G.R. No.

134498 November 13, 2001

Celia M. Meriz, petitioner,

vs.

People of the Philippines, respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner violated the BP 22.

Ruling:

Petitioner, in the instant appeal, would have it that there was an absolute lack of
consideration for the subject checks which were issued only as a condition for the grant of loan
in her favor and that the requisite element of notice was not complied with.

The essential elements of the offense penalized under BP 22 are (1) the making, drawing
and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the check
is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court has since said that
a check issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for encashment, has the same effect
like any other check and must thus be held to be within the contemplation of BP 22. Once a
check is presented for payment, the drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in
payment of an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation. BP 22 does not appear to concern
itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to
instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for
currency. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The element of knowledge
involves a state of mind that obviously would be difficult to establish; hence, the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit
coincidental with the attendance of the two other elements. Section 2 of the Act provides:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in
full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.

The prima facie presumption that the drawer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
or credit at the time of the issuance, or on the presentment for payment, of the check might be
rebutted by payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within
five banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer. The payment could thus be a
complete defense that would lie regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. It must be presupposed then that the issuer receives a notice of dishonor and that,
within five days from receipt thereof, he would have failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangement for its payment.
G.R. Nos. L-66003-04 December 11, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HERBERTO A. MANZANILLA, Presiding Judge, Branch XLVII, Regional Trial Court
of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, LOURDES TAN CHUA and JOHNNY TAN CHUA,
respondents.

RULING:

Violation of the bad checks act is committed when one "makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds" or "having sufficient funds" in or credit with the drawee bank ... shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank." 1 Contrary to the opinion of the respondent judge, dishonor is
but one ingredient of the offense. In so holding, he has discounted the elements of "making or
drawing and issuing" of the worthless check, or "knowledge" by the drawer at the time of issue"
that he has insufficient funds to cover it, or having sufficient funds, "shall fail" to cover the full
amount of the check within ninety days from issuance.

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the private respondents knew at the time they
issued the two checks in question that they had not enough funds in the drawee bank to cover the
said checks. "Knowledge," therefore, as an essential ingredient of the offense charged and as
defined in the statute, is, by itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one
territory or another. Being so, it is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court.

The act of issuing the bum checks, as charged in the informations, furthermore, is a
malum prohibitum. 3 As such, it is committed by the very fact of its performance. 4 In that event,
jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information. 5 In this case, the
information states that the offense was committed in Bacolod City. The legal requirements set
forth in Rule 110, Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Court as amended have, therefore, been
substantially complied with.
G.R. No. 74524-25 December 18, 1986

OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑ;O Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Rulings

BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it
unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during
its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a
bill on Third Reading.

The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and

thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the
exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to
the judicial department of the government.

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states
of the United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless to
warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is
that substantial differences exist between our statute and the worthless check acts of those states
where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily
from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider that judicial decisions must be read
in the context of the facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social economic
and political environment—in short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize the
wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.

As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even
override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the
constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the
state. 32 Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so
there is no occasion to cross it.

We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.

We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which,
in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the
payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check
there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection,
the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the
well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. 34
 It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative
powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but
is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank
for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to
absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the
power to legislate, or the power to make laws. 35 which means, as applied to the present case, the
power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of
logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty
therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the
statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power.
The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is
farfetched.

Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973
Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. This
constitutional provision prohibits the introduction of amendments to a bill during the Third
Reading. It is claimed that during its Third Reading, the bill which eventually became BP 22 was
amended in that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as adopted on Second
Reading was altered or changed in the printed text of the bill submitted for approval on Third
Reading.

A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter
shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact
text of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading. 36 Part of the
confusion was due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the
amendment period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or accepted by
the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten the complete text of the provisions of
the bill as amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records that
the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by
the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes for that
day. In any event, before the bin was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the Interim
Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report,
which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question
was ... an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the
provision in question as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore, find no merit in the
petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution were violated.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting
aside the order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419,
66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby dismissed and the
temporary restraining order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs against private
petitioners.
G.R. No. 129900. October 2, 2001

JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Rulings
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22 does not make any
distinction regarding the purpose for which the checks were issued. Thus, it is of no moment
even if it were true that, as claimed by accused, the checks she issued were meant only to
guarantee payment of her obligation. Criminal liability attaches whether the checks were issued
in payment of an obligation or to guarantee payment of that obligation. There is violation of B.P.
22 when a worthless check is issued and is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The
OSG also points out that accused did not deny having issued the subject checks.
After a careful consideration of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find
that the resolution of this petition hinges on the issue of whether the prosecution evidence
suffices to convict the accused, herein petitioner Jane Caras. The elements of the offense under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for
value; (2) knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
presentment; and (3) said check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the
basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received
by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22
Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and
was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we
cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground
for her acquittal. Discussion of the other assigned errors need no longer detain us.
G.R. No. 110782. September 25, 1998

IRMA IDOS, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Section 1 of B.P. 22 specifically requires that the person in making, drawing or issuing
the check, be shown that he knows at the time of issue, that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.

In the case at bar, as earlier discussed, petitioner issued the check merely to evidence the
proportionate share of complainant in the partnership assets upon its dissolution. Payment of that
share in the partnership was conditioned on the subsequent realization of profits from the unsold
goods and collection of the receivables of the firm. This condition must be satisfied or complied
with before the complainant can actually encash the check. The reason for the condition is that
petitioner has no independent means to satisfy or discharge the complainants share, other than by
the future sale and collection of the partnership assets. Thus, prior to the selling of the goods and
collecting of the receivables, the complainant could not, as of yet, demand his proportionate
share in the business. This situation would hold true until after the winding up, and subsequent
termination of the partnership. For only then, when the goods were already sold and receivables
paid that cash money could be availed of by the erstwhile partners.

Complainant did not present any evidence that petitioner signed and issued four checks
actually knowing that funds therefor would be insufficient at the time complainant would present
them to the drawee bank. For it was uncertain at the time of issuance of the checks whether the
unsold goods would have been sold, or whether the receivables would have been collected by the
time the checks would be encashed. As it turned out, three were fully funded when presented to
the bank; the remaining one was settled only later on.

Since petitioner issued these four checks without actual knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds, she could not be held liable under B.P. 22 when one was not honored right away. For it is
basic doctrine that penal statutes such as B.P. 22 must be construed with such strictness as to
carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant x x x.i[24] The element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds has to be proved by the prosecution; absent said proof, petitioner could not
be held criminally liable under that law. Moreover, the presumption of prima facie knowledge of
such insufficiency in this case was actually rebutted by petitioners evidence.

Further, we find that the prosecution also failed to prove adequate notice of dishonor of
the subject check on petitioners part, thus precluding any finding of prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. There is no proof that notice of dishonor was actually sent
by the complainant or by the drawee bank to the petitioner. On this point, the record is bereft of
evidence to the contrary.

But in fact, while the subject check initially bounced, it was later made good by
petitioner. In addition, the terms of the parties compromise agreement, entered into during the
pendency of this case, effectively invalidates the allegation of failure to pay or to make
arrangement for the payment of the check in full. Verily, said compromise agreement constitutes
an arrangement for the payment in full of the subject check.

The absence of notice of dishonor is crucial in the present case. As held by this Court in
prior cases:

Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the
prima facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2
of B.P. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing,
making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check
the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such
check.
 The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a
notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic
postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to
afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.ii
Furthermore, the element of knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason x x x is inversely applied in
this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds
with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the
vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It
would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt
with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance
Management.
To recapitulate, we find the petition impressed with merit. Petitioner may not be held
liable for violation of B.P. 22 for the following reasons: (1) the subject check was not made,
drawn and issued by petitioner in exchange for value received as to qualify it as a check on
account or for value; (2) there is no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner, at the time of
issue of the check, had actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and (3) there was no
notice of dishonor of said check actually served on petitioner, thereby depriving her of the
opportunity to pay or make arrangements for the payment of the check, to avoid criminal
prosecution.
VICTOR QUE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
G.R. No. 75217-18
RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration of Our minute resolution 1 dated September

22, 1986 denying the main Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision 2 and resolution 3 of
the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City convicting herein petitioner of the crime of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on
two (2) counts.

In the main Petition filed on August 25, 1986, petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of
the appellate court's decision dated January 14, 1986 and the resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the same, on the grounds that respondent appellate court not only
decided a substantial question of jurisdiction not in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence but also sanctioned the departure by the lower court from the accepted judicial
procedures on the issue of jurisdiction.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner raises the following grounds:

1. That the denial of the petition by way of a minute resolution is for no stated reason
except for "lack of merit. "

2. That the respondent-appellate court erred in not considering material facts as well as
the principal element of the crime charged showing that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to try the instant case.

3. The respondent-appellate court erred in failing to consider that one of the most
important elements of the offense charged under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which is the
place of the issuance of the check is clearly absent in the instant case.

Or simply stated, the issue is whether the decision of both the trial court and appellate
court and the denial of the Petition for Review are in accordance with law and evidence.

The motion is without merit.

There is no question that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City had jurisdiction over
the case as provided for in Secs. 10 and 15 (a) Rule 110 of the New Rules of Court. The findings
of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City as admitted
by petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on his civil liability.
Thus, the trial court held:

In his answer (Exhibit "H") to the civil complaint for collection of sum of money,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-32445 of the Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Quezon City
(Exhibit "G"), the accused inferentially admitted that the purchases and issuance of the check in
question were made at Francis Hill Supply located at No. 194 Speaker Perez Street, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City. (Exhibit "G-1" and Exhibit "H-1"). (p. 4, Dec.) (p. 62, Rollo)

It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank
located outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in
Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction.
 The argument on petitioner's second issue has likewise no leg to stand on. On this
argument that he issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases
by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of which he is the Manager, We give our stamp of approval on the
findings of the appellate court, to wit:

Neither may appellant's claim in his second assignment of error that the accused issued
the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply,
Inc. serve to exculpate accused from criminal liability for his act of issuing the checks in
question.

It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does
not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment
of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule
of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no
such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history
of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition
all- embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee.
This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9)
which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the
Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to
prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks,
all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as
above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet
Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued
as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on
the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately
for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record, First
Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp- 1035-1036).

Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately issued
the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon presentment
regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee. (pp. 4-5. Dec.
IAC (pp. 37-38, Rollo)

From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that is the intention of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and
thus punishable under such law.

Finally, We now come to the third argument regarding the denial of the petition by a
minute resolution. Although, petitioner in his Reply, thru his counsel, Atty. Joanes G. Caacbay
has never questioned the power of this Court to deny petition for review by the issuance of a
mere minute resolution as there is no violation whatsoever of the provisions of the Constitution
and at the same time, same counsel disowns having knowledge or a hand in the preparation of
the motion for reconsideration which was prepared by a certain Atty. Victor T. Avena, We
deemed it worthwhile to mention here the case of In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, 574 where We
held that.

Six years ago in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31, 1963 (60
O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered
view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with Identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before;
and we held that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions' within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of
the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals' opinion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered. the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
instant petition for certiorari, is hereby DENIED.

Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., conc

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 87416

San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.

Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.

Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the
essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is
necessary for identifying the offense charged.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of
Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the information."

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed
in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction
upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over
the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a
criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA
160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative
factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check."

On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of
Justice, citing the case of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following
guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2)
the place where the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it
was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs.
Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus
F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14).

It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to
herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
 However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar
account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks
Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As
the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either
drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of
said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish
courts should not distinguish.1âwphi1 Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not
make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify
it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the
actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a
statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus,
where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted
(Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

RAMON C. TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 134298
DECISION
The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements
of fencing as against petitioner.[2]
We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.[3]
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things.[4]
The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things.[5]
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design
to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or
theft.[6]
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an
accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the
principal.[7]
P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects
of the crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft
could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in
the latter case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of
fencing. Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the
other, are separate and distinct offenses.[8] The State may thus choose to prosecute him either
under the Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would
seem inevitable considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a
presumption of fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.[10]
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the
crime of fencing as follows:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.[11]

Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the
existence of all the elements of the crime charged. [12]
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential
elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.[13] It is an ancient principle of
our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9).[14]
 What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that
the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular fact if he
has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of
something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence
unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words should know
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must
determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which
sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.[23]
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of
fencing.[24]
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and
thus petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
G.R. No. L-45490 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE SABIO, SR., City Judge of Cagayan de Oro and RANULFO M. SALAZAR, respondents.

Ruling

The motion to dismiss the case was denied on December 23, 1975,13 and the motion for its
reconsideration 14 was also denied on February 2, 1976. 15 Whereupon, Daylinda Lagua instituted the
present petition.

As stated, the issue for determination is whether or not the issuance of a postdated check, which is
subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds, in payment of a pre-existing obligation, constitutes
estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885 and Presidential Decree No. 818.

Prior to its amendment, Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, read:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the offender

knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee
of such circumstances.

Under said provisions, it was the rule that the mere issuance of a check with knowledge on the part of
the drawer that he had no funds to cover its amount and without informing the payee of such
circumstances, does not constitute the crime of estafa if the check was intended as payment of a pre-
existing obligation. The reason for the rule is that deceit, to constitute estafa, should be the efficient
cause of the defraudation and as such should either be prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud.16

In 1967, the law was amended by Republic Act No. 4885, eliminating the phrases "the offender knowing
that at the time he had no funds in the bank" and " without informing the payee of such circumstances.
" However, a presumption was included. The pertinent provisions of the law, as amended, now reads:

Art. 315. Swindling(estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the

offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
 insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act.

A comparative analysis of the two provisions will readily show that what has been established under the
amendment is the prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act in case
the drawer fails to deposit the necessary amount within three (3) days from notice of dishonor from the
bank and/or payee or holder of the check. Likewise, the amendment has eliminated the requirement
under the previous provision for the drawer to inform the payee that he had no funds in the bank or the
funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. 17 Moreover, what is
significant to note is that the time or occasion for the commission of the false pretense or fraudulent act
has not at all been changed by the amendment. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. Thus, under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, the following are the
elements of estafa: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the cheek was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the
payee thereof. Now, it is asked: Is there deceit and damage when a bad check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation? It is clear that under the law, the false pretense or fraudulent act must be
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. To defraud is to deprive some
right, interest, or property by deceitful device. 18 In the issuance of a check as payment for a pre-existing
debt, the drawer derives no material benefit in return as its consideration had long been delivered to
him before the check was issued. In short, the issuance of the check was not a means to obtain a
valuable consideration from the payee. Deceit, to constitute estafa should be the efficient cause of the
defraudation. 19 Since an obligation has already been contracted, it cannot be said that the payee parted
with his property or that the drawer has obtained something of value as a result of the postdating or
issuance of the bad check in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 20

Finally, considering the absence of an express provision in the law, the postdating or issuance of a bad
check in payment of a pre-existing obligation cannot be penalized as estafa by means of deceit,
otherwise, the legislature could have easily worded the amendatory act to that effect. Since the
language of the law is plain and unambiguous, We find no justification in entering into further inquiries
for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent. 21 Moreover, laws that impose criminal liability are
strictly construed. 22 The rule, therefore, that the issuance of a bouncing check in payment of a pre-
existing obligation does not constitute estafa has not at all been altered by the amendatory act. 23

The issue of jurisdiction was also raised by the petitioner in the case of People vs. Sabio, G.R. No. L-
45490. It is contended that the City Court, acting pursuant to its authority to conduct preliminary
investigations, cannot dismiss the case as a motion to quash can only be availed of in a regular trial
where the court has jurisdiction to try the offense. It is further alleged that the purpose of a preliminary
investigation is merely to determine a probable cause and not to rule on difficult questions of law. We
see no merit in these contentions. There is no dispute that the information was filed before the City
Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only, as the offense falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance. The check involved amounts to P1,500.00, hence, the imposable penalty
for the offense is prision mayor in its medium period or an imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years. 24 Under Section 78 of Republic Act No. 521, as amended by Republic
Act No. 3969, the City Court of Cagayan de Oro City is authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation. 25 When a power is conferred upon a court or judicial officer, it is deemed that all the
means necessary to carry it into effect are included therein. 26 The power, therefore, conferred upon the
City Court of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct preliminary investigations carries with it the power to draw
a conclusion after the investigation. It has been held that in the preliminary investigation proper, the
Justice of the Peace may discharge the defendant if he finds no probable cause to hold the defendant
for trial. But if he finds a probable cause, it is his duty to bind over the defendant to the Court of First
Instance for trial on the merits. 27 Moreover, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public
accusation of a crime. 28 The City Court, therefore, acted within its jurisdiction in granting the motion to
quash the information filed in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the petition in case G.R. No. L-45490 for lack of merit;

2. Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals in case G.R. No. L-45711, and acquitting the petitioner
of the crime charged; and

3. Dismissing Criminal Case No. 2023, entitled "People vs. Daylinda Lagua."

No pronouncement as to costs.