Page 1 of 29
municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government center on the subject
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125183. September 29, 1997]
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, CORAZON DE
JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ADRIANO A. DELAMIDA, SR.
CELSO T. TORRES, TARCILA V. ZATA, QUIRICO T. TORRES, CATALINA
BONGAT, MILAGROS A. HERBOLARIO, ROSALINDA A. PIMENTAL,
PURIFICACION MORELLA, FRANCISCO RENION, SR., MARCELINA CORPUZ,
BENEDICTO FALCON, MAXIMO FALCON, MARIO BOLANOS, VICENTE T.
SURIAO, ROSARIO GREGORIA G. DORADO, JEREMIAS Z. PATRON, ALEX
RODRIGUEZ, MARIA LUISA ALPAPARA, HERMINIA C. RODRIGUEZ,
VICTORIANO ESPANOL, MARIO L. AGUILAR, FREDDIE AMADOR, SILVERIO
PURISIMA, JR., PROCOPIO B. PENARANDA, ELADIO MAGLUYAN, HELENITA
GUEI, CELESTINO MONTANO, ROMEO GOMEZ, OFELIA LOGO, JIMMY MACION,
DAISY A. MANGA, MAURO MANGA, ARTHUR HERBOLARIO, MANOLITO
HERBOLARIO, ROSARIO ANCHETA, TERESITA A. VICTORIA, ROSALINA
SAMPAGA, MARIQUITA RUADO, FELIPE ANCHETA, MAGDALENA CABREZA,
MARIA BIANDILLA, NILDA ARENSOL, LORENZO S. TOLEDO, and NAPOLEON
D. VILORIA, SR., respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing and seeking to reverse and set aside: a) the decision dated November 23, 1995 of the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b) the resolution dated May 28,
1996 denying reconsideration of said decision.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site
Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by
squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as
resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the
land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to
develop its government center by constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP
Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two salas of the
Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the
Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the
Municipal High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as follows:
PROCLAMATION NO. 164
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1978, WHICH
RESERVED FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER
SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METROPOLITAN
MANILA, ISLAND OF LUZON, BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS OPERATION THE
PARCELS OF LAND NOT BEING UTILIZED FOR GOVERNMENT CENTER
SITES PURPOSES BUT ACTUALLY OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO DISPOSITION UNDER
THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and by virtue of the 
powers vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby 
amend Proclamation No. 1716, dated February 17, 1978, which established for municipal government 
center site purposes certain parcels of land mentioned therein situated in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by excluding from its operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government 
center site purposes but actually occupied for residential purposes and declaring the land so excluded, 
together with other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied 
for residential purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended, 
subject to future survey, which are hereunder particularly described as follows :
Lot 1 (Port.) Psu­73270
x x x x x x x x x
Lot 4 (Port.) Psd­740 and Psd­810
x x x x x x x x x
Lot 5 (Port.) Psu­73270

x x x x x x x x x
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and  bone of contention in the petition before us boils down to the correct interpretation of
eighty­seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
By the President :
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Acting Executive Secretary
(Rollo, pp. 148­151.)
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein
private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against the
Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin
them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were
claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation
No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the
property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes
and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in a decision dated July 17, 1991.
This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a
private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the
same to respondent Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under
Proclamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality
filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus
Page 2 of 29
Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from
disposing and awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No.
164.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present recourse.
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that ultimately, the central question and
Proclamation No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No. 1716.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by hammering on the
issue of res judicata in view of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and
executory, had already settled the respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No. 164.
This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the reasons why the court had previously ruled in
favor of petitioners rights over the subject property against the claims of private respondents.
We find good legal basis to sustain petitioners position on the issue of res judicata insofar
as the particular area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject matter of the
earlier case, is concerned.
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 21 [1995]).
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of parties, we
have ruled that only substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of parties (Suarez
vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682 [1966]). The addition of public respondent DENR in
the second case will thus be of no moment. Likewise, there is identity of cause of action since
the right of the municipality over the subject property, the corresponding obligation of private
respondents to respect such right and the resulting violation of said right all remain to be the
same in both the first and the second actions despite the fact that in the first action, private
respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action, they were the respondents.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res judicata only extends to such portion of
land covered by Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not be automatically
segregated from the land covered by Proclamation No.
1716. It does not include those portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation No.
1716.
Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the above
premise and our discussion may properly end here. However, there exists a more basic reason
for setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to a fundamental and gross error
in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by then President Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by
Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may
 Page 3 of 29

only be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a
valid act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution of February 1986, President
Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24,
1986, she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional
Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II,
Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative
power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the
ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress
was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October
6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely on Congress.
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the attention of petitioner as well as
the courts before which this case has already passed through, this Court cannot help noticing
this basic flaw in the issuance of Proclamation No.
164. Because this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the
most basic principle in the separation of powers between the three branches of government
enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the principle of
the presumption of validity of a law.
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid (Salas vs.
Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 [1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
[1978]). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature.
This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the
executive branch. For this Court to allow such disregard of the most basic of all constitutional
principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back
to its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution.Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this
task that we take this exception from the Courts usual practice of not entertaining constitutional
questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of
legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Public respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently
ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Romero, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.


EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003]
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON.
GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION
DALISAY, PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Section 2, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the decision [1] dated September 14, 1999 of
the Commission on Audit (COA), affirming the resolution of COA Regional Director Gregoria S.
Ong dated March 29, 1994 which in turn affirmed the opinion dated October 19, 1993 of the
Provincial Auditor of Oriental Mindoro, Salvacion M. Dalisay. All three denied the grant of
P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes by the Municipality of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch
formerly assigned to the Municipality ofNaujan, Oriental Mindoro as
presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such, his salary and representation and
transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition,
petitioner received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds[2] of the Municipality of
Naujan starting 1984.[3]
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution
No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any
budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner judge. On May
7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges
monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993.[4] By virtue of said
Page 4 of 29
resolution, the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan) approved a
supplemental budget which was likewise approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of
Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro. In 1994, the Municipal
Government of Naujan again provided for petitioner judges P1,600 monthly
allowance in its annual budget which wasagain approvedby
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro.[5]
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of
the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund
of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could
not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from
the Supreme Court. Her directive was based on the following:
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent rank as 
may be determined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual 
performance of their respective functions are hereby granted monthly commutable representation and 
transportation allowances payable from the programmed appropriations provided for their respective 
offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below . . .
National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of the Department of Budget and 
Management
Subject: Representation and Transportation Allowances of National Government Officials 
and Employees
x x x x x x x x x
4. Funding Source: In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount 
appropriated for the purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or project from where 
the officials and employees covered under this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to
collect RATA from more than one source.[6] (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however,
upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and who added that
Resolution No. 101, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated September 1, 1993 outlining the conditions for
the grant of allowances to judges and other national officials or employees by the local
government units (LGUs). Section 3 of the said budget circular provides that:
 Page 5 of 29

2. Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General Appropriations Act; 
Sec. 3 Allowances. ─ LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the national 
government officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and  3. Officials /employees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve other offices
regulations and subject to the following preconditions: or agencies shall be paid from their parent agencies; 
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as certified 
4. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. 
by the Accountant concerned will allow the grant of the allowances/additional 
compensation without exceeding the general limitations for personal services  On the other hand, the municipal government may provide additional allowances and other benefits to 
under Section 325 of RA 7160; judges and other national government officials or employees assigned or stationed in the municipality, 
provided, that the finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1 
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full 
(xi), R.A. 7160, and provided further, that similar allowance/additional compensation are not granted by
requirement of RA 6758 have been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as 
the national government to the official/employee assigned to the local government unit as provided 
certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU concerned; 
under Section 3(e) of Local Budget Circular No. 53, dated 01 September 1993.
c. That   the   LGU   has   fully   implemented   the   devolution   of   personnel/functions   in
The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and 
accordance with the provisions of RA 7160;  Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645] have been harmonized by the Local 
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160; Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01 September 1993, issued by the Department of Budget and 
Management pursuant to its powers under Section 25 and Section 327 of the Local Government Code. 
and 
The said circular must be adhered to by the local government units particularly Section 3 thereof which 
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national  provides the implementing guidelines of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code of 
1991 in the grant of allowances to national government officials/employees assigned or stationed in their
government to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU. [7] 
respective local government units.
Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the
Commission on Audit. In the meantime, a disallowance of the payment of the P1,600 monthly Consequently, the subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of
allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he received his P1,600 monthly allowance from the
Municipality of Naujan only for the period the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, having failed to comply with the inherent 
May 1993 to January 1994. precondition as defined in Section 3 (e). . . is null and void. Furthermore, the Honorable Judge Tomas 
C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to receive additional RATA from the 
On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of Regional
local government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act (R.A. 7645 for 1993) 
Director Gregoria S. Ong:
and National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated 1 January 1992. [8] (emphasis ours)
The main issue . . . is whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly 
provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Generally, the grant of (RATA) [sic] to qualified national government officials and employees 
pursuant to Section 36 of R.A. 7645 [General Appropriations Act of 1993] and NCC No. 67 dated  Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied
01 January 1992 is subject to the following conditions to wit: by the Commission in a resolution dated May 30, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant
petition, raising the following assignments of error for our consideration:
1. Payable from the programmed /appropriated amount and others from personal services
I
savings   of   the   respective   offices   where   the   officials   or   employees   draw   their WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 1O1, SERIES OF 1993 OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL 
salaries; MINDORO, WHICH GRANTED ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE TO THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL 
 Page 6 of 29

JUDGE OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO AND INCREASING HIS CURRENT  1. National Compensation Circular No. 67 (hereafter NCC No. 67) dated
REPRESENTATION AND TRAVELLING ALLOWANCE (RATA) TO AN AMOUNT  January 1, 1992 of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) which
provides that (a) the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable from
EQUIVALENT TO THAT RECEIVED MONTHLY BY SANGGUNIANG MEMBERS IN PESOS: 
the programmed appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where
ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P1,600.00) EFFECTIVE 1993, IS VALID. such officials or employees draw their salary and (b) no one shall be allowed to
collect RATA from more than one source;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO GRANT ADDITIONAL 2. the General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) which provided that the RATA of
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES  national officials shall be payable from the programmed appropriations of their
respective offices and
STATIONED IN THEIR MUNICIPALITY IS VERY EXPLICIT AND UNEQUIVOCAL UNDER 
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53 (hereafter LBC No. 53) dated September 1,
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 IN RELATION TO
1993 of the DBM which prohibits local government units from granting allowances
SECTIONS 17 AND 22 THEREOF. to national government officials or employees stationed in their localities when such
allowances are also granted by the national government or are similar to the
III allowances granted by the national government to such officials or employees. [10]
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM) CAN, BY 
THE ISSUANCE OF BUDGET CIRCULARS, RESTRICT A MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FROM 
EXERCISING ITS GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL  POSITION OF PETITIONER
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO NATIONAL EMPLOYEES STATIONED OR 
ASSIGNED TO THEIR MUNICIPALITY FOR AS LONG AS THEIR FINANCES SO ALLOW.
Petitioner judge, on the other hand, asserts that the municipality is expressly and
unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) to enact
IV appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other benefits to judges stationed in its
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY  territory. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 imposes only one
SECTION 447 (a) (1) (xi) WAS EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY REPEALED OR MODIFIED  condition, that is, when the finances of the municipal government allow. The Code does not
impose any other restrictions in the exercise of such power by the municipality. Petitioner also
BY REPUBLIC ACT 7645 AND THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1993. asserts that the
DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the Local Government Code of 1991
V through mere budget circulars. Petitioner emphasizes that budget
circulars must conform to, not modify or amend, the provisions of the law it seeks to implement.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE ADDITIONAL  [11]

ALLOWANCES GRANTED TO HIM BY THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL 
MINDORO BY VIRTUE OF ITS RESOLUTION NO. 101, SERIES OF 1993.
HISTORY OF GRANT OF
ALLOWANCES TO JUDGES

POSITION OF COA
The power of local government units (LGUs) to grant allowances to judges stationed in
their respective territories was originally provided by Letter of Instruction No. 1418 dated July
18, 1984 (hereafter LOI No. 1418):
Respondent Commission on Audit opposes the Grant by
the Municipality of Naujan of the P1,600 monthly allowanceto petitioner WHEREAS, the State is cognizant of the need to maintain the independence of the Judiciary;
Judge Leynes for the reason that the municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to
the RATA already received from the Supreme Court. [9] Respondent bases its contention on the WHEREAS, the budgetary allotment of the Judiciary constitutes only a small percentage of the national
following: budget;
 Page 7 of 29

WHEREAS, present economic conditions adversely affected the livelihood of the members  as of June 30, 1989 and shall be co­terminous with the 

of the Judiciary; incumbent judges; and

WHEREAS, some local government units are ready, willing and able to pay additional allowances  5. That the subject allowance shall automatically terminate upon transfer of a judge
from one local government unit to another local government unit. (emphasis
to Judges of various courts within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
ours)
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the 
On October 10, 1991, Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Philippines, do hereby direct: Government Code of 1991. [13] The power of the LGUs to grant allowances and other benefits to
judges and other national officials stationed in their respective territories was expressly
1. Section 3 of Letter of Implementation No. 96 is hereby amended to read as  provided in Sections 447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)(1)(xi) of the Code.
follows: On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (hereafter LBC No. 55)
setting out the maximum amount of allowances that LGUs may grant to judges. For provinces
3. The allowances provided in this letter shall be borne exclusively by the  and cities, the amount should not exceed P1,000 and for municipalities, P700.
National Government. However, provincial, city and municipal  On December 3, 2002, we struck down the above circular in Dadole, et al. vs. COA.[14] We
governments may pay additional allowances to the members and  ruled there that the Local Government Code of 1991 clearly
provided that LGUs could grant allowances to judges, subject only to the condition that the
personnel of the Judiciary assigned in their respective areas out of 
finances of the LGUs allowed it. We held that setting a uniform amount for the grant of
available local funds but not to allowances (was) an inappropriate way of enforcing said criterion. Accordingly, we declared that
exceed P1,500.00; Provided, that in Metropolitan Manila, the city and  the DBM exceeded its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did not
municipal governments therein may pay additional allowances not  jibe with the Local Government Code of 1991. [15]
exceeding P3,000.00. (emphasis ours)[12]

On June 25, 1991, the DBM issued Circular No. 91-7 outlining the guidelines for the ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
continued receipt of allowances by judges from LGUs:

Consistent with the constitutional provision on the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary and the policy of the  From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges, the
National Government of allowing greater autonomy to local government units, judges of the Judiciary  following principles should be noted:
are hereby allowed to continue to receive allowances at the same rates which they have been receiving  1. the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges has long been recognized (since
from the Local Government Units as of June 30, 1989, subject to the following guidelines: 1984 by virtue of LOI No. 1418) and, at present, it is expressly and unequivocally
provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code of 1991;
1. That the continuance of payment of subject allowance to the recipient judge shall be 2. the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated June 25, 1991 and LBC No. 55 dated
entirely  voluntary  and  non­compulsory  on  the  part  of  the  Local  Government March 15, 1994 indicates that the national government recognizes the power of
LGUs to grant such allowances to judges;
Units;
3. in Circular No. 91-7, the national government
2. That payment of the above shall always be subject to the availability of local funds; 
merely provides the guidelines for the continued receipt of allowances
3. That it shall be made only in compliance with the policy of non­diminution of  by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the national government merely tries to
compensation received by the recipient judge before the implementation of the  limit the amount of allowances LGUs may grant to judges and

salary standardization;  4. in the recent case of Dadole, et al. vs. COA, the Court upheld the constitutionally
enshrined autonomy of LGUs to grant allowances to judges in any amount
4. That the subject allowance shall be given only to judges who were receiving the same deemed appropriate, depending on availability of funds, in accordance with the
Local Government Code of 1991.

OUR RULING
We rule in favor of petitioner judge. Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the
P1,600 monthly allowance by the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes.
DISCUSSION OF OUR RULING
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances,  consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy. RA 7645 (the GAA of
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its  the share in the national fund of all branches of the national government. RA 7645 therefore,
inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective municipal  7645 in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion. [23]
government, and in this connection shall:
x x x x x x x x x
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional allowances and other
benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national  3. Rules and Regulations:
government officials stationed in or assigned to the municipality; (emphasis ours)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has been repealed, modified
or amended by NCC No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, RA 7645
(the General Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53 dated September 1, 1993. [16]
It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede,
abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an administrative circular, thus the
latter cannot repeal or amend it. [17] In the present case, NCC No. 67, being a mere
administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive law like RA 7160.
It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction that repeal of statutes by
implication is not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. The legislature is
assumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and cannot be presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. [18] Respondent
COA alleges that Section 36 of RA 7645 (the GAA of
1993) repealed Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991). A review of the two laws,
however, shows that this was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645 merely provided for the different
rates of RATA payable to national government officials or employees, depending on their
position, and stated that these amounts were payable from the programmed appropriations of
the parent agencies to which the concerned national officials or employees belonged.
Furthermore, there was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section 447(a) (l)
(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence, therefore, of any clear repeal of Section
Page 8 of 29
447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160, we cannot presume such intention on the part of the legislature.
Moreover, the presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when, as in this
case, one law is special and the other is general. [19] The principle is
expressed in the maxim generaliaspecialibus non derogant, a general law does not nullify a
specific or special law. The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special
character, considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by
the special law. This being so, the legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions
repugnant to those of the special law and without making any mention of its intention to amend
or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to have intended an amendment, repeal or
modification of the latter.[20]
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law [21] which exclusively deals with
local government units (LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in
1993), on the other hand, was a general law[22] which outlined
being a general law, could not have, by mere implication, repealed RA 7160. Rather, RA 7160
should be taken as the exception to RA
The controversy actually centers on the seemingly sweeping provision in NCC No. 67
which states that no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. Does this
mean that judges cannot receive allowances from LGUs in addition to the RATA from the
Supreme Court? For reasons that will hereinafter be discussed, we answer in the negative.
The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read:
 
3.1.1 Payment of RATA, whether commutable or reimbursable, shall be in 
accordance with the rates prescribed for each of the following officials 
and employees and those of equivalent ranks, and the conditions 
enumerated under the pertinent sections of the General Provisions of 
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA): 
x x x x x x x x x 
4. Funding Source: 
In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated for the 
purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and 
employees covered under this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA 
from more than one source. (emphasis ours)
In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in statutory construction that force and
effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit,
broadly taking all its provisions together in one rational view. [24] Because a statute is enacted as

a whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as important as the others, the statute
should be construed and given effect as a whole. A provision or section which is unclear by
itself may be clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. [25]
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of
RATA by a national official from the budgets of more than one national agency. We emphasize
that the other source referred to in the prohibition is another national agency. This can be
gleaned from the fact that the sentence no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source
(the controversial prohibition) immediately follows the sentence that RATA shall be paid from
the budget of the national agency where the concerned national officials and employees draw
their salaries. The fact that the other source is another national agency is supported by RA
7645 (the GAA of 1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in fact, by all subsequent GAAs
for that matter, because the GAAs all essentially provide that (1) the RATA of national officials
shall be payable from the budgets of their respective national agencies and (2) those officials
on detail with other national agencies shall be paid their RATA only from the budget of their
parent national agency:
Section 36, RA 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993:
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of equivalent rank as 
may be determined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) while in the actual  Constitution.[27] The Local Government Code of 1991 was specially promulgated by Congress to
performance of their respective functions are hereby granted monthly commutable representation and  ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the Constitution. By upholding, in
transportation allowances payable from the programmed appropriations provided for their respective 
offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below, which shall apply to each type of allowance:
x x x x x x x x x
Officials on detail with other offices, including officials of the Commission of Audit assigned to serve 
other offices or agencies, shall be paid the allowance herein authorized from the appropriations of their
parent agencies. (emphasis ours)
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only against the dual or multiple collection of
RATA by a national official from the budgets of two or more national agencies. Stated otherwise, when a
national official is on detail with another national agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent
national agency and not from the other national agency he is detailed to.
the in the controversial prohibition is
Since other source referred another
national agency, said prohibition clearly does not apply to LGUs like
the Municipality of Naujan. National agency of course refers to the different
offices, bureaus and departments comprising the national government. The budgets of these
departments or offices are fixed annually by Congress in the
General Appropriations Act.[26] An LGU is obviously not a national agency. Its
annual budget is fixed by its own legislative council
Page 9 of 29
(Sangguniang Bayan, Panlungsod or Panlalawigan), not by Congress. Without
doubt, NCC No. 67 does not apply to LGUs.
The prohibition in NCC No. 67 is in fact an administrative tool of the DBM to prevent the
much-abused practice of multiple allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA by national
agencies. Thus, the purpose clause of NCC No. 67 reads:
This Circular is being issued to ensure uniformity and consistency of actions on claims for 
representation and transportation allowance (RATA) which is primarily granted by law to national 
government officials and employees to cover expenses incurred in the discharge or performance of 
their duties and responsibilities.
By no stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges under the Local Government Code of 1991. It was issued
primarily to make the grant of RATA to national officials under the national budget uniform. In
other words, it applies only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds
of LGUs.
To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges as what respondent COA
would like us to do will subvert the principle of local autonomy zealously guaranteed by the
the present case, the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of
local funds, we ensure the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.
We now discuss the next contention of respondent COA: that the resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge was
null and void because it failed to comply with LBC No. 53 dated September 1, 1993:
Sec. 3 Allowances. ─ LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the national 
government officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and 
regulations and subject to the following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as certified 
by the Accountant concerned will allow the grant of the
allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the general 
limitations for personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full 
requirement of RA 6758 have been satisfied and provided fully in the 
budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the 
LGU concerned;
 Page 10 of 29

proof to the contrary, that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in  Oriental Mindoro performed what the law required it to do, that is, review the
accordance with the provisions of RA 7160;  complied with Sections 324 and 325 of the Code. [34] We presume
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160. 
e. That   similar   allowances/additional   compensation   are   not   granted   by   the
national government to the officials/employees assigned to the 
LGU.
Though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the ambit of the President's
power of general supervision over LGUs, [28] we rule that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is
invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly provides that provincial, city and
municipal governments may grant allowances to judges as long as their finances allow. Section
3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to
judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the national government or (2)
similar to the allowances granted by the national government, violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of
the Local Government Code of 1991. [29] As already stated, a
circular must conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or amend it. [30]
Moreover, by prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted
by the national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibits LGUs from
granting allowances to judges and, in effect, totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being
unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and
being violative of their autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of
LBC No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.
resolution and the corresponding budgets of the Municipality of Naujan to make sure that they
the regularity of the Sangguniang Panlalawigans official act.
Moreover, it is well-settled that an ordinance must be presumed valid in the
absence of evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law. [35] Respondent COA had
the burden of proving that Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan did not comply with the condition provided in Section 447 of the
Code, the budgetary requirements and general limitations on the use of municipal funds provided in
Sections 324 and 325 of the Code and the implementing guidelines issued by the DBM, i.e., paragraphs
(a) to (d), Section 3
of LBC No. 53. Respondent COA also had the burden of showing that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro erroneously approved said
resolution despite its non-compliance with the requirements of the law. It failed to
discharge such burden. On the contrary, we find that the resolution of
the Municipality of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner
judge fully complied with the law. Thus, we uphold its validity.
In sum, we hereby affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the questioned
allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes in accordance with the constitutionally mandated policy of
local autonomy and the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. We also sustain the
validity of Resolution No.
101, Series of 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan for being in accordance with the law.

Paragraphs (a) to (d) of said circular, however, are valid as they are in accordance with
Sections 324[31] and 325[32] of the Local Government Code of
1991; these respectively provide for the budgetary requirements and general limitations on the
use of provincial, city and municipal funds. Paragraphs (a) to
(d) are proper guidelines for the condition provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 that LGUs may grant allowances to judges if their funds allow. [33]
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan failed to comply with paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September
14, 1999 of the Commission of Audit is hereby SET ASIDE and
Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The argument is misplaced.

Guidelines (a) to (d) were met when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Oriental Mindoro approved Resolution No. 101 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to
petitioner judge as well as the corresponding budgets of the municipality providing for the said
monthly allowance to petitioner judge. Under Section 327 of the Local Government Code of
1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to review the appropriation
ordinances of its component municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and 325 of
the Code.
Considering said duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, we will assume, in the absence of
 Page 11 of 29

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval- power to inspect at any time the financial accounts of LGUs. Moreover, the Solicitor
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., General opined that the DBM and the respondent are only authorized under RA 7160
concur. to promulgate a Budget Operations Manual for LGUs, to improve and systematize
methods, techniques and procedures employed in budget preparation, authorization,
[1] Penned by Chairman Celso D. Gagan and Commissioners Raul C. Flores and Emmanuel execution and accountability pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor
M. Dalman. General pointed out that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the aforementioned
provisions.
[2] Respondent COA erroneously considered the P944 monthly allowance as
RATA from the Supreme Court in its Comment dated October 23, 2000 and
Memorandum dated June 26, 2001. Rollo, pp. 53, 103. [16] Rollo, pp. 22-25.
[3] Annex "D," Certification of the Office of the Municipal Accountant; Petition for [17] China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 327 [1996].
Certiorari, p. 5.
[18] U.S. vs. Palacio, 33 Phil 208 [1916]; Maceda vs. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771 [1991].
[4] Annex "E," Resolution No. 101, Series of 1991, Rollo, p. 35.
[5] Petition for Certiorari, p. 4.
[6] Rollo, p. 38. [19] Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil 224 [1919]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 487 [1992].
[7] Rollo, pp. 40-42.
[20] De Villa vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722 [1991].
[8] Rollo, pp. 22-25.
[9] Respondent COA erroneously considered the P944 monthly allowance being received by [21] A special law is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class, or to a
petitioner judge from the local funds of the municipality since particular portion or section of the state only. U.S. vs. Serapio, 23 Phil
1984 as RATA from the Supreme Court. Thus, in 1993 when the municipality 584 [1912].
increased said allowance to P1,600 (an increase of P656), COA opposed the grant of [22] A general law is one which affects all people of the state or all of a particular
the whole P1,600 monthly allowance because the municipality supposedly could not class of persons in the state or embraces a class of subjects or places and does not
grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA already granted by the omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. U.S. vs.Serapio, 23 Phil
Supreme Court. See 584 [1912]; Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil 823 [1948]; Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190
Comment dated October 23, 2000 and Memorandum dated June 26, 2001, Rollo, pp. [1971].
53, 103.
[23] Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 [1971].
[10] Rollo, pp. 22-25, 31-33, 36-38, 57-64.
[24] Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil 709 [1956]; Sotto vs. Sotto, 43 Phil 688 [1922].
[11] Rollo, pp. 10-17.
[12] In Allarde vs. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993], we ruled that the use of the
[25] Maddumba vs. Ozaeta, 82 Phil 345 [1948]; Lopez vs. El Hogar Filipino, 47
word may in LOI No. 1418 signifies that the allowance may not be demanded as a
Phil 249 [1925].
matter of right, but [26]
National agencies included in the national budget are Congress, Office of the President,
is entirely dependent on the will of the municipality concerned. It should be treated as an Office of the Vice-President, DA, DAR, DBM, DECS,
honorarium, an amount that is given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation DENR, DOF, DFA, DOH, DILG, DOJ, DOLE, DND, DPWH, DOST,
of services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration for services which admit of DSWD, DOT, DTI, DOTC, NEDA, Office of the Press Secretary, the Judiciary,
no compensation in money (Santiago vs. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 128, 130). Constitutional Offices, Commission on Human Rights, State
[13] The law took effect on January 1, 1992.
[14] G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002.
[15]
Instead of filing a comment on behalf of respondent COA in this case, the Solicitor
General filed a manifestation supporting the position of petitioner judges. The
Solicitor General argued that (1) DBM only enjoyed the power to review and
determine whether disbursement of funds were made in accordance with the
ordinance passed by a LGU while (2) the COA had no more than auditorial visitation
powers over the LGUs pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the

Universities and Colleges and Autonomous Regions. See the GAA of 1993 as
example.
[27] Section 25, Article II; Section 2, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
[28] The LBC No. 53 was issued by the DBM by virtue of Administrative Order No. 42 which
clarified
the role of the DBM in the administration of the compensation and position classification
systems in the LGUs and mandated it, among other things, to provide guidelines for
the grant of allowances and additional forms of compensation by the LGUs. AO No.
42 was issued by the President by virtue of his power of general supervision over the
LGUs under Section 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
[29] Also Section 458(a)(1)(xi) and Section 468(a)(1)(xi), Local Government Code of 1991.
[30] Supra note 17.
[31] Section 324. Budgetary Requirements. - The budgets of local government units for any
fiscal year shall comply with the following requirements:
(a) The aggregate amount appropriated shall not exceed the estimates of income;
(b) Full provision shall be made for all statutory and contractual obligations of the local
government unit concerned: Provided, however, that the amount of appropriations for
debt servicing shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the regular income of the
local government unit concerned;
(c) In the case of provinces, cities, and municipalities, aid to component barangays shall be
provided in amounts of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per barangay;
and
(d) Five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as an
annual lump sum appropriation for unforeseen expenditures arising from the
occurrence of calamities: Provided, however, that such appropriation shall be used
only in the area, or a portion thereof, of the local government unit or other areas
declared in a state of calamity by the President.
[32]
Section 325. General Limitations. - The use of the provincial, city and municipal funds shall
be subject to the following limitations:
(a) The total appropriations, whether annual or supplemental, for personal services of a local
government unit for one (1) fiscal year shall not exceed forty-five (45%) in the case of
first to third class provinces, cities, and municipalities, and fifty-five percent (55%) in
the case of fourth class or lower, of the total annual income from regular sources
realized in the next preceding fiscal year. The appropriations for salaries, wages,
representation and transportation allowances of officials and employees of the public
utilities and economic enterprises owned, operated, and maintained by the local
government unit concerned shall not be included in the annual budget or in the
computation of the maximum amount for personal services. The appropriations for the
personal services of such economic enterprises shall be charged to their respective
budgets;
(b) No official or employee shall be entitled to a salary rate higher than the maximum fixed for
Page 12 of 29
his position or other positions of equivalent rank by applicable laws or rules and
regulations issued thereunder;
(c) No local fund shall be appropriated to increase or adjust salaries or wages of officials and
employees of the national government, except as may be expressly authorized by
law;
(d) In cases of abolition of positions and the creation of new ones resulting from the abolition
of existing positions in the career service, such abolition or creation shall be made in
accordance with pertinent provisions of this code and the civil service law, rules and
regulations;
(e) Positions in the official plantilla for career positions which are occupied by incumbents
holding permanent appointments shall be covered by adequate appropriations;
(f) No changes in designation or nomenclature of positions resulting in a promotion or
demotion in rank or increase or decrease in compensation shall be allowed, except
when the position is actually vacant, and the filling of such positions shall be strictly
made in accordance with the civil service law, rules and regulations;
(g) The creation of new positions and salary increases or adjustments shall in no case be
made retroactive; and
(h) The annual appropriations for discretionary purposes of the local chief executive shall not
exceed two percent (2%) of the actual receipts derived from basic real property tax in
the next preceding calendar year. Discretionary funds shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law. No amount shall be appropriated for the
same purpose except as authorized under this Section.
[33]
Paragraph (a) should be read in conjunction with the recent circular of the DBM, Local
Budget
Circular No. 75 dated July 12, 2002 entitled Guidelines on Personal Services
Limitation. Section 5.5 thereof entitled Honoraria of National Government Personnel
provides: The appropriation intended to be granted as honoraria and similar benefits
to national government personnel shall be classified as Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE) since these are not personal services costs of the local
government unit.
[34]
Figuerres vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 206 [1999].
[35]
Ibid.
 Page 13 of 29

Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against
SUPREME COURT Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964. Due to the institution of the
Manila criminal case, plaintiff Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said ordinance with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants
EN BANC Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman
Andrada from enforcing the ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined
from further proceeding in the criminal case.
G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding that the
JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS, plaintiff- ordinance was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise
appellee, vs. known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Now, defendants, appellants herein,
THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants. allege that the lower court erred in: 3

Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for appellee. f. declaring that Municipal Ordinance No. 3 (Series of 1964) of Urdaneta
is null and void;
Primicias, Castillo & Macaraeg for appellants.
g. requiring the municipal council of Urdaneta in the enactment of said
ordinance to give maximum allowable speed and to make classification
of highways;

DE CASTRO, J.:
h. holding that said ordinance is in conflict with section 35 par.
b(4) of Republic Act 4136;
The main issue in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted on
March 13,1964 by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which was declared null
i. requiring that said ordinance be approved by the Land
and void by the Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated June
29, 1966, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Transportation Commissioner;

WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision declaring Ordinance No, 3, j. holding that said ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms;
Series of 1964, to be null and void; making the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the defendant, Felix D. Soriano definite and k. issuing ex-parte a writ of injunction to restrain the proceedings in
permanent; and further restraining the defendants, Amadeo R. Perez, Jr.,
criminal case no. 3140.
Lorenzo G. Suyat and Estanislao Andrada, from enforcing the said
ordinance all throughout Urdaneta; and ordering the said defendants to
return to the plaintiff his drivers (sic) license CIN 017644, a copy of which is The ordinance in question provides: 4
Exhibit D-1, and to pay the costs of suit. 1
SECTION 1 - That the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along
From the aforecited decision, defendants appealed to this Court. The antecedent facts of this the National Highway and the Provincial Roads within the territorial
case are as follows: 2 limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows:

On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was driving his car within a. Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at
the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop. 'blind corners, passing school zones or thickly
He was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, populated areas, duly marked with sign posts, the
"and more particularly, for overtaking a truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiff's license maximum speed limit allowable shall be 20 kph.
which he surrendered, and a temporary operator's permit was issued to him. This incident took
place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. SECTION 2 - That any person or persons caught driving any motor vehicle
 Page 14 of 29

violating the provisions of this ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SPEEDS
offense; P20.00 for the second offense; and P30.00 for the third and
succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall recommend the cancellation
of the license of the offender to the Motor Vehicle's Office (MVO); or failure Passenger Motor
to pay the fine imposed, he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in cars and truck
accordance with law.
and
motorcycle buses
Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and based on Section 53,
5
par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended (Revised Motor Vehicle Law)." In so arguing, appellants On open country
fail to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land 1. roads, with
Transportation and 'Traffic Code, which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three
months after the questioned ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The "blind corners" not closely
explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, to wit: bordered
80
Act Numbered thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as by habitation. km. 50 km.
amended, and all laws, executive orders, ordinance,
resolutions, regulations or paints thereof in conflict with per
the provisions of this Act are repealed. 2. On through streets or per hour hour
boulevards, clear of traffic,
By this express repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier with "no
law, 6 appellants are in error in contending that "a later enactment of the law
relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not blind corners" when so 40
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law." Pursuant to designated. km. 30 km.
Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus placed per
within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not Act No. 3992. The 3. On city and municipal per hour hour
validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, must therefore be determined
vis-a -vis Republic Act No. 4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which streets, with light traffic,
was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against Primicias for when not
the violation of the said ordinance.
designated "through 30
streets." km. 30 km.
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . . .
the statute," 7 for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are Through crowded per
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." 8 Following this 4. streets ap per hour hour
general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a
statute, the ordinance "must give way. 9

Since the Ordinance is aimed at regulating traffic, Chapter IV Traffic

Rules), Article I (Speed Limits and Keeping to the Right), consisting of
sections 35, to 38 of Republic Act No. 4136, particularly Sections 35, 36,
38 contain the provisions material to its validity. Section 35 (b), Republic
Act No. 4136, which took the place of Section 53, par. (4), Act No. 3992,
provides restrictions as to speed thus:

proaching intersection at "blind cor
ners," passing school zones, passing
other vehicles which are stationary, or
for similar circumstances. 20 km.
per hour per hour
A look at the aforecited section and Section 1, par. (a) of the Ordinance shows
that the latter is more or less a restatement only of number (4), par. (b), Section
35. As observed by the trial court, the Ordinance "refers to only one of the four
classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35." 10 limiting the rates of
speed for
vehicular traffic along the national highway and The
provincial roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta to
20 kilometers per hour without regard to whether the road
is an open country roads (six), or through streets or
boulevards, or city or municipal streets with light traffic. 11
As also found correctly by the lower court, the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit
requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No. 4136, which provides:
Classification of highways. - Public highways shall be
properly classified for traffic purposes by the provincial board
or city council having jurisdiction over them, and said
provincial board, municipal board or city council shall provide
appropriate signs therefor, subject to the approval of the
Commissioner. It shall be the duty of every provincial, city
and municipal secretary to certify to the Commissioner the
names, locations, and limits of all "through streets"
designated as such by the provincial board, municipal board
or council.
Under this section, a local legislative body intending to control traffic in public
highways 12 is supposed to classify, first, and then mark them with proper signs,
all to be approved by the Land Transportation Commissioner. To hold that the
provisions of Section 38 are mandatory is sanctioned by a ruling 13 that
Page 15 of 29
statutes which confer upon a public body or officer . . . power
to perform acts which concern the public interests or rights
of individuals, are generally, regarded as mandatory
although the language is permissive only since the are
construed as imposing duties rather than conferring
privileges.
The classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of
Section 36 which states that "no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact
20 km. or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds
other than those provided in this Act." In this case, however, there is no showing
that the marking of the streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a),
Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the approval of the Land
Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very ground alone, the Ordinance
becomes invalid. Since it lacks the requirement imposed by Section 38, the
provincial, city, or municipal board or council is enjoined under Section 62 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting or enforcing any ordinance
or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act."
Regarding the contention that the lower court erred in holding that said "Ordinance is not clear
and definite in its terms." We agree with the Court a quo that when the Municipal Council of
Urdaneta used the phrase "vehicular traffic" (Section 1, Ordinance) it "did not distinguish
between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses." 14 This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular traffic" defined. Considering
that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more
important so that "an average man should be able with due care, after reading it,, to understand
and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct." 15 In
comparison, Section 35(b), Republic Act No. 4136 on which Section 1 of the Ordinance must be
based, stated that the rates of speed enumerated therein refer to motor vehicle, 16 specifying
the speed for each kind of vehicle. At the same time, to avoid vagueness, Art. 11, Section 3
defines what a motor vehicle is and passenger automobiles are.
On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 3140, the general rule is that "ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked by
court prohibition or injunction." 17 Exceptions however are allowed in the following
instances:
5. for the orderly administration of justice;
6. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
and vindictive manner;
7. to avoid multiplicity of actions;
8. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;
 Page 16 of 29

#Footnotes
9. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or
was held invalid. 18 4. Record on Appeal, pp. 50-51.

The local statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the exception just cited obtains in this case. 5. Ibid, pp. 36-38.
Hence, the lower court did not err in issuing the writ of injunction against defendants. Moreover,
considering that "our law on municipal corporations is in principle patterned after that of the
United States, " 19 it would not be amiss for Us to adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin 6. Rollo, pp. 76-77.
the enforcement of a void ordinance, "injunction has frequently been sustained in order to
prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it." 20 7. Rollo, pp. 39-40.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

8. Section 53 enumerated the rates of speed of motor vehicles for the
roads classified in the said section.
SO ORDERED.
9. Enrile vs. Vinuya, 37 SCRA 381, 382 (1976).
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero,
and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. 10. Martin, Ruperto G. Public Corporations, 1977 ed., p. 140, Citing
Cooley's Municipal Corporations, p. 170, 171, and U.S. v. Abendan, 24
Aquino, J., took no part. Phil. 165; U.S. v. Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. 89, 91.

Antonio, J., is on leave. 8 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 374, p. 406.

9 City of Basilan v. Hechanova, L-23841, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 711.

Separate Opinions
10 Record on Appeal, p. 45.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
11 Ibid., p. 42.
The ordinance in question was in effect a speed trap for unwary motorists for which Urdaneta
had become notorious.

# Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The ordinance in question was in effect a speed trap for unwary motorists for which Urdaneta
had become notorious.
 Page 17 of 29

12 Art. 11, Sec. 30), R.A. No. 4136 states that highways "shall mean every public
thoroughfare public boulevard, driveway, avenue, park, alley and caution but shall not
include roadway upon grounds owned by private persons, colleges, universities or other
similar institutions.

13 Vda. de Mesa, et. al. v. Mencias, etc., et. al., L-24583, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 533,
542.

14 Record on Appeal, p. 46.

15 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 367, p. 394.

16 Section 35(b) starts with "(s)ubject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the
rates of speed of any motor vehicle shall not exceed the following. . ."

17 Gorospe v. Penaflorida, 101 Phil. 892, citing 43 C.J.S. 768, 770; Lava v. Gonzales, L-
23048, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 650, 651; Ramos v. Torres, L-23454, October 25, 1968, 25
SCRA 557, 563.

18 Ramos v. Torres, L -23454, October 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557, 564; Hernandez v.
Albano, L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95, 96.

19 Homeowners Association of the Phil., Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 24 SCRA
856, 858 (1968).

20 6 MCQUILLIN 70, (3rd ed.), citing among others, Chicago v. Collins, 175 ILL. 445, 51 N.E.
907, 67 Am. St. Rep. 224; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md 186.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ,
TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE
VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS,
RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO
GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO
GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO
GABRIEL,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor,
MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.
Federico N. Alday for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a municipal
corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with
nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect
withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1.— Title of Ordinance.— This
Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of
Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. — Definitions of Terms — (a) 'Night Club' shall include any place
or establishment selling to the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. (b)
'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or establishment where dancing is permitted to
the public and where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and professional dancers are
employed. (c) 'Professional hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman employed
Page 18 of 29
by any of the establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at their table or
to dance with them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any woman who dances at any of the
establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the
operator or by the persons she dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the owner, manager,
administrator or any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club,
cabaret or dance hall. Section 3. — Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses,
Permits. — Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other
adverse effects on this community as explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or
dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the
municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls
and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The
prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said
establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.— Revocation of
Permits and Licenses.— The licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets
or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-
day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these
establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5.— Penalty in
case of violation. — Violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the
discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person charged with
the management and/or operation thereof shall be liable for the penalty provided herein.
Section 6. — Separability Clause.— If, for any reason, any section or provision of this
Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision hereof shall be
affected thereby. Section 7.— Repealing Clause.— All ordinance, resolutions, circulars,
memoranda or parts thereof that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed. Section 8.— Effectivity .— This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon
its approval; provided, however, that operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in
operation including professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are given
a period of thirty days from the approval hereof within which to wind up their businesses and
comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 5 The grounds alleged follow:
l. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling.
m. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection
of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by Presidential Decree No.
259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has
been transferred to the Department of Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to respondent
Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court, who issued a
restraining order on November 7, 1975. The answers were thereafter filed. It was therein

alleged: " 1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit
the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC,
CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of
petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are
subordinate to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not
deprive Municipal Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs." 7There was
the admission of the following facts as having been established: "l. That petitioners Vicente de
la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal
Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since
1960; petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That
petitioners had invested large sums of money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are
well-lighted and have no partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners
owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral
acts and to go out with customers; 5. That these hospitality girls are made to go through
periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is suffering from any venereal disease and that
those who fail to submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be infected with
venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the crime rate there is better than in other
parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision
upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases.
Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court dismissed the petitions. Its
rationale is set forth in the opening paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last. This in
essence is why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized as it has been by
innuendos of sexual titillation and fearful of what the awesome future holds for it, had no
alternative except to order thru its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of partial
economic dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets. This in essence is also
why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and cognizant of the
categorical imperatives of the current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name
of police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, of the
Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. The restraining orders heretofore issued in these two
cases are therefore hereby rifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose of the
grace period being to enable the petitioners herein to apply to the proper appellate tribunals for
any contemplated redress." 9 This Court is, however, unable to agree with such a conclusion
and for reasons herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify
the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General
power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact
such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is practically a reproduction
of the former Section 39 of Municipal Code. 11An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according
to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan 12
"is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the
Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a
Page 19 of 29
given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not
prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power,
or it will be pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United States v.
Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where the present Administrative
Code provision was applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has two
branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to
such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here
directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific
functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.' It is a general rule that
ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated
and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two
leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to
be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation." 16 It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in
this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments
made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended. 17 It was
originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first section insofar as pertinent reads:
"The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate
by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar
places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: ... " 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first
section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " 20
The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be
admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a
municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then
the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not
in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced
by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every

bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. " 21 Since there
is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club
was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 22 in the language of the
Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs, 23 to quote from
Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one
of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect,
the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the
seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the
recently-enacted Local Government Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the
Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the
powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances
and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein; ..." 26 There are in addition provisions that may have a bearing on
the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes,
restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except
travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and
tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory
power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the
taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public
dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and
operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of
entertainment; ..." 27 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant
licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial
correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued
existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel
petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to
no more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees
would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be
avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less
than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a
municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be
avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay
less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness
and reasonableness.
Page 20 of 29
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute
stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an
Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that character is deserving of the fullest
sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the weight
of its support to measures that can be characterized as falling within that aspect of the police
power. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a misapprehension as to what was
decided by this Court. That was a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid
objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely
regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to
practices which could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case. What
was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in the aforesaid Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must be a factual foundation of
invalidity, it was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement if a
statute were void on its face. That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the
most dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated
January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the
Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves his right to file a dissent.
De Castro, Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 Municipal Mayor Matias Ramirez and Municipal Vice-Mayor Mario Mendoza.
2 Petition, 7. The other question raised was the jurisdiction of a municipal council to prohibit
the operation of nightclubs, it being alleged that the power of regulating tourist-oriented
businesses being granted to the then Department, now Ministry, of Tourism.
3 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975.
10. Ibid.
11. Vicente de la Cruz, et al. v. Matias Ramirez, et al., and Teresita Calot, et al. v. The
Municipal Mayor, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 4755-M and 4756-M, respectively. On
November 21, 1975, the petition in one of the above cases was amended to raise the further
 Page 21 of 29

issue of lack of authority of respondent Municipal Officials to pass the ordinance in question,
since the power to license, supervise and regulate night clubs has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended.
12. Petition, 7.
13. Ibid, 8.
14. Ibid, 8-9.
15. Decision, Annex A to Petition 1.
16. Section 2238, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines (1917).
17. Act No. 82 (1901).
18. 24 Phil. 165 (1913). Abendan is followed in United States v. Tamparong,
31 Phil. 321 (1915); United States v. Gaspay, 33 Phil. 96 (1915) and Sarmiento v.
Balderol, 112 Phil. 394 (1961).
13 Ibid, 168. Cf. United States v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1 (1912); Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil.
250 (1913).
14 39 Phil. 102 (1918).
15 Ibid, 109-110.
16 Ibid, 111. In Salaveria though the ordinance penalizing the playing
of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays was declared as valid. 17 It was
amended by Republic Act No. 979 and Republic Act No. 1224.
18 Title of Republic Act No. 938 as amended.
19 Republic Act No. 938, Section 1.
20 Republic Act No. 979, Section 1.
21 Article VIII, Section 19, par. 1 of the Constitution.
22 Section 2238.
23 Otis v. Parker, 187 US 606 (1902).
24 Cf. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
Separate opinion of Justice Makasiar. De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, March 12,1982,112
SCRA 294.
25 Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (1983) . Under Section 234 of the Code it took effect one month
after its publication in the Official Gazette. It was published in the issue of February 14,1983.
11. Ibid, Section 149 (1) (a).
12. Ibid, Section 149 (1) (rr, ss and tt ).
13. L-24693, 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office,
and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359,
360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085,
1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141,
150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209,
Page 22 of 29
211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231- 239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253- 261, 263-
269, 271- 273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-
315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-
397, 405, 438- 440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-
713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-
1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588,
1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630- 1649, 1694-
1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737- 1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764- 1787, 1789- 1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825- 1826, 1829, 1831- 1832,
1835- 1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846- 1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876- 1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933,
1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492,
494- 507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-
553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-
677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51,
59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office

to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for
the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has
any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America
were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar
for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if
under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist,
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to
error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted
upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator
is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to
Page 23 of 29
appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-
for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue
at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published
by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...

The clear object of the above -quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and
for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies
the law -making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means
of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas
de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the
Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.
Page 24 of 29
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is
quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all- inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it
is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by

the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled
that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be
admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now
applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind,
Page 25 of 29
needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
n. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its
first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said
though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement
with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds
that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
o. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would
indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure
once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be
that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with
their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the
Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such
"Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our
decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.
p. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the
Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive

act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
q. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too
far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary
change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an
elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that
"before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents
and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself:
the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days]
after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify
the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally
fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
Page 26 of 29
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition
is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective
only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. Neither is the publication of laws in theOfficial Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of
laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to
when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that

role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
19. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question
would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication
required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding
force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act
is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is
decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
Page 27 of 29
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
20. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana.
Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case.
Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due
process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In
fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 2
21. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown
and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe
to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there
is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could
have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could
attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise.
Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question.
Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect
is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5
In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There
must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or
executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to
determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
14. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm
that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is
subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only
a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of
a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of
law can legally provide for a different rule.

15. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin
that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official
Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It
may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable
to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary
change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an
elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that
"before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents
and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule
of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself:
the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days]
after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify
the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally
fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Page 28 of 29
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition
is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective
only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the
decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself.
There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or
shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is
not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. Neither is the publication of laws in theOfficial Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same
footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act
No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision
of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution,
can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
 Page 29 of 29

However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of
the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report
has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other
presidential issuances.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

11 129 SCRA 174.
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
Fernando, CJ.:

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7,
Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR
1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be
recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as
may be provided by law.
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs.
City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
95 SCRA 392.
Teehankee, J.:
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486;
Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. 2 Notes in brackets supplied.
Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
Plana, J.:
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., * See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of
110 Phil. 150. all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel.
White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.