Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No.
L-2662, March 26, 1949 conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international
MORAN, C.J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was
charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He
questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the
National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of
accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory
to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law,
national and international.
II. THE ISSUES: Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the
validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international
law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva
Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian
who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in
1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague
and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules
and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule
and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for
our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
have been or shall be a signatory.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national
security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among
others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, among others, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said
Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the
Act, contending that:
 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be
observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an
exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted
principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the
raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.”
JOSE B.L. REYES VS RAMON BAGATSING
125 SCRA 553 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech – Primacy of
the Constitution over International Law
Facts: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the
Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until
the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart.
The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing.
The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that
indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He
also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies
within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out
that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from
such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere
to generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the
permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign
diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna
Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of
international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees
the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the
City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present
danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than
the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to
ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet
because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the
500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the
mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not
been raised an an issue in this case).
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), v EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
G.R. No. 138570
FACTS: The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their
defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed
to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed
RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary
Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998,
the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the
Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless
the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it
must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required
by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and
effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the senate.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of
the VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing
a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only
that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct
injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's
suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove
that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation
are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by
petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,
petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of
the VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not
possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to
which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP
lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board
resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National
President to commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush
aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25,
Art. XVIII of the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA
involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of
the Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of
the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting State.”
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements
in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3)
of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid
and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general
rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or
particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the
Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII
is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only
one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.
Sec 25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of
US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights
of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment,
materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which
specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent,
however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to determining the number of votes required
to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to
mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent
placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The
Constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and
“permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that
requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law;
the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument
that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign
military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in
the VFA. The proscription covers “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities.” Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry
of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established.
The clause does not refer to “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and independent
subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a
military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases,
(b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing
alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the
VFA effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the
case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were
at least 16 Senators that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a
treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the
US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the
words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador
Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty
obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the
VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and
unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said
treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to
be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which
the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide
in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our
jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and
incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta
sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no
less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PEDRO MANAYAO
78 Phil. 721 – Political Law – Citizenship – Defense of State –
Treason
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino
traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with
his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of
Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents
they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of
guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively
identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted with the
high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to death
and to pay the damages. Manayao’s counsel argued that his client
cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his
Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of allegiance to support the
Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine
courts for any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.
HELD: No. Manayao’s swearing of allegiance to Japan was not
proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese Naval,
Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of
Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court also emphasized
that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional
provision which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to render personal,
military or civil service…
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely
swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and joining the
opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even
if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also indicated that no such
person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held
guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.
The court also said that such act would shock the conscience of any
enlightened citizenry to say that Manayao, by the very fact of
committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of
which under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested
himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself
beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime
would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
People of the Philippines vs Tranquilino Lagman
66 Phil. 13 – Political Law – Defense of State
FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is
being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National
Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so
because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he
does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the
constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far
as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government,
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal military or civil service.”
GERONA, ET AL. vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION, ET AL.
FACTS:
1. When RA 1265 (An Act Making Flag Ceremony Compulsary In All
Educational Institutions) took effect, the Sec. of Education issued
Dept. Order No. 8 prescribing the rules and regulations for the proper
conduct of the flag ceremony.
2. The said order mandates that a proper salute must be given, or at
least standing still with arms and hands straight at sides along with the
singing of the National Anthem and recital of the pledge. However,
petitioners’ children attending the Buenavista Community School in
Uson, Masbate refused to do so.
3. This was because, as members of Jehova’s Witnesses, they believe
that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws
enacted by the State. This is based on a verse which states:
“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that
is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to
them, nor serve them.”
They consider that the flag is an “image” within this command and
thus refuse to salute it. Because of this, they were expelled from the
school.
4. The counsel of petitioners wrote to the Sec. of Education that the
children be allowed to just remain silent and stand still with their arms
and hands straight at their sides. This was, however, denied along with
the children’s reinstatement.
5. An action was then filed before the CFI with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction but the complaint was dismissed. Hence, the
present petition with the SC issuing a temporary writ subject to the
result of the case.
ISSUE: Should the department order be upheld?
RULING: Yes. The CFI decision was affirmed and the writ of
preliminary injunction was dissolved.
1. First, there was no question with the act of saluting since the
department order allows that students can just stand still with their
arms and hands straight at their sides. The issue was focused on the
singing of the national anthem and the recital of pledge.
2. The court eventually held that if the exercise of said religious belief
clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law,
then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The reasons are:
a. the flag is not an image nor the flag ceremony a religious rite; the
flag is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
national sovereignty, unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty.
b. the wordings of the patriotic pledge or the national anthem does not
have anything that is religiously objectionable as they speak only of
love of country, patriotism, liberty and the glory of suffering and dying
for it.
c. the State was merely carrying out its constitutional duty to supervise
and regulate educational institutions and see to it that all schools aim
to develop civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship. (Art.
XIV, section 5 of the Constitution).
d. considering the separation of the State and Church, the flag does not
have any religious significance.
e. also, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a
religious ceremony must rest with the court; it cannot be left to a
religious group or sect or to its follower as there would be confusion
and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and
meaning to be given as there are religious groups or sects or followers.
f. as emphatically stated, if a man lived on an island, alone and all by
himself, he would normally have complete and absolute rights as to the
way he lives, his religion, incuding the manners he practices his
religious beliefs with no laws to obey, no rules and regulations to
follow; but since man is gregarious by nature and instinct and he
gravitates toward community life, to receive and enjoy the benefits of
society, he becomes a member of a community or nation; thus, he has
to give up rights for the benefit of his fellow citizens and for the
general welfare, just as his fellow men and companions also agree to a
limitation of their rights in his favor.
g. also, exempting the children will disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes
the great majority; other pupils would naturally ask for the same
privilege because they might want to do something else such as play or
study; if this exemption is extended, then the flag ceremony would
soon be a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few
participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens
untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the
flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism
— a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of
the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an
exemption.
3. US jurisprudence made as basis:
a. Reynolds vs. US – the law prohibited polygamy which was allowed
for Mormons
“Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his
religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”
b. Hamilton vs. University of California – the university requires
military science and tactics training but the objectioners believe that
war and preparation for war is a violation of their religious belief
– it was held untenable. The Court stated that California did not call
them. They sought education in the university and the due process
clause secured by law will be violated if they are to be exempted from
the training.
In this case, having elected not to comply with the regulations about
the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
c. Minersville School District vs. Gobitis – same facts with present
case; the US Supreme Court upheld the conduct of flag ceremony but
after 3 years, it was reversed in West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Bernette. This was only because in the latter case, the
parents are to be prosecuted criminally if their children are not in
school. It turned out as a dilemma with the authority against individual
rights so the Court then approved the exemption. However, it is not the
ruling in the present case.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in the latter case stating:
“The constitutional protection of religious freedom … gave religious
equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to
religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma…”
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL
OF CEBU GR 95770,
FACTS: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether
school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and
private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the
Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting
the patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from
their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by
Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the
Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the
flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and
invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The
respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of
Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine
provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and
the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be
exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid
right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will
disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school
population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of
religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their
freedom of religion?
HELD: YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from
the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to
public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to
prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.
FORTUNATO PAMIL VS VICTORINO TELERON Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied
repeal.
86 SCRA 413 – Political Law – Inviolability of the Separation of
Dissenting Opinion
Church and State
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and
FACTS: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national
for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as
funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office
mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo
because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person
warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga.
holding a public appointive office or position, including active
He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised
members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or
Administrative Code:
position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This
…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office
implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an
ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised
public works of the municipality.
Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for public works
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino
of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices
Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election
under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not
Code of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary
Code of 1917 is no longer operative?
qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code,
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935
are eligible to run for public office.”
Constitution, “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.” If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy
is to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an
ecclesiastic may run for elective office. However, this issue proved to
have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the
majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section
2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by
Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and
set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty
position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one
who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to
enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets.
This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The
RELI GERMAN VS SANTIAGO BARANGAN J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship,
135 SCRA 514 – Political Law – Religious Freedom vs Clear and
alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable
Present Danger Doctrine
assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly
One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred
stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other
by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the
departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring
same is within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And considering that
respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula,
German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One
no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan
felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative of
deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are
judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight
there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang.
of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and
precedence and primacy.
pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom to worship and
J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both
locomotion.
petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to
HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not denied or
public peace and order or to the security of persons within the
restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but
premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has
only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same
adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public
into action. There has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that
disturbance or violence.
they allow German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the
manner that German et al impressed. Such manner impresses “clear
and present danger” to the executive of the state hence the need to
curtail it even at the expense of curtailing one’s freedom to worship.
Dissenting Opinions
J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure then from what
has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a
basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus
entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it
does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less
vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of
stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith
that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the
majority of mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is
devoid of meaning, bereft of significance.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
119673
PUNO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” –
i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs
allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner
INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against
contrary religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent
Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC
the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the
respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1)
the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV
program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not
act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the
ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion.
The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law
and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision,
petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV
program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA
sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s
TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to
AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the
respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo.”]
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV
program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD
No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and
classify] should not include religious programs like its program “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will
contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees
that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public
broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the
State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to
the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality
of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State
should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden
of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It
failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
series for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church.
An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called
“attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they
were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law
and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such
criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional
scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In
fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia
ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the
reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is
better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the
spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the
embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to
apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society
v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.”
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that
“. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.”
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed
by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for protected by the Constitution
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., review over the controversy.
Petitioners, 1. Power of Judicial Review
vs. 2. Actual Case or Controversy
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. 3. Facial Challenge
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and 4. Locus Standi
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of 5. Declaratory Relief
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of 6. One Subject/One Title Rule
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents. Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
Facts: unconstitutional for violating the:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible 1. Right to life
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was 2. Right to health
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. 3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the 5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: 6. Due process clause
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: 7. Equal protection clause
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. 8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products. PROCEDURAL:
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on controversy.
involuntary servitude. 1. Actual Case or Controversy
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. 2. Facial Challenge
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. 3. Locus Standi
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due 4. Declaratory Relief
process clause of the Constitution. 5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount
to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely
a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights
in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the
rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as
not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question
of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in
conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration
of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause
in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question
of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should
not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could
express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to
refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of
the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion.
By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect
it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term
“primarily”, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA
4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in
mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right
or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the
Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH
Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects
to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a
state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive
use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which
permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic
social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b)
the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and
the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the
RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
“in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as
it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures)
about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental
guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section
14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education.
Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves
its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of
the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is
superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH
program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by
the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health
service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly”
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and
non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as
their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro
bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
 Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple.
For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion
and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by
the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would
diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only
when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and
again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-
traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they
may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that
the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence,
their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.
 5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In
this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms,
the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.