ON HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the
other to acknowledge his participation in the... making of the will.
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973// AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
Facts:
Probate of the last will and testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz.
Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said deceased...
ed,... opposed the allowance of the will... alleging that the will was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence;... executed without
the testator having been fully informed of the contents... particularly as to... what
properties he was disposing;... not executed in accordance with law
Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely, Deogracias T. Jamaoas, Jr.,
Dr. Francisco Pañares, and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is
at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have
been acknowledged.
Petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the
notary public to acknowledge the will.
private respondent -appellee, Manuel B. Lugay,... who is the supposed executor of
the will... maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement
of having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of
them 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227
"It is said that there are practical reasons for upholding a will as against the purely
technical reason that one of the witnesses required by law signed as certifying to
an acknowledgment of the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting
the execution... of the instrument."
Issues:
whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was
executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil
Code, the first... requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe
to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge
the will before a notary public.
whether the last will and testament in question was attested and subscribed by at
least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other,
considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear before the... notary
public to acknowledge the same.
Ruling:
We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in
question was not executed in accordance with law
We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in
question was not executed in accordance with law.
Principles:
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto,... Deogracias T. Jamaoas, Jr., Dr.
Francisco Pañares, and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at
the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered...
as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his
having signed the will.
To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262;
Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and
"before"... means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
if the third... witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow,
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangements.
That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or
instrumental witnesses.
e would... be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves
Page |
himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent 1
position and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud...
would be thwarted.
these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not
decisive of the issue herein, because the notaries public and witnesses referred to
in the aforecited cases merely acted as... instrumental, subscribing or attesting
witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here the notary public acted not
only as attesting witness but also as acknowledging witness, a situation not en-
visaged by Article 806 of the Civil Code which reads:
"ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court."
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article
805 requiring at least three credible... witnesses to act as such and of Article 806
which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will
// Gonzales v. CA// 90 SCRA 183
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent),
niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the
principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was
executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel,
on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and
attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will
did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was
procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed
the said decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC
claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed
and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3
instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be
considered credible as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has
good standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1.Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires
something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to
being competent under Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The
competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by
the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation
of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled
that: “Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible
witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow
a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but
may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.”
2.No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any
time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and for being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes
are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the
opposing party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the
trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil
Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or
deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18
years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able
to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. L-8774. November 26, 1956.] // In the matter of the testate estate of the
deceased JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO. EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-
NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees, vs. ENRIQUE TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET
AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay,
province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or
ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana
Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz
Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of
Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi
left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20,
1939.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June
20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon
petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to
probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both
parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate
of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was
executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on
February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by
the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors
filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is
now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has
not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been
subsequently revoked.
Issues:
1. Was Molo’s will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939?
2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary
consequence of the testator’s belief that the revocatory clause
contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be
given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?
Doctrines:
1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine
that “a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.”
Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions
perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by
each State in the subject of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a
review and the study of the pertinent authorities that the doctrine laid down in the
Samson case is still a good law.
1. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle
of “dependent relative revocation”. The failure of a new testamentary
disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent
to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents
the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some
time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the
valid execution of a new will.
Page |
Labrador v. CA// 184 SCRA 170
2
FACTS:
ISSUE: W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of
CC.
HELD: YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the
tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that “this being in the
month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of
mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other
than Melecio Labrador, their father.” This clearly shows that this is a unilateral act
of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will.
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985// IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS &
PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic
Will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the
date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent
contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the
California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had
consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, and day, and
that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent
further contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810
of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the
execution of holographic Wills are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We
should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution
of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy —
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law
on wigs in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution
with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to the formalities
in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos
(27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will
and testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better
than that which the law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing
more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the decedent.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of testamentary privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will
has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and
the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win
should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,
xxx xxx xxx
... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances
point to a regular execution of the wilt and the instrument appears to have been
executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the
inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud,
lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from
some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez
68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites,
although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought
to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by
the testator.
hundred seven who live both actually with me, the totality of my personal
properties, real estates and mixed including those on which I could have the power
of disposition or designation whatsoever, by equal parts in all properties, instituting
them my residuary legatee.
4. I name for my testamentary executor, without bail, my son, FRANCISCO
CARMELO VARELA, to his default my daughter CARMEN VARELA to the default of
this one my brother MIGUEL VARELA CALDERON and to the default of my brother,
Mr. ANTONIO GUTIERREZ DEL CAMPO. Page |
In witness whereof I have in this one my act of last wills and testament, written 3
dated and signed entirely by my hand, applied my signature and my seal at Paris,
this fourteenth of April nineteen hundred thirty.
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO VARELA CALDERON (L. S.)
(Sgd.) HENRI GADD
(Sgd.) TH. PEYROT

The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been
expounded by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the testator above mentioned,
FRANCISCO VARELA CALDERON, on the 14 April 1930, as being his act of last wills
and his testament in the presence of we, who at his request, in his presence, and in
the presence of one another, have to these presents applied our signatures as
witnesses:

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as

that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming (Sgd.) F. DE ROUSSY DE SALES,
insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720).
39 rue la Boetie, Paris, France.
There is no such contingency in this case.
(Sgd.) GETHING C. MILLER,
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad
faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and 39 rue la Boetie, Paris, France.
Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and (Sgd.) HENRI GADD,
in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the 39 rue la Boetie, Paris, France.
holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor- Pour traduction certifiee conforme,
respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the
Manille, le 15 september 1930.
date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained. The original will was executed in the French language and had been written, dated
and signed by the testator with his own hand, with the exception of the attestation
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month,
clause which appears at the bottom of the document. This fact is proved by the
and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no
testimony of the appellee and his other witnesses, including the depositions, and is
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity
admitted by the appellants.
of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"
appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance. Kalaw v. Relova
132 SCRA 237
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic
FACTS:
Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased
sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will
G.R. No. L-36342 October 8, 1932/ In re Will of Francisco Varela Calderon,
executed on December 24, 1968.
deceased. FRANCISCO CARMELO VARELA, petitioner-appellee, vs. MIGUEL VARELA
CALDERON, ET AL., opponents-appellants The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as
her sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that the holographic Will contained
The will in question, Exhibit B, as translated into English reads as follows: alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the
full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
I. FRANCISCO VARELA CALDERON, Doctor in Medicine, bachelor, citizen of the
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
Philippine Islands and subject of the United States of America, borne and domiciled
holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
at Manila, Philippine Islands, and actually residing temporarily at Hendaye-Plage,
France, I declare that the followings are my act of last wills and my testament: ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given
effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
1. I revoke all testamentary dispositions made by myself before this day.
Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.
2. I desire that the inhumation of my body be made without any ceremony.
ISSUE: W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
3. I give and bequeath to my children FRANCISCO CARMELO VARELA borne at
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the
Madrid on the twenty fourth of November nineteen hundred five and to CARMEN
testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.
VARELA borne at Manila, Philippine Islands, on the fourth of October nineteen
HELD:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, … the
Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by
the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or
revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which
could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is
to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind
can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions,
cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the
efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the
Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the
testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.
The petition for the allowance and probate of said will is based on the provisions of
article 970 of the French Civil Code which considers as a holographic will that which
is made or executed, dated and signed by the testator in his own handwriting
without the necessity of any other formality, and on section 635 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in force in this jurisdiction which provides that a will made out of the
Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country in which it was
made and which may be allowed and admitted to probate therein, may, also be
proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands in the same manner and
with the same effect as if executed in the latter country. Both provisions of law
literally copied from the English text, read as follows:
(Article 970, French Civil Code)
A holographic will is not valid unless it is entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testator. No other formality is required.
(Article 635, Code of Civil Procedure)
Will made out of the Philippine Islands. — A will made out of the Philippine Islands
which might be proved and allowed by the laws of the state or country in which it
was made, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
As we have already said, it is an admitted fact that the will was written, dated and
signed by the deceased testator, for which reason, there is no doubt that it had
been made and executed in accordance with article 970 of the French Civil Code
were it not for the attestation clause which appears at the bottom of the
document.
The appellants contend that the addition of said of clause has entirely vitiated the
will, because it ceased to be a holographic will, neither does it possess the
requisites of a public or open will in accordance with the French law. The court
which originally took cognizance of the case decided that such circumstance does
not invalidate the will. We concur in said opinion and hold that a clause drawn up
in such manner is superfluous and does not affect in any way the essential
requisites prescribed for holographic wills by the French law, and, consequently, it
has not invalidated the will nor deprived it of its holographic character. In reaching
this conclusion, we base our opinion not only on the clear and conclusive provisions
of article 970 of the French Civil Code and on the decisions of the French Court of
Appeals cited in the appelee's brief, but principally on the fact established in the
depositions made by practicing attorneys F. de Roussy de Sales, Gething C. Miller
and Henri Gadd of Paris, France, who emphatically declared that the will in
question did not lose its holographic character by the addition of the
aforementioned attestation clause and that it may be allowed to probate in
conformity with the French laws under which it had been made and executed.
In view of the foregoing, we believe it unnecessary to consider and pass upon the
other grounds invoked by the opposition consisting in the incapacity of the three
witnesses who signed at the end of the attestation clause and the absence of the
requisites prescribed by the French Civil Code for the execution of open wills,
inasmuch as the attorney for the appellee has conclusively proved that the will in
question is holographic, and we have so held and decided.1awphil.net
The order appealed from, being in conformity with the law, is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Ajero v. CA// 236 SCRA 488
Page |
FACTS: 4
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the
will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by
decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the
will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no
reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities
prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply
with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will
were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the
erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by
decedent.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were
not complies with.
HELD: YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity
of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and
signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of
the holographic will (Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those found in Articles 813 and
814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate
the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no oher grounds can
serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:
1. whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;
2. whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law;
3. whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the
will was executed; and
4. whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted
to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to
strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic
will that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
Codoy v. Calugay// 312 SCRA 333
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the
testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due
execution of the deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and
is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the
word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes
of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous
individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the
testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true
intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar
was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer
available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and
did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of
the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign
a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied
with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are
different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support
of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged
as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law
requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of
the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting
of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
Page |
required.”
5
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word
“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990// JOSE RIVERA petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two?
We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera. It is true that Adelaido could not present his
parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained it, the marriage records for
1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even so, he could
still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera
and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting
seven children in all during that time.
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, ... .
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio
was described therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the
same Venancio Rivera described in Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the son of
Magno Rivera. While we realize that such baptismal certificate is not conclusive
evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue here) it may nonetheless be
considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and Florencio are
one and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be
called by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is no evidence that
Venancio's father was called either Magno or Florencio. What is more likely is that
two or more persons may live at the same time and bear the same name, even in
the same community. That is what the courts below found in the cases at bar.
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the
legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his
father was still alive. By his own account, Jose supported himself — and
presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline attendant and driver for
many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town — and obviously
prospering — and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with
another woman and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by
Jose without protest, taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he
insists, he and Venancio Rivera were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the
father did not help the son and instead left Jose to fend for himself as a humble
worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a comfortable life. Such
paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered —
assuming the claims to be true — that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account,
the only legitimate child of Venancio Rivera.
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As
Venancio's legitimate wife — if indeed she was — she should have objected when
her husband abandoned her and founded another family by another woman, and
in the same town at that. Seeing that the children of Maria Jocson were being
raised
G.R. No. L-12190 . August 30, 1958// TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA
ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. ILDEFONSO YAP,
oppositor-appellee.
n November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in
the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court
of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased, substantially in these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na
ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking
mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:
Vicente Esguerra, Sr. .............................................
5 Bahagi
Fausto E. Gan .........................................................
2 Bahagi
Rosario E. Gan .........................................................
2 Bahagi
Filomena Alto ..........................................................
1 Bahagi
Beatriz Alto ..............................................................
1 Bahagi
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking
ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y
magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa
halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang
Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking
asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the testimony of the
oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to discredit them. It appears that
the same arguments, or most of them, were presented in the motion to reconsider;
but they failed to induce the court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief,
on the other hand, aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over
the same matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the
weakness of the opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the petitioner,
who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along with
other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved August 7, 1901,
adopted only one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including holographic
wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814.
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills
under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be
subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page;
such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the
testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee their truth and
authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to avoid those who have no
right to succeed the testator would succeed him and be benefited with the probate
of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections
may be brushed aside when authenticity of the instrument is duly proved.
(Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off. Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when
such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony
of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition
(Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. (Cabang vs.
Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony
of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its
opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the
circumstances its due execution.
Page |
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity
are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that 6
they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself."
The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as material proof
of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be
demonstrated to be — or not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the
probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In
the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if
the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the
holographic will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they
may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor
may present other witnesses who also know the testator's handwriting, or some
expert witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters of the
deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the
hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such
contradictory testimony may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the
document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been written by the
testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of
authenticity3 — the testator's handwriting — has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon
the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was
in the handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove that such
document was not in the testator's handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's
handwriting have not examined it. His experts can not testify, because there is no
way to compare the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or
proven to be, in the testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be caught
between the upper millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form
thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to prove its falsity. Again the
proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may have been shown
a faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof have
taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying,
in the knowledge that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could
prove that they have not "been shown" a document which they believed was in the
handwriting of the deceased. Of course, the competency of such perjured
witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be tested by exhibiting to them
other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what
witness or lawyer would not foresee such a move and prepare for it? His
knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply
stick to his statement: he has seen and read a document which he believed was in
the deceased's handwriting. And the court and the oppositor would practically be
at the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also as
to the contents of the will. Does the law permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost
or destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of
the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic
wills which could not then be validly made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art.
830-New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic
will is that it may be lost or stolen4 — an implied admission that such loss or theft
renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented
to the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and require its identity to be
established by the three witnesses who depose that they have no reasonable doubt
that the will was written by the testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that
the identity of the will has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All
these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a
greater degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and the legitimate ascendants
and descendants be summoned so that they may make "any statement they may
desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of the will." As it is universally
admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself
alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the
above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to
state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself
they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is
presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of
either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think
it spurious.5 Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for
their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because anyway
the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if
genuine, a right which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof
from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in
the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied
protocolization or probate to a document containing testamentary dispositions in
the handwriting of the deceased, but apparently mutilated, the signature and some
words having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations and testimonial
evidence (which was controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of
the will. The aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance with the provision of
the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo segundo del
articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea valido el testamento olografo debera
estar escrito todo el y firmado por testador, con expression del año, mes y dia en
que se otorque, resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia de esos testamentos,
no basta la demostracion mas o menos cumplida de que cuando se otorgaron se
Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que de la expresada redaccion el precepto
legal, y por el tiempo en que el verbo se emplea, se desprende la necesidad de que
el documento se encuentre en dichas condiciones en el momento de ser
presentado a la Autoridad competente, para au adveracion y protocolizacion; y
como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es affirmar que el de autos carece de
validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa
de la falta de firma, y sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los
perjudicados, bien para pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la persona culpable,
si la hubiere, o su castigo en via criminal si procediere, por constituir dicha omision
un defecto insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo,
admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E depues que
los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda, fasta ... annos muestrenla al obispo
de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez tomen otros tales tres
escritos, que fuesen fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la manda; e por aquellos
escriptos, si semjara la letra de la manda, sea confirmada la manda. E depues que
todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo o el juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el
escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta manera vala la manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--
Codigo Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with specimens of
the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the
deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his
handwriting and signature.7
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss
of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil Frances,
traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to
adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such holographic wills.
We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive of this controversy,
simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal may rest on
the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Page |
Fausto E. Gan.
7
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why,
unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence
when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the
only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now).
The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the
ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with
the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed,
their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be
called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were
intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to
any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive
anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible9 only
one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable
imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let
three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter,
having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith
affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may
have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to
expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And
considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only
one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be
the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable
feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this
kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known
Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the
testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the
witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly
saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the
oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing
the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the
appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her
will precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and
Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a
share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this
leads to another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her
husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was
not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged
execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted
with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear
and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.11 Wherefore, the rejection of the
alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.well while her own son Jose was
practically ignored and neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him at least
Rodelas v. Aranza// 119 SCRA 16 a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition
thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.

HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the
Page |
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison 8
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings
of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of
the handwriting of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and
the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says
that “Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court,”support, if not better treatment, from his legitimate
father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of
another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his
wayward father's neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never demanded
support from her wealthy if errant husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy
or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson, the alleged partners in
crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and complaisant.

Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented
at the trial to support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife.
Jose says this was not done because she was already old and bedridden then. But
there was no impediment to the taking of her deposition in her own house. No
effort was made toward this end although her testimony was vital to the
petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this
Court does not agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio
Rivera was null and void, Jose had the burden of proving that serious allegation.

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in
holding that the Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the
same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose
belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family of
Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except
for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence linking
the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of
both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid
because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by the testator
himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no
necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the
authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were
questioned by Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that
Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the
holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings,
Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and
claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent
court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested,
at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not
the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being