ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO (G.R. NO.

226679; AUGUST 15, 2017)

.

FACTS: Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165. He wants to enter into a plea
bargaining agreement but Judge Lobrigo did not allow him to do so because Section 23
specifically prohibits plea bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona argues that Section 23 is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal
protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but
drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses.
Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and
it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14,
RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually
prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted
by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by
any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?
RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part
of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.
The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in
so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional
rule-making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that
was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to
the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation
of the separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should
squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that
they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review
over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has
developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in
which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu
may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed.
The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.