.
Dr. Chua, who sustained gunshot wounds oil the head, was
brought to the nearby Our Lady of Fatima Hospital where he died
on arrival.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court revised the decision promulgated by the Trial
Court on the appelant’s conviction with robbery to theft under
Art. 308 of the RPC.
FACTS:
Peñalosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop
in Malabon. Unable to recover her car, she filed a complaint for
carnapping against Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed when the
petitioner convinced the military authorities that the complainant
had sold the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed
of Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor. 3
ISSUE:
RULING:
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and
PEOPLE v. BAGO
FACTS:
ISSUES:
I.
II.
RULING:
In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based
on the chain of events.
FACTS:
Petitioners Hizon, et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for
supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance
(sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were fishing
by "muro ami" led to the apprehension of such boat (F/B
Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP
Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat) directed
the boat captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish
cage for testing. The initial results tested the fish positive for
sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the information against
Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded a
negative result on the sodium cyanide. The RTC found Hizon et
al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of
the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together
with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of
the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B
Robinson without a search warrant are admissible in evidence.
YES.
(2) Whether or not et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the use
of poisonous substances. NO.
HELD:
VALENZUELA v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post the open parking
area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela,
hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded
them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting.
Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later
emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela
hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside.
As the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked
Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused
reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended
at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela
appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should
only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to
freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
PEOPLE v CAÑALES
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
SC ruled that the mere recovery of the stolen vehicle does not
mean that the crime qualified theft was not consummated.
Neither will it diminished the criminal liability of the appellant.
As in the case of People v. Carpio, “(T)he gist of the offense of
larceny consists in the furtive taking and asportation of property,
animo lucrandi, and with intent to deprive the true owner of the
possession thereof. The act of asportation in this case was
undoubtedly committed with intent on the part of the thief to
profit by the act, and since he effectively deprived the true owner
of the possession of the entire automobile, the offense of larceny
comprised the whole car. The fact that the accused stripped the
car of its tires and abandoned the machine in a distant part of
the city did not make the appellant any less liable for the larceny
of the automobile. The deprivation of the owner and the trespass
upon his right of possession were complete as to the entire car;
and the fact that the thieves thought it wise promptly to abandon
the machine in no wise limits their criminal responsibility to the
particular parts of the car that were appropriate and
subsequently used by the appellant upon his own car.”
The value of the truck, the van and the cargo contained therein
should be used as basis for the imposable penalty although the
truck and van were recovered (People vs. Juan Carpio, 54 Phil.
48). Since the value of the truck was P300,000.00 and the cargo
was valued at P2,500,000.00, the imposable penalty for the
felony of theft was reclusion temporal. However, under Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is
punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than
that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two (2) degrees higher
than reclusion temporal is death. This is likewise conformable
with Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that:
PEOPLE v. SISON
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIO:
Under Article 308 of the said Code, the elements of the crime of
theft are:
4. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Court found the first element absent. When the money,
goods, or any other personal property is received by the
offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2)
on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires
both material or physical possession and juridical possession of
the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case,
petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible
for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to
the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank
employees. Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had
no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the
element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot
be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b)
of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in the commission of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
No. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
RULING:
YES. There is no merit to the petitioner's pretense that the
transaction between him and the complainant was one of joint
venture, and that if he had any liability at all, it is civil in nature.
The evidence presented in this case conclusively shows that
Ricardo Celino, together with his two sons, Zosimo (deceased)
and Requerido, led the complainant to believe that there was a
hidden treasure underneath his lot; that a dwarf whose spirit
supposedly entered the body of Zosimo directed the digging
operations; that to obtain said treasure and upon instructions of
the "dwarf", it was necessary for the complainant to give the
accused money which amounted to P41,300.00 all in all and to
pray in the church for three (3) consecutive days.
Under the above stated facts, the Court found that that
there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the act committed
by the accused constitutes the crime of estafa defined and
punished under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
The facts clearly show that petitioner together with his sons
pretended to possess power to find hidden treasure in order to
fleece the complainant of his hard-earned money. Nevertheless,
the acts committed by the petitioner constitute a classic case of
swindling under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
RULING:
FACTS:
RULING:
FACTS:
RULING:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Benjamin Lu Hayco is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
RULING:
SALCEDO v CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Teofisto Salcedo was, on March 14, 1968, the local
branch manager of Manhattan Guaranty Company, Inc. at Iligan
City engaged in the business of property insurance. Said
company, however, had been suspended from operating and
eventually closed by the Insurance Commissioner since February
21, 1968 (p. 13, id.). The petitioner was aware of the suspension
and closure order but he deliberately concealed the same from
complainant Basilio F. Ponce when he issued on March 18, 1968
a P50,000.00 fire insurance policy unto the complainant, and
collected the amount of P1,095.80 purportedly as premium
thereof.
RULING:
Yes. All the requisites are present in the case at bar. To secure
a conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent
representations as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (2)
that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were
made prior to, or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
(3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations
constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to
part with his money or property, and (4) that as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage.
The deliberate concealment by the petitioner of the fact that his
company was no longer authorized to engage in the business of
insurance when he signed and issued the fire insurance policy
and collected the premium payment constitutes false
representations or false pretenses. The complainant relied upon
these false pretenses. After reading in the newspapers that the
Insurance Commissioner had suspended his company from
operating, it was the petitioner's duty to stop the solicitation of
insurance policies while ascertaining the veracity of the news
reports. Instead, he allowed business to go on as usual. He
signed and issued the insurance policy. And knowing not only
through the newspapers but also from an official communication
from his own superiors that business operations were already
prohibited when he issued the insurance policy and received
premium payments, he refused to return the money thus
collected long after the Insurance Commissioner had prohibited
operations. In totality, these acts only point out to petitioner’s
culpability in the crime of estafa.
PEOPLE v ONG
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Baguio City, found accused-
appellant guilty of illegal recruitment committed in large scale
and seven (7) counts of estafa. In this appeal, appellant claimed
that when complainants filled out their respective bio-data,
application forms and other documents for employment in
Taiwan, they knew that they were applying abroad through the
Steadfast Recruitment Agency. He contended that he merely
suggested to them the opportunity to work overseas but he
never advertised himself as a recruiter. He also averred that the
elements of estafa had not been proven by the prosecution,
specifically, the requirement that complainants knew that he was
not a licensed recruiter.
ISSUE:
1. WON the accused is guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment.
2. WON the accused is guilty of the crime of estafa.
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale. The Court
ruled that even if accused-appellant did no more than
"suggest" to the complainants where they could apply for
overseas employment, his act constituted "referral" within
the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. The
testimonial and documentary evidence in the record
showed that accused-appellant did more than make
referrals. The evidence showed that he made
misrepresentations to them concerning his authority to
recruit for overseas employment and collected various
amounts from them for placement fees.
PEOPLE v MANANSALA
FACTS:
The appellants Galicano Alon (alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales
(alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala, Generoso
Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa, committed as
follows:
RULING:
Yes. The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as
defined in article 315, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides that any person who shall defraud another
through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the
substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which the
offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even
though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration. The amount of the fraud being P600, the penalty
applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, and it appearing that the
appellant Galicano Alon has already been convicted of estafa, he
is therefore a recidivist, and the penalty applicable to him should
be imposed in the maximum degree.
US v ABAD
FACTS:
The defendant and appellant in this case was charged with the
crime of estafa upon an information which reads as follows:
"That on or about December 10, 1910, in the municipality of
Cavite, Province of Cavite, P. I., the above-named accused
entered the bicycle renting establishment, named 'Ligaya,"
located in Plaza Soledad of said municipality, pretended that his
name was Jose de los Santos and that he lived at No. 111 Calle
Paseo, and rented from the proprietor of said establishment,
named Leoncio Pangilinan, an Iver Johnson bicycle, No. 169787,
with the private marks No. 10 and the initials L. P., agreeing to
the sum of 50 centavos an hour, and to return it after one hour;
but having taken away said bicycle he did not return it at the
time agreed or pay the rental thereof, but he did willfully,
illegally, and maliciously and against the will he did willfully,
illegally, and maliciously and against the will of its owner take
possession of it for himself and for the sake of gain, keeping it
in his possession until January 29, 1911, when the said bicycle
was found in the possession of the said accused in the town of
Imus, Province of Cavite, P. I."
For the defense, counsel for the appellant contendd that since
the information fails expressly to allege that the bicycle in
question had a specific definite value, and to set forth just what
that value was, a judgment of conviction upon this information
should not be sustained.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that a conviction of the crime of estafa
cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the subject
matter of the fraud perpetrated by the accused had some value,
and while in good practice a complaint or information charging
the commission of the crime of estafa should specifically allege
the monetary value of the subject matter of the fraud where that
is possible, the SC held that the mere omission of an allegation
of the specific value of the bicycle mentioned in the information
did not render it fatally defective, because the facts alleged in
the complaint, when proven, establish beyond any reasonable
doubt that the bicycle had some value.
The information alleges that the bicycle was the property of one
Leoncio Pangilinan; that it was in use, at the time when the crime
was committed, in his bicycle renting establishment; and that
the defendant rented it from the owner and agreed to pay him
50 cents per hour for its use. The SC held that these allegations
are sufficient, when proven, to sustain and justify a finding that
the bicycle in question had some value, and that it was the
personal property of the complaining witness; and it appearing
that this bicycle had been converted or misappropriated by the
defendant, in violation of the provisions of subsection 5 of article
535, the finding that the bicycle was personal property of some
value is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the provisions of
subsection 1 of article 534, which prescribes the penalty to be
imposed where the value of the subject matter of the fraud is
not shown to be in excess of 250 pesetas.
US v de Vera
FACTS:
On the 20th of February, 1920, three Igorots named Jose II,
Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta, of this city, trying to
dispose of a bar of gold when an Ilocano invited them to go to
his house, stating that there was a woman there who would buy
the precious metal. They accompanied the Ilocano to the house
indicated by him where they met a woman, the accused herein,
who, apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and requested
them to hand it examined, stating that she would return within
a short time to report the result. The Igorot Pepe, who was the
owner of the bar of gold, thereupon handed it to her to have
changed into silver coins which were more desirable in the
Mountain Province. The woman the left the house at about 12
o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait there. But the
woman did not return. They waited in vain for hours for her and
at nightfall they agreed that one of them should remain on watch
while the other two went to the Meisic police station to report
the matter. The police acted promptly and effectively. The
policeman Jose Gonzalez, assigned to take charge of the case,
soon identified the woman who had taken away the bar of gold,
by the description which the Igorots had given him, an at a few
minutes after 11 o'clock he already was in a house on Calle
Barcelona, examining the accused as to the whereabouts of the
bar of gold and the bank notes of the Igorots. As the woman
gave evasive answers, it became necessary to ask for assistance
from the office of the police, and shortly thereafter, two other
policemen, Mr. Abbot and one Ronas, arrived, who took the
woman to house at No. 541 Calle Regidor, followed by Gonzalez
and the three Igorots. There, the bar of gold divided into three
pieces was found wrapped in a handkerchief and placed inside
the water tank of a water-closet. The accused requested one
Mamerta de la Rosa to let her have P150 which she in tun handed
to the policemen.
After the proper proceedings, the trial court found the accused
guilty of the crime of theft defined and punished in article 518,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, without any circumstance
modifying the liability.
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the purchase and sale is perfected from
the moment that the contracting parties agree on the goods to
be sold and the price, the title being thereupon transferred to
the purchaser, yet there is an exception to this rule, and that is
the case where the goods sold are of the kind which are usually
tried, measured, or weighed. In this case, as the goods are not
sold in bulk, but by weight or measurement, the sale is not
perfected, since the risk or deterioration of the goods is not
shifted to the buyer until it is measured or weighed; in operation
is completed, applying the maxim res perit domino, it was
evidently the intention of the legislator that until then the
transfer of the ownership was not effected: it is true that there
exists a promise which binds the vendor, and which, if broken,
would give the purchaser the right to demand delivery of the
goods upon payment of its price, after the same had been
measured or weighed, or to claim indemnity for damages; but it
is also true that until the goods sold are delivered, no definite
change of ownership takes place, and the sale is not, so to speak,
finally perfected; and for this same reason, where, after the sale,
but prior to the measuring or weighing, the purchaser takes
away fraudulently, that is, with intent of gain, a part of the goods
covered by the contract, this, evidently, theft, with all its
essential elements, as it cannot be reasonably argued that the
purchaser has taken what is his own.
For the foregoing reasons, the SC held that the crime proven in
the cause to have been committed by the appellant by
appropriating the gold bar delivered to her for examination, and
by converting to her own use, without the consent of the owner,
the bank notes which had been handed her to be exchanged for
silver coins, is that of theft, defined and punished in article 518,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
PEOPLE v CONCEPCION
FACTS:
In the month of October, 1919, Miguel Concepcion had need of
funds, which could only be had from the Philippine National
Bank; and as he apparently had no bankable security available,
recourse was had to the expedient of getting the money upon
loans from the bank upon fictitious warehouse receipts
(quedans), with the knowledge and connivance of Teodorico
Angeles, the manager of the concerned PNB branch.
RULING:
Yes, Miguel G. Concepcion, is guilty of the complex offense of
estafa by means of the falsification of mercantile document. The
estafa here involved consists in the fact that Teodorico Angeles,
as manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank,
and as such having charge of the funds of said institution,
converted, misappropriated, and misapplied the sum of about
P55,000 of the bank's money, upon security that was known to
him to be wholly fictitious, for the benefit of the appellant
Concepcion and to the prejudice of the bank, all in contravention
of subsection 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code. To the
accomplishment of this estafa the falsification of two warehouse
receipts was a necessary prerequisite; and the appellant
Concepcion participated in the falsification on those documents
not only as author by induction as to both, but in the fact that
he was the mechanical author of at least the first, having himself
reduced the document to proper form upon his own typewriting
machine at the dictation of Teodorico Angeles.
LATEO v PEOPLE
FACTS:
Sometime in 1994, [petitioners] Lateo and Elca proposed that
[Lucero] finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in
Muntinlupa allegedly owned by [petitioner] Elca as the sole heir
of Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been transferred
to [petitioner] Elca's name because of a certain discrepancy
between the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 77730. [Petitioner] Elca
offered to assign [Lucero] 70 hectares of said land. She was then
introduced to [petitioner]
Baldemor, Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
RULING:
Yes. Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code lists the ways
by which estafa may be committed, which includes:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—x x x. x x x x
Moreover, where only the intent to cause damage and not the
damage itself is shown, the accused could only be convicted of
attempted estafa. Here, petitioners commenced the commission
of the crime of estafa but they failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their
own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension
by the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since
only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had
been shown, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners
of attempted estafa.
Guilty of estafa
ISSUE: W/N the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
under article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: NO.
To constitute estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, the issuance of a check should be the means to
obtain money or property from the payee. In Ilagan v. People,
the therein accused was charged with estafa for indorsing
postdated checks which were dishonored on maturity. In
acquitting the accused, the Court noted that he and the payee
had been priorly engaged for four years in rediscounting
transactions hence; the Court held that it would have been
unnecessary for the accused to assure the payee that the checks
would be sufficiently funded on maturity to convince her to
change them with cash.
The accused denied the charges against them. In their brief, the
accused claimed that they could not be held liable for estafa
under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code since the
element of deceit was not established. They alleged that they
received the placement fees on behalf of the travel agency. They
argued that it was unclear whether the false statements or
fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneously
with the delivery of the money by the complainants.
RTC found the accused guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale
and 3 counts of estafa. CA affirmed the decision.
HELD: YES. The Court affirms the conviction of the accused for
the crimes charged.
Illegal recruitment
The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the accused are
guilty of simple illegal recruitment only, modifying the trial
court’s ruling that the accused are guilty of illegal recruitment in
large scale. Since the accused were prosecuted under several
informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed
should be for each information charged. To convict the accused
for illegal recruitment in large scale, there must be one
information that must include all the complainants. Otherwise,
the accused should be convicted only for simple illegal
recruitment. Accordingly, the penalties imposed by the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768, V-0770, and V-
0771 (for simple illegal recruitment) are likewise correct.
Estafa
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check
is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof It is the
criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is
punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence
of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check
failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 22nd day of October, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.
B.P. Blg. 22
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes
or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or
to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity,
the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of
such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
The trust receipt may contain other terms and conditions agreed
upon by the parties in addition to those hereinabove enumerated
provided that such terms and conditions shall not be contrary to
the provisions of this Decree, any existing laws, public policy or
morals, public order or good customs.
The entruster may cancel the trust and take possession of the
goods, documents or instruments subject of the trust or of the
proceeds realized therefrom at any time upon default or failure
of the entrustee to comply with any of the terms and conditions
of the trust receipt or any other agreement between the
entruster and the entrustee, and the entruster in possession of
the goods, documents or instruments may, on or after default,
give notice to the entrustee of the intention to sell, and may, not
less than five days after serving or sending of such notice, sell
the goods, documents or instruments at public or private sale,
and the entruster may, at a public sale, become a purchaser.
The proceeds of any such sale, whether public or private, shall
be applied (a) to the payment of the expenses thereof; (b) to
the payment of the expenses of re-taking, keeping and storing
the goods, documents or instruments; (c) to the satisfaction of
the entrustee’s indebtedness to the entruster. The entrustee
shall receive any surplus but shall be liable to the entruster for
any deficiency. Notice of sale shall be deemed sufficiently given
if in writing, and either personally served on the entrustee or
sent by post-paid ordinary mail to the entrustee’s last known
business address.
Section 10. Liability of entrustee for loss. The risk of loss shall
be borne by the entrustee. Loss of goods, documents or
instruments which are the subject of a trust receipt, pending
their disposition, irrespective of whether or not it was due to the
fault or negligence of the entrustee, shall not extinguish his
obligation to the entruster for the value thereof.
Section 11. Rights of purchaser for value and in good faith. Any
purchaser of goods from an entrustee with right to sell, or of
documents or instruments through their customary form of
transfer, who buys the goods, documents, or instruments for
value and in good faith from the entrustee, acquires said goods,
documents or instruments free from the entruster’s security
interest.
HELD: YES.
Estafa
ISSUE: W/N petitioner can be held liable for the nine criminal
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately
also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-
d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same
bouncing checks.
PEOPLE VS GROSPE
Sol Gen points that 2 checks are involved. That Parulan issued
PDB’s check (Bulacan) and was received by SMC at Bulacan.
Then it was forwarded to SMC San Fernando, Pampanga where
it was received by the Finance Officer and deposited with BPI
San Fernando Branch then the SMC depository bank received a
notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee
bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This check was the
subject of Estafa.
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the
elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required.
An essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of
the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds,
it being mala prohibitum.
Issue:
Ruling:
YES.
QUE VS PEOPLE
Facts:
WON the decision of both trial and appellate court and the denial
of the Petition for Review are in accordance with law and
evidence.
Ruling:
The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in
question were issued at Quezon City as admitted by petitioner
himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on
his civil liability. It is of no moment whether the said checks were
deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of
Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance
which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction.
PEOPLE VS NITAFAN
Petitioner: People
Respondents: David Nitafan, RTC Manila Judge & K.T. Lim alias
Mariano Lim
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
YES.
Facts:
The checks, before they were issued to Palijo went through the
normal procedure within Premiere investment, to wit; First, the
checks are required to be co-signed by Lina Lim Lao, a junior
officer of Premiere Investment. Second, the checks are then
forwarded to her head office to be co-signed by one Teodulo
Asprec. Third, Asprec would then decide to whom the checks
were to be ultimately issued and delivered, in this case to Palijo.
Palijo filed a criminal case against Lao and Asprec for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Issue:
Ruling:
NO.
The elements of violations against BP 22 are as follows:
1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on
account or for value.
3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the
check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment.
4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In the present case, the fact alone that petitioner was a signatory
to the checks that were subsequently dishonored merely
engenders the prima facie presumption that she knew of the
insufficiency of funds, but it does not render her automatically
guilty under B.P. 22. After a thorough review of the case at bar,
the SC finds that Petitioner Lao did not have actual knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time
she affixed her signature to the checks involved in this case, at
the time the same were issued, and even at the time the checks
were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The scope
of Lao’s duties and responsibilities did not encompass the
funding of the corporation’s checks; her duties were limited to
the marketing department of the Binondo branch.
IDOS VS CA
Petitioner: Irma Idos
Respondents: CA & People
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
NO.
First, only one of the four checks was not encashed and second,
even Alarilla himself admitted that there was no consideration
for the issuance of the check. Hence the check in question was
not issued for any debt of or any account due and payable by
the petitioner. Moreover, Idos and Alarilla were still in the
“winding up” of the affairs of the partnership when the check
was issued as evidenced by the fact that they still had to sell the
goods on hand and collect the receivables from debtors.
PEOPLE VS GANASI
Facts:
Held:
While the accused is correct in saying that article 316 of the
Revised Penal Code does not apply, the Solicitor General erred
in stating that the offense comes within the purview of paragraph
1(a) of Article 315.
Since the facts of this case are not covered by any of the
provisions of Articles 315, 316 and 317, the offense committed
by Ganasi must perforce come within the meaning and
intendment of the blanket provisions of paragraph 1(a) of Article
318.
Note: Another reason why Art. 315, par. 1(a) is not applicable is
that the estafa under par. 1(a) is one with abuse of confidence,
while the accused employed deceit to defraud the offended
party.
VILLAFLOR VS CA
Facts:
On 07 June 1967, appellant Ricardo Villaflor went to the house
of complainant Mariano Locsin, a real estate businessman, to
secure a loan in the amount of P1,000.00 with the former
offering his Opel car as collateral. Both agreed that the loan
would be given on the condition that it would be secured by a
proper chattel mortgage on the vehicle. With the assurance from
appellant that the car was fully paid and free from any
encumbrance, a chattel mortgage contract over the car was
drafted and signed by complainant and appellant, and the latter
received the loan, which, apart from the contract, was also
evidenced by a promissory note stating that the loan amount
would be repaid in eight (8) days. For failing to pay the loan on
time, complainant thought of taking appellant’s car but he found
to his surprise that the car was repossessed by Northern Motors
for failing to pay the monthly installments therefor. For failing to
heed complainant’s written demands to pay the loan, appellant
was charged for estafa.
Issue:
Ruling:
YES.
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan in Crim Cases Nos. 2073-2095 and
33233345 insofar as it finds petitioner Jose R. Veloso guilty as
co-principal in the complex crimes of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Documents, as defined and penalized under Article 318 1
and 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised
Penal Code.
Held: YES
Facts:
Held:
The judgment being strictly in accordance with the law and the
merits of the case, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
6. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
4. If committed by a syndicate.
Facts:
That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did
then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously burn the
house of one, FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE
MARIGOMEN, located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights
Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city, said accused knowing the
same to be prohibited, by then and there setting fire to the said
house thereby causing the same to be totally burned, to the
damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the estimated
amount of P100,000.00.
The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza
and Marieta Acosta as witnesses. Appellant claimed that at the
time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his mother's home,
some five houses away from the burned house. Ernesto
Riolloraza testified he lived in the house behind the home of
appellant's mother; that at around 9:00 in the evening, he saw
appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the
house of appellant's mother; that at around 11:00 in the
evening, he saw appellant watching TV; and that at around 1:00
AM, he was awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he
and appellant stood by the roadside and watched the fire.
Marieta Acosta, common-law wife of appellant, corroborated
appellant's testimony that they were sleeping in the home of
appellant's mother at the time of the incident.
The trial court rendered its decision and found, with moral
certainty, that the accused guilty of the crime.
Issue:
Held:
People v Murcia
Facts:
Issue:
Ruing:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
US v Go Foo Suy
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
People v Taguinod
Facts:
This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the
parking area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private
complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd
basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was
driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement
parking. When they were about to queue at the corner to pay
the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other.
The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to
overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors.
The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and
naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward.
This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter,
namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the
CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner appeared to be
hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and
daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to
the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved backward
as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara,
took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the
parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was
at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the
CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless
steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.
The case was appealed to the RTC of Makati City, which rendered
its Decision dated September 6, 2007, affirming the decision of
the MeTC.
Issue/s: