from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea and

the said land." cra law virtua 1aw lib rary

The question is an important one because the phrase

"agricultural public lands" as defined by said act of Congress
of July 1, is found not only in section 54 above quoted but in
other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same
construction must be given to the phrase wherever it occurs
in any part of that law.
FIRST DIVISION
The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands
can be called agricultural lands unless they are such by their
[G.R. No. L-3793. February 19, 1908. ]
nature. If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct,
and this land because of its nature is not agricultural land, it
CIRILO MAPA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR
is difficult to see how it could be disposed of or what the
GOVERNMENT, Respondent-Appellant.
Government could do with it if it should be decided that the
Government is the owner thereof. It could not allow the land
Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellant.
to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926
allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public
Basilio R. Mapa, for Appellee.
lands" in the Philippine Islands, as defined by the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in accordance
SYLLABUS
with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10
only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral
1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. — The phrase agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in
"agricultural public lands" defined by the act of Congress of the act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."
July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions of
sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public Chapter III of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases
lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor limits them to "nonmineral public lands, as defined by section
timber lands. eighteen and twenty of the act of Congress approved July
first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in passing
that there is perhaps some typographical or other error in
DECISION this reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither one of
these sections mentions agricultural lands. The Government
could not give a free patent to this land to a native settler, in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates
WILLARD, J. : only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act of Congress
of July first, nineteen hundred and two." c ralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the
petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about Government could do nothing with this land except to lay out
16 hectares in extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, a town site thereon in accordance with the provisions of
in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Chapter V, for section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing
Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the about agricultural land.
Government has appealed. A motion for a new trial was made
and denied in the court below, but no exception was taken to The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but
the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the what definition has been given to that phrase by the act of
evidence. Congress. An examination of that act will show that the only
sections thereof wherein can be found anything which could
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 be called a definition of the phrase are sections 13 and 15.
section 54, paragraph 6 which follows: jg c:cha nrob les.com. ph
Those sections are as follows: jg c:chan rob les.com. ph

"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in
interest have been in the open, continuous exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first,
nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of
ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except
when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and to have received the
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter." c ralaw virt ua1aw
The only question submitted to the court below or to this
court by the Attorney-General is the question whether the
land in controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of
the section above quoted. The findings of the court below
upon that point are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in
question is lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more
than twenty years, in the possession of the petitioner and his
ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the
said period, and up to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands,
and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far
"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands,
subject to the provisions of this act and except as herein
provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character
and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and
regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the
public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such
rules and regulations shall not go into effect of have the force
of law until they have received the approval of the President,
and when approved by the President they shall be submitted
by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing
session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by
lib rary
Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period
have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands:
Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed
sixteen hectares in extent.
"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is
jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
hereby authorized and empowered on such terms as it may
prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting
or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and
other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the
public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the
United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not
exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the
sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and
twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of
persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial
payments shall be conditioned upon actual and continued
occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold
for a period of not less than five years, during which time the
purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land
or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to
transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for
the distribution of the estates of decedents." c ralaw
It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express
definition of the phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section
15 the word "agricultural" does not occur.
There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this
question. The first is to say that no definition of the phrase
"agricultural land" can be found in the act of Congress; the
second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and
that it means land which in its nature is agricultural; and,
third, that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase
means all of the public lands acquired from Spain except
those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below
adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or
mineral land, came within the definition of agricultural land,
and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was
applicable thereto.
1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no
definition in the act of the phrase "agricultural land." The
Commission in enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that
such a definition could be found therein. The President
approved this act and it might be said that Congress, by
failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if
it should be said that there is no definition in the act of
Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how
any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to
which we have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act
of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be
granted can not be determined. Nor can it be known what
land the Government has the right to sell in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can lease in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands
for which it can give free patents to native settlers in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would
seem to follow, necessarily, that none of those chapters could
be put into force and that all that had up to this time been
done by virtue thereof would be void.
2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying
that Congress has defined agricultural lands as those lands
which are, as the Attorney-General says, by their nature
agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural"
does not occur in section 15. Section 13 says that the
Government "shall classify according to its agricultural
character and productiveness and shall immediately make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition
of the public lands other than timber or mineral land." This is
the same thing as saying that the Government shall classify
the public lands other than timber or mineral lands according
to its agricultural character and productiveness; in other
words, that it shall classify all the public lands acquired from
Spain, and that this classification shall be made according to
the agricultural character of the land and according to its
productiveness.
One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and
indefinite that it would be very difficult to apply it in practice.
What lands are agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General
himself in his brief in this case says:
"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible
of cultivation by the hand of man." c ralaw
The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery,
could be filled up and any kind of crops raised thereon.
Mineral and timber lands are expressly excluded, but it would
be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was
not agricultural in nature. Such lands may be found within
the limits of any city. There is within the city of Manila, and
within a thickly inhabited part thereof an experimental far.
This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in
the same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace, devoted
to sports. The land surrounding the city walls of Manila,
between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the Luneta
vi rtua 1aw lib rary on the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east,
is of many hectares in extent and is in nature agricultural.
The Luneta itself could at any time be devoted to the growing
of crops.
The objection to adopting this construction on account of its
uncertainty is emphasized when we consider that whether
certain land was or was not agricultural land, as defined by
the act of Congress, and therefore subject to homestead
entry, to sale, or to lease in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 926, would be a question that would finally have to
be determined by the courts, unless there is some express
provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers to
determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No.
926 relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of The
Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether
the land described is prima facie under the law subject to
homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of
public lands, provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief
of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more
valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says
nothing about his decisions as to whether it is or is not
agricultural land in its nature. Section 26 relating to the lease
of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the
Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more
valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes and further
summarily determine from available records whether the land
is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or
salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents to native settlers
makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of
Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land
applied for.
After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases
made by the administrative officers on the theory that the
lands were agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the
matter of their true character open for subsequent action by
the courts would be to produce an evil that should if possible
be avoided.
3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a
definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a
careful consideration of the question we are satisfied that the
only definition which exists in said act is the definition
adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the
Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease,
sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber
or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition
that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other
words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones
v. The Insular Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where
these same section of the act of Congress were under
discussion:jgc:cha nro bles. com.ph
"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult
to give to them a construction that would be entirely free
jgc:c han robles. com.ph from objection." cra law virtua 1aw li bra ry
But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less
virtua1aw l ibra ry objectionable than any other one that has been suggested.
There is nothing in this case of Jones v. The Insular
Government which at all conflicts with the result here arrived
at. The question as to whether the lands there involved were appropriated as, were not devoted to forestry and mining
or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the which is consistent with the direction of section 13 of the act
sections was neither discussed nor decided. In fact, it of Congress that public lands, other than timber or mineral
appears from the decision that those lands, which were in the lands, should be classified according to their agricultural
Province of Benguet, were within the strictest definition of the character and productiveness.
phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had
been cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case In view of the restricted scope of these statutes under the
decided was, not that the lands therein involved and other decisions of the United States Supreme Court, this direction
lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were as to the classification of all remaining lands not forest or
not agricultural lands but that the law there in question and mineral in character, "according to their agricultural nature
the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and and productiveness," may fairly be considered a definition of
regulations within the meaning of section 13. them as agricultural lands, with the result of freeing the act
of the Commission from ambiguity.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the Appellant. So ordered. It was apparently the intention of Congress that such
classification, in a general way, should be immediately made,
Arellano, C.J. and Torres, J., concur. but the fact that it has been delayed does not prevent the
designation of any particular parcel of land, upon being
Johnson, J., concurs in the result. granted by the Government, as coming under one of these
heads.
Separate Opinions
For these reason, I concur in the interpretation put upon this
act in the majority opinion.
TRACEY, J., with whom concurs CARSON, J., concurring: chan rob1e s virtua l 1aw libra ry

By its title as well as throughout its text Act No. 926 is

restricted to the "Public domain of the Philippine Islands" and
to "public lands" in said Islands. This act, drawn in
furtherance of an act of Congress, must be interpreted
according to the American understanding of the words Republic of the Philippines
employed and the meaning of these terms as definitely fixed SUPREME COURT
by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Manila
"Public domain" and "public lands" are equivalent terms.
(Barker v. Harvey, 181, U.S., 481, 490. EN BANC
"The words "public lands" are habitually used in our
legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918
disposal under general laws." (Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S.,
761)
CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,
"A grant of public lands applies only to lands which at the vs.
time are free from existing claims. (Bardon v. Northern THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
Pacific R. R. Co., 145 U.S., 535, 543.)

These words do not include land reserved for the use of Basilio Aromin for appellant.
certain Indian tribes, although still the property of the United
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.
States (Leavenworth, etc., v. United States, 92 U.S., 733),
nor lands covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
tide. (Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S., 273.) And the
same was held of the words "unoccupied and unappropriated
public lands." (Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S., 1.)

In Wilcox v. Jackson (13 Peters, 498, 513) it was held that

whenever a tract of land has been legally appropriated to any
purpose, from that moment it becomes severed from the
mass of public lands and no subsequent law will be construed
to embrace it, although no express reservation is made.
There have been similar rulings in regard to reservations for
military purposes, for town sites, educational purposes, and
for mineral and forest uses. Consequently Act No. 926 applies
only to the lands of the United States in these Islands not
already devoted to public use or subject to private right, and
this construction necessarily excludes from its scope lands
devoted to the use of municipalities, including public buildings
and such tracts as Wallace Field and the strip surrounding the
walls of the City of Manila. As the act has no application to
them, they are not public lands in this sense, and can not be
included within the term "agricultural public lands." cralaw
In referring to agricultural lands as being defined in the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Commission must
have had in mind this well-settled meaning of the terms
employed and have used the word "agricultural" to
distinguish and include such public lands, not otherwise
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from
a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of
parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by
the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the
Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained
possession of a considerable tract of land located in
v irtua1aw l ib rary the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija,
in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory
information title to the land, registered as such on
February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the
limits of the possessory information title of Restituto
Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio entitled to a certificate of title to such land
Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia under the provisions of this chapter.
Salamanca.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his which must be discussed. The first relates to the
title registered. Opposition was entered by the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not possession and occupation of what, for present
acquired a good title from the Spanish government purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public
and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the land, under a bona fide claim of ownership.
first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with
the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from Actual possession of land consists in the
registration. So much for the facts. manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor- own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is
General is based on the provisions of the Spanish admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about
Mortgage Law and of the Royal Decree of February one fourth of the entire tract. This is graphically
13, 1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:
Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to
come under the protective ægis of the Maura Law, it
must have been shown that the land was cultivated
for six years previously, and that it was not land which
pertained to the "zonas forestales." As proof that the
land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to
1896, forestal and not agricultural in nature is the fact
that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80
years of age.

We do not stop to decide this contention, although it

might be possible, following the doctrine laid down by
the United States Supreme Court with reference to
Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United
States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to
say that the possessory information, apparently
having taken cognizance of the requisites for title,
should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney
[1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs.United
States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will
later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in
interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land
under color of title.

Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled

The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908,
reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their

predecessors and interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership
The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy
of a part of the land described in the instrument giving
color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land? lawphil.net

except as against the Government, for a

period of ten years next preceding the
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the
twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred
answer. The general rule is that the possession and
and four, except when prevented by war
cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of
or force majeure, shall be conclusively
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if
presumed to have performed all the
the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
conditions essential to a government grant
another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213;
and to have received the same, and shall be
Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale
[1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a
number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly
relating to the size of the tract in controversy with
reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the
general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith;
and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land
was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil
Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest
fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition
that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration
of the term "agricultural public land." The law affirms
that the phrase is denied by the Act of Congress of
July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to
the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof
that three classes of land are mentioned. The first is
variously denominated "public land" or "public
domain," the second "mineral land," and the third
"timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress
comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes
the determination of whether the land is more
valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of
its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have
come before the courts on numerous occasions, what
was said in the case of Jones vs. Insular Government
([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The
meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult
to give to them a construction that will be entirely free
from objection." In the case which gave most serious
consideration to the subject (Mapa vs. Insular
Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that
there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of
the phrase "agricultural public lands." It was said that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act
No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands."
The idea would appear to be to determine, by
exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature
and, if not so found, to consider it to be agricultural
land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful.
For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code
of 1917 provides: "For the purposes of this chapter,
'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa
and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character." This definition of "public forest,"
it will be noted, is merely "for the purposes of this
chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides:
"Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves,
upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that
said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required
by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural
lands." With reference to the last section, there is no
certification of the Director of Forestry in the record,
as to whether this land is better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of
land covered with a natural growth of trees and
underbrush; a large wood." The authorities say that
he word "forest" has a significant, not an insignificant
meaning, and that it does not embrace land only
partly woodland. It is a tract of land covered with
trees, usually of considerable extent.
(Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y.
Supp., 262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110
N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is
practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work
on Forest Law of India, states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be
framed for legal purposes will be found either
to exclude some cases to which the law
ought to apply, or on the other hand, to
include some with which the law ought not to
interfere. It may be necessary, for example,
to take under the law a tract of perfectly
barren land which at present has neither
trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which
in the course f time it is hoped will be
"reboise;" but any definition wide enough to
take in all such lands, would also take in
much that was not wanted. On the other
hand, the definition, if framed with reference
to tree-growth, might (and indeed would be
almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery,
orchard, or vineyard, which it was not
designed to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of
Forestry, states as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the
term, as an economic factor, is by no means
a mere collection of trees, but an organic
whole in which all parts, although apparently
heterogeneous, jumbled together by
accident as it were and apparently unrelated,
bear a close relation to each other and are
as interdependent as any other beings and
conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has
said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of
forest and agricultural lands was beginning
to receive some attention and it is clearly
shown in section 18 of the above mentioned
Act; it leaves to the Bureau of Forestry the
certification as to what lands are for
agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act
states timber lands, the Bureau has in its
administration since the passage of this act
construed this term to mean forest lands in
the sense of what was necessary to protect,
for the public good; waste lands without a
tree have been declared more suitable for
forestry in many instances in the past. The
term 'timber' as used in England and in the
United States in the past has been applied to
wood suitable for construction purposes but
with the increase in civilization and the
application of new methods every plant
producing wood has some useful purpose
and the term timber lands is generally
though of as synonymous with forest lands
or lands producing wood, or able to produce
wood, if agricultural crops on the same land
will not bring the financial return that timber
will or if the same land is needed for
protection purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
The laws in the United States recognize the
necessity of technical advice of duly
appointed boards and leave it in the hands of
these boards to decide what lands are more
valuable for forestry purposes or for
agricultural purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows
to as great an extent as allowable under the
law. In many cases, in the opinion of the
Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single
tree on them are considered as true forest
land. For instance, mountain sides which are
too steep for cultivation under ordinary
practice and which, if cultivated, under
ordinary practice would destroy the big
natural resource of the soil, by washing, is
considered by this bureau as forest land and
in time would be reforested. Of course,
examples exist in the Mountain Province
where steep hillsides have been terraced
and intensive cultivation practiced but even
then the mountain people are very careful
not to destroy forests or other vegetative
cover which they from experience have
found protect their water supply. Certain
chiefs have lodged protests with the
Government against other tribes on the
opposite side of the mountain cultivated by
them, in order to prevent other tribes from
cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their
source of water for irrigation.
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the
Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if
mankind could not devise and enforce ways
dealing with the earth, which will preserve
this source of like "we must look forward to
the time, remote it may be, yet equally
discernible, when out kin having wasted its
great inheritance will fade from the earth
because of the ruin it has accomplished."
The method employed by the bureau of
Forestry in making inspection of lands, in
order to determine whether they are more
adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by
a technical and duly trained personnel on the
different phases of the conservation of
natural resources, is based upon a
previously prepared set of questions in which
the different characters of the land under
inspection are discussed, namely:
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very
steep.
Exposure: North; South; East; West.
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very
rocky.
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass
land, brush land, brush land and timber
mixed, dense forest.
If cultivated, state crops being grown and
approximate number of hectares under
cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is
this land suitable?
State what portion of the tract is wooded,
name of important timber species and
estimate of stand in cubic meters per
hectare, diameter and percentage of each
species.
If the land is covered with timber, state
whether there is public land suitable for
agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered
with timber.
Is this land more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes? (State reasons in
full.)
Is this land included or adjoining any
proposed or established forest reserve or
communal forest? Description and
ownership of improvements.
If the land is claimed under private
ownership, give the name of the claimant,
his place of residence, and state briefly (if
necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds
upon which he bases his claim.
When the inspection is made on a parcel of
public land which has been applied for, the
corresponding certificate is forwarded to the
Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately
claimed parcel for which the issuance of a
title is requested from the Court of Land
Registration, and the inspection shows the
land to be more adapted for forest purposes,
then the Director of Forestry requests the
Attorney-General to file an opposition,
sending him all data collected during the
inspection and offering him the forest officer
as a witness.
It should be kept in mind that the lack of
personnel of this Bureau, the limited time
intervening between the notice for the trial on
an expediente of land and the day of the
trial, and the difficulties in communications
as well as the distance of the land in
question greatly hinder the handling of this
work.
In the case of lands claimed as private
property, the Director of Forestry, by means
of his delegate the examining officer,
submits before the court all evidence
referring to the present forest condition of the
land, so that the court may compare them
with the alleged right by the claimant.
Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a
title issued by the proper authority or
evidence of his right to the land showing that
he complied with the requirements of the
law, the forest certificate does not affect him
in the least as such land should not be
considered as a part of the public domain;
but when the alleged right is merely that of
possession, then the public or private
character of the parcel is open to discussion
and this character should be established not
simply on the alleged right of the claimant
but on the sylvical condition and soil
characteristics of the land, and by
comparison between this area, or different
previously occupied areas, and those areas
which still preserve their primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter
difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of
the natural resources of the Philippines. The
prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his
substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment
must be restrained for the less spectacular but surer
policy which protects Nature's wealth for future
generations. Such is the wise stand of our
Government as represented by the Director of
Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of
the United States, believes in "the control of nature's
powers by man for his own good." On the other hand,
the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof,
that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent
reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine
Islands to have the large public domain come under
private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the
sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private
claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long
run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of
public land can be established as provided by law.
When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the
Government as to a particular piece of property
collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that
the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
should submit to the court convincing proof that the
land is not more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be
stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the
courts to the opinion of the technical expert who
speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere
formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General
for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from
giving title to the claimant.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved
a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked
registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of
section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No.
1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the
Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his
possessory information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall
register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in
parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without
special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAULINO ABELLA, ET AL., claimants;
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, petitioner-appellant.
Francisco, Lualhati and Lopez for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel
or tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears
from the record that on the 21st day of September,
1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance for the
registration under the Torrens system, of the very
land now in question by virtue of her appeal. In that
case, after issue joined and after hearing the
evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge,
denied the registration of all of the northern portion of
the land included in her petition represented by
Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in that action,
upon the ground that said portion was more valuable
for timber purposes than for agricultural purposes.
From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed.
The Supreme Court after a consideration of the
evidence affirmed the decision of the lower court. In
the course of that decision the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have
examined the plans and all the evidence presented in
this case and are of the opinion that the trial court was
correct in its declaration that this send a did not mean
the old road to Boñgabon. The fact that nearly all the
northern property is forestry land is a further indication
that the applicant's possessory information title did not
include the land running up to the road to Bongabon,
because all the papers which the applicant has
regarding this property call the land palayero." 1
Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the
appellant herein present an amended plan in that
case, showing the particular part or parcel of the land
in question which she was entitled to have registered.
We have no evidence before us showing that order of
Judge Nepomuceno was ever complied with.
Nothing further seems to have occurred with
reference to the registration of the land included in the
former case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when the
Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the
present case for the registration, under the cadastral
survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality
of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by
Maria del Rosario in the former action. She presented
her opposition in the present action, claiming the very
land which she claimed in the former action. The only
proof which she presented in support of her claim in
the present action was the proof which she had
presented in the former action. No proof was adduced
in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree
showed that she was entitled to the registration of any
other parcel of land than those which had been
conceded to her in the first action.
Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present
case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of
the Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the
name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral
survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are
the very lots which had been ordered registered in her
name in the former action. From that judgment she
appealed to this court upon the ground that the lower
court committed an error in not registering all of the
land included in her opposition in her name. 1awph!l.net
In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and
in support thereof presents some proof to show that
the northern portion of the land in question is not
forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land.
With reference to said motion for rehearing, it may be
said that all of the proof which is presented in support
thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with
reasonable diligence, have been presented. It cannot,
therefore, be considered now. It is not newly
discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be
accepted it would not be sufficient to justify the
granting of a new trial.
After a careful examination of the entire record and
the evidence adduced during the trial of this cause as
well as that adduced during the trial of the first cause,
we are fully persuaded that no error has been
committed. Whether particular land is more valuable
for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or
vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be
established during the trial of the cause. Whether the
particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a
question to be settled in each particular case, unless
the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority
conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private
interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the
particular land in question. (Ankron vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of
the present cause the appellant made no effort to
show that the land which she claimed, outside of that
which had been decreed in her favor, was more
valuable for agricultural than forestry purposes. For all
of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns,
Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.
VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.
Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MOIR, J.:
In the cadastral land registration for the town of
Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants sought
to register the three lots or parcels of land involved in
this appeal, which registration was opposed by the
Director of Forestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely
"forestry" land, that a small portion of lot 1154 and all
of lots 1158 were "forestry" lands, to which appellants
had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and
refused registration of the parts of these lots to which
opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The
claimants excepted and perfected their bill of
exceptions and brought the case to this court for
review, setting up the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not holding to have
been proven the facts that the lots 1104,
1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of
Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano
Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from
a time prior to the year 1880, and, after his
death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants
were planted and now exists and that these
latter are not spontaneous plants utilized by
said heirs.
2. The court erred in not holding to have
been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice
and pasture land that was possessed as
owner by Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime
and peaceably long before 1880, a
possession continued by his heirs who still
enjoy the use of the land up to the present
time.
3. The court erred in not holding to have
been proven that on that same lot 1158,
there has existed since the year 1890, and
still exists, a fish hatchery which has been
possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of
Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more than 27
years, not counting the prior possession of
their predecessor in interest.
4. The court erred in holding that lot No.
1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are
forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently
proven by the sole and absurd testimony of
the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of
spontaneous growth and in not planted; and
, as the photographs only refer to small
portions of the area of the lot, the court also
erred in holding that the whole lot was
covered with firewood trees, while in fact but
a very small portion of it is covered with trees
which protect the nipa plants and the fish
hatchery, it having been proven that a large
part of the lot was sown with rice and used
as pasture land.
5. The court erred in not holding that the
parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered
by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land,
and in not holding to have been proven that
these swamp are not available, inasmuch as
they are drained at low tide; errors
committed with manifest violation of law and
disregard of the jurisprudence established by
the Honorable Supreme Court of the
Philippine.
6. The court erred in not holding that the
claimants and appellants, by their
peaceable, public, and continuous
possession for more than forty years, as
owners, including that held by their
predecessors in interests, had acquired by
prescription lots 1104, 1154, and 1158, in
conformity with act No. 190, section 41,
which, without exception, is applicable to the
State as well as to private parties, and by
extraordinary prescription of thirty years.
7. The court erred in not adjudicating said
lots to the claimants and appellants, in
consideration of the possession they have
had for more than forty years, form the time
of their predecessor in interest to the present
time, thus violating the legal provision
whereby the holders of land who have been
in its possession for ten years prior to the
enactment of the land law, Act No. 926, by
the United States Philippine Commission,
are to be deemed the absolute owners of
such land, and to be presumed to have
applied for the same and to have complied
with the Spanish laws and all the
proceedings required by the Royal Decrees
on the composition of titles; and, therefore,
pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in
 question should be adjudicated to the
possessors thereof.
8. The court erred in not granting the new
trial requested by the appellants, the motion
therefor being based on the ground that his
findings of facts, if there are any, are openly
and manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.
It is not necessary to consider all these assignments
of error, for the main question involved is
whether manglares[mangroves] are agricultural lands
or timber lands. If they are timber lands the claimants
cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years
prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them
under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is
necessary.
This being a cadastral case there are no findings of
fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104 was in
possession of claimants and their ancestors for more
than thirty years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-
five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal."
The are of the lots does not appear.
The evidence fully sustains the contention of the
claimants that they have been in possession of all of
those lots quietly, adversely and continuously under
a claim of ownership for more than thirty years prior to
the hearing in the trial court. There is not a word of
proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up
no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the
lands denied registration are "mangles" with nipa and
various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing
on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they
constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces) which was
later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this
lot is pasture land, part palay and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the
parts of the lands denied registration are public forest
and cannot be acquired by occupation, and that all
"manglares are public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a
classification of all public lands of the Philippine
Islands, and in mentioning forestry land the Act of
Congress used the words "timber land." These words
are always translated in the Spanish translation of
that Act as "terrenos forestales." We think there is an
error in this translation and that a better translation
would be "terrenos madereros." Timber land in
English means land with trees growing on it.
The manglar plant would never be called a tree in
English but a bush, and land which has only bushes,
shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be
called "timber land."
The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits
in this case show that at two places there were trees
growing on this land, but the forester who testified for
the Government always calls these lots "mangles,"
and he says the trees which are growing on the lands
are of no value except for firewood. The fact that
there are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa
swamp does not change the general character of the
land from manglar to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within the
meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act of
Congress has been definitely decided by this Court in
the case of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil.
Rep., 572). In that case the court said:
Although argued at different times, five of
these cases have been presented
substantially together, all being covered by
one brief of the late Attorney-General in
behalf of the Government in which, with
many interesting historical and graphic
citations he described that part of the
marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands
known as manglares, with their characteristic
vegetation. In brief, it may be said that they
are mud flats, alternately washed and
exposed by the tide, in which grow various
kindered plants which will not live except
when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics,
which exists naturally, but which are also, to
some extent, cultivated by man for the sake
of the combustible wood of the mangrove,
like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are
literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion
that they can not be so regarded in the
sense in which the term is used in the cases
cited or in general American jurisprudence.
The waters flowing over them are not
available for purpose of navigation, and they
"may be disposed of without impairment of
the public interest in what remains."
The court on page 573 further said:
It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The
Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., 175).
As some discussion has arisen as to the
scope of that decision, it appears opportune
to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The
issue was, whether lands used as a
fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt
deposits, inland some desistance from the
sea, and asserted, thought not clearly
proved, to be overflowed at high tide, could
 be registered as private property on the
strength of ten years' occupation, under
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of
the Philippine Commission. The point
decided was that such land within the
meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading
up to that conclusion being that Congress
having divided all the public lands of the
Islands into three classes it must be included
in tone of the three, and being clearly neither
forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall
into the division of agricultural land.
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.
Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase "agricultural
lands" as used in Act No. 926 means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
"forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress
of July 1st, 1902, classified the public lands in the
Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as
including manglares found in the Administrative Code
of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its
enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands
the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands then
the rights of appellants are fully established by Act
No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as
follows:
All persons who by themselves or their
predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership
except as against the Government, for a
period of ten years next preceding the taking
effect of this Act, except when prevented by
war of force majuere, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant
and to have received the same, and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore,
all persons who were in possession of agricultural
public lands under the conditions mentioned in the
above section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July,
1894, are conclusively presumed to have a grant to
such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title
issued to them. (Pamintuan vs.Insular Government, 8
Phil., Rep., 485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands
are subject to private acquisition and ownership when
it is fully proved that the possession has been actual,
complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare
that each case must stand on its own merits.
One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp
by merely cutting a few loads of firewood from the
lands occasionally. The possession must be more
complete than would be required for other agricultural
lands.
The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in
question from 18821, and their ancestors before that
date, and they should have been declared the owners
and title should have been issued to them.
There is no need to consider the other points raised
on appeal.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
case is returned to the lower court, with instruction to
enter a decree in conformity with this decision. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and
Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
IN BENCH
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and
Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for
appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as
amici curiae.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the
registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in
the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on
the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing
of the application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection
of the opponent and adds that the lower court,
committed an error in not declaring null and void the
sale of the lot to the applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the case,
then he would apply for the benefits of the Public
Land Act (C.A. No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot
that may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act. He failed to show that he or any of his
predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, under
the laws, orders and decrease promulgated by the
Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by
possessory information under the Mortgaged Law
(section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant
below to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53
Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under
the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by
his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next
question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain (sections
48, 49, C.A. No. 141).
As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and
has invoked the provisions of the Public Land Act, it
seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this
case on the nature or classifications of the sought to
be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the
Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor
in interest would have been entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot had they applied for its
registration; and that he having purchased or acquired
it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to
a decree of registration must be deemed also to have
been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the
Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the
condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the registration of
the land of which they had been in possession at least
since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not
have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title
which was transmissible to the applicant. The only
right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the
lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in
interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to
apply for its registration but not by a person as the
applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant
should have been declared null and void. In a suit
between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the
sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if the
court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not
necessary in this case where the vendors do not even
object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application
for registration dismissed, without costs.
Moran, CJ, Fair, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon,
JJ., Concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased
in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo a
parcel of land located in the residential district of
Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the
continuous, public, and adverse possession of their
predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on June
17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said
parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the
application because, among other grounds, the
Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or
private agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-
examination, expressly admitted that the land in
question is susceptible of cultivation and may be
converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia,
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a
witness for the government, stated that the land,
notwithstanding the use to which it is actually
devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with an
opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice.
The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by
Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, is as follows:
1. Whether or not the "public agricultural
land" in section 1, Article XII, of the
Constitution may be interpreted to include
residential, commercial or industrial lots for
purposes of their disposition.
1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and
mineral. This is the basic classification
adopted since the enactment of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of
the Constitution of the Philippines, the term
"agricultural public lands" had, therefor,
acquired a technical meaning in our public
laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
in the leading case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that
the phrase "agricultural public lands" means
those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in many subsequent cases.
(Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574;
Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil., 593;
Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil.,
159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil.,
505, 516 Mercado vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175,
181; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil.,
560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)
Residential, commercial or industrial lots
forming part of the public domain must have
to be included in one or more of these
classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor
mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be
classified as agricultural.
Viewed from the another angle, it has been
held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands
is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p.,
25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of
the land to cultivation for agricultural or not
(State vs. Stewart, 190, p.,129).
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of
Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15, 1940,
overruling the opposition without must explanation
and decreeing the registration prayed for the
applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the
decision, and the Solicitor General appearing for
appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a
citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or
acquire the parcel of land in question and that the
purchase made in question and that the purchase
made in 1938 is null and void.
This is the question squarely reversing to us for
decision. The majority, although reversing the lower
court's decision and dismissing the application with
we agree, abstained from the declaring null and void
the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for
the appellant. We deem it necessary to state our
opinion on the important question raised, it must be
squarely decided.
The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:
I. The lower court erred decreeing the
registration of the lot in question in favor of
the applicant who, according to his own
voluntary admission, is a citizen of the
Chinese Republic.
(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in
the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in
the Public Land Act includes residential lots.
In this jurisdiction lands of public domain
suitable for residential purposes are
considered agricultural lands under the
Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural
public lands" has well settled judicial
definition. It was used for the first time in the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as
the Philippine Bill. Its means those public
lands acquired form Spain which are neither
mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibañes de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil.,
159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.,
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil.,
560; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court, in defining the meaning and
scope of that phrase from the context of the
sections 13 and 15 of that Act, said:
The phrase "agricultural public lands" as
defined by the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No.
926) means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither mineral timber
lands.
xxx xxx xxx
"We hold that there is to be found in
the act of Congress a definition of
the phrase "agricultural public
lands," and after careful
consideration of the question we
are satisfied that only definition
which exists in said Act is the
definition adopted by the court
below. Section 13 say that the
Government shall "make and rules
and regulations for the lease, sale,
or other dispositions of public lands
other than timber or mineral lands,"
To our minds that is only definition
that can be said to be given
agricultural lands. In other
words, that the phrase "agricultural
lands" as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands. . . ." Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178,
182, emphasis added.)
"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was
subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is
the first public land law of the Philippines. As
therein used, the phrase was expressly
given by the Philippine Commission the
same meaning intended for it by Congress
as interpreted in the case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, supra. This is a self-evident
from a reading of section 1, 10, 32, and 64
(subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the
phrase "agricultural public lands" is used in
any of said sections, it is invariably by the
qualification "as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two."
"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court held that a residential or
building lot, forming part of the public
domain, is agricultural land, irrespective of
the fact that it is not actually used for
purposes of agriculture for the simple reason
that it is susceptible of cultivation and may
be converted into a rural estate, and
because when a land is not mineral or
forestal in its nature it must necessarily be
included within the classification of a
agricultural land. Because of the special
applicability of the doctrine laid down in said
case, we quote at some length from the
decision therein rendered:
"The question set up in these proceedings by
virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for
Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a
parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural
land, was converted into a building lot, is
subject to the legal provisions in force
regarding Government public lands which
may be alienated in favor of private
individuals or corporations. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, any parcel of land or
building lot is susceptible of
cultivation, and may converted into
a field, and planted with all kinds of
vegetation ; for this reason, where
land is not mining or forestal in its
nature, it must necessarily be
included within the classification of
agriculture land, not because it is
actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was
originally agricultural and may again
become so under other
circumstances; besides the Act of
Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains
only three classifications, and
makes no special provision with
respect to building lots or urban
land that have ceased to be
agricultural land. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"From the language of the foregoing
provisions of the law, it is deduced
that, with the exception of those
comprised within the mineral and
timber zone, all lands owned by
State or by the sovereign nation are
public in character, and per
se alienable and, provided they are
not destine to the use of public in
general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with
law, they may be acquired by any
private or juridical person; and
considering their origin and
primitive state and the general uses
to which they are accorded, they
are called agricultural lands, urbans
lands and building lots being
included in this classification for the
purpose of distinguishing rural and
urban estates from mineral and
 timber lands; the transformation
they may have undergone is no
obstacle to such classification as
the possessors thereof may again
convert them into rural
estates." (Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13
Phil., 161, 163 164, 165, 166;
emphasis added.).
(b) Under the Constitution
and Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (Public Land Act),
the phrase (Public Land
Act), the phrase "public
agricultural land" includes
lands of the public domain
suitable for residential
purposes.
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution,
reads as follows:
"All agricultural timber, and
mineral lands of the public
domain waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and
disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant
lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the
exception of publicagricultural land,
shall not be alienated . . ."
(Emphasis added.).
"Under the above-quote provision, the
disposition exploitation, development or
utilization of the natural resources, including
agricultural lands of the public domain is
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to the
corporations or associations therein
mentioned. It also clearly appears from said
provision that natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, are not
subject to alienation.
"On November 7, 1936, or more than one
year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the
Public Land Act, was approved. Under this
Act the lands of the public have been
classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or
disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands.
The lands designated alienable or
disposable correspond to lands designated
in the Constitution as public agricultural
lands, because under section 1, Article XII,
public agricultural lands are the only natural
resources of the country which are the only
natural resources of the country which are
subject to alienation or deposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
provide that the alienable or disposable
public lands shall be classified, according to
use or purposes to which they are destined,
into a agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would
seem that under this classification residential
land is different from agricultural land. The
difference however, is more apparent than
real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase
is used in the Constitution means alienable
lands of the public domain and therefore this
phrase is equivalent to the lands classified
by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
alienable or disposable. The classification
provided in section 9 is only for purposes
administration and disposition, according to
the purposes to which said lands are
especially adopted. But notwithstanding this
of all said lands are essentially agricultural
public lands because only agricultural public
lands are subject to alienation or disposition
under section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution. A contrary view would
necessarily create a conflict between
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of
Article XII of the Constitution, and such
conflict should be avoided , if possible, and
said Act construed in the light of the
fundamental provisions of the Constitution
and in entire harmony therewith.
"Another universal principles
applied in considering constitutional
question is, that an Act will be so
construed, if possible, as to avoid
conflict with the Constitution,
although such a construction may
not be the most obvious or natural
one. "The Court may resort to an
implication to sustain a statute, but
not to destroy it." But the courts
cannot go beyond the province of
legitimate construction, in order to
save a statute; and where the
meaning is plain, words cannot to
be read into it or out of it for that
purpose." ( 1 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one than
one year after the adoption of the
Constitution the National Assembly revised
the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which a
compilation of the laws relative to the lands
of the public domain and the amendments
thereto, form to the Constitution.
"Where the legislature has revised
a statute after a Constitution has
been adopted, such a revision is to
be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102;
emphasis added.)
"By the way of illustration, let us supposed
that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential
land. If, by reason of this classification, it is
maintained that said land has ceased to be
agricultural public land, it will no longer be
subject to alienation or disposition by reason
of the constitutional provision that only
agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such
residential lot is alienable under section 58,
59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations mentioned in section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore, the
classification of public agricultural lands into
various subdivisions is only for purposes of
administration, alienation or disposition, but it
does not destroy the inherent nature of all
such lands as a public agricultural lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause
or phrase use in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the
phrase "public agricultural land" is a
sufficient authority for giving the same
interpretation to the phrase as used in
subsequent legislation, and this is especially
so in view of the length of time during which
this interpretation has been maintained by
the courts. On this point Sutherland has the
following to say:
"When a judicial interpretation has
once been put upon a clause,
expressed in a vague manner by
the legislature, and difficult to be
understood, that ought of itself to be
sufficient authority for adopting the
same construction. Buller J., said:
"We find solemn determination of
these doubtful expressions in the
statute, and as that now put another
construction has since prevailed,
there is no reason why we should
now put another construction of the
act on account of any suppose
change of convenience." This rule
of construction will hold good even
if the court be opinion that the
practical erroneous; so that if the
matter were res integra the court
would adopt a different
construction. Lord Cairns said: "I
think that with regard to statutes ...
it is desirable not so much that the
principle of the decision should be
capable at all times of justification,
as that the law should be settled,
and should, when once settled, be
maintained without any danger of
vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial
usage and practice will have
weight, and when continued for a
long time will be sustained though
carried beyond the pair purport of
the statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, pp. 892,
893.) .
"An important consideration
affecting the weight of
contemporary judicial construction
is the length of time it has
continued. It is adopted, and
derives great force from being
adopted, soon after the enactment
of the law. It may be, and is
presumed, that the legislative sense
of its policy, and of its true scope
and meaning, permeates the
judiciary and controls its exposition.
Having received at that time a
construction which is for the time
settled, accepted, and thereafter
followed or acted upon, it has the
sanction of the of the authority
appointed to expound the law, just
and correct conclusions, when
reached, they are, moreover, within
the strongest reasons on which
founded the maxim of stare decisis.
Such a construction is public given,
and the subsequent silence of the
legislature is strong evidence of
acquiescence, though not
conclusive. . . . (II Lewis Sutherland
Statutory Construction, pp. 894,
895.)
"Furthermore, when the phrase "public
agricultural land" was used in section 1 of
Article XII of the Constitution, it is presumed
that it was so used with the same judicial
meaning therefor given to it and therefor the
meaning of the phrase, as used in the
Constitution, includes residential lands and
another lands of the public domain, but
excludes mineral and timber lands.
"Adoption of provisions previously
construed — ad. Previous
construction by Courts. — Where a
statute that has been construed by
the courts of the last resort has
been reenacted in same, or
substantially the same, terms, the
legislature is presumed to have
been familiar with its construction,
and to have adopted it is part of the
law, unless a contrary intent clearly
appears, or a different construction
is expressly provided for; and the
same rule applies in the
construction of a statute enacted
after a similar or cognate statute
has been judicially construed. So
where words or phrases employed
in a new statute have been
construed by the court to have been
used in a particular sense in a
previous statute on the same
subject, or one analogous to it, they
are presumed, in the a absence of
clearly expressed intent to the
contrary, to be used in the same
sense in the statute as in the
previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-
1063.).
"Legislative adoption of judicial
construction. — In the adoption of
the code, the legislature is
presumed to have known the
judicial construction which have
been placed on the former statutes;
and therefore the reenactment in
the code or general revision of
provisions substantially the same
as those contained in the former
statutes is a legislative adoption of
their known judicial constructions,
unless a contrary intent is clearly
manifest. So the fact that the
revisers eliminated statutory
language after it had been judicially
construed shows that they had such
construction in view." (59 C. J.,
1102.)
"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null
and void the sale of said land to the
appellant (appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has
ceased to be a part of the lands of the public
domain by reason of the long continuous,,
public adverse possession of the applicant's
predecessors in interest, and that the latter
had performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and were entitled to a
certificate of title under section 48,
subsection (b), of Commonwealth Act No.
141, still the sale of said land of December 8,
1938, to the applicant as evidenced by
Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being
contrary to section 5, Article XII of the
Constitution, which reads as follows:
"Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or
assignedexcept to individuals,
corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain of the
Philippines."
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is
disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain (section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), and
consequently also disqualified to buy and
acquire private agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning
of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase
'private agricultural land,' as used in the
above quoted provision, can only mean land
of private ownership, whether agricultural,
residential, commercial or industrial. And this
necessarily so, because the phrase
'agricultural land used in the Constitution and
in the Public Land Law must be given the
same uniform meaning to wit, any land of the
public domain or any land of private
ownership, which is neither mineral or
forestal.
"A word or phrase repeated in a
statute will bear the same meaning
throughout the statute, unless a
different intention appears. ...
Where words have being long used
in a technical sense and have been
judicially construed to have a
certain meaning, and have been
adopted by the legislature as
having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are
used, the rule of construction
requires that the words used in
such statute should be construed
 according to the sense may vary
from the strict literal meaning of the
words." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction., p. 758.) .
"This interpretation is in harmony with the
nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the
Constitution.
"A narrow and literal interpretation of the
phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair
and defeat the nationalistic aim and general
policy of our laws and would allow a gradual,
steady, and unlimited accumulation in alien
hands of a substantial portion of our
patrimonial estates, to the detriment of our
national solidarity, stability, and
independence. Nothing could prevent the
acquisition of a great portion or the whole of
a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet
a city or urban area is more strategical than
a farm or rural land.
"The mere literal construction of
section in a statute ought not to
prevail if it is opposed to the
intention of the legislature apparent
by the statute; and if the words are
sufficiently flexible to admit of some
other construction it is to be
adopted to effectuate that intention.
The intent prevails over the letter,
and the letter will, if possible be so
read as to conform to the spirit of
the act. While the intention of the
legislature must be ascertained
from the words used to express it,
the manifest reason and the
obvious purpose of the law should
not be sacrificed to a liberal
interpretation of such words." (II
Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp.
721, 722.)
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential
lot which the applicant seeks to register in
his name falls within the meaning of private
agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not
subject to acquisition by foreigners except by
hereditary succession."
The argument hold water. It expresses a correct
interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent of
the Constitutional Convention.
One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla,
said:
The constitutional precepts that I believe will
ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1)
the complete nationalization of our lands and
natural resources; (2) the nationalization of
our commerce and industry compatible with
good international practices. With the
complete nationalization of our lands and
natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one
hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands
and natural resources are immovable and as
such can be compared to the vital organs of
a person's body, the lack of possession of
which may cause instant death or the
shortening of life. If we do not completely
nationalize these two of our most important
belongings, I am afraid that the time will
come when we shall be sorry for the time we
were born. Our independence will be just a
mockery, for what kind of independence are
we going to have if a part of our country is
not in our hands but in those of foreigner? (2
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p. 592.).
From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:
The nationalization of the natural resources
of the country was intended (1) to insure
their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to
serve as an instrument of national defense,
helping prevent the extension into the
country of foreign control through peaceful
economic penetration; and (3) to prevent
making the Philippines a source of
international conflict with the consequent
danger to its internal security and
independence.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . In the preface to its report, the committee
on nationalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources said;
"International complications have often
resulted from the existence of alien
ownership of land and natural resources in a
weak country. Because of this danger, it is
best that aliens should be restricted in the
acquisition of land and other natural
resources. An example is afforded by the
case of Texas. This state was originally
province of Mexico. In order to secure its
rapid settlements and development, the
Mexican government offered free land to
settlers in Texas. Americans responded
 more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon
they organized a revolt against Mexican rule,
and then secured annexation to the United
States. A new increase of alien landholding
in Mexico has brought about the desire a
prevent a repetition of the Texas affair.
Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917
contains serious limitation on the right of
aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico.
The Filipinos should profit from this
example."
xxx xxx xxx
It was primarily for these reasons that the
Convention approved readily the proposed
principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire,
exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines. For the same reasons the
Convention approved equally readily the
proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer
of assignment to aliens of private agricultural
land, save in the case of hereditary
succession. (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605, 606.).
All the foregoing show why we, having been a
member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with
Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in
this case, although we would go as far as the outright
pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is
null and void.
BRIONES, M., with whom they are satisfied
PARAS and TUASON, MM., Dissident:
The applicant in this file requests the registration of
the lot that is treated as privately owned land , and
only with a supplementary character invokes the
provisions of chapter 8 of Law No. 2874 on public
lands (Part of Exceptions, p. 3.)
For its part, the Director of Land opposes the
application under three grounds, namely: (1) because
neither the applicant nor its predecessors in interest
can demonstrate sufficient title on said parcel of land,
not having acquired it or by title of composition with
the State under the sovereignty of Spain, or title of
possessory information under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894; (2) because the aforementioned
lot is a portion of the lands of public domain belonging
to the Commonwealth of the Philippines; (3) because
the applicant being a Chinese citizen, is not qualified
under the provisions of the Constitution of the
Philippines to acquire lands of a public or private
nature ( idem , pp. 5 and 6).
Both the applicant and the Director of Lands practiced
their tests before an arbitrator appointed by the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas. In view of such
evidence, Judge Magsalin, of the aforementioned
Court, issued a judgment in favor of the applicant, of
which we transcribe the following pertinent portions:
The representation of the opposing Director
of Land tries to prove through the testimony
of the Land Buro Inspector that the land
subject of the request is part of the public
domain and in addition the applicant is a
Chinese citizen, but said witness stated that
the land subject to the the present
application is a site located within the
population of the municipality of Guinayanga,
Tayabas, and in the same there is a house
of strong materials and lacking merit this
opposition should be dismissed.
Therefore, after rejecting the opposition of
the Director of Land, is awarded with its
improvements the plot of land subject of the
present application described in the map
Psu-109117, in favor of the applicant Oh
Cho, Chinese citizen, adult, married with Yee
Shi, and resident in the municipality of
Guinayanga, Tayabas, Philippine
Islands. (Decision, page 8, Record on
Appeal.)
From the transcript, the following is inferred in a
forced manner: ( a ) that the lower court dismissed
outright the opposition of the Director of Land based
on the assumption that the site under question is part
of the public domain ; ( b ) that the same court
rejected the other basis of the opposition, that is, that
the applicant being Chinese citizen is incapacitated
under our Constitution to acquire land, whether public,
or private, even if it is an urban lot; ( c ) that,
according to the Judge a quo's ruling , the questioned
land is not public, it is necessarily private land .
The Director of Land, not being satisfied with the
judgment, appealed it to the Court of Appeal and
made two allegations of error, none of which calls into
question the quality of private land disputed. The
appellant does not raise any question of fact; It raises
only one question of law. That is why in the
reconstitution of this file - the original was burned
during the war - there has been no need to include
the shorthand notes or the documentary evidence,
and in fact we have considered and decided this
matter without these notes and proofs. The lawyer
Constantino, of the appellee, in the hearing for the
reconstitution of the cars, made this
demonstration; "In view also of the fact that the
questions involved here are only questions of law, this
representation waives the right to present the
evidence presented in the trial court. . . "For his part,
the Attorney General, when explaining the case on
behalf of the appellant Director of Land, begins his
argument with the following statement:
This appeal is a test case. There are now
several cases of exactly the same nature
pending in the trial courts.
Whether or not an alien can acquire a
residential lot and register it in his name is
the only question raised in this appeal from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas which sustained the affirmance and
decreed the registration of the said property
in favor of the applicant who, by his own
voluntary admission, is a citizen of the
Chinese Republic. This question is raised in
connection with the constitutional provision
that no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned to foreigners except
in cases of hereditary succession. (Pags. 1,
2, alegato del apelante.)
Having appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal,
why did this case go to the Supreme Court, before
which it was pending even before the war, and
without being resolved during the Japanese
occupation? The reason does not appear specifically
in the record, but since it is not an appeal from the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the only
explanation is that he should realize that the appeal
was not more than a question of law , ordered, as it
was de rigueur, the transfer of the matter to this Court
because of its jurisdiction and competence.
We have considered it necessary to set the previous
premises because they serve as the basis for the
argument that we are going to follow to support this
dissidence.
I. From the foregoing it is evident that the Director of
Lands has opposed the requested registration, among
other reasons, because the land is public ; that the
lower court has dismissed this ground for "lacking
merit," ruling that the land is private ; that the Director
of Lands, in his appeal before us, does not question
this conclusion of the Judge a quo, but admitting that
the land is privately owned, argues, however, that
under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution of the
Philippines the applicant, being a foreigner, can not
acquire private agricultural land, being included in this
concept an urban lot like the one in this file. Once the
matter has been raised in such terms, can this Court
consider and resolve a point not disputed between the
parties - a point that is firmly and definitively resolved
and is not subject to appeal? In other words: can this
Court, as the majority in its opinion, revoke a
conclusion of the lower court that is not discussed in
the appellant's argument? Can we, in good procedural
law, declare public the land in question on our own
initiative, when the same Attorney General, which
represents the State, admits in its argument the
private nature of the site, and only raises a question,
of right, namely: that under our Constitution no
transfer act of ownership in favor of a foreigner is
valid, so it is an urban property , because the phrase
"private agricultural land" that is contained in the
Constitution includes not only the rustic but also the
urban ones? And, above all, can we, in fairness and
justice, consider and review a point that not only is not
discussed by the parties, as they consider it accepted
and established, but it is of right and of because the
phrase "private agricultural land" that is contained in
the Constitution covers not only rustic but also urban
properties? And, above all, can we, in fairness and
justice, consider and review a point that not only is not
discussed by the parties, as they consider it accepted
and established, but it is of right and of because the
phrase "private agricultural land" that is contained in
the Constitution covers not only rustic but also urban
properties? And, above all, can we, in fairness and
justice, consider and review a point that not only is not
discussed by the parties, as they consider it accepted
and established, but it is of right and ofdone at the
same time? What basis do we have to do it when we
do not have both the testimony and documentary
evidence in front of us? Our answer is, at all,
negative.
The competence of this Court to review the judgments
of the lower courts, of which an appeal has been filed,
is based on the principle that such jurisdiction, in its
exercise, must be limited to the controversial issues,
and this is determined through the pointing out errors
that the appellant makes in his plea. Article 19 of the
old rules of procedure in this Supreme Court said in
its first paragraph the following:
Attached to the appellant's argument and in
a separate document, a list of the errors of
law to be discussed will be attached. The
specification of each of these errors will be
made by separate paragraphs, clearly, in a
concise manner, and without incurring
repetitions, and will be numbered in
correlative order.
Article 20 of the same regulation stated:
No error of law other than that relating to
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
litigation shall be taken into consideration as
it is not specified in the relationship of the
errors and presented as one of the grounds
in the pleading.
Interpreting these regulatory provisions, the Court
made in the Santiago case against Felix (24 Jur. Fil.,
391), the following doctrinal pronouncements:
 1. APPEAL; EFFECT OF LEAVING OF
PRESENTING RELATIONSHIP OF
ERRORS; RULE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED. -
It is a rule established by the jurisprudence
of the Courts of these Islands, by virtue of
repeated and uniform judgments of this
Court, that if in an appeal the appellant fails
to point out the errors incurred by the lower
Court, and will limit itself to discussing issues
of fact in general, it is not possible that this
Court can consider or review the adverse
resolution to the appellant, for the reason of
having been issued against the law and the
weight of the evidence, but it is necessary
that State and specify the error or errors that
determined the appealed decision that the
appellant qualifies as unlawful and unfair.
2. Id .; Id .; Rule Same as Adopted by the
Courts of the United States. - Equal legal
doctrine is in observance in the Courts of the
United States of North America, since a
general manifestation that the Court failed to
pronounce judgment in favor of one of the
parties, is not enough as a basis for the
Court may review the sentence appealed,
because unless the Judge's assessment of
the facts alleged and proven at trial is
manifestly contrary to the result and weight
of the evidence, the Court of Appeals usually
accepts the Judge's judgment and criteria on
the issues of fact, and it is not appropriate to
revoke the sentence appealed without just
cause. (Enriquez against Enriquez, 8 Jur.
Fil., 574; Chaplaincy of
Tambobong againstAntonio, 8 Jur. Fil.,
693; Paterno against the City of Manila, 17
Jur. Fil., 26) "(Santiago against Felix, 24 Jur.
Fil., 391.)
This doctrine was subsequently reiterated in the
following matters: Tan Me Nio v. Administrator of
Customs, 34 Jur. Fil., 995,
996; Hernaez against Montelibano, 34 Jur. Fil., 1011.
Rule 53, section 6, of the current regulations of the
courts, provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Questions that may be decided. —
No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter will be
considered unless stated in the assignment
of errors and properly argued in the
brief, save as the court, at its option, may
notice plain errors not specified, and also
clerical errors.
It will not be said that the question of whether the
disputed terrain is public or private, considered and
resolved by the majority in its decision without prior
notice of error or appropriate argument in the Attorney
General's plea , is included among the exceptions of
which the rule speaks transcribed above because it
does not affect the jurisdiction over the matter of the
litigation, nor is it a "plain error," or "clerical error."
It will be noted that in the old regulation there was no
"plain errors not specified" (patent or manifest errors
not specified in the allegation). But can this
reservation be invoked in the case at hand?
Undoubtedly not, for the following reasons: ( a ) the
documents do not show that the judge a quohe made
a clear and manifest error in declaring in his judgment
that the land is not public but private; we have no
choice but to accept in its face the conclusion of the
judge sentencing on this matter for the simple reason
that we do not have before us the evidence or testify
or documentary, and, therefore, there is no basis to
review, much less to revoke said conclusion, having
interpreted this reservation in the sense that one can
only take "judicial knowledge of the palpable error in
view of the proceedings and proceedings"; ( b) even
admitting for a moment, for the purposes of the
argument, that His Honor the Judge suffered a
palpable error in stating this conclusion, since the
Attorney General does not raise the issue in his plea,
it must be understood that he has renounced his right
to do so , choosing to base its case on other reasons
and reasons; therefore, we are not entitled to
consider the alleged error motu proprio proprio
proprio motu proprio motu proprio proprio proprio ,
because obviously it is not an oversight
or oversight of the representative of the State, but a
deliberate resignation, and jurisprudence on the
subject tells us that "the underlying purpose,
fundamental of the reservation in the rule is to prevent
the miscarriage of justice by virtue of carelessness.
" Here are some relevant authorities:
Purpose of exception as to plain errors. —
The proviso in the rule requiring assignments
of error, permitting the court, at its option, to
notice a plain error not assigned, "was and in
intended, in the interest of justice, to reserve
to the appellate court the right, resting in
public duty, to take cognizance of palpable
error on the face of the record
and proceedings, especially such as clearly
demonstrate that the suitor has no cause of
action." Santaella vs. Otto F. Lange Co. (155
Fed., 719, 724; 84 C. C. A., 145).
The rules does not intend that we are to sift
the record and deal with questions which are
of small importance, but only to notice errors
which are obvious upon inspection and of a
controlling character. The underlying
purpose of this reservation in the rule is
to prevent the miscarriage of justice from
oversight. Mast vs. Superior Drill Co. (154
Fed., 45, 51; 83 C. C. A. 157).
II. So far we have developed our argument under the
assumption that the quality of private litigation is
not controversial justiciable in this instance because
the question is not raised in the plea of the Attorney
General or be a matter of dispute between the parties
in the appeal pending before US; so, consequently,
we are not entitled to review, much less revoke motu
propriothe conclusion of the court to quo on the
particular. Now we are going to work under another
assumption - that the Attorney General has made the
corresponding error statement and the question is,
therefore, properly raised before this Supreme Court
for the purposes of the review. The question naturally
in order is the following: did the Judge a quo when
declaring and conceptualizing the land in question as
private, or is his conclusion in this regard correct? We
are of opinion that the Judge did not make an error,
that the land in question meets the necessary legal
conditions to qualify as private and differentiate it from
a property of public domain, and that, therefore, the
applicant has a confirmatory title on the property.
under the provisions of the Land Registration Law No.
496.
It is affirmed in the decision of the majority that the
applicant has not been able to prove that he or any of
his legal claimants acquired the lot of the State
through purchase or concession under the laws,
ordinances and decrees promulgated by the Spanish
Government in the Philippines, or by virtue of of the
procedures related to possessory information under
the mortgage law in the time of Spain. From this the
majority concludes that the disputed land is not
private because, according to its criterion, "all the
lands that were not acquired from the Government
(Spanish Government, it is meant), either by
purchase, or by concession, belong to the public
domain"; and citing as authority the classic
affair againstThe Government Insular the paper does
not admit more exception to the rule that the case in
which a land has been in the possession of the
occupant and its predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, because such possession would justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain, or that had been private property
even before the Spanish conquest. "
What, in the first place, does not seem correct is the
assurance with which the paper states that the land
was not acquired under Spanish sovereignty by virtue
of any of the ways known in the legislation of that
time, because as we do not have before proofs, there
is naturally no way to verify the certainty of the
proposition. If it is taken into account that the Director
of Lands opposed the application for registration on
the grounds that the land is public domain, and that
the lower court dismissed this ground, the
presumption is that the quality of the land was
satisfactorily proven. , Presumption that is
strengthened if it is considered that the Attorney
General, in sustaining the Government's appeal, does
not discuss or question in his plea the conclusion that
the aforementioned land is private property.
On the other hand, the majority seems to give a too
absolute and rigid character to the proposition that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government (in
the time of Spain), by purchase or by concession,
belong to the public domain." Strictly interpreting the
law, this Supreme Court denied the registration
requested in the famous affair againstthe Insular
Government that cites the majority in its opinion, for
that same reason that is accentuated in the paper - on
the grounds that Cariño could not show title of
purchase, concession or possession information
issued by the Government in the time of Spain, being
therefore the land is part of the public domain. But
when the matter was raised to appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, it reversed the judgment of
this Court, declaring the land as private property and
decreeing its registration on behalf of the
applicant.paper issued by that Government. Here is
what Judge Holmes says:
We come, then, to the question on which the
case was decided below — namely, whether
the plaintiff owns the land. The position of
government, shortly stated, is that Spain
assumed, asserted, and had title to all the
land in the Philippines except so far it saw fit
to permit private titles to be acquired; that
there was no prescripcion against the
Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of
June 25, 1880, required registration within a
limited time to make the title good; that the
plaintiff's land was not registered, and
therefore became, if it was not always, public
land; that the United States succeeded to the
title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no
rights that the Philippine Government is
bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the
government's contention is so far correct that
the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to
this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to
which the United States succeeded, it is not
to be assumed without argument that the
plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that
Spain, in its earlier decrees,"embodied the
universal feudal theory that all lands were
held from the Crown, and perhaps the
general attitude of conquering nations
toward people not recognized as entitled to
the treatment accorded to those in the same
zone of civilization with themselves. It is true,
also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as
Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does
not follow that, as against the inhabitants of
the Philippines, the United States asserts
 that Spain had such power. When theory is
left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a
new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the
head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to
decide. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol.
212, p. 596.)
Further on, the following is said in the aforementioned
judgment of the Federal Supreme Court:
It is true that, by section 14, the Government
of the Philippines is empowered to enact
rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles
to public lands were some, but not all,
spanish conditions has been fulfilled, and to
issue patents to natives for not more than 16
hectares of public lands actually occupied by
the native or his ancestors before August 13,
1898. But this section perhaps might be
satisfied if confined to cases where the
occupation was of land admitted to be public
land, and had not continued for such a
length of time and under such circumstances
as to give rise to the understanding that the
occupants were owners at that date. We
hesitate to suppose that it was intended to
declare every native who had not a paper
title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all
the wilder tribes afloat.
xxx xxx xxx
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the
law of Spain, we do not discover such clear
proof that it was bas by that law as to satisfy
us that he does not own the land. To begin
with, the older decrees and laws cited by the
counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to
indicate pretty clearly that the natives were
recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all
the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias,
cited for a contrary conclusion in
Valenton vs. Murciano (3 Phil., 537), while it
commands viceroys and others, when it
seems proper, to call for the exhibition of
grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It
is true that it begins by the characteristic
assertion of feudal overlordship and the
origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and
discourse. The fact was that titles were
admitted to exist that owed nothing to the
powers of Spain beyond this recognition in
their books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal
cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in (3 Phil.,
546): "Where such possessors shall not be
able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription." It
may be that this means possession from
before 1700; but, at all events, the principle
is admitted. As prescription, even against
Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of
Spain, we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in
the Philippines in regard to lands over which
Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5
attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we
do not overlook the argument that this
means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but
certainly it was not calculated to convey to
the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that
ancient family possessions were in danger, if
he had read every word of it. The words
"may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken
to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, as not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. The royal decree of February 13,
1894, declaring forfeited titles that were
capable of adjustment under the decree of
1880, for which adjustment had not been
sought, should not be construed as a
confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a
privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant
never was disturbed. This same decree is
quoted by the court of land registration for
another recognition of the common-law
prescription of thirty years as still running
against alienable Crown land.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Upon a consideration of the whole case
we are of opinion that law and justice require
that the applicant should be granted what he
seeks, and should not be deprived of what,
by the practice and belief of those among
whom he lived, was his property, through a
 refined interpretation of an almost forgotten
law of Spain. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports,
Vol. 212, pp. 597-599.)
It is evident from the jurisprudence set forth in the
aforementioned affair of Cariño against the Insular
Government that whatever the theory about the feudal
superdomination that the Crown of Spain assumed on
all lands in the Philippines, in practice and in reality it
was recognized that the mere lapse of time in the
possession (20 or 30 years, as the case may be)
could establish and in fact establish private property
rights by just prescription,and the presumptive title
thus acquired was for all purposes equivalent to an
express concession or a written title issued by the
Government. But anyway - paraphrasing what was
said by Judge Holmes - even supposing that Spain
had such feudal sovereignty or superdomination over
all the lands in this archipelago, and that against other
nations the United States, upon succeeding Spain,
would affirm said uprising, of it does not follow that
against the inhabitants of the Philippines the
American Government (now the Philippine Republic)
would take the position that Spain had such absolute
power. Historically it is known that the change of
sovereignty had the effect of liquidating many Spanish
institutions and laws that became obsolete, archaic in
the new state of affairs, and incompatible with the
spirit of the new regime. There was no reason why
this change should not also produce its salutary
effects on the legal rules of the land property
regime. To paraphrase Judge Holmes again, and
applying the doctrine to the present case, there is no
reason why, meditating "a refined interpretation of an
almost forgotten law of Spain," it is considered as
public land what evidently, under all concepts and
norms , it is private land.
The jurisprudence established in the affair of Cariño
against the Insular Government has come to establish
the norm, the basic authority in matters of registration
before our courts. In the wake of its genuinely liberal
sense and tendency, there has been an inflow of
private land under the Torrens system. In cases much
less meritorious than the one before us, our courts
have recognized the character or condition of private
ownership of the lands on which the requests were
based, not the enabling and supplementary clauses of
the public land laws being applied - first the Law No
926, then No. 2874, and finally No. 141 of the
Commonwealth - but the stricter provisions of Law
No. 496 on registration of private lands, under the
Torrens system.
But even under strictly interpreted Spanish legislation,
we believe that the land in question is as private as
the land in the affair of Cariño, if not more
so. According to the sentence of the inferior - the
united data for this examination, since it has already
been said repeatedly that we do not have the
evidence before us - "the land object of the present
request was originally from Captain Gina and that this
was in possession since the year 1880 , then became
Francisco Reformed until 1885, later that is in 1886
was Claro Lagdameo, the death of this happened to
him in the possession of his widow Fortunata Olega
de Lagdameo, this in 1929 he sold it to his three
children Antonio, Luis and Rafael appellant
Lagdameo, according to Exhibits F and G, and these
last ones in turn sold it in 1938 to the applicant Oh
Cho, according to Exhibits B 1 -and C-1. " "
As you can see, at least since 1880 there was a well-
known owner and owner of the land - Captain
Gina. Now, it coincides that on June 25 of that year
that precisely when the Decree was issued "for the
adjustment and adjudication of the real estate
occupied unduly by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands." Although it is true that the purpose
of the Decree or law was to order that the adjustment
and registration procedures described in it be
complied with and practiced, and in this sense, to
require that each one obtain a title document or,
failing that, lose your property. It is also true that the
Decree expressed certain qualifications that seemed
to denote that these formal procedures were not
strictly applicable to the entire world. One of these
caveats, for example, provided (Article 5) that, for all
legal purposes, "all those who have been in
possession for a period of time would be considered
as owners - for cultivated land, 20 20 years without
interruption, it is sufficient, and for uncultivated land,
30 years." And Article 6 provides that "the interested
parties not included in the two previous articles (the
articles that recognize the 20 and 30 years
prescription) may legalize their possession, and
consequently acquire full control over said lands,
through adjustment and adjudication procedures.
processed as follows. " This last provision seems to
indicate, by its terms, that it is not applicable to those
who have already been declared owners by virtue of
the mere passing of a certain period of time
(See Affection against Insular Government, supra ,
598).
It does not appear in the inferior's ruling that Captain
Gina has accepted the provisions of the
aforementioned Decree of June 25, 1880, obtaining a
title document to legalize his possession, but neither
does it positively state otherwise, because we do not
have before us the proofs . But even assuming that
the formal procedures prescribed in the Decree have
not been complied with, it does not follow that the
land was not already private then, since the
presumption is that there was no need for such
formality because Captain Gina or her legal claimants
they had already been declared owners of the
property by the mere passing of a lapse of time,
according to the qualifications mentioned above. This
presumption is all the more logical since Article 8 of
the Decree provided for the case of parties that did
not request within a year the adjustment and
adjudication of land from whose possession they were
unduly enjoying, and declared that the Treasury "will
resume the domain of the State on the land "and sell
at auction the part that is not reserved for itself; and
not only does it not appear in the record that the
possession of Capitata Gina or its successors in law
has never been considered illegal or that Estao and
its agents have adopted and practiced against them
the proceedings and procedures referred to in Article
8 of the said Convention. Decree, but, on the
contrary, it is stated in the ruling that from Capitan
Gina in 1880 there were successive transmissions of
rights first to Francisco Reformed in 1885 and later to
Claro Lagdameo in 1886, and to the death of the
latter to his widow Fortunata Olega de Lagdameo,
from whom the title passed under of sale to his
children Antonio, Luis and Rafael named Lagdameo,
and the last transaction on the site took place quite
recently, in 1938, when the last named were sold to
Oh Cho the applicant in the present record. From all
of which it follows that the site in question was always
considered private property - at least where the
memory reaches - from 1880 until the American
sovereignty died in the Philippines, and that neither
the State nor its agents ever interfered in the made of
his exclusive possession, Continues and publishes as
owner by different people not only under the Decree
of June 25, 1880 so often mentioned, but even under
the Decree of February 13, 1894 (possessory
information) that was practically the last decree
issued in the aftermath of the Spanish sovereignty in
relation to the adjustment and adjudication of real or
public lands. And do not say that it would have been
by inadvertence of the authorities, particularly the
Treasury, because it is a plot located in the same
town of Guinayangan, one of the oldest towns in the
province of Tayabas, it is undeniable that if it did not
gather the conditions and requirements to be
conceptualized as private property and the
possession of its successive occupants was undue
and illegal,See Affection against Insular
Government, ut supra598.) The fact that none of this
has happened is the best proof that in the time of
Spain the different and successive occupants of this
site already had a perfect Sunday title, and it is simply
absurd, ridiculous that now, after 66 years, declare
public land; and all because of what and for that - to
yield submission, repeating again the subtle irony of
Judge Homles, to the "refined interpretation of an
almost forgotten law of Spain." And it is more the
futility of this tardy tribute to an anachronism, to a
juridical mummy of a more and more remote past, if
one considers that when Magistrate Homes
pronounced his sentence clearly and progressively
liberated (January 23, 1909) we were only barely 10
years after the fall of the Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines while now that a radical deviation from the
groove drawn by the solid grid of said sentence we
are already almost half a century away, with full
republican dominion over the national territory. This
should not worry us if it were not because this
decision can now be interpreted as an abrogation of
so many precedents molded in the turquoise of the
Holmesian doctrine, and at the same time as the
demarcation of the starting point of a new route in our
jurisprudence on registration of land.
However, in the opinion of the majority it is said that
the applicant can not successfully claim that their lot
is private land because the possession of its first
predecessor (Capitana Gina) started only in 1880,
while in the case of Cariño against the Insular
government, is required as a requisite possession
from time immemorial, possession that, according to
the majority. "would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain, or that
it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest." It does not seem that one wants to indicate
a date, a year, as a norm to determine
the immemoriality of the possessory beginning. But
what date, what year would this be? 1870, '60,
'50? Would not it be enough v. gr. 1875, '65, or '55? In
the affair of Cariño the known and remembered date
of the initial possession could be fixed around the
middle of the last century, that is 1849, because
according to the evidence, Cariño and his
predecessors had owned the land for more than 50
years until the treaty of Paris - April 11, 1899. In the
present case, from Capitana Gina until the applicant
submitted his application for registration on January
17, 1940, 60 years had elapsed; so that in the time of
possession both cases are identical. With an
advantage in favor of the present case, namely: while
in the affair of Cariño the lands that were the object of
the application were pasture, in large part, and only
cultivated a few portions, in which the lot is urban, but
in one of the oldest towns in the Philippines, with a
house of strong materials nestled in the. It is
undeniable that the possession of an urban site is
more concrete, more strict and more adverse to the
whole world, without excluding the State.
But even limiting ourselves to possession under
Spanish sovereignty for the purposes of qualifying the
land as private property, it can still be said that the
present case is as good as, if not better than, that of
Cariño. In the affair of Cariño the known point of
departure is around 1849; in ours, 1880, when the
possession of Capitana Gina began, according to the
appealed sentence. But this does not mean that
before Capitana Gina the site was no longer an urban
estate, owned by someone else as private property. It
must be taken into account that it is a plot located in
the town of Guinayangan, one of the oldest in
Tayabas. We do not have before us the exact date of
the founding of said town, and we do not have time
now to do historical research. But fortunately we have
managed to save a substantial part of our private
library from the devastation caused by the recent war,
and one of the books saved is the celebrated
Geographical, Statistical and Historical Dictionary of
the Philippine Islands published in Madrid by Fr.
Manuel Buzeta and Fr Felipe Bravo in 1950,
according to the imprint, of two volumes. In the 2nd
volume, pp. 70 and 71, a description of the town of
Guinayanga is given, with a good copy of historical,
geographical, social and economic data. The
description begins this way: "Town with priest and
gobernadorcillo, in the Island of Luzon, province of
Tayabas, dioc, of Nueva caceres"; . . "It has about
1,500 houses, in general of simple construction,
distinguishing as the best factory the parish house
and the so-called court of justice, where is the
jail. "Considering that we can take judicial knowledge
that in time of Spain the municipality and the parish
were the culmination of a long and slow process of
civilization and Christianization, we can therefore
presume that long before 1850 - 50, 70 or 100 years -
the town of Guinayangan was already a geographical,
civil and spiritual unit, in every rule, and with definitive
characteristics of urban viability.It is also perfectly
possible to presume that its inhabitants possessed
their respective lots as owners, as well as what
happened In other duly organized municipalities, it
can not be presumed that the State allowed them to
occupy their plots unduly, without taking against them
the action referred to in Article 8 of the
aforementioned Decree of June 25, 1880; and we
have already seen that it does not appear in the
record that the land in question has ever been
confiscated by the agents of the Treasury or
Treasury, or declared illegal possession thereof, in
accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned
Decree. So from any angle you see this case, falls
perfectly under the rules of immemorial possession
established in the affair of love.
III. Demonstrated since the land in question is private,
the conclusion is conclusive that the applicant has the
right to have his title confirmed under the provisions of
the Land Registration Law No. 496, in accordance
with the Torrens system. It is firmly established
doctrine in this jurisdiction that a foreigner has the
perfect right to have private land registered under his
name, under the Torrens system, and that the
provisions of the law of public lands are inapplicable
to private lands ( see Agari against the Government of
the Philippine Islands, 42 Jur. Fil., 150, Tan
Yungquip against the Director of Land, 42 Jur. Fil.,
134, Central Capiz againstRamirez, 40 Jur. Fil.,
926). In the first case cited the applicant was a
Japanese called Ichisuke Agari and the request was
estimated to be a private land, acquired in Spain time
mediant composition with the state. In the second
case, the applicant was a Chinese and the application
was considered for the same reason, having proven a
known and remembered possession of 30 to 40 years
prior to the filing of the application, that is, a shorter
time than that of the applicant. present case. The
same happened in the third case cited, being Spanish
owners of the farm. Confirm, therefore, the sentence
appealed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
IN BANC
GR No. L-46935 April 18, 1941
GREGORIO REYES UY UN, recurrent,
vs.
MAMERTA PEREZ and ISIDORO
VILLAPLANA, appealed.
Mr. Claro M. Recto in representation of the appellant.
D. Potenciano A. Magtibay in representation of the
respondents.
IMPERIAL, J .:
The appellant requests in his application
for certiorari to review and revoke the decision issued
by the Court of Appeals, nullifying the sale made by
the Sheriff on September 21 , 1934 of the land subject
to the litigation, declaring valid the sale of the
improvements existing in the same and ordering that
these improvements are sold to satisfy the amount
that the appellant paid as auction price amounting to
P379.85, without costs.
The appellant initiated the matter in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas to recover the property and
possession of an agricultural land of 10 hectares of
surface, located in the municipality of Guinayangan,
Province of Tayabas, as well as the improvements
that exist in the same consisting of 333 first fruity
coconuts and 200 fruitless coconuts.
The relevant facts in the case are exposed by the
Court of Appeals in these terms:
Martin Villaplana was owner of a land, as
owner, from the time of the Spanish
Government, having declared it for mining
purposes in 1902, and having introduced in
the improvements consisting of coconut
trees, the oldest of which is now 60 year
old. On May 27, 1916, Martin Villaplana sold
the land to his son Vicente Villaplana,
married to the defendant Mamerta Perez. On
December 7, 1922 Vicente Villaplana
requested it as "Free Patent." Having
Vicente Villaplana contracted a debt of
P291.05 of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on
February 13, 1931, and having been sued
for the payment of said amount and
sentenced to pay it on May 5, 1933, the
corresponding execution order was issued,
which was completed on September 21,
1934, selling the property to the demarker
 (Exhibit A). On April 20, 1935, Vicente
Villaplana was granted a free title. On
December 13, 1934, the possession of the
land was handed over to Gregorio Reyes Uy
Un by virtue of an order of the Magistrate's
Court of Guinayangan, Tayabas, but in July
1935 the defendants, who are Vicente
Villaplana's wife and children, escaped take
possession of it, having been released from
it on September 10 of the same year under a
preliminary injunction issued in this case.
The Court of Appeals, after reviewing the evidence
presented in the first instance, declared that the land
was public and that it was part of the public lands of
the State that could be disposed of by free consent. In
his first error statement, the appellant maintains that
such conclusion is erroneous and inconsistent with
the facts established by the Court of Appeals
itself. He argues that having declared the Court of
Appeals that Martin Villaplana owned the land as
owner since 1902, declaring it in the millage as his
property and having cultivated it by sowing in the
coconut trees that are now over 60 years of age and
that its son Vicente Villaplana and his wife owned it in
the same concept, the land stopped being public land
and became private and, therefore,
According to subsection ( b ) of article 45 of Law No.
2874, in force on the dates on which the possesion of
the respondents and their cause occurred and the
issuance of the gratuitous title, which, by itself, or by
means of their quasantes, would have been in open,
conitnua, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
pretending in good faith to acquire the property,
except against the Government, from the twenty-six of
July one thousand eight hundred and ninety four, they
have right to the confirmation of their rights and the
issuance of a certificate of titutlo in accordance with
the Law of the Registry of Property, and have in their
favor the presumption juris et de jureof having fulfilled
all the necessary conditions for the granting of the
Government and will have the right to a certificate of
title under the provisions of said Law. In accordance
with said legal disposition, the petitioners and their
cause had an inchoative Sunday right on the ground,
which enabled them to to request and obtain the
confirmation of said right and to issue the certificate of
title in accordance with the Law of the Property
Registry; they had also in their favor the
presumption juris et de jurethat they had fulfilled all
the necessary conditions for the granting of the
title; but until the title was issued, they did not have
the legal concept of being the true owners of the land,
nor did they cease to belong to the public lands of the
State susceptible to alienation. That this was the legal
condition of the land until the Government issued the
free title, is confirmed by Article 54 of the same law
that provides that in the future you can not acquire
title, legal right or right for equity reason on land of the
public domain by prescription or by possession or
occupation as owner, or by agreement or by virtue of
any law in force before the American occupation,
except as expressly provided by the laws issued after
said occupation of the Philippine Islands by the
U.S. The fact that Vicente Villaplana requested the
free title of the land on December 7, 1922, is another
fact that shows that in his opinion he had not acquired
a perfect title and that it continued to be public land of
the State. We conclude, therefore, that the Court of
Appeals did not err in stating that the land was public
and subject to the provisions of Law No. 2874.
In the second error statement, it is intended that the
Court of Appeals should have declared that the land
subject of the litigation could not be granted by
gratuitous title and that this title, issued on April 20,
1935, is null and void and may affect the rights that
the appellant had acquired on the spot. Having
declared that the land continued to be public on the
date on which the free title was issued, it is obvious
that it was subject to the provisions of the Law of
Public Lands and, consequently, the free title that was
issued in favor of Vicente Villaplana is legal and valid.
To support his theory that the land had become
private property, that Vicente Villaplana and its cause
Martin Villaplana were the exclusive owners of the
same and that he happened in the title of the first one
when acquiring it in public auction, the appellant cites
what was resolved by this Court in the matters of
Affection vs. Insular Government of the Philippines
Islands, 212 US, 449, 53 Law. ed., 594, 597; 41 Phil.,
935, 940-941; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
vs. The Director of Lands , 27 Phil., 246,
248; and Susi vs. Razon and the Director of Lands,
48, Phil., 424, where it was declared that the
agricultural land that has been owned under the
conditions prescribed by the Law of Public Lands has
ceased to be public land to become oppressed land,
and that the one that has owned it has the juris et de
jure presumption of having obtained a government
concession and that has the right to register it in its
name in accordance with the Law of the Land
Registry. The above-mentioned cases are
distinguished, however, from the present in that in this
the one that owned the land and from which derives
its rights the recurente is the same that recognized
the condition of the land of being public of the
property of the State and not only recognized that it
continued to be public land but I request that it be
issued free title in accordance with the Law of Public
Lands.
In the last error statement the appellant maintains that
the Court of Appeals should have confirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance that declared
valid the sale in public auction of the land made by
the Sheriff in his favor. Since the land was public of
the State when the Sheriff sold in auction publishes to
the appellant the 21 of September of 1934 and
Vicente Villaplana was not even owner of the, it is On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for
obvious that the first one did not acquire the domain registration of the land above described pursuant to
of the land that did not have it yet the executed the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land
Vicente Villaplana and, consequently, the sale was had been inherited by them from their grandfather,
null and of no legal effect. The sale, in addition, can Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a
not be declared valid under the precept of Article 116 Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos
of Law No. 2874, as amended by Article 23 of Law Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the
No. 3517, which prohibits the encumbrance and provisions of the Land Registration Act be not
alienation, applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b)
If the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and
adjusted to the law, the request for certiorari is their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous
denied , with the costs to the appellant. This is how it and adverse possession of the land in concept of
is ordered. owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding
the application.
Avanceña, Pres., Diaz, Laurel, and
Horrilleno. MM., Are satisfied. Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the
Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The
latter's opposition recites:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila x x x that the parcel of land sought to be
registered by the applicants consisting of
107 hectares, more or less, was included in
EN BANC the area of the parcel of land applied for
registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967 Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
Court, which was decided by this same
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, Court through the then incumbent Judge, the
SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September
MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, registered by the applicants was declared
VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE public land in said decision; that they (the
GARCIA, applicants-appellants, oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and
vs. Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF the land in question because for a period
FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees. more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE have been in possession, and which
VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees. possession, according to them, was open
continuous, notorious and under the claim of
ownership; that the proceeding being in rem,
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants- the failure of the applicants to appear at the
appellants. case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania their imperfect and incomplete title over the
for private oppositors-appellees. property, barred them from raising the same
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director issue in another case; and that as far as the
of Forestry. decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No.
601 which was affirmed in the appellate
MAKALINTAL, J.: court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned,
there is already "res-adjudicata" — in other
words, the cause of action of the applicant is
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
now barred by prior judgment; and that this
Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants'
Court has no more jurisdiction over the
"application for registration of the parcel of land
subject matter, the decision of the Court in
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in
said case having transferred to the Director
the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan,
of Lands.
Province of Batangas, and designated in amended
plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr.
was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged
in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land
applied for had already been declared public land by
the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants,
granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January
27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of
land is declared or adjudged public land by the court
having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject
anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x
(that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose
of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by
homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal
neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue
posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949
judgment in the previous case, denying the
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring
the 107 hectares in question to be public land,
precludes a subsequent application by an alleged
possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis
of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public
Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision
reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. 1äwphï1.ñët
The right to file an application under the foregoing
provision has been extended by Republic Act No.
2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the
alternative: for registration of their title of ownership
under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their
"imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may
be that although they were not actual parties in that
previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their
claim as owners under the first alternative, since the
proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
predecessor had constructive notice by publication.
Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment
declared the land in question to be public land. In any
case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not
disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the
aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141
presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the
decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is
not that the land is already privately owned and hence
no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by
reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he
is conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private
oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality
to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering
that they also claim to be in possession of the land,
and have furthermore applied for its purchase from
the Bureau of Lands. 1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and
the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and
judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.