Torts and Damages- September 20, 2017

E.M. Wright vs. Manila Electric, G.R. No. 7760, October 1, 1914

FACTS:

 August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa and as his horse leap forward along the rails of
the Manila Electric company and it fell
 Wright was thrown and got injured
 that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground making the
tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street
 RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the
authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a judgment of P1,000
ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his own injury (NOT contributory)
thereby he cannot recover

HELD:NO. Affirmed

 Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to
prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or
prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one.
 Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a
street where there is a large amount of travel
 If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken
condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he received
 Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages, although the Wright, in the judgment of the
court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages
 no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was negligent
 It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described
 It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the
appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in the
opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.

Dissenting Opinion by Carson:

 if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these findings sufficiently establish the negligence of
Wright
 The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence though not fully sustained should be assumed that there
were evidentiary facts disclosed which were sufficient to sustain that there is negligence

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Baltimore & Ohio R.R. vs. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24

Facts:

Brief Fact Summary. Goodman (Plaintiff) was struck and killed by Baltimore and Ohio R.R.’s (Defendant’s) train when
Plaintiff crossed a train track. Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s own negligence caused his death.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The question of due care is generally left to the jury. When the standard is clear, the court should
make the decision. However, “when the standard is clear, the Courts should lay it down once and for all.”

Facts. Plaintiff was driving his automobile truck and was killed by a train operated by Defendant running at a rate of speed not
less than sixty miles per hour. Plaintiff’s estate argued that he had no practical view beyond a section house until he was about
twenty feet from the rail, or twelve feet from danger. Defendant’s engine was obscured by said section house. Plaintiff had
been driving at ten or twelve miles per hour, but slowed down to five or six miles per hour as he neared the crossing. The
railroad line was straight, it was daylight, and Plaintiff was familiar with the crossing. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant.
Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s own negligence caused his death. Defendant requested a directed verdict, however it was
denied. The jury found for the Plaintiff. This decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendant appealed.

Issue. Not knowing whether or not a train was coming, did Plaintiff assume the risk when he crossed the train track without
first exiting his vehicle and checking?

Ruling:

When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him
before he is clear of the track. He knows that he must stop for the train not the train stop for him. In such circumstances it
seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his
vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and look. It seems to us that if he relies upon
not hearing the train or any signal and takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk. If at the last moment Goodman
found himself in an emergency it was his own fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier or come to a stop. It is true as said
in Flannelly v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 225 U. S. 597, 603, 32 S. Ct. 783, 56 L. Ed. 1221, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 154, that the question
of due care very generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it
should be laid down once for all by the Courts.

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Pokora vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. Sup. Ct. 580

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was killed while attempting to cross Wabash Ry. Co.’s (Defendant’s) four railroad tracks.
Plaintiff did not get out of his vehicle to obtain a better view as required by the opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. To get out of a vehicle is uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. The actions of a
plaintiff depend on the situation and the circumstances, and it is up to the jury to decide whether a particular course of action
was reasonable.

Facts. Defendant had four railroad tracks. Plaintiff, in his vehicle, attempted to cross the tracks. Plaintiff could not see the main
track because a boxcar on the first track obstructed his view. Plaintiff stopped and listened for a bell or whistle but did not
hear either. Plaintiff did not get out of his vehicle to obtain a better view as the opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman
seemed to require. The trial court directed a verdict for Defendant on its finding that Plaintiff had been contributory negligent.
Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is there a duty for Plaintiff to stop, exit the vehicle, look and listen before crossing a railroad track?

Ruling:

The argument is made, however, that our decision in B. & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, supra, is a barrier in the plaintiff's path,
irrespective of the conclusion that might commend itself if the question were at large. There is no doubt that the opinion in
that case is correct in its result. Goodman, the driver, traveling only five or six miles an hour, had, before reaching the track, a
clear space of eighteen feet within which the train was plainly visible.2 With that opportunity, he fell short of the legal standard
of duty established for a traveler when he failed to look and see. This was decisive of the case. But the court did not stop there.
It added a remark, unnecessary upon the facts before it, which has been a fertile source of controversy. 'In such circumstances
it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his
vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and look.'
There is need at this stage to clear the ground of brushwood that may obscure the point at issue. We do not now inquire into
the existence of a duty to stop, disconnected from a duty to get out and reconnoitre. The inquiry, if pursued, would lead us into
the thickets of conflicting judgments.3 Some courts apply what is often spoken of as the Pennsylvania rule, and impose an
unyielding duty to stop, as well as to look and listen, no matter how clear the crossing or the tracks on either side. See, e.g.,
Benner v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 262 Pa. 307, 105 A. 283, 2 A.L.R. 759; Thompson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 215 Pa. 113,
64 A. 323, 7 Ann.Cas. 351; Hines v. Cooper, 205 Ala. 70, 88 So. 133; cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 129 A. 36,
41 A.L.R. 398. Other courts, the majority, adopt the rule that the traveler must look and listen, but that the existence of a duty
to stop depends upon the circumstances, and hence generally, even if not invariably, upon the judgment of the jury. See, e.g.,
Judson v. Central Vermont R. Co., 158 N.Y. 597, 605, 606, 53 N.E. 514, and cases cited; Love v. Fort Dodge R. Co., 207 Iowa,
1278, 1286, 224 N.W. 815; Turner v. Minneapolis R. Co., supra; Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Brady, 157 Ark. 449, 454,
248 S.W. 278; cf. Metcalf v. Central Vermont R. Co., 78 Conn. 614, 63 A. 633; Gills v. N.Y., C. & St. L.R. Co., 342 Ill. 455, 174 N.E.
523. The subject has been less considered in this court, but in none of its opinions is there a suggestion that at any and every
crossing the duty to stop is absolute, irrespective of the danger. Not even in B. & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, supra, which goes farther
than the earlier cases, is there support for such a rule. To the contrary, the opinion makes it clear that the duty is conditioned
upon the presence of impediments whereby sight and hearing become inadequate for the traveler's protection. Cf. Murray v.
So. Pacific Co., 177 Cal. 1, 10, 169 P. 675; Williams v. Iola Electric R. Co., 102 Kan. 268, 271, 170 P. 397.
Choice between these diversities of doctrine is unnecessary for the decision of the case at hand. Here the fact is not disputed
that the plaintiff did stop before he started to cross the tracks. If we assume that by reason of the box cars, there was a duty to
stop again when the obstructions had been cleared, that duty did not arise unless a stop could be made safely after the point of
clearance had been reached. See, e.g., Dobson v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., supra. For reasons already stated, the testimony permits
the inference that the truck was in the zone of danger by the time the field of vision was enlarged. No stop would then have
helped the plaintiff if he remained seated on his truck, or so the triers of the facts might find. His case was for the jury, unless
as a matter of law he was subject to a duty to get out of the vehicle before it crossed the switch, walk forward to the front, and
then, afoot, survey the scene. We must say whether his failure to do this was negligence so obvious and certain that one
conclusion and one only is permissible for rational and candid minds. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, supra.
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken over from the facts of life. To get out of a
vehicle and reconnoitre is an uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Besides being uncommon, it is very
likely to be futile, and sometimes even dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn
nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in motion, the hidden

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train may be upon him. See, e.g., Torgeson v. Missouri-K.-T.R. Co., 124 Kan. 798, 800, 801, 262 P. 564, 55 A.L.R. 1335; Dobson v.
St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., supra; Key v. Carolina & N.W.R. Co., 150 S.C. 29, 35, 147 S.E. 625; Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Stanley,
38 Ga.App. 773, 778, 145 S.E. 530. Often the added safeguard will be dubious though the track happens to be straight, as it
seems that this one was, at all events as far as the station, about five blocks to the north. A train traveling at a speed of thirty
miles an hour will cover a quarter of a mile in the space of thirty seconds. It may thus emerge out of obscurity as the driver
turns his back to regain the waiting car, and may then descend upon him suddenly when his car is on the track. Instead of
helping himself by getting out, he might do better to press forward with all his faculties alert. So a train at a neighboring
station, apparently at rest and harmless, may be transformed in a few seconds into an instrument of destruction. At times the
course of safety may be different. One can figure to oneself a roadbed so level and unbroken that getting out will be a gain.
Even then the balance of advantage depends on many circumstances and can be easily disturbed. Where was Pokora to leave
his truck after getting out to reconnoitre? If he was to leave it on the switch, there was the possibility that the box cars would
be shunted down upon him before he could regain his seat. The defendant did not show whether there was a locomotive at the
forward end, or whether the cars were so few that a locomotive could be seen. If he was to leave his vehicle near the curb,
there was even stronger reason to believe that the space to be covered in going back and forth would make his observations
worthless. One must remember that while the traveler turns his eyes in one direction, a train or a loose engine may be
approaching from the other.
Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.
The need is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They are
then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed from without.
Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or
normal. In default of the guide of customary conduct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh where the ordinary
safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a jury. Dolan v. D. & H.C. Co., 71 N.Y. 285, 288, 289; Davis v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R. Co., 47 N.Y.
400, 402. The opinion in Goodman's Case has been a source of confusion in the federal courts to the extent that it imposes a
standard for application by the judge, and has had only wavering support in the courts of the states. 4 We limit it accordingly.
The judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CC∅ | Transformed by Public.Resource.Org

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Preciolita Corliss vs. Manila Railroad, 27 SCRA 674

FACTS:
 Feb 21, 1957 near midnight: although the conductor applied the brakes Ralph W. Corliss' jeep collided with a locomotive
of Manila Railroad Company
 in his eagerness to beat, despite the tooting of the horn and the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to
reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation
 Case was filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, 21 year old widow

ISSUE: W/N the Manila Railroad Co. is negligent

HELD: NO. Decision is affirmed

 negligence - The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.
 Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.
 The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to those who go
upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility
 Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines
and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place
 it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the
crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner

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Cipriano vs. CA, 263 SCRA, 711

FACTS:
E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, owned by petitioner Cipriano, is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style
Motobilkote. On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia
Pride People’s car to petitioner’s shop for rustproofing. The job order showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well
its condition at the time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was specified. According to the
petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 o’clock in the morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that
afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at
the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the
shop and the restaurant, including private respondent’s car.

On May 8 1991, MACLIN sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply,
petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event (Art. 1174 and 1262, NCC), prompting private
respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages. Private respondent argued that petitioner was liable
for the loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended that the nature of petitioner’s business required
him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his
customers.

RTC ruled in favor of MACLIN stating that the “failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of
negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire,” and
that rustproffing is “definitely covered” by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his business and insure it, he must
bear the cost of loss of his customers. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s failure to abide by PD 1572 constitutes negligence

HELD:
We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. We stated that where the very injury which was
intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act negligence
but also the proximate cause.

Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under
the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals.[11] Petitioner's negligence is the source of his
obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not
complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was
due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of
the loss.
Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with
the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires
covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this Order provides in pertinent parts:[12]

1- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCREDITATION

1) Enterprises applying for original accreditation shall submit the following:

1.1. List of machineries/equipment/tools in useful condition;

1.2. List of certified engineers/accredited technicians mechanics with their personal data;

1.3. Copy of Insurance Policy of the shop covering the property entrusted by its customer for repair, service or
maintenance together with a copy of the official receipt covering the full payment of premium;

1.4. Copy of Bond referred to under Section 7, Rule III of this Rules and Regulations;

1.5. Written service warranty in the form prescribed by the Bureau;

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 1.6. Certificate issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Articles of Incorporation or Partnership in
case of corporation or partnership;

1.7. Such other additional documents which the Director may require from time to time.

8 - INSURANCE POLICY

The insurance policy for the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and loss should cover exclusively the
machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment, engines, electronics, electrical, airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines and
data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for
repair and/or service in the premises of the applicant.

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of
negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous
event,[13] this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.

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Honoria Delgado Vda de Gregorio vs. Go Chong Bing, 102 Phil. 556

Facts:

1. Honoria Delgado, the widow of Quirico Gregorio files an action for damages against Go Chong Bing, the owner of the
truck that killed her husband.
2. Go Chong Bing owns 2 trucks. One afternoon, Bing ordered his truck driver to drive one of his trucks and instructed
another employee, Romera, the driver’s helper- who only holds a student permit, to drive the other truck as a back up
in case the first truck will not be able to cross a flooded bridge.
3. While the truck is on its way, some people boarded the said truck and one of them was police officer Orfanel. During a
stop, Orfanel took the wheel from Romera who initially refused because he had received instructions from his master
that no one else is to drive the truck but him. However, Romera still gave the wheel to Orfanel out of respect for the
latter, who was a uniformed policeman and because he believed that the latter had both the ability and the authority
to drive the truck, especially as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's license.
4. As Orfanel is about to park the truck, it became apparent that it will hit the other truck so he swerved the truck to the
right. But then there were two pedestrians on that side of the road so to avoid hitting the people, Romera shouted for
brakes but Orfanel instead stepped on the accelerator. Quirico Gregorio was hit and died.
5. Gregorio’s widow asserts that that when Bing permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a driver's license, to
drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (section 28., Act No. 3992), and
that this constitutes negligence per se.

Issue:

Is Bing liable?

Ruling:

1. No. The court said it is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of Gregorio was the
negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from Bing’s cargador, in spite of
the protest of the latter.
2. In order to recover damages in case of negligence, the following must concur and must be established by
competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co., supra. p.15)

3. In order that a person may be held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or
omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is produced by the said act or
omission.

4. This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act or the omission and
the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary
that the damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; 'necessarily presupposing, a
legal ground for imputability.

5. The court said that admitting for the sake of argument that Bing had so violated the law, or may be deemed
negligent in entrusting the truck to one who is not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not be declared liable
for the accident because his negligence was not the direct and proximate cause thereof. Bing is absolved because because there
is no direct and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of the law. The death was caused by the
negligence of Orfanel.

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S.D. Martinez vs. William Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, Dec. 27, 1910

Facts:

1. September 11, 1908: CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, Manila, along the left-
hand side of the street. A delivery wagon belonging to BUSKIRK used for the purpose of transportation of fodder
and pulled by a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction in the same side of the street.
2. The driver of the carromata, observing that BUSKIRK’s delivery wagon was coming at great speed, crowded close to
the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give the delivery wagon an opportunity
to pass by, but the wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by MARTINEZ with her child and overturned
it, severely wounding MARTINEZ by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and
the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
3. BUSKIRK presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the
accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon
had been sent to deliver some forage and that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it
out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which
frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the
inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses which led to the
collision.
4. TC: found the BUSKIRK guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest at the rate of 6
per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908.

Issue: W/N the driver of the wagon was negligent rendereing Buskirk liable– NO.

RULING:

1. While the law designating the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many
jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. SC held
that judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was
negligent.
2. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that
the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or
six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they
were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the
manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cocheros who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was
sanctioned by their employers.
3. The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care
and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce
damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues.
4. The act of BUSKIRK’s driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts
the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by
society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be of themselves unreasonable or
imprudent.
5. It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then
being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left
at the time of the accident.
6. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection.
7. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of
decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting
under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the customs of a people? We think not.

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CHAN V IGLESIA NI CRISTO
G.R. No. 160283; October 14, 2005
Solidary Liability

FACTS:

Chan owned the Aringay Shell Gas Station in Aringay, La Union. It is bounded on the south by Iglesia ni Cristo’s chapel. The gas
station was supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services Yoro, a
retired general of the AFP, was procured as Yoro was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality.

They entered into a MOA which stipulated that ”[a]ny damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY (Chan)
incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY (Yoro).” Further, the MOA discusses division of wealth in
case hidden treasure is found during the digging. After some time, Chan was informed by the members of the INC that the
digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a
tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.

A complaint against petitioner was filed by the respondent before the RTC La Union. Petitioner filed an Answer with Third-
Party Complaint impleading Yoro.

RTC: The diggings were intended to find hidden treasure! Chan and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65%
basis!

CA: Affirmed RTC decision, but reduced the award of exemplary damages from

 Coming now to the matter on damages, the respondent questions the drastic reduction of the exemplary damages
awarded to it. It may be recalled that the trial court awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000,000.00 but
same was reduced by the Court of Appeals to P50,000.00. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.

 Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. [31] In quasi-delicts,

exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. [32] By gross negligence is meant such

entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of

carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others. [33]

 Surreptitiously digging under the respondents chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof, thereby endangering the

lives and limbs of the people in worship, unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Not to mention the damage that

may be caused to the structure itself. The respondent may indeed be awarded exemplary damages.

 For such tortious act done with gross negligence, the Court feels that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is

inadequate. The exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00.

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Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

1. RAMON MIRANDA purchased from the NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC. 4 special cabin tickets (the ship used was
named M/V DON JUAN; left Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980) for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were
going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion.

2. The ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. At about 10:30p.m., M/V DON JUAN collided with the M/T
TACLOBAN CITY, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC).

3. As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. The 4 members of private respondents’ families were never found.

4. MIRANDA filed a complaint seeking damages against Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC),
and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). RTC awarded damages. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the crew members of M/V Don Juan were grossly negligent in the performance of their duties; WON Negros
Navigation was negligent.

Ruling:

Yes.

1. Court finds that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at
least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.

2. Although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T TACLOBAN CITY, the crew of
the M/V DON JUAN was equally negligent. The grossness of the negligence of the “Don Juan” is underscored when one
considers the foregoing circumstances:

 The latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of collision;
 The officer-on-watch, Senior 3rd Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban
to the imminent danger facing them.
 The Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded.
 “Don Juan” was more than twice as fast as the “Tacloban City.”
 “Don Juan” was better-equipped with radar which was functioning that night.
 “Don Juan’s” officer on-watch had sighted the “Tacloban City” on his radar screen while the latter was still 4
nautical miles away. Visual confirmation of radar contact was established by the “Don Juan” while the “Tacloban
City” was still 2.7 miles away.

3. Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan, as the faster and better-equipped vessel,
could have avoided a collision with the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if the Tacloban City had been at fault,
the Don Juan was guilty of contributory negligence.

4. NEGROS NAVIGATION was found equally negligent in tolerating the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other
crew members while on board the ship and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank
within 10 to 15 minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban City. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. found guilty of
negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers.

11
Mercury Drug vs. Huang, G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007
Topic: Evidence; use of expert

Facts:
1. Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler truck with. It has in its
employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of
respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.
2. These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of
Alabang going to Pasig City.
3. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right. When the truck suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it
hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane.
4. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His driver’s license had
been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.
5. The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal
cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest
down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
6. Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and
petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
7. In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was respondent Stephen
Huang’s recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the car
bumped the truck’s front right tire. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of all its employees.
8. RTC found Del Rosario to be at fault. The appellate court affirmed the decision with modifications as to the moral
damages.

Issue:

Was the driver negligent?

Ruling:

We affirm the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that petitioner Del Rosario was negligent. The
evidence does not support petitioners claim that at the time of the accident, the truck was at the left inner lane and that it was
respondent Stephen Huangs car, at its right, which bumped the right front side of the truck. Firstly, petitioner Del Rosario
could not precisely tell which part of the truck was hit by the car, despite the fact that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot
higher than the car.

Petitioner Del Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 which was on its left
side. He said that the car did not pass in front of him after it hit him or under him or over him or behind him. [7] If the truck
were really at the left lane and the car were at its right, and the car hit the truck at its front right side, the car would not have
landed on the opposite side, but would have been thrown to the right side of the C-5 Highway.

Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He
conducted a study based on the following assumptions provided by respondents:
1. Two vehicles collided;
2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the other;
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per
hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.

12
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier vehicle,
the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the other way
around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which would move to the
right of, and away from the truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the car will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to the
left of the truck.

Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same assumptions except that the car is on the left side of the
truck, in accordance with the testimony of respondent Stephen Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that the general direction of the car
after impact would be to the left of the truck. In this situation, the middle island against which the car was pinned would slow
down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and hit the car again, before running over it.[8]

To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the damages that the truck sustained at its front right side. The
attempt does not impress. The photographs presented were taken a month after the accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the
automechanic who repaired the truck and authenticated the photographs, admitted that there were damages also on the left
side of the truck.[9]

Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted that after the impact, he lost control of the truck and failed to
apply his brakes. Considering that the car was smaller and lighter than the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly caused by
the car when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to cause petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on
the brakes.

Mercury was found liable for not being able to negate negligence

In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs.
Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical
and actual driving tests, and psychological examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic admitted
that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when
he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light
vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills development,
perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No
NBI and police clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars – on June
30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident which occurred in
1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the
accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic
testified that she does not know of any company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its
employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for
reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not
suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario.

13
Guillang vs. Bedania, G.R. No. 162087, May 21, 2009

FACTS: Guillang, with three companions was driving his brand new car to Manila. On the other hand, Bedania was driving a
ten-wheeler cargo truck towards Tagaytay. Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania
negotiated a U-turn. When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Guillang's car hit the gas tank at the truck’s right
middle portion. The truck dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road.

As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the hospital for treatment. Because of severe injuries, one of the
passengers was later transferred to another hospital. Consequently, he died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision.
The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.

ISSUE: Whether Bedania was grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway
without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists.

RULING: Yes. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In this case, the report showed that the truck,
while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision,
Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is another violation of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the
presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap. The point of impact was on the lane where the car
was cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck that was
making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.

It is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. If Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an
intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that
the highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.

Layugan vs. IAC, 167 SCRA 376

14
Ramos vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 124354 December 29, 1999

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-year old robust woman. Except for occasional
complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as normal as any
other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), she has three
children whose names are Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond.

2. Because of the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sough professional advice. She was told
to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which revealed
that she was fit for the said surgery. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for the
first time and she was advised by Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy and the same was agreed to be
scheduled on June 17,1985 at 9:00am at the Delos Santos Medical Center.

3. Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to look for a good anesthesiologist to which the latter agreed to. A day before the scheduled
operation, she was admitted at the hospital and on the day of the operation, Erlinda’s sister was with her insider the operating
room. Dr. Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina when Herminda
heard her say that intubating Erlinda is quite difficult and there were complications. This prompted Dr. Osaka to order a call to
another anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully intubated Erlina.

4. The patient’s nails became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. After the operation, Erlina
was diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged that this was due to
lack of oxygen supply to Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages against petitioner for the result to Erlinda of the said
operation.

Held: Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda
and their negligence was the proximate case of her piteous condition.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically follow that it apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case.

It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common
knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of
something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those
skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit
against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.

Scientific studies point out that intubation problems are responsible for 1/3 of deaths and serious injuries associated
with anesthesia. Nevertheless, 98% or the vast majority of difficult intubation may be anticipated by performing a thorough
evaluation of the patient’s airway prior to the operation. As stated beforehand, respondent, Dra. Guttierez failed to observe the
proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this unfortunate incident. Had appropriate diligence and
reasonable care been used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been more prepared to meet the
contingency brought about by the perceived atomic variations in the patient’s neck and oral area; defects which could have
been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those variations together with a change in technique. In other words, an
experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going
around the short neck and potruding teeth. Having failed to observe common medical standards in pre-operative management
and intubation, respondent Dra. Guttierez negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda.

15
TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego
CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249

FACTS:

1. Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr.
Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

2. Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of
the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and
platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

3. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990.
Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision. –Applied the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to
prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the
morgue,[12] making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the
building the day after the incident[13] and saw the platform for himself.[14] He observed that the platform was crushed[15] and
that it was totally damaged.[16]PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police
headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt. [17]
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform was
the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to
certain exceptions,[18] the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.[19]

Issue: Was the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur proper?

Ruling: Yes.
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of
the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having
charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.[20]
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or
instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or
at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes
stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.[21]

One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.[22]

16
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact
that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but
inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause,
reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in
respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of
necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants negligence
is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some courts add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.[23]

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working
with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control and
management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the
accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the
following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained
earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive
control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed
to the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule
of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. x x x.[24]

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident
which befell respondents husband.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants negligence is
presumed or inferred[25] when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. [26] The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption,
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. [27] It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense
to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after
the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.

17