EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be
informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973
constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its
enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled
that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-
for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or
“of general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden for the people, such as tax
and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
DE ROY v CA
G.R. No. 80718 (157 SCRA 757) January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to
the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents, which
was also affirmed by the CA on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,
the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners
filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
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reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court
in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was
denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
Rule on motion for filing an extension:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the RTCs, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule on motion for filing an extension and SC
decisions should be published in the Official Gazette.
RULING:
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions
in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition
to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and
law journals.
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F.
BRILLANTES, JR., respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
FACTS:
Atienza alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro,
who are both living together.
Upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw Brillantes sleeping
on his bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that
Brillantes had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not
bother to wake up Brillantes and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Atienza claims that Brillantes is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with
whom he has five children. Furthermore, he alleges that Brillantes
caused his arrest after he had a heated argument with De Castro.
For his part, Brillantes alleges that Atienza was not married to De
Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to
complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by
De Castro.

Brillantes denies that he caused Atienza's arrest and claims that he
was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave
Slander filed by De Castro against Atienza. According to him, it was
the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest Atienza.
Brillantes also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and
Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija
town mayor the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, Brillantes went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Brillantes claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the FC on judicial declaration of nullity
of previous marriage can be applied.
RULING:
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the FC, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that
as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
CARLOS V SANDOVAL
GR# 179922 12/16/2008
ISSUE:
Whether the Family Code applies to marriages celebrated prior to its
effectivity in 1988.
RULING:
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside
of the marriage.
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
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the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only
ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life.
They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should
decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds
allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of
the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the
surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as
to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.
PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
ADORACION CAROLINO (SPOUSE AND IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE
DECEASED JEREMIAS A. CAROLINO), Petitioner, v. GEN. GENEROSO
SENGA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AFP; BRIG. GEN. FERNANDO
ZABAT, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP FINANCE CENTER; COMMO.
REYNALDO BASILIO, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP-GHQ MANAGEMENT
AND FISCAL OFFICE; AND COMMO. EMILIO MARAYAG, PENSION
AND GRATUITY OFFICER, PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT
CENTER, AFP FINANCE CENTER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015
FACTS:
Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, retired from the AFP with
the rank of Colonel November 29, 1976. He started receiving his
monthly retirement pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in December
1976 until the same was withheld by respondents in March 2005.
Jeremias wrote a letter addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff asking for
the reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay. In a letter
reply, Myrna F. Villaruz, Pension and Gratuity Officer of the AFP
Finance Center, informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino citizenship
caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of the AFP
Pensioners' Payroll effective March 5, 2005 and that he could avail
of re-entitlement to his retirement benefits and the restoration of
his name in the AFP Pensioners' Masterlist Payroll by complying with
the requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual
Citizenship Act.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done
pursuant to Disposition Form dated October 29, 2004, which was
approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in January 2005.
In the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge Advocate General
opined that under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No.
340, retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving
pension benefits once incapable to render military service as a result
of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign country. It was also
mentioned that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of
the AFP could be done pursuant to the provisions of PD No. 1638
which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance with the
policy consideration that all retirement laws inconsistent with the
provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and modified accordingly.
Jeremias died on September 30, 2007 and was substituted by his
wife, herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot
be used against petitioner as her husband's retirement and pension
were granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not
superseded by PD 1638, a later statute.
RULING:
Petitioner's husband retired in 1976 under RA No. 340. He was
already receiving his monthly retirement benefit in the amount of
P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was terminated in March
2005. Section 5, RA No. 340 provides:
Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall be
subject to the rules and articles of war and to trial by court-martial
for any breach thereof. At any time said officers and enlisted men
may be called to active service by the President. Refusal on the part
of any officer or enlisted man to perform such services shall
terminate his right to further participation in the benefits of this Act
provided he resides in the Philippines and is physically fit for service.
Such fitness for service shall be determined by applicable
regulations.
The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a retiree's retirement
benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the retiree refuses to
perform active service when called to do so provided that (1) the
retiree resides in the Philippines and (2) is physically fit for service.
There is no other requirement found in the law which would be the
reason for the termination of a retiree's retirement benefits.
Petitioner's husband was never called to perform active service and
refused to do so, however, his retirement benefit was terminated.
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The reason for such termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship
based on Section 27 of PD No. 1638, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and
12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos
on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is
provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only
and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally
given that effect to some legal provisions; that all statutes are to be
construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used;
and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective
effect. These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive
application, nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact,
Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take
effect upon its approval. As held in Parreno v. COA, there is no
question that PD No. 1638, as amended, applies prospectively. Since
PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement
and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to
those who were in the service at the time of its approval.
Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is
amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all
rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the
retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and
12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-
enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No. 340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits
or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated
conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment,
age, and length of service. Undeniably, petitioner's husband had
complied with the conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as
he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis
until it was terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits
that is protected by the due process clause. It is only upon
retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-
existing law.
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right"
expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his
retirement benefits which must be respected and cannot be
affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which
provides that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement
benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations after the right has vested.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention to
reduce or to revoke whatever retirement benefits being enjoyed by
a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides for an
exception to what the decree repealed or modified, i.e., except
those necessary to preserve the rights granted to retired or
separated military personnel.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner, vs. CA (Spc. Fmr. Seventh
Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. Respondents.
G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006
FACTS:
NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of
Roberto G. Famanila as Messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered
and owned by its principal and co-respondent, Barbership
Management Limited.
While Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A.
and while Famanila was assisting in the loading operations, he
complained of a headache. Famanila experienced dizziness and he
subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that
he had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured
cerebral aneurysm. Petitioner underwent a brain operation and he
was confined. He, then, underwent a second brain operation.
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was
repatriated to the Philippines. He was examined at the American
Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician, Dr.
Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and
has been observed for 120 days, he is being declared permanently,
totally disabled."
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents
convinced him to settle his claim amicably by accepting the amount
of US$13,200. Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his
signature in the Receipt and Release. His wife, Gloria Famanila and
one Richard Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the
release.
Famanila filed a complaint with the NLRC praying for an award of
disability benefits, share in the insurance proceeds, moral damages
and attorney’s fees. Voltaire A. Balitaan Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Famanila appealed the decision with the NLRC.
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ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Receipt and Released signed by Famanila is
valid.
2. Whether or not Famanila has the right to claim for disability
benefits
RULING:
1. Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release
voluntarily or freely because he was permanently disabled and in
financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent
which makes the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and
unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable
agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. If consent is given
through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is
voidable. A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a proper
action in court.
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated
his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and
unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that
may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving
allegations, there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated
on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated
consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We
agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner’s consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement.
Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his health at the
time he signed the subject document, the same cannot still lead to
the conclusion that he did not voluntarily accept the agreement, for
his wife and another relative witnessed his signing.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was
attached by petitioner in his appeal does not show on its face any
violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present
any proof to show that the consideration for the same is not
reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence to support the
same, the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide against the
unreasonableness of the consideration.
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon
and are considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full
measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits
therefrom does not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain.
Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on the same
footing. However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as
against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties
and may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It
is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from
an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what
he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding undertaking, as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those
giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. We have
reviewed the terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and
Release and we find the same to be clear and unambiguous. The
signing was even witnessed by petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila
and one Richard T. Famanila.
2. This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all
liabilities of any character and/or claims or damages and/or losses
and/or any other liabilities whatsoever, whether contractual or
statutory, at common law or in equity, tortious or in admiralty,
now or henceforth in any way related to or occurring as a
consequence of the illness suffered by me as Messman of the
vessel "HANSA RIGA", including but not limited to all damages
and/or losses consisting of loss of support, loss of earning
capacity, loss of all benefits of whatsoever nature and extent
incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or all damages and/or
indemnities claimable in law, tort, contract, common law, equity
and/or admiralty by me or by any person or persons pursuant to
the laws of the United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or
the Republic of the Philippines and of all other countries
whatsoever.
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and
from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping
with good faith, usage and law. Further, dire necessity is not an
acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has
not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it.
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the
money claims against the respondents is the three year period
pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that:
Since petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is a
money claim arising from his employment, Article 291 of the Labor
Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared permanently
and totally disabled which gave rise to his entitlement to disability
benefits up to the time that he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997,
more than three years have elapsed thereby effectively barring his
claim.
OBLIGATORY EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS & NATIONALITY THEORY
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue
of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At
that time, their son was only 18 months old. Thereafter, Norma and
her son came home to the Philippines.
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According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of 250 Guildene.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, Ernst came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Ernst and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the respondent has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law
2. Whether or not the respondent can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING:
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
1. Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides
the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient
and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor
son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by
reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for
any financial support.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely
on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By
analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland
or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of
his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged
to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that
he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree).
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to
support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by
law, said law would still not find applicability.
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent
may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for
unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered anact of violence against
women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:
"penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
6|Page
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
NATIONALITY THEORY
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal
of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations
between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.
After about 3 ½ months of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for
the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction.
On June 27, 1986, or more than 5 months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia
as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983".
ISSUE:
1. WON the divorce decree promulgated by foreign law of the
respondent is valid in the Philippines
2. WON the criminal case of adultery was validly raised by the
respondent
RULING:
1. YES. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point
of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in
it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint
which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without which the
court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery
and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as
parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only
the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate
the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule
in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of
criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution
for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to
refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
7|Page
his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential
jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of
a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that
jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that
after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has
the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in
this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons.
2. NO. Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought
this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When
said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew
that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there
be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our
law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
NATIONALITY THEORY
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued
by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the
Australian government. Petitioner, a Filipina, and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While
the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
ISSUES:
1. WON the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven
2. WON the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner
RULING:
1. Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon
proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law
of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis).
In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-
off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
8|Page
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and
proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears
to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May
18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40]
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of
the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take
judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
2. Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense,
divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
9|Page
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence,
we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity
to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the
trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo
may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
NATIONALITY THEORY
[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN,* respondents.
FACTS:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in
the Philippines on 18 May 1941. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce
proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of
their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. 3 weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a
divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino
Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal,
which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan
children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving
brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
ISSUE:
WON Fe and Arturo were still married under the Philippine
jurisdiction at the time the divorce decree was issued
RULING:
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider
the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of
petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely
address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant
private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve
her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
"Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." It maintained
that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the
finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their
marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from Arturo.
10 | P a g e
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's
citizenship; it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner.
In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew
to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with
the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy
thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an
American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954.[19]
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file
a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship
at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate
court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the
trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit
from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
NATIONALITY THEORY
G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division,
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig
twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated
at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church
in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that
they decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of a mutual
friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special
Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of
San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the RTC of
Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic
ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 133,
ordered the complete separation of properties between Tristan and
Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the
State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and
wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree
issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the
marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under
Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan about this, the latter
assured her that he would legalize their union after he obtains an
annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the
petitioner that he would adopt their son so that he would be
entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each of his children
with Lily.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
claiming that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
because she knows certain information which might aid the trial
court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case,
which the trial court granted on September 30, 2002.
ISSUE:
WON the divorce decree issued from the Dominican Repubic is valid
in the Philippines.
RULING:
Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never
the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest has no
basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was
still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily
obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be,
he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or
her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and
legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she
was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an
absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in
getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize
such absolute divorce.20
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code21 which took effect on
August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No.
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never
acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.
Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of
the indispensable requirement of legal interest, the issuance by the
trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the
complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of
11 | P a g e
discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside
and declared as null and void the said order.
NATIONALITY THEORY
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo
T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born 6 children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
5 years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister
of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration.
RULING:
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized
the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where
the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In
the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party
in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated
that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to
file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
NATIONALITY THEORY
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA, Respondents.
FACTS:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first
wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted
by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY.
LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot 7 children. After almost 2
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to
live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of
the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another
marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
12 | P a g e
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband
and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named:
Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA
was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased
from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project (condominium unit). Said
condominium unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON. After
full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit
was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on
August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty.
Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty.
Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on
February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium
unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still
registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would
be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed
another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion
of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm
lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found
therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty.
Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
ISSUE:
WON the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable;
RULING:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of
his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos,
was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in
force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code,
which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine
laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12,
1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September
10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses
are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first
marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the
nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect
for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must
be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground
expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void
for lack of court approval
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not
specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time
of the marriage.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did
not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution
of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
13 | P a g e
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall
be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the
approval took place only as an incident of the action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications
for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce. With the divorce not being itself
valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void;
properties acquired during their marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to
Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the
death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner
being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code.
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the
burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership,
therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent
evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
NATIONALITY THEORY
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS,
Respondent.
FACTS:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were
married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
children, namely: Jerome T. Noveras, who was born on 4 November
1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged
in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San
Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the several properties in the
Philippines and in the USA.
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The
parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the
property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the
couple paid a total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the
Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in
September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with
Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David
agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence
of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating
that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall
return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of
the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and
3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in
the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines. David
was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of
San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June
2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The
California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as
well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity which can result into the
forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and
their 2 children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in
California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.
RULING:
1. In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are
US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties
in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the
Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal
properties.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.
14 | P a g e
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well
as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the
lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties,
the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must
be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this
rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135
and 136 of the Family Code.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after
the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back
to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between
them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of
a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such
turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the said
petition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to
stay in the Philippines.
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and
David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment
had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been
living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio,
who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of
David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for
at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
2. The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as
stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not
acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and
Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to
the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their
children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court
explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds
of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed
to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing
where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have
come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
NATIONALITY THEORY
G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014
ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI,
Respondent.
FACTS:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki
(Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa
(SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 covered
by CCT No. 18186 and Parking Slot No. 42 covered by CCT No. 9118
were for sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that
the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief
negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to P2,800,000.00.
On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a BPI Check No. 833496 for
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee. On
August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No.
83350, this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 20039 covering Unit No. 536
15 | P a g e
and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation
of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver
the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession
of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping.
Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the
documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country,
prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the
Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title
to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations although it
remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding,
Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez,
certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No.
53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186 representing the
title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except
for anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided
that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be
subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA).
Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999 representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a
P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on
June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties
remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim12 dated September 8, 2003, with the Registry of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT
No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion,
(through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited
the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.
ISSUE:
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and
void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property
should be made with the consent of both spouses;
RULING:
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal
consent. We cannot uphold this position, however, because the
issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a
well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing
court. To consider these belated arguments would violate basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion
belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the
correctness of the denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and
so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property
are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can
alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person
to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost.
This general principle includes all rules governing the descent,
alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity,
effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a
deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may
be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if
the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even
though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However,
the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice
of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of
the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of
a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining
to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South
Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely
attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"
to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for
16 | P a g e
there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of
his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun
Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other
words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the
owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone,
and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not
negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In
those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either
conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to
declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the
supposed lack of spousal consent.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
[G.R. NO. 157314 July 29, 2005]
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioners, v. THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR.,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Pacilan opened a current account with FEBTC Bacolod Branch on
May 23, 1980. His account was denominated as Current Account No.
53208 (0052-00407-4). Pacilan had since then issued several
postdated checks to different payees drawn against the said
account. Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued Check No.
2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and the same was presented for
payment to petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886 was
dishonored by petitioner bank. The next day, or on April 5, 1988, the
respondent deposited to his current account the amount of P800.00.
The said amount was accepted by petitioner bank; hence, increasing
the balance of the respondent's deposit to P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank
about the dishonor of Check No. 2434866, he discovered that his
current account was closed on the ground that it was "improperly
handled." The records of petitioner bank disclosed that between the
period of March 30, 1988 and April 5, 1988, the respondent issued
four checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 forP6,000.00; Check No.
2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880 for P680.00 and; Check No.
2434886 for P680.00, or a total amount of P7,410.00. At the time,
however, the respondent's current account with petitioner bank
only had a deposit of P6,981.43. Thus, the total amount of the
checks presented for payment on April 4, 1988 exceeded the
balance of the respondent's deposit in his account. For this reason,
petitioner bank, through its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed
the respondent's current account effective the evening of April 4,
1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of
the overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the closure of respondents bank account was done
in bad faith
RULING:
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo and the
appellate court show that the award of damages in the respondent's
favor was anchored mainly on Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence
of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith
is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good
faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts
of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad
faith or with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind
which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes
of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks
not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the account of
the respondent based on the following provisions of its Rules and
Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of Regular
Demand Deposits.
However, it is clearly understood that the depositor is not entitled,
as a matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the bank
reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor
which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any other reason.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do
not establish that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank
committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third
elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case.
The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of
bad faith or malice on its part in closing the respondent's account on
April 4, 1988 because on the said date the same was already
overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4,
1988, amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current
account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an overdraft
of P428.57 which resulted in the dishonor of his Check No. 2434886.
Further, petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current account of
the respondent was overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of
checks against insufficient funds.13 In 1987, the said account was
overdrawn 117 times for the same
reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also several instances
when the respondent issued checks deliberately using a signature
different from his specimen signature on file with petitioner bank.
All these circumstances taken together justified the petitioner bank's
closure of the respondent's account on April 4, 1988 for "improper
handling."
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is
petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or any depositor
for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing
checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be
imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out
17 | P a g e
that the respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly
handling his account not just a few times but hundreds of times.
Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted for
exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and
regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors. Upon
the opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound
by these terms and conditions.
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by
the respondent the day following the closure of his account
constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The
same could be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel.
Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad faith.
The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of proving
bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or that it was motivated by
ill-will or spite in closing his account on April 4, 1988 and in
inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by
petitioner bank with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring
the respondent. It is conceded that the respondent may have
suffered damages as a result of the closure of his current account.
However, there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. The Court had the occasion to explain the distinction
between damages and injury in this wise:
'Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that the individual was injured
in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a
consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded
checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It was the
respondent's repeated improper and irregular handling of his
account which constrained petitioner bank to close the same in
accordance with the rules and regulations governing its depositors'
current accounts. The respondent's case is clearly one of damnum
absque injuria.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
[G.R. NO. 146322 : December 6, 2006]
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS,
INC., Petitioners, v.ERNESTO QUIAMCO, Respondent.
FACTS:
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan
Davalan, Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle
the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco
against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the
three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the
motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent's
business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was
visible and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on
installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons,
Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle
was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan
assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In September
1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments
and told petitioner corporation's collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the
motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent's men."
Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,
went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The
leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk
in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the
clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside
the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises,
the policemen left to look for respondent in his residence while
petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take
photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the
policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner
Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's objection, took the
motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City. Respondent moved for dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor
bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed
the complaint and denied petitioner Uypitching's subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner abused his right of recovery as mortgagee
RULING:
Petitioners' suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for
damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against
respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking
the motorcycle from respondent's establishment in an abusive
manner.
18 | P a g e
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice
and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to
respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were
deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. This
alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to
respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners' concern, we also find that the
trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of the
complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners
themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act."
Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this
connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the
RTC, as adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the
City Prosecutor's Office because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching
knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no
probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft
and fencing activity against respondent. Atty. Uypitching had no
personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in
question. He was merely told by his bill collector (i.e. the bill
collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.), Wilfredo Veraño, that Juan
Dabalan will no longer pay the remaining installments for the
motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of
respondent. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Veraño
in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan
Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was 'taken', not
'unlawfully taken' or 'stolen.' Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the complaint-affidavit
wherein he named respondent as 'the suspect' of the stolen
motorcycle but also charged respondent of 'qualified theft and
fencing activity' before the City Prosecutor's Office of Dumaguete.
The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of
malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the
owner of the motorcycle, did not accuse respondent or the latter's
men of stealing the motorcycle, much less bothered to file a case for
qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitching's act in
charging respondent with qualified theft and fencing activity is
tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of
Cupid Gonzaga during one of their conversations - "why should you
still file a complaint? You have already recovered the motorcycle' ":
"Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the
thief of motorcycle.")
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner
corporation's exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly
mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged
property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right
thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the
recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is
unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such
possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action
necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead,
petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's establishment
with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle
without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the
illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner
Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the
enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners'
acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the
proper norms of human relations.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes
that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.19 It seeks to
preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as
a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or
injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive
or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at
petitioners' instance was not only attended by bad faith but also
contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners' exercise of
the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial
and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act
of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered
to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners'
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively
harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law,
petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
should indemnify him.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
[G.R. NO. 160273 - January 18, 2008]
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D.
ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI,
RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, Petitioners, v. RICARDO
F. ELIZAGAQUE, Respondent.
FACTS:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation
operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club,
having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company
proprietary member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F.
Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for the
Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. The
designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI's Board of
Directors.
19 | P a g e
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary
membership. The application was indorsed by CCCI's two (2)
proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range,
Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a
share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the
share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate
No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the
CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent's application for
proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting
held on July 30, 1997, respondent's application was voted upon.
Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter
from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI's corporate secretary, informing him that
the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent,
wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer,
respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of
reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997,
respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member
of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disapproval of respondent’s application for
proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to
respondent for damages
RULING:
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting
known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member
will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity
to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means
disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a
unanimous vote of the directors is required. When respondent's
application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the
Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1)
black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was
disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of
Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application
for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised
arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on
Human Relations provide restrictions.
In rejecting respondent's application for proprietary membership,
we find that petitioners violated the rules governing human
relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of social
order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving
respondent's applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom
or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant
to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI's
Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of the directors
present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was
printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was
silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of an
applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the
application form due to economic reasons. We find this excuse
flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being
extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost
twenty (20) years before respondent filed his application. We cannot
fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like
the CCCI, whose members are all affluent, did not have enough
money to cause the printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not even
informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was
required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry
whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners
apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this
kind of treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel
Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should
have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the
very least, they should have informed him why his application was
disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in
accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.6 It bears reiterating that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners' disapproval of respondent's
application is characterized by bad faith.
As to petitioners' reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria
or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is
misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does
not apply when there is an abuse of a person's right, as in this case.
As to the appellate court's award to respondent of moral damages,
we find the same in order. Under Article 22 of the New Civil Code,
moral damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and actions
referred to in Article 21. We believe respondent's testimony that he
suffered mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings as
a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However, the
amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-
fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount
of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose
a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the
expense of the defendant.8 Taking into consideration the attending
circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent
ofP50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is
reasonable.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
[G.R. NO. 165443 : April 16, 2009]
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. Petitioner, v. SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR.,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan,
indicating in his application for membership his mailing address at
"Phimco Industries, Inc. - P.O. Box 240, MCC," complete residential
20 | P a g e
address, office and residence telephone numbers, as well as the
company (Phimco) with which he was connected, Calatagan issued
to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 after paying
P120,000.00 for the share.
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet expenses
for general operations, as well as costs for upkeep and improvement
of the grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly dues is
incorporated in Calatagan's Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It
is also reproduced at the back of each certificate of stock. As
reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock No. A-01295.
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at
P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21 March 1991
and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased paying
the dues. At that point, his balance amounted toP400.00.
10 months later, Calatagan made the initial step to collect
Clemente's back accounts by sending a demand letter dated 21
September 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22
October 1992. Both letters were sent to Clemente's mailing address
as indicated in his membership application but were sent back to
sender with the postal note that the address had been closed.
Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay his
monthly dues for more than sixty (60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as
of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included Clemente's name in the
list of delinquent members posted on the club's bulletin board. On 1
December 1992, Calatagan's board of directors adopted a resolution
authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquent members,
including Clemente's; and the public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to
Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate Secretary, Atty.
Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless
Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share would be included
among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction on 15
January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to Clemente's mailing
address that had already been closed.
On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted on the Club's
bulletin board, as well as on the club's premises. The auction sale
took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clemente's share
sold for P64,000. According to the Certificate of Sale issued by
Calatagan after the sale, Clemente's share was purchased by a
Nestor A. Virata. At the time of the sale, Clemente's accrued
monthly dues amounted to P5,200.00. A notice of foreclosure of
Clemente's share was published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the
Business World.
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of 1997.
He filed a claim with the SEC seeking the restoration of his
shareholding in Calatagan with damages.
SEC – Citing Section 69 of the Corporation Code which provides that
the sale of shares at an auction sale can only be questioned within
six (6) months from the date of sale, the SEC concluded that
Clemente's claim, filed four (4) years after the sale, had already
prescribed. The SEC further held that Calatagan had complied with
all the requirements for a valid sale of the subject share, Clemente
having failed to inform Calatagan that the address he had earlier
supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC ruled, had
acted in bad faith in assuming as he claimed that his non-payment of
monthly dues would merely render his share "inactive."
CA – reversed SEC’s decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calatagan has the right to sell the shares of
Clemente
RULING:
There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence or even
analogy between the sale of delinquent stock under Section 68 and
the sale that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of
delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for
the share of stock itself. The stockholder or subscriber has yet to
fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed. In this case,
Clemente had already fully paid for the share in Calatagan and no
longer had any outstanding obligation to deprive him of full title to
his share. Perhaps the analogy could have been made if Clemente
had not yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock corporation,
pursuant to an article or by-law provision designed to address that
situation, decided to sell such share as a consequence. But that is
not the case here, and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69
to the case at bar.
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clemente's suit is barred by
Article 1146 of the Civil Code which establishes four (4) years as the
prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to the rights of the
plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit is purely for damages. As a
second alternative still, Calatagan posits that Clemente's action is
governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which sets five (5) years
as the period of prescription for all other actions whose prescriptive
periods are not fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither
article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code which provides
that an action to recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years.
Calatagan's action is for the recovery of a share of stock, plus
damages.
Calatagan's advertence to the fact that the constitution of a lien on
the member's share by virtue of the explicit provisions in its Articles
of Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately of no help to
its cause. Calatagan's Articles of Incorporation states that the "dues,
together with all other obligations of members to the club, shall
constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to any lien in favor
of the national or local government, and in the event of delinquency
such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the
manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other
obligations of the stockholders."14 In turn, there are several
provisions in the By-laws that govern the payment of dues, the lapse
into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and execution
on the lien.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a clear and
comprehensive procedure to govern the payment of monthly dues,
the declaration of a member as delinquent, and the constitution of a
lien on the shares and its eventual public sale to answer for the
member's debts. Under Section 91 of the Corporation Code,
membership in a non-stock corporation "shall be terminated in the
manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation
or the by-laws." The By-law provisions are elaborate in explaining
the manner and the causes for the termination of membership in
21 | P a g e
Calatagan, through the execution on the lien of the share. The Court
is satisfied that the By-Laws, as written, affords due protection to
the member by assuring that the member should be notified by the
Secretary of the looming execution sale that would terminate
membership in the club. In addition, the By-Laws guarantees that
after the execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be returned
to the former member after deducting the outstanding obligations.
If followed to the letter, the termination of membership under this
procedure outlined in the By-Laws would accord with substantial
justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law provisions when
it sold Clemente's share? The appellate court's finding on this point
warrants our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third and final
demand letter to Clemente on December 7, 1992. The letter states
that if the amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will be
included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction.
This letter was signed by Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golf's
Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to Clemente's mailing address
- Phimco Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati. As expected, it
was returned because the post office box had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to "give or
cause to be given, all notices required by law or by these By-Laws. ..
and - keep a record of the addresses of all stockholders. As quoted
above, Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides that "within ten
(10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a
member's share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 (b)
hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and shall advise
the Membership Committee of such fact.," The records do not
disclose what report the Corporate Secretary transmitted to the
Membership Committee to comply with Section 32(a). Obviously,
the reason for this mandatory requirement is to give the
Membership Committee the opportunity to find out, before the
share is sold, if proper notice has been made to the shareholder
member.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is
knowledgeable on the law and on the standards of good faith and
fairness that the law requires. As custodian of corporate records, he
should also have known that the first two letters sent to Clemente
were returned because the P.O. Box had been closed. Thus, we are
surprised - given his knowledge of the law and of corporate records -
that he would send the third and final letter - Clemente's last chance
before his share is sold and his membership lost - to the same P.O.
Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it "exercised due diligence before the
foreclosure sale" and "sent several notices to Clemente's specified
mailing address." We do not agree; we cannot label as due diligence
Calatagan's act of sending the December 7, 1992 letter to
Clemente's mailing address knowing fully well that the P.O. Box had
been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon the
Corporate Secretary - the chief repository of all corporate records -
the obligation to check Clemente's other address which, under the
By-Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on file. One obvious
purpose of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the
addresses of members on file is specifically for matters of this kind,
when the member cannot be reached through his or her mailing
address. Significantly, the Corporate Secretary does not have to do
the actual verification of other addressees on record; a mere clerk
can do the very simple task of checking the files as in fact clerks
actually undertake these tasks. In fact, one telephone call to
Clemente's phone numbers on file would have alerted him of his
impending loss.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to
duly observe both the spirit and letter of its own by-laws. The by-law
provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the
delinquent member of the impending sale, and not just to provide
an intricate façade that would facilitate Calatagan's sale of the
share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagan's part is palpable. As
found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that
Clemente's postal box to which it sent its previous letters had
already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to
the same postal box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it
had known very well that the letter would never actually reach
Clemente.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had
provided his residential address along with his residence and office
telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagan's By-Laws
requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely
through the member's mailing address. Clemente cites our
aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals15 that "[a] simple telephone call
and an ounce of good faith x x x could have prevented this present
controversy." That memorable observation is quite apt in this case.
Calatagan's bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had
resulted not merely in the loss of Clemente's privilege to play golf at
its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant
pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could be
thrown Clemente's way was his failure to notify Calatagan of the
closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would
cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve
answerability for failing to notify the club of the closure of the postal
box? Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of
his home address as well as residence and office telephone
numbers, he had every reason to assume that the club would not be
at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition, according to
Clemente, he was not even aware of the closure of the postal box,
the maintenance of which was not his responsibility but his
employer Phimco's.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, under the Chapter on
Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did
apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to
act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A non-stock
corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its
treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat
every person honestly and in good faith extends even to its
shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves
contractually bound to perform certain obligations to the
corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of
dehumanization.
22 | P a g e
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA.
THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND
GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S.
Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153)
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in
consideration of P70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement
carries a stipulation:
“4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for
the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective
June 1, 1994.” (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the
mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home
Mortgage (Records, Exh. “A”, pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the
name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N.,
October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice,
the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the
office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a
certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for
three (3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998,
January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due
date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31,
2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N.,
February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N.,
October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma.
Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the
cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
[respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March
15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her
husband] filed [a] complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD
and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only
restored and reconnected when the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999.
ISSUES:
WON petitioner has the right to cut the water connection of the
respondent

RULING:
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account
with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach. In the present case,
intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she
requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water
supply without warning or informing the latter of such request.
Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on
the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent
spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she
should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately
after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her
request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation
under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What
made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect
the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner,
COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil
Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that “every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same.” It speaks of the general sanctions
of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its
own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not
23 | P a g e
provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
G.R. No. 160689 March 26, 2014
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY ANITA COROMINA,
ELIZABETH COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE COROMINA), VICENTE E.
GARCIA (SUBSTITUTED BY EDGAR JOHN GARCIA), FELIPE
CONSTANTINO, RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO ABELLANA,
DEMETRIO BALICHA, ANGELITA LHUILLIER, JOSE E. GARCIA, AND
VISA YAN ELECTRIC COMPANY (VECO), Respondents.
FACTS:
On May 11, 1989, about 4:00pm, the Violation of Contracts (VOC)
Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC
escort, Balicha, conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La
Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals,
conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter installations.
After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked
the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had
been turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia,
Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said
meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño was in his office and no one called to inform him
of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received
Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the
kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in the household
and determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed
the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the
electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it,
with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also
signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing
routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team did on May 11,
1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding
premises was effected without his permission and over the
objections of his maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their
way into his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it
upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it
with a new electric meter. They searched the house and its rooms
without his permission or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to
sign two documents, making her appear to be his representative or
agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal effects were
missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the
house.
ISSUE:
WON there was abuse of rights on the part of VOC for entering the
main premises
RULING:
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two
distinct portions of Sesbreño’s residence were inspected by the VOS
team – the garage where the electric meter was installed, and the
main premises where the four bedrooms, living rooms, dining room
and kitchen were located.

Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed,
the respondents assert that the VOC team had the continuing
authority from Sesbreño as the consumer to enter his premises at all
reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without
being liable for trespass to dwelling. The authority emanated from
paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into between
VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized employees or
representatives of the COMPANY to enter his premises at all
reasonable hours without being liable to trespass to dwelling for the
purpose of inspecting, installing, reading, removing, testing,
replacing or otherwise disposing of its property, and/or removing the
COMPANY’S property in the event of the termination of the contract
for any cause.
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give
Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha the blanket authority to enter at will
because the only property VECO owned in his premises was the
meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter only the garage.
He denies that they had the right to enter the main portion of the
house and inspect the various rooms and the appliances therein
because those were not the properties of VECO. He posits that
Balicha, who was not an employee of VECO, had no authority
whatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search. He concludes
that their search was unreasonable, and entitled him to damages in
light of their admission that they had entered and inspected his
premises without a search warrant.
We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion. Paragraph 9 clothed the
entire VOC team with unquestioned authority to enter the garage to
inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously met the
conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly,
their entry had the objective of conducting the routine inspection
of the meter. Secondly, the entry and inspection were confined to
the garage where the meter was installed. Thirdly, the entry was
effected at around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonable hour. And, fourthly,
the persons who inspected the meter were duly authorized for the
purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO, his
participation was to render police assistance to ensure the personal
security of Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection, rendering
him a necessary part of the team as an authorized representative.
Under the circumstances, he was authorized to enter considering
that paragraph 9 expressly extended such authority to "properly
authorized employees or representatives" of VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the
entry into the main premises of the residence. Did this necessarily
mean that any entry by the VOS team into the main premises
required a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreño’s insistence has no legal and factual basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is
intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents
tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure
freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power.
24 | P a g e
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main
premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreño turned upside
down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable
them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his
household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their
inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the
authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability to
determine the unbilled electricity called for them to see for
themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being agents of the
State, they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.
Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not make the
inspection a search by an agent of the State within the ambit of the
guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part of the team by
virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the
team during its routine inspection. Consequently, the entry into the
main premises of the house by the VOC team did not constitute a
violation of the guaranty.
Our holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively
demonstrated the intervention of malice or bad faith on the part of
Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main premises,
or any excessiveness committed by them in the course of the
inspection. But Sesbreño did not. On the other hand, the CA
correctly observed that the inspection did not zero in on Sesbreño’s
residence because the other houses within the area were similarly
subjected to the routine inspection. This, we think, eliminated any
notion of malice or bad faith.
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the
respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the
concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use
his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to
another who suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to
present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and the stability of social order.
Moreover, according to a commentator, "the exercise of right ends
when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others; it cannot be said that a person
exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another." Article
19 of the Civil Code sets the standards to be observed in the exercise
of one’s rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to
act with justice; (b) to give everyone his due; and (c) to observe
honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights – that in the exercise of the rights, the
standards under Article 19 must be observed.
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should
there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is performed without
prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach under the
concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present,
to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised
in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to
ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be
invoked. The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances
of each case.
The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for consideration in this
appeal. The RTC and the CA unanimously found the testimonies of
Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on
material points; and even declared that the non-presentation of
Garcia as a witness was odd if not suspect. Considering that such
findings related to the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it
is not a trier of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again. Verily, a review that may tend to supplant
the findings of the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses themselves should be
undertaken by the Court with prudent hesitation. Only when
Sesbreño could make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation
of the evidence and records by the trial and the appellate courts
should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts. Alas, that showing was not made here.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTURO B.
ASTORGA, Respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B.
Astorga entered into a “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” on
December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with right of repurchase)
to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga,
Baybay, Leyte covered by TCT No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under the
said deed, respondent represented that he has “the perfect right to
dispose as owner in fee simple” the subject property and that the
said property is “free from all liens and encumbrances.” The deed
also provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years
within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased
within the said period, “the parties shall renew the
instrument/agreement.”
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the
period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the contract was
made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated
May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property.
Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the property until
December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank of
Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was
mortgaged by respondent to RBAI, that the bank had subsequently
foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should therefore
vacate the property.
Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by
RBAI.
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
against respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the act of Atty. Astorga constitutes an abuse of rights
RULING:
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent
and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of
equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly
show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers,
for which respondent should be held administratively liable.
25 | P a g e
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an
oath where he undertook to “obey the laws,” “do no falsehood,”
and “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion.” He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board
of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent caused the ambiguity
or vagueness in the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” as he
was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument.
Respondent could have simply denominated the instrument as a
deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as
“mortgagor” and “mortgagee,” respectively, rather than as “vendor
a retro” and “vendee a retro.” If only respondent had been more
circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed,
then the controversy between him and complainant could have
been avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and
misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of legal
competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to
“conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.”
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the
fundamental tenet of human relations as embodied in Article 19 of
the Civil Code.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it
to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his
agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that
clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who
drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and
clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise,
the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will
be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the
said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor
formulation of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” was a
significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and
complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act, the law in effect at
the time the PNB acquired the subject property and obtained TCT
No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a
purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure
proceedings becomes final, such purchaser becomes entitled to the
issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a memorandum
thereof shall be “indorsed upon the mortgagor’s original certificate.”
TCT No. T-662, which respondent gave complainant when they
entered into the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated
December 2, 1981, does not bear such memorandum but only a
memorandum on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and
the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and
deceit when he entered into the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it
appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his
name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said
certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had already
been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement
in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No.
T-7235 on January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the execution of
the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross
dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
To be “dishonest” means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On
the other hand, conduct that is “deceitful” means as follows:
Having the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who
is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the
party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either
have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious
ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms,
and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon,
and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or
deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” clearly fall within the
concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate
Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for Section 63 of
the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty,
and deceit on respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be
sanctioned.
Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good
faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his gross disregard of this
Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s Investigating
Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to
the Court’s referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation), which caused delay in the resolution of these
administrative cases.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
G.R. No. 174715 : October 11, 2012
FILINVEST LAND, INC., EFREN C. GUTIERRE and LINA DE GUZMAN-
FERRER, Petitioners, v.ABDUL BACKY, ABEHERA, BAIYA, EDRIS,
HADJI GULAM, JAMELLA, KIRAM, LUCAYA, MONER, OMAR, RAMIR,
ROBAYCA, SATAR, TAYBA ALL SURNAMED NGILAY, EDMER
ANDONG, UNOS BANTANGAN and NADJER ESQUIVEL,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands located in
Tambler, General Santos City through Homestead and Fee patents
sometime in 1986 and 1991 which are covered by and specifically
described in the following Original Certificates of Title issued by the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City:
Negotiations were made by petitioner, represented by Lina de
Guzman-Ferrer with the patriarch of the Ngilays, Hadji Gulam Ngilay
sometime in 1995. Eventually, a Deed of Conditional Sale of the
above- enumerated properties in favor of petitioner Filinvest Land,
Inc. was executed. Upon its execution, respondents were asked to
deliver to petitioner the original owner's duplicate copy of the
certificates of title of their respective properties. Respondents
received the downpayment for the properties on October 28, 1995.
A few days after the execution of the aforestated deeds and the
delivery of the corresponding documents to petitioner, respondents
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came to know that the sale of their properties was null and void,
because it was done within the period that they were not allowed to
do so and that the sale did not have the approval of the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
prompting them to file a case for the declaration of nullity of the
deeds of conditional and absolute sale of the questioned properties
and the grant of right of way with the RTC, Las Pis, Branch 253.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that sometime in 1995, the
representative of Hadji Ngilay approached petitioner to propose the
sale of a portion of his properties. Thereafter, representatives of
petitioner flew to General Santos City from Manila to conduct an
ocular inspection of the subject properties. Petitioner was willing to
purchase the properties but seeing that some of the properties were
registered as land grants through homestead patents,
representatives of petitioner informed Ngilay that they would return
to General Santos City in a few months to finalize the sale as ten (10)
certificates of title were issued on November 24, 1991.
According to petitioner, Ngilay and his children prevailed upon the
representatives of petitioner to make an advance payment. To
accommodate the Ngilays, petitioner acceded to making an advance
with the understanding that petitioner could demand anytime the
return of the advance payment should Ngilay not be able to comply
with the conditions of the sale. The Ngilays likewise undertook to
secure the necessary approvals of the DENR before the
consummation of the sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Filinvest Land, Inc. and upheld the sale of
all the properties in litigation. It found that the sale of those
properties whose original certificates of title were issued by virtue of
the 1986 Patents was valid, considering that the prohibitory period
ended in 1991, or way before the transaction took place. As to those
patents awarded in 1991, the same court opined that since those
properties were the subject of a deed of conditional sale,
compliance with those conditions is necessary for there to be a
perfected contract between the parties. The RTC also upheld the
grant of right of way as it adjudged that the right of way agreement
showed that the right of way was granted to provide access from the
highway to the properties to be purchased
Respondents elevated the case to the CA in which the latter
modified the judgment of the RTC. While the CA upheld the validity
of the sale of the properties the patents of which were awarded in
1986, including the corresponding grant of right of way for the same
lots, it nullified the disposition of those properties granted through
patents in 1991 and the right of way on the same properties. As to
the "1991 Patents," the CA ruled that the contract of sale between
the parties was a perfected contract, hence, the parties entered into
a prohibited conveyance of a homestead within the prohibitive
period of five years from the issuance of the patent.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents were unjustly enriched.
RULING:
The five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the
homestead patent is provided under Section 118 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act. It bears stressing that the law was
enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labour in cleaning and
cultivating it. Its basic objective, as the Court had occasion to stress,
is to promote public policy that is to provide home and decent living
for destitute, aimed at providing a class of independent small
landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order. Hence, any act
which would have the effect of removing the property subject of the
patent from the hands of a grantee will be struck down for being
violative of the law.
In the present case, the negotiations for the purchase of the
properties covered by the patents issued in 1991 were made in 1995
and, eventually, an undated Deed of Conditional Sale was executed.
On October 28, 1995, respondents received the downpayment of
P14,000.000.00 for the properties covered by the patents issued in
1991. Applying the five-year prohibition, the properties covered by
the patent issued on November 24, 1991 could only be alienated
after November 24, 1996. Therefore, the sale, having been
consummated on October 28, 1995, or within the five-year
prohibition, is as ruled by the CA, void.
Petitioner argues that the correct formulation of the issue is not
whether there was a perfected contract between the parties during
the period of prohibition, but whether by such deed of conditional
sale there was "alienation or encumbrance" within the
contemplation of the law. This is wrong. The prohibition does not
distinguish between consummated and executory sale. The
conditional sale entered into by the parties is still a conveyance of
the homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Ortega v.
Tan:
And, even assuming that the disputed sale was not yet perfected or
consummated, still, the transaction cannot be validated. The
prohibition of the law on the sale or encumbrance of the homestead
within five years after the grant is MANDATORY. The purpose of the
law is to promote a definite policy, i.e., "to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the
State has gratuitously given to him." Thus, the law does not
distinguish between executory and consummated sales. Where the
sale of a homestead was perfected within the prohibitory period of
five years, the fact that the formal deed of sale was executed after
the expiration of the staid period DID NOT and COULD NOT legalize a
contract that was void from its inception. To hold valid such
arrangement would be to throw the door open to all possible
fraudulent subterfuges and schemes which persons interested in the
land given to a homesteader may devise in circumventing and
defeating the legal provisions prohibiting their alienation within five
years from the issuance of the patent.
To repeat, the conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of
the five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the
homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for it is
not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public
policy by law seeks to preserve.
Nevertheless, petitioner does not err in seeking the return of the
down payment as a consequence of the sale having been declared
void. The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract
which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and
condition in which they were found before the execution thereof.
Petitioner is correct in its argument that allowing respondents to
keep the amount received from petitioner is tantamount to judicial
acquiescence to unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists "when
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a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another. Thus, the sale which
created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed amount
having been declared void, respondents have the duty to return the
down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it. The
principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment
when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the
payment has no right to receive it. As found by the CA and
undisputed by the parties, the amount or the down payment made
is P14,000,000.00 which shall also be the amount to be returned by
respondents.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
G.R. No. 160600 January 15, 2014
DOMINGO GONZALO, Petitioner, vs. JOHN TARNATE, JR.,
Respondent.
FACTS:
After the DPWH had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain
Province-Benguet Road in the total amount of 7 014 963 33 to his
company, Gonzalo Construction,1 petitioner Domingo Gonzalo
(Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate)
on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the
project under the latter s business known as JNT Aggregates. Their
agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to
Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price,
respectively, upon Tarnate s first and second billing in the project.
In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6,
1999 a deed of assignment whereby he, as the contractor, was
assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total
collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee
(equivalent to P233,526.13) was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment
that had been utilized in the project. In the deed of assignment,
Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of
Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents relative to
the collection of the 10% retention fee and in encashing the check to
be issued by the DPWH for that purpose. The deed of assignment
was submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the
processing of the documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate
learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of
assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of
assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999;
and that the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had
then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee
released to him.
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo,
but to no avail. Thus, he brought this suit against.
ISSUE:
WON there can still be unjust enrichment involving void contracts
RULING:
There is no question that every contractor is prohibited from
subcontracting with or assigning to another person any contract or
project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary has
approved the subcontracting or assignment. This is pursuant to
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594, which provides:
Section 6. Assignment and Subcontract. – The contractor shall not
assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract or make any other disposition
of the contract or any part or interest therein except with the
approval of the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of
Energy, as the case may be. Approval of the subcontract shall not
relieve the main contractor from any liability or obligation under his
contract with the Government nor shall it create any contractual
relation between the subcontractor and the Government.
Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in question,
subcontracted the implementation of the project to Tarnate in
violation of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal,
therefore, because it did not bear the approval of the DPWH
Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of assignment was also illegal,
because it sprung from the subcontract.
Obviously, without the Sub-Contract Agreement there will be no
Deed of Assignment to speak of. The illegality of the Sub-Contract
Agreement necessarily affects the Deed of Assignment because the
rule is that an illegal agreement cannot give birth to a valid contract.
To rule otherwise is to sanction the act of entering into transaction
the object of which is expressly prohibited by law and thereafter
execute an apparently valid contract to subterfuge the illegality. The
legal proscription in such an instance will be easily rendered
nugatory and meaningless to the prejudice of the general public.
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent contract.
As such, a void contract cannot produce a valid one. To the same
effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code, which declares that "a
contract, which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is
also void and inexistent."
We do not concur with the CA’s finding that the guilt of Tarnate for
violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594 was lesser
than that of Gonzalo, for, as the CA itself observed, Tarnate had
voluntarily entered into the agreements with Gonzalo. Tarnate also
admitted that he did not participate in the bidding for the project
because he knew that he was not authorized to contract with the
DPWH. Given that Tarnate was a businessman who had represented
himself in the subcontract as "being financially and organizationally
sound and established, with the necessary personnel and equipment
for the performance of the project," he justifiably presumed to be
aware of the illegality of his agreements with Gonzalo. For these
reasons, Tarnate was not less guilty than Gonzalo.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to
an illegal contract cannot recover from one another and are not
entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in
equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that
holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or
to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money
agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the
28 | P a g e
parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be
given to one against the other.
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not
always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application
contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction, public
policy has been defined as "that principle of the law which holds
that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good."
There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor
and materials for the project in compliance with his obligations
under the subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was
Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment for his
contract with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that should
have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of assignment.
Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to
Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee that would have
compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project,
Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the
latter was to be barred from recovering because of the rigid
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The prevention of
unjust enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate’s
favor. Consequently, the RTC and the CA properly adjudged Gonzalo
liable to pay Tarnate the equivalent amount of the 10% retention
fee (i.e., P233,526.13).
Gonzalo sought to justify his refusal to turn over the P233,526.13 to
Tarnate by insisting that he (Gonzalo) had a debt of P200,000.00 to
Congressman Victor Dominguez; that his payment of the 10%
retention fee to Tarnate was conditioned on Tarnate paying that
debt to Congressman Dominguez; and that he refused to give the
10% retention fee to Tarnate because Tarnate did not pay to
Congressman Dominguez. His justification was unpersuasive,
however, because, firstly, Gonzalo presented no proof of the debt to
Congressman Dominguez; secondly, he did not competently
establish the agreement on the condition that supposedly bound
Tarnate to pay to Congressman Dominguez; and, thirdly, burdening
Tarnate with Gonzalo’s personal debt to Congressman Dominguez to
be paid first by Tarnate would constitute another case of unjust
enrichment.
ARTICLE 26
[G.R. NO. 180832 : July 23, 2008]
JEROME CASTRO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
FACTS:
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed
Tan's son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the
terms of his disciplinary probation.3 Upon Tan's request, RIS
reconsidered its decision but imposed "non-appealable" conditions
such as excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation
ceremonies.
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education
(Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private
Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code
against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken
with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS' code violation point system
allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which
had no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due
process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it.
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to
readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus, he was able to
graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement
ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow
parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that
he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster.
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and
told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that's
dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said "talking
to him was dangerous."
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner
on August 21, 2003.
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral
defamation in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 607 under the following Information:
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate
intent of bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit, dishonor,
disrepute and contempt, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously speak and utter the following words to Ms. Bernice C.
Ching:
"OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL TALKING TO [TAN],
THAT'S DANGEROUS."
and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.
ISSUE:
WON the act of Castro falls under Article 26 of the CC
RULING:
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article
26 of the Civil Code:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
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Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a
role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 27
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses
PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private respondents),
respondents.
FACTS:
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by
some students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late
Violeta Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended
loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the
school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans
was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as
President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that
she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that
she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the
school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner
denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the
Bureau of Public Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13,
1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the
legal officers of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta
Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an
exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of
the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2,
authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for
financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance
with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo
extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon
proper application duly approved by the majority of the members of
the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr.
Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office
conducted an investigation on the matter and having been
convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and
members of the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision in
question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is contended
that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the
Club is necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never
submitted to that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-
Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed
based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and
effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to
some officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal
(sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed guilty
of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand,
Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President,
Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the
Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last
October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution
and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive Board
passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution became the basis for the
extension on of loans to some officers and members of the Club,
that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has
been approved by the superintendent because the adviser of the
Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club that he
will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to
office on October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club
had been likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week
Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action
taken by the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as
well as the officers and members thereof by dropping them from
membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that Violets
M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer,
in extending loans to the officers and members of the Student
partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to
discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance and other
humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr.
Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his
capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the
Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and
members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained
why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the
Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club
president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the
part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of
his duties as such, this Office considers as too severe and
unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating that
Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation
from this school or any organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it
is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she
alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question
would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her
dreams of graduating with honors in this year's commencement
exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and
hereby directs that appellant Violeta M. Delmo, and for that matter
all other Club members or officers involved in this case, be not
deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are
otherwise entitled thereto.
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the
Director and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner
received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the
petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also
send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the
records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the
Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The
petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the
30 | P a g e
latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not
retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received
another telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive
Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to
include Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students,
the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being
awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote
the Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he
believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors.
The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the
school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor,
"Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in
flag action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency
of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended
and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole
and only heirs.
RTC – Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now
petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to
Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools
(Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the officers of the
Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was
allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If
the defendant he not approve of the constitution and by-laws of the
Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to
sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own
act that the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with
the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of
Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe
that he was acting as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality.
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that,
although, he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r
Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss
Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew
that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive
Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not
finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director
Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. It could not be true
that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L,"
because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion
which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award,
citation or honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto is
found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he know the last
paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of
bias and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was
deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss
Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the
exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the
information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh.
"11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him
to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead
of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed
back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April
29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter that he had
returned the decision, together with the record. Why a night letter
when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case,
because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination
of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been
sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. At least, if the
defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, to Miss Delmo,
he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and
citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr.
Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly
this is home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his
decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned
by Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the
defendant, believed that she did not deserve those honors. Despite
the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant received
hours before the commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he
did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony
that he would be embarrassment. Evidently, he knew only his
embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being
flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim and certainly, not the
least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of
ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for
having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss Delmos case
smacks of contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the
New Civil Code.
RULING:
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts
should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went
through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the
petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness.
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate
omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of
the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to
enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he
received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it
back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of
it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner
should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's
father, and inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This,
the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the attendant
bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its
decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a
copy of the decision, he could have used his discretion and plain
common sense by informing her about it or he could have directed
the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement
program or announced it during the commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director
Benardino hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4,
1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss
31 | P a g e
Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did
so, to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's
rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr.
Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see
defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme
disappointment and humiliation.
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with
circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo.
Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly
disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino,
defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity.
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in
order.
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses
Delmo damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual
capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already
entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the
decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the
spouses in their own behalf.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary
to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the SC in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the CA in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
WON the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his civil liability
RULING:
Article 89 of the RPC is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the RPC heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132
of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y
respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y
Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused
die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action
might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant."
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in
the RPC. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also
brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the ROC which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the RPC means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long
as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said
that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason.
For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action
is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity,
cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case."
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based
solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be
found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability." I Kapunan, RPC, Annotated, supra.
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the ROC (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the ROC).
32 | P a g e
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application
in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as
part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in
Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Delicts
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
[G.R. NO. 155223 : April 4, 2007]
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MARIE
F. FUJITA, Petitioner, v. FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent.

FACTS:
Frias is the owner of a house and lot located at No. 589 Batangas
East, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired
from Island Masters Realty and Development Corporation (IMRDC)
by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated Nov. 16, 1990. The property is
covered by TCT No. 168173 of the Register of Deeds of Makati in the
name of IMRDC.
On December 7, 1990, Frias, as the FIRST PARTY, and Dra. Flora San
Diego-Sison, as the SECOND PARTY, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement over the property with the following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of THREE
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00) receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the
parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of 6 months from the date
of the execution of this contract within which to notify the FIRST
PARTY of her intention to purchase the aforementioned parcel of
land together within (sic) the improvements thereon at the price of
6.4M. Upon notice to the FIRST PARTY of the SECOND PARTY's
intention to purchase the same, the latter has a period of another 6
months within which to pay the remaining balance of 3.4M.
2. That prior to the 6 months period given to the SECOND PARTY
within which to decide whether or not to purchase the above-
mentioned property, the FIRST PARTY may still offer the said
property to other persons who may be interested to buy the same
provided that the amount of 3M given to the FIRST PARTY BY THE
SECOND PARTY shall be paid to the latter including interest based on
prevailing compounded bank interest plus the amount of the sale in
excess of 7M should the property be sold at a price more than 7M.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first 6
months from the execution of this contract, no interest shall be
charged by the SECOND PARTY on the 3M however, in the event
that on the 6th month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to
purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a
period of another 6 months within which to pay the sum of 3M
pesos provided that the said amount shall earn compounded bank
interest for the last 6 months only. Under this circumstance, the
amount of 3M given by the SECOND PARTY shall be treated as a loan
and the property shall be considered as the security for the
mortgage which can be enforced in accordance with law.
Petitioner received from respondent 2M pesos in cash and one
million pesos in a PDC dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991,
which rendered said check stale. Petitioner then gave respondent
TCT No. 168173 in the name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified
petitioner through a letter dated March 20, 1991, which petitioner
received only on June 11, 1991, reminding petitioner of their
agreement that the amount of 2M pesos which petitioner received
from respondent should be considered as a loan payable within 6
months. Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent the
amount of 2M pesos.
Petitioner’s contention:
33 | P a g e
MOA was conceived and arranged by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita
Lozada, who is also respondent's lawyer; that she was asked to sign
the agreement without being given the chance to read the same;
that the title to the property and the Deed of Sale between her and
the IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for safekeeping and were
never turned over to respondent as there was no consummated sale
yet; that out of the 2M pesos cash paid, Atty. Lozada took the 1M
pesos which has not been returned, thus petitioner had filed a civil
case against her; that she was never informed of respondent's
decision not to purchase the property within the 6th month period
fixed in the agreement; that when she demanded the return of TCT
No. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC from
Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her these documents in a brown
envelope on May 5, 1991 which her secretary placed in her attache
case; that the envelope together with her other personal things
were lost when her car was forcibly opened the following day; that
she sought the help of Atty. Lozada who advised her to secure a
police report, to execute an affidavit of loss and to get the services
of another lawyer to file a petition for the issuance of an owner's
duplicate copy; that the petition for the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy was filed on her behalf without her knowledge and
neither did she sign the petition nor testify in court as falsely
claimed for she was abroad; that she was a victim of the
manipulations of Atty. Lozada and respondent as shown by the filing
of criminal charges for perjury and false testimony against her; that
no interest could be due as there was no valid mortgage over the
property as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud and
deception. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, counter-
claim for damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is entitled to damages under Art. 31
RULING:
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury
cases filed by respondent against her, those actions are entirely
distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by
respondent against petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that
petitioner's act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her
loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
168173 entitles respondent to moral damages.
Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of
contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.
The MOA provides that in the event that respondent opts not to buy
the property, the money given by respondent to petitioner shall be
treated as a loan and the property shall be considered as the
security for the mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that
after they executed the agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner
gave her the owner's copy of the title to the property, the Deed of
Sale between petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy,
and the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed the
Deed of Sale. However, notwithstanding that all those documents
were in respondent's possession, petitioner executed an affidavit of
loss that the owner's copy of the title and the Deed of Sale were
lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of the affidavit of
loss was due to the fact that she was of the belief that since she had
demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she thought that
the brown envelope with markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on
May 5, 1991 already contained the title and the Deed of Sale as
those documents were in the same brown envelope which she gave
to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with respondent. Such
statement remained a bare statement. It was not proven at all since
Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her claim. In
fact, even petitioner's own witness, Benilda Ynfante, was not able to
establish petitioner's claim that the title was returned by Atty.
Lozada in view of Ynfante's testimony that after the brown envelope
was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she placed
it in petitioner's attaché case and did not bother to look at the
envelope.
It is clear therefrom that petitioner's execution of the affidavit of
loss became the basis of the filing of the petition with the RTC for
the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
Petitioner's actuation would have deprived respondent of the
security for her loan were it not for respondent's timely filing of a
petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral
damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the
award of exemplary damages is proper. Exemplary damages may be
imposed upon petitioner by way of example or correction for the
public good. The RTC awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages. While the award of moral and exemplary
damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of
awarding said damages, no error has been committed by CA. There
is no question that respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud,
Negros Oriental, HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor),
SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS ORIENTAL,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD
DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA ESTRELLANES,
respondents.
FACTS:
On 9 February 1989, Estrellanes and Binaohan were designated as
industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor
sectoral representative, respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Sec. Luis T. Santos of
34 | P a g e
the Department of Local Government. Binaohan and Estrellanes
took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989,
respectively.
However, petitioners refuse to pay Sectoral Members Bartolome M.
Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes despite demand the amount
P95,350.00 and P108,900.00 representing respectively their per
diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue
injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of
Bartolome Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.
ISSUE:
WON the legality or validity of private respondents' designation as
sectoral representatives is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners.
RULING:
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or before it may proceed
(Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the
eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the
prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in
said criminal case.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before
the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case."
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that
the issue in the civil case, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to
warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in
the criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts
and issues involved in the civil action and the criminal case are
closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on
petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying
private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
More importantly,the resolution of the civil case will certainly
determine if there will still be any reason to proceed with the
criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with
manifest partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral
representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners'
assertion that said designations were made in violation of the LGC
and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should the CA uphold the
trial court's decision declaring null and void private respondents'
designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with
the provisions of the LGC, the charges against petitioners would no
longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be
accused of bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no
obligation on their part to pay private respondents' claims. Private
respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per
diems and other benefits. In other words, the CA' resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or
not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are
nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services
rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out
by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as
sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They
began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of
which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989,
barely 8 days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private
respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as
sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis
that even in the event that private respondents' designations are
finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public
officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the
following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith.
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated
elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there
is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de
jure office.
PREJUDCIAL QUESTION
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the
Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.
35 | P a g e
FACTS:
Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June
16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao,
Quezon City. Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. However, petitioner's wife,
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the
conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including
the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of
the criminal case.
ISSUE:
WON the nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the
concubinage case
RULING:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a
civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the
civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his
marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of
the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and
void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has
not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. (PASI) and MICHAELC. U. DE
GUZMAN, Complainants, vs. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO
Undersecretary for Communications, DOTC, Respondents.
FACTS:
PASI is a duly organized corporation, whose President and CEO is co-
petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a
consortium of private telecommunications carriers which entered
into a MOU with the DOTC, through its then Sec. Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into
outer space. Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an
endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite itself to be owned
by the Filipino-owned consortium. The consortium was to grant the
Philippine government 1 transponder free of charge for the
government's exclusive use for non-commercial purpose, as well as
the right of first refusal to another 1 transponder in the Philippine
satellite, if available. The Philippine government, through the DOTC,
was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International
Telecommunication Union the required orbital slot(s) and frequency
assignment(s) for the Philippine satellite.
PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The
government, together with PASI, coordinated through the
International Telecommunication Union 2 orbital slots for Philippine
satellites. On 28 June 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Sec. Amado S.
Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government
confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned
Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites, which PASI had
designated as the Agila satellites. Sec. Lagdameo, Jr. confirmed "the
Philippine Government's assignment of Philippine orbital slots to
PASI for its Agila satellites."
PASI, then, proceeded with preparations for the launching,
operation and management of its satellites, including the availment
of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business
partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5Mto the French satellite
manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersec.
for Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign
the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI."
Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her
offering orbital slot for bidding to other parties, despite the prior
assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that
Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose
indentity was unknown to PASI.
ISSUE:
WON Lichauco may validly invoke state immunity from suit to secure
the outright dismissal of petitioners' complaint
RULING:
36 | P a g e
There is a connective issue between these two aspects in that if the
State is sued without its consent, the corresponding suit must be
dismissed. At times, it would be teasingly obvious, even from the
moment of the filing of the complaint, that the suit is one against
the State. A cursory examination of the caption of the complaint can
sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as when the suit is directly
initiated against the Republic of the Philippines, any foreign
government, or an unincorporated government agency as the
named respondents. In such cases, obviously there is need for
immediate caution, although if it is somehow established that those
respondents had given their consent to be sued, the suit may
nonetheless prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the
unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the complaint as
"acting Secretary of the DOTC." The hornbook rule is that a suit for
acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer
of the government by a private citizen which would result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government must be
regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will
not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability
of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the
performance of his/her duties.
Petitioner insists that Lichauco is being sued for her acts committed
in excess of her authority, ultra vires in nature, and tortious in
character. The CA responded that such acts fell within Lichauco's
official duties as DOTC Undersecretary, thus enjoying the
presumption that they were performed in good faith and in the
regular performance of official duty. This rationale is pure sophistry
and must be rejected outright.
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith"
or "regular performance of official duty", yet these presumptions
are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence. Many civil actions are oriented towards overcoming any
number of these presumptions, and a cause of action can certainly
be geared towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow a
party to present evidence overcome the disputable presumptions
involved. Otherwise, if trial is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary,
owing to the perceived indisputability of the presumptions, the
judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere ascertainment of
what presumptions apply in a given case, nothing more.
Consequently, the entire ROC is rendered as excess verbiage, save
perhaps for the provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the CA were ever adopted as a jurisprudential
rule, no public officer could ever be sued for acts executed beyond
their official functions or authority, or for tortious conduct or
behavior, since such acts would "enjoy the presumption of good
faith and in the regular performance of official duty". Indeed, few
civil actions of any nature would ever reach the trial stage, if a case
can be adjudicated by a mere determination from the complaint or
answer as to which legal presumptions are applicable. For example,
the presumption that a person is innocent of a wrong is a disputable
presumption on the same level as that of the regular performance of
official duty. A civil complaint for damages necessarily alleges that
the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would
serve as basis for the award of damages. With the rationale of the
CA, such complaint can be dismissed upon a motion to dismiss solely
on the ground that the presumption is that a person is innocent of a
wrong. So obviously, the Decision of the CA cannot receive the
imprimatur of this Court.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three (3) causes of action
against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act
in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of
nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot
153º East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.
Evidently, the first two causes of action stem from Lichauco's act of
offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding, through the
Notice of Offer which was attached to the complaint.
Thus, insofar as the first two causes of action are concerned,
Lichauco may have a point when she asserts that they were based
on acts which she performed in her capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. But does this necessarily mean that these two
causes of action may thus be dismissed on the basis of state
immunity of suit?
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of
official functions by an officer of the government will result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government that the
complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself.
However, the distinction must also be raised between where the
government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and
jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the
latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial
review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as
the proper party- defendant or respondent.
However, the first two causes of action do sufficiently impute grave
abuse of discretion against Lichauco in her official capacity. Since
judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse
of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows
in such instances that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in the appropriate suit.
Moreover, if the suit had been directed against Lichauco alone, and
in her personal capacity, yet it sought, as it now does, the
nullification of the Notice of Offer or the awards thereon, such
remedy could not avail even if granted. Lichauco, in her personal
capacity, cannot be directed to set aside the Notice of Offer, the
award of the bid, or to issue a new award herself. It is only because
Lichauco was sued in her official capacity as the DOTC
Undersecretary that she, or her successors in office, could be
judicially compelled to act in such fashion.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the
defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes
of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in
constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to
impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely
the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two
causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the
nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so
that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said
causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against
the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an
unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the
37 | P a g e
suit would have been considered as one against the State. But
neither circumstance obtains in this case.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, Lichauco herself was already the acting head of the
DOTC, owing to the sudden death of then Secretary Enrile a few
days before. At that stage, any suit seeking to nullify the Notice of
Bid and the alleged award to the "Unknown Bidder" should have
properly denominated Lichauco as the respondent, and not the
DOTC.
Nonetheless, as to the first two causes of action, there was a viable
ground to dismiss the complaint: the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Indeed, such ground was alleged by
Lichauco in her Motion to Dismiss. Yet the principle of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits to several exceptions.
In its Order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, the RTC
adequately dispensed with the objection, applying the established
exceptions to the rule of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
To wit:
Turning to the matter pertaining to non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is fundamental that this principle is not
an inflexible rule. It yields to many accepted exceptions. (Rocamora
vs. RTC - Cebu, G.R. No. 65307). As in this case, this principle can be
dispensed with when its application would cause great and
irreparable damage and when it does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy.
When the subject orbital slot 153 E was bidded out to other
applicants, the damage and injury plaintiffs stand to suffer was clear,
present, and substantiated that this Court was impelled to provide
urgent needed measure such as the issuance of writ of injunction
against the public defendant. Indeed, under the circumstances then
obtaining it was impractical for the plaintiffs to first proceed to the
administrative official concerned before taking court action.33
A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action,
anchored as it is on alleged acts that are tortious in character or
otherwise beyond the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The
complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and
defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false assertions
against them in her letter to the Land Bank President.
The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the trial to
be determined on the basis of the evidence. However, if proven,
they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not
shielded by the doctrine of state immunity from suit.
The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on the merits, it is
established that the public official concerned had committed illegal
or tortious acts against the plaintiff. How does it apply in relation to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity from suit,
necessarily lodged before trial on the merits?
Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is
shielded by the State's immunity from suit, to hypothetically
admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such
hypothetical admission has to be deemed a concession on her part
that she had performed the tortious or damaging acts against the
petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable for damages.
Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the defense of state
immunity from suit in regard to the third cause of action with the
assertion that the acts complained of constituting said cause of
action fell within her official functions and were not tortuous in
character. Still, to establish such assertions of fact, a full-blown trial
on the merits would be necessary, as would the case be if Lichauco
raised the defense that she did not commit these acts complained
of. Certainly, these defenses cannot be accorded merit before trial,
factual as they are in character.
All told, contrary to the ruling of the CA, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in denying Lichauco's Motion to
Dismiss.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
[G.R. NO. 159186 : June 5, 2009]
JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner, v. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City;
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT
OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and
MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the
real estate business through their company Primetown Property
Group.
Petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te
(Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several
BPI PDCs to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl
Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted
the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but
in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited
with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the
"Account is Closed." Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno
and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks.
Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
Sps. Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money,
damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against petitioner. The Office of the City
Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the civil action for collection of sum of money is a prejudicial
question justifying the suspension of the criminal case
RULING:
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question,
as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is
the petitioner's assertion that Civil Cases for collection of sum of
money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to
collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an
issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration
38 | P a g e
for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily
follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among
other elements, that the check should have been issued for account
or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no
violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said
that the reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the
drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in order to
avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to
the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased
properties to him.
On the other hand, the OSG contends that there is no prejudicial
question in Civil Cases which would warrant the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against
the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the
sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the
complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the
checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of
Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private
complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such
issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner
may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The present case hinges on the determination of whether there
exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the
proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the
petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt
or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one
is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a
prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused
in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.
Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of
violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the private
respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or
the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil
case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not
liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an
offense.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the
public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the
determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private
respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the
guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in
the criminal cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks,
regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the
determination of the issues involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to
the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised
as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The
validity and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as the
admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before
the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the
respective rights of the parties, to examine and to put to test all
their respective allegations and evidence through a well-designed
machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defenses available to the
accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This
court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and
decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the
petitioner.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
[G.R. NO. 184861 : June 30, 2009]
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, v. CLEOFE S.
JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
FACTS:
39 | P a g e
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.
Concepcion, and VP for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora,
filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of BP
22 against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint
dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
ISSUE:
WON the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the
criminal cases
RULING:
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988,
the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,
Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. - The two (2) essential
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to
create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it
must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the
filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to
guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a
civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to
delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 36. Prejudicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code.
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted
to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is
filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that
there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court
and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have
presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded
the filing of the civil case.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change
in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had." In the instant case, the phrase, "previously
instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action
involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action.
This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
"subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no
other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action
must precede the criminal action.
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly
conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that
resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would
harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted
civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of
the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the
motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the
preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court
hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule
111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary
investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this
interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order
to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant
case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent
move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the
presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the
Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the
criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that
would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable
under BP 22 are as follows:
40 | P a g e
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement
to support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were
issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of
the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the
agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L.
PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before
the RTC of Antipolo Cityfor the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide against petitioner
RULING:
Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt
on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-
04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner
was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.
Respondent's petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4
November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the
civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the
civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case
for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who
shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."
The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes
the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue
in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner's
will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner
and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for
estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
41 | P a g e
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz various loans totaling 18M from Unicapital. The
loans were secured by a REM constituted on a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-687599 of the ROD for the Province of Cavite
registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its
option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of
P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts
due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and
Consing in the amount of 18M and paying an additional amount of
P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they
learned that the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in
the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from
whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT
No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of
P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and
received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands.
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case in the Pasig City RTC (pasig
Civil Case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital
from proceeding against him for the collection of the
P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of
his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and
de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office (Makati Criminal
Case).
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City
(Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and
damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment
(Makati civil case).
ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite
and Makati criminal cases
RULING:
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in
the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the
Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig
civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to
do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the
similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case with
Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals
that the action was predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the
allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing
and de la Cruz had acted in a “wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or
malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a
property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a
spurious title.”22 As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of
the Civil Code, which states as follows:cralawlibrary
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and
physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to Article
33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question
that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.23 This was
precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it
will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply
the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital, for,
although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different
complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus
Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were
undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and
were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati
criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the
Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s
being a mere agent of his mother who should not be criminally liable
for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged to
his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to
wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify
the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite
criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil
case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing)
merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are
liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the
purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely
an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.
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An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify
public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt
or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.
PERSONALITY SPRINGS FROM BIRTH
[G.R. No. L-26795. July 31, 1970.]
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FELIX
ICAO, Defendant-Appellee.
FACTS:
Felix Icao had carnal knowedge with Carmen Quimiguing. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s
fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause
of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been
born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
WON child support must be given after the child has been born.
RULING:
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from it
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even
if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived
child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be
born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code)
"ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may
be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if
they were already born."
"ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
"If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation."
It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the
Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as
yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for ail purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived
child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a
married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as
averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:
"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.’
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 . . ."
Thus, independently of the right to support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under
the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to
state a cause of action was doubly in error.
PERSONALITY SPRINGS FROM BIRTH
[G.R. NO. 182836 : October 13, 2009]
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
v. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S.
MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO
STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a
member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel
Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
concluded between Continental and the Union,
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child.
Hortillano's wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5
January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the
female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
43 | P a g e
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan
(Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely
delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery.
Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and
voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer
Steel.15 Dugan's child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died
before labor, as opposed to Hortillano's child who was already 37-38
weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
ISSUE:
WON a dead fetus acquired a juridical personality
RULING:
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave
under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death
must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister,
of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under
Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death
must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to
prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of
Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano's
claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the
purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and
"dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are
indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to
the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the
Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave
and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40
provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article
42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40,
41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in
relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of
legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only
through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein
since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are
not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death
that were passed on to or assumed by the child's parents. The rights
to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter's
death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all
a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the

CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who
relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano's child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano's
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions
in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother's womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status

in relation to his/her parents.

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited

jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon
his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate
upon her conception.

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