CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYLLABUS – FULLTEXT

A. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASE IS JURISDICTIONAL

MANUEL S. ISIP, G.R. No. 170298

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, June 26, 2007

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to set aside the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip to
the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isips conviction for Estafa in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its
Amended Decision[2] dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the
RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received
from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (mens ring), valued
at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to
 deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before
March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once in possession of the above-described
articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands
made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the
proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine
Currency.[3]

Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.The cases
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-
84. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking
Corporation Check No. 518672 in the amount of P562,000.00, in payment for
assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon
presentation with the drawee bank for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
redemption of the said check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated amount
of P562,000.00, Philippine Currency.[4]

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense
was committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other
informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check

147-84 17 March 1984 518644 P50,000.00

148-84 30 March 1984 518645 P50,000.00
149-84 12 March 1984 030086[5] P150,000.00
155-84 25 March 1984 518674 P95,000.00
156-84 29 March 1984 518646 P90,000.00
157-84 1 April 1984 518669 P25,000.00
 The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of
Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1)
set dome shape ring and earrings valued at P120,000.00, with the obligation of
selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in
possession of the said jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to defraud
and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their own personal use
and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29,
1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount of P90,000 and P25,000,
respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice in the
abovestated amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.[6]

Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt
and agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the checks issued in payment
thereof, the four other informations are similarly worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:

Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date Check No./Date Amount
Jewelry Receipt of Return

257-84 P150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84 030086/03-12-84 P150,000

260-84 P95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 518647/03-25-84 P95,000
261-84 P562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 518672/03-27-84 P562,000
378-84 P200,000 02-03-84 - 518644/03-17-84 P50,000
518645/03-30-84 P50,000

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There
being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases followed.

The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in the
parties respective briefs, are the following:

i) Prosecution Version.
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by complainants father,
Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in
the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitus
(pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).

Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced
complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p.
14, ibid).

Thus, the operation went smoothly that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn,
ibid).

On February 3, 1984, at complainants residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant

spouses received from complainant a 6 carat mens ring valued at P200,000.00 with
the condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis
for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring
if sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).

On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead,
Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984,
respectively, for P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of
the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp.
9-11, tsn, ibid).

This particular mens ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while
Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30,
respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.

In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainants
residence in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl
with 35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond worth P150,000.00. The condition
was that the proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before March 30,
1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of turning over the
proceeds or return the Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984
for P150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainants residence
in Cavite City and got from the latter a mens ring (7 carats) worth P200,000.00. Mr.
Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring or deliver the
proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip
sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by,
but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one
(1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds valued
at P120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be returned or the
proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The
following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal checks (Check Nos.
518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984 for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and
Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of
complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one (1)
baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip
signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be
delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs.
Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22, 1993).

The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa
against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant
informing him that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur
saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of
jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit
O) acknowledging the value thereof to the tune of P562,000.00.

Exhibit O contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit O, Mrs. Isip
issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October
22, 1993).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple
and Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6,
1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against insufficient
funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).

ii) Defense Version.

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his
residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero
Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street,
Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since
1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel
hereafter) and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635
M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in
various business undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City
and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and
trucking business; while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing,
as well as in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started when she was still
single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City,
appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from losing or financially-strapped
players which she repledged as security for financing she obtained from one Nemesio
Jose, father of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After
about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his
son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium
aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early
1983, at complainants residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant
Marietta, accompanied by her husband who participated only as a witness, started
having transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February, March and
April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged
jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to
complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant Marietta
had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the payment of the
subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned the unsold
jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry,
some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga,
Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be
registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits
1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to
complainant have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36,
37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which were
initially dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In
fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against
 appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid
checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not bring them
(Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment
and complainant suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay
for the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain
documents to avoid any misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the
Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to
maintain good relations with complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document
acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed
(Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the transactions were
entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein before the Cavite Regional
Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).[7]

On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion thereof
reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M.
Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos.
146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in
each case; and of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify
the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for the value of the
articles misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify
the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-
84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and
One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty
 of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12)
years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose
in the amount of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the
costs.[8]

In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Joses ancestral house
in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he
was connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the
transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that
the money with which the complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted the defenses claim that the
transactions happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the defenses contention, that
the obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to complainant of personal and
real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to human nature to demand payment when
the same had already been made and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were
settled amicably and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutors Office at the
instance of the complainant.

The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of jewelry
involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-
84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him
in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted as
a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases, but found him liable in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a 7-carat diamond mens ring which he secured
from the complainant.

Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following as
errors:

-I-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE CASES
AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT
NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
 - II -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD
IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY
FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.

- III -

THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA
HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.

- IV -

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M.
ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND
IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF
ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL. [9]

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII)

1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence
imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall
bear interest at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid;
 2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged;
and

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is

REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and
severally, the sums of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P562,000.00
and P200,000.00 representing the amounts involved in said cases, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid.[10]

The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the venue was properly laid
and that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions transpired
at complainants ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses charged
took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on
the ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor
thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the
Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84),
the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the
pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the
defenses claim of redemption/dacion en pago that real and personal properties were conveyed
to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the
cases to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though novation does not
extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to
the filing of the criminal information in court.In these five cases, it ruled that there was
novation because complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the
pieces of jewelry involved in said cases.Consequently, the Court of Appeals
acquitted Marietta and petitioner,[11] but held them liable to complainant for the value of the
jewelry involved.

As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts ruling of conviction. It found petitioners claims that he did not receive
the jewelry worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt he issued for
said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon him to sign under threat of
criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant,
to be not persuasive.
 On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased
wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally,
with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. [12]

On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta M.
Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the
following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of
the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows:

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84

is REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases
DISMISSED.[13]

Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He raises the
following issues:

First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;

Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED

THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and

Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS
(sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.

On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge
in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not altogether
improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements of the Estafa
charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the residence
of the parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that
it is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in
Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the transactions there with him
when he and his late wife were actual residents of Manila.Mere convenience suggests that
their transaction was entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to
finance the transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was
delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines
venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does
not follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs, the
transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that
there is no competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City;
and that the transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering
roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional.
[14]
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
is an essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.[16]

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the
venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that
the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home
in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence [17] from the Bureau of Customs. Since
it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise,
for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.[18]

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence
that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife
actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was
entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far
from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure
goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not
improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one
day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late wife in all the
transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks
in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not
entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight
of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.
[19]
It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. [20] In the
case at bar, we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient
evidence to show that the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals holding that the ring
subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously
flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not due
to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact
remains that there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists
there is no competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever
actually received by, or delivered to, him.

We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on
record. The acknowledgment receipt[21] executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that he
received the ring in question. Petitioners claim that he did not receive any ring and merely
executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant deserves scant
consideration.

Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation
of what he executed and signed. The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against
petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been
fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been followed [22] Thus, it is
presumed that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents
and consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully well the ramification of the
acknowledgment receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation
that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no competent
evidence that would rebut said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner
signed the acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant in Cavite City.

Petitioners argument that he did not receive the subject ring [23] is further belied by the
testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7 March
1984.[24] In all, the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same occurred
in Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any
criminal liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No.
136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to
cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the fact
that complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the
cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation as
regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of
said ring and his claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of
prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have
denied the application of the rule of novation on said case because the rejected initial claim
(that he did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good
relations) was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the
application of the novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation [25] cannot be applied in Criminal Case
No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed to
complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance
remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered
to complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as
in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife.This, complainant did not do for
the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the
obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased wife.Complainant testified that the
properties he received were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.
[26]
In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases which were
subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as payment. [27] It follows then that the
obligations incurred by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal cases
herein tried were filed.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is
untenable. The main reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was
that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take place, four essential
requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all
parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the
birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first element is
extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were
checks issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry
involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither petitioner nor his wife issued
any check as payment for the subject ring that could have extinguished his old obligation and
brought to life a new obligation.

From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that
petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the
money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the
offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies receiving such money
or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) the offended party demands that the offender return the money or property. [28] All
these are present in this case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond
(mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis
and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner
misappropriated or converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the
same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the
proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount
of P200,000.00.

As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be
in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the Philippines
(petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision1 and the July 28, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096.

The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8) parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to
their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.

The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private
respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said agricultural lands.

It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only ₱227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at ₱317,259.31.

Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11 November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation
and Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V)
docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.

On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the fallo of which reads:

Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby preliminarily fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX
THOUSAND and FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 (₱2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land Bank of the Philippines, Legaspi City, is hereby
ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already remitted per
Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually issued an Order dated 8
October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the valuation claim of petitioner herein with respect to her due
share in the above lots to the tune of Two Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven and 58/100
(₱2,540,211.58) Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing
rules and guidelines, minus the sum already paid per Order dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the same
sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.

The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed Order dated 12 November 2003 "for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure does not
apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the instances when a
court may dismiss a case on its motion."

As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November 2003, petitioner LBP elevated the
case before the Tribunal through the present Petition for Review, theorizing:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB 2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES FILED AND
PENDING BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE
SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.3

On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.

The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution
shall be filed before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC without first seeking
the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA found that
petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, and under its transitory provision, it is provided that the
2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should
first be filed with the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in dismissing petitioner's petition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT
VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES" WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION OF THE
DARAB.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE
RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, 2002.4

Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional
Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that
under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the adjudicators prior to the
date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from the
transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is
the date of filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the applicability of the
2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the filing
of the respondent's claim for just compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought

directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner brought the adjudicator's decision to
the RTC sitting as SAC.

In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original action and, since the case was filed at a
time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial
action, the RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.

Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.

The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under Republic Act (RA)
No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting
as SAC.

The court rules in the negative.

Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.

Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are
within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.

In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:

Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories
of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by
considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as
excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an
administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No.
6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of property in
eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s
Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal
cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.6

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions
for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,7 the Court upheld the RTC's jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for determination of
just compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings was held before the DARAB which has primary
jurisdiction over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation
without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial
court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation,
thus –

… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the
RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void.
Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian Court] by private respondent is valid.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just
compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was
able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405,
Series of 1990.8 x x x

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,9 wherein Land Bank questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek
reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, but instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:

At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers
to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. 1avvphi1

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is
subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform
is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice.10

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over
respondent's petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before
the DARAB, the Court stated that:

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by
the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took
cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of just compensation.12

The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of
the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring the matter to the Board by filing
with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.

Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the resolution of the
Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with the land
valuation, hence said valuation shall become final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party who disagrees with the
decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction
over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which
provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation – The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the
Board, but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is a power
vested in the courts.13 Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation
cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57
of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57
authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation. 14 In accordance with
the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.15 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies while rules of procedure cannot.16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July
28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay petitioner's petition for the determination of
just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192466

Appellee,
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,* and

MENDOZA, JJ.

ALEJO TAROY y TARNATE,

Appellant. Promulgated:

September 7, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Apart from the question of credibility of testimonies in a prosecution for rape, this case
resolves the question of proof of the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor charged Alejo Taroy y Tarnate (Taroy) with two counts of rape in Criminal
Cases 02-CR-4671 and 02-CR-4672 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet.[1]

DES[2] was the eldest daughter of MILA [3] by her first marriage. MILA married Taroy in 1997
upon the death of her first husband.[4] The couple lived with MILAs children in
Pucsusan Barangay, Itogon, Benguet, at the boundary of Baguio City.[5]

DES testified that she was alone in the house on August 10, 1997 doing some cleaning since
her mother was at work and her two siblings were outside playing. When Taroy entered the
house, he locked the door, closed the windows, removed his clothes, and ordered DES to
remove hers. When she resisted, Taroy poked a knife at her head and forced her to submit to
his bestial desires. Taroy warned her afterwards not to tell anyone about it, lest MILA and her
siblings would suffer some harm. DES was 10 years old then.[6]

DES testified that Taroy sexually abused her again in September 1998. This time, he entered
her room, locked the door, closed the windows, undressed himself, and ordered her to do the
same. When she refused, Taroy pointed a knife at her. This compelled her to yield to him.
 Four years later or on November 1, 2002, when DES was 15, she told her aunt and MILA
about what had happened between Taroy and her. They accompanied DES to the National
Bureau of Investigation to complain.

MILA and a certain Alumno testified that they later accompanied DES to the hospital for
examination. MILA corroborated DES testimony regarding how she revealed to her and an aunt
the details of the rape incidents. The doctor who examined DES testified that the latter had
two narrow notches in her hymen at three oclock and five oclock positions.She explained that
these notches or V-shaped or sharp indentions over the hymenal edges suggested a history of
previous blunt force or trauma possibly caused by the insertion of an erect male penis.

For the defense, Taroy denied raping DES on the occasions mentioned. He averred that the
testimony was a fabrication made upon the prodding of her aunt who disliked him.

The RTC found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to pay DES for each count: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[7] The RTC
found the testimony of DES credible and worthy of belief.

Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he having
testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in
Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony that their
residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the
jurisdictional requirement.

On January 19, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. [8] The CA gave
weight to the RTCs assessment of DES credibility and found no evil motive in her. The CA also
held that the prosecution has sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the
testimony of MILA, DES, and Alumno. Taroy seeks his acquittal from this Court.
 The Issues Presented

The issues presented to the Court are:

1. Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear and decide
the cases of rape against Taroy; and

2. Whether or not the prosecution has proved his guilt in the two cases beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Courts Rulings

One. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to
stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law. [9] Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to
attach, the criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality,
city, or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
took place.[10]

The Informations[11] filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes were
committed in the victim and the offenders house in City Limit,
Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial
jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of
MILA and DES as well as the affidavit of arrest [12] point to this fact. Clearly, Taroys
uncorroborated assertion that the subject offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to
belief. Besides, he admitted during the pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad
that had jurisdiction to hear the case. [13] Taken altogether, that RTCs jurisdiction to hear the
case is beyond dispute.

Two. What is necessary for the prosecution to ensure conviction is not absolute
certainty but only moral certainty that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. [14] Here, the
prosecution has sufficiently proved the guilt of Taroy beyond reasonable doubt. DES testimony
is worthy of belief, she having no ill-motive to fabricate what she said against her stepfather.

More, contrary to the claims of Taroy, there is nothing in the testimony of DES that
would elicit suspicion as to the veracity of her story. For one thing, the fact that she did not
shout for help or resist the sexual advances of Taroy does not disprove the fact that he raped
her. Women who experience traumatic and terrifying experiences such as rape do not react in
a uniform pattern of hysteria and breakdown.

Lastly, there is nothing unusual for DES to remain in the family dwelling despite the
incidents that had happened to her. She was just a child. Where else would she go except stay
with her mother who happened to be married to the man who abused her?

While we do affirm the guilt of Taroy for the crime of rape, we modify the award of
exemplary damages in accordance with People v. Araojo.[15] The prosecution has sufficiently
established the relationship of Taroy to the victim, as well as the minority of DES necessitating
the increase of the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in
CA-G.R. CR-HC 03510 dated January 19, 2010 with the MODIFICATION that the award of
exemplary damages be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN G.R. No. 184800

UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND
JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. Promulgated:
GIMENEZ, May 5, 2010
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail
the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent)
Order[1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information
indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of
the first issuance.

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez [3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on
behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in particular, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), [4] a criminal complaint,
[5]
before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355
in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan
and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc.
(PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio,
Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo
Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI
(collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the
website www.pepcoalition.com.

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific
Plans, Inc. (PPI)  a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also
owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC)  who had previously purchased
traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with
prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need
plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their
pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address
of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a
blogspot[6] under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-
group[7] at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public
or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on
various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he was appalled to read numerous articles
[numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing
highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco
Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan.[8] He cited an article which was posted/published
on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga

kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since
we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos
benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat
pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.

LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND
AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and
other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within
ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and
I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood
lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after
knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT
BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO
KILL US NA. x x x [9] (emphasis in the original)

By Resolution of May 5, 2006, [10] the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable
cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations [11] charging them with
libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which
was raffled off to public respondent reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such
trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of
general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of
 attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant
to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:

Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang

mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x

For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it
because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to
kill us na. x x x

A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted

in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex F of the complaint.

That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above
defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the
above-cited website and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article
in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and
ridiculing the complainant before the public.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for
review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007, [13]reversed the finding
of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in
court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.[14]

Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public

respondent, a Motion to Quash[16] the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds
that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information
are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the
Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.

Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege
a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and
first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first published.

By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause
existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information
lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of
the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at
Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first
published in Makati.

The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, [20] insisting that
the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v.
Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous
publication was printed and first published in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that
Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution
alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal
amendment.

Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia,
that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel
pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment. [22]

By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion
for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to
cure the defect of want of venue.

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20,
[24]
2007, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such
trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of
general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together
with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention
of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
 complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant
to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said
website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and
defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City, as follows:

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information [25] which, they alleged, still failed
to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous
articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the
internet-published article.

By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found
the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the public respondent
by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:

1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT
PUNISHABLE BY LAW;

2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and

3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF

CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether
petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and
(2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the
Amended Information.

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, [29] as a rule,
requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.[30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and
those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. [31] The rule is not iron-clad,
however, as it admits of certain exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.[32]

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary
authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a
pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of
the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written
defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:

Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall
be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a

daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is
a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360,
as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and
civil aspects of such cases.

In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v.

Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:

For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it
appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for

written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to
whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public
officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that
time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua
non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used
as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to
lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first
published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction

in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to
Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of these
changes:

Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for

criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal
Code:
 Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil
actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published,
displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed
or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts
that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.

Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed ( People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under
that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.

Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant place.

Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine
Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with
libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De
Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).

To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended
party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May
31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the
indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung
areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity
or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person
of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order
to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory

material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining
the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his
first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first
publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would
ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in
the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open
the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website
is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as
amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon

the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel
either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of
residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this
rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing
reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions
filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such
persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence,
in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with
precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the
Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-
876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED

B. JURISDICTION TO HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349. July 12, 2001]

BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC,

Tacloban City Branch 1, respondent.

R E S O LUTIO N
KAPUNAN, J.:

In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged
Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law,
partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133
entitled People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent judge issued a hold departure order against
her on October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that hold
departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to
be heard before issuing the questioned order.
When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued said order
because he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not
furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he instructed his legal
researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure
order dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge
averred that complainant and her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but neither
appeared on said date.
The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the assailed hold
departure order, recommended that he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides
that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level
courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent
judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence. The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower
courts, has not been remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due diligence in
keeping abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not
a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt with in
numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his
infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they
could discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.
In recent cases,[1] involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on
erring judges. Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a
repetition of the same and similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1850. July 14, 2004]

JUDGE LORINDA T. MUPAS, petitioner, vs. JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Damarias,
Cavite, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a letter-complaint[1] dated October 29, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA for brevity), Judge
Lorinda T. Mupas (complainant Judge for brevity) of the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite (MTC for brevity),
charges Judge Dolores L. Espaol, Regional Trial Court (Branch 90) of Dasmarias, Cavite (RTC for brevity), in her capacity as
Executive Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.

It appears from the records that on August 23, 2001, private complainants Leonora Bituon, Florencio Cantada, Anita
Mendoza, Rodelia Callo and Cael M. Glorioso (private complainants for brevity) filed three separate criminal complaints
for syndicated estafa against Eva Malihan, Sister Trinidad Sinagbulo, Mely Vargas, Geraldine Sine Baldovino, Belen
Liwanag, Juanita Sanchez and Nelia Tizon before the MTC, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-1487.
[2]
On August 24, 2001, acting upon a motion of private complainants, [3]herein complainant Judge conducted a
preliminary investigation.[4] On the same day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and recommended no
bail for their provisional liberty.[5] On August 28, 2001, private complainants filed a motion to transfer accused Eva
Malihan from the municipal jail to the provincial jail. [6] On August 29, 2001, complainant Judge required the Chief of
Police of Dasmarias, Cavite to comment on the motion to transfer within five days from receipt of the order.
[7]
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, accused Eva Malihan filed an urgent petition for bail. [8] On September 3, 2001, the
private complainants filed a supplemental pleading to support their previous motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan.
[9]
Invoking that the Executive Judge has authority to supervise all detainees in the municipal jail of
Dasmarias, Cavite under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the private complainants
sent copies of the motion to transfer and supplemental pleading to respondent. On September 4, 2001, complainant
Judge required the private complainants in the criminal case to file their comment or opposition to the petition for bail.
[10]
However, on that same day, respondent issued two orders in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1485 to 01-
1487. The first Order directed the transfer of the accused Eva Malihan from the Municipal Jail to the Provincial Jail,
[11]
while the second Order directed the Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to hold and prevent the
departure from the Philippines of the accused Eva Malihan while the cases are pending. [12]

Complainant Judge alleges that respondents act of issuing said assailed orders, despite the fact that the cases are
pending with the MTC, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.

In her Comment[13] dated February 4, 2002, respondent claims that the complaint is baseless and retaliatory as it is
founded on intrigue and spite for blowing the whistle concerning complainants activities that are pernicious to the
judiciary. Respondent states that complainants involvement in a scam in the form of commissions from bail bond
applicants is the main reason why complainant clings dearly to the delegated authority in the conduct of preliminary
investigation of cases filed with her court.

Respondent explains that she was surprised when she was furnished a copy of the two pleadings relating to cases
pending with the MTC, but admits that she acted on the motions as Executive Judge in order not to frustrate the
administration of justice.

With respect to the transfer order, she claims that under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, she has the authority to supervise all persons in custody.

As regards the hold-departure order, she argues that she is authorized under Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97, which
does not require that the subject criminal cases be in her court for the issuance of a hold-departure order. She argues
further that she issued the questioned hold-departure order based on the allegation of the complaining witnesses that
accused is trying to abscond from prosecution in the criminal case. Furthermore, she decided to act on the motions
because of the fact that complainant chose to ignore said motions to the prejudice of the complaining witnesses.

Subsequently, in a letter[14] dated February 8, 2002, complainant Judge iterates her earlier inquiry in 1999 involving the
practice of respondent in granting bail on cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.

On May 15, 2002, the OCA treated complainants letter as a supplemental complaint and referred it to respondent for her
comment.[15]

In a letter[16] dated July 3, 2002, respondent avers that the matter raised in the supplemental complaint is a mutation of
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, entitled Judge Dolores L. Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas, pending resolution with the
Court along with A.M. No. 01-2-39-RTC, entitled Wilma Go-Amposta and Medy M. Patricio vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas,
and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352, entitled Employees of MTC Dasmarias, Cavite vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas. She alleges that
the issue raised in said supplemental complaint is one of complainants defenses in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. Consequently,
she submits that this issue should not be treated as separate and distinct therefrom.

In her comment to the supplemental complaint [17] dated July 31, 2002, respondent further maintains that the issue of
granting bail is subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348.

She contends that the complaint is frivolous considering that the hold-departure order she issued against Eva Malihan
was sustained by the prosecutor. She claims that it is complainant Judge who should be investigated on irregularities in
approving bail bonds of detention prisoners. She avers further that complainant Judge falsified her report on detention
prisoners and purposely delayed the resolution of preliminary investigation cases until after a considerable period of
time which is a clear instance of complainant Judges gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
In her Reply[18] dated May 29, 2003, complainant Judge brandishes as lies the allegations of respondent in her Comment.
She adds that the issues therein are subject of investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348. Moreover, in A.M. No. MTJ-01-
1352, which was allegedly initiated by employees of her court through an anonymous letter, she claims that the said
employees denied authorship of the anonymous letter. With respect to A.M. No. 01-2-39-RTC, she alleges that the said
complaint has already been dismissed by the court. As regards the hold-departure order, complainant Judge claims that
the case was eventually dismissed by the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Lastly, she claims that respondent continues to defy the
rules on bail since she still issues release orders on detention prisoners whose cases are filed either for preliminary
investigation or trial in the MTC.

On February 28, 2004, complainant Judge filed a supplement [19] to her allegations in the letter dated February 8,
2002 regarding the practice of respondent to grant bail in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. She cites
nine cases pending with the MTC wherein respondent granted bail and subsequently released the accused even though
the judge where the case is pending is neither absent, unavailable nor even alleged to be absent or unavailable.

Complainant Judge emphatically submits that without the necessity of a formal investigation on the matter, the records
of the case involved will bear out the culpability of respondent Judge Espaol and will more than justify the imposition of
the most severe penalty upon her.

In its Memorandum[20] dated May 19, 2004, the OCA opines that respondents order to transfer the accused from the
municipal jail to the provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides, in part:

SEC. 25. Court supervision of detainees. The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose
of eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal
inspections of provincial, city and municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall
ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and health and examine the condition of the
jail facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of
detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to detainees.

The OCA expounds that as Executive Judge, respondent exercises supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose
of eliminating unnecessary detention but the rule does not give her the authority to arrogate upon herself a power
vested upon a presiding judge of the court where the case is pending. Instead of issuing an order transferring the
accused, the OCA observes that respondent should have called the attention of the complainant regarding the motions
which allegedly required immediate action; that there was no showing that she called the attention of complainant
Judge on the alleged motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan, neither was there any indication that the accused in the
subject cases was in a situation which requires the interference of the Executive Judge. The OCA concludes that
respondent encroached upon the power of complaining judge when respondent took cognizance of the motions not
pending in her court.

With regard to the hold-departure order, the OCA opines that the same cannot be sustained since it is contrary to the
mandates of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 inasmuch as at the time of its issuance, no case has yet been filed in the
RTC. It adds that while Section 1 of said circular states that Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court the same should be read that the subject criminal case has
been filed and pending with the RTC. In the criminal cases subject of the present administrative case, there is even no
final determination yet of a prima facie case that would warrant the filing of an information in court. The determination
made by an MTC would still be reviewed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OCA concludes that respondent
went against the injunction in Circular No. 39-97 that judges of the RTCs should be cautious and avoid the indiscriminate
issuance of hold-departure orders as this results in inconvenience to the parties affected and is tantamount to an
infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel.

With regard to the Supplemental Complaint, the OCA opines that the same should be incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-
01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358 entitled Wilma Go-
Amposta and Medy Particio vs. Judge Lorinda Mupas inasmuch as the issues raised in the supplemental complaint
containing the granting of bail are the same as those raised and taken up in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348.

Thus, the OCA recommends to the Court that: (a) respondent be admonished for issuing an order transferring the
accused from the municipal jail to the provincial jail; (b) respondent be reprimanded for issuing a hold departure order in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-1435 to 01-1437 considering that it is not within her authority to issue hold departure orders in
cases pending preliminary investigation in the MTC; and (c) the Supplemental Complaint be incorporated with A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Espaol, et al. vs. Judge Lorinda T. Mupas.[21]

Respondent compulsorily retired from service on January 9, 2004.

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.

Respondent urges that her conduct was nothing more than the zealous fulfillment of her duties as Executive Judge of the
RTC, Dasmarias, Cavite. However, it is elementary that an Executive Judge only has administrative supervision over lower
courts. Her function relates only to the management of first and second level courts, within her administrative area with
a view to attaining prompt and convenient dispatch of its business. Acting as such, she cannot unilaterally override the
MTCs actions in cases pending with it under the guise of administrative supervision, without running afoul of the orderly
administration of justice. Only when her courts jurisdiction is appropriately invoked in an appeal or certiorari and other
special civil actions can respondent judge, in her judicial capacity, override the lower courts judgment.

Although the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives
and Duties,[22] to wit:

SECTION 1. Executive Judges; general powers, prerogatives and duties. Executive Judges shall, within their respective
area of administrative supervision:

(a) Provide leadership in, and coordinate with the management of the first and second level courts;

(b) Exercise supervision over the judges and personnel;

(c) Balance the workload among the courts and maintain equitable distribution of cases in accordance with relevant
existing issuances;

(d) Recommend and implement policies concerning court operations;

(e) Identify, address and resolve problems in court administration which do not require any intervention by the Supreme
Court or the Court Administrator.

(f) Direct, through the Clerk of Court, the undertaking of staff support activities to improve judiciary services in
accordance with relevant existing issuances;

(g) Initiate, propose, and supervise the implementation of professional development programs for judicial personnel that
the Philippine Judicial Academy, in coordination with the Office of the Court Administrator, may undertake;

(h) Exercise such other powers and prerogatives as may be necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions
in relation to court administration; and
(i) Perform such other functions and duties as may be assigned by the Supreme Court or the Court Administrator.

the same is a mere reiteration of what has been in effect before said Circular.

Administrative Order No. 6, which took effect on July 1, 1975, narrates the specific power, prerogative and duties of an
executive judge. Portions pertinent to his duties with respect to lower level courts, read as follows:

IV. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties

The specific powers, prerogatives and duties of the Executive Judge are as follows:

1. To investigate administrative complaints against Municipal and City Judges, and other court personnel within his
administrative area; and to submit his findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court.

...

10. To visit and inspect municipal and provincial jails and their prisoners as required by Section 1730 of the Revised
Administrative Code and by applicable rules and regulations.

...

12. To designate, with immediate notice to the Supreme Court, the municipal judge to try cases in other municipalities
within his area of administrative supervision, in case of absence or incapacity of the municipal judge concerned, which
designation shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme Court.

13. To assign, with the prior approval of the Chief Justice, Municipal and City Judges to hear and determine cadastral
cases as provided by law.

...

the executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with the transfer of detainees in cases handled by
other judges, be it of the first or second level; nor to grant hold-departure orders in cases not assigned to her sala.

The powers of an executive judge relate only to those necessary or incidental to the performance of his/her functions in
relation to court administration.

Time and again the Court has adverted to the solemn obligation of judges to be very zealous in the discharge of their
bounden duties. Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of judges to promote a speedy administration of justice must at all
times be exercised with due recognition of the boundaries and limits of their jurisdiction or authority. Respondent's
ardent determination to expedite the case and render prompt justice may be a noble objective but she did so in a
manner which took away from the complainant MTC judge the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates
properly belongs to her.

The Court agrees with the observations of the OCA that respondent should have conferred with complainant regarding
the criminal cases and relayed her concerns to the latter, rather than precipitately issuing the assailed orders.

The Court further notes that, contrary to respondents allegation, complainant did not choose to simply ignore the
pending motion to transfer but, in fact, promptly directed the Chief of Police to comment thereon.

With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. [23] Criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level
courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular. It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending in the sala
of the RTC concerned.

In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal cases were only in the preliminary
investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva Malihan is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial. Complainant Judges findings had not yet been elevated to and
reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Respondents issuance of the hold-departure order was therefore premature and
clearly contravenes the mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the precipitate and indiscriminate issuance of hold-
departure orders. All told, respondents claim of good intention finds no convincing justification.

The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where,
however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law. [24]

Considering the respondents ten years of service as a judge, her judicial mind should have been tempered with the
delicate intricacies of the law and procedure. Respondents confusion between her administrative and judicial functions
betrays the degree of her competency and displays her unfamiliarity with basic procedural rules. Respondent ought to
have known the correct procedure to be followed in order to ensure proper administration of justice with due regard to
her jurisdictional boundaries. She was bound to discharge her duties with competence, prudence, caution and attention
inasmuch as she is a reflection of the entire judiciary.

Thus, the Court finds the penalty of admonition and reprimand recommended by the OCA to be too lenient.

Besides, the recent cases[25] wherein the penalty of reprimand was imposed on erring judges for the issuance of hold-
departure orders beyond the ambit of Circular 39-97 is not applicable because of the different circumstance in this case
where respondent precipitately issued orders in criminal cases still undergoing preliminary investigation in the MTC.

Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges,
which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which carries with it a
penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.However, considering that the incident took place on September 4, 2001 which is before A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC took effect, the Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is sufficient for unduly transferring the detainee and
arrogating upon herself the authority to issue a hold-departure order.

With regard to the Supplemental Complaint, the Court finds the recommendation of the OCA that the same should be
incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 to be well-taken since it refers to an issue subject of said administrative case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Dolores L. Espaol is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits due her. With regard to the
supplemental complaint, the same is incorporated with A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348 entitled Judge Dolores Espaol, et al. vs.
Judge Lorinda T. Mupas.

SO ORDERED.

C. JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

 D. VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. G.R. No. 167764
FAJARDO,
E. Petitioners,
F. Present:
G.
H.
I. - versus -
J. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
K.
CARPIO MORALES,*
L.
M. VELASCO, JR.,
N. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
O. Respondent. NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 9, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners
Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as
follows:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the
health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to
serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel

Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company
physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn
obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports
reaching Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and

residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo.
Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to
Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking
seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo
an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los
Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a
clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family
chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to
recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from
the hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of
difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to
the hospital.

The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was

devastating to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out her
anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right
side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another

hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral
frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since
the disease was already on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.
 My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all
healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the
conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license
for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed
away, July 2, 1994.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where

physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act
like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen
if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes,
Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious
institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of
promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and
more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although
mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the
brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms
for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time
stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
death!

My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who

died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G
Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City.May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional
integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation
and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without
 foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good
name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision [6] finding petitioners guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz,
Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353
and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing
aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3)
Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight
(8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to
pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[7]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[8] dated February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC
decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution

dated April 8, 2005.

Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:

 I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS
WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN

THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF

PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND
COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
COLUMNISTS.[9]

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was
satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor
and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the
question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her
family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes
the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not
entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it
would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice
in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the
prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to
report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an
opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the
editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held
responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual
issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was
established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence
already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming
those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or
circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result of the case − a
situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not
require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has
always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them
with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City,
Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information
dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction
over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are
not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the
issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is
settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of
the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by
law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the
landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction
by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by
laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which
justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal
case.[11]

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held
in Macasaet v. People[12] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
 offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) [13]

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the
specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a

daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court
of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is
a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense. [15]

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the
time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the
province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province
where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience
the Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-
Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in
Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar
Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue
of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN....

The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed that Iloilo was the place
where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said
publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with
the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose
 true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and
reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines,
and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred
and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be
published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their
respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....[17]

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila
to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following
disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word published is
utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in
'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila. The Information states that
the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published
in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in
general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact
that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that
it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading
national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in
general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and
first printed in Cebu.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction
in Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would
be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is
in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of
this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a
reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in
Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid. [18]
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the
Information therein alleged that the libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines, the
Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of
the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also
file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the
residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he
was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible
that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel alleged that the offended
party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and
reputation in the community, the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that
the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this
wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the
residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of
something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide
in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place,
two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place,
combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an
indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the
Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged
crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have
been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and
spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein.
Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within
the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.[21]

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
[22]
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case
under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this
case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want
of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET
ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.