Ana Carastathis - Intersectionality - Introduction

University of Nebraska Press
Chapter Title: Introduction
Book Title: Intersectionality

Book Subtitle: Origins, Contestations, Horizons
Book Author(s): ANNA CARASTATHIS
Published by: University of Nebraska Press. (2016)
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Introduction
How should we understand the concept of intersectionality given its
ascendancy in feminist philosophy and in women’s, gender, and sexu-
ality studies as the way to theorize the synthesis, co-constitution, or
interactivity of “race” and “gender”? As it has traveled from margin to
center, “intersectionality” appears to have become a cliché, a common-
place, or a “buzzword” that garners widespread agreement that axes of
oppression are not separable in our everyday experiences and therefore
must be theorized together (K. Davis 2008). In a progressivist narrative,
intersectionality is celebrated as a methodological triumph over “previ-
ous” essentialist and exclusionary approaches to theorizing identity and
power relations; viewed as a research paradigm (Hancock 2007a, 2007b),
it has even been characterized as the “most important contribution that
women’s studies has made so far” (McCall 2005, 1771), and is hailed as
the inclusionary political orientation par excellence for the millennial
generation (Hancock 2011). Α quarter-century has elapsed since the
term “intersectionality” was theorized by the Black feminist legal scholar
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, who introduced the metaphor in 1989
and further elaborated the concept in 1991. One of the founders of Criti-
cal Race Theory in the U.S. legal academy, Crenshaw is the most widely
cited (if rarely closely read) “originator” of intersectionality, although
her work inherits a much longer history of Black feminist thought traced
to the nineteenth century. In the intervening twenty-five years, it seems
feminist theory has very much “settled down” with intersectionality. On
the face of it this is a positive development, inasmuch as it demonstrates
a consensus that homogenizing, essentialist, and exclusionary models
of identity that falsely universalize relatively privileged experiences and
identities to all “women,” models that marginalize some (indeed, most)
women while centering others, are unjust and inadequate to building
truly emancipatory theories and political movements. But how does the
prevailing conception of intersectionality, which (white-dominated)
feminist theory has made very much its own, connect to Crenshaw’s
aims when she originally articulated the metaphor and developed the
concept, or to the intellectual project of Black feminism? Although it is
frequently characterized as “difficult work” (Nash 2010), intersectionality
seems to have been “easily” appropriated by the white-dominated main-
stream of feminist thought, even as Black feminism and women-of-color
feminisms remain at the margins (or, are fetishized as tokens of “differ-
ence”) and the social groups for which they advocate are systemically
excluded from academic institutions. Nikol Alexander-Floyd diagnoses
a “neocolonial,” “post–black feminist approach . . . on intersectionality
within the social sciences . . . that disappears or re-marginalizes black
women” (2012, 9). All this raises the question, what is the relationship
between intersectionality’s “mainstreaming” (Dhamoon 2011) and the
broader concerns of Black feminism, in which intersectionality is but one
of a constellation of concepts, yet from which it seems to have become
detached as the sole contribution this intellectual project has to offer?
These questions motivate my attempt in this book to examine the
notion of intersectionality as a provisional concept and to explore how
it may serve as a horizon of possibility for liberatory, coalitional femi-
nist praxis in the embattled twenty-first century. Intersectionality faces
a peculiar historical dilemma. On the one hand, the Anglo-American
political mainstream declares that we find ourselves in a “postracial,”
“post-feminist,” “postcolonial” era; identity-based claims are greeted
with suspicion and groups seeking redress of historical injustice face
public cynicism and fatigue. On the other hand, critical theories reveal
not only that inequalities have not been attenuated, hierarchies have not
been dismantled, and identities have not been dissipated into univer-
sal humanity; if anything, as global institutions adaptively reconfigure
2 Introduction
themselves in response to socially transformative movements, oppressive
power relations have become increasingly mystified, inequalities seem-
ingly more intractable, and institutions seemingly more difficult to trans-
form. Moreover, an enduring obstacle to forming effective movements
against oppressions is the fragmentation of identities and the divisions
within and among communities of struggle—processes that are as much
about violence, marginalization, and collusion with hegemonic power
as they are about inadequate imaginations, flawed cognitive habits, and
misplaced allegiances. Initially, intersectionality was explicitly aimed at
contesting these representational, discursive, and intersubjective dynam-
ics within antiracist and feminist movements seeking to transform social
relations. Yet much of what Crenshaw’s analysis revealed about identi-
ties, oppressions, and political struggle has been forgotten—some say
systematically (Bilge 2013)—as intersectionality became mainstreamed as
an institutionalized intellectual project. Although intersectionality has
become an axiom of feminist theory and research and has been “institu-
tionalized” (Nash 2008) in academic and, increasingly, in human-rights
discourses and policy frameworks, flippant or vague references to “inter-
sectionality” abound and can serve to obscure a profound critique of
deeply entrenched cognitive habits that inform feminist and antiracist
thinking about oppression and privilege. In other words, paradoxically,
the success of intersectionality may mark its failure, the wide travel of
the concept its shallow apprehension.
My aim in this book is neither to “settle” the various debates that
“intersectionality” has generated nor to conclusively pronounce on its
utility or inutility as a “grand theory” of oppression, discrimination, or
identity (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 788–89). Instead, my point
of departure is the observation that Crenshaw, Sumi Cho, and Leslie
McCall make that “some of what circulates as critical debate about what
intersectionality is or does reflects a lack of engagement with both origi-
nating and contemporary literatures on intersectionality” (788). I take
up their call for “greater theoretical, methodological, substantive and
political literacy” (792) and offer, in the chapters that follow, an engage-
ment with Crenshaw’s foundational texts, contextualized in the intel-
lectual history which animates their framing of intersectionality as an
Introduction 3
analytic sensibility, a disposition, or a way of thinking. Indeed, I argue
that intersectionality points to a way of thinking into which most of us
have not yet become habituated. That is, I suggest intersectionality con-
stitutes a profound challenge, as opposed to a determinate resolution of
cognitive essentialism, binary categorization, and conceptual exclusion.
My intervention into the fraught field of “intersectionality studies” is
twofold. On the one hand, I want to challenge the triumphal narrative
of “political completion” (Wiegman 2012) that surrounds intersectional-
ity as the way to theorize the relationship among systems of oppression.
If intersectionality is bound to disappoint, as Robyn Wiegman argues
(2012, 20), perhaps it is because the concept has been fundamentally
misapprehended and tendentiously misappropriated. Detached from
its political aims to redress Black women’s invisibility in law and social-
movement discourses, it has been harnessed to inverted representational
objectives, namely, to signify mainstream feminism’s arrival at a postracial
moment. Intersectionality is routinely invoked as a corrective to exclu-
sion within feminist theory and politics, whether it is espoused as the
guarantor of ethico-political values, such as inclusion (Hancock 2011), or
methodological values, such as complexity (McCall 2005). On the other
hand, I argue that calls to go beyond intersectionality are premature. If,
as I will try to show, intersectionality is a provisional concept, meant
to get us to think about how we think, then the failure to confront it as
such, and instead to deploy it as a theory of double or multiple oppres-
sion based on a positivist approach to categories (e.g., race, ethnicity,
gender, gender identity, sexuality, disability, age, citizenship, etc.), means
that the field of intersectionality studies is actually in its infancy (Collins
2009, vii)—neither at some impasse which signals its exhaustion nor at
a mature phase which signals its completion. Accordingly, in seeking
to “go beyond,” the post-intersectional critique of intersectionality fails
to fully confront the challenge to cognitive and perceptual habits that
intersectionality advances. Intersectionality-as-challenge urges us to
grapple with and overcome our entrenched perceptual-cognitive habits
of essentialism, categorial purity, and segregation.
Taking a third way between complacency with intersectionality (as
feminism’s postracial telos) and its rejection in a premature attempt to
4 Introduction
“go beyond” intersectionality, I propose that immanent critiques of inter-
sectionality (and of the field of “intersectionality studies”) are crucial
if we are to achieve analytic clarity, contextual rigor, and a politicized,
historicized understanding of the trajectory of this concept. I argue
that if intersectionality has been uprooted and transplanted in various
sites, domains, and contexts, its roots in social-justice movements and
critical intellectual projects—specifically, Black feminism—must be
recovered, retraced, and embraced. Performing a close reading, in the
chapters that follow I recover three overlooked yet crucial moments in
Crenshaw’s 1989 and 1991 essays: an overlooked metaphor that served
as a companion metaphor to the now-famous intersection metaphor—
that of the basement (1989, 151–52); an overlooked footnote in which
Crenshaw makes it explicit that she intends “intersectionality” to serve
as a provisional concept (1991, 1244–45n9); and an overlooked norma-
tive conclusion in which she argues that the implication of intersection-
ality for a theory and a politics of identity is that identities should be
viewed as coalitions (1991, 1299). Finally, I synthesize my interpretation
of intersectionality—as a provisional concept intimating the possibility
of coalitional praxis—with decolonial feminism, which seeks to over-
come the coloniality of heteropatriarchal gender: the violent historical
enmeshing of binary gender in systems of capital, white supremacy, and
empire (Lugones 2010, 747).
One of the implications of this heterodox reading of intersectionality
is that it undermines the currently hegemonic view of the term as a syn-
onym of double (or multiple) jeopardy. I argue against an understanding
of intersectionality that, preserving the integrity of categories of “race,”
“gender,” and other “axes” of oppression, conjoins them in order to “get
at” the experiences of “multiply oppressed” groups. On this basis, I also
contest the equation of “intersectionality” with the “race, gender, class
(sexuality)” paradigm developed in sociology, psychology, and other
empirical social sciences, which in my view is inherently additive even
as it insists that “no simple mathematical relationship can capture the
complexity of the interrelationships of these systems” (L. Weber 1998, 25;
L. Weber 2010). While stipulating the simultaneous expression of “race,
class, gender and sexuality . . . in every social situation,” these categories
Introduction 5
are presupposed as analytically separable “systems of social hierarchies”
(L. Weber 1998, 24). At first glance, the “crossroads” metaphor seems
to support this kind of interpretation of intersectionality, as presuppos-
ing that “race” and “gender” constitute separate roads that meet at an
intersection, which represents the social location of Black women (for
instance) as the junction of “racial” and “gender” oppression. However, I
argue against such a deployment of intersectionality, which assumes that
the intersection of single-axis categories results in the representation of
multiply oppressed groups (Lugones 2007). The categorial erasure and
political exclusion of Black women from “women” and “Black people”
is an intractable problem of representation which results from how the
received categories have historically been produced and how they con-
tinue to be deployed. I disagree with theorists who argue that the inter-
section of categories changes their structure or content (see Garry 2012,
510). Intersectionality can make visible categorial exclusion, but it can-
not remedy it at the level of representation; instead of complacency with
received categories, it urges their reconceptualization—taking as the
starting point for this process the social location of groups whose con-
crete, “simultaneous” experiences have been fragmented and distorted
beyond recognition (crc 1983; Lugones 2003; A. P. Harris 1990). Argu-
ing against what has become the predominant usage of “intersectional-
ity” may seem an exercise in futility; the reason for my insistence on this
point is that I think the continued use of essentialist categories construct-
ed through the privileging of the normative or prototypical members of
groups reproduces (instead of contesting) this privilege at the prereflec-
tive, perceptual level (see Goff and Kahn 2013). Intersectionality was
introduced as a politically engaged theoretical framework invested in
sociolegal transformative praxis; its reduction to an additive conceptu-
alization of oppression that reproduces exclusionary cognitive and per-
ceptual habits thwarts its critical impetus. While it might be necessary
to use existing categories in some instances, we should not harbor the
illusion that their unadulterated junction constitutes “intersectionality.”
In the later chapters of the book I emphasize how the political poten-
tial of intersectionality lies in our ability to reimagine our identities and
our alignments in coalitional terms, revealing the inherent and potential
6 Introduction
impurity of categories by practicing their interconnectedness (see chap-
ters 5and 6). Intersectionality is often conflated with identity politics, in
the sense that it is perceived as a narrow identitarianism that militates
for the visibility of subjects caught in the intersection of race, gender,
and other “axes” of oppression. (This assumes that intersectionality is an
additive theory of double jeopardy, which, as I have already explained, I
believe to be a misinterpretation.) The intersectional critique of identity
politics—which reveals identity categories to be coalitions: internally
heterogeneous, complex unities constituted by their internal differences
and dissonances and by internal as well as external relations of power—
has been overlooked by critics and post-intersectionality scholars who
have misconstrued intersectionality as a naive form of identitarian-
ism. Intersectionality is impelled by a politics of visibility for Black
women; the implication of this liberatory politics—as the Combahee
River Collective (crc) articulated so powerfully in “A Black Feminist
Statement”—is the “destruction of all the systems of oppression” (crc
1983, 215). To understand why the liberation of Black women entails the
liberation of all oppressed groups—why Black feminist politics are always
already coalitional, even when they appear “separatist”—it is necessary
to revisit the relationship of Crenshaw’s intersection metaphor to the
basement metaphor (see chapter 2). The crc argues that Black (lesbi-
an) women “might use our position at the bottom to make a clear leap
into revolutionary action. If Black women were free it would mean that
everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate
the destruction of all the systems of oppression” (215). As Crenshaw’s
basement analogy shows, a symmetrical claim does not obtain with
respect to an “identity politics” by and for relatively privileged members
of oppressed groups, whose efforts to seek redress for the discrimina-
tion (only) they face within the parameters set by antidiscrimination
discourses actually serve to reproduce social hierarchy, and specifically
to condemn multiply oppressed groups to sociolegal invisibility, to rel-
egate them to the “unprotected margins” of social life (Crenshaw 1989,
151–52; see chapters 2 and 4).
My perspective on intersectionality is an immanently critical one. To
use the admittedly problematic metaphor of feminist “waves,” intersec-
Introduction 7
tionality is a concept of undeniable importance in what are characterized
as the “third” and “fourth” waves of feminism—although as we will see
in chapter 1, its seeds were planted in the “first wave” and it put down
roots in the “second” (see Thompson 2002). However, its easy appro-
priation means that often the aims of intersectionality are inverted, its
theoretical content is oversimplified, and its political force is therefore
effaced. This occurs in both critical and celebratory accounts, in which
the metaphor is variously reduced to an additive junction of essen-
tialist categories, upheld or dismissed as a naive form of identity poli-
tics, fetishized as the guarantor of political or theoretical inclusion, or
aggrandized as a unified theory of “multiple oppressions.” In my view,
the transformative potential of intersectionality lies in its political and
intellectual challenges to the normative segregation of social movements,
liberatory discourses, cognitive matrices, and conceptual apparatuses.
If those challenges have been systematically overlooked in the course
of intersectionality’s ascendancy, or conflated with the very different
political norm of “inclusion,” it is arguably within a “suspenseful” space
carved by immanent critique—neither seeking to transcend intersection-
ality nor celebrating its “arrival”—that we can confront, tarry with, and
understand its critical import, its theoretical significance, and its political
potentialities. Paradoxically, if we are to advance the liberatory and trans-
formative goals which initially motivated intersectionality, perhaps we
need to suspend the assumption that the concept is itself the guarantor
of these aims. One component of this project is to read intersectional-
ity against the grain, contesting prevalent readings in what has come to
be known as “intersectionality studies.” This is not done merely out of a
hermeneutic commitment to the “most accurate” reading, or to “police”
or “discipline” the uses to which intersectionality is put, but rather in
order to contribute to a collective process already under way of grap-
pling with the concept’s most generative interpretations (see May 2015).
I begin, in chapter 1, by offering a preliminary definition of “intersec-
tionality” (drawn from Crenshaw’s 1991 essay) and situating the concept
in a trajectory of Black feminist thought that begins in the nineteenth
century, tracing its relationship to antecedent concepts (double and tri-
ple jeopardy, interlocking oppressions) and contemporaneous concepts
8 Introduction
(multiple jeopardy, matrix of domination, etc.). I then examine intersec-
tionality as a research paradigm that has crossed disciplinary boundaries
and adduce four analytic benefits which its proponents claim it affords
social theory: complexity, simultaneity, irreducibility, and inclusivity.
Finally, I broach the fraught and complex question of identity in rela-
tion to intersectionality: If intersectionality is, in part, a framework for
theorizing identity, should it be viewed as a general theory of identity,
or as a theory of the identities of “multiply oppressed” groups, such as,
prototypically, those of Black women? Can intersectionality account for
the convergence of identity categories that confer privilege, and for those
identities that are normatively “unmarked,” such as those of white men?
In chapter 2, I recover an overlooked metaphor that, in Crenshaw’s
1989 article “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics,” served as a companion metaphor to intersectionality:
the basement metaphor. Largely forgotten in the “mainstreaming” of
intersectionality, in addition to the now-famous intersection metaphor,
Crenshaw offered the basement metaphor to show how—by privileging
monistic, mutually exclusive, and analogically constituted categories of
“race” and “sex” tethered, respectively, to masculinity and whiteness—
antidiscrimination law functions to reproduce social hierarchy rather
than to remedy it, systematically denying Black women plaintiffs legal
redress. In this chapter I ask how we should interpret the widespread
“forgetting” of the basement and the ascendancy of intersectionality.
Why did the latter prove to be a more mobile traveling metaphor? I
argue that the overlooking of the basement metaphor is symptomatic
of the deracination of intersectionality from its origins in Black feminist
thought, and that its effect has been to occlude Crenshaw’s account of
the sociolegal reproduction of hierarchical power. This theoretical argu-
ment is contextualized in a reading of recent antidiscrimination juris-
prudence which reveals (contrary to what we might imagine or hope)
that U.S. law entrenches, rather than alleviates, endemic discrimination,
naturalizing systemic conditions of exploitation and oppression.
In chapter 3 my point of departure is an overlooked footnote in Cren-
shaw’s 1991 article “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Introduction 9
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” in which Crenshaw
characterizes intersectionality as a “provisional concept.” Elaborating
an interpretation of intersectionality that sees it as anticipating or pre-
figuring the normative and theoretical goals that are often imputed to
it, I argue that triumphal narrative of “political completion” (Wiegman
2012) that surrounds intersectionality—as the way to theorize the rela-
tionship among systems of oppression—helps to cement the impression
of mainstream feminism’s arrival at a postracial moment. First, I suggest
we should approach intersectionality as a “provisional concept” that
disorients entrenched cognitive habits. I draw on Sara Ahmed’s (2006)
work to suggest that disorientation is a vital, embodied experience that
can not only reveal how we are presently normatively oriented but can
also call into question or “queer” our normative orientations, leaving us
productively unsure of how to move forward. We might contrast that
productive uncertainty with the predominant view of intersectionality
as “a kind of feminist truth, a proven account of how both identity and
oppression are experienced” (Nash 2010). Finally, in this chapter I argue
that we should exercise caution with respect to (postracial) discourses
of “arrival” in which some deployments of intersectionality participate,
as these seem to me to be motivated by a form of “aversive racism” with-
in feminism (Son Hing et al. 2004), manifested in the simultaneous,
nonperformative avowal and affective disavowal of antiracist and other
anti-oppression politics.
In chapter 4, I discuss several critical arguments that have been
advanced against or in relation to intersectionality, particularly in the
last decade when the concept has increasingly come under scrutiny. On
the one hand, the ascendancy of intersectionality was, from an early
phase, marked by the relative absence of critique, which I suggest indi-
cates a superficial engagement by scholars eager to embrace a concept
that, once untethered from its origins and often emptied of its critical
content, quickly began to circulate as a pliable “buzzword.” On the
other hand, some critiques that have, more recently, been articulated
also fall prey to the tendency to oversimplify, misread, and reduce inter-
sectionality to a shallow simile, overlooking its conceptual and political
challenges to ways of thinking that are still prevalent and which critics
10 Introduction
often replicate even as they diagnose intersectionality’s ostensible faults.
Most critiques erroneously assume that intersectionality is, uncontro-
versially, a model of double or multiple jeopardy, amenable to positivist
as well as postmodernist representational goals. In short, both critiques
and approving deployments tend to overlook the critical significance of
intersectionality, its provisional status, and its potential to destabilize
essentialist cognitive habits. Given the shared premises of many criti-
cal and celebratory accounts, rather than simply dismissing critiques of
intersectionality, in this chapter I read them as opportunities to consider
the limitations of intersectionality’s positivist deployments.
Following my assessment of these various critiques of the concept, in
chapters 4 and 5, I continue my heterodox interpretation of intersec-
tionality by examining its implications for theories of identity and for
radical coalitional praxis. Although intersectionality has been overt-
ly linked to coalition as a normative goal, few scholars have carefully
examined Crenshaw’s argument that an intersectional analysis ought to
lead us to reconceptualize identities as coalitions (1991, 1299). Taking
this overlooked normative conclusion as my point of departure, in this
chapter I draw on social-movement history to explore the theoretical
underpinnings and political implications of the claim that identity cat-
egories are potential coalitions, and trace the relationship of the concept
of intersectionality to the concept of coalition in women-of-color femi-
nisms. I suggest that reconceptualizing identities as coalitions enables
us not only to form alliances across lines of experiential and political
difference but also to constitute “coalitions of one” where one is aligned
with all aspects of one’s identity, particularly those that one has been
encouraged to repress or deny. I argue that coalition should animate
our understanding of intersectionality: conceptualizing intersectional
identities in coalitional terms may help us avoid positivist and essential-
ist constructions of identity and subjectivity.
In chapter 6, I consider what it might mean to synthesize a robustly
intersectional analytic sensibility with a decolonial politics. In Cren-
shaw’s work and in the field of intersectionality studies, intersectional-
ity lacks an explicit consideration of the coloniality of U.S. law and of
the colonial and anticolonial dynamics in U.S. social movements. Yet a
Introduction 11
historicized understanding of oppressions requires an account of colo-
nialism as an ongoing, diachronic process of long duration that haunts
embodied identities, cognitive and perceptual habits, and human and
nonhuman relationships. Using the architectural metaphor of “three
pillars” upholding white supremacy, Andrea Smith has shown that coali-
tions among women of color and Indigenous women are imperiled by
complicity in one another’s marginalization, a phenomenon that is
occluded by a singular, homogeneous conception of “racism” and a fail-
ure to view heteropatriarchy as crucial to its reproduction (2006, 2012).
I juxtapose Smith’s framework of “three pillars of white supremacy” and
María Lugones’s “modern/colonial gender system” with intersectional-
ity to examine the points of convergence and divergence between these
concepts. I also elaborate the reading of intersectionality, interlocking
oppressions, and “intermeshed oppressions” advanced by Lugones (2003,
2007, 2010). Lugones argues that intersectionality—as a critique of colo-
nial institutions, such as U.S. law, that embody the “logic of purity”—is
compatible with but not identical to the coalitional, decolonial feminist
project of overcoming the “coloniality of gender,” that is, “racialized,
capitalist gender oppression” (2010, 747). I suggest that in her decolonial
feminism we can discern “post-post-intersectional” glimpses (Crenshaw
2014) that can help us to reanimate the interpretation of intersectional-
ity I have been advancing in this book: as a struggle concept prefiguring
the tasks ahead—including the formation of identities-as-coalitions that
preserve multiplicity and heterogeneity—as opposed to a truth taken as
axiomatic, signifying feminism’s theoretical “completion.”
We find ourselves at a juncture between skeptics who declare “intersec-
tionality fatigue” and celebrants who declare “intersectionality’s arrival.”
If we could articulate what is wrong with each of these positions, could
we reinterpret intersectionality without taking for granted, as self-evident
or as truism, the meaning of categorial “intersection” but rather using the
intersection to reveal and contest categorial exclusions that are deeply
entrenched in our perceptual, cognitive, and political lives? Animated
by concerns stemming from women-of-color feminisms and decolo-
nial feminisms, I problematize the institutionalization, mainstream-
ing, or neocolonization of intersectionality, tracing these developments
12 Introduction
to particular occlusions of Crenshaw’s argument—provisionality (the
footnote); hierarchy (the basement metaphor); coalitional identity (the
normative conclusion)—that facilitated the deracination, detachment,
and deployment of the concept in ways that may evacuate it of its politi-
cal challenge and its political promise.
Introduction 13

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