9. Melanio s. Salita v.

Atty Salve
A.C. No. 8101
Febraury 4, 2015

Facts:
Complainant Melanio S. Salita (Salita) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Reynaldo T. Salve (Atty. Salve) in
connection with the latter’salleged falsification of public documents. On November 15, 2006, Salita paid his loan in
full as evidenced by a Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez before Notary Public Buenaventura
Melendres, which was later duly entered in the Register of Deeds of Davao Del Norte. Notwithstanding such full
payment, Rodriguez, on September 17, 2007, instituted an ejectment complaint against Salita in furtherance of his
cause the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale and the two (2) REM instruments signed by the latter. Upon checking
the said documents, Salita discovered that the Deed of Absolute Sale had already been notarized by Atty. Salve and
his Community Tax Certificate Numbers were allegedly falsified.
Salita noticed that one copy of the Deed of Sale was purportedly notarized on August 12, 2007, while another was
notarized a month later, or on September 12, 2007. Thus, Salita went on to conclude that because of the foregoing
events, it appeared as if he had sold the subject property to Rodriguez and executed the same before Atty. Salve.
Aggrieved, Salita filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against Rodriguez and Atty. Salve. Salita
likewise filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Salve.
In his defense, Atty. Salve vehemently denied that he falsified the Deed of Absolute Sale. He averred that the said
document was regular on its face except the month of sale, i.e., August 12, 2007 instead of September 12, 2007,
which is a mere clerical error due to “sheer” inadvertence on the part of his secretary.
Atty. Salve claimed that the date stamp accidentally slid to August instead of September as it was also being used
by three (3) other office clerks and two (2) lawyers for other office documents. Atty. Salve further narrated that
both Salita and Rodriguez went to him and brought the PN and other loan documents executed by Salita himself.
He also clarified that the PN was notarized in their presence on December 12, 2002 and both got a copy right after.
Atty. Salve then inferred that it was Salita who erased the PN’s machine printed numbers using his own
handwriting and thereafter photocopied it to make it appear that the document was not among the notarial
documents he submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tagum Cityfor the year 2002.
Finally, Atty. Salve averred that the certified electronic copies of the PN in the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tagum
City and the ones in his law office are identical and the same, while Salita’s alleged falsified photocopy is totally
different.

Issue: Whether Atty. Salve should be held administratively liable?

Held:
Yes, Atty. Salve’s act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the
personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as
a notary public.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have
personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the
said documents as the ones who executed the same.
To recount, records reveal that Rodriguez used, among others, the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by Atty. Salve
to file an ejectment complaint against Salita. However, it must be remembered that Salita was merely made to sign
such document as collateral for his loan and that he had already fully paid the same, as evidenced by the notarized
Release of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Rodriguez herself. Considering the circumstances, it is simply
unfathomable for Salita to appear before Atty. Salve to have the said document notarized, as it will be detrimental
to his own interests. Hence, the Court finds that Atty. Salve notarized the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale
without Salita’s presence before him.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing
his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public
document. In doing so, Atty. Salve,as borne from the records of this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that:
(a) all the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were
the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares, complainant, versus Justice Onofre A. Villaluz (retired), respondent.
Adm. Case No. 4431 June 19, 1997

Facts:

Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while respondent Onofre A.
Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.

Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained a decree
declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years. Thus, she got married to respondent in a
civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.

They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the Presiding Judge of
the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of the son of Mijares.

During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit affair with another
woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the complainant judge. As a result, they lived
separately and did not get in touch with one another and the respondent did not bother to apologize for what
happened.

Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez. Complainant then
filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and bigamously entered into a second
marriage while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single.

In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham marriage”; that he
voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by
her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with complainant, he had a
subsisting marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet
become final and executory or published.

Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on affirmed by the
Court.

Issue:

a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid

b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage

Ruling:

a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of
the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was facing criminal case for bigamy
and assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in civil case declaring the annulment of marriage
between respondent and the first wife had not attained complete finality, the marriage between complainant and
respondent is not void but only voidable.
b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. Thus, former
Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
he is hereby suspended from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.

SANTOS JR. VS. ATTY LLAMAS (AC 4749 01/20/2000)

FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has
been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts
in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership
and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged
in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP
O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and
for being a senior citizen.

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the
courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a
ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does
not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption however does not include payment of membership or association dues.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later.

Joselano Guevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.7136, August 1, 2007

Facts:
Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent. After leaving the conjugal home,
petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living together in a residential house few blocks away from the
church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the
respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene.

Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of merit.

Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct?

Ruling:

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the
affair was carried out discreetly.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v.
Rongcal)

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative
of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay
v. Atty. Tucay)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2.
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates
the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes
a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law."

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Antero J. Pobre v. Sen Miriam Defensor-Santiago

A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
 The Judicial and Bar Council of the Philippines is a constitutionally-created body that recommends
appointees for vacancies that may arise in the composition of the Supreme Court and other lower courts.

The function of the Council is to recommend to the president of possible appointees to the Judiciary.
he person then chosen by the president then becomes a member of the Judiciary, and is not anymore reviewed by
the Commission on Appointments.

The Council is composed of a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. They are the "regular" members, as opposed to the
Secretary of Justice and a representative of Congress who are the ex officio members. The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is the ex officio chairman,[1] while the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve as the ex officio
secretary

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

1. The Judicial Bar Council sent public invitations for nominations to the soon-to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice. Senator Miriam Defensor applied for the position. However, the JBC then informed the applicants that only
incumbent justices of the Supreme Court could qualify for the position. For not being qualified, Sen. Miriam
delivered this speech on the Senate Floor.

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,

debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this
nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather
be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

2. In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor. To Pobre, the foregoing
statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

3. HOWEVER, according to Sen. Miriam, the purpose of her speech, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what
she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” She felt that the JBC should have at least given
an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of
Chief Justice

4. Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained
that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution: No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
In Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun: Parliamentary Immunity is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success”. It is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one.

Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Parliamentary Immunity is not for private indulgence, but for the public good.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech.

HELD:
1. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.

2. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used
in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question
were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

3 No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
people’s faith in the judiciary. As stated in In Re: Vicente Sotto, the people must not lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of this Court because if they do, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

4. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

5.Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law,
an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.

Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith.

6. The court does not accept the allegation of Senator Santiago that she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude
to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her
statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court for disgust. Parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

7. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an “unjust
act” the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC
functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the
JBC’s ex-officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief
Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the
members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

8. Under Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides, the court may
promulgate rules to shield the judiciary, from the assaults that politics and self interest, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice.” It been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.

9.The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a
lawyer.

10. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members.
However, the Court could not impose disciplinary sanctions upon the Senator because of her Constitutional
Privilege of Parliamentary Immunity. Doing such would result to encroachment of powers of Legislative Body.
As such, The Supreme Court ONLY REMINDS that parliamentary immunity as granted to members of
Congress does not protect them against their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall.
THEREFORE, SC REFERRED the matter to Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action
because The Rules of the Senate contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that prevents a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against
any public institution.” The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber but it is unfortunate that the
Senate President and her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

11. WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”

Facts:

SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied
the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department
to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses
committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the
comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial
enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the
first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Issue:

Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar per issues stated above.