Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an

exercise of their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government
for
redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute.[17] For the
protection of other
significant state interests such as the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on
investments, and to expansion and growth[18] enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
must also be
considered, otherwise, oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to
promote the
interests of labor would be sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers
joining
demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to make
the
necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the
business,
and ignore the novel principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers[19] aimed at fostering industrial peace.
There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or
that
they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990,
their
work stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Petitioners, nonetheless, assert that when they returned to work the day following
the welga
ng bayan on October 24, 1990, they were refused entry by the management, allegedly
as
punishment for their joining the welga. Hence, they claim that they were illegally
locked out
by respondents.
If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with
the
management or a complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter
observed,
[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their contention for
normally a lockedout
union will immediately bring management before the bar of justice.[20]
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with
legal
formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free
ingress to and
egress from the company premises, they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code
which
provides that [n]o person engaged in picketing shall obstruct the free ingress to
or egress from
the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
Even the NLRC, which ordered their reinstatement, took note of petitioners act of
physically blocking and preventing the entry of complainants customers, supplies
and even
other employees who were not on strike.[21]
In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its
legal
formalities but also by the means by which it is carried out.
Petitioners, being union officers, should thus bear the consequences of their acts
of knowingly
participating in an illegal strike, conformably with the third paragraph of Article
264 (a) of the
Labor Code which provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike
shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been
hired by the
employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[22] this Court,
passing on the use of the word may in the immediately quoted provision, held that
[t]he law . .
. grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in
an illegal
strike as having lost his employment. Reinstatement of a striker or retention of
his
employment, despite his participation in an illegal strike, is a management
prerogative which
this Court may not supplant.