(1952) Cabague v Ausilio – promise to marry with improvements (2 contracts)

Petitioners: Felipe Cabague and Geronimo Cabague

Respondents: Matias Auxilio and Socorro Auxilio

Summary: Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover from Matias and Socorros’ refusal to honour their contract with
Felipe and Geronimo. Matias and Socorro promised that Socorro will marry Geronimo provided that Geronimo would make improvements on their house and spend for
the wedding. Complaint was dismissed for being unenforceable under the rule of evidence. SC ruled that in fact there were two agreements, one for improvement,
another for the wedding. For breach of the mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is
admissible. However, Felipe Cabague’s action may not prosper because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage.

FACTS

1. Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from Matias and Socorro’s refusal to carry out
the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo
2. In the complaint they alleged that:
a. Matias and Socorro promised such marriage to Geronimo provided the latter would improve their house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and
the needs of the bride;
b. Felipe and Geronimo made the improvement and spent P700
c. Matias and Socorro refused to honor their pledged word.
3. Matias and Socorro MTD arguing that the contract was oral, unenforceable under rule of evidence. (BACK THEN Parol evidence made upon the consideration of
marriage other than a mutual promise to marry is unenforceable under ROC)
4. Court dismissed case.
5. CFI affirmed dismissal

ISSUE: May the contract be proved in court? YES but only Geronimo’s action may be maintained

RATIO:

 The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other really involves two kinds of agreement:
o Agreement between Felipe and defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo
o Agreement between the two lovers as a “mutual promise to marry”
 For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is admissible.
 However Felipe’s action may not prosper because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage.
 Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio, this action could not be maintained on the theory of mutual promise to marry. Neither may it be regarded as
action by Felipe against Socorro on a mutual promise to marry.
 Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.
Wherefore this expediente will be returned to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion
 (1916) Domalagan v Bolifer – 516 pesos, waiver of the statute

Petitioner; Jorge Domalagan

Respondent: Carlos Bolifer

Summary: Domalagan and Bolifer verbally agreed that Domalagan shall pay P500 (plus P16 as token for future marriage) upon the marriage of their children to each other.
Domalagan paid the agreed sum but later found out that Bolifer’s daughter was joined in lawful wedlock with another man. Domalagan demanded for the return of the
amount he paid. But Bolifer contends that the contract was not valid as it was not reduced into writing. SC held that since contract was merely verbal it falls under the 3rd
paragraph of Section 335. Said section requires some note or memorandum in order to prove the existence of the contract, otherwise the contract is unenforceable,
HOWEVER during the trial, Bolifer did not object to any proof presented by Domalagan which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract – which
made such proof binding upon Bolifer.

FACTS

1. On Nov 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a verbal contract in which parties agreed that Domalagan was to pay to Bolifer the sum of P500 upon the
marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with Bolifer;s daughter, Bonifacia Bolifer.
2. On August 1910, Domalagan paid the agreed sum of P500 plus a further sum of P16 as hansel or token of future marriage.
3. Notwithstanding the agreement, Bonifacia Bolifer was joined in lawful wedlock with Laureano Sisi.
4. Upon learning of marriage, Domalagan demanded the return of paid sum P516 together with interest and damages. He further alleged that in order to raise P500
he was obliged a curtained real property belonging to him at a great sacrifice.
5. Bolifer presented a general denial and alleged that the facts stated in complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
6. LC ruled IFO Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to pay P516 with 6% interest
7. Bolifer to SC

ISSUE: W/N the verbal contract entered into by Domalagan and Bolifer in regard to the delivery of money by reason of prospective marriage is valid and effective – YES

RATIO

 Citing par 3 of Section 335 of CCP, Bolifer argues that by virtue of the provisions and the fact that the agreement was not put into writing, Domalagan cannot
recover.

“Section 335 0 In the ff cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be
in writing, and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent; evidence therefore of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary
evidence of its contents
1…
2…
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry,”

 SC found that during the trial, Bolifer never objected to any proof presented by Domalagan which showed or tended to show the existence of alleged contract,
 Section 335 provides that evidence of the agreement referred to cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents. Here all of the
evidence relating to the said agreement admitted without the slightest objection.
  Section 335 does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section
provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless same is evidence by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by
which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare said contract to be invalid, which have not been reduced to writing except those
mentioned in par 5.
 A contract may be perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. IF it is not made in conformity with said section of course it
cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the
statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
 If the parties to an action during the trial of the case, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like ithe one in question and
permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than in writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
 SC AFFIRMS

(1960) Hermosisima v CA – 10 years older, no seduction, removed claim for breach of promise to marry

Petitioner: Francisco Hermosisima

Respondent: CA et al Soledad Cagigas

Summary: Petitioner and his girlfriend Soledad (older than him by 10 years) had sex on a boat. When Sol became pregnant, Frank promised that he would marry her, but
a month after their daughter was born, he married someone else. The LC awarded MD, on the basis that seduction had occurred. SC deleted the MD, stating that seduction
as contemplated in Art. 2219 is the crime, as punished by Art. 337 and 338 of the RPC. Besides the age gap, ocurt also considered the fact that Sol was supposedly more
enlightened than Frank, being a HS teacher and insurance agent. Lastly, the court considered the fact that Sol admitted that she gave in to Frank out of love for him.

FACTS

1. Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in Sibonga Provincial HS, Cebu who later became an insurance underwriter. She and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, who was
almost 10 years her junior, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, though Frank had made no prior promise of marriage to her.
2. One evening, after coming from the movies, they had sex in Frank’s cabin onboard M/V Escano where he was then an apprentice pilot. Later, Sol told Frank that
she was pregnant so he promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born the next year. The month after he birth, Frank married a certain
Romanita Perez.
3. Sol thus instituted this complaint for acknowledgement an support of her child as Frank’s natural child as well as MD for alleged breach of promise.
4. Frank admitted paternity and said he was willing to pay for support but denied having promised to marry Sol
5. TC rendered decision declaring that Chris was the natural daughter, and ordered payment of support with actual and compensatory damages, MD and AF.
6. CA affirmed except on AD, CD, and MD which were increased because of seduction.

ISSUE: W/N there was seduction in this case? NO; W/N moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry – NO

RATIO:

1. Seduction under Art 337 and 337 of the RPC does not exist under this case.
 The language used in Art 2219(3) of CC strongly indicates that the seduction contemplated is the crime punished by Art 337 and 338 of the RPC
  Frank is not morally guilty of seduction. He is 10 years younger, and that Sol should be highly enlightened, being a former HS teacher and a life insurance
agent, whereas Frank was a mere apprentice pilot when the two became intimate.
 Finally the CFI had found that Sol surrendered herself to Frank because she had been overwhelmed by her love for him and wanted to bind him by have the
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. Thus the court could not find that seduction as contemplated in the RPC had occurred.

2. There is no COA to recover damages for breach of promise to marry in PH civil law, apart from the recovery of money or property advance on the faith of such
promise (De Jesus v Syquia)
 The proposed CC initially contained provisions that would have made the breach of promise to marry an actionable right, but these articles were eliminated
in congress on the ground that as in the US and England, breach of promise suits tend to lend themselves more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. Thus, Heart Balm suits have been abolished in many US States.
 Thus based on the clear and manifest intent of lawmakers not to sanction actions for the breach of promise to marry, the award of MD was improper.
 SC therefore eliminated award for MD, but affirmed other respects.

(1964) Wassmer v Velez – tumakas sa wedding; liable for Art 21 contrary to GC

Petitioner: Beatris Wassmer

Respondent: Francisco X. Velez

Summary: Beatriz and Francisco were set to wed on sept 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz that the wedding will have to be
postponed for his mother opposes it. A day before the wedding he sent a telegram to the bride-to-be, assuring her that “nothing has changed and that he will return
soon”. He never returned. Beatriz sued Francisco for damages. RTC ruled IFO Beatriz. Upon appeal, SC likewise ruled IFO Beatriz. SC ruled that mere Breach of Promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized is quite different. Surely this not a case of mere breach of promise to marry, but palpably and unjustifiably contrary to GC for which defendant must be held
answerable for damages in accordance with Article 21.

FACTS

3. On August 23, 1954, Beatriz and Francisco applied for a license to contract marriage which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for Sept 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to friends, relatives, and acquaintances
4. The bride-to-be’s Trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
5. And then with but two days before wedding, Francisco who was then 28, simply left a note for Beatriz stating “will have to postpone wedding – My mother
opposes it”. Francisco enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: “Nothing changed, rest assured
returning soon”. But he never returned and was never heard from again.
6. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The TC ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz for AD, MD and ED.
7. Francisco appealed to SC asserting that the judgment was contrary to law as there is no provision in the CC authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE: W/N breach of promise to marry is actionable – NO; W/N Velez is liable for damages – YES

RATIO
  Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above prep and publicity only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to GC for which the defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Art 21 NCC.
 Note that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Art 21 of the CC provides that “Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, GC or PP shall compensate the latter for dmaages”.
 Francisco is held to be liable not only for AD (for the costs of wedding) but also for MD and ED. Per Art 2219(10) of the NCC, MD are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Art. 21 of the said Code. As to ED, considering the above circumstance, defendant clearly acted in a wanton reckless and oppressive manner.
 15 k reasonable award

Estremos v Ephan – different from Wassmer – here parents agreed to marry, and that Erlinda also to blame

Petitioner: Sps Francisco Estremos and Estrella Estremos, et al

Respondent: Sps Gonzalo Ephan and Resurrecion Valenzona et al

Summary: Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos were college sweethearts. Erlinda became pregnant with Virgilio’s child. The parents of Virgilio arranged the wedding of
their son to Erlinda after Erlinda informed them of the pregnancy. Days before the wedding, Virgilio ran away and the wedding did not push through. The Estremos family
sued the Ephan family for breach of promise to marry under the exception stated in Wassmenr v Velez. The Court stated that the Wassmer case is not on point since here,
Virgilio was only forced to enter into the promise to marry and that Erlinda is also to blame.

FACTS

1. Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos fell in love with each other sometime in Sept 1975, which culminated in Virgilio Ephan’s having carnal knowledge of Erlinda
Estremos several times with her consent.
2. Erlinda became pregnant. The parent’s of both parties arranged the wedding of Erlinda and Virgilio despite Virgilio’s protest.
3. On July 22, 1976, Virgili sent a letter to Mrs. Estremos stating that he was not going thru with the wedding and disappeared.

ISSUE: W/N Ephans’ are liable for the breach of promise to marry – NO; Erlinda is also to blame and should shoulder some of the responsibility

RATIO

 Marriage being a lifelong arrangement, the parties to it should be deliberate and mature. The SC has recognized the fact that there is no provision of the CC
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
 A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The SC previously emphasized “that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the NCC
the provisions that would have it so.
 The SC however laid down certain exceptions as in the case of Wassmer v Velez (Dec 26, 1964). Under the Art 21 of the CC, the SC found that “to formally set a
wedding and go through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different [from a breach of
promise to marry]. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art.
21”.
 However in Wassmer v Velez, it was the parties themselves who entered into the agreement to marry. In this case, it was the parents that “agreed connive
Virgilio to her in a marriage celebration”. Erlinda was as much to blame for said breach.
 (1966) Tanjanco v CA – claimed that promise to marry induced her sex – pero 1 year na e

Petitioner: Apolonio Tanjanco

Respondent: CA and Araceli Santos (of IBM PH)

Summary: Based on guy’s promise to marry her, girl allowed him into her pants. She became pregnant and the guy refused to marry her and support the child. Girl filed
for damages under Art 21. The Court held that since there was no seduction on the guy’s part (she consented, and of legal age), there was no element of deceit and
therefore there is no case for damages under Article 21. Case dismissed without prejudice to action for recognition of child and for support.

FACTS

1. Apolonio started courting Araceli in 1957. Because of his promise to marry her, Araceli consented to having sexual intercourse with Apolonio regularly until 1959.
2. She became pregnant which resulted to her resigning from her job due to humiliation.
3. Because of Apolonio’s refusal to marry Araceli, she filed a complaint for MD and ED and for recognition of their child and support.
4. CFI dismissed complaint for lack of COA but CA reversed finding basis in Art. 21.

ISSUE: W/N Apolonio is liable for damages – NO

RATIO

 CA relied on the example of an Art 21 situation given during the Code Commission’s deliberation, but it was not on point – the example set forth In the Code
Commission’s memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abused of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
 To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction.
 Examining the complaint there was no seduction employed on Araceli.
o Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for over a year from 1958 to 1959, plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
o Such conduct is incompatible with idea of seduction. Plainly is here voluntariness and mutual passion for the appellant had been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of deceit or artful persuasion and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less
for one year, exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promises.
 (1993) Baksh v CA – Iranian seduce – liable for damage b/c proximate cause considered as seduction Art 21; MAYROON NA SA BACOLOD PALA

Petitioner: Gashem Shookay Baksh (exchange med student)

Respondent: CA and Marilou Gonzales (HS student, waitress)

Summary: Baksh proposed to Gonzales that he would marry her after the academic semester ends. Gonzales accepted. The petitioner’s attitude toward her changed a
week before the filing of the complaint. He maltreated her and eventually threatened to kill her. During a confrontation a day before filing the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement. He said that he is already married to someone living in Bacolod. The Court ruled IFO respondent. The breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong. Court held that where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had in reality no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21, not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud, deceit, behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

FACTS

1. A complaint for damages was filed by resp Gonzales with the RTC alleging:
a) She is 22 YO single, Filipino and a pretty lass of GMC and reputation duly respected in her community
b) Pet Baksh is an Iranian citizen residing in Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City.
c) Before August 20, 1987, the Baksh courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year.
d) On August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him
e) A week before the filing of complaint, pet attitude towards her started to change, maltreating her and threatened to kill her as a result of such, she sustained
injuries. (note: naging pregnant siya but aborted through Baksh medicine)
f) During a confrontation with a representative of the brgy captain of Guilig a day before the filing of complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement
and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
2. Defense: he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with respondent Baksh told Gonzales to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport.
3. RTC IFO Respondent – that pet pay 20k MD, 3k AF, 2k Lit exp.
4. CA affirmed
5. Argument of Petitioner: art 21 is not applicable bc he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or PP, he has not professed love
or marriage to the private respondent nor has he maltreated her.

ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. 21 of the CC – YES

RATIO

 The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said code contains a provision, Article 21 which
is designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
  The court held that where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or enveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify grant of damages pursuant to Art 21 not because of promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed.
o It is essential that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to M, GC, or PP.
 The court said that the ruling in Hermosisima v CA (10 years older) does not apply since in that case, because the complainant in that case “wanted to bind the
defendant by having the fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of the clergy. In the case at bar, Gonzales surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.
 The respondent’s profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool dupe, entice, beguile and deceive her into believing that
indeed he loved her and would want her to be her life partner.
o His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage,
she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
o Petitioner clearly violated the concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
 Denied.
 CRIMINAL OR MORAL SEDUCTION
 Court also did not condone parents in allowing her and Baksh to live together in same room of their house

(1933) Panganiban v Borromeo – contract on without opposition is void, but is a consent meaning cannot prosecute future

Petitioner: Jose Panganiban

Respondent: Elias Borromeo

Summary: Husband and wife executed and subscribed to a contract where they agreed that husband is permitted to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in
an adulterous relationship with another man WITHOUT OPPOSITION from the other. Court ruled that the contract contains provisions contrary to law, morals and PO,
and as a consequence, is not valid. However since they both agree through stipulations in the void contract, it operates as a bar to prosecution for adultery or concubinage
if ever they want to prosecute the other in the future.

FACTS

1. On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala, husband and wife, subscribed a contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo.
2. The contract was prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian Isabela. Atty Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document and had, at least, some
knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been fully informed of because of different in dialect.
3. The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a
concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.
4. ISSUE: W/N the contract between husband and wife was valid – NO

RATIO
  The contract of the spouses was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code as modified by Act 1773 was in force. Conceding that more liberal provisions of
RPC should be given application, it is herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended party constitute a bar to prosecution for adultery or
concubinage.
o In this instance, if the sps should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of their one by the other could be expected.
 Nevertheless we think it far from the purpose of the legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that
prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender.
o This is a matter of future contingency and not a matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals.
 We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals, and public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

(1940) In re Santiago – gumawa ng document authorizing each other to marry again – VOID – suspended from practice 1 year

Respondent: Atty. Roque Santiago

Summary: Ernesto Baniquit and Soledaci Colares were separated for 9 years and executed a document authorizing each other to marry again upon the legal advice of
Atty. Santiago. Ernesto contracted a second marriage. He tried to rectify the situation by executing a deed of cancellation of the contract. An admin case was filed against
Atty. Santiago and he was suspended for 1 year. Such contract was void and without legal effect according to NCC 221.

FACTS

1. This is an admin case initiated upon complaint of the SolGen against Roque Santiago charging him with malpractice.
2. Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife Soledaci Colares for 9 years and wanted to contract a second marriage, sought legal advice from Atty.
Santiago. He was a practicing atty and notary of Negros Occidental.
3. Santiago asked Ernesto to bring his wife that afternoon of the same day. He prepared a document that the contracting parties authorized each other to marry
again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. He assured them that they were again
single.
4. Ernesto remarked, “Would there be no trouble?” and Santiago replied pointing to his diploma on the wall, “I would tear that off if this document turns out not to
be valid”.
5. Ernesto contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. Santiago asked for P50.
6. Santiago’s defense is that he had the idea that 7 years separation of husband and wife would entitle either to contract a second marriage. Upon realizing his
mistake, he asked for parties to execute a deed of cancellation.

ISSUE: W/N Santiago is guilty of malpractice – YES

RATIO

 The document executed is contrary to law, morals and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given and the preparation of the document
all constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment.
 Santiago was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law, or carelessly negligent in giving legal advice. Ff the recommendation of investigator, instead of
disbarment, he is suspended from practice of law for 1 year because he endeavored to rectify it.
 (1975) Selanova v Mendoza – Judge preparing and ratifying a document extrajudicially liquidating CP – VOID; kaso 1948 bar passer kaya di alam

Petitioner: Saturnino Selanova

Respondent: Alejandro Mendoza, City Judge of Mandaue

Summary: A judge prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of a married couple. The court ruled that such agreement is void
as it contravenes Art 221 of the CC.

FACTS

1. Judge Mendoza prepared and ratified a document dated Nov. 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of Saturnino Selanova and Avelina
Ceniza.
 A condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw their respective complaints for adultery against each other.
2. Selanova charged Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law based on the above facts.
3. Mendoza commented that he was aware of the invalidity agreement but he nevertheless ratified the same on the assurance that the sps would ask the CFI
where they reside to approve the said agreement. He also alleged that he relied on Art. 191 Par4 of OCC which provides that Husband and Wife may agree upon
dissolution of Conjugal Partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
 Mendoza also surmised that Selanova’s complaint was instigated by a lawyer whose case was adversely decided by Mendoza. This was denied by Selanova.
4. Mendoza retired in 1975, after which he asked the court of a compassionate view in view of his 43 years of service in the government and his family’s current
financial predicament. He admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the document which he cause Selanova and wife to sign.

ISSUE: W/N Agreement in question is void – YES; W/N Mendoza should be drastically penalized – NO – he only deserves a severe censure

RATIO

 The agreement in question is void

o The agreement contravenes Art. 221 of the NCC
o Even before the enactment of the NCC, it has been held by SC that extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void.
 Mendoza deserves only severe censure
o Similar acts have been punished by severe censure, reprimand, or suspension from practice eof law
o Mendoza due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition against contracts for the personal separation of husbang and wife and for the extrajudicial
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, prepared the said void agreement.
 He was admitted to the bar in 1948. Because he did not study the NCC in law school, he might not have been cognizant of Art 221 thereof.
 Taking into account his apparent good faith and sincere desire to terminate the marital conflict, only a severe censure should be meted against
him. This should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement benefits (assuming that there are no other causes for depriving him of such).
 (1990) Lichauco-De Leon v CA – Letter agreement to terminate Conjugal property with MIL din – NOT ONLY PROP BUT ALSO MARITAL SO VOID

Petitioner: Sylvia Lichauco de Leon

Respondent: CA, Macaria De Leon and Jose Vicente De Leon

Summary: Sylvia and her husband Jose separated de facto due to irreconcilable differences. Thereafter, Sylvia entered into a Letter-Agreement with Jose’s mother
Macaria, concerning the “termination of relations” between Sylvia and Hose. Macaria assailed the validity of this agreement on ground that its purpose was to terminate
the MARITAL relationship of Sylvia and Jose. Sylvia on the other hand, insisted that the purpose was limited to their PROPERTY relations. SC declared the agreement null
and void for being contrary to morals and PP.

FACTS

1. Private resp Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylva Lichauco De Leon were married in 1969. In 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occurred due
to irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home and flying to the US.
2. Thereafter, Sylvia entered into a Letter-Agreement with her Mother-in-law, Macaria De Leon, with respect to the “termination of relations” between her and Jose.
3. Sylvia and Jose then filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
4. Macaria filed her complaint in intervention (also claiming ownership of property) to assail the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its
purpose accordin to her, the termination of marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose. Sylvia insists that the consideration for the letter was for the termination
of Property relations.

ISSUE: W/N Letter-Agreement is valid – NO

RATIO

 It is readily apparent that the use of the word “relations” is ambiguous, perforce, it is subject to interpretation.
 On page two of the agreement, the parties contemplated not only agree to a judicial separation of their property but likewise to continue with divorce
proceedings. If taken with the ambiguous provisions regarding termination of “relations” the parties clearly contemplated not only termination of property
relationship but likewise the marital relationship in its entirety.
 Furthermore it would be safe to assume that the parties not having specified the particular relationship which they wanted to peacefully and amicable terminated,
had intended to terminated all kinds of relations both marital and property.
 While there could be inherent benefits to a termination of conjugal property relationship, court could not clearly perceive the underlying benefit for the
intervenor insofar as the termination of property relationship is concerned, unless the underlying consideration is the termination of marital relationship by
divorce proceedings between her son Jose and Sylvia (In other words, why would Macaria mother of Jose be a party to the letter agreement if said document
only limits to conjugal property? Her interest would only be limited to marital relations between her and son Sylvia)
 The letter agreement premised on the termination of marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and PP. As such any
agreement or obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to PP should be deemed null and void