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Introduction
The construction industry in both Canada and the United States is the single largest non-governmental employer. In 1997, the industry was
estimated in Canada to have a value of about $90 billion, representing 15% of the gross domestic product. However, within the last 20 years
considerable cost wastage has been identified by the Construction Industry Institute (CII, 1986). A significant portion of this cost wastage may
be attributed to inappropriate risk allocation in contracts, as cited in various examples analyzing risk allocation in the construction industry and
the underlying causes of disputes conducted in Canada and the U.S. (American Consulting Engineers Council (ACE) and Associated General
Contractors of America (AGC), 1991; Enger, 1997; CII, 1988).
Risk is a major element in the construction industry and actually it is one of the main elements that can significantly affects the final cost of any
project. The risk inherent in the construction process has grown substantially over the past 50 years due to a myriad of factors. Despite this, the
process of allocating risk has not changed in the same proportion (Hartman, 2000). Risk allocation always occurs in any situation where more
than one party (owner, contractor, consultant, etc.) is responsible for the execution of a project. Making sure that every risk is recognized and
managed is good practice in any project. This activity is an important step in that this allocation can significantly influence the behavior of the
project participants and hence impact both project performance and final cost.
As soon as the contract includes a disclaimer clause to shift certain type of risks to the contractor, this is the time that problems begin. When a
risk is shifted to the contractor and the contractor has no means by which to control the occurrence or outcome of the risk, the contractor must
either ensure against it or add a contingency to the bid price (Jergeas et al., 1994). Two recent studies indicate that using disclaimer clauses in
Canadian contracts carries a premium of between 8% and 20%, depending on whether business conditions were favorable or adverse (Khan,
1998; Hartman, 1998; Zaghloul, 2001). On multimillion-dollar projects, such an increase can obviously be very significant. An additional but less
visible, cost of shifting risk to the contractor through disclaimer clauses presents a number of hidden costs including restricted bid competition,
increased potential for claims and disputes and above all, more adversial owner-contractor relationships. These studies examine the five most
common disclaimer clauses in construction contracts that include (1) Uncertainty of work conditions, (2) Delaying events, (3) Indemnification,
(4) Liquidated damages, and (5) Sufficiency of contract documents.
In this paper, the authors present some of the findings of a study conducted across the Canadian construction industry including owners,
contractors, and consultants and appear to be generalizable to the United States construction industry. These findings identify the relationship
between trust and risk allocation practices in construction contracts and how can a strong trust relationship affects the final cost of any specific
project by improving the risk allocation method between the contracting parties.
Exhibit 1. Perception of Disclaimer Clauses Risks Under Low and High Trust Relationships
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• Blue (or competence) trust is all about ability and competence, which is based on the perception of the other's capacity to perform what is
required. It is simply the answer for the question, “Can you do the job?”
• Yellow (or Integrity) trust is based on integrity, which is founded upon the perception of the other's attitude to act ethically, to adhere to
values that we hold important, and to be motivated to not take advantage of the other party. It is simply answer the question, “Will you
consistently take care of my interests?”
• Red (or intuitive) trust is based on intuition, which is the result of a combination of emotional response and rapid processing of information
and may be described as the instincts or “gut feelings” that one person has about the other, a situation, or an artifact. It simply answers the
question “Does this relationship feel right?”
Just as the primary colors can be mixed to make diverse colors, so too can the different types of trust. Different types of trust (or combinations
of the three) are important for different relationships and situations.
• Delaying events
• Indemnification
• Liquidated damages
The results of the study were based on more than 300 respondents to the survey. The study sample includes owners, contractors, and
consultants from both private and public industry sectors, working in different types of projects; civil, industrial, commercial, residential, and
others such as pipelines.
Another major finding from the results was that risk premiums associated with the five most common exculpatory clauses were validated with
an average of 8% to 20% based on ideal or adverse market conditions in the construction industry. The ideal market conditions include low need
for work, low technical complexity, fair contract administration, negotiated contract, and complete design work. Meanwhile, adverse work
conditions include high need for work, high technical complexity, unfair contract administration, unnegotiated contract, and uncomplete design
work. To a great extent, the findings are very similar to the work of Hartman and Khan reported by Hartman (1998).
Exhibit 2. Averages for the Level of Each Type of Trust Required to Eliminate Disclaimer Clauses From Construction Contracts
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11/9/2017 Construction contracts and risk allocation
Another interesting finding of the study is that the trust level that generally exists in the construction industry contracts between contracting
parties is low (average 2.3 out of 5 points scale), which reflects the level of mistrust in the industry contracting practice. As the results report,
owners and contractors risk allocation contracting practice is mainly a function of their trust (or mistrust) relationship between each other. If the
owner-contractor contract is based on a strong trust relationship, the amount of the premiums associated with disclaimer clauses is very low, or
even better; the disclaimer clauses would not exist on the contract from the outset.
Other than the problem of risk premiums associated with disclaimer clauses, there is one more major problem. The existence of disclaimer
clauses in contracts may destroy yellow and/or red trust (integrity and intuitive). Disclaimer clauses can send a clear message about how much
one party trust or value the other party or the contracting relationship itself. As a result, the contractor would be very creative in finding ways to
get more money as much as possible from the owner. This can be through different ways such as risk premiums, change orders, overheads,
inflated estimates, and more other ways.
In general, the process of risk allocation through disclaimer clauses does not encourage any creative ways of doing business between the
contracting parties and destroy the level of trust between them. Above all, the existence of a disclaimer clause in any contract would affect the
relationship negatively and make both contracting parties work on different sets of personal objectives instead of common ones.
The survey respondents report that to reach a better risk allocation process, a trust relationship between the contracting parties should exist
first. This can be done through certain stages as follow:
• A clear understanding of the risks being born by each party and who owns or can manage the risk
• More time and effort in the front-end of a project and sufficient experience to manage or mitigate the risks and administrate the contract
• A negotiation phase prior to the start of the contract should exist, this phase is required to built a trust relationship between the contracting
parties, then this negotiation phase can be part of the contract itself
• Adequate risk-sharing or risk-reward system should exist to share the benefits if the risk does not occur during the project life cycle.
The rationale for better risk allocation between owners and contractors ought to be based on meeting these conditions as far as possible. Missing
one of these criteria is very likely to trigger inappropriate risk allocation process for any given project and hence bring additional cost for the
contracting parties.
References
ACE & AGC. 1991. “Owner's Guide to Saving Money by Risk Allocation.” American Consulting Engineers Council and Associated General
Contractors of America, Washington, pp. 6–12.
Construction Industry Institute (CII). 1986. “Impact of Various Construction Contract Types and Clauses on Project Performance.” Publication #
5–1, pp. 1–14.
Construction Industry Institute (CII). 1988. “Impact of Risk Allocation and Equity in Construction Contracts.” Publication SD – 44, pp. 1–7.
Enger, T. 1997. “Beyond NORSOK and CRINE.” Transaction of the Annual EPCI Conference. Stanvanger, Norway, June 11–13.
Erikson, C., O'Connor, M., & Boyer, L. 1978. “Construction Process Risk Allocation.” Transaction of the American Association of Cost Engineers,
July 9–12.
Goldsmith, I., & Heintzman, T. 1995. “Goldsmith on Canadian Building Contracts,” 4th Edition. Carswell, Ontario, Canada.
Gransberg D., & Ellicot M. 1997. “Best-Value Contracting Criteria.” Cost Engineering. Morgantown, Jun., Vol. 39, Issue 6, pp. 31–34.
Hartman, Francis. 2000. Don't Park Your Brain Outside—A Practical Guide to Improving Shareholder Value With SMART Management. Newtown
Square, PA: Project Management Institute.
Hartman, F. 1999. “The Role of Trust in Project Management.” Proceeding of the PMI research Conference.
https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/construction-contracts-risk-allocation-1025
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Hartman, Francis. 1998. “The Real Cost of Weasel Clauses in Your Contracts.” Proceeding of the 29th Annual Project Management Institute
Seminars and Symposium, October 9 to 15.
Hosmer, L. T. 1995. “Trust: The Connecting Link Between Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics.” Academy of Management Review, Vol.
20, Issue 2, pp. 1–25.
Jergeas, G., & Hartman, F. 1994. “Contractors' Protection Against Construction Claims.” American Association of Cost Engineers, AACE
Transactions.
Khan, Z. 1998. “Risk Premiums Associated With Exculpatory Clauses.” Masters Thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Mayer, R., Davis, C., & Schoorman, F. 1995. “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust.” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, pp. 709–
734.
O'Reilly, Michael. 1996. “Civil engineering construction contracts.” Thomas Telford Publication Inc., London, England.
Zaghloul, R., & Hartman, F. 1999. “How To Reduce Your Project Cost.” AACE (American Association for Cost Engineers) Annual Conference,
Calgary, Canada.
Zaghloul, R. 2001. Contracts' Hidden Costs: A Trust/Risk Allocation Approach. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Project Management
Specialization, University of Calgary, Canada.
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For permission to reproduce this material, please contact PMI or any listed author.
Proceedings of the Project Management Institute Annual Seminars & Symposium
October 3–10, 2002 • San Antonio, Texas, USA
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