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B
ill Clinton came to San Francisco for the Democratic Na-
tional Convention hungry for attention. It was July 1984,
and the second-term Arkansas governor, not yet forty years
old, knew where to find opportunity.
The convention itself would be a morose affair, with party regu-
lars dutifully ratifying former vice president Walter Mondale as their
nominee. Four years earlier, Mondale had been number two on the
Jimmy Carter–led ticket that surrendered forty-four states to Ronald
Reagan. For a while, Democrats had believed Reagan’s triumph to
be a fluke, especially when a nasty recession pushed unemployment
to over 10 percent early in his term. But by the summer of ’84, the
economy was resurgent, patriotism was in full bloom (Los Angeles
would soon host the Summer Olympics), and America’s grandfatherly
president was enjoying some of the best poll numbers of his tenure.
Democrats, a survey of delegates revealed, were significantly less op-
timistic about Mondale’s prospects than they had been about Carter’s
back in 1980. Even the truest of true believers knew it: Reagan was
going to swamp them—again.
This meant the race for the next time around was already on.
Once Mondale suffered his inevitable defeat in November, the search
would commence for a new leader for the party, someone to carry the
torch in 1988, when Reagan would be forbidden from running again
and the country might, after eight years of Republican rule, be ready
for a break. The conversation was already under way, and Clinton was
intent on forcing his name into it.
His ambition had never been parochial or regional. It was na-
tional office Clinton coveted, and he’d spent his postadolescent life
maneuvering to attain it—Boys Nation delegate, Georgetown under-
grad, intern for a powerful senator, Rhodes Scholar, law school at
Yale. Those early years had been about making personal connections,
mixing with the national power class and those who would one day
join it, charming them with his warmth and charisma, dazzling them
with his intellect, his sharp political instincts, his potential.
Then, after finishing law school in 1973, the critical decision: to
leave it all behind and head back to his native Arkansas, an impov-
erished state practically invisible to the very people he’d just spent
years cultivating. But in Arkansas there was political opportunity.
The ancient segregationist order was at last giving way. If he could
just get a toehold and win some political office back home, any politi-
cal office, Clinton knew he could move up and make his way to the
top of the Arkansas political ranks. And then he would have it—the
springboard to go national, to reconnect with all those people he’d
so impressed as a young man; except now they would have matured
into positions of power and influence, making them immensely useful
to their old pal from Arkansas.
He took his first shot in 1974, and the timing seemed perfect.
The Watergate scandal finally took down Richard Nixon that sum-
mer, and he left behind a Republican Party in ruins, discredited by
the blind eye that too many of its leaders had turned to the president’s
misdeeds for too long. Clinton, only a year out of law school, set his
sights on a congressman named John Paul Hammerschmidt, the
only Republican elected to the House from Arkansas since Recon-
wanted to talk about, anything to get his name out there, to remind
the political world that he was more than just another good ol’ boy
pol from a backwater state. Back in Arkansas, the locals weren’t ex-
actly blind to all of this, and the notion that their boy wonder gov-
ernor might be moving a little too fast, getting a bit too big for his
britches, started to take hold.
Then there was his wife. People wondered how a woman like
Hillary Rodham ended up in Arkansas in the first place. A whip-
smart daughter of the Chicago suburbs, she shared Bill’s immense
ambition and had plenty to show for herself. At just twenty-t wo, she
had made national headlines with her student speech at Wellesley
College’s 1969 graduation ceremony, using it to present a blistering
rebuke of the commencement speaker, Republican senator Edward
Brooke. From Wellesley, it was on to Yale Law, where she and Bill
began their relationship, and then to D.C., where she landed a gig
as a staff attorney for the House Judiciary Committee as it explored
Nixon’s impeachment.
She faced a dilemma. Her prospects were bright in D.C., at a time
when high-level opportunities that had until now been unthinkable
for women were suddenly opening up. But her boyfriend wasn’t going
to be sticking around town and was asking her to come to Arkansas
with him and to make a life—and a political career—together. She
took the bar exam in D.C. and flunked it, but passed in Arkansas.
In the summer of 1974, with one of her Washington mentors along
for the ride and pleading with her to reconsider the whole way, Hill-
ary made the long drive south to Arkansas. Within a year, she and
Bill were a married couple.
She worked briefly as an advocate for children, then segued into a
spot in the state’s premier law firm. Here was a driven career woman
from up north, the antithesis of the kind of deferential southern po-
litical wife Arkansans were accustomed to. And she was adamant:
She would not be taking her husband’s last name. You could call her
Hillary Rodham, thank you very much.
Her stand coincided with a growing backlash in the South against
now he’d gotten it, and he’d made a nice impression, too. It was just
the kind of win he needed.
And a few minutes later, it was forgotten forever.
I f Clinton craved validation from political and media elites, the next
featured speaker on opening night in San Francisco was his oppo-
site. The delegation breakfasts, the late-night parties, the chance ho-
tel lobby encounters with power brokers, all the priceless networking
opportunities that come with a national convention: Mario Cuomo
conveyed indifference, even hostility, to all of it. It was a character
trait that would, in the years to come, only magnify the impact of
what happened this night.
Cuomo was in town at the invitation of Mondale, who’d scored a
crucial victory in New York’s March primary with an assist from the
governor. Now Mondale had deputized Cuomo to deliver the keynote
address. But there was no preconvention schmoozing for the New
York governor, and there’d be no lingering afterward. He liked his
own bed, hated to travel, and was fond of telling anyone who’d listen
about the gravity of his responsibilities in Albany. This was a day trip
for Cuomo, nothing more.
Expectations were minimal. The fifty-t wo-year-old Cuomo had
only been elected governor two years earlier. It had been a big upset,
Cuomo rallying liberals and organized labor to stun his longtime
rival, New York City mayor Ed Koch, in the Democratic primary.
Even then, Cuomo only won the general election in a squeaker. Back
home, he was a formidable figure, but his national profile was lim-
ited. At first glance, Cuomo seemed like just another of a familiar
type. He was urban, ethnic, and liberal in the tradition of FDR—
a friend to labor unions and the proliferating assortment of interest
groups now operating within the Democratic Party. It was organi-
zation men like Cuomo who’d delivered the nomination to Mon-
dale over Gary Hart and his appeal to a new, more suburban and
machine-averse breed of Democrat.
that we can make it all the way with the whole family intact—and we
have, more than once. Ever since Franklin Roosevelt lifted himself
from his wheelchair to lift this nation from its knees—wagon train
after wagon train, to new frontiers of education, housing, peace; the
whole family aboard, constantly reaching out to extend and enlarge
that family; lifting them up into the wagon on the way; blacks and
Hispanics, and people of every ethnic group, and Native Americans—
all those struggling to build their families and claim some small share
of America.
“For nearly fifty years we carried them all to new levels of com-
fort, and security, and dignity, even affluence. And remember this:
some of us in this room today are here only because this nation had
that kind of confidence. And it would be wrong to forget that.”
For forty minutes, he continued like this, rarely permitting the
audience to interrupt him, as if fanfare would cheapen the message.
His party had come to San Francisco aware of its dim November
prospects. It was the height of the Reagan era, the tone for which
had been set four years earlier when the new president used his in-
augural address to declare that “government is not the solution to
our problem—it is our problem.” Old-style liberalism had never felt
so out of date, so politically toxic. But in this moment, Cuomo was
making his party forget all of this. He was summoning their pride in
the America that their values had built—the America that Reagan
and his crew were now threatening to dismantle. It was a valentine to
the New Deal legacy of the Democratic Party, and an intensely per-
sonal one. Cuomo spoke of his father, an Italian immigrant who’d
run a grocery store in the South Jamaica section of Queens.
“I watched a small man with thick calluses on both his hands
work fifteen and sixteen hours a day,” he said. “I saw him once liter-
ally bleed from the bottoms of his feet, a man who came here un-
educated, alone, unable to speak the language, who taught me all I
needed to know about faith and hard work by the simple eloquence
of his example.”
The cameras caught delegates in tears. He never did mention the
name of Walter Mondale, not that anyone minded. What he was say-
ing felt bigger than one candidate, one election. He ended with a call
to action: “For the love of God: please make this nation remember
how futures are built!” Then he thanked the crowd, walked offstage,
got on a plane, and flew back home.
H e was all anyone in San Francisco could talk about. For years,
Reagan, a trained actor and master of public performance, had
flummoxed them by forging such an easy, natural connection with
Americans. To these exasperated, beaten-down Democrats, the gov-
ernor of New York was nothing short of a revelation: at long last they
had discovered their own Great Communicator.
“New York Gov. Mario M. Cuomo,” wrote the Washington Post’s
Haynes Johnson, “gave Democratic Party power brokers dramatic
reason to wish they could bring back the old smoke-filled room that
in conventions past produced deals to anoint someone other than
[Mondale] as the party’s presidential nominee.”
Gushed one delegate, “I am overwhelmed by his speech. He’s got
great potential nationally. He talks from the heart. He’s terrific.” Said
another, “He’s reaching an emotional chord that hasn’t been touched
since John Kennedy.” And a third: “That’s who should be running
for president.” California senator Alan Cranston said it was the best
speech he’d ever heard. Representative Tony Coelho, one of the top
Democrats in the House, called Cuomo “fabulous.”
“We’ve got to get the floating voters who went Republican in
1980,” Coelho said. “We need a message that the Democratic Party
is a home for them, and that’s what Cuomo is saying.”
Those watching at home, wrote Washington Post television critic
Tom Shales, “saw yet another star born on TV: Mario Cuomo, the
keynote speaker and New York governor who might this morning lay
claim to the title Son of the Great Communicator.
“Like Ronald Reagan, the absolute standard by which all others are
judged, Cuomo appears to have mastered the art of speaking directly
T heir defeat that fall was worse than even the most pessimistic of
Democrats had braced for. Voters went to the polls in all fifty
states on November 6, 1984, and in forty-nine of them they sided
with Reagan. All that was left for Democrats, besides the eternally
loyal District of Columbia, was Mondale’s home state of Minnesota,
and even there the president came a mere thirty-eight hundred votes
from triumphing. Never before had someone come so close to pull-
ing off a clean sweep of all fifty states. All told, Reagan took 59 per-
cent of the national popular vote, his margin of victory a staggering
seventeen million votes.
Nothing the Democrats tried in 1984 had worked. Putting a
woman, New York congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro, on a national
ticket for the first time? Reagan still got 58 percent of the female vote.
Mondale’s decision to double down on the party’s traditional alliance
with organized labor? Reagan still grabbed nearly half the votes cast
from union households. More than a quarter of self-identified Demo-
crats deserted their party and voted to reelect Reagan. About the only
bedrock Democratic constituency left was minority voters. African
Americans backed Mondale at a 91 percent clip, while Latinos gave
him 66 percent of their votes. But the American electorate of 1984
was 89 percent white—and whites went for the president two to one.
As beatings go, this one was thorough.
Worse for Democrats, this was becoming the norm. Once upon a
time, from FDR all the way through LBJ, with only the interruption
of Eisenhower, they’d been the dominant party in presidential poli-
tics. No longer. Since 1968, they’d now lost four of five White House
races—three in landslides. Reagan’s initial victory in 1980, dismissed
as a near impossibility when the campaign began, had shaken them to
the core. But now it seemed that everything they’d done in response
to it had only made their plight more desperate. The talk now was of
a Republican lock on the White House. How had Americans become
so allergic to the idea of a Democratic presidency? What could they
do about it? Who could rescue them?
Cuomo was a tantalizing possibility. Within days of Mondale’s
political demise, the venerable columnist Mary McGrory was out
with a column heralding the star of the San Francisco convention
the party’s “last liberal hope.” She’d been with him at a watch party
in New York on Election Night. When he came to the podium, she
noted, there were chants of “ ’88! ’88!”—which, she added, made the
governor grimace.
“Cuomo’s appeal is obvious,” McGrory wrote. “He is the popu-
lar governor of the second largest state, and the finest orator in the
country. He is an intellectual who loves the meat and potatoes of
politics. He is both thoughtful and zestful. And although he says his
face is that of ‘a tired frog,’ he is totally telegenic.”
The two-decade decline of liberalism was congealing into de-
spair on the left, a sense that winning back the White House—if it
was even possible anymore—would require some kind of traumatic
ideological makeover. But now in this darkness, as if on cue, came
Cuomo. What if all they’d been missing was him? What if there was
nothing wrong with liberalism that couldn’t be fixed by one magnetic
and morally righteous orator? Revival without compromise. This was
the promise of Mario Cuomo.
devastation. Here was a very different way of grappling with the wreck-
age of Mondale, the rise of Reagan conservatism, and the Democratic
Party’s declining national fortunes. There was a regional aspect that
was impossible to ignore, a dramatic political realignment playing out
in what Democrats had for nearly a century called “the Solid South.”
Reagan won everywhere on the map in ’84, but nowhere bigger
than in Dixie, where he gobbled up 64 percent of the vote—this in
a place where, not long before, any association with the Republican
Party was the kiss of death. It was a particular type of southerner with
whom Reagan was striking such a resonant chord: white southern-
ers, who cast more than 70 percent of their ballots for him. When it
came to blacks in the South, fully 90 percent went for Mondale. Were
Democrats headed for oblivion below the Mason-Dixon line? It was a
chilling prospect for them, and all too imaginable. Carter, the peanut
farmer from Plains, was now the only Democrat in two decades to
win multiple southern states, and even his native appeal had its limits.
In 1976, he nearly swept his home region. After four years as presi-
dent, though, Georgia was all he had left; every other southern state
went for Reagan in 1980.
Meanwhile, the South was experiencing a population boom with
no end in sight. Its electoral muscle was expanding with each new
census. Democrats had problems all over the map, but there was no
one who believed a return to the White House was possible without
a return to competitiveness in the South.
They could take heart in one fact. Even after Mondale’s drub-
bing, they still held nearly every southern governorship and state leg-
islature, plus the lion’s share of Senate and House seats; and when it
came to county courthouses, wide swaths of the South were still one-
party territory, just like in the old days. These were not, by and large,
liberal Democrats. “Boll Weevil” was the catchy term of the 1980s
for the conservative southern Democrats who were providing pivotal
congressional support to Reagan and his program.
The mixed messages spoke to a wider clash, between the national
party and its leftward drift and the more moderate, even conservative,
for national office, but now there was an opening for Republicans to
plant their flag in a place that had long been off-limits to them. It was
a deal with Thurmond that ensured the GOP nomination in 1968 for
Nixon, whose “southern strategy” won over many of those aggrieved
white voters. Reagan was aiming straight at them, too, when he kicked
off his general election campaign in 1980 in Philadelphia, Mississippi,
the notorious scene of a triple homicide committed against civil rights
activists by the local white resistance just sixteen years earlier. “I be-
lieve in states’ rights,” Reagan told the crowd. Officially, the line had
nothing to do with race, but to critics it was a wink as ugly as it was
blatant.
Republicans bristled at the charge of race baiting. Civil rights,
their party platform proclaimed, was a settled matter, and America
was better for it. But race was so intertwined with the most conten-
tious issues of the 1970s and ’80s, from school busing and affirmative
action to welfare and crime, that it was possible to stoke prejudices in
ways that were politically advantageous.
Moreover, Democrats moved in the opposite direction, embrac-
ing newly enfranchised blacks in the South and forging tighter bonds
with nonwhite voters everywhere. The New Left movement of ac-
tivists and academics gained influence within the party, pushing it
toward a vision of social equality and powering the nomination of
George McGovern for president in 1972. Quotas to ensure diversity
were imposed starting with that year’s convention, and the Demo-
cratic Party became associated not just with civil rights for blacks, but
with feminism, the fledgling gay rights movement, migrant rights,
and a host of other cultural causes.
Black politicians were making their way to prominence, too.
By 1984, two of the nation’s three biggest cities were led by black
Democrats—Harold Washington in Chicago and Tom Bradley in
Los Angeles. This was also the year that the Reverend Jesse Jackson,
a veteran of the civil rights movement, sought to channel the grow-
ing clout of black voters within the party into a full-fledged national
campaign for president. He won three primaries and caucuses and
more than three million votes, the best showing ever by a black can-
didate for national office.
Pitted against the Republican Party of Reagan, this Democratic
Party—the national one—was facing an existential crisis in the South.
It could win the support of black voters, but not nearly enough whites.
The math was the math. Not only did Reagan take every southern
state in 1984; the margin wasn’t within twenty points in any of them.
But then there were the Democrats like Bill Clinton, one step
removed from their Washington brethren and thriving with the
same voters who were rejecting their party’s national candidates.
As Mondale lost Arkansas by twenty-t wo points on Election Day,
Clinton was reelected by twenty-six. He personified a new breed of
southern Democrat, a younger generation whose political maturation
had coincided with integration. Like their parents, they’d been born
into the Democratic Party, but the South in which they launched
their political careers had been transformed. Segregation was dead,
blacks were voting in real numbers, and whites were drifting toward
the GOP, a volatile mix of variables the old guard had never had to
worry about.
These new southern Democrats strived for a conciliatory tone
on race and welcomed African Americans into their party, while
still minding the conservative cultural values of their white constitu-
ents. They liked to emphasize improvements to public education and
economic development and tended to keep their distance from the
national party, ducking the fraught cultural issues of the day.
Some lived in fear of their national party and its move to the
left. How many more McGoverns and Mondales could they survive?
Others saw opportunity. If national Democrats needed to make in-
roads in the South to win back the White House, well, then maybe
they’d come looking for a candidate who could do just that. There was
no question which of these camps included Bill Clinton.