II.
OWNERSHIP, Articles 427-439 – Cases 1-17 hypothetically assuming
1. ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM vs. ESTATE OF CHARLES
PARSONS
FACTS: Grimm and Parsons are 2 0f the 3 original partners of G – P and
company. Both of them own shares on MGCC. Later on Grimm desires to
assign his playing rights to Yoshida and to make it possible Grimm needs to
transfer some of his shares to Parsons and make Yoshida an assignee of the
company. But after the transfer but before they were able to inform the MGCC
about the company the MGCC board accommodated Yoshida even not being
an assignee, by then Parson wrote a letter to MGCC that the name of the
shares to be retained in his name but he recognizes Grimm as the real owner,
but on the other hand Grimm also emphasizes that he is still the original owner.
But on the demise of Grimm the Partnership was continued by the Parsons
and the other partner and adding up the sons of Parsons. And time came when
Parsons also died. The issues arise when the Estate of Grimm is claiming back
the shares and transfer it to their name. But the Estate of Parsons claimed that
it was theirs and it was entrusted to the G – P and company as beneficiary of
Parson, where by this time the Grimm is not already a part owner as part of
dissolution of the old Partnership. The CA also decided in favor of the Parsons
because the estate Grimm failed to present evidence to prove that Grimm
really bought the property in question.
ISSUE: Who is the real owner?
RULING: Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable
ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such
property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.
Trust relations between parties may be express, as when the trust is created
by the intention of the trustor. An express trust is created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or by words evidencing an
intention to create a trust; the use of the word trust is not required or essential
to its constitution, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Implied
trust comes into existence by operation of law, either through implication of an
intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the
trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any such intention. Judging from
their documented acts immediately before and subsequent to the actual
transfer on September 7, 1964 of MC No. 590, Parsons, as transferee, and
Grimm, as transferor, indubitably contemplated a trust arrangement.
And lest it be overlooked, Parsons had previously acknowledged Grimm to be
the owner of MC No. 1088, after his earlier repeated declarations that the
transfer of the replaced MC No. 580 was temporary. Parsons was thus in
contextually in estoppel to deny, thru the Letter of Trust aforementioned,
its authenticity, Grimm’s ownership of the
replacement certificate.
2. WAITE VS. PETERSON
3. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. ONATE
FACTS: Spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños owned disputed lot
registered under the Torrens System of land registration. They had three
children: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all surnamed Oñate. Respondent is
the grandson of Claro Oñate, being the son of Francisco Oñate. In 1940,
Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga, now known as Daraga North
Central Elementary School, constructed on a portion of the disputed lot.
Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding with the
Legaspi City RTC, which consequently issued in the name of spouses Claro
Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños. On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate and Cession was executed by the respondent and his
three sisters, who waived their successional rights in favor of the respondent,
asserting that the disputed lot was inherited by his father, from his grandfather,
by virtue of a prior partition among the three sons of Claro Oñate and Gregoria
Los Baños, respondent in turn claimed ownership of said lot through the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement. Meanwhile, the heirs of Rafael Oñate filed a
petition before the Leagaspi City RTC questioning whether the respondent’s
father truly acquired the disputed lot. The petition was dismissed by the court.
On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to the
petitioner, proposing that they purchase the disputed lot, as well as reasonable
rentals from 1960. On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent
likewise wrote to the District Engineer regarding the on-going construction
projects in the disputed lot. The District Engineer answered the respondent,
stating that the petitioner is the owner of the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of
Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga.
ISSUES: Whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715 without
its consent
Ruling: DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy
to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over
the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any
dispute that may arise from... it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down
to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an
interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and
relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.
The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant
in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the
involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation
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involving a contract between a government department... and a third party, the
Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting
from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such
department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and
authority to sue and... be sued in its name.
Principles:
In a situation involving a contract between a government department... and a
third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party
to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted
to such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full
responsibility and authority to sue and... be sued in its name.
4. MWSS VS. ACT THEATER
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS),
petitioner, vs. ACT THEATER , INC. (ACT) respondent
G.R. No. 147076 / June 17, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J
FACTS
On September 28, 1988, four employees of ACT were apprehended
by the Quezon City police for allegedly tamperng a water meter in violation of
P.D. No 401, as amended by B.P. Blg 876, and were subsequently criminally
charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.
At mignight of the day following the said apprehension, the MWSS
disconnected ACT's water supply on account of the meter tampering incident.
ACT subsequently filed a civil case against MWSS before the same court on
the ground that the water supply provider acted “arbitrarily, whimsically and
capricuously” in cutting off the respondent's water service connection without
prior notice, adversely affecting the health and sanitation of the theater
company's patrons and in surrounding premises.
The two cases were jointly tried in the same RTC. After due trial, the
four employees were acquitted in the criminal case for failure of the
prosecution to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the civil
case, the RTC again ruled in favor of ACT, ordering MWSS to pay the theater
company P25,000 for compensatory damages and to return P200,000 earlier
deposited by ACT for the restoration of its water services following its
disconnection. The RTC also ordered MWSS to pay costs of suit and to pay
ACT P5,000 as attorney's fees.
Aggrieved, MWSS appealed the civil aspect of the aforementioned
decision to the Court of Appeals. In justifying its act of disconnecting the water
supply, MWSS relied upon Article 429 of the Civil Code, which provides that
“(t)he owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”
The appelate court, however, dismissed the appeal, justifying the
award of damages, citing Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that “(e)very
person must, in the exercise of his rights x x x act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.'' In quoting the decretal portion
of the RTC decision, the appelate court, however, erroneously typed
P500,000 as attorney's fees when the same should only be P5,000.
Thus, MWSS elevated the case to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the CA decision affiriming
the civil aspect of the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals validly affirmed the RTC decision
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals validly upheld the award of
attorney's fees
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of
Article 19 of the New Civil Court without considering the applicable
provision of Article 429 of the same code
HELD
(1) There is no reason to deviate from the uniform findings of the RTC
and the appellate court and that the petitioner's act of disconnecting
the water supply was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
respondent pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code
(2) The amount of P500,000 as attorney's fees in the assailed CA
decision was obviously a typographical error but it is nevertheless
reasonable and warranted as attorney's fees may be awarded when a
party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest
by reason of an unjustified act of the other party
(3) Concededly, MWSS, as the owner of the utility providing water supply
to certain consumers, including the respondent, had the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Article 19
sets the norms for the exercise of one's rights. When a right such as
that provided in Article 429 is exercised in a manner which discards
the norms mentioned in Article 19 resulting in damage to another, a
legal wrong is committed. In this case, MWSS failed to act with justice
and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner
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 unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water supply connection.
The petition is denied.
5. PNB VS. CA
and ERNESTO AUSTRIA and LORETO Q. QUINTANA
FACTS: Spouses Godofredo and Wilma Monsod obtained a loan from
petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) secure by a mortgaged on a parcel
of land. Due to Monsods’ failure to pay their loan obligation, PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale of the subject real property, PNB
was declared the highest bidder. Upon expiration of the redemption period on
July 12, 1985, ownership of the property was consolidated in PNB. Foreclosed
property is occupied by one Ernesto Austria which accordingly was invited by
the bank to a conference to discuss the ownership of the foreclosed lot,
however, he did not honor the bank’s invitation. PNB’s petition and a writ of
possession was granted by the court causing respondents Ernesto and Loreto
Quintana Austria to filed a “Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop
the Enforcement of the Writ of Possession.” The Austrias alleged that they are
the actual occupants of the subject lot, which they purportedly bought from the
Monsods as early as 1974. They claimed that the foreclosed property was
enclosed within a concrete fence and formed part of their family compound.
PNB allegedly knew of this fact even before it granted the loan to the Monsods,
because the bank’s credit investigators were advised of the same when they
inspected the property in the summer of 1976. Consequently, the Austrias
maintained that the issuance of the possessory writ ex parte was improper,
since it will deprive them of their property without due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ex-parte writ of possession issued pursuant to Act
No. 3135, as amended, can be enforced against a third person who is in actual
possession of the foreclosed property and who is not in privity with the debtor/
mortgagor.
HELD: The SC held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex-parte writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases
to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the
property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The
same principle was inversely applied in a more recent case, where we ruled
that a writ of possession may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage, only if the debtor is in possession and no third party had
intervened. Although the factual nuances of this case may slightly differ from
the aforecited cases, the availing circumstances are undeniably similar – a
party in possession of the foreclosed property is asserting a right adverse to
the debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which
the ex-parte writ of possession was applied for.
(Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit: Art.
433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for
the recovery of the property. Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims
to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate
judicial action for its physical recovery. The term “judicial process” could mean
no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership
claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. An
ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No.
3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated above. Even
if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of
one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party “sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”
It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any
property brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a
petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made. Besides, as earlier stressed, Article
433 of the Civil Code, cited above, requires nothing less than an action for
ejectment to be brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessor
of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor, which must be
overcome by the party claiming otherwise.)
6. CALUB VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
apprehended two motor vehicles. One is loaded with 1,026 board feet of
illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, with Plate No. HAK-733, being
driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by Jose Vargas. The other is loaded with
1,224.97 board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, with plate
number FCN 143, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by
[a certain] Manuela Babalcon. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present
proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued
but the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda for
violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive
Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. On January 31,
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1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda
from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file
a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The
complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.
The vehicle driven by Constancio Abuganda was again apprehended
by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army
elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar.
It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47
board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against
Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John for violation of
Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Although Abegonia and
Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable, the trial court ordered
that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that
the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other
persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It appeared
that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut
timber be loaded on it.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle , with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
HELD:
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all
conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78.
In addition, Section 78 makes mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable
with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-
310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit
evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was
duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus
there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry
Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said
violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. The
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-
A and 89 of the Forestry Code.
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession
of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load
was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined
in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the
impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of
the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the
petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary
nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The
seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected
under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were
validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for
replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law.
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession
of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against
the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without
its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a
suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and
without wilfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which
the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry
Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties
and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against
the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
prosper without the State’s consent.
7. SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INC VS. PNCC
FACTS:
 SUPERLINES TRANSPORATION COMPANY, INC is a corporation
engaged in the business of providing public transportation
 December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling north and
approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed
Page 4 of 12
 into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction
Company (PNCC).
 The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll way
patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal (Balubal),
then head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon
tollway.
 The bus was thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for
it to conduct its own investigation of the incident. Because of lack of
adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic investigator Pat.
Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound
where it was stored.
 Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release
the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s
undertaking to repair the damaged radio room. Respondent Balubal
instead demanded the sum of P40,000.00, or a collateral with the
same value, representing respondent PNCC’s estimate of the cost of
reconstruction of the damaged radio room. By petitioner’s estimate,
however, the damage amounted to P10,000.00 only.
 Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property
(replevin) with damages against respondents PNCC and Balubal with
the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon.
ISSUE:
W/N the property can be subjected to replevin.- NO
HELD/RATIO:
 In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that
he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object
sought to be recovered,and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
 Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was
towed by respondents on the request of Lopera. It was thus not
distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or
seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
otherwise placed under custodia legis.
 The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request,
were unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the
authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
 Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of
the foregoing discussion, thus in order.
8. SUAREZ VS. SPOUSES EMBOY JR.
FACTS: A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos
and Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy,
who were claiming that they inherited it from their mother Claudia Emboy, who
inherited it from her parents Carlos and Asuncion.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2 and
transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They refused to comply and insisted that
Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita
requiring them to vacate the lot and informed them that she had already
purchased the lot from the former's relatives. Felix and Marilou did not heed
the demand so Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint against unlawful
detainer against them.
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific allegation as to
when and how possession by tolerance of them began.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.
HELD: In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be
alleged:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently
show a statement of facts to determine the class of case and remedies
available to the parties. When the complaint fails to state the facts constituting
a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria.
In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly
allege and prove how Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon
it. She was also silent about the details on who specifically permitted Emboy
to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.
Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and
the CA did not commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.
Page 5 of 12
 9. ASIS VS. ASIS
ASIS VS ASIS
FACTS:
 Respondent Consuelo Asis Vda. De Guevarra, claiming to be the
owner of the apartment units located at 1495, 1497 and 1499 7th
Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco, Manila, filed separate ejectment
cases with MeTC against her brothers Romeo, Oscar and Eduardo,
all surnamed Asis, the petitioners herein.
 Respondent admits that the land on which the apartment units were
built are owned in common by her and her siblings, including
petitioners, but alleges that she alone owns the apartment units,
having paid for the construction of the same, and that the name of
petitioners had only been included in the title of the property at the
instance and benevolence of respondent.
 She then alleges that petitioners, as lessees of the apartment units,
had been paying her for several years monthly rentals of P500.00,
P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 respectively, for their occupation of the
apartment units.[6] All of a sudden, and she states that for no
justifiable reason, petitioners stopped paying rent. Despite repeated
demands, they failed and refused to pay. When the matter could not
be settled by the Barangay Lupon, a Certification to File Action was
issued. The cases against petitioners were then consolidated, as they
involved common issues and questions of fact and law.
 Petitioners claim that they are co-owners not only of the lot but also of
the apartment units, by virtue of inheritance, because it was their
parents the original owners of the land who had constructed the
apartment units by way of loan and mortgage of the land with the
Philippine National Bank in 1964. They each claimed that they have
never paid any rental for the occupation of the apartment units to
respondent.
 Petitioner Eduardo added that any money he may have given to
respondent was in the form of abuloy (alms), since respondent was
their eldest sister, and a widow without children. In their petition with
this Court, they admit to having previously paid the exact amounts
specified by respondent monthly, but averred that these were not
rentals but contributions for the upkeep and maintenance of the
premises.
 The records show that petitioners claim of co-ownership over the
apartment units is solely based on the principle of accession. They
argue that since they can establish possession of the apartment units
during the lifetime of their parents who were then owners of the parcel
of land and the buildings/improvements situated thereon, then their
inheritance as compulsory heirs must necessarily include ownership
not only of the land but also of the improvements.
 The MeTC ruled for respondent, finding sufficient basis for the valid
ejectment of petitioners. RTC reversed on the ground that the latter
had no jurisdiction over the case since it involved not only possession
of the lot but of the rights of the parties on the building constructed
thereon.
ISSUE: Whether MeTC has jurisdiction?
HELD: YES. In an action for unlawful detainer, the municipal or metropolitan
trial court has jurisdiction when the plaintiff really and primarily seeks the
restoration of possession; even if there is a need to resolve the ownership of
the disputed property to determine who has prior possession. As long as the
issue of ownership is to be ascertained ONLY for the purpose of determining
the issue of possession, then the court can make a declaration who among
the contending parties is the real owner of the property. Any such
pronouncement is to be regarded merely as provisional, and will not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the disputed
property.
Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking the Chua
Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred when it
was applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was an action for specific
performance [with the then Court of First Instance], and it was the defendant
there who raised the issue that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction,
implying that the case was really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this
context that this Court held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over
the case, not only because the issues raised do not only involve the
possession of the land, but also the rights of the parties to the building
constructed thereon.
10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SUNVAR REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS:Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power
Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located
along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by
four Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). The main subject matter of the instant
Petition is one of these four parcels of land with an area of approximately
22,294 square meters. Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned
by petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to
petitioner NPC. Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease
agreements, which had in the meantime expired. Petitioners filed the
Page 6 of 12
Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati City.
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that
the allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for
unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them. The MeTC
denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer
to petitioners Complaint. The lower court likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent. Respondent later on filed its Answer to
the Complaint. Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for
ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the
RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondents Motion to
Dismiss.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary
proceedings. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the RTC. The RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and
directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an
unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease
contract and the sublease agreements. Petitioners should have then filed
an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
ISSUE: WON the petition on Rule 45 is proper.
RULING: Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there
are procedural issues that merit preliminary attention. Respondent Sunvar
argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari
before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision.
Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition
instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint,
from which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and
holds that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly
within the bounds of our procedural rules. As respondent Sunvar explained,
no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an action without
prejudice, but the aggrieved party may file a certioraripetition under Rule 65.
Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved.
This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they
filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
The instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect
to the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the
present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure;
or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took
cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC
of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question
of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged
with this Court.
11. BONGATO VS. MALVAR
FACTS:
Spouses Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against Bongato, for
allegedly unlawfully entering a parcel of land and constructed a house
of light materials thereon. The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the lot
and thereafter issued an order insofar as to determine the location of the
houses involved in the civil case is the same with the one in the criminal case
for anti-squatting. The judge made a warning that there will be no
extension granted for the submission of the survey and failure to do so
would prompt the issuance of the writ of execution. Upon failure of
petitioner to submit a survey report, the judge ordered the return of the
records of the case to the court of origin for disposal.
HELD:
In forcible entry, one employs FISTS to deprive another physical
possession of land or building. Thus, plaintiff must allege and prove prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by
defendant. Sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material
possession of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an
averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court
from taking cognizance of the case. Ejectment cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove
prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In the present case, the lower court lacked jurisdiction in this case. First, the
house of petitioner was actually situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting
case and not on the lot of the spouses. Second, the house has
been in existence prior to the alleged date of forcible entry. Third, the
respondents had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the
alleged date of entry.
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Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is
prescribed to complement the summary nature of the process. Indeed, the
one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted
from the time plaintiff knew about it. after the lapse of the one-year
period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right to possession, or an
accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as
possession.
12. SARMIENTO VS. CA
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or
Ownership > Actions Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property >
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
FACTS:
Sarmiento purchased a parcel of land. The adjacent lot was owned by the
family of Atty. Naguid and was occupied by Cruz. Sarmiento found out that
Cruz is occupying about 71 meters of her lot. She informed Cruz that she
would like to remove the old fence so that she could construct a new one that
will cover the true area of her property but Cruz refused.
Sarmiento filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
which ruled in favor of Sarmiento. Cruz appealed to the Regional Trial Court
and assailed the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, which ruled in
favor of Cruz. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and reinstated that of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
ejectment case.
HELD:
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private
respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of
unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be
resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the
disputed 71 square meters involved.
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In
forcible entity, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry
centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful
by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of
rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the
land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of
unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last
demand.
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's
alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It
does not state how petitioner entered upon the land and constructed the house
and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's possession
became legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the
fence. The complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is
owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed
by a fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the
adjacent lot belonging to her.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the judgment of the Regional Trial Court ruling that the Municipal
Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the case.
13. JOSE VS. ALUERTO
FACTS: The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of
Rodolfo Chua Sing located in San Dionisio, Paranaque City. Chua Sing
purchased the land in 1991, he then leased the property to petitioner Fiorello
Jose. The Contract of Lease was neither notarized nor registered with the
Paranaque City Registry of Deeds.
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 The Lease Contract provided that the lessor transfers all its rights and
prerogative to evict occupants in favor of lessee which shall be responsible for
all the expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement from the lessor.
There are however occupants already occupying the property even
before the lease contract was executed. Soon after Chua Sing and petitioner
signed the lease contract, petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents
vacate the property within 30 days and that they pay monthly rental of
P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.
Respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. Petitioner then filed
an ejectment case against respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Paranaque. When Petitioner brought the case to the Barangay for
conciliation, the Barangay issued a Certification to File Action. Petitioner
claimed that as lessee of the subject property, he had the right to eject the
respondents who unlawfully occupy the land.
Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent’s possession of the land
was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. Having been in possession
of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted through
an ejectment case. CA emphasized that ejectment cases are summary
proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to
the physical possession of a property. Petitioner’s claim is of accion publiciana
(for the recovery of the possession), wherein he asserts his right as a
possessor by virtue of a contract of lease. CA dismissed the ejectment case.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can treat an ejectment case as an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership).
RULING: The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.
Ratio Decidendi:
Petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as
an action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, the Court should still resolve the
case. However, the Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before
the MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria for these cases are different and not interchangeable.
An action for forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. Forcible
entry must be filed within one year after the unlawful dispossession while the
latter must be filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property.
Former is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of
the real property while the latter’s subject of litigation is the better right to
possession over the real property. The former is filed in the municipal trial court
and summary action, while the latter is plenary action in the RTC.
The cause of action in the ejectment case is different from accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The ejectment case is brought before the
proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or possession de
facto, not possession de jure. MeTC’s ruling is only to resolve the issue of the
possession and therefore inconclusive. MeTC resolves only possession de
facto, ejectment cases are summary in nature, while accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria are plenary action. Hence petition is denied; CA’s
decision dismissing the ejectment case was affirmed.
14. CARO VS. SUCALDITO
FACTS: Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No.
160 from Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21,
1953. The said lot was situated in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality
of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares.
Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro,
consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the
Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a
Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512. On
August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of
Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area of the property
which he bought from his father. The application was, however, opposed by
Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional Director rendered
a Decision canceling the said application. Caro filed a notice of appeal before
the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City, docketed as MNR Case No. 5207.
However, the appeal was dismissed in an Order dated June 29, 1982, on the
ground of failure to file an appeal memorandum within the reglementary period
therefor. On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No.
4512, filed an Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was
issued Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
City issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor.
Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Iloilo
City, which was granted in an Order dated May 7, 1984. Thereafter, on
February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for “Annulment of
Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession
with Damages” before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an amended
complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had been in
possession of the same “since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept
of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously.” He further alleged
that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of
his predecessors-in-interest, and that the corresponding land taxes had been
paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had actually been
divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had
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actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two
kilometers away. He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence proving
his ownership and possession of the said property, the Bureau of Lands did
not award it to him. Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free
patent over the subject lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent,
she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as a “trustee of a
constructive trust,” she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful
owner. In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special
affirmative defense, the fact that she intervened in the proceedings on Caro’s
application for a free patent over Lot No. 4512 before the Bureau of Lands
having bought the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover, contrary to the
allegations of the petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one and the
same lot, as per the findings of the Bureau of Lands. The parties thereafter
presented evidence to prove their respective claims. In a Decision dated
December 7, 1993, the trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and
dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.
RULING OF TRIAL COURT: Caro had no personality to file the action for the
annulment of the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be
brought by the Solicitor General. It held that “an applicant for a free patent who
is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover
the land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and
the Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through
administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act,” or Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a
rival-applicant for a free patent over the same land was through administrative
channels, not judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the
title of the applicant, the former does not thereby become the owner of the land
in dispute.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA
CA’S DECISION: The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision dated July 31,
2002. The appellate court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner
had no personality to file the action under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free patent.
Citing several cases, the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact made
by administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence must
be respected, particularly where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge and experience.
ISSUE: WON he has the legal personality to file the action for annulment of
patent based on constructive trust.
HELD: The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds
that the petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of
the subject property. The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before
the RTC prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s
favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to
“return” the subject property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance.
In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “[t]he essence of an
action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right.” Indeed, in an action for
reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to
the State. Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant
by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the
grantee. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or
one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.”
Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a
material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved. Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-
interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the
owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent,
cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file
an action for reconveyance. To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper
party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion
of the land to the government. The petitioner has no personality to
“recover” the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.
15. CANEZO VS. BAUTISTA AND APOLINARIO
FACTS:
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (appellees) are the registered owners of a
parcel of land with an area of 186 square meters, covered by TCT No. 32911.
Whereas, Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (appellants) are the
registered owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of 181 square meters,
covered by TCT No. 31727. Both parcels of land are located at Coronado
Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants’ lot is adjacent to that of appellees.
Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot.
During the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached
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upon by the structures built by appellants without appellees’ knowledge and
consent.
Three surveys were conducted which confirmed the fact of encroachment.
However, despite oral and written demands, appellants failed and refused to
remove the structures encroaching appellees’ lot.
Spouses Cañezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition
with damages on 13 April 2000. In an Order dated 15 August 2000, the trial
court declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to answer within the
reglementary period. The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the
spouses Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built
structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The
spouses Bautista also refused to remove the structures and respect the
boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to the Barangay
Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that
the spouses Bautista are builders in bad faith, such that spouses Cañezo are
entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.
On appeal, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the Trial
Court’s Decision. The appellate court ruled that since the last demand was
made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year before the filing of the complaint,
the spouses Cañezo should have filed a suit for recovery of possession and
not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of demolition can be granted
only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses Cañezo’s
complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Cañezo failed to specify the
assessed value of the encroached portion of their property. Because of this
failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action.
Finally, the appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of
encroachment in the action for recovery of possession and that the
encroachment was built in good faith, the market value of the encroached
portion should be proved to determine the appropriate indemnity.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should have filed recovery of
possession and not writ of demolition
HELD:
PROPERTY LAW
The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of
Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or
an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Accion
reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria
is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession.
The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached
property. Aside from testimonial evidence, the spouses Cañezo were also able
to present documentary and object evidence which consisted of photographs,
transfer certificates of title, and a relocation survey plan.
The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Cañezo’s testimony on
the reason for the spouses Bautista’s attitude regarding the encroached
property. The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautista’s
property encroached upon that of the spouses Cañezo by 0.97 centimeters,
while the spouses Bautista’s property was encroached upon by 1.01
centimeters by another landowner.
The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses
Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot
15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the
spouses Cañezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the
spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are entitled to the
issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista,
in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.
16. EMILIA VS. BADO
17. VALDEZ VS. CA
FACTS:
A complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and
Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella.
Without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot. The Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property. The Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case
for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the
private respondents the right to occupy the premises
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY
MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
HELD:
Page 11 of 12
 It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the
cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry.
If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal,
the case is unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face
of the complaint. The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was
illegal at the inception. Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. An examination
of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an
action for ejectment are lacking.

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