Republic of the Philippines P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
SUPREME COURT insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto
Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation of opium, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused,
conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring
from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court,
520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of
P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said
accused, also conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium
and aided each other in the transportation, receipt and
concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported,
knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported
and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign
country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried
separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to
pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and
the judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of
error) and are greatly multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat
changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the
elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly understood, are
these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May
6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal
evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that
the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914
was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must
be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null
and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is
admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital
question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the
legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in
the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall
perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of
the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the
Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among
other things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and
accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for
the ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the
following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved.
Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on
 motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber
of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other
things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of
its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this
mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of
1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28,
1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of
the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of
the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court
may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states,
when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for
its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313
[as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also provides
that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their
order: Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature when there is in
existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact
question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative
journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill
became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348,
and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated
cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of
the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals
are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published
by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was
passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when
such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which
embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is
maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation
or alleged fact may be established by extraneous evidence; while, on the
other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to
understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the
nature and character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is
understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question
or to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that
which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive
presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel
for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily
depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the
legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself.
From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of
the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows
that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight
and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters.
Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable
the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by
the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in
direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in
fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as
compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend
upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries
ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule
giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character
is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and
the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less
certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts
between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."
(Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same
point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348),
decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various
cases upon this question; and, out of a multitude of citations, not
one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the
proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals
required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question
whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation
upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been
stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent.
Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of
laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent
character. They should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired
to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by
facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited
numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in
support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a
single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed
or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the
Federal Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow
the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez
y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo,
twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to
Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this cargo,
engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and
warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's
invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to
Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto
Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release of
the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were
delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned
street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery.
Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments
of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from
Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not listed as merchants,
and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so
consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the 10th of April,
1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the
customs registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the
serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels
began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on
the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the
appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in
the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left
and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were unloaded in
Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and
directed him to go out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with
the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment
of twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver
them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was
complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place
designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the
customs secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date
before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was
found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded
to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry
numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on
Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed
the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by
him to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents,
accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here
found the five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and
entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were
empty, the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five
empty tins, each corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels,
were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on further
search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no
one in the house when this search was made, but some clothing was
discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the But during the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that
customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 Garcia was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had
on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and
owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to
latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels
Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced by the agent of the of "wine," but that he had destroyed it because he feared that it would
owner, the agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in
Pons." After discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had
and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C.
customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was found to Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine
contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the
and securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty
ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial court, "that The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these
they were in every way identical in size, form, etc." fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any question of a doubt,
notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The appellant took a
on the morning of April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that anything direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The
unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the
taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret decisions of this court in similar cases.
service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation
in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire costs. So ordered.
importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed
the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the
barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the wood,
contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the
three barrels, Pons further stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of
opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of
April 10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several
opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General Solano had
been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of
handling the prohibited drug; and that he and Beliso had shared the
profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had
delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs
agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several
large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144 Calle
General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At
first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in
the between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he
retracted this statement and admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE
HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in
his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE
SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS
YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR.,
ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO,
MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO
VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE
BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in
their capacities as members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas
and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for
respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic
Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred
Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was
filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was
sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed
by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that
instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the
latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading
on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 11 were introduced
by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas
does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been
acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House
of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it,
and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were
then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No.
4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation
mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from
Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of
the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the
Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate
President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated
July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both
Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly
approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21,
1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate
President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact
that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a
valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view
of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House
Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July
3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert
into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic
Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-
Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor,
Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964
for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief
of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never
became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and
that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself
should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then
going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from
exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred
upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065
and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law
until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded
by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and
Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici
curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on
the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities,
principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have
been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or
the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar
question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the
case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil.
Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the
"enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been
laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of
Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision)
had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in
by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M.
Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not
within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of
powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon
merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning
being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice
Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the
question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of
the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No.
2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the
"enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or
of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or
by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order;
provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy
signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by
both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding
officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has
been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, 3 to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval,
because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses.
Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities
are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that
their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view, it is
pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of
veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary6 There is less
reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where
the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should
sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required
the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however, under the
same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not
required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The
authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case
of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill
as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a
bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill,
thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the
respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires
the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required
for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent
as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the
presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due
enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to
the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it
shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President shall have certified to the
necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a
bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question
upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said,
by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his
signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification
that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it
did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In
other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
"[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme
Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final
passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both
houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but
argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to
have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at
all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out,
Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument
begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no
enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the
journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors,
the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire
whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate
such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President
of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be
to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-
called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY
OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS
TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED
NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining
order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
pronouncement as to costs. unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and National Bureau of Investigation or police department of
Aquino, JJ., concur. any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part. graduate who has served the police department of a city
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
xxx xxx xxx

At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has

served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to
make the provision read:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency

unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served
Republic of the Philippines either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
SUPREME COURT National Bureau of Investigation or police department of
Manila any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school
EN BANC graduate who has served the police department of a city
or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at
G.R. No. L-29658 February 27, 1969 least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the
vs. nature of an addition to the phrase "who has served the
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent. police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner
RESOLUTION herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both
parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year
CASTRO, J.: of the law course) could possibly qualify. However,
somewhere in the legislative process the phrase ["who
The petitioner's motions for reconsideration are directed specifically at the has served the police department of a city or"] was
following portion of our decision: dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to
which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute
measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes
its present form and substance The provision of the substitute bill
reads:
provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version
approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision
was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record".
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic
copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various
changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as finally
approved by both Houses of Congress (annex G), the following provision
appears:
SEC. 10. Minimum qualifications for appointment as Chief of a
Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record or the National Bureau of Investigation or the
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years from
the rank of captain and/or higher.
It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the
police department of a city or was still part of the provision, but according
to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and
substituted what now is section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which
section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
— No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution
of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school
graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a
memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the
Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the
bill, explaining the change in section 10, thus: .
Section 10 was recast for clarity (with the consent of Sen.
Ganzon & Congressman Montano).
It would thus appear that the omission — whether deliberate or
unintended — of the phrase, "who has served the police department of a
city or was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only
in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by Congress but
only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to
suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is
for this reason that the petitioner would have us look searchingly into the
matter.
The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our
system of government. As we observed explicitly in our decision, the
enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as
officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go
behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect
due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon
the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as
the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be
cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation
which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress. After all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative
need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be
effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter
worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock
Holmes.
What the first Mr. Justice Harlan said in Hardwood v. Wentworth 1 might
aptly be said in answer to the petitioner: "If there be danger, under the
principles announced in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671, that the
governor and the presiding officers of the two houses of a territorial
legislature may impose upon the people an act that was never passed in
the form in which it is preserved in the published statutes, how much
greater is the danger of permitting the validity of a legislative enactment
to be questioned by evidence furnished by the general indorsements
made by clerks upon bills previous to their final passage and enrollment,
— indorsements usually so expressed as not to be intelligible to any one
except those who made them, and the scope and effect of which cannot
in many cases be understood unless supplemented by the recollection of
clerks as to what occurred in the hurry and confusion often attendant
upon legislative proceedings." 2
Indeed the course suggested to us by the petitioner would be productive
of nothing but mischief.
Both Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark and Harwood v. Wentworth involved
claims similar to that made by the petitioner in this case. In both the
claims were rejected. Thus, in Marshall Field & Co. it was contended that
the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 was a nullity because "it is shown by the
congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of
conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress, and
having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill as it finally
passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the
presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress, and approved by
the President." 3 In rejecting the contention, the United States Supreme
Court held that the signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled bill is
an official attestation by the two houses that such bill is the one that has
passed Congress. And when the bill thus attested is signed by the
President and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress should be deemed complete and peachable. 4
In Harwood the claim was that an act of the legislature of Arizona
"contained, at the time of it final passage, provisions that were omitted
from it without authority of the council or the house, before it was
presented, to the governor for his approval." 5 The Court reiterated its
ruling in Marshall Field & Co.
It is contended, however, that in this jurisdiction the journals of the
legislature have been declared conclusive upon the courts, the petitioner
citing United States v. Pons. 6 The case cited is inapposite of it does not
involve a discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the journal. Rather the
issue tendered was whether evidence could be received to show that,
contrary to the entries of the journals, the legislature did not adjourn at
midnight of February 28, 1914 but after, and that "the hands of the clock
were stayed in order to enable the legislature to effect an adjournment
apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the
expiration of the special session." In answering in the negative this Court
held that if the clock was in fact stopped, "the resultant evil might be slight
as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend
upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory." 7 This Court "passed
over the question" whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its
contents and mode of passage.
It was not until 1947 that the question was presented Mabanao v. Lopez-
Vito, 8 and we there held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and
is binding on the courts". This Court held itself bound by an authenticated
resolution despite the fact that the vote of three-fourths of the members of
the Congress (as required by the Constitution to approve proposals for
constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on account of the
suspension of some members of the House of Representative and the
Senate. lawphi1.nêt
Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt
there might have been as to the status and force of the theory in the
Philippines, in view of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, 9 was
finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. 10 Speaking for the Court, the then Justice
(now Chief Justice) Concepcion said:
Furthermore it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses
the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"
— is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President
(Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood
as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To
be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution 11 expressly
requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent
the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now
decide. 12 All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required
to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit
association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of the
Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, has
filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines,
duly assigned thereto by the Auditor General as his representative,
seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by
Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General, was substituted
for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that
the annual salary of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the
Senators and members of the House of Representatives, P32,000.00
each (thereby increasing their present compensation of P16,000.00 and
P7,200.00 per annum for the Presiding officers and members,
respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly provided
that "the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides
"that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the
effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June
30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the following items for the
House of Representatives:
SPEAKER
1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from
July 1 to December 29, 1965 and P40,000 from December 30,
1965 to June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00
MEMBERS
2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives
at P7,200 from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and P32,000 from
December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . . P 16,000.00
2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . . 165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented
the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by Republic Act 4134, approved just the preceding
year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI,
Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides as
follows:
 SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive
an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos
each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances,
and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their
respective districts in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives, and to and from their places of residence in the
case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such, increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in
1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will
expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the
House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December
30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from
petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines summarized above, the
then Auditor General requested the Solicitor General to secure a judicial
construction of the law involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General
evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought
from the Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the
suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the PHILCONSA
letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or before
January, 1966, and before the Justice Secretary could act, respondent
Aguiluz, as former Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in
Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the payment
of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act in force;
hence the filing of the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of
petitioners to institute the action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the
Speaker and Members of the House should be joined parties defendant.
On the merits, the answer alleges that the protested action is in
conformity with the Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members
of the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965,
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand, in short, is
that the expiration of the term of the members of the House of
Representatives who approved the increase suffices to make the higher
compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members
of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor
General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As taxpayers, the
petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf.
PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs.
Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405,
December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24,
1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022,
March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as
such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure or waste of state
funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of
Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts
sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in audit and the
approval of the payment of the Representatives' increased salaries, and
not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were
indispensable or proper parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main
issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution require that not only
the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators
who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it
allow the payment of the increased compensation to the members of the
House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the
term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of
the non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise,
participated in the approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to
the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries.
Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with
the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes
effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need
for it is clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before
the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the
constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit,
without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the
full term" of the Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the
difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for
Representatives thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider
both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined
with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the
House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the
Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or
Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation
can become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of
the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests
on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is
not apportionable between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported
by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the
committee on legislative power in the Constitutional Convention of 1934,
before it was decided that the Legislature should be bicameral in
form, initially recommended that the increase in the compensation of
legislators should not take effect until the expiration of the term of office
of all members of the Legislature that approved the increase. The report
of the committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their services
an annual compensation of four thousand pesos including per
diems and other emoluments or allowances and exclusive of
travelling expenses to and from their respective residences when
attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise
fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature that approved
such increase. (Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a
unicameral legislature, was carried over and made more rigid in the first
draft of the constitutional provision, which read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect
until after the expiration of the term of office of the Members of the
National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to the approval of
such increase. (Aruego, 1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and
enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth,
provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of the Members of the National Assembly
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our
fundamental law, the limitation assumed its present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of
the restriction has not been altered. From the first proposal of the
committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the
present, the intendment of the clause has been to require expiration of
the full term of all members of the Legislature that approved the higher
compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in
order to circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its
adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the
framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had intended to
require the expiration of the terms not only of the Representatives but
also of the Senators who approved the increase, they would have just
used the expression "term of all the members of the Congress" instead of
specifying "all the members of the Senate and of the House". This is a
distinction without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for
specifying the component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize
the transition from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature as a result of
the 1940 amendments to the Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of
the" before "House" in the provision being considered, and in the use of
the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have
employed the shorter expression "of the Senate and the House". It was
grammatically correct to refer to "the members of the Senate and (the
members) of the House", because the members of the Senate are not
members of the House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the
House" would imply that the members of the Senate also held
membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of
the Senators, as well as that of the Representatives, must all expire the
Constitution would have spoken of the "terms" (in the plural) "of the
members of the Senate and of the House", instead of using "term" in the
singular (as the Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been
already considered. As previously observed, the use of the singular form
"term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the
Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit, and
this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, "until the
expiration of the full term of ALL the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the
Senators before the effectivity of the increased compensation would
subject the present members of the House of Representatives to the
same restrictions as under the Constitution prior to its amendment. It may
well be wondered whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers
of the 1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original
limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum delay of six (6)
years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before an increase of
legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an
election, two assemblymen's terms, of 3 years each, had to elapse under
the former limitation in order that the increase could become operative,
because the original Constitution required that the new emolument
should operate only after expiration of the term of assemblymen
elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an
assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as
amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators hold office for six (6)
years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the
legislature on its last session just prior to an election, the delay is reduced
to four (4) years under the original restriction, because to the last year of
the term of the approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their
successors must be added. Once again an identical period must elapse
under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of the Senators are
elected every two years, so that just before a given election four of the
approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected
in, say, 1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the 1936 sessions,
the new pay would not be effective until after the expiration of the term of
the succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase would
not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the
present Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the
participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be
collectible until December 30, 1969, since the said Senators' term would
expire on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution)
were to approve the increase in compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938
(the last of their 3-year term), the new compensation would still operate
on December 30, 1941, four years later, since the term of assemblymen
elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the
increase) would end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the
1965 sessions immediately preceding the elections in November of that
year, the higher compensation would be operative only on December 30,
1969, also four years later, because the most recently elected members
of the Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in
November of 1963, and their term would not expire until December 30,
1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and
the amended constitution can not be just due to accident, and is proof
that the intent and spirit of the Constitutional restriction on Congressional
salaries has been maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it
shows how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of the
present House to await the expiration of the term of the Senators, who
concurred in approving the increase in compensation, they are placed in
a worse position than under the Constitution as originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage
the approval of increases of compensation just before an election by
legislators who can anticipate their reelection with more or less accuracy.
This salutary precaution should not be nullified by resorting to technical
and involved interpretation of the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased
compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not
be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No.
4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the
increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the
Constitution and must be held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby
granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-
1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of
the increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as
violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of
the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from
approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased
compensation authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, before December 30, 1969.
No costs.
We concur in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring opinions
of Justices Bengzon, Zaldivar and Castro.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor,
Congress of the Philippines, respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the
Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term
of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement
benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is
entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by
him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant
petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of members of
Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with
incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would commence
on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate that such
salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term
of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such
increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of
Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such salary
increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going
around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their
compensation during their term of office and of doing indirectly what
could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms
covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30,
1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
"fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of
the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7
thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress
(senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from
P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of
P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous
decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30,
1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the
constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections
and his term having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for
retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or
employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law."2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant
in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity,
using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of
Congress which he never received during his incumbency and which
under this Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could
become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the
full terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964
such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant,
however, pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim
filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as
Congressman likewise expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested
petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a
recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the
Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim
for retirement gratuity as computed on the basis of the salary increase of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No.
4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on
January 20, 1972, by the Auditor General through respondent Auditor
who further advised petitioner and furnished him with copy of the 2nd
indorsement of June 29, 1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing
the appeal of Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's adverse
decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a
salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse
decision of the Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his
incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative
only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic Act 4134)
was already P32,000.00 per annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of
Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be operative
only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when
the full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that
approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of
the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935
Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner
must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they
received "as provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of
office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the
similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch
a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same
prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what can not be done directly."3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape
notice that during his entire tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his government
service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely
because of the ,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such
amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand
to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while
still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue
of his retirement."4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum was already operative when his retirement took effect on
December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such
increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of
Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30,
1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or
benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional
provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to their
salary as provided by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down
Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the
retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials thereof for
being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that
retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it
is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office" and
that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was
on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately
availablethereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in
Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow
petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per
annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his
term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were
amply refuted by the Office of the President in dismissing the appeal in
the similar case of ex-Congressman Singson and therefore likewise serve
to show the untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis
mutandis, as follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of
P32,000 is the rate of pay prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134
for Mr. Singson's successor in office, while Mr. Singson and his
colleagues of the same term are limited to the annual
compensation of P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his
retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000 per annum after the
expiration of his term of office would effectively give him the
benefits of increased compensation to which he was not entitled
during his term, thereby violating the constitutional prohibition
against increased compensation of legislators during their term of
office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which was presumably in the mind
of Congress when it stated in Republic Act No. 4134 that "the
salary increases herein fixed shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement
supports the proposition that, as Mr. Singson's retirement legally
started simultaneously with the beginning of the term of his
successor and the effective rate of pay of his successor and all
 incoming members of Congress was already the new rate of
P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of pay that should be made
the basis in computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that
P7,200 per annum is Mr. Singson's authorized compensation
during his term of office and, therefore, the rate of pay prescribed
by law for him on his retirement, while P32,000 per annum is the
allowable compensation of incoming members of Congress
during their term and, hence, the rate of pay prescribed by law for
them on their retirement. There is, then, no basis for equating a
constitutionally prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson with a
statutory prescribed rate of pay for his successor in computing his
retirement gratuity.
It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay
(P32,000) authorized him Republic Act No. 4134 would be used
in the instant case, not to compensate him for services during the
constitutionally prohibited period, but would simply serve as basis
for computing his retirement gratuity for services rendered by him
not only as a member of Congress but in other branches of the
government as well. The foregoing contention carries its own
refutation. Retirement benefit is compensation for services
rendered (PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr.
Singson applied for retirement as an "elected official," it is evident
that he seeks compensation not only for services rendered in
other branches of the Government but also for his services as
member of Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for
him but allowed for his successor, in the computation of his
retirement gratuity."7
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010
MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges
the Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6,
2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public
respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo
Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of
the party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in
the House of Representatives, and denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto1 seeking the ouster of private
respondent, petitioner alleged that, among other things, private
respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or
beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of
affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May
14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under
Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was
deemed to have entered a general denial pursuant to public respondent’s
Rules.2
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14,
2009,3 dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that
CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had
partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of
Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution
No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed on
October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10
days from private respondent’s proclamation.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under
Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public respondent held that it applied only to
those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after
the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which
CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public
respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there
was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No.
09-130 dated August 6, 2009,4 petitioner filed the present Petition for
Certiorari.5
Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created
distinctions in the application of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that
are not found in the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at war
with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which
was a partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations, was not
enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10, 2007,
especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of
Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.
In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has
not substantiated her claims of grave abuse of discretion against public
respondent; and that he became a member of the overseas Filipinos and
their families sector years before the 2007 elections.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected
in the May, 2007 elections will expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition
has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of a decision on the
merits in this case would still be of practical value.7
The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1)
whether petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having
been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No.
7941 apply to private respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto
filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided
in its Rules8 from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9,
2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC
as a winner in the May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list
organizations,9 it was by no measure a proclamation of private
respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list
representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list
of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions
to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
COMELEC10 after revisiting the formula for allocation of additional seats
to party-list organizations.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of
private respondent’s proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of
timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner’s
challenge goes into private respondent’s qualifications, it may be filed at
anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.11
On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss
the age requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA
No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation
that Section 9 applied only to those nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998,
unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing
the youth sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. 12
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth
sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years
of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is
more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List
System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995.
There is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector
nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last
elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months
after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent,
and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination
that after the third congressional term from the ratification of the
Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would
apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish. 13
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota
of textual support for public respondent’s ratiocination that the provision
did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there
was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes
his political party orsectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an
election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative
under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both
political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the
same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to
participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who
changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible
for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been
effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or
verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is
the index of intention.14
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply
to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee
of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30
years of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August,
1975.15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six
months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he
shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families sector
only on March 17, 2007.16 1avvphi1
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was
later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list organization’s ranking of its
nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications according
to law are a different matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually
proclaimed as a party-list representative of CIBAC and rendered services
as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and emoluments
provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to
hold the same.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14,
2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House
of Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts1is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the
context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate
As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
—
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular
will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any
right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative
amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts
to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates
entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to
attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member
thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its
mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
 8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will."
He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In
the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity
of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the
applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty
of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could
not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions
were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and
in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was
no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and
intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the
concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the
custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions
or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor
offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which
states, inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the
above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the
injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It
is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial
Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted
him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties
outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was
issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in
the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body
whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to
justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial
Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at
the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at
the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this
case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted
to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for
the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist
in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for
his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a
member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make
him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes
to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation
of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that
crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to
answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter
urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded. 1âwphi1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other
member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House
of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a
full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-
department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while
under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears
that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits.
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate
as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the
restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,
accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in
office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism
or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well
in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types
of individuals.8
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of
one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or
lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own
pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more
than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits
defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individual's status in society. 16 Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily,
both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other
right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed

by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes
of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion

exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts1is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the
context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate
As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
— importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular
will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any
right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative
amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts
to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates
entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to
attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member
thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its
mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will."
He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga
del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made
possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In
the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity
of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the
applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty
of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could
not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions
were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and
in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was
no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and
intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the
concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the
custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions
or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor
offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which
states, inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people
have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the
above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also
serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the
injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It
is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial
Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted
him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might
escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties
outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was
issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in
the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body
whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to
justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial
Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at
the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at
the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical
Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this
case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted
to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for
the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist
in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for
his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a
member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make
him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes
 to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation
of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that
crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to
answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an
accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter
urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
1âwphi1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other
member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House
of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a
full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-
department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while
under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears
that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits.
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate
as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the
restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,
accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in
office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism
or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well
in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
from those others who are validly restrained by law. appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other
right or interest, including the police power of the State.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
of individuals.8
SO ORDERED.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
Republic of the Philippines
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
SUPREME COURT
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes
Manila
of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10
THIRD DIVISION
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion
exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11 A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of
one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or
lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own
pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more
than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits
defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individual's status in society. 16 Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily,
both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.17
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures,
Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate
floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am
not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in
the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the
part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago,
through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech
she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out
in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she
believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which,
after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be
vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that
only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be
considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A
Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the
import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña,
Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to
enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded
upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the
functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to
the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of
a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment
against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives. 2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government,
investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or
its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative
floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the
assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or
correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. 5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed,
her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not
be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect
on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling
the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention
to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in
the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of
this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would be the result. 1avvphi1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the
courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In
this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her
achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial
Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and
international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected
senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member
of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are
burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than their brethren in private practice.7Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would
make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes
the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she
said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am
not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in
the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her
statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not
being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her
remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions.
Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle
to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded
the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without
indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable
to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in
connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while
the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members,
save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-
officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss
to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault
on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory
words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art.
VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution
that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in
view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except
within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may
level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we
reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer 11 that
the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering
no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are
bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that
"[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as
a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney’s
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity
x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
"not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting
injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking,
a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official
duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath
as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity
or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential qualification for
the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.
When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court
speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to
one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license
and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts
and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary
authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice,
attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the
integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women
who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator
Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and
in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang 17 who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions
on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an
act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members.
The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the
Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s
offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate
the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this
Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability
thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress
against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the
decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Republic of the Philippines
Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any SUPREME COURT
circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator Manila
or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called EN BANC
her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee
for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own
chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided
HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,
imposing their own rules on her.
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint,
stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the
ESCOLIN, J.:
public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress
that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate
the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with
lawyers owe to the courts.21 prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order are: [1]
whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified
as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove
functions of both offices simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-
that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this
governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost,
regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such
can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the
statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her
office of governor if the said office is vacated.
privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against
Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec.
11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of
Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of
office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March
SO ORDERED.
3, 1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections
was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and
assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective
terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy

for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza
followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by
placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19,

1984 1 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office.
On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2 and started to
perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has
brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he
was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be
the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as
provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system,
as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can
hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an
elected member of Parliament.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered
to have abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when
he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa
elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere
private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no
longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office
of governor.
1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan
Pambansa from holding any other office or employment in the
government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the
cabinet. ...
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free
from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of
prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the
said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to
determine.
A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest and the
benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such
regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding
of more than one office." 4 It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the
system of government in other states allows a local elective official to act
as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of
the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no
exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted
constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within the purely
parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in the
nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is
understood in common law, the incompatibility herein present is one
created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is
no question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected
Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In
the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to
vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same,
nor attempt to discharge its functions.
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent
Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the Batasan
Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should be considered as
having abandoned or resigned from the vice-governorship when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The point
pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the
election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section
13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of
the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a
certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from
office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The reason
the position of vice-governor was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg.
697 is explained by the following interchange between Assemblymen San
Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said legislation:
MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the proposed
amendment it would cover only governors and members of the
different sanggunians? Mayor, governors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunian or barangay officials. A vice-governor is a member of
the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.
 MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local
officials?
MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation
...
MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-
governor, the vice-mayors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians,
Mr. Speaker. They are covered by the provision on members of
sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings, February 20, 1984, p. 92,
Rollo]
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the
Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession
to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in
accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code,
which reads as follows:
SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:
1] x x x
2] He shall:
a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the
latter in the cases provided for in Section 48, paragraph 16 of this
Code;
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES,
ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and
REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of
the Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO,
R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO,
SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following
dates and allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in
charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the
right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the
Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warrantoproceedings, docketed as
Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14,
1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not
properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the
parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally,
the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The
cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did
not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of
IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him
to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30,
1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of
Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent
Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10)
IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of
Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order
allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde
Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman
Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we
ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a
case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the
Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner
from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC
Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner,
supports the stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en
banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an
Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case
without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as
amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
 by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or
matter where he may be called to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the
SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is
not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of
the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the
matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30,
1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after
the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and
one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on
May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T.
C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the
validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of
legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the
case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that
there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an
administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote
and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of
the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel
indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in
the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or
by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC.
No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the
question of the constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan,
allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation
to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate
matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty.
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is
hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175352 2009
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M.
VIARI, Petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as
having forfeited his seat in the Senate.
The Facts
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari
(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon
as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors.
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines,1 he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23
February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners
allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as
provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2 which held that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in
accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,3 which held that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.
In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to
file this petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the
petition alleges that respondent committed an act which, by provision of
law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do
not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section
5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be
entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring
an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo
warranto, it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule
66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced
within one year after the cause of the public officer’s forfeiture of office. In
this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the
past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been
elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a
taxpayer’s suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional
question in the absence of any claim that they suffered some actual
damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of
respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there
is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is
being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage
of public funds.
Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for
declaratory relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original
jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI
of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer
service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for
quo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that
the present petition is a taxpayer’s suit questioning the unlawful
disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his
salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer
entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction
over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which is
of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government- owned or controlled corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC
and at the same time a Member of the Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a
Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution; and
4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against
respondent.4
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC
Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo
warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the
usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by
a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision
of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was
elected as such during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the
Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the
minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof
as Annex "A."
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, during his incumbency as a Member of the House of
Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having been elected
as such during the national elections last May 2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has
been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and
duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by
accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the
PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House of
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution, x x x
xxxx
 10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February
23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the
House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a
Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case
of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R. No.
104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent
continues to act as such and still performs the powers, functions
and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law and
jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to
falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of the
House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and other
compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due only
to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and irreparable
injury of the Government and the Filipino people. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited
his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation
of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly
committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically
under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper
party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
an individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to
the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring
the action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at
any stage.6 In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to
file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a
taxpayer’s suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No.
95,7 otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit,
donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to
bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for
the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion,
gender, social status, or political affiliation. 8 The PNRC provides six major
services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service. 9
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,
established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose
contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.10 The Whereas
clauses of the PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22,
1864, a convention by which the nations of the world were invited to join
together in diminishing, so far lies within their power, the evils inherent in
war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or adhered
to the subsequent revision of said convention, namely the "Convention of
Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field" (referred to in this Charter as
the Geneva Red Cross Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the
establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in
caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish
supplies for that purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent
nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the Geneva Red
Cross Convention on February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its
desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating the
suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary
organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross
Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter of the
American National Red Cross which must be terminated in view of the
independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other countries
which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross Convention
assist in promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in
war, and through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and
through their international organizations promote better understanding
and sympathy among the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (International
Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its seven
Fundamental Principles:
1. HUMANITY – The International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without
discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors, in its
international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate
human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to
protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.
It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and
lasting peace amongst all peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY – It makes no discrimination as to nationality,
race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to
relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their
needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
3. NEUTRALITY – In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of
all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at
any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or
ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE – The Movement is independent. The
National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services
of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective
countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may
be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the
Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE – It is a voluntary relief movement not
prompted in any manner by desire for gain.
6. UNITY – There can be only one Red Cross or one Red
Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It
must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY – The International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status and
share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is
worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for
all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society
of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and
ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society,
the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the
Fundamental Principles of the Movement.11
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring
belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed
conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side
of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist
insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen
as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC
volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of
government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat
PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded
in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be,
autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in
accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear
to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy;
otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out
its mission as a National Red Cross Society.12 It is imperative that the
PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the
State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the
PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the
Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not
have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.13 The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions
from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation
campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under
Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine
National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by contributions obtained
through solicitation campaigns throughout the year which shall be
organized by the Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in
their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns shall be
conducted independently of other fund drives by other organizations.
(Emphasis supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter,
as amended, only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of
Governors are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus,
twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of
Governors are not appointed by the President. Section 6 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, provides:
SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested in a
Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of whom shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected
by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall
be selected by the twenty-four members of the Board already chosen. x x
x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are
elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the
twenty-four members already chosen — a select group where the private
sector members have three-fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming
majority of four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the
private sector members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of
the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC.
The incumbent Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was
elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled
PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the
PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any
subordinate government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, 14 the President appoints
all officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution or by law. The President
also appoints those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. Under this Section 16, the law may also authorize the "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" to appoint officers lower
in rank than such heads of departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.15 In Rufino v. Endriga,16 the Court explained appointments under
Section 16 in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of
the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers
to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The
law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such
Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency
for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a
commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board,
the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations,
the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the
agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-
ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in
no other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the
commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does
the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the
PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature.
This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not
an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not
hold a government office or employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,17 the President exercises
control over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office
is legally not under the control of the President, then such office is
not part of the Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,18 the Court
explained the President’s power of control over all government offices as
follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive,
Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the
independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or
local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or
agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of
government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional
bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government
unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or
order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office
of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over
the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the
President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office
— one performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies — from the President’s power of control. There is no
dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or
quasi-judicial functions.
The President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all
officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are
appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise
or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and
exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices."
There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the
Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive
branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive
power exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in
the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a
lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional
basis. (Emphasis supplied)
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private
sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector
members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers
of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals.
Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the
President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or
actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify
the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board
that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a
private office, not a government office.
1avvphi1
Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a
National Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination
with the public authorities, and the government representatives may take
part in decision-making within a National Society. However, the freely-
elected representatives of a National Society’s active members must
remain in a large majority in a National Society’s governing bodies. 19
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast
majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals,
including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the
annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the
PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can
be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing ₱35, ₱100, ₱300,
₱500 or ₱1,000 for the year.20 Even foreigners, whether residents or not,
can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,21 reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be open
to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any
contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign
shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year and said
contribution shall be deductible in full for taxation purposes.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run
charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v.
NLRC,22 which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was
created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or
by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was
created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a
government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to
consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation
as provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. – x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital
stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may
be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise
and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities
with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of
its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-
stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be
government officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed
earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against
the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was
created by special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by general
law. Section 1 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a
"body corporate and politic," thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a
body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially
designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross Society. The
national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan
Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,23 the Court explained the
constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental
law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first
refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second
refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special
charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private
corporations except by general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose
of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by
special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or
groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with
a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private
corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is
private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation
Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of
cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or
controlled corporations through special charters. Since private
corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can
create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are
government-owned or controlled.24 (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are
government-owned or controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their special charter. The
seed capital assets of the Local Water Districts, such as waterworks and
sewerage facilities, were public property which were managed, operated
by or under the control of the city, municipality or province before the
assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local Water
Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations
Act,25 the LWUA has a budget amounting to ₱400,000,000 for its subsidy
requirements.26 There is no private capital invested in the Local Water
Districts.The capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water
Districts all come from the government, either through transfer of assets,
loans, subsidies or the income from such assets or funds.
The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the
municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board
directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors
and other personnel of the Local Water Districts are government
employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the
Local Water Districts are considered government-owned or controlled
corporations not only because of their creation by special charter but also
because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water
Districts.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a
special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements
of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC.
Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be
considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence
of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In
creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a
private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the
creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception
even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
grants it corporate powers,27 is void for being unconstitutional. Thus,
Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,3610,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of
the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
The other provisions41 of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be
considered as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is
the local National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, and thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and
privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the
PNRC Charter implement the Philippine Government’s treaty obligations
under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National
Society, the Society must be "duly recognized by the legal government of
its country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national
legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in
the humanitarian field."
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it
creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate Constitution."5 The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC
powers. Charter "insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and
consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the
SO ORDERED. Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation." 6 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the

Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Republic of the Philippines Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
SUPREME COURT amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
Manila they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.7
EN BANC
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent
G. R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011 raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that
VIARI, Petitioners, Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the
vs. pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent. considered obiter.8
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue;
RESOLUTION therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question.
Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia,9 wherein the Court said that it "will not
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground" and goes on
This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration1 filed to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of the petition on
on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no need
Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment
Motion for Partial Reconsideration2 filed on August 27, 2009 by movant- should be deemed obiter.
intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter’s
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper 3 filed on In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court
December 23, 2009. sustain the constitutionality of its Charter on the following grounds:

In the Decision,4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in
the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR
PNRC OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
 1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO THE
INSTANT CONTROVERSY.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95, AS
AMENDED WAS NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1264 AND NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF CONGRESS.
C. PNRC’S STRUCTURE IS SUI GENERIS; IT IS A CLASS OF ITS
OWN. WHILE IT IS PERFORMING HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS AS
AN AUXILIARY TO GOVERNMENT, IT IS A NEUTRAL ENTITY
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL, YET
IT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS STRICTLY PRIVATE IN CHARACTER.
In his Comment and Manifestation10 filed on November 9, 2009,
respondent manifests: (1) that he agrees with the position taken by the
PNRC in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated August 27, 2009;
and (2) as of the writing of said Comment and Manifestation, there was
pending before the Congress of the Philippines a proposed bill entitled
"An Act Recognizing the PNRC as an Independent, Autonomous, Non-
Governmental Organization Auxiliary to the Authorities of the Republic of
the Philippines in the Humanitarian Field, to be Known as The Philippine
Red Cross."11
After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the
respondent as well as those of movant-intervenor in their respective
motions, we have reconsidered our pronouncements in our Decision
dated July 15, 2009 with regard to the nature of the PNRC and the
constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter, R.A. No. 95, as
amended.
As correctly pointed out in respondent’s Motion, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not
among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the
Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc.,12 thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will
be unavoidable.13
Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have
declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court
could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most
adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was
not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate
under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence
in this country.
Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on
ground of unconstitutionality notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was
enacted on March 22, 1947 during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
which provided for a proscription against the creation of private
corporations by special law, to wit:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned and controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. (Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.)
Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution and Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The
latter reads:
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and
October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264,
and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to
the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law,
is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none
like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international
community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis.
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was
in existence in the Philippines since 1917. It was created by an Act of
Congress after the Republic of the Philippines became an independent
nation on July 6, 1946 and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its
adherence to the Convention of Geneva of July 29, 1929 for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the
Field (the "Geneva Red Cross Convention"). By that action the
Philippines indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world
in mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the
Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose and like other
volunteer organizations established in other countries which have ratified
the Geneva Conventions, to promote the health and welfare of the people
in peace and in war.14
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373,
and further amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical
background and legal basis of the creation of the PNRC by legislative fiat,
as a voluntary organization impressed with public interest. Pertinently
R.A. No. 95, as amended by P.D. 1264, provides:
WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on 22 August
1894, the nations of the world unanimously agreed to diminish within their
power the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the world have
ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces
in the Field and at Sea, The Prisoners of War, and The Civilian
Population in Time of War referred to in this Charter as the Geneva
Conventions;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an independent
nation on July 4, 1946, and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its
adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1929, and by the action,
indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating
the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a voluntary
organization for that purpose as contemplated by the Geneva
Conventions;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a chapter of the
American National Red Cross which was terminated in view of the
independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in other countries
which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions assist in
promoting the health and welfare of their people in peace and in war, and
through their mutual assistance and cooperation directly and through
their international organizations promote better understanding and
sympathy among the people of the world;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and
General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby decree and
order that Republic Act No. 95, Charter of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) as amended by Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be
further amended as follows:
Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the Philippines a
body corporate and politic to be the voluntary organization officially
designated to assist the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a national Red Cross Society. The
national headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in Metropolitan
Manila. (Emphasis supplied.)
The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be gleaned from
Section 3 of its Charter, which provides:
Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as follows:
(a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armed
forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit of and under
 the conditions prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to which
the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
(b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to
perform all duties devolving upon the Corporation as a result of
the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the said
Convention;
(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the
authorities of the armed forces as a medium of communication
between people of the Republic of the Philippines and their
Armed Forces, in time of peace and in time of war, and to act in
such matters between similar national societies of other
governments and the Governments and people and the Armed
Forces of the Republic of the Philippines;
(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and
international relief in time of peace and in time of war and apply
the same in meeting and emergency needs caused by typhoons,
flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to
devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering caused
by such disasters;
(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of peace
and in time of war as may be found desirable in improving the
health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people;
(f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or
resident of the Philippines a member of the Red Cross.
The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
which, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and the IFRC and RCS, make up the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement (the Movement). They constitute a worldwide
humanitarian movement, whose mission is:
[T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to
protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being, in
particular in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for
the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social
welfare, to encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give
help by the members of the Movement, and a universal sense of
solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance. 15
The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in
humanitarian activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among others,
these activities in the country include:
1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or
otherwise affected by armed clashes between the government
and armed opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao;
2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and
violence on the population;
3. Visiting detainees; and
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the
public and private sectors.16
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public
authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a
range of services including disaster relief and health and social
programmes.
The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent
Societies (RCS) Position Paper,17 submitted by the PNRC, is instructive
with regard to the elements of the specific nature of the National
Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its
sister Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities
deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention and the Statutes of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement).
They are also guided by the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality,
Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.
A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected
component of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the
First Geneva Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. These
provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be respected
and protected in all circumstances. Such protection is not ordinarily
afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private entities or even non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This sui generis character is also
emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an
Occupying Power cannot require any change in the personnel or
structure of a National Society. National societies are therefore
organizations that are directly regulated by international
humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities,
including NGOs.
xxxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their
public authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public
authorities in the humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition at
the International level. This is considered to be an element distinguishing
National Societies from other organisations (mainly NGOs) and other
forms of humanitarian response.
x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide Movement in which
all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and
duties in helping each other. This is considered to be the essence of the
Fundamental Principle of Universality.
Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to
the public authorities in the humanitarian field. x x x.
The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and
the same time a private institution and a public service organization
because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the
authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their major functions,
Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies, in
general having larger resources than the Societies, working towards
comparable ends in a given sector.
x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government’s
humanitarian partner while remaining independent.18(Emphases ours.)
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No.
95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in
March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the
Court now.
In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on
Audit,19 explained that the purpose of the constitutional provision
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent
the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or
groups, which were denied to other groups. Based on the above
discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come within
the spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special
privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity
that strives to serve the common good.
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section
16 of the 1987 Constitution will hinder the State in adopting measures
that will serve the public good or national interest. It should be noted that
a special law, R.A. No. 9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008,
and not the general corporation code, vests corporate power and
capacities upon cooperatives which are private corporations, in order to
implement the State’s avowed policy.
In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service
rendered by the PNRC as the government’s partner in the observance of
its international commitments, to wit:
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or
political affiliation. The PNRC provides six major services: Blood
Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services, Community Health and
Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,
established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose
contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929. x x
x.20 (Citations omitted.)
So must this Court recognize too the country’s adherence to the
Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in
consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has
the force and effect of law.21 Under the Constitution, the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.22 This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of
using the latter to negate the former.
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like
any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of
the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as
an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Although the PNRC is called
to be independent under its Fundamental Principles, it interprets such
independence as inclusive of its duty to be the government’s
humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the International Committee,
the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and carry out its
humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner.
However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary
Service of National Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be
distinguished from private and profit-making entities. It is the main
characteristic of National Societies that they "are not inspired by the
desire for financial gain but by individual commitment and devotion to a
humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as part of the service
that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to
the Community."23
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither "be classified as an instrumentality of
the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by
international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State. 24
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now
sufficiently established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or
1âwphi1
instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled
corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the
Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not
ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation" within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized
under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto
A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national
disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion
of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an
untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in
the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
declared void must therefore stay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordon’s
Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration and movant-intervenor
PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No.
175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A.
No. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross,
was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been
passed upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸
being neither strictly private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains
valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the
Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second
sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and

auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with
its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO,
VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO,
DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE
HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA
MAGSAYSAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL
TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
Gamboa & Hofileña Law Office for petitioners.
ALAMPAY, J.:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating
a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners
herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the
various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with
this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents
Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant
to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January
3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the
northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated
from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del
Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the
southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador
Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the
territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on
the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95
square kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the
City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new
province which are the areas affected within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the
ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by
a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the
Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and
supervise the plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which
shall be charged to local funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-
24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is
unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it
is expressly mandated that—
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions
which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial
unit and these requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it
has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square
kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand
persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the
Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last
three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the
population and income of the mother province or provinces at the
 time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income
alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of
trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas
holidays during which the Court was in recess and unable to timely
consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on
January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be
restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that
there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the
legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should
properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of
Negros del N•rte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the
exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros
Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition
"to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the
action will be ventilated and given final resolution.'"At the same time, they
asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be
suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on
the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have
brought out.
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events
rendered moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite
scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead,
nevertheless, that-
... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent
Commission on Elections to desist from issuing official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986.
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of
the Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within
the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to be not in
accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of mandamus be
issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to
schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the
qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as
now existing shall participate, at the same time making
pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has
no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;
And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the
respondent Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the
release of any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the
holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-
10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in
abeyance the issuance of any official proclamation of the results
of the aforestated plebiscite.
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear
as amicus curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with
the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in Our resolution of January
2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the
Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the
same, to require respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss.
Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment,
arguing therein that the challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should
be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is
not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear,
categorical and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement
of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang-
Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that
Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the
requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with.
Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and
academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the
Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new
Province of Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of
the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of
our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing
the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive
Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128
SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:
1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of
the Court is allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an
element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit or units
affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when
certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to
form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much
more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the
acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the
barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that
between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of
unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former
is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will
destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic
presumption all these years is one of validity. ...
3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that
when there are indications that the inhabitants of several
barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality
they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to
ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they,
and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New
responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A
new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will
be a matter of choice-their choice. They should be left alone then
to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will
not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it,
That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons,
and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the
fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local
autonomy, the preference being for smaller units. To rule as this
Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional
construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular
provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers
and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia.
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally
with force in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the
requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation
of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with,
Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of
3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code
for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist
that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del
Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which
evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress that
Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly
declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an
area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been
rendered moot and academic considering that a plebiscite has been
already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the
corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total
votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of
Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the
affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said
plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new
province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents
stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte
province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were
announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case
should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the
creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts
which appear to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand
unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the
Province of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to
disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on
January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by
the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January
20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said
Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from ordering the
release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not
longer deserve further consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of
Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned
Parliamentary Bill, the following:
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the
southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador
Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the
natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros
on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656
hectares more or less. (Emphasis supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly
enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new
Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its boundaries
then stated to be as follows:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the
northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated
from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a
new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the
southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador
Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the
territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on
the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95
square kilometers more or less.
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification
issued by Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of
Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of
Negros Occidental have the land area as indicated hereunder
based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population,
Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8
2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3
3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9
4. Manapla......................................................................112.9
5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5
6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6
7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0
8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4
9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5
10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)
This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan
for whatever purpose it may serve him.
(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the
relatively new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it
is an uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador
municipality, one of the component units of the new province, was
derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about
one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is
significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners that the
total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is
only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this
total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from the
land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This
area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square
kilometers, representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San
Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias,
Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in
approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers using as basis
the Special Report, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density:
1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila
(see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the
allegations of petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation,
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas
affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days
from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the
creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority
of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President shall
appoint the first officials of the new province.
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a
significant change in the above provision. The statute, as modified,
provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed
new province which are the areas affected."
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the
cities and towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed
by the petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution.
Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite
that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation of the new
province as a result of the consequent division of and substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the existing province. In this instance, the
voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should
have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had
been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the
case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be
inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its
creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse
for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents'
urging that, as there has been fait accompli then this Court should
passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an
unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this
Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what
the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in
the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create,
merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either
brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from
entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about
a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as
attending to the unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros
del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to
repudiate and discourage the commission of acts which run counter to
the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our
government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon
those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative
measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such
acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land.
It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the
ground that what is already done is done. To such untenable argument
the reply would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the
duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its attention.
On the merits of the case.
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new
province of Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the
present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the
case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief
and for convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes
in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the
existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially
altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The
first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would
be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should
conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation
of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical
flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite
because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors
of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to
guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged
good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what
our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a
requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No one
should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy
intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units
but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the
Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents
would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then
spits at the Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition
should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law
may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the
petitioners is not the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the
infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial
inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of
B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but
are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case.
Mention by petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the
proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and approval of
said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news
articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on
January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive
matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little
support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and
pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et
al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to
a plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing
barangays, this Court upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was
participated in exclusively by the people of the barangay that would
constitute the new municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by
respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory
statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the
discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is
indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units
affected." The ruling rendered in said case was based on a claimed
prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did
not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution
should be correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable
Executive Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or
compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible
to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated
from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are
affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case
of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find
very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his
opinion, which We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to
be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the
Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the—
forerunner of the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at
bar, In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable
Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this
dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as
suffering from a constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include
all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended
to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of
their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a
useful guideline in the instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now
afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked
by respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of
the views then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted
However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the
subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with
concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what
was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political
unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser
problems are involved. In the case at bar, creation of a new province
relates to the largest political unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the
Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than
three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent
province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing
province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It
becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division of the
parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate
areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del
Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new
province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse.
Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be
affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite
contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular
provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the
people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia."
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite
shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred
and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation
speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of
areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in
such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed
new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will
be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be
conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected."
We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units
affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted
by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the
new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other
people necessarily affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings.
They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite
only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted
with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality
of such a plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the
enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province constitutes
the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for
the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining
portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to
mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners.
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of
Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived
of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as
the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding
petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental
will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the
fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province.
In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing
territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be
partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but
"amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros
what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as
Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration
of boundary.
As contended by petitioners,—
Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as
used in the constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct
situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each other. A
Province maybe created where an existing province is divided or
two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will involve
 existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being
substantially altered.
It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political
unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the
Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in the
whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration
of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the
merits of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may
exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be
favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the
indecisive pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the
Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already
here express, We now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases
sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political
unit from which the new political unit will be derived, from participating in
the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of
another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by
petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent
Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at
which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental
as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a
pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal
effect for being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3,
1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI
of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the
conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so.
With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big.
885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del
Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such
new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does
not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been
gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because of the
appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del
Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be
put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications
currently attending to its creation. As has been manifested, the parent
province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the defendant in a
suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional
Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for
the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent
province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least
P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality
of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created
province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in
Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the
exhibits submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and
91), that the new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers,
more or less. This assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted,
disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more than
3,500 square kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only
about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into account government statistics
relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities constituting
Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local
Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created
and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what
is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water over
which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the
submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within
the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the
territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect,
and fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing.
As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular
provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence
thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only
to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political
unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous."
Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most
of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary,
1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in
the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a
touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of
particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words
associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League
vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the
sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the
physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators
to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory"
embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is
meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases
used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature
(82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the
rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents
make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision
whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and
obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify
an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute
is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction
based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of
the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L.
Ed., p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small
land area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La
Union province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked
province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly
exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state
was marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs
to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings
more than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it
(Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo,
p. 43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the
merits of this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real
motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper
challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this
proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or
wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or
unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as
recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant
people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people
of the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation.
Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute
this case in order to preserve the continued existence of their historic
province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to
our Constitution which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the
setbacks and the hardships which petitioners aver confronted them, they
valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A happy destiny for
our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be
exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared
unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province of Negros del
Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared
null and void.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59180 January 29, 1987
CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and RESOLUTION L. RUGAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
and ITS MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article XI of
the 1973 Constitution, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 56, enacted on 1
February 1980, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan
del Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56 read:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon,
Perez, Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa Maria, San Isidro, Villangit, Del
Rosario, Anahauan Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality
of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur, are hereby separated from said
municipality to form and constitute an independent Municipality of Sibagat
without affecting in any manner the legal existence of the mother
Municipality of Bayugan.
Sec. 2. The boundaries of the new Municipality of Sibagat will be:
Beginning at the point of intersection of the Cabadbaran-Old Bayugan
and Surigao del Sur boundaries; thence in a southernly direction
following the Old Bayugan and Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan and Butuan
City, Old Bayugan and Las Nieves boundaries, until it reaches the point
of intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and the Municipality of Las
Nieves; ...
Sec. 3. The seat of government of the newly created municipality shall be
in Barangay Sibagat.
Sec. 4. Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws, now or hereafter
applicable to regular municipalities shall be applicable to the new
Municipality of Sibagat.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to
be conducted in the area or areas affected within a period of ninety (90)
days after the approval of this Act, the President (Prime Minister) shall
appoint the Mayor and other Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner,
Clementino Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials
of the new Municipality.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been infringed,
is reproduced hereunder:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the unit or units affected.
The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted
provision, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine
the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio;
and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of
the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly
complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created,
hence, it is null and void.
It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only on 10
February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was not yet in
existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had been
conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of
the new Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that officials
of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and had assumed
their respective positions as such.
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local
Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it
intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not
proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political
subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It
contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a
condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the
same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the
enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional
provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation,
modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with
the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of
such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation
of the new local government unit should be approved by the people
concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said
requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units
affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local
government unit (parag. 5, Petition; p. 7, Memorandum). In fact, the
lwphl@itç
the plebiscite conducted. Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area
for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885.
No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised
here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885
and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other
hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the
normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period
specified in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of the

new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are
performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.

It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal

corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitations a legislative body may Create any corporation it
deems essential for the more efficient administration of government (I
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., 509). The creation of the new
Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then
vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142 SCRA 727
[1986]), striking down as unconstitutional BP Blg. 885 creating a new
province in the Island of Negros known as the Province of Negros del
Norte, and declaring the plebiscite held in connection therewith as illegal
There are significant differences, however, in the two cases among which
may be mentioned the following. in the Tan case, the Local Government
Code already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted
on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Blg. 885 in
the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to
the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the
Constitutional mandate and of the Local Government Code that the
plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56
specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." In
fact, as previously stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of