PEOPLE VS.
CATANTAN (piracy; banca) committed –
PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its
cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered
as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided."And a vessel is
construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel
or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from
one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include
all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in
fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to
do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had
full control of his victims. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532
designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage
and prevent piracy in Philippine waters.
SORIA VS. DESIERTO (ay, kaloka! Kababayan ko si Prosec. Jessica
Viloria, my town San Juan was also mentioned, LOL)
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
ESPANOL VS. FORMOSO ( Mapua and Sharcon like Mapua the
school and Sharon)
ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so
where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its
face, merely constitutes indirect contempt. Moreover, settled is
the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a
separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court
exercises limited jurisdiction. Perforce, petitioner judge erred in
declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct
contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have
conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF ( Si Lolo Judge Pano, hehe)
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish.
BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE (Crispin Beltran, nagspeech sya)
Rebellion?
The arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw
and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government
or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against
the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either –
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers and prerogatives.23
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or
multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end.
GONZALES VS. ABAYA ( Oakwood Mutiny)
R.A. No. 7055 lays down the general rule that members of the
AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members
of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit
crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances
shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the
exception to the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court
martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e.,
where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be
tried by the proper civil court.
GELIG VS. PEOPLE (Pubic school teachers, buntis si Gemma,
incomplete abortion)
Unintentional abortion? NO.
Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be
committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining
the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.[14]
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is
the more common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties,
or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of
official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.[15]
PEOPLE VS. DASIG ( traffic tapos may mga NPA pala )
There is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty,
what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and
hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the
government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal
Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his
membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and
that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as
a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not
murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."
PEOPLE VS. ABALOS ( father and son nag aaway sila, tapos
umeksena si pulis)
The trial court correctly concluded that he should be held
accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said
person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person
in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.[16]
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or
of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex
crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
PEOPLE VS. UMALLI
see dugest sa net
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUROR VS. CA (NPA)
In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it
becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not
the act was done in furtherance of a political end.The political
motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission
of the crime indicated in the foregoing affidavit. Merely because
it is alleged that private respondents were members of the
CPP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight resulting
in the death of a government trooper and the wounding of four
others does not necessarily mean that the killing and wounding
of the victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The
political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to
justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion.
RUZOL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (regulation of salvafe forest
products, si Mayor)
On the basis of the issued Permits Informations for violation of
Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria, without being
lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to the
damage and prejudice of the of the government.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government
instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating rules
and regulations for the protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government
instrumentality clothed with such authority. The claim of DENR’s
supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle
of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution16 in
relation to the general welfare clause under LGC.
Main Issue: Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official
Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of
Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under
Art. 177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. —
Any person who shall knowingly and falsely represent
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of
any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Emphasis
Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two
ways of committing this crime:
1. by knowingly and falsely representing himself
to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government;
2. under pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled
to do so.32 The former constitutes the crime of
usurpation of authority, while the latter act
constitutes the crime of usurpation of official
functions.
UNIONBANK VS. DESI ( issue saforum shopping)
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against
Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a)That the accused made
a statement under oath or executed
an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b)That the statement or affidavit was
made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer
oath.
(c)That in the statement or affidavit,
the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d)That the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was
allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public
in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material
statements she subscribed and swore to were not true.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is
false testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case
(Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a
civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in
other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed,
the present case involves the making of an untruthful
statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
DAAN VS. SANDUGANBAYAN ( yong na plea of not guilty ito )
Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly
forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.
Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may
plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals
inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his
official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll..In the
same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a case
for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of
conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to
render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to
render such an accounting within the prescribed period.
BORLONGAN VS. PENA ( agent's compensation)
par. 2, Article 172 of the RPC or Introduction of Falsified
Document in a Judicial Proceeding. The elements of the offense
are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was
falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in
Article 171 or in any subdivisions No. 1 or 2 of
Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence
in any judicial proceeding.45
The falsity of the document and the defendant's knowledge of
its falsity are essential elements of the offense.
CHOA VS. PEOPLE (
At the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had
committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the elements of the
crime were already present then, such withdrawal only
terminated the proceedings for naturalization. It did not
extinguish his culpability for perjury he already committed.
PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (alias)
Alias is dfined in Ursua doctrine a name or names used by a
person or intended to be used by
him publicly and habituallyusually in business transactions in
addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority.There must be, in the words of Ursua,
a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day
forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.[18]
BUTALANON VS. PEOPLE (PCCI cashier, pati si baby nya
pinaapply nya... hay)
Falsification of Public or Private Document?
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanons
act[38] of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e.,
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of
private document,[45] it is important to ascertain whether the
offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document
or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is
committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without
the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be
charged is estafa.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals
correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents.
DABU VS. KAPUNAN ( Si Judge)
Falsification of an official document such as court records is
considered a grave offense. It also amounts to dishonesty. Under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave
offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon
commission of the first offense.
Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as
a criminal offense under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
and dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in the
judiciary.
PEOPLE VS DILAO
Doctrine: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.
PEOPLE VS. QUIAOIT
Doctrine: Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires the
presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation,
for the only elements necessary to consummate the crime is
proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the illicit drug as evidence
PEOPLE VS. STA. MARIA (
PEOPLE VS. LAYLO ( Gusto mo bang umiskor)
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.9
PEOPLE VS. NICOLAS
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-
buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. In the
case at bar, the buy-bust operation was conducted without need
of any prior surveillance for the reason that the informant
accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the
dangerous drugs.
LASERNA VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
Doctrine: students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their
right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
PEOPLE VS ROBELLO
PEOPLE VS. AURE
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred,
coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized
as evidence.[37] In the instant case, all these were sufficiently
established by the prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. ALLI (Ginawang prosti sa Malaysia)
In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of
syndicated illegal recruitment, to wit:
1. the offender undertakes either any activity within
the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
2. he has no valid license or authority required by
law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers; and
3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating
with one another.43
DEL MAR VS. PAGCOR
PEOPLE VS. PEPITO (postmaster)
Hence, five (5) criminal Informations for malversation of
public funds through falsification of official documents were
filed against him.
It is settled that in cases of malversation of public funds, the
mere failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any
public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence
that he has put such funds or property to personal use.[28] An
accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in
the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there
is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to
explain.
ABDULA VS. PEOPLE
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however,
automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation
because disbursement of public funds for public use is per
se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have
committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the
Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave
benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil
service laws.
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the
prosecution to prove the existence of all the essential elements
of the crime of technical malversation defined in Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code, which are:
1. That the offender is a public
officer;
2. That there is public fund or
property under his administration;
3. That such public fund or
property has been appropriated by
law or ordinance;
4. That he applies the same to a
public use other than that for which
such fund or property has been
appropriated by law or ordinance.[15]
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to
prove the second and third elements of the crime
charged. [16] She argued that the public funds in question,
having been established to form part of savings, had therefore
ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific
purpose.
LAURO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN ( si fiscal nanghingi ng pera)
Whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can
be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of
Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
Held: No. The contested provisions provides ,
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person,
in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it
a transactionbecause this term must be construed as analogous
to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is
one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions
and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner.
DUGAYON VS. PEOPLE (typewriters)
Recall that at the time of purchase of the typewriters, the
petitioner was then the Assistant Regional Director of DSWD and
member/signatory of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee.
She accepted the secondhand typewriters, contrary to the
requirement to buy brand new units, and allowed payment for
them at the price of brand new units.
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at
least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance
of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be
two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2
of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed
towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public
officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with
him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.
NAVA VS. PALATTAO ( DECS, 7 Superintendents)
To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic
Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that
1) the accused is a public officer;
2) the public officer entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and
3) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.[70]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan
did not err in ruling that the evidence presented warranted a
verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who approved
the transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby
suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices
of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased
by the COA audit team clearly established such undue
injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
PEOPPLE VS. DE CASTRO ( buying lik at the bakery)
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established:
(1) a person was killed;
(2) the accused killed him;
(3) the killing was with the attendance of any of
the qualifying circumstances under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and
(4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide.17
In this case, the foregoing elements of the crime of
murder were duly established.
They questioned the second element, the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use
excessive force, out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. Is We agree with the CA that
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
present in this case.
PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO (Alcala, Cagayan; raped by the godfather)
For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and
(2) that said act was accomplished
1. through the use of force or intimidation;
or
2. when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
3. when the victim is twelve years of age, or
is demented."20
"[I]n rape through force or intimidation, the force
employed by the guilty party need not be irresistible. Itis only
necessary that such force is sufficient to consummate the
purpose for which it was inflict..
What is important is that because of force and intimidation, the
victim was made to submit to the will of the appellant.
PEOPLE VS. JUMAWAN (Marital rape)
More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most
progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof
recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its
perpetration, viz:
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses
the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No.
8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal
relationship with his victim
PEOPLE VS. BARDE
From the afore-quoted provision of law, the killing of the
aforesaid deceased victims with the use of explosive, i.e., hand
grenade particularly M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, certainly
qualifies the crime to murder.
Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, also
attended the commission of the crime. Time and again, this
Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held that there is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.
There are two (2) conditions that must concur for
treachery to exist, to wit:
(a) the employment of means of execution gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and
(b) the means or method of execution was deliberately
and consciously adopted.

PEOPLE VS. FALLORINA (sarangola/kite)
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on
his part.The abuse of superior strength as alleged in the
Information is already absorbed by treachery and need not be
considered as a separate aggravating circumstance.53
DE OCAMPO VS. SOJ (teacher banged tehir heads)
Section 3(b), Article VI of RA 7610 defines child abuse as the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes physical abuse and cruelty. Petitioners alleged banging
of the heads of Ronald and Lorendo is clearly an act of cruelty.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (Jalosjos, the rapist politician, lol )
In People v. Campuhan,[21] we ruled that rape is
consummated by the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis. There need not be full and complete penetration of the
victims vagina for rape to be consummated.
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the
victim may be proved by the presentation of her birth
certificate.
Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether
male or female, who for money or profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraphs 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period;
In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing
Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast, inserting his finger into
her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all
constitute lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his
sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly convicted accused-
appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child
Abuse Law, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989,
96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him with the above-
described lascivious acts.
PEOPLE VS. JOSE (Maggie dela Riva case... see digest)
PEOPLE VS PERALTA (Sigue-sigue and “OXO” gangs riot)
The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because
of the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance:
Carriego was clubbed by Factora from behind, and as he lay
prostrate and defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him
repeatedly on the chest.
PEOPLE VS. BERDIDA (Pier 6 and 8... se digest on the net)
PEOPLE VS. GLINO ( mag asawa sa jeepney sinasak)
No Attempted Murder But
Less Serious Physical Injuries
The Court had occasion to explain the rudiments of proving
intent to kill in crimes against persons. It may consist in:
(1) the means used by the malefactors;
(2) the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time of, or immediately after the killing of the
victim;
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was
committed; and
(5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as a
result of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is presumed.
The nature and location of her wound militates against
the finding of their intent to kill. According to the physician who
examined her immediately after the incident, Virginia suffered
from an incised wound measuring 2.5 centimeters by 0.2
centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.58
POEOPLE VS. CAMPUHAN (Primo the helper; statutory rape)
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art.
335, par. (3)The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in
Art. 335, par. (3)The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in
Art. 335, par. (3)The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in
Art. 335, par. (3)
We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal
knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is
not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen
necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge.[10] But the act of touching should
be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis
into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching
alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated,[16] and not merely for
the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of
the pudendumby the penis, there can be no consummated rape;
at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness
PEOPLE VS. GOMEZ

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
PEOPLE VS. DIONALDO ( sa gym nakidnapped)
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and
murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48,
nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-
appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the
penalty of death.
PEOPLE VS. SALVADOR (Pinky was kidnapped by a Toyota Hi
Ace; cockfight)
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were
indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all private individuals.
Albert was taken on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six
days, during which period, threats to kill him and demand for
ransom were made.
Kidnapping for ransom
PEOPLE VS. BALDOGO ( Prrison compound; Julie was brought to
the mountains)
There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first
by accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed. The last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable only if
kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the
victim There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or
detained first by accused-appellant and Bermas before he was
killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable
only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the kidnapping
or serious illegal detention.
(Kasi it was not clear if there was really a kidnapping or serious
illegal detention before he was killed, if there was an apparent
truth about it then it can be a special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder ( if attendant of the 6 circumtances) or
homicide (if none)
Thus, two separarate crimes; kasi Julie was kidnapped and her
brother was killed.
BALEROS VS. PEOPLE (Mga medical students sa UST)
In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution
to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape,
the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the
penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant,
embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his
hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while
admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute
attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually
commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual
organ. xxx.
Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light
coercion.
PEOPLE VS. ASTORGA (Tinangay yong bata, pinasok sa school,
hinabol sila ng mgakabataan)
Actual detention or locking up is the primary element of
kidnapping. If the evidence does not adequately prove this
element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the
present case, the prosecution merely proved that appellant
forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he knew. There
being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be
convicted only of grave coercion.
the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under
Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion
grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or
wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would
produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of
the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will
and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words,
that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right
MARZALADO VS. PEOPLE (renting apartment; umaapaw yong
tubig sa faucet)
Is there trespass to dwelling?
In trespass to dwelling, the elements are:
(1) the offender is a private person;
(2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and
(3) such entrance is against the latters will.
In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the trespass.
The gravamen of the crime is violation of possession[16] or the
fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.[17]
Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified purpose of
avoiding further flooding and damage to his mothers property
caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly
imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken.
There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage
to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning
Marzalado, Jr.s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the
faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.
REYES VS. PEOPLE (nagwelga sa harap ng US Naval Station)
grave threats?
Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its
paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely:
(1) that the offender threatened another person
with the infliction upon his person of a wrong;
(2) (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and
(3) (3) that the threat was not subject to a
condition.
threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in
the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat
would be carried into effect." 2
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of
the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure
PEOPLE VS. PANGILINAN (Jollibee)
he evidence presented by the prosecution supports his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt[13] of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[14] Thus in People
v. Larraaga[15] the Court held:
Where the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex
crime. Some of the special complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery
with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4)
kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5)
rape with homicide. In a special complex
crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove
each of the component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints. As
earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding thereto this provision: When the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or israped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed; and that this provision gives
rise to a special complex crime.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO (Japan japan)
for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa?
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following
elements:
(1) the person charged undertook any
recruitment activity as defined under Section
6 of RA 8042;
(2) (2) accused did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
of workers; and,
(3) (3) accused committed the same against three
or more persons individually or as a group.
Suffice it to say that money is not material to a prosecution for
illegal recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal
recruitment" under the law includes the phrase "whether for
profit or not." Besides, even if there is no receipt for the money
given by the private complainants to appellants, the former's
respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter's
involvement in the prohibited recruitment.[16]
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a
person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may, for
the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article
315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa
are:
(1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) (2) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation."
PEOPLE VS. CAHILIG (Cashei in Wyeth Phils..)
Qualified Theft?
First, there was taking of personal property, when
accusedappellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI checks
issued in her name as cashier of the association which are
supposed to be redeposited to another account of WPESLAI.
Second, the property belongs to another, since the funds
undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the taking was done
without the consent of the owner, which is obvious because
accusedappellant created a ruse showing that the funds were
credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from
her own personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with
intentto gain,as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took
the fundsby means of a modus operandi that made it appear
through the entries inthe ledgers that all withdrawals and
deposits were made in the normal course of business and with
the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against the person [or] force
upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with grave
abuse of confidence considering that her position as cashier
permeates trust and confidence.7
MAGSUMBOL VS. PEOPLE (cutting of the coconut trees)
RTC - simple theft. The CA was of the view, however, that the
crime committed in this case would not fall under the general
definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision
which penalizes theft of damaged property?
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft
of damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property
belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits
or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged
property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability
attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with
criminal intent or malice.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is
adjacent to the land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution claimed
that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within
the land co-owned by Menandro
PEOPLE CS. GO (OCBC, loans)
Estafa thru Falsification of CommercialDocuments?
The elements of estafa through abuse of confidence under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code48 are:
"(a) that money,goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
 (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part
of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(ci) (d) there is demand by the offended party to
the offender."
The evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds
to his own personal use and benefit. To misappropriate for one’s
own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without right. x x x In proving the element of conversion
or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation
arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an
account of their whereabouts.Thus, the merepresumption of
misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude thata
probable cause exists for the indictment
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown
that the bank demanded the return of the funds, it has
nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is not an element of the
felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal
complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay be convicted
ofthe felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or
conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of
the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not
necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or
conversion."54 Thus, strictly speaking, demand is not an
element of the offense of estafa through abuse of confidence;
even a verbal query satisfies the requirement.
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of
commercial document under Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the
offender is a private individual;
(2) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification; and
(3) (3) that the act of falsification is committed ina
commercial document
As to estafa through falsification of public, official or commercial
documents, it has been held that –
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
document may be a means of committing Estafa, because
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of Falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification
has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public,
official or commercial document todefraud another is estafa.
But the damage is caused by the commission of Estafa, not by
the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of
the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit the estafa.59
(not clear to me; substatiate it with annotations by Campanilla
or Sandoval)
PEOPLE VS. MACABANDO (sinunog sariling bahay)
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No.
1613 are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling.
Both these elements have been proven in the present
case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his
own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society."
On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting
Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than
(ano proper charge? See full text again)
PIDELI VS. PEOPLE (sub-contractors sa riprapping)
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner
received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson
under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the
MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to
account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give
each of the partners their respective shares. He, however, failed
to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the
construction contract.
As early as U.S. v. De Vera,[23] the Court has consistently ruled
that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly
opined:
The principal distinction between the two
crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while
in estafa the accused receives the property
and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if
the accused has possession of the property. If
he was entrusted only with the material or
physical (natural) or de facto possession of the
thing, his misappropriation of the same
constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.[24]
Physical possession – theft
Juridical possession - estafa
In De Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an
Igorot, a bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams for the purpose of
having a silversmith examine the same, and bank notes
amounting to P200.00 to have them exchanged for silver coins.
Accused appropriated the bar of gold and bank notes. The Court
ruled that the crime committed was theft and not estafa since
the delivery of the personal property did not have the effect of
transferring the juridical possession, thus such possession
remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with gainful
intent and lack of owners consent constituted the crime of theft.
In People v. Trinidad,[25] defendant received a finger ring from
the offended party for the purpose of pledging it as security for a
loan of P5.00 for the benefit of said offended party. Instead of PEOPLE VS. GUZMAN ( pieces of jewelry, Anti-fencing law)
pledging the ring, the defendant immediately carried it to one of
Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the
her neighbors to whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated
filing of an information therefor in the place where the robbery
the money to her own use. The Court, citing De Vera, similarly
or theft is committed and not necessarily where the property,
convicted defendant of theft.
unlawfully taken is found to have later been acquired?
In People v. Locson,[26] this Court considered deposits received
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct
by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material
offenses. True, the object property in fencing must have been
possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal
previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the
force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a
place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential.
business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is
only material possession. Juridical possession remains with the
bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited
cases, beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller
PEOPLE VS. PUNO ( Bakeshop in Araneta that owns by the
appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony
offended party)
committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller
occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in
the tellers possession due to the confidence reposed on the
but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not
teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever
In People v. Isaac,[27] this Court convicted a jeepney driver of
to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty
theft and not estafa when he did not return the jeepney to its
owner since the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of
its owner, although physically held by the driver. The Court
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and
reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the
robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and
jeepney because the Public Service Law and its regulations
are of continuing validity:
prohibit a motor vehicle operator from entering into any kind of
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to
contract with any person if by the terms thereof it allows the
prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed
heart of the offense consists in the formation of
rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the
a band by more than three armed persons for
boundary system, legally, the accused was not a lessee but only
the purpose indicated in art. 306. On the other
an employee of the owner. Thus, the accuseds possession of the
hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose
vehicle was only an extension of the owners.
members were not primarily organized for the
purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
NOTE: PHYSICAL POSSESSION – THEFT
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but
JURIDICAL POSSESSION – ESTAFA
only robbery. Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed
persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands.
OCAMPO VS. PEOPLE ( shoulder bag)

he RTC founf the three accused guilty of the crime of Robbery

with Physical Injuries
PEOPLE VS. REGALA ( aparador, grandmontther and
granddaugther)
he victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of
the robbery. There are cases[16] holding that the additional
rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not
increase the penalty. . .The special complex crime of robbery
with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts
of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that
occasion being integrated in one composite crime." Jjsc
There are likewise cases[18] which held that the multiplicity of
rapes committed could be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. In People vs. Candelario[19] where three (3) of
the four (4) armed men who robbed the victim "alternately
raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People vs.
Obtinalia,[20] ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense
as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because
there were several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes
should instead be taken into account in raising the penalty to
death." Scjj
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the
additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as
aggravating circumstance.
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed
by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as
aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the
trial court is proper. Supreme
as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery
conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not
constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by
appellants is simple robbery
PEOPLE VS. GARCIA (van for rent)
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as An Act
Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latters consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
[16] More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the
vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or
that the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.[17]
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows
that all the elements of carnapping were proved in this case.
 What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his
co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on which
the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by
appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the
deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The
settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property
through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the
person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the
owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property
taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the
property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there
is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the
latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de
lucro, unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is
imputable to the offender. [20]
SANTOS VS. PEOPLE (car for repair)
estafa or theft?
"The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in
theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the
property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However,
there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the
property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical
(natural) or de factopossession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the
juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same
constitutes embezzlement or estafa." 13
PEOPLE VS. JULIANO (purchased sack of milled rice)
estafa?
JCT was also aware that the postdated check would be fully
funded from the proceeds of another check which had not yet
been cleared for payment.
The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender
has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the
time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no
funds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been
defrauded.14
Damage and deceit are essential elements of the
offense and must be established with satisfactory proof to
warrant conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act
must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the issuance
of the bad check. The drawer of the dishonored check is given
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the
amount of the check, otherwise, a prima faciepresumption of
deceit arises. 16
As regards the first reason of the trial court in holding
appellant liable for Estafa, we find that appellant did not deceive
complainant JCT by stating that she had sufficient funds in the
bank on the date of issuance of the check. JCT knew that the
postdated check was not yet funded as of the date of its
issuance and that it would be funded on July 30, 1991.
SYCIP VS. CA (townhouse, defects, stop payment)
In this case, we find that although the first element of
the offense exists, the other elements have not been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, the second element
involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the
check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in
the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22
creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of
the offense are present.
No concviction for estafa
BAX VS. PEOPLE (Vachman Industries, Inc. (VACHMAN)
Upon presentment of the checks to the United Coconut Planters
Bank for payment, they were dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite ILYONs demand, petitioner failed to
make good the bounced checks for the reason that he has been
encountering financial problems. As a result, ILYON caused the
filing of ten (10) Informations against petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution wa\s able to prove the guilt of
petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: We find that the prosecution failed to prove the second
element. To hold petitioner liable for violation of B.P. 22, it is not
enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. It must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that he knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued. Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must
prove not only that the accused issued a check that was
subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the
accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored,
and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt
of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof
that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.[9]
It must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the drawer or maker
of the dishonor of his check is not enough
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VS. PEOPL
(Japanese son-in-law)
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause[16] in the
crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It
limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees
him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the
offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first
paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions are
parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.[17] By virtue
thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who
commits malicious mischief against his stepson;[18] by the
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;[19] by the
stepfather who steals something from his stepson;[20] by the
grandson who steals from his grandfather;[21] by the accused
who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;[22] and by the son
who steals a ring from his mother.[23]
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to
the blood relatives of ones spouse, does the extinguishment of
marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by
affinity?
The continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-
laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1)
is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the
degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity
view is more appropriate.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the
felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.[39]
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited
to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.[39]
The waiver does not apply when the violation of the
right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity
and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the
latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the
property right of a family relation but a paramount public
interest.
ADDENDUM LANG
The falsification of a public, official or commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or commercial document.[59] In
other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to
the consummation of the crime of estafa.
PEOPLE VS. ABORDO ( victims and brother naglalaro outside of
their bedroom; little brother pinukpok yong accused)
(see digest)
SOLEDAD VS. PEOPLE ( credt cars agent daw)
Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section
9(e), R.A. No. 8484 (Accsess Device Regulation Act) for
possessing a counterfeit access device or access device
fraudulently applied for.
MILLA VS. PEOPLE (sold MPI a property, real estate
developer daw sya)
NO TCT, Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents?
The
principle
of
novation
cannot be
applied to
the case
at bar.
The principles of novation cannot apply to the present case as to
extinguish his criminal liability.
It must be clarified that mere payment of an obligation
before the institution of a criminal complaint does not, on its
own, constitute novation that may prevent criminal liability.
The role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of
criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original petition
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the
Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have novated
the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to
secure the return of the P2 million the former had already given
him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to
satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for
simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed
through Millas falsification of public documents, the liability for
which cannot be extinguished by mere novation..
OLIVAREZ VS. CA (sampaguita)
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.13
Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or
the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth,
of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her
breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.15
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is
likewise present. As succinctly explained in People v. Larin:16
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, when the child indulges insexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group. …
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when
the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge
in a lascivious conduct.
MALTO (Assumption College, sweethearts)
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of
a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage
in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
 mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or public area of a person.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under thecoercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group. (emphasis supplied)
paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a
child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a
situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which
a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.20
The information against petitioner did not allege anything
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It did not aver
that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was that
petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA; AAA was induced
and/or seduced by petitioner who was her professor to indulge
in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-
year old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation
of paragraph (b), not paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA
7610.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in Criminal Cases Involving
Violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in
child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
PACUAL VS PEOPLE (former boyfriend, picture of a naked
woman)
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom
he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not
say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
DOMINGO VS. RAYALA (sexual harrassment, Chairman of NLRC
Rayala)
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual
harassment may be committed in any of the following
forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but
not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for
the same purpose;
Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for
purposes of sexual gratification which is generally
annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.2
It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated
in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned,
with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and
squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a
promise of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound
with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
CABALQUINTO ( raped 8 year old girl by her own father)
Carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is rape as
defined under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
qualified when the offender is a parent of the victim, in which
case, the death penalty shall be imposed as provided under the
Death Penalty Law.39 In this case, the qualifying circumstances of
the victim's minority and her relationship with the accused as the
latter's daughter were properly alleged in the Informations,
proven during trial and not refuted by Cabalquinto.
IMBO (ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, BY HER OWN FATHER)
(b) Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may
be; Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18
12
years of age.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
 and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18
12
years of age.
Above all, it is quite clear by specific provision of
Section 5 Article III of R.A. No. 7610 that when the
victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under the RPC, but the
penalty is that which is provided in R.A. No. 7610.
PEOPLE VS. ABARRI (employees sila nung victim,
robberry with rape, robbery with acts of
lascibiousness)
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the
nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances (People v. Balbas, 129 Phil. 358[1967]). We find
that the acts of appellants in striping naked and hogtying the
victim and touching her private parts constitute lewd designs.
However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness
committed by him culminated in the raping of the victim when
he was left alone with her. Nothing in the records show that the
other accused had knowledge or were aware of the rape
committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone is guilty of
robbery with rape (People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 [1951]).
RONULO VS. PEOPLE (Aglipay priest, marriage in
Batac, Ilocos Norte; no marriage license;
Performance of illegal marriage)
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an
authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority
of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance
of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority
to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to
be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by
the petitioner is tantamount to the performance
of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony
despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements
of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence
of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
GARCIA VS. CA (Bigamy – offended spouse)
The distinction he made between public crimes and private
crimes relates not to the discovery of the crimes, but to their
prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this
matter.
Prosecution of crimes of adultery, comcubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness – shall noT
be prosecuted except upn a complaint filed by the offended
party.
Prescription
NOLLORO VS. PEOPLE (Bigamy; met in Saudi Arabia)
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally
married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil
Code.
3. That he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;14(2) Nollora and
Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date
of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the
lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16
TORREDA VS. TOSHIBA (Finance supervisor/asssitant; nanakaw
daw yong 200 pesos ny sa drawer; he email the Finance Manager
imputing her acrime of robbery)
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood,
has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words
which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the
expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case.
The false attribution by the petitioner of robbery (theft) against
Sepulveda was made in writing; patently then, petitioner
committed libel, not grave slander against Sepulveda. The
malicious and public imputation in writing by one of a crime on
another is libel under Article 353, in relation to Article 355, of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
CHEN VS. CALASAN (domicile vs. residence; Chen not a lawyer;
Atty. Calasan then filed criminal cases for libel against petitioner
in Aparri, Cagayan, among them Crim. Case Nos. 07-1168 and
VI-1094, which were dismissed
On December 4, 2001, respondents spouses Atty. Eleazar S.
Calasan and Leticia B. Calasan filed a complaint for damages
with the Aparri, Cagayan RTC against petitioner and his spouse
for alleged malicious imputations against Atty. Calasan made by
petitioner, and it was docketed as Civil Case No. 08-418
This case will be resolved on the core issue—the interpretation
and application of the third paragraph of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, the portion of which reads:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense x x x (emphasis
supplied).
True, plaintiffs are residents and domiciled in Aparri, Cagayan. In
fact, they are registered voters of Aparri, Cagayan. However,
they also admit that they have a residential house in Las Piñas
and it is in Las Piñas where they stay most of the time due to
their profession and occupation. In short, plaintiffs are habitual
residents of Las Piñas and not in Aparri, Cagayan. Aparri is
plaintiffs’ legal residence and place of domicile. However, to the
Court’s opinion, plaintiffs’ actual residence is in Las Piñas,
Metro-Manila [sic] as they are habitually residing thereat due to
their profession and occupation.13
In procedural law, specifically for purposes of venue it has been
held that the residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency
TULFO VS. PEOLE (Customes; Libel publised in Remate;
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: Assuming that the Prosecution
presented credible and relevant evidence, the Honorable CA
erred in not declaring the assailed articles as privileged; the CA
erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the courts having
incorrectly reasoned out that malice was presumed in the
instant case.
I determine whether the defamatory statement was made with
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means
that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it
is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
[30] (Emphasis supplied.) (EXCERP FROM
BORJAL)
Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a
public official to be actionable, it must be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court
found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and
that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information
before publishing his articles.
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be
considered as qualified privileged communication under the
second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the
presumption of malice a fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions. This particular provision has several elements
which must be present in order for the report to be exempt from
the presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as
follows:
In order that the publication of a report of an
official proceeding may be considered
privileged, the following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is
a fair and true report of a
judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature,
or of a statement,
report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by a
public officer in the
exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made
in good faith; and
(c) That it
is without any comments or
remarks.[3
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,[37] and reiterated in Flor v. People, which should be to
actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.[38]
In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim
that they had no participation in the editing or writing of the
subject articles, and are thus not liable.

The argument must fail.
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons
responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who
shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the
same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or
the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not
shield them from liabilit
Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the
punishment must still be tempered with justice. Petitioners are
to be punished for libel for the first time. They did not apply for
probation to avoid service of sentence possibly in the belief that
they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v. People,
[46] the Court, in a criminal case for libel, removed the penalty
of imprisonment and instead imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon
v. Court of Appeals,[47] the accused was merely fined in lieu of
the original penalty of imprisonment and fine. Freedom of
expression as well as freedom of the press may not be
unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too harshly. In
light of this, considering the necessity of a free press balanced
with the necessity of a responsible press, the penalty of a fine of
PhP 6,000 for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, should suffice.[48] Lastly, the
responsibilities of the members of the press notwithstanding,
the difficulties and hazards they encounter in their line of work
must also be taken into consideration.
BORJAL VS. CA (Philippine Star column; Wenceslao the
engineer)
The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is
not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could
identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.10 Regrettably, these requisites have not been
complied with in the case at bar.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good
faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged
or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications
are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted
in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987
Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks."
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with
matters of public interest. A reading of the imputations of
petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that all
these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his
moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The
nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of
funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in order to
generate interest in the conference, and the management and
coordination of the various activities of the conference
demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence.
These are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, taking into account the very public character of the
conference itself.
While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory
words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the
presumption of malice. 32 The onus of proving actual malice then
lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must
bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.33
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed,
and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm.34 Malice is bad faith or bad motive.35 It is the essence of
the crime of libel.
VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE (Counilor and A vIce-Mayor)
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood,
has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words
which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood.20
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the
expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case.
However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation
on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light
felony.25
Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty
only of slight oral defamation because of the attendant
circumstances in the case at bar.
Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the
vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner,
but following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to
the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our considered view
that the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized
as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part
of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony.31
The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not
petitioner’s act of poking a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes grave slander by deed.
Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing
discussion of the first issue, we find petitioner guilty only of
slight slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94 inasmuch as
we find complainant’s unjust refusal to sign petitioner’s
application for monetization and her act of throwing a coke
bottle at him constituted a perceived provocation that triggered
the "poking of finger" incident.
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by
performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt
upon another person. The elements are (1) that the offender
performs any act not included in any other crime against honor,
(2) that such act is performed in the presence of other person or
persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain
slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or
not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was committed, the
occasion, etc.32 It is libel committed by actions rather than
words. The most common examples are slapping someone or
spitting on his/her face in front of the public market, in full view
of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon
the person of another.
CRUZ VS. CA (Medical Malpractice; dity clinic/hospital; myoma)
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(2) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(3) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary;
(4) that it be without malice;
(5) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and
(6) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE (Lenny Villa; Aquila Fraternity; Reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide)
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the
perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even
if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the
unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of
the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is
mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally
imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the
framework governing the destruction of the life of a person,
punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and
Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types
of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each
other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for
physical injuries when actual death occurs.102
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under
Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,222 the
employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is
no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or
well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial court’s finding of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required
in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his
death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting
hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately
devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According
to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act
done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm,
injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor.242In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave
fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason
of a mere lack of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm
is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244
The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent
in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to
the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty
to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act.
Failure to do so constitutes negligence.24
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa
IVLER VS. MODESTO SAN PEDRO (reckless imprudence; double
jeopardy)
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in
195

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or

acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO (tricycle)

There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the
primary objective of the accused is to commit rape
Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
forcible abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her
will; and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction
with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has
carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under the following
circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the
appellant should be convicted only of rape. His forcible
abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his
real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape. Where
the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim
of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be
convicted only of rape. 11