TITLE TWELVE she contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the court has declared that the said
d or subsequent marriage before the court has declared that the said spouse
CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS (Articles 347 – 352)
CHAPTER ONE – SIMULATION OF BIRTHS AND USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS
ART. 347 – SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER AND
CONCEALMENT OR ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD
THREE ACTS PUNISHED UNDER ART. 347:
1. Simulation of birth
Simulation of birth- takes place when the woman pretends to be pregnant when in fact she is not
and on the day of the delivery, takes the child of another as her own.
􀂾 If the simulation is done in the birth certificate, the crime committed is simulation of birth
􀂾 If the simulation is done in any other document aside from birth certificate, the crime committed is
falsification of a public or private document as the case may be.
Q: A was a pregnant. She told the midwife that she does not want the baby. The midwife said that
she knew a couple who wanted a child. The couple arrived and the mother gave the child to the
couple. This couple took the baby and registered the child as their own. What are the crimes
committed and who are criminally liable?
A: All of them are all liable for simulation of birth. The mother, the midwife and the couple. The
said couple pretended that the child is their own child. In that case, said child lost its original status.
2. Substitution of a child with another In substitution of a child with another, the classic example
is MARA and CLARA.
􀂾 Mara was substituted as Clara and Clara was substituted as Mara. As a result, Mara loses her real
civil status of being a daughter of a rich family and assumes a new civil status of being a daughter
of a poor family. The same happened to Clara, Clara assumes a civil status of being a daughter of
a rich family and loses her real civil status of being a daughter of a poor family. Crime committed is
Substitution of a child with another child which tend the child to lose his or her real civil status
3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status
The offender conceals or abandons the legitimate child and the intention of the offender is to
lose the child’s civil status.
It is necessary that the child is legitimate, not illegitimate.
Q: A and B husband and wife had a child. the child was born without legs. So A and B could not
accept the fact that their child has no legs. They brought the child in the forest for the child to die, to
a forest with no people. Thereafter, left the child. What crime is committed by A and B?
A: If the child died, and the child was less than 3 days old, the crime committed is infanticide. If not,
the crime committed is attempted infanticide if the child was later on discovered and rescued.
If the child is above 3 days old, the crime committed would be parricide, in case the child died when
left in the forest. Or, it not, attempted parricide.
Q: What if A and B, instead of going to the forest, went to the mall. The mother went inside the
restroom and placed the said child in one of the cubicles in one of the restrooms of the mall. What
crime is committed by the mother and the husband?
A: Abandoning the Minor under Art. 276. The parents left her deliberately, consciously, and
permanently, without intent to kill. There was no intent to kill because they could not kill the child.
They left it inside the restroom therefore obviously there was no intent to kill.
Q: What if this husband and wife and the child that they have happens to be their 13th child. They
already had 12 children and these children are not going to school. So their 13th child was born and
they wrapped the child in a nice towel, placed it inside a basket and then placed it at the gate of the
house of a rich family. Then they rang the bell. What crime is committed by the husband and the
wife?
A: Violation of Art. 347 – Abandoning a legitimate child with intent to lose its real civil status.
Obviously, the intent of the parents is for the child, their 13th child to lose its real civil status of being
that of a poor family and assume a new civil status of coming from a rich family because the child
was left at the gate and the parents rang the bell.
NOTE: It depends on the intent of the offender. It could be any other crime, depending on the intent
of the offender.
ART. 348 – USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall usurp the civil status of
another, should he do so for the purpose of defrauding the offended part or his heirs; otherwise, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed.
􀂾 It shall be committed by any person who shall usurp the civil status of another, who shall assumes
the filiation, or the paternal, or the marital rights of another 􀂾 Intention of the offender is to enjoy the
civil rights arising from the civil status of the person whom he impersonates.
􀂾 If the intention of the offender is to defraud the offended party, or his heirs, the penalty is
QUALIFIED.
CHAPTER TWO – ILLEGAL MARRIAGES
ART. 349 – BIGAMY
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender has been legally married
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
􀂾 Bigamy shall be committed by any person who shall contracts a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or who shall contract a subsequent or second
marriage before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead, meaning in a decision
made in an appropriate proceeding.
􀂾 The offender is a married person, but he contracted a second or subsequent marriage, his previous
marriage has not yet been declared null and void by the court, or her spouse is absent and he or
is presumptively dead
Old case in the Book:
The wife contracted a second marriage because she inquired from the relatives of the husband and
the relatives of the husband said, “He is already dead” and because of that, the wife contracted a
second or subsequent marriage. The first husband appeared, and filed a case of bigamy against the
said wife. Is the wife liable for bigamy?
􀂾 The court said that the woman is liable for bigamy through reckless imprudence, because according
to the court, there was imprudence because just by mere reliance on the statement made by the
parents of the husband, she already contracted a second marriage Is there such a crime of bigamy
through reckless imprudence?
􀂾 I do not believe in that decision. It is impossible for this crime to have happened. because the law
says, without the first marriage being legally dissolved, it means there must be a court declaration
of nullity of marriage, without that the absent spouse being declared presumptively dead in a decision
made in an appropriate proceeding, there must be a court decision.
􀂾 Since there is a need of a court decision before one could contract a second or subsequent
marriage, there cannot be an instance of bigamy through reckless imprudence. The moment the
said married person contracted a second or subsequent marriage, without any court decision, the
crime committed is evidently BIGAMY. It cannot be done through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence.
Sample problem:
A and B are married. B, the husband fell in love with another woman, and married the woman
thereafter. It is now a bigamous married. A bigamous marriage is an otherwise valid marriage, except
for the fact that there is a subsisting marriage.
ART. 350 – MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not
been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence,
intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next
preceding paragraph.
Illegal marriage- marriage contracted without the requisites of the law.
􀂾 Committed by any person who shall contract a marriage knowing that he was not able to comply
with the requisites of law or if there is a legal impediment of the said marriage.
􀂾 In the Family Code, before one can contract a marriage, there is the so called essential and formal
equisites. All of these must be complied with. The absence of any of these, the contracting parties
knows its absence, yet contracted the marriage, the liability falls under Art. 350 f0r illegal marriage.
Q: What if the priest, or the minister who contracted or solemnized the marriage, knows that there
is a legal impediment or knows that the parties failed to comply with the requisites. What is the
liability?
A: Liability is under Art. 352. Under Art. 352, there is a liability of any priest, or minister of any
denomination or religious sect, or also civil authorities who shall contract or solemnize any marriage
which is not in accordance with any requisites of the law.
ART. 351 – PREMATURE MARRIAGES
Person Liable:
1. A woman who married within 301 days from the death of her husband, or before delivery of her
baby if she is pregnant at the time of his death
2. A woman whose marriage having been annulled or dissolved, married before delivery or before
expiration of the period of 301 days after the date of legal separation.
Q: Why is a woman prohibited from marrying for a period of 301 days?
A: This is to ensure that there is no doubt as to the paternity of the child to be delivered, in order for
the child to know who is his father. Otherwise, if he is not the one who died, he is the new husband
of the wife.
􀂾 The period of 301 days is only important if the woman is not pregnant
􀂾 If the woman is pregnant at the time of the death or at the time of the declaration of the nullity of
marriage, it is only at the time of the delivery of the baby. After the baby is delivered, she can already
marry because there is no doubt as to the paternity of the child.
􀂾 Nowadays, you can easily determine the paternity of the child through DNA testing.
ART. 352 – PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY
Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law.
TITLE THIRTEEN
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
(Articles 353 – 364)
CHAPTER ONE – LIBEL
Section One: Definitions, forms, and punishment of this crime.
DEFAMATION – Kinds of Defamation:
1. Written defamation or Libel
2. Oral defamation or Slander
3. Slander by deed
ART. 353 – DEFINITION OF LIBEL
LIBEL – is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
ELEMENTS:
1. There must be an imputation or allegation of a crime, or a vice of defect, whether real or imaginary,
or any act or omission, condition, status or circumstance which tend to dishonor or discredit a natural
or juridical person.
2. That there must be a publication of the said defamatory statement or article
3. The identity of the person defamed must be established or identified
4. The existence of malice
SECOND ELEMENT:
􀂾 Publication- satisfied the moment that a 3rd person has heard or read the libelous statement, even
if the person pertained has not heard or read it.
o So the basis is that a 3rd person has heard or read the libelous statement.
Q: What if A, in national television said, “ikaw B, isa kang estafadora”. A accused B of the crime of
estafa. Is the crime committed libel or oral defamation (slander)?
A: The crime committed is LIBEL. According to the Supreme Court, Television is within the phrase
any similar means.
Q: What if A, in the same incident, using a microphone, using an amplifier sound system, called B
“isa kang estafadora”. Is the crime committed libel or is it oral defamation?
A: The crime committed is Oral Defamation or Slander. The use of the microphone or the
amplifier is not within the means provided for Art. 355.
THIRD ELEMENT:
􀂾 Identity of the person- must be identified, not necessary that the person must be named or
described.
􀂾 It suffices that any reader or a person who heard would know that he is the person being referred
to.
􀂾 The moment a 3rd party has recognized or has known that he is the one being referred to in the
defamatory statement, the identity of the offended party is already present.
FOURTH ELEMENT in relation to Art. 354 – Requirement for Publicity:
􀂾 As a rule, every defamatory statement is presumed to be MALICIOUS, even if it is true.
􀂾 In defamatory statements, if the offender cannot state any good intention or justifiable motive for
stating defamatory statements, the law presumes malice.
􀂾 MALICE IN LAW – Prosecution need not prove malice. It is the defense who must prove that in
stating the defamatory statements, there was no malice on the part of the offender because the law
presumes malice in law.
􀂾 There are certain statements wherein the law does not presume malice. In this kind of malice, it
must be proven by the prosecution. This is MALICE IN FACT. It is available in privilege
communication.
o It is the burden of the prosecution to prove the existence of malice on the part of the offender when
he said the defamatory mark or statement. Otherwise, if not proven. There will be an acquittal.
ART. 354 – REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLICITY
Kinds of Privilege Communications (Exceptions)
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
􀂾 These are considered as privilege communications. The said prosecution, the complainant must
prove malice, otherwise, there will be an acquittal of the said offender or accused.
ART. 355 – LIBEL MEANS BY WRITINGS OR SIMILAR MEANS
A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both,
in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
􀂾 If the defamatory statement or article is published through any of these means, then, the crime
committed is LIBEL.
ART. 356 – THREATENING TO PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PRESENT SUCH PUBLICATION FOR
A COMPENSATION
The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other
members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such
libel for a compensation or money consideration.
Art. 355 enumerates how libel can be committed:
1. Writing
2. Printing
3. Lithography
4. Engraving
5. Radio
6. Phonograph
7. Painting
8. Theatrical Exhibition
9. Cinematographic Exhibition
10. Any similar means
Q: What if A told B, if you will not give me P100,000, I will inform your husband that you are having
an affair with another man. What crime is committed by A?
A: Crime committed is Light Threats. It is a form of Blackmailing which constitutes light threats.
Q: If you will not give me P100,000, I will publish on the magazine, on the newspaper, your love
letters to the said man who is not your husband. What crime is committed?
A: Crime committed is Threatening to Publish a Libel, also a form of Blackmailing.
BLACKMAILING – is an unlawful extortion of money appearing [on the fears] of the offended party,
can either be light threats or threatening to publish libel
􀂾 It is light threats if the offender asks the money or any other consideration in exchange for a doing
of a wrong which does not constitute a crime.
􀂾 Otherwise, if the thing to be published would involve the morality of the person, then you are
threatening to publish a libel.
Where do you file a case of Libel?
􀂾 You file a case of Libel before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Although the penalty for libel is
prision correcional in its minimum and medium period, it should be filed before the MTC under the
Rules of Court, yet Revised Penal Code (RPC) itself, a substantive law, states that all libel cases
must be filed before the RTC.
􀂾 Rules of Court is only a procedural law. Therefore, the substantive law, the Revised Penal Code,
should be followed.
Where shall be these cases of libel be filed?
􀂾 It depends. Generally, it should be filed before the RTC where the article was printed or first
published or the RTC where the offended party is residing at the time of the commission of the crime.
􀂾 If the offended party is a public officer and is working in City of Manila, it must be filed before RTC
of Manila or the RTC where the article was printed and first published.
􀂾 If the public officer is not working in Manila, it shall be filed in the RTC of the province or city where
he is working at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article was printed
or was first published.
􀂾 If libelous article refers to a private individual who is the offended party, it can be filed before the
RTC of the place where the private individual resides at the time of the actual commission of the
offense or where the libelous material was printed or first published.
ART. 357 – PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE COURSE OF
OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 20 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any reporter, editor or manager or a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts
connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is
necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have
been mentioned.
ART. 358 – SLANDER
Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
ORAL DEFAMATION/SLANDER
1. Grave Slander- when serious and insulting in nature.
2. Simple Slander
Factors to consider whether serious or insulting in nature:
- there are no concrete parameters in order to determine whether the said defamatory statement is
serious or insulting in nature. You have to take into consideration not only the grammar and meaning
sense of the statement, but also the:
a. Personal relations of the accused and the offended party
b. Facts and Circumstances surrounding the case
c. Social standing and position of the offended party.
􀂾 All of which must be considered in order to determine whether it would constitute Grave Slander or
Simple Slander
Q: Calling a public officer a magnanakaw without any evidence.
A: It would constitute criminal case of Slander
Q: What about the phrase of Putang ina mo? Is it considered as a slanderous remark?
A: In the case of Pader vs. People, PUTANG INA MO is not a slanderous remark. It is merely an
expression of the Filipino People. When a Filipino is sad, happy, angry or surprised, he says this
word.
PADER v. PEOPLE
There was a drunk man who passed by the house of a political candidate. Their families are enemies.
A told to the family of B, “putang ina mo B, magnanakaw ka sa bayan”. So because of this, B filed a
case of oral defamation or slander.
The Supreme Court said that phrase is not considered as a defamatory statement. It is a mere
expression on the part of the Filipino People. The crime committed by the offender is only SIMPLE
ORAL DEFAMATION or SIMPLE SLANDER, not grave. Although the offended party is running for
a political position. The Court has taken into consideration the antecedent facts of the case. Their
families are enemies of each other.
ART. 359 – SLANDER BY DEED
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or
a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act
not included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another
person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
SLANDER BY DEED refers to the commission of acts, it does not refer to the use of words, with the
intent to blemish the credit and reputation of another person.
It can also be
a. serious, grave slander by deed – serious and insulting
b. simple slander by deed.
􀂾 The Supreme Court said that there are no concrete parameters when you should consider it grave
slander by deed or simple slander by deed. It depends on the sound discretion of the court.
Q: What if A, intending to defame or slander a priest, slapped the priest in front of his ___
A: Crime committed is SERIOUS SLANDER BY DEED because of the reputation, the status in life
of the said person.
BUATIS v. PEOPLE
An open letter was addressed to the Atty. Pieraz which contained Libelous statements such as Satan,
senile, stupid and according to the offender, the offended party uses carabao English and ended the
letter in Satan’s name. This letter was read by the wife of the offended party. It came to the
knowledge of not only the wife but also the children.
Issue: would you consider the wife as a 3rd person, a public, in so far as libel is concerned?
SC: The wife is still considered as a third person. For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must concur:
1. It must be defamatory
2. it must be malicious
3. It must be given publicly
4. The victim must be identifiable
DEFAMATORY – The latter contained libelous remarks such us satan, senile, stupid, and English
carabao
MALICIOUS – every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if NO
GOOD INTENTION or JUSTIFIABLE MOTIVE for making it is shown
PUBLICLY – publication means the making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to
someone other than the person against whom it has been written. It is enough that the author of the
libel has communicated it to a third person.
- In addition, the open letter was found in a mailbox, open to the public.
IDENTIFIABLE – The libelous letter was addressed to the respondent himself.
Section two: General Provisions
[not discussed]
ART. 360 – PERSONS RESPONSIBLE.
Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or
pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the
City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first published:
Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is
filed and vice versa:
Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first
filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And, provided, finally, That this
amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which
have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal action for written defamations as provided for in the chapter
shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of
the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed
by the offended party. (As amended by R.A. 1289, approved June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363, approved
June 19, 1965).
ART. 361 – PROOF OF THE TRUTH
In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears
that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted,
unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts
related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
ART. 362 – LIBELOUS REMARKS.
Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article
354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a
newspaper from criminal liability.
CHAPTER TWO – INCRIMINATORY MACHINATIONS
ART. 363 – INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSON
Any person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent
person the commission of a crime, shall be punished by arresto menor.
􀂾 Act commited by any person, directly incriminating or imputes to an innocent person the
commission of the crime outside perjury
􀂾 It is necessary that it must not be made on an affidavit, because if it is through an affidavit, it will
be perjury.
􀂾 EXCEPTIONS:
o perjury (sworn affidavit), or
o sec 29 of RA 9165 (Planting of evidence)
Q: A in his counter-affidavit, in his sworn statement, imputed upon A the commission of the crime of
theft, what crime is committed?
A: PERJURY. It is a sworn statement under oath before a public officer.
Q: What if a Magic ballpen was lost in a party. A took the magic ballpen of B, and then surreptitiously
entered it inside the bag of C. And so when everybody was looking for it, it was found in the bag of
C. However, someone saw A did the act. What crime if any is committed by A?
A: A IS LIABLE FOR INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSONS. Incriminating innocent persons is
about PLANTING OF EVIDENCE in order to impute, incriminate another person the commission of
the crime.
Q: A and B are neighbors, A is mad at B, and deliberately bumped B and in course thereof, he
inserted a plastic sachet of shabu in the pocket of B and then he told the police that B has a shabu
inside his pocket. What crime if any is committed by A?
A: Crime committed is Sec. 29 of R.A. 9165, planting of evidence. If what has been planted is
any dangerous drugs, the crime committed is particular, Sec. 29 of R.A. 9165, because the special
penal law specifically punishes the planting of dangerous drugs. If it is any other thing, a necklace
was lost and A planted it inside the bag of B, the crime committed is incriminating innocent persons.
Q: What if a police officer was mad at X, and so what he did was, while X was sitting, he deliberately
planted an unlicensed firearm inside the bag of X and thereafter arrested X, what crime is committed
by the said police officer?
A: He committed unlawful arrest. He arrested X without any justifiable reason thereof. He
incriminates upon the innocent person the commission of the crime which is illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm. So here, unlawful arrest was committed by incriminating innocent persons.
UNLAWFUL ARREST THROUGH INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSONS. It is a complex crime
under Art. 48 of Book I because the incriminating of innocent persons is a necessary means to
commit unlawful arrest.
ART. 364. INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR
The penalty of arresto menor or fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed for any intrigue
which has for its principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of a person.
􀂾 This refers to any intrigue which has for its purpose to cause blemish or dishonor on the reputation
of any person
􀂾 It refers to any scheme or plot which is designed to blemish or dishonor the reputation of any person
Common Example:
“Isang chismis na hindi alam kung saan nagsimula”
o It is an intrigue which spread a negative rumor, you don’t even know where it started. It is a plot, a
scheme in order to detain or blemish the reputation of another person
Crime committed is INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR.
TITLE FOURTEEN
QUASI-OFFENSES
Sole Chapter – CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Art. 365 – IMPRUDENCE AND NEGLIGENCE
Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than
that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person
shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
(As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).
IVLER v. HON MODESTO
There was this vehicular accident and the husband, Ponce, died. The wife suffered only slight
physical injuries. Two charges were filed in the court: Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Slight
Physical Injuries and Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Damage to Property.
In the case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Slight Physical, Jason Ivler immediately pleaded
guilty to the crime charged. The judgment became final and executory. During the arraignment of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Damage to Property, the council of Jason Ivler filed
a motion to quash claiming that he can no longer be prosecuted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide and Damage to Property because he has already been convicted of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Slight Physical Injuries. He cannot be prosecuted based on the same
offense otherwise; the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This was denied so it went up to
the SC by a petition for certiorari. The SC said, Jason Ivler and his counsel are correct. A person
can no longer be prosecuted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Damage to
Property after he is convicted of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Slight Physical Injuries. SC said,
what is being punished is the reckless imprudence. Since what is punished is reckless imprudence
the damage to property and slight physical injuries or homicide are only resulting felonies. Since
they are only resulting felonies, since the crime being punished is the imprudence or negligence,
one can no longer be prosecuted or convicted after he has already been convicted and prosecuted
of the same offense. Reckless imprudence and simple negligence are crimes by themselves. THEY
ARE QUASI-OFFENSES. Therefore, to prosecute a person after he has been convicted of simple
negligence, will result to double jeopardy.
Take note of the case of Ivler v. Hon Modesto.
Reckless imprudence or negligence is the crime itself. Hence, once committed or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Art 365 of the RPC lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
1st case: reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
2nd case: reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to property
􀂾 One quasi-offense cannot give rise to another quasi-offense.
􀂾 Note simple negligence is not a means to commit a crime. They are crimes by themselves.
Q: What if A was driving his car and he collided with another car. As a result thereof, let’s say that a
person died and 4 persons suffered serious physical injuries, they have wounds but they survived.
And 1 person suffered slight physical injuries. What is/are the crime committed by A?
A: The offender is liable for RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AND
MULTIPLE PHYSICAL INJURIES BUT NOT SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY. There should be another
charge for RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES. You cannot
complex slight physical injury in the first crime because it is only a light felony. And its complexity is
prohibited under Art.48. But in reality, you no longer file a case of reckless imprudence resulting to
slight physical injury because the moment the offender is convicted, patay na yung first case.
Because there will already be double jeopardy. In reckless imprudence and simple negligence what
is being punished is the imprudence and negligence that’s why the appropriate name is reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide, simple negligence causing damage to property, simple negligence
resulting to homicide not homicide through reckless imprudence because what is being punished is
the imprudence and negligence. Homicide and damage to property are merely results of the said
imprudence or negligence.
􀂾 Remember also that under Art 265 that if the result of imprudence or negligence is only damage to
property the penalty shall only be fine. There is no penalty of imprisonment.
PAZ CHENG v. PEOPLE (estafa – jewelry)
FACTS: Three (3) separate Informations were filed charging Cheng of the crime of Estafa defined
and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 226 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75440, Q-98-75441, and Q-98-75442.
According to the prosecution, private complainant Rowena Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and Cheng
entered into an agreement whereby Rodriguez shall deliver pieces of jewelry to Cheng for the latter
to sell on commission basis. After one month, Cheng is obliged to either: (a) remit the proceeds of
the sold jewelry; or (b) return the unsold jewelry to the former. On different dates (i.e., July 12, 1997,
July 16, 1997, and August 12, 1997), Rodriguez delivered various sets of jewelry to Cheng in the
respective amounts of P18,000.00, P36,000.00, and P257,950.00. Upon delivery of the last batch of
jewelry, Cheng issued a check worth P120,000.00 as full security for the first two (2) deliveries and
as partial security for the last. When Cheng failed to remit the proceeds or to return the unsold jewelry
on due date, Rodriguez presented the check to the bank for encashment, but was dishonored due
to insufficient funds. Upon assurance of Cheng, Rodriguez re-deposited the check, but again, the
same was dishonored because the drawee account had been closed. Rodriguez then decided to
confront Cheng, who then uttered "Akala mo, babayaran pa kita?" Thus, Rodriguez was constrained
to file the instant charges.
In defense, Cheng denied receiving any jewelry from Rodriguez or signing any document purporting
to be contracts of sale of jewelry, asserting that Rodriguez is a usurious moneylender. She then
admitted having an unpaid loan with Rodriguez and that she issued a check to serve as security for
the same, but was nevertheless surprised of her arrest due to the latter's filing of Estafa charges
against her.
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa. The RTC found that the
prosecution has sufficiently proven through documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a)
Rodriguez indeed gave Cheng several pieces of jewelry for the latter to either sell and remit the
proceeds or to return said jewelry if unsold to the former; and (b) Cheng neither returned the jewelry
nor remitted their proceeds to Rodriguez within the specified period despite the latter's demands. In
contrast, Cheng failed to substantiate her claims through the documentary evidence she presented
while her testimony was deemed to be incredible and not worthy of belief.
CA: affirmed RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly affirmed Cheng's conviction for three counts of Estafa defined and
penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
HELD: YES.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property;
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of money, goods,
or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by
the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received. In the case of Pamintuan v. People,
the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as
the proof needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit:
The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert"
and "misappropriate" connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for
one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to
deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account
of their whereabouts.
In this case, a judicious review of the case records reveals that the elements of Estafa, as defined
and penalized by the afore-cited provision, are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered
the jewelry to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required
to either remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c)
Cheng failed to do what was required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez
attempted to encash the check given by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored twice
for being drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez demanded
that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter disregarded such demand; (f) Cheng's acts
clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its value.
In a desperate attempt to absolve herself from liability, Cheng insists that Rodriguez admitted in her
own testimony that the transaction between them is not an agency on commission basis, but a plain
sale of jewelry with Rodriguez as the seller and Cheng as the buyer. As such, Cheng's non-payment
of the purchase price of the jewelry would only give rise to civil liability and not criminal liability.
The foregoing "admission" on the part of Rodriguez did not change the fact that her transactions with
Cheng should be properly deemed as an agency on a commission basis whereby Rodriguez, as the
owner of the jewelry, is the principal, while Cheng is the agent who is tasked to sell the same on
commission. In the eyes of the Court, Rodriguez merely accepted the check as full security for the
first and second batches of jewelry and as partial security for the last batch. It was only when Cheng
defaulted in her undertaking pursuant to their agreement that Rodriguez was constrained to treat the
check as the former's remittance of the proceeds of the sale of jewelry — albeit deficient — by
presenting it for encashment on October 20, 1997, or more than two (2) months after the delivery of
the last batch of jewelry. However, the check was dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds. This notwithstanding and with the assurance from Cheng that the check will be cleared,
Rodriguez presented such check for the second time on November 4, 1997; but it was again
dishonored — this time for being drawn against a closed account. As such, the fact that Rodriguez
loosely used the words "payment" and "paid" should not be taken against her and should not in any
way change the nature of her transactions with Rodriguez from an agency on a commission basis
to a full-fledged sale. Moreover, even Cheng does not consider such check as payment for the
jewelry, but rather, as security for the loan she allegedly obtained from Rodriguez.
SAN DIEGO v PEOPLE (cooperative – qualified theft not estafa)
FACTS: Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997. Petitioner was in charge of
accounting all business transactions of the cooperative and performed the functions of cashier and
teller, granted loans and did check discounting and trading. She also recorded and reported the cash
in bank transactions and summarized the bank transactions for the day and was also entrusted with
a set of blank checks pre-signed and was authorized to fill up the checks, particularly the date, the
amount in words and in figures, and the payee.
That from November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, petitioner acted as cashier when Teresita
Gonzales was on maternity leave and acted as teller from January 13-30, 1997 when Flordeliza
Ocampo was on her honeymoon. She then, on both occasions, had complete access to the cash
vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative where its documents were kept.
On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped reporting for work. Narciso Correa, the General Manager of
the cooperative, then instructed the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis, to prepare bank book balance
based on the cash transactions during the day at the office. They tried to establish the accountability
of San Diego by comparing the cash position she prepared and certified as correct against the
balances of the bank. Dimapelis asked the different depository banks for their bank balances since
their savings account passbooks and bank statements were missing at that time.
It was only after Corres and Dimapelis reconciled the cash position with the bank balances that they
discovered the discrepancies in petitioner's report. The audited figure showed the cash on hand in
bank to be Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11, 1997. However, petitioner reported and certified the
cash on hand of the cooperative with the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be correct.
Dimapelis reported the said discrepancies to Correa and the Board of Directors. It was then that they
decided to file a criminal complaint against San Diego.
Crime Charged: Qualified theft
RTC: guilty of the crime charged
CA: affirmed the ruling of the RTC
Petitioner then insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission of estafa and not
qualified theft. Petitioner argued that if the thing is not taken away, but received and then
appropriated or converted without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is estafa.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of qualified theft.
HELD: YES. This Court is not persuaded by her argument. One of the elements of estafa with abuse
of confidence is that the money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return, the same. When the thing is received by the offender from the offended
party in trust or in commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
transferred and this he may set up even against the owner. It was established in the trial that
petitioner never received the sum of money in trust, or on commission or for administration. Correa
outlined the procedure followed by the cooperative in the deposit of its funds with the cooperative's
depository banks, thus:
A: There were cash summarized for the day and the checks collected during the day for the different
depository banks are summarized and prepared by Grace San Diego and this (sic) were being
brought to the different depository banks and sent through our liaison office Mr. Al Gonzales. 27
xxx xxx xxx
When asked how said funds were withdrawn from said banks by the cooperative, Correa answered:
A: Normally, withdrawals are made by checks and if there are no cleared checks in the bank the
accountant because she knew the cash position in the bank if there is a need of cash, a check is
converted into cash in the depository bank and sent through the liaison officer and handed to the
chief accountant because she was the one responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
As to how checks were prepared as far as withdrawals were concerned was, Correa's answer was:
A: Because we have so many things to do, we were busy we were preoccupied, we prepared set of
blank check resigned and we entrusted this to Ms. Grace San Diego and she filled up the checks
particularly the date, the words, the amount in words and in figure numbers, sir.
Clearly, the above testimonies show that petitioner did not have juridical possession of the sum of
money. She did not have the right over the sum of money she may have received in the course of
her functions as accountant, teller and cashier of the cooperative. The CA was correct when it
described the possession of the petitioner was akin to that of a receiving teller of funds received from
third persons paid to the bank. Payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself;
the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent, autonomous
right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency, as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without
his fault.
PEOPLE v MATEO (illegal recruitment)
FACTS: Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private complainants,
namely, Abel E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza (Victorio), Manuel
Oledan (Manuel) and Virgilio N. Concepcion (Virgilio), met appellants on separate occasions at
Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for overseas employment. Appellant Mateo, representing
himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as
conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could facilitate
private complainants' employment as direct hires and assured their departure within three weeks.
However, after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to
P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them. Appellants likewise
failed to return private complainants' money. This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a Certification stating that appellants are
not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Thereupon, the private complainants
filed their Complaint and executed their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). The NBI referred the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable
cause against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa and accordingly filed the
corresponding Informations for the same before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate car importer
and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the private complainants whom
she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor's Office.
Crime charged: illegal recruitment under RA 8042 and 5 counts of estafa
RTC: guilty as charged
In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the
elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They contended that Abel has not shown any
receipt to prove that they received money from him; that there is likewise no proof that Virgilio
borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony
of Emilio that appellants were holding office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and
that their transactions with Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel
documents.
CA: affirmed RTC’s decision
ISSUE: WON the accused are guilty of the crime charged.
HELD: YES.
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the person charged
undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have
the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused
committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. These elements are
obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a recruitment activity
when they promised private complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was
affirmed by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge." And when his
findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court. Second, the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that
appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. Notably,
appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was established that there were five
complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly
proved by the prosecution.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private complainants
deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to a prosecution for illegal
recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law includes the phrase
"whether for profit or not." Besides, even if there is no receipt for the money given by the private
complainants to appellants, the former's respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the
latter's involvement in the prohibited recruitment.
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment
under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par.
2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation." All these elements are likewise present in
this case.
“Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private complainants by making
it appear as though they had the authority and resources to send them to Japan for employment;
that there were available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be hired although, in truth,
there were none; and, that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the private complainants
parted with their money in payment of the placement fee, documentation and hotel accommodations.
All these representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellants must be made
liable under par 2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code”.
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing any of the complainants must necessarily fail.
As noted by the RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the transactions, serving as runner of
Mateo and was even the one keeping the money entrusted by the private complainants to appellants.
She would also often pacify the private complainants' uneasiness about the absence of receipts for
each of the amounts given and repeatedly assure them they would be deployed to Japan. In short,
she was an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of Mateo in the illegal recruitment of
the private complainants.
ESTRELLADO-MAINAR v PEOPLE
FACTS: Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of
land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told
Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no problems. The petitioner also informed Naval
that the area subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from the mother title."
On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sel where the petitioner agreed
to sell to Naval a 200-square meter portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-19932 representing a portion of the petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father,
Nicolas Estrellado. Naval paid a down payment totaling P100,000.00, and then asked permission
from the petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought. After the petitioner issued
an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the subject land.
On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's
house. It was only then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a
dispute between the petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the
return of the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house demolished, but
the latter refused to heed these demands.
Crime charged: other forms of swindling under Article 316 (1)
MTCC: guilty of other forms of swindling under Article 316 (2)
RTC: affirmed
CA: dismissed the petition
ISSUE: WON the accused should be convicted under Art. 316 (2) when the charged against her was
under Art. 316(1).
HELD: NO.
Section 14 (2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the
Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts
alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption
of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be
alleged in the Information.
To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which punishes "[a]ny person
who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the
same."
The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes
the act of any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same,
although such encumbrance is not recorded.
The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew
that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that
there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is free from
encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage
of another.
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its caption that it is charging
the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged that the petitioner
"with deceit and intent to defraud," pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter
portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her knowledge that the entire property had
already been sold and was owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been alleged that the
petitioner expressly represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance.
We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an
express representation that the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information was
crafted in such a way that only one particular crime was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and
the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that is, by pretending to be the
lawful owner . . .) did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be
committed even by the owner of the property.
Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did not contain
any representation by the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance.
There is an annotation of adverse claim at the back of the TCT.
At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered property; the Crime charged: forcible abduction with rape
vendor must have represented to the buyer that the property was free from encumbrance. What RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, as defined and
brings about criminal liability is the deceit in selling the property. Corollarily, the deed must have a penalized under Article 342 and Article266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
statement of warranty that is false in order to commit the offense. The petitioner's passive attitude in relation to Article 48 thereof. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
regarding the presence of an adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became aware of this perpetua and to pay the costs.
inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT No. T-19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient CA: affirmed
to constitute fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud and/or deceit by misrepresentation ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape (YES)
contemplated by law must be the result of overt acts; they cannot be implied or presumed. HELD: YES, the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.
In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial courts erroneously convicted the petitioner The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.To uphold the Code, are:
petitioner's conviction for an offense other than that charged in the Information would be a violation 1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation;
of her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. 2) that she is taken against her will; and
For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the 3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
Revised Penal Code, the following essential elements of this crime must be established: (1) that the On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building; (2) that the offender who is not by:
the owner of said property should represent that he is the owner thereof; (3) that the offender 1) force or intimidation, or
should have executed an act of ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging 2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or
the property; and (4) that the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person. 3) when she is under twelve years of age.
The presence of the first and third elements are beyond question, as the parties admitted that the The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven
petitioner sold to Naval a 200-square meter parcel of landlocated in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. The (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her that he knew her mother
fourth element is likewise settled, as the petitioner did not deny that Naval paid her a total of and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived by
P123,000.00. The fact of destruction of Naval's house by the representatives of JS Francisco is also appellant. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially
not disputed. since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that
With regard to the second element, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible
the Information that the petitioner pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter portion of abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
a lot covered by TCT No. 19932. During the direct examination, AAA recounted the rape incident and positively identified appellant
It is not disputed that the petitioner was one of the nine (9) children of Nicolas and Narcisa, who as the perpetrator. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the
was the registered owner of TCT No. T-19932 entered at the Registry of Deeds of Davao City on victim suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.
October 31, 1967. The Register of Deeds of Davao City eventually cancelled TCT No. T-19932 and Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. AAA’s
issued a new title (TCT No. T-364319) in the name of "Nicolas Estrellado, married to Narcisa Trono, abduction was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated
both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Davao City, Philippines." and ensured by her abduction.
In Naval's own complaint-affidavit, he stated that the petitioner informed him during the In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's testimony
negotiations for the sale "that the area that I will buy would still be segregated from the mother title." because of the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The issue
30 In this same complaint-affidavit, Naval also stated that he caused the property to be surveyed in therefore boils down to credibility. Significantly, findings of fact of the trial court should not be
order to determine the boundaries of the area he bought, and to separate it from the mother title. disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on
These statements were corroborated by Naval's wife, Josephine, who stated in her own affidavit that the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the petitioner told her and Naval that the subject property was still part of the mother title. In addition,
the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
stipulation no. 3 of the Agreement to Buy and Sell provides that ". . . the SELLER shall cause the Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
subdivision of the title and take out two hundred (200) square meters portion of the BUYER from the particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
SELLER's nine hundred thirty six (936) square meters share." to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner did not pretend to be the owner of the immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only
property sold. From the very start, the petitioner made it clear to Naval that the subject property was her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which
still under the name of her (petitioner's) father; and that the area subject of the sale would still be she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
segregated from the mother title. Naval also admitted that he saw the front page of the land's title Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward manner.
showing Nicolas to be its registered owner. The element of deceit — central to prosecutions for On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi. It is jurisprudential that denial
swindling — is therefore wanting. We additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs (Narcisa and his nine and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
legitimate children) eventually executed anExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
Shares, Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale where they agreed, among others, to give a portion overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the appellant and his
(totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land covered by TCT No. T-364319 to the petitioner. involvement in the crime attributed to him. Alibi is evidence negative in nature and self-serving and
In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for other forms of swindling
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and
under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Codeabsent a finding that she employed fraud positive evidence.
or deceit in the form of false pretenses with regard to her ownership of the real property sold. The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
ratiocinating, to wit:
TITLE 11 The presence of lewd intentions is established by the conduct of the accused during the abduction.
PEOPLE v AMARO When the girl is defiled, the forcible abduction becomes the means to commit the rape, and since
FACTS: rape is the more serious offense, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1998 at more or less 5:00 in the afternoon in front of Boots of forcible abduction with rape is committed and penalized by reclusion perpetua, the penalty proper
& Maya located at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified to rape.
that she was walking on her way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She For clarity, the lower courts should have emphasized that reclusion perpetua as the proper penalty
met a man, whom she later identified in court as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After for the crime of statutory rape was imposed in lieu of death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No.
buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave her bread and banana cue. After 7659. When Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited the imposition of death penalty, persons convicted of
eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant. offenses punished with death penalty will now be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed
her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried PEOPLE v CAYANAN
but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped FACTS: The prosecution established that accused-appellant Marvin Cayanan (Cayanan) took
five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellant’s penis touched the outer portion of her vagina. advantage of 15-year old AAA on February 1, 2001 while the victim was alone inside her house.
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, Cayanan is the victim’s brother-in-law, being married to her older sister, and the couple lived in a
a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to the police nearby house. AAA was asleep when she felt someone caressing her. It turned out to be Cayanan.
station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken away but he did nothing. He then started kissing her and told her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant because the took it off and after the latter took off his own under garment, he inserted his organ into her genitalia.
latter promised to bring her home. Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and informed anybody of
Accused’s Version the incident.
He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the latter to his house when AAA On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend Armina Adriano
approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to take her with him because she was (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy Manalastas. Cayanan then
always being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he covered her mouth. They alighted
of Florante Magay’s sister. Appellant then went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop where he asked someone to give
only decided to go back home when he heard his name on the radio in connection with the her a change of clothes as she was in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then
disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house brought her to his sister’s house where he raped her inside a bedroom. Afterwards, a certain couple
in Buncag. AAA walked alone towards her house. Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office where she was
According to appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter was not in his custody at the time asked to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latter’s
said incident allegedly happened. Appellant adds that he entrusted AAA to the custody of Florante mother and sister-in-law who brought her home later that evening.
Magay’s sister because he was working. Appellant also insists that AAA voluntarily went with him to
his house.
She told her mother and brother of the incidents only after her classmate Adriano informed her family
of what happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA testified that she did not immediately tell
her family because she was still in a state of shock.
Adriano and the victim’s mother corroborated her testimony. A resident psychiatrist at the National
Center for Mental Health also testified that AAA was suffering from mental depressive
symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse.
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense.
Crimes charged: qualified rape and forcible abduction with qualified rape
RTC: convicted
The RTC did not give credit to his sweetheart defense, ruling that it is a weak defense and does not
rule out the use of force given the prosecution’s evidence. He also failed to establish the genuineness
and authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA.
CA: sustained the ruling of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes qualified rape and forcible abduction
with qualified rape (QUALIFIED RAPE – YES; FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH QUALIFIED RAPE
– NO, QUALIFIED RAPE only)
HELD:
A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any reversible error in affirming
Cayanan’s conviction for the crime of qualified rape.
Record shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex with him on February 1, 2001 and threatened
her and her family with physical harm. The testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAA’s
testimony that Cayanan forcibly took her by the school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and
thereafter raped her. The defense failed to show any reason why the prosecution’s evidence should
not be given weight or credit.
Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission of the crimes.
For the Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory.
Independent proof is required ― such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. And while
Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding
of the RTC that these letters were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative value.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of qualified rape in the second
criminal case, not forcible abduction with qualified rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the
crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this case,
circumstances show that the victim’s abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after
Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his sister’s
house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape absorbed the
forcible abduction.
NOTE: qualified because rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon (knife)
TITLE 12
CAPILI v PEOPLE (prejudicial question? NO!)
FACTS: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:
1. there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC
of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;
2. in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge
of bigamy; and
3. the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.
Crime charged: bigamy
RTC: dismissed the case against the accused
CA: reversed the RTC’s decision
ISSUE: WON the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case for bigamy (NO)
HELD: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:
1) the offender has been legally married;
2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo
City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. The Court cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private complainant had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his second marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the second marriage was annulled.
PEOPLE vs. ODTUHAN (1st marriage declared void prior to bigamy case, so what?)
FACTS: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993, respondent
married Eleanor A. Alagon.
Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On
February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared
his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn
Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with bigamy.
Crime charged: bigamy
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do
not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
RTC: issued an Order denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion.
The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between
respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a
second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that
neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished,
because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing
criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA,
assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with
Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
CA: granted the instant petition for certiorari. It ordered the RTC to give due course to and receive
evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
The CA applied Morigo vs. People, and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to
quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void
ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. The CA thus concluded
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information,
considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES: WON the CA committed reversible error when it granted the respondent’s petition for
certiorari and the resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (YES, BIGAMY IS
PRESENT)
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of
their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition
for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which
was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against
respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the
criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to
the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage
on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration
of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to
comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage,
respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a
declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15,
2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an Information for bigamy against respondent which
the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases.
As in Antone and Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both
because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information.
On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, “a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information.” The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts
alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be
considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which
is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may
order that another complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the
ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the
allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime
as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
1) the offender has been legally married;
2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void
from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to
establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting
at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because
matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve
the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller
examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and
to quash the information on the basis of the document presented by respondent. With the
presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima
facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission
thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with
Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the
crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at
the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA
heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo vs. People where the accused therein was
acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first
marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak
of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires
is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If we allow respondent’s line of
defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him,
because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him. Again, the Court cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above,
settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law
and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription.
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to
present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
SANTOS vs. SANTOS (domestic helper in HK; presumptive death)
FACTS: The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic
fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy
when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed
a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Respondent’s Version (husband/spouse present)
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina
rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June
18, 1980. After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business.
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her
to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's
insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita,
Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired
about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
Petitioner’s Version (wife/absent spouse)
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived
her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune
Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring
her presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic
helper abroad. Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. She also claimed
that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left
their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit
with another woman.
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.
CA: dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is
appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death. She added that it would
be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place.
She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive
death is obtained fraudulently.
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
declaring her presumptive death.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring her presumptive death (YES)
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is extrinsic or collateral
when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest,
or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17, 2008. This was less than two
years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year
period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is
the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of
the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead,
that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his
or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions:
1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio;
2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the
sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance;
3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and
4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal.
This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.
The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that
the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.
The Court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage in Social Security System vs. Vda. de Bailon. The Court noted that mere
reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent
marriage were notified if there was “no step taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
filing an affidavit of reappearance or by court action.” Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the
second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse
was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration
of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already
dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to
the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a
subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from
an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against
marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify
the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the
prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not
available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an
affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment
of judgment will, therefore, lie.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
LANSANAS v PEOPLE (nullity of 2nd marriage not a defense in bigamy)
FACTS: On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel,
Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of
a marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.
In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious
ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against
Socorro. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in
securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and
social humiliation warranting the award of damages.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC rendered its judgment in the civil case
dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage
between him and Socorro valid and legal.
Crime charged: bigamy
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in
finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element
of bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory
in his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration
of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.
CA: affirmed RTC ruling
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy (YES)
Defense
He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in
this purely criminal prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should
still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;
that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage
be valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him
of criminal liability.
HELD: The appeal lacks merit. Accused is guilty of bigamy.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
1) the offender has been legally married;
2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article
40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In numerous cases, the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
Hence, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was consummated
from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being
first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not
being yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.
“What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy,” according to People vs. Odtuhan: is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to
the institution of the criminal complaint against him, but after he had already contracted his second
marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC dismissed his
complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed
against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro.
Considering that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third
element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was
invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. In Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court has explained that since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
RONULO vs. PEOPLE (from Catholic Church to Aglipayan Church)
FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003
at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As recourse, Joey, who was then
dressed in barong tagalog, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown together with their parents, sponsors,
guests, proceeded to Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan
Church. They requested the petitioner to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC was filed against the petitoner before the
MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
Prosecution’s Version
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne
testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding
rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. She heard the petitioner instructing the principal
sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took
pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local registrar os San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano Nalupta, Jr. where she was given a
certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple.
Defense
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
Crime charged: violation of Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony
MTC: guilty. It held that petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he
made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner
violated Art. 352 of the RPC.
RTC: affirmed the ruling of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the
petitioner in “blessing” the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than
the petitioner’s negative statements.
CA: affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz: (1) the contracting parties
must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. According to
the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC (YES)
HELD:
The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA. The elements of the crime were proven by the prosecution.
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony.
The elements are as follows:
1) authority of the solemnizing officer;
2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
the only issue resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by the petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an “illegal marriage ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and
what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that “no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties
to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.” Pertinently, Article 3(3)
mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which
takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear
that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, the Court finds that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The Court also does not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when
it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This
pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
The Court emphasizes at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, it is clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a “blessing,” the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony” as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
As to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal,
under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore,
was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense
of good faith.
The Court also does not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of
the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability
of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
TITLE 13
BRILLANTE vs. CA & PEOPLE (Save Makati)
FACTS: Roberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of councilor in Makati City held a press
conference where he accused Jejomar Binay, a candidate for mayoralty in Makati, and Nemesio
Prudente of plotting an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another mayoral candidate in
Makati. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the same and an open letter was subsequently
published under the title “Plea to Cory--Save Makati” in newspapers such as the People’s Journal,
Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer. Binay and Prudente separately filed libel charges
against Brillante.
RTC-Manila (case filed by Prudente): found Brillante guilty of four counts of libel, as author or
writer, of libel defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Article 355
of the same code
RTC-Makati (case filed by Binay): Brillante was likewise convicted of five counts of libel
Brillante appealed the Decisions to the Court of Appeals. Brillante contended that when the
Informations were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense had already prescribed
because more than one year had elapsed since the publication of the open letter on January 10, 11
and 12, 1988. He also averred that the open letter which he wrote and caused to be published was
not defamatory and was without malice. Brillante also claimed that he wrote the open letter and
uttered the statement complained of during the January 7, 1988 press conference out of a social
duty to disclose to all concerned the dangers to which he and his fellow candidate Syjuco were
exposed in view of the concerted actions of Binay and Prudente. In effect, he argues that his
defamatory statements and utterances fall under Article 354, No. 1 and are in the nature of either a
privileged communication or a political libel.
CA: affirmed the RTC’s decision
The appellate court held that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed because the one-year
prescription period should be reckoned from the time that the private complainant Prudente filed his
complaint with the fiscal’s office on January 15, 1988 and not when the Informations were filed by
the prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals added that under Section 1, Rule 110,
which took effect during the pendency of the cases against Brillante, the institution of the
complaint before the fiscal’s office or the courts for preliminary investigation interrupts the
prescriptive period of the offense charged. It held that being a procedural rule, Section 1, Rule
110, applies to the cases against Brillante.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Brillante’s statements were qualified privileged communication (NO)
2) Whether or not Brillante’s statements constitute as political libel (NO)
3) Whether or not the act of libel charged against petitioner has prescribed (NO)
HELD:
1) NO. The Court is not convinced. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are
those mentioned in, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
1) A private communication made by a person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur:
1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of
the one to whom it is made;
2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest
or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
It may be argued that Brillante’s statements, which according to him were made in order to protect
himself and Syjuco as Binay’s rivals in the 1988 elections, as well as to protect the electorate from
possible acts of terrorism by Binay, Prudente and their associates and from casting their votes for
undeserving candidates, satisfy the first requisite. However, Brillante’s statements were based
merely on unconfirmed intelligence reports. His belief in such intelligence reports hardly justifies
the publication of such serious imputations against his political rivals. As a journalist and as a
candidate for public office, Brillante should have known that it is necessary to further verify the truth
or at least the reliability of the intelligence reports before making them public. His hasty publication
thereof negates the existence of good faith and justifiable motives.
It is the absence of the second element of a privileged communication that unequivocally negates
the characterization of Brillante’s statements as privileged communication. The law requires
that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such
statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in
the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the
statement.
In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the
communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers
of general circulation and was thus made known to the general public. Even if the interest
sought to be protected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general
public does not have the power to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by
Brillante in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar statements during the January 7, 1988
press conference. Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the information which
essentially destroyed the reputations of the complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of
malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.
Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as “a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or
to blacken the memory of one who is dead.”
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist:
1) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
2) publication of the charge;
3) identity of the person defamed; and
4) existence of malice
There could be no dispute as to the existence of all the elements of libel in the cases at bar.
An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter
the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Brillante’s statements during
the January 7, 1988 press conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible
acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their associates, such as the use of goons to
threaten Binay’s opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjuco’s assassination.
The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory
material is communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the
defamatory statement refers. In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory
statements during the press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open
letter to be published in several newspapers, namely, News Today, People’s Journal, Balita,
Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as the
persons who participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination of
Syjuco not only in his open letter but also during the press conference.
Since the open letter and the statements uttered by Brillante during the January 7, 1988 press
conference are defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally privileged communication,
malice is presumed and need not be proven separately from the existence of the defamatory
statement.
2) NO, Brillante’s statements do not constitute as political libel.
Unfounded and malicious statements made by one against another in the course of an election
campaign, or by reason of differences in political views are not per se constitutionally protected
speech. Our laws on defamation provide for sanctions against unjustified and malicious injury to a
person’s reputation and honor.
Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with
or relevant to their performance of official duties, or against public figures in relation to matters of
public interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit
of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public
officer’s performance of his duties, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
3) NO, the act of libel charged against petitioner has not yet prescribed.
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel shall prescribe within one year.
In determining when the one year prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made
to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of
offenses which states that period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. The filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office also suspends
the running of the prescriptive period of a crime. Like the proceedings in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or
acquittal.
BUATIS vs. PEOPLE (inutile; carabao English, stupidity, Yours in Satan name)
FACTS: On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Pieraz, retrieved a letter from
their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and
Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on her husband’s desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter
and made out its content. It reads:
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila
Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to
our client; using carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita
Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to
his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against
you.
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for
you to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present
case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in
filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice,
so as we can prove “who is who” once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly informed regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a
communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr.
dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: “Satan, senile, stupid, English
carabao,” Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its
contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided
him telling him: “Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.”
Crime charged: libel
RTC: guilty of the crime of libel
The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer “inutil”, stupid and capable of using only carabao English,
is intended not only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the
libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent
and an affront to his standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was
representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person represented by petitioner;
the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the
entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from
the defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been couched in a civil and
respectful manner, as the intention of petitioner was only to advise respondent that demand was not
proper and legal but instead petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by
satanic intention.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of
other persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity
was also established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s stance that
the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to
reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of
petitioner’s association.
CA: affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they
impeached the good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected
petitioner’s claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability
since he failed to come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and
downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called
“duty” in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the letter, thus, it
cannot be classified as privileged.
ISSUE: Whether or petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel (YES)
HELD: In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling in People vs.
Velasco that “if the act/matter charged as libelous is only an incident in an act which has another
objective, the crime is not libel;” when he made his reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco
making a demand for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs.
Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over
the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator
of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer
under obligation to defend a client’s cause is but a privileged communication; the instant case is a
qualified privileged communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however, respondent failed
to present actual proof of malice; the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence
that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was ill will or ill feeling between
them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all
indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was justifiable
motive in sending such a letter which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to abate
any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized,
there is justification for the use of those words, to wit: “lousy but inutile threatening letter…using
carabao English” was due to the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it
does not serve its purpose as respondent’s client has no legal right over the property and respondent
did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus
he is stupid; that the words “Yours in Satan name” is only a complementary greeting used in an
ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being
communicated and which is just the reverse of saying “Yours in Christ.”
The Court denies the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
1) it must be defamatory;
2) it must be malicious;
3) it must be given publicity; and
4) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in
this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to
someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioner’s subject letter-reply
itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the
letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated
it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in
an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to
respondent himself.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, the Court laid
down the rule in Jimenez vs. Reyes, to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co., the court had the following to say on this point:
“In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are
conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such
a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would
naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be
construed as a whole.”
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or
ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being
the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been
assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect
of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.
Gauging from the above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent
by petitioner to respondent are defamatory. In using words such as “lousy”, “inutile”, “carabao
English”, “stupidity”, and “satan”, the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character,
integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence
aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused
respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: “Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.”
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down
in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is
defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law). A reading of
petitioner’s subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such
a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s
good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal
inference of malice.
Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of
his moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where
Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate,
thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous. The Court is not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. ─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral,
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a
qualified privileged communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication
under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur:
1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of
the one to whom it is made;
2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest
or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of
the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand
letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does
not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the
premises as against the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely contained insulting words,
i.e., “lousy” and “inutile letter using carabao English”, “stupidity”, and “satan”, which are totally
irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written had
only the effect of maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as
legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for so many years until his
retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was
crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed
respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on
petitioner’s part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty
to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have
some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought
by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified
as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. In this case, petitioner
admitted that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print
out of the computer. While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter
showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice
and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Such publication had already created
upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s
reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed
above.
Penalty
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos,
or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or
conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment
only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for
alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, the Court deleted the
prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to
double the amount of the check.
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 was then issued. On February 14, 2001, we issued
Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing
that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. 22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, the Court finds the reasons behind the imposition of fine
instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. It is noted that this is petitioner’s
first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to
Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC
and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to
private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he
did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case.
The Court believes that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the
social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the
individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. Consequently, the Court deletes the
prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand pesos.
TULFO v PEOPLE
FACTS: On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate
informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay City.
These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and
charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing
House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of
the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999;
and June 25, 1999.
Criminal Case No. 99-1598 – Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of
Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata na government official sa buong bansa sa
pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.
Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro
nito. Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.
Criminal Case No. 99-1599 – SI ATTY. SO NG BOC
"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa South
Harbor.
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw
ideklara ang totoong laman ng mga container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs
duties at taxes.
Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din
niya ng salapi yung ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig
diyan sa mga buwayang taga BOC.
Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga, ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.
Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para
kumita ng mas mabilis. Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay sa iyo ang
pagiging buwayang naka korbata at holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!"
Criminal Case No. 99-1600 – "Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Division,
saksakan din ng lakas itong si Daniel Aquino ng Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa
South Harbor. Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino. Panghihingi ng pera sa mga
brokers, ang lakad nito. Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-release ng
kanilang kargamento."
Criminal Case No. 99-1597 – Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng Bureau of
Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at ilang opisyales ng Remate sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong
tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko siya at inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC. Hoy, So . . .
dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog na ang
iyong kaluluwa sa impyerno.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the following: (1) that during the four dates of the publication of
the questioned articles, the complaining witness was not assigned at South Harbor; (2) that the
accused and complaining witness did not know each other during all the time material to the four
dates of publication; (3) that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the Philippines;
(4) the existence and genuineness of the Remate newspaper; (5) the column therein and its
authorship and the alleged libelous statement as well as the editorial post containing the designated
positions of the other accused; and (6) the prosecution's qualified admission that it is the duty of
media persons to expose corruption.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M. Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys
Fontanilla, and complainant Atty. So. The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well.
Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo, and that the articles were untrue
because he had known Atty. So since 1992 and had worked with him in the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service Division of the Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading
the articles written by Tulfo, he concluded that they referred to Atty. So because the subject articles
identified "Atty. Carlos" as "Atty. 'Ding' So" of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service
Division, Bureau of Customs and there was only one Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs.
7
Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified that she issued a certification in
connection with these cases upon the request of Atty. So. 8 This certification stated that as per
records available in her office, there was only one employee by the name of "Atty. Carlos T. So" who
was also known as "Atty. Ding So" in the Intelligence Division of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service or in the entire Bureau of Customs. 9
Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer,
and that having read the articles of Tulfo, he believed that these were untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos
"Ding" So. 10
Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these consolidated cases. He further testified
that he is also known as Atty. "Ding" So, that he had been connected with the Bureau of Customs
since October 1981, and that he was assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service Division at the Manila International Container Port since
December 27, 1999. He executed two complaint-affidavits, one dated June 4, 1999 and the other
dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600. Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases
of libel against Raffy Tulfo, brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He testified that petitioner Tulfo's act of
imputing upon him criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor, discredit,
and contempt among his co-members in the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and employees and
superior officers in the Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said articles.
He said it also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings,
intrigues, and embarrassment. He further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the
officers of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national editor because
under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), they are equally responsible and liable to the
same extent as if they were the author of the articles. He also testified that "Ding" is his nickname
and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau of Customs who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos
T. So or Atty. Carlos "Ding" So. 11
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he
neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism
of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a
person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of
certain people to use other people's names to advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that
his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the
Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research
on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and
that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.
Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos "Ding" So when the latter filed a case
against them. He testified that he is an employee of Carlo Publishing House, Inc.; that he was
designated as the national editor of the newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of
the position are to edit, evaluate, encode, and supervise layout of the news from the provinces; and
that Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey Briones, Vice President for Editorial and Head of the
Editorial Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation in the subject articles of Tulfo,
nor had he anything to do with the latter's column.
Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies the news articles written
by the reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor;
Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor; and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner
Barlizo is her subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout
of the page assigned to her, the Metro page. She further testified that she had no participation in the
writing, editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo because the column was not edited. She claimed
that none among her co-accused from theRemate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the
publication and editing of the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given
blanket authority to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page wherein Tulfo's
column appeared was supervised by Bueno as news editor.
Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. since
December 1998. He testified that the company practice was to have the columnists report directly to
the vice-president of editorials, that the columnists were given autonomy on their columns, and that
the vice-president for editorials is the one who would decide what articles are to be published and
what are not. He further testified that Tulfo was already a regular contributor.
RTC: guilty of libel
CA: affirmed the RTC’s decision
ISSUE: WON the accused are guilty of libel.
HELD: YES.
In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals.
In essence, he argues that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged communication" under
Borjal and that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is
the burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.
This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being that Borjal stemmed
from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal case. Second, the ruling in
Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant, which shall be differentiated
from the present case in discussing the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in
Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a public official. Finally, it
was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were "fair commentaries on matters of public
interest". It shall be discussed and has yet to be determined whether or not the articles fall under the
category of "fair commentaries".
In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfo's articles being qualifiedly privileged
communication is raised for the first time in the present petition, and this particular issue was never
brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus, neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly
consider and evaluate this defense. Tulfo now draws parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal,
and argues that the prosecution should have proved malice in fact, and it was error on the part of
the trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in law in Art. 354 of the RPC. This
lays an unusual burden on the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to refute a defense that
Tulfo had never raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are privileged
communications must first be established by the defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC
and the CA. Even so, it shall be dealt with now, considering that an appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review. ITSacC
There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau
of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the
goings-on at the Bureau of Customs, a government agency, are matters of public interest. It is now
a matter of establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged
communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be liable.
Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to
commentaries made on public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the
freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has
stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that
right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the
rights of others.
The Journalist's Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows
that the press recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this
freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists "recognize the
duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly". Art. VIII states that
journalists "shall presume persons accused of crime of being innocent until proven otherwise".
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalist's Code of Ethics and
exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.
In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved
in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than
that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw sa miyembro nito". He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his
alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article,
challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-
expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."
In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had neither met nor
known him prior to the publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a
more in-depth research of his allegations before he published them, and relied only on his source at
the Bureau of Customs.
In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others
for personal gain, and even stated that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued then
that it may have been someone else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South
Harbor, and this person was the target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for
even with the knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else
may have used Atty. So's name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given
by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.
The trial court found Tulfo's accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity
of contents of articles does not affect their privileged character. It may be that the falsity of the articles
does not prove malice. Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their
publications. It cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered
by the mantle of qualified privileged communication.
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with
good faith and reasonable care". This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject
articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his
responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an
adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover
every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor
does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.
Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances
given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances
of qualified privileged communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on
a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it
is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts. 30 (Emphasis supplied.)
The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters of public interest". While Borjal places fair
commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject
of the article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author
from liability.Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it
must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As previously
mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not
exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles.
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of Customs
and relied only on this source for his columns, but did no further research on his story. The records
of the case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be.
Tulfo's articles related no specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt
public official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official. Although wider
latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to
their performance of official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public interest
involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. 31 Journalists still bear the burden of writing responsibly when
practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest.
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged
communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the
presumption of malice "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements which must
be present in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can
be dissected as follows:
In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the
following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not
of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no
details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless
accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to
substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack
the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion and the legal
profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in
Tulfo's articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are qualified privileged communications under the
RPC.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true", Tulfo's articles do not meet
the standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and honesty". 35 "True" is
defined as "conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest." 36 Tulfo failed to satisfy
these requirements, as he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown
that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports", but merely wild
accusations.
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged
communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues that
the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon the
prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should
have been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject articles.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 37 and reiterated in Flor
v. People, which should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. 38
The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with reckless
disregard of whether the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There was the finding
that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he based his writings, and that the defense
presented no evidence to show that the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue
that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was no malice attendant in his
articles. The test laid down is the "reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to meet that test.
The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered as
further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo, 39wherein publication after the
commencement of an action was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to injure the victim.
Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming
respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and
is proof of malice.
TITLE 14
IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO (vehicular collision; double jeopardy)
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline
L. Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Crimes charged:
1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and
2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler
moved to quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash
ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property (YES)
Defense
Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for
injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty.
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish
the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for
the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either
of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu
of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental
attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number
or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.
MARIANO vs. PEOPLE (“magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo”)
FACTS: Sometime, at about 6:30 in the evening, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner-type
jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-
year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also
came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner-type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo
Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años,
as passengers. They had just attended a worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got
mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the
jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and
Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and
kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought
the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo “magpasensiyahan
na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand.” Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice
of Luis and they went their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house
in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother
and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away
and lost consciousness. Urbanita shouted, “Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie.” She identified
the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
Accused's Version
Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in
front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-up.
Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter,
Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted
from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop
his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his
companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo
proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.
Crime charged: frustrated murder
RTC: convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Article 50 thereof
CA: modified the felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
Defense
In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt, and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists that he
lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should
have appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the accused is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
(YES)
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor (NO)
HELD:
1) YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of
Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand.
However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that
Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy
to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980
because they have a store where he used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo
should have foreseen the possibility that Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go inside the
house of his mother where the store is also located.
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed
and within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact
of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and
drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will
enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As
held in People vs. Garcia:
“A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is
responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have
performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all
those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of Ferdinand, he
could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was no
oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order
to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his injuries.
Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection
between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In the absence of any
cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven
his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to
overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
2) NO, contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code,
expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
“The rationale of the law,” according to People vs. Medroso, Jr.:
x x x can be found in the fact thatin quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness,
imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to
another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and
just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition, without
being bound by what We may call the mathematical formula provided for inArticle 64 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph
5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with
no aggravating circumstance to offset them.
Penalty
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the resulting
injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that
had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it
would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches
the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with Article
25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty
that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code;
and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty of either arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.
The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity of
the physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another,
shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
a. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured
person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
b. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence
of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to
hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use
of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor
habitually engaged;
c. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any
other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for
the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
d. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the
injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article
246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered
by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered by subdivision
number 3 byprision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by
subdivision number 4 by prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict
physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.
In its decision, the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the
inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma;
that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record
that he had testified at the trial that he was unable to attend to his general merchandise store for
three months due to temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and
a masseur.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did not fall
under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner’s act as
a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that
caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony, because
Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him
from the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the
rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in reckless imprudence, and
considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering
the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months
of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.
GONZAGA v PEOPLE (father and 2 children, on board a motorcycle)
FACTS: Prosecution’s Version
At around 6 o’clock in the morning, Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle to bring his two minor
children, Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry, to school. While they were ascending the curving road on their
proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Rogelio was swiftly
descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle
to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to
avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved
towards the same direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle.
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio,
Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood
of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry,
and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped
to help and placed the victims together on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc, while
Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance and chanced upon Kgd. Dadivas and
informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting his
vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle. Meanwhile, Rolf
went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia, of what had transpired.
Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital. Operations were performed on the
legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherry and Dionesio, Jr.
stayed in the hospital for more than one (1) month. All the expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.
Accused’s Version
Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane along the descending
curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of about 70 meters
away, he saw the motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr.and Rolf racing towards the curve from the
opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser’s
lane while Rolf was on his proper lane. Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid collision,
Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless, bumped into it.
As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the roof and the hood of the
Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle
were pinned beneath the land Cruiser. With the use of a jack handle and the assistance of two (2)
persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve
both Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the
victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought to the hospital, but the vehicle turned out
to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another vehicle instead.
Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with double serious physical
injuries and damage to property with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on
the spot to the injured party such help that was in his hands to give
RTC: found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
RTC sentenced him to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of
prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay civil liabilities.
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration which was partly granted, reducing the penalty to four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The RTC reconsidered its opinion
regarding Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid to the victims, concluding that the jack handle that
was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the
absence of showing who owned the same.
CA: reinstated the RTC’s Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the original indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and the same civil liabilities
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly imposed the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender
who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give” (NO)
HELD: Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something
more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard
of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others
within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a
course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved,
or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is
the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence
under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may
himself be considered likewise at fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast
on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death
of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where
the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were
bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very
fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist,
Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that
a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another
vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined
with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this
case, constitutes negligence.
Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast
speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened,
thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages
resulting therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was
Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the
limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next
higher in degree upon the offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give.” Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph:
(a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance
that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and
(b) requires adequate proof.
It is well to point out that the RTC’s Decision found that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims
and, thus, imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree. However, upon Rogelio’s motion, the
RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion, holding that the jack handle that was used to get the body
of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who owned
the same and, accordingly, reduced the penalty. Nothing was said on this point by the CA which
affirmed Rogelio’s conviction based on the RTC’s previous Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies presented by the
prosecution and the defense on this matter. Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted that
the victims were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s
vehicle, the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim that he tried to extend help to the
victims, but when he started the engine with the intention to go to the hospital, he discovered that
the vehicle had no brakes. Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the accused, the qualifying
circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide with double
serious physical injuries and damage to property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the
RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide,
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
CRUZ v AGAS
FACTS: In his Complaint-Affidavit 5 for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and
Medical Malpractice against Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in May 2003,
he engaged the services of St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC) for a medical check-up; that after
being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003, he underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid
tests conducted by the employees and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29, 2003, he was
sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that
because the specialist assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave the
colonoscopy results to the attending female anesthesiologist for the information and consideration
of the assigned specialist; that, thereafter, he was sedated and the endoscopic examination was
carried out; that when he regained consciousness, he felt that something went wrong during the
procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold clammy perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty;
that he could not stand or sit upright because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his abdomen;
that when he was about to urinate in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the
specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be found; and that his cardiologist,
Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe his critical condition and immediately referred him to
the surgical department which suspected that he had hemorrhage in his abdomen and advised him
to undergo an emergency surgical operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the ICU on May 30,
2003, he found out that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because of the internal bleeding;
that he learned that the doctors cut a portion of the left side of his colon measuring 6-8 inches
because it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused the internal bleeding; that despite the
painkillers, he was under tremendous pain in the incision area during his recovery period in the ICU
and had fever; and that he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms, subclavian artery on the left
part of his chest and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the colonoscopy
procedure but the latter insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7, 2003, he was discharged from
SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained that he had a hard time digesting his food; that he was
frequently fed every two hours because he easily got full; that he had fresh blood stools every time
he moved his bowel; that he had lost his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he slept most of the
day; and that he was in good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that
at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove the basic elements of reckless
imprudence or negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he did not know
that he would perform the procedure. He explained that before the start of the colonoscopy
procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and review his medical history which was taken
earlier by a fellow gastrointestinal physician. He claimed that the gastroscopy and colonoscopy
procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were completely successful considering that the latter did not
manifest any significant adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that his vital
signs were normal throughout the procedure.
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements were submitted by the Assistant Medical
Director for Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of Digestive Diseases, the
anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse attesting to the fact that the intraperitonial bleeding which
developed after the colonoscopy procedure, was immediately recognized, evaluated, carefully
managed, and corrected; that he provided an adequate and reasonable standard of care to Dr. Cruz;
that the endoscopist followed all precautionary measures; that the colonoscopy procedure was done
properly; that he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the colonoscopy procedure; that he did
not deviate from any standard medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he exercised
competence and diligence in rendering medical services to Dr. Cruz.
Office of the Prosecutor: dismissed the complaint for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence and Medical Malpractice
DOJ: dismissed
CA: affirmed the DOJ resolution
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in affirming the DOJ resolution.
HELD: YES. In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion
in finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for
Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor, like in
this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or that
he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or action
caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation. 10
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas.
Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa
of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr. Agas's negligent and reckless
conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that
particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz
did not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence
of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact
for defendant to meet with an explanation. 11
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an
injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant;
(3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those
who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the
defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control and management of the
thing which caused the injury. 12
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his purported negligence in performing the
colonoscopy on Dr. Cruz was not immediately apparent to a layman to justify the application of res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained by Dr. Cruz was due to the
abnormal condition and configuration of his sigmoid colon which was beyond his control considering
that the said condition could not be detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr. Agas adequately
explained that no clinical findings, laboratory tests, or diagnostic imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound
or computed tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could have detected this condition prior to an
endoscopic procedure.
SENIT v PEOPLE
FACTS: In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along
Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-year-
old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and was coming to the center
of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards
Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the
right towards the shoulder of the road and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a
collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the right side of private complainant's pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital, Sumpong,
Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor's
Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the right arm
and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity which required two
surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident and was unable to return to her job as the
Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her
treatment and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the accident.
Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder
Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which required suturing. The damage
sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00. CAIHTE
Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended Information
which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City.
RTC: convicted of the crime charged
CA: affirmed the decision of RTC
In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the evidence presented
by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records further reveals that the
pictures taken after the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking the claim of the petitioner
that he was convicted on the mere basis of allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, there was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses. 16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as baseless. 17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods that is — imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the petitioner
has, by reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave
felony, based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
ISSUe: WON the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
HELD: YES.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time, and place. 35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies are biased.
He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus
violating traffic rules resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented in the
instant case.
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses' narrations of the accident credible and worthy of
belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses'
testimonies are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings in his
accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr., together with his family and a househelper as his
passengers, was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by the
petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner was overtaking but was not able
to do so because of the pick-up. The petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was
a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator
clearly testified that, on the basis of data gathered, the collision was due to the error of the bus driver who was
driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid marks towards the axle. 37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.'s pick-up turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and a Super 5
bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was running fast and
overtaking the big truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and pushed the smaller vehicle due
to the force of the impact. He went nearer the area of collision and saw that the four passengers of the pick-up
were unconscious. 38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan on board her employer's pick-up,
she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown
out of the pick-up and hit her head on the ground. 39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving
fast, overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was moving
fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw
the pick-up truck turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right
shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously
to give way to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the ten-
wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-
up, which was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was
incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the pick-up
to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder
of the road and overtake the truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly
failing to observe the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things, the
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus. 42
Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law provides that
the one overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction know his presence and
not the other way around as the petitioner suggests.
SEVILLA v PEOPLE
FACTS: The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon,
Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of whether there
is a pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the
pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in authority before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed
against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively
liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio,
7 the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as
regards Sevilla's administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer vis-à-vis the
question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his
PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
cCTaSH
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. At around
two o'clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the
same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five o'clock that afternoon. He then instructed Mendoza
to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled
up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of
the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal
case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres
testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the
members of Sevilla's staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter inside Torres'
office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the
typewriter in his office.
SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to
Art. 365.
since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory
of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a pending
case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements
of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under
Article 171 (4) 10 of the RPC since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his
PDS. However, considering that Sevilla's PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false
entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence
under Article 365 of the RPC.
ISSUE: WON Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence
notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC.
HELD:
The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which
resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed
as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century,
we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it . . ." on three points
of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent
to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of
minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. . . .
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty
should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence atarresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes. (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property. 15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as 'homicide through
reckless imprudence', and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, 'reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide'; or 'simple imprudence causing damages to property'."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the
guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent." 17 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense
proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the
prosecution — the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under
Article 171 (4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC.
Thus, Sevilla's claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is
untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is
necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As
such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding
that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.
An Information was then filed against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted
the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused
therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the
Sandiganbayan's disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since
he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional Cultural Community Officer
(Unassembled) Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position,
then he should only be held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G.
2937; People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle
way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a wrongful act
committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone
to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered
by others from acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although
such mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24,
1966). 21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public
document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In
this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly
imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months
and twenty one (21) days ofprision correccional as maximum.