G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994 On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br.
On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4, 2 dismissed Civil Case
FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional trial court citing
the final decision of the city court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible
entry, and on the basis thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of res
judicata. We summon the time-honored remedies accion interdictal, accion
publiciana and accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion to resolve the issues
presented in the petition.
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan,
Olongapo City, with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City.
Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion
of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before
the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 926, stating in pars. 2 and
3 therein that —
. . . plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession of a
certain parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of Olongapo, said lot
being designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite
Subdivision since 1961 and up to the present time, until the day and incidents
hereinafter narrated. . . . Sometime on December 12, 1970, the defendant,
without express consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, through
scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part
of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with the assistance of hired helpers, started
construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of
land; said entry was further augmented by removing plaintiff's chain link, fence
with galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise destroying plants
introduced by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments
thereon, and by these actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of
said portion of land which contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less. 1
No. 926 on the ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has
considered the area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ." 3 The
Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and executory on 30 April
1973 when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br.
3,4 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court
holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to prove that
the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot No. 1641. 5
Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No.
1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for
forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about
200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the
surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to
comply with the demand.
On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery
of possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court
of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0,
alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein that —
. . . plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as
Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision . . . covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3259, issued by the Register of Deeds for the province
of Zambales. . . . Sometime in December, 1970, and until present, defendants,
relying on an application filed on December 23, 1969, with the Bureau of
Lands, however have squatted, illegally occupied and unlawfully possessed the
southwestern portion of plaintiff's above-described property of about 200
square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL and now by defendant REINO
ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his property to the latter,
including the portion in question. . . . 6
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private
respondent herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Defendant Ben Babol did not file any pleading.
1
In its Order dated 27 January 1978,7 the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br.
1,8 sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.9 Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no
identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which
had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title.
She argues that private respondent Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense or res
judicata, was never impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action in
personam; neither was he a purchaserpendente lite who, perhaps, could have validly
invoked the defense of res judicata. With regard to the cause of action, she maintains
that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry,
which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent
case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.
Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases
since he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the
commencement of the first action. On the issue of identity of causes of action, he
simply states that neither of the two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the
subsequent petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action. Thus, private
respondent continues, both cases have to be dismissed.
Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a
subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final
judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4)
There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and
of causes of action. 10 The presence of the first three requirements and the identity of
subject matter in the fourth requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues
remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0 there
is identity of parties and of causes of action which would bar the institution of Civil
Case No. 2203-0.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is
without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required
is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. 11 It is fundamental that the
application of res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in
a subsequent litigation. In fact we have said that there is still identity of parties
although in the second action there is one party who was not joined in the first action,
if it appears that such party is not a necessary party either in the first or second
action, 12 or is a mere nominal party. 13 Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of
Court, provides that ". . . the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity."
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in
interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the
first action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the
two actions. But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of
causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior
possession, regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. 14 Thus,
"[t]he only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of
real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy
underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror." 15 And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of
possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership.
It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. 16
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for
"Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to
recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil
Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion
interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff
therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent
Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given
possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion
reivindicatoria. 18
The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 19, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still
good law and has preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and
2
jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely accion interdictal, which
is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession
of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer
(desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so
by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court; 20 accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of
the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court
when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and
includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff
alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 21 It is
different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges
proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. 22
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over
the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil
Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she
be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in
Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful (possessor)
and in actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil
Case No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the
parcel of land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The
complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and
clearly gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute
ownership, including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such
ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case
disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of
possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has
the right or title of ownership. 23
And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 24 even if
we treat Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it
has a cause of action different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no
identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0,
the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or
petition to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the
then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City,
dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration of
the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court of a
quo and the latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120784-85 January 24, 2001
SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA-
VIRAY, respondents.
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch
552 and the resolution denying reconsideration.3
Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957. 4 He had four (4) children, namely:
Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.
On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition5 of the estate of
Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses6 G. Mendoza,
husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale.7 The description of the property reads as
follows:
"A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro,
Masantol, Pampanga. Bounded on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the East,
by Paulino Fajardo; on the South, by Paulino Guinto. Containing an area of
3
 5,253 sq. mts., more or less. Declared under Tax Declaration No. 3029 in the
sum of P710.00."
At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later,
the cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were
specified as Lots 280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which
was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was
subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to
her brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a
complaint for partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold
to him.8
During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15,
1984, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.
On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to
spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray.
On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55
rendered a decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.1âwphi1.nêt
"1. The division and partition of the parcel of land identified and described
earlier with the aid and assistance of a qualified surveyor, segregating
therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right
eastern portion which is toward the national road the same to be determined
by one (or the said surveyor) standing on the subject land facing the
municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiffs;
"2. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by
metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs;
"3. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should
be taken, a commission is hereby constituted, and the OIC-Clerk of Court is
hereby appointed chairman, and the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of Branches
54 and 55 of this Court are hereby appointed members, to carry out the orders
contained in the foregoing first two paragraphs;
"4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
"SO ORDERED."9
On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and
Herminia Reyes-Bustos.
In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-
Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer10 against
spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as
lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land.
The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray.
Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed
when spouses Bustos filed with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe,
Branch 55,11 a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.
On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is as it is hereby, dismissed.
The preliminary injunction is ordered dissolved and the petitioners and
Meridian Assurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to
pay the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses and attorney's fees, and to pay the cost of the proceedings."12
In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 13
4
On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals.14
Upon motion for consolidation of the petitioners, on August 9, 1993, the Court of
Appeals resolved to consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No.
37606.15
On August 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases,
the dispositive portion of which provides:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, consolidated judgment is
hereby rendered for bot CA-G.R. SP No. 37607 and CA-G.R. SP No. 30369
as follows:
"1. The appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses
Mendoza is declared as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned
by Manuela Fajardo; and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
February 8, 1989 in Civil Case No. 83-0005-M is affirmed but MODIFIED as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby
orders.
"1. A relocation survey to be conducted (at the expense of the
plaintiffs) to retrace the land subject of the deed of sale dated
September 30, 1964 between Manuela Fajardo and Moses Mendoza;
"2. The division and partition of said relocated land by segregating
therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the
vacant right eastern portion which is toward the national road, the
same to be determined by one standing on the subject land facing the
municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiff-appellees;
"3. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion,
described by metes and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and
assigned to the plaintiffs-appellees;
"4. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion
should be taken, a Commission is hereby constituted, with the
OIC/present Clerk of Court as Chairman, and the OIC/present
Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of the Court (RTC) as
members, to carry out and implement the Orders contained in the
second and third paragraphs hereof;
"5. The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
"2. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 92-0421-M is AFFIRMED but the
reasons for its dismissal shall be effective only as to the issue of possession.
CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 is DISMISSED.
"3. No. pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."16
On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration;17 however, on
June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. 18
Hence, this petition.19
The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own
land.
The petition is meritorious.
In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the
unlawful detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as
to possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This
means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court
declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the
ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment
5
admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal,20the Supreme Court
reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of
special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579);
whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil.
164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became
final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135
SCRA 354)."
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are
now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the
judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result
in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court
adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of
the same. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of
ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories,
to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner." 22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals I Ca G.R. SP No. 30609 for being moot and academic. We AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 37606. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128177 August 15, 2001
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS
and AQUILINA ABALOS,respondents.
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated September 20,
1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 as well as its Resolution 2
dated January 15, 1997, denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
We quote the undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals, to wit —
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of
24,550 square meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Nipa with an area of 8,410 square meters; fishpond
with an area of 14,000 square meters; and residential land with an
area of 1,740 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the N, by
river and Filemon Anselmo; on the South by Alejandro Soriano and
Filemon Anselmo; and on the West by Fortunata Soriano.
Originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, the above-
described property passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses
David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years
beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman Soriano, one of the children of Adriano
Soriano, acting as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease.
After executing an extra judicial settlement among themselves, the heirs of
Adriano Soriano subsequently subdivided the property into two (2) lots, Lot
No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes,
Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to
Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was sold by
Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and
Aquilina Abalos (hereinafter referred to as petitioners), while, Elocadio,
Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares in Lot No. 8459 also to
petitioners.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker
and appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes. Thereafter,
Roman Soriano filedCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and
reliquidation against the de Vera spouses. The agrarian court authorized the
ejectment of Roman Soriano but on appeal, the decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals, which decision became final and executory. However, prior
to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a post-decisional
6
agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease
the property until the termination of the lease in 1982. In an Order dated
December 22, 1972, the post-decisional agreement was approved by the
agrarian court.
On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over
Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (3/4)pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed
asLRC Case No. N-3405. Said application for registration was granted by the
trial court, acting as a land registration court, per Decision dated June 27,
1983. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the land
registration court. The petition for review filed with the Supreme Court by
Roman Soriano docketed asG.R. 70842, was denied for lack of merit and
entry of judgment was entered on December 16, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of
the land registration court's decision, Roman Soriano, together with Elocadio
and Librada Soriano, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Branch 37, and against petitioners, an action for annulment of document
and/or redemption, ownership and damages, docketed asCivil Case No.
159568 (sic; should be 15958). Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground ofres judicata, pendency of another action, laches, misjoinder of
parties and lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the
post-decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera
inCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners
filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said post-decisional
agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. The
motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of the subject property,
jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Roman's property to
answer for the use and occupation by Soriano of 6/7 share of the property. On
October 25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion to suspend hearing on the
rental demanded by petitioners, which, however, was denied by the agrarian
court. The agrarian court likewise authorized the substitution of the de Vera
spouses by petitioners. Soriano's motion for reconsideration was also denied,
prompting Soriano to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985. Thus, the
complaint inCivil Case No. 159568(sic) for annulment of document and/or
redemption, ownership and damages, was amended to substitute Soriano's
heirs, herein private respondents, as party-plaintiffs. The complaint was again
amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-defendant for having allegedly
purchased part of the disputed property from petitioners. On motion of
petitioners, the re-amended complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the
ground that the re-amended complaint altered the cause of action. Upon
reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and petitioners were ordered to
file their Answer, in view of which petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed asC.A. GR SP No.
22149.
On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Roman
Soriano (substituted by private respondents) impugning the denial of their
motion to suspend hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, and
authorizing the substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners, on the
ground that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the agrarian court.
Thus, private respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 93401.
Meanwhile, on December 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No.
22149, also denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners, ruling that the land registration court committed no error when it
refused to adhere to the rule ofres judicata. Petitioners then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed asG.R. 99843.
On June 26, 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision inG.R. 93401,
and granted the petition filed by private respondents. Thus, the decision of the
Court of Appeals denying the petition of private respondents was set aside,
and the motion for execution filed by petitioners inCAR Case No. 1724-P-
48 was denied.
On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court, inG.R. 99843, reversed and set aside
the denial of the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, and
consequently,Civil Case No. 15958 for annulment of document and/or
redemption, ownership and damages, was ordered dismissed.
7
 On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed with the Department of
Agrarian Adjudication Board (sic), a complaint against petitioners for
"Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary
Injunction" docketed asDARAB Case No. 528-P-93.
Meanwhile, it appears that the decision of the land registration court inLRC
Case No. N-3405 was partially executed with the creation of a Committee on
Partition per Order dated March 25, 1987. On July 27, 1988, the land
registration court approved the partition of Lot No. 8459, with Lot No. 8459-
A assigned to private respondent, and Lot No. 8459-B assigned to petitioners.
For Lot No. 60052, O.C.T. No. 22670 was issued in the name of petitioners;
for Lot No. 8459-B, O.C.T. No. 22687 was issued, also in the name of
petitioner; and for Lot No. 8459-A, O.C.T. No. 22686 was issued in the name
of Roman Soriano. Dissatisfied with said partition, private respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed asCA G.R. SP No. 119497. The
appellate court affirmed the partition but reversed the order of the land
registration court directing the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground
of pendency ofCivil Case No. 15958.
On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the
Supreme Court inG.R. No. 99843, dismissedCivil Case No. 15958, in view of
which, petitioner, on November 25, 1993, inLRC Case No. N-3405, moved
for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of possession to
place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-B. Per
Resolution dated January 21, 1994, said motion was held in abeyance by the
land registration court until and afterDARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for security
of tenure with prayer forstatus quo, has been resolved.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 5, 1984,
petitioners interposed an appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R.
115073. In a Resolution dated July 27, 1994 issued by the Supreme Court,
petitioners' appeal, which was treated as a petition for certiorari, was referred
to this Court [of Appeals] for determination and disposition. 3
The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Resolution of the land registration
court and ordered instead the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor
of private respondents. With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners
are now before us raising the following grounds:
1. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
SECURITY OF TENURE OF TENANT-CARETAKER.
2. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISION ON RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD EARLIER
PERFECTED AN APPEAL OF THE RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF THEIR
PETITION.4
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited
by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude
other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually
and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of
two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. 5 A person
may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may
be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have
improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may
have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership,
therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. 6
There is no dispute that private respondents' (petitioners below) title over the land
under litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such
declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession,
especially so in the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel
of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final
judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet,
8
controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed
by petitioners (private respondents below) before the DARAB.
It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled
owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to
limitations that may be imposed by law.7 The Tenancy Act provides one such
limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right
to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established.
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life
itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood.8 The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the
exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
However, petitioners' status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In
keeping with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be
dispossessed of the subject property. As ratiocinated inNona v. Plan9 —
It is to the credit of respondent Judge that he has shown awareness of the
recent Presidential Decrees which are impressed with an even more solicitous
concern for the rights of the tenants.If, therefore, as he pointed out in his
order granting the writ of possession, there is a pending case between the
parties before the Court of Agrarian Relations, ordinary prudence, let alone
the letter of the law, ought to have cautioned him against granting the plea of
private respondents that they be placed in possession of the land in
controversy,x x x. At the time the challenged orders were issued, without any
showing of how the tenancy controversy in the Court of Agrarian Relations
was disposed of, respondent Judge could not by himself and with due
observance of the restraints that cabin and confine his jurisdiction pass upon
the question of tenancy. (Emphasis ours)
In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the principle of
finality of judgments. It applied the legal doctrine that once a judgment has become
final, the issuance of a writ of execution becomes ministerial. The appellate court held
that petitioner's situation does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule since his
occupation of the subject land did not transpire after the land registration court's
adjudication became final.
In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals loses sight of the fact that petitioner's
claim of possession as a tenant of the litigated property, if proven, entitles him to
protection against dispossession.
Private respondents argue that petitioners' tenancy claim is barred byres judicata,
having been ruled upon in G.R. Nos. 99843 and 93401. However, not being an issue in
the case before us, this question should properly be resolved in DARAB Case No. 528-
P-93. To restate, the only issue before us is whether or not a winning party in a land
registration case can effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure
rights are still pending determination before the DARAB.
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor
of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the
DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be
placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an
agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 dated September 20, 1996,
as well as its Resolution dated January 15, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in LRC Case No. N-3405 dated
January 21, 1994 is ordered REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133140 August 10, 1999
JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA. LUISA MAGPAYO AND
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T.
Garcia, Plaintiff-Appellee versus Spouses Luisito and Ma. Luisa Magpayo and Sheriff
of Makati, Defendants, Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant".1
The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz.:
9
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered,
sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their
daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the
Magpayos).
On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank
of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan, Five Hundred Sixty Four
Thousand (P564,000.00) Pesos according to them, One Million Two Hundred
Thousand (P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to PBCom.1âwphi1.nêt
On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the name of the
Magpayos.
The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of
Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title.
The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage
was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which
was the highest bidder bought the land.
The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the
Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in
favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name.
On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint
seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public
auction sale, and PBCom's title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This
complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land,
docketed as LRC Case No. M-731, which Branch 148 thereof granted.
Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T.
Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and
filed a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which
motion was denied.
Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff
the instant suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter
alia, that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T.
Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right thereover.
In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim over the land is
belied by the fact that it is not among the properties owned by his mother
listed in the Inventory of Real Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City,
Branch 27, in SP Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of Administration, Pedro V. Garcia
Petitioner-Administrator.
The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was
transferred to them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to enable them (Magpayos) to
borrow from PBCom.
Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that judgment be
rendered in his favor to which PBCom counter-motioned that judgment
should be rendered in its favor.
The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that
PBCom raised in its answer both factual and legal issues which could only be
ventilated in a full-blown trial.
The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment. 2
In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the
Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. It found that:
. . . [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage
in favor of the defendant PBCom on March 5, 1981, the said spouses were
not yet the owners of the property. This finding is evident from the other
10
 undisputed fact that a new Torrens title was issued to the defendants Magpayo
spouses only on March 9, 1981 . . . . The Magpayo spouses could not have
acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale
because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro
V. Garcia, was not in possession and hence could not deliver the property
merely by the execution of the document (MANALILI V. CESAR, 39 PHIL.
134). The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the said mortgage is null
and void for lack of one of the essential elements of a mortgage as required
by Art. 2085 of our Civil Code . . . .3
Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233 issued to
PBCom. Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. In reversing the trial court, the Court of
Appeals held:
(P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed property was
not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of
the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse
possession thereof does not lie.
For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered into possession
of the disputed property only upon the demise of his mother, from whom he
alleges to have inherited it but who was not the registered owner of the
property, that is, on October 31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p. 17, Records),
by which admission he is bound. Since the execution of the deed of sale by
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took place earlier or on
August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, plaintiff-appellee was not in
possession of the property at the time of the execution of said public
instrument.
Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the
property which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was
likewise registered, then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were
free to exercise the attributes of ownership including the right to mortgage the
land.
When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument of
sale is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer
may exercise the actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 55).
That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days
following the execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment,
for registration under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is
intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have
on the land (Municipality of Victorias v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32, 44-
45 [1987]).
Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of above decision which was denied. He
now comes before us raising the following errors committed by the Court Appeals:
I
The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of
proceedings when it decided the appeal subject of this case based on issues which were
raised neither in the trial court nor in the appellant's brief.
II
The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord with applicable
jurisprudence when it disregarded the admissions of the private respondents and,
despite ruling that Summary Judgment was proper, made its own findings of facts
which were contrary to the said admissions.
III
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord with established
jurisprudence and even contradicts itself, as far as the issue of the propriety of the
Summary Judgment is concerned.
The petition has no merit.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals
resolved the issues "ownership" and "possession" though they were not raised by
11
PBCom in its appellant's brief. The allegation is belied by page 17 of PBCom's
appellate brief, viz.:
Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously that "Magpayo
Spouses could not have acquired the property merely by the execution of the
deed of sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff"
(Order, p. 10).
Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession.
Ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts.
Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court, started only "at the
time of the filing of the complaint in this present case up to the present."
(page 2, Summary Judgment).
Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only in
1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His
possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat
PBCom's Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept
of an owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in
the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was subsequently cancelled
when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting
in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985.
Anent the second-assignment of error, petitioner contends that the following facts were
admitted by the parties in the trial court:
1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty. Pedro V.
Garcia and Remedios Tablan Garcia;
2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the conjugal property
of the said spouses;
3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously to the present
in actual physical possession of the property. At the time of the alleged sale to
the Magpayo spouses, petitioner was in possession of the property;
4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died, sometime in October,
1980, he became, by operation of law, a co-owner of the property;
5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in
favor of the Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject property. 4
We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records shows that these
alleged admitted facts are his own paraphrased portions of the findings of fact listed by
the trial court in the summary judgment.5 Indeed petitioner did not cite any page
number of the records or refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who
admitted the said facts.
Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is
entitled to a summary judgment merits scant attention. A summary judgment is one
granted by the court, upon motion by either party, for an expeditious settlement of the
case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that
no important questions or issues of fact are involved (except the determination of the
amount of damages) and that therefore the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.6 Under Rule 34, either party may move for a summary judgment — the
claimant by virtue of Section 1 and the defending party by virtue of Section 2, viz.:
Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought
may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.
It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless,
PBCom likewise moved for a summary judgment with supporting affidavit and
documentary exhibits, to wit:
COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
12
 PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment
The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also by the
defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims as clearly
shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 34.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render
summary judgment in PBCom's favor by DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint
as well as Sps. Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous.7
Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to
summary judgment as prayed for by both parties.
We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership
exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. 8 Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by
way of sale.9 Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose
of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On
the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right.10 Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of
an owner and possession of a holder.11 "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be
the owner himself or one who claims to be so." 12 On the other hand, "one who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes
to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."13 The records show that
petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely
tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals 14 that an owner's act
of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment
that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo
spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand,
petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother's share in the
conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory
of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling
that indeed the property was no longer considered owned by petitioner's parents. We
also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the
Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the
property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration
does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular
property.15 The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property
sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. 16 All said,
the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to
PBCom.17
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129609 November 29, 2001
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN BONDOC, TERESITA BONDOC-ESTO,
DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR and CHUA HUAY SOON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 135537 November 29, 2001
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
IDES O'RACCA BUILDING TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
These twin petitions filed under Rule 45 seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 39919, 36381 and 37243.
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O'Racca Building
(O'RACCA) since 1959.1 It was a "former alien property" over which the Republic of
the Philippines acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477, as amended. 2
Sometime in 1980 RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen
Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,3 members of
the Ides O'Racca Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).
13
On 4 September 1972 the lease contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was
renewed for another fifteen (15) years.4 At that time the O'RACCA was under the
administration of the Building Services and Real Property Management
Office (BSRPMO) then headed by Director Jesus R. Factora. 5
On 12 September 1982 BP 2336 was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien
properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the O'RACCA building was
classified as commercial property.7
On 8 January 1987 RODIL offered to purchase the subject property conformably with
BP 233 and the REPUBLIC responded that its offer to purchase would be acted upon
once the Committee on Appraisal shall have determined the market value of the
property.8
On 22 July 1997 the ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same building through
the Department of General Services and Real Estate Property
Management (DGSREPM).9
Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property, Director Factora of the
BSRPMO granted RODIL's request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23
September 1987 for another five (5) years from 1 September 1987. 10 The renewal
contract was forwarded to then Secretary Jose de Jesus of DGSREPM for approval.
On 25 September 1987 Undersecretary of DGSREPM Rufino B. Banas recommended
to Secretary De Jesus the suspension of the approval of the renewal contract because
the offer of the ASSOCIATION was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC.
Resultantly, on 30 September 1987 Secretary De Jesus issued another memorandum to
Director Factora disapproving the renewal contract in favor of RODIL, at the same
time recalling all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus
likewise directed RODIL to pay its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of
a temporary occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION. 11
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila against the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the
ASSOCIATION.12 RODIL prayed that a restraining order be issued enjoining the
ASSOCIATION or any person acting under it from collecting rentals from the
occupants or sub-lessees of O'RACCA. On 26 October 1987 the trial court granted the
writ of preliminary injunction. 13 On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the deposit of the monthly rentals
with the lower court pendente lite.
On 20 November 1987 the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas and Factora filed their
Answer with Counterclaim for damages. On 21 December 1987 the ASSOCIATION
also filed its Answer with Counterclaim for damages.
De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for
specific performance. On 31 May 1988 Factoran issued Order No. 1 designating the
Land Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of
all "former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC.
On 18 May 1992 RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was
approved by Secretary Factoran.14 The renewal contract would extend the lease for ten
(10) years from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was
subsequently entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract
were increased.15
On 14 August 1972 the action for specific performance was dismissed by the trial
court upon joint motion to dismiss by RODIL and the Solicitor General. The order of
dismissal however was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals. 16
On 25 September 1992 the spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez,
sublessees of RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the
authority of Factoran to enter into the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 with RODIL,
and claiming the right to purchase the subject property. 17
While the appeal of the ASSOCIATION from the order of dismissal and the letter-
appeal of the spouses Alvarez were pending, the ASSOCIATION instituted Civil Case
No. 92-63833 with the Regional Trial Court of Manila 18 praying for the setting aside
of the renewal contract of18 May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of 25 May
1992, and further praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3
May 1993 the trial court denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
14
On 30 July 1993 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria
Footwear,19 and on 4 August 1993, a similar action against Chua Huay Soon. 20
On 10 September 1993 the trial court dismissed the action for declaration of nullity of
the lease contract filed by the ASSOCIATION on the ground of litis pendentia.21 The
Order stated that the action for declaration of nullity and the action for specific
performance filed by RODIL were practically between the same parties and for the
same causes of action.22 This Order was appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court
of Appeals.23
On 19 January 1994 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondent
Teresita Bondoc-Esto,24 and on 1 February 1994 filed another action against
respondent Carmen Bondoc,25 both with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
On 8 February 1994 the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Teofisto
Guingona Jr. denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez, but nullified the renewal
contract of 18 May 1992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992. 26
Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL's right to eject
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon,27 as
promulgated in separate decisions the dispositive portions of which read —
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143301 —
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.] and against
the defendant [CARMEN BONDOC], to wit: 1. Ordering the defendant and
all those claiming title under her to vacate the subleased portion of the
O'Racca Building, corner Folgueras and M. de los Santos Streets, Binondo,
Manila; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the back rentals from
October 1987 to August 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 per month and from
September 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 per month plus a yearly increase of
20% per month up to the time that she vacates the premises; 3. Ordering the
defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the
cost of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143216 —
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [RODIL
ENTERPRISES, INC.] as against the defendant [TERESITA BONDOC
ESTO] ordering the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her to
vacate the premises at O'Racca Building located at corner Folgueras and M.
de los Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila, and turn over the possession thereof
to plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,700.00
as rental in arrears for the period from September 1992 plus legal rate of
interest less whatever amount deposited with the Court; ordering defendant to
pay the sum of P3,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the premises from January 1994 until defendant shall have
finally vacated the premises minus whatever amount deposited with the Court
as rental; ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney's fees in the amount
of P2,000.00 and the costs of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142258 —
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [RODIL
ENTERPRISES, INC.], ordering defendant [DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR], its
representatives, agents, employees and/or assigns to vacate the leased
premises or portion of the Ides O'Racca Building presently occupied by said
defendant and to pay plaintiff the following: a) Rentals in arrears from
October 1987 to June 1993 in the amount of P521,000.00; b) Rentals in the
amount of P9,000.00 a month from July, 1993 until defendant will have
vacated the premises; c) Attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00; d)
Costs of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142282-CV —
IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. defendant
CHUA HUAY SOON and all persons claiming rights through him, to vacate
the premises occupied by him at O'RACCA Building, located at the corner of
Folgueras and M. delos Santos Street, Binondo, Manila, and turn over
possession thereof to plaintiff RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.; 2. defendant to
pay rentals in arrears from October 1987 up to June 1993 at the rate of
P6,175.00 a month, representing the rentals in arrears; 3. defendant to pay
P6,175.00 per month from July 1993 until he vacates the premises, as
reasonable compensation for the use of the premises; 4. defendant to pay the
sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; 5. defendant to pay interests on the
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 amounts mentioned in Nos. 2 and 3 above at ten (10%) percent per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint until said amounts are fully paid;
and, 6. defendant to pay the costs.
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court28 in all the four (4)
decisions above quoted. Thus, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Divisoria
Footwear subsequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals,29 followed by respondent Chua Huay Soon.30
While the consolidated appeals from the unlawful detainer cases were pending, the
Second Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 12 April 1996
with regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919 declaring the renewal contract between RODIL and
the REPUBLIC null and void.31 RODIL moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied.32Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 33
On 29 November 1996 the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. No. 36381 and CA-G.R. No. 37243 setting aside
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, which sustained the Metropolitan Trial
Court, and dismissing the action for unlawful detainer filed by RODIL against its
lessees.34 RODIL moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. 35 Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.36
On respondents' motion, G.R. Nos. 129609 and 135537 were consolidated.
RODIL now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling its renewal contract
with the REPUBLIC and in dismissing its actions for unlawful detainer against
respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua. RODIL claims that
the assailed contracts are neither void nor voidable as the facts show they do not fall
within the enumerations under Arts. 1305 and 1409, and an implied new lease still
exists by virtue of Art. 1670. As a result, the right to eject respondents properly
belongs to it.37
With regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919, RODIL argues that the REPUBLIC, the only
defendant who is a real party in interest, signified its assent to having the action
dismissed. Assuming arguendo that the ASSOCIATION was a real party in interest,
its counterclaim was nonetheless unmeritorious.38
On the other hand, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua
contend that the lease contract which the lease contract of 18 May 1992 was to renew,
never came into existence. Therefore, since there was no contract to "renew," the
renewal contract had no leg to stand on, hence, is also void. 39 Respondents then
conclude that since there was no lease contract to speak of, RODIL had no right to
relief in its action for unlawful detainer. The ASSOCIATION, for its part, argues that
the counterclaim it filed against RODIL cannot be dismissed because the trial court has
not passed upon it.40
We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law.41 Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no
exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus
disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the
leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful
detainer are present.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992
and 25 May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts. 42 This is true only of the Contract
of Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve.
RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it. The so-
called approval of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of
Secretary De Jesus addressed to Director Factora. 43 This is evident from the fact that
Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a lease contract and
forward it to his office for approval.44 The consequences of this fact are clear. The
Civil Code provides that no contract shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is
communicated to the offeror.45Until that moment, there is no real meeting of the
minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence, no contract. 46
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As
argued by RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law
prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there
is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.47
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed
in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. 48 The
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appellate court however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from
awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not
petitioner RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was indeed issued against
RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered
into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.49
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that
respondents consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract
of 23 September 1987. However, novation is never presumed. 50 Also, the title of a
contract does not determine its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of
the contract which dictate its nature.51Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of
two (2) interpretations, one that would make it valid and another that would make it
invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted.52 The assailed agreement of 18 May
1992, "Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that the term of the contract
would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987. This is hardly conclusive of the
existence of an intention by the parties to notate the contract of 23 September 1987.
Nor can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite incompatibility
between the original contract and the subsequent one is not present. 53 Based on this
factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been
overturned.
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President
declaring null and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be
counted in its favor.
We do not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court's
judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto.
Respondent ASSOCIATION finally argues that the 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992
contracts can be considered rescissible because they concern property under litigation
and were entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority.54 Civil Case No. 87-42323 involved an action for specific
performance and damages filed by RODIL against the REPUBLIC and the
ASSOCIATION. The right to file the action for rescission arises in favor of the
plaintiff when the defendant enters into a contract over the thing under litigation
without the knowledge and approval of the plaintiff or the court. The right of action
therefore arose in favor of petitioner RODIL and not respondent ASSOCIATION.
Having preliminarily dealt with the validity of the lease contracts, we now proceed to
resolve the issue raised by respondent ASSOCIATION with regard to its counterclaim.
The ASSOCIATION argues that its counterclaim should not have been dismissed. On
this point, we agree. The requisites for the application of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure are clearly present.55 The counterclaim is necessarily connected with the
transaction that is the subject matter of the claim. In malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charge
was false and groundless.56 A determination of whether the charge is groundless would
necessarily involve an analysis of whether the action instituted by RODIL is
meritorious. The counterclaim did not require the presence of third parties over which
the court could not acquire jurisdiction, and that the court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the counterclaim since the amount of damages claimed by the
ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim amounted to P3,500,000.00, clearly within the
jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court under BP 129.
However, in the interest of making a final adjudication on an issue which has been
pending for fourteen (14) years, we will rule on the issues raised by the
ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim, and accordingly deny the same, dispensing with
any discussion regarding the merits of RODIL's cause of action which is clearly
neither "false" nor "groundless." Therefore, the elements of malicious prosecution are
absent.
As regards the action for unlawful detainer, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto,
Divisoria Footwear and Chua argue that this should not prosper because RODIL is not
in actual possession of the property and because they are not its sublessees. 57 Their
arguments do not convince.
In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease
contract with the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject
property was merely by virtue of acquiescence.58 The records clearly show this to be
the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a "temporary occupancy permit" which was
not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or
Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation of respondents was
merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter remained
uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately
17
for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by
virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had
the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom
possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.
Respondents finally argue that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory
provisions of Rule 45 so that its petition must be dismissed. They allege that petitioner
failed to state in its petition that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the date of
filing, when the motion was denied, and the date when the resolution denying the
motion was received.
A cursory review of RODIL's petition belies respondents' assertion. All dates required
under Rule 45, Sec. 4, are properly indicated except when the motion for
reconsideration was filed. Procedural rules are required to be followed as a general
rule, but they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his noncompliance with the procedure required. Dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure,
not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims. The rules have
been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting the
proper dispensation of justice. As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to
subvert and defeat, instead of promote and enhance its objective, suspension of the
rules is justified.59 Petitioner did not repeat its error in its later petition filed under G.R.
No. 135537. The oversight must be fashioned with leniency.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 36381, 37243 and 39919 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 39, in Civil
Cases Nos. 94-70776, 94-71122 and 94-71123 as well as the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 23, in Civil Case No. 94-72209 affirming in toto the Decisions of the
MeTC — Br. 28 in Civil Case No. 143301, MeTC — Br. 15 in Civil Case No. 143216,
MeTC — Br. 7 in Civil Case No. 142258, and MeTC — Br. 24 in Civil Case No.
142282-CV, as herein quoted, and the Orders dated 14 August 1992 and 6 November
1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 87-42323, recognizing the
validity and legality of the Renewal of the Lease Contract dated 18 May 1992 and the
Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992, are REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and
ADOPTED. Costs against private respondents in both cases. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138053 May 31, 2000
CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE, petitioner,
vs.
FELICITAS DE LARA, respondent.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre assails the October 5, 1998
decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 and its Resolution promulgated on March 5, 1999.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre,
filed with the Bureau of Lands on January 17, 1942 and with an area of 2,324 square
meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife — respondent
Felicitas de Lara, as claimant. On November 19, 1954, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales application to cover only 1,600
square meters. Then, on November 3, 1961, by virtue of a decision rendered by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated November 19, 1954, a
subdivision survey was made and the area was further reduced to 1,000 square meters.
On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation
purposes under TD 43927 in the name of respondent's sons — Apolonio and Rodolfo,
both surnamed de Lara.
Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National
Bank. When she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner
Cornelio M. Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for assistance. On February 10,
1960, a document denominated as "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and
Interests" was executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250
square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-story commercial and
residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in consideration of
the sum of P5,000.
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Sometime in May, 1968, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against
petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story
building.3 However, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on
the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984,
resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February 13,
1984, in the name of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over
the entire 1,000 square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter
portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-13038 on June 19, 1989, in the name of
respondent.4
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May 17,
1990. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered judgment on October 19, 1992, in favor of petitioner, declaring
him to be the lawful owner of the disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the transaction entered into by the
parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale.5 The
appellate court's decision was based on the inadequacy of the consideration agreed
upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a large portion of the "purchase
price" was made after the execution of the deed of sale in several installments of
minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to confirm
his rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the execution of the
deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 issued in favor of petitioner to be null and
void. On July 8, 1996, in a case docketed as G.R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and on September 11, 1996, we denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
On May 5, 1997, respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying
for the immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was
granted on August 18, 1997. On February 3, 1998, respondent moved for a writ of
possession, invoking our ruling in G.R. No. 120832. Petitioner opposed the motion,
asserting that he had the right of retention over the property until payment of the loan
and the value of the improvements he had introduced on the property. On March 12,
1998, the trial court granted respondent's motion for writ of possession. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on May 21, 1998.
Consequently, a writ of possession dated June 16, 1998, together with the Sheriff's
Notice to Vacate dated July 7, 1998, were served upon petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to
annul and set aside the March 12, 1998 and May 21, 1998 orders of the trial court,
including the writ of possession dated June 16, 1998 and the sheriff's notice to vacate
dated July 7, 1998.6
The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as follows: (1) whether
or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the
property pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the
mortgagor; and (b) whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith
with respect to the improvements he made on the property before the transaction was
declared to be an equitable mortgage.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of the
subject property. It said that —
. . . the mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the certificate
of title in order to protect his rights against third persons and thereby secure the
debt. There is therefore no necessity for him to actually possess the property.
Neither should a mortgagee in an equitable mortgage fear that the contract
relied upon is not registered and hence, may not operate as a mortgage to justify
its foreclosure. In Feliza Zubiri v. Lucio Quijano, 74 Phil 47, it was ruled "that
when a contract . . . is held as an equitable mortgage, the same shall be given
effect as if it had complied with the formal requisites of mortgage. . . . by its
very nature the lien thereby created ought not to be defeated by requiring
compliance with the formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real
estate mortgage, as long as the land remains in the hands of the petitioner
(mortgagor) and the rights of innocent parties are not affected.
Proceeding from the foregoing, petitioner's imagined fears that his lien would
be lost by surrendering possession are unfounded.
19
 In the same vein, there is nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara from acquiring
possession of the property pending actual payment of the indebtedness to
petitioner. This does not in anyway endanger the petitioner's right to security
since, as pointed out by private respondents, the petitioner can always have the
equitable mortgage annotated in the Certificate of Title of private respondent
and pursue the legal remedies for the collection of the alleged debt secured by
the mortgage. In this case, the remedy would be to foreclose the mortgage upon
failure to pay the debt within the required period.
It is unfortunate however, that the Court of Appeals, in declaring the transaction
to be an equitable mortgage failed to specify in its Decision the period of time
within which the private respondent could settle her account, since such period
serves as the reckoning point by which foreclosure could ensue. As it is,
petitioner is now in a dilemma as to how he could enforce his rights as a
mortgagee. . . .
Hence, this Court, once and for all resolves the matter by requiring the trial
court to determine the amount of total indebtedness and the period within which
payment shall be made.
Petitioner's claims that he was a builder in good faith and entitled to reimbursement for
the improvements he introduced upon the property were rejected by the Court of
Appeals. It held that petitioner knew, or at least had an inkling, that there was a defect
or flaw in his mode of acquisition. Nevertheless, the appellate court declared petitioner
to have the following rights:
. . . He is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which he may
have incurred over the property, in accordance with Art. 526 and Art. 452 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, considering that the transaction was merely an equitable
mortgage, then he is entitled to payment of the amount of indebtedness plus
interest, and in the event of non-payment to foreclose the mortgage.
Meanwhile, pending receipt of the total amount of debt, private respondent is
entitled to possession over the disputed property.
The case was finally disposed of by the appellate court in the following manner:
WHERFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and this case is ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for further proceedings, as
follows:
1) The trial court shall determine —
a) The period within which the mortgagor must pay his total amount of
indebtedness.
b) The total amount of indebtedness owing the petitioner-mortgagee plus
interest computed from the time when the judgment declaring the contract to be
an equitable mortgage became final.
c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner over the property. 7
On March 5, 1999, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate
court.8 Hence, the present appeal wherein petitioner makes the following assignment of
errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING
THAT THE RTC ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A
WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.
A.1 The RTC patently exceeded the scope of its authority and acted with
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate delivery of possession
of the Property to respondent as said order exceeded the parameters of the
final and executory decision and constituted a variance thereof.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE PAYMENT OF RESPONDENT'S
MORTGAGE LOAN.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH.
20
 D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST COMPUTED ONLY FROM
THE TIME WHEN THE JUDGMENT DECLARING THE CONTRACT TO
BE AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE BECAME FINAL.9
Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject
property until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful
improvements he made upon such property. 10 According to petitioner, neither the
Court of Appeals' decision in G.R. CV No. 42065 nor this Court's decision in G.R. No.
120832 ordered immediate delivery of possession of the subject property to
respondent.
The dispositive portion of the March 31, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R.
CV No. 42065, which was affirmed by this Court, provides that —
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (1) dismissing the
complaint; (2) declaring the "Document of Sale and Special Cession of Rights
and Interests" (Exhibit B) dated February 10, 1960, to be an equitable mortgage
not a sale; (3) upholding the validity of OCT No. P-13038 in the name of
Felicitas de Lara; and (3) declaring null and void OCT No. P-11566 in the name
of plaintiff Cornelio Isaguirre. All other counterclaims for damages are likewise
dismissed. Costs against the appellee. 11
Petitioner argues that the abovementioned decision merely settled the following
matters: (1) that the transaction between petitioner and respondent was not a sale but
an equitable mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of respondent is valid;
and (3) that OCT No. P-11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void. Since the
aforementioned decision did not direct the immediate ouster of petitioner from the
subject property and the delivery thereof to respondent, the issuance of the writ of
possession by the trial court on June 16, 1998 constituted an unwarranted modification
or addition to the final and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No. 120832. 12
We do not agree with petitioner's contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995
decision of the appellate court, which was affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996,
served as more than adequate basis for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor
of respondent since these decisions affirmed respondent's title over the subject
property. As the sole owner, respondent has the right to enjoy her property, without
any other limitations than those established by law. 1 Corollary to such right,
respondent also has the right to exclude from the possession of her property any other
person to whom she has not transmitted such property. 14
It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights over the
property enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant or
lessee. 15 Petitioner anchors his own claim to possession upon his declared status as a
mortgagee. In his Memorandum, he argues that —
4.8 It was respondent who asserted that her transfer of the Property to petitioner
was by way of an equitable mortgage and not by sale. After her assertion was
sustained by the Courts, respondent cannot now ignore or disregard the legal
effects of such judicial declaration regarding the nature of the transaction.
xxx xxx xxx
4.13 Having delivered possession of the Property to petitioner as part of the
constitution of the equitable mortgage thereon, respondent is not entitled to the
return of the Property unless and until the mortgage loan is discharged by full
payment thereof. Petitioner's right as mortgagee to retain possession of the
Property so long as the mortgage loan remains unpaid is further supported by
the rule that a mortgage may not be extinguished even though then mortgagor-
debtor may have made partial payments on the mortgage loan:
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt
may be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or the
creditor.
Therefore, the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask
for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as long
as the debt is not completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditor's heir who has received his share of the debt
return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other
heirs who have not been paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
21
 4.14 To require petitioner to deliver possession of the Property to respondent
prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would be equivalent to the
cancellation of the mortgage. Such effective cancellation would render
petitioner's rights ineffectual and nugatory and would constitute unwarranted
judicial interference.
xxx xxx xxx
4.16 The fact of the present case show that respondent delivered possession of
the Property to petitioner upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
Special Cession of Rights and Interest dated 10 February 1960. Hence, transfer
of possession of the Property to petitioner was an essential part of whatever
agreement the parties entered into, which, in this case, the Supreme Court
affirmed to be an equitable mortgage.
xxx xxx xxx
4.19 Petitioner does not have the mistaken notion that the mortgagee must be in
actual possession of the mortgaged property in order to secure the debt.
However, in this particular case, the delivery of possession of the Property was
an integral part of the contract between petitioner and respondent. After all, it
was supposed to be a contract of sale. If delivery was not part of the agreement
entered into by the parties in 1960, why did respondent surrender possession
thereof to petitioner in the first place?
4.20 Now that the Courts have ruled that the transaction was not a sale but a
mortgage, petitioner's entitlement to the possession of the Property should be
deemed as one of the provisions of the mortgage, considering that at the time
the contract was entered into, possession of the Property was likewise delivered
to petitioner. Thus, until respondent has fully paid her mortgage loan, petitioner
should be allowed to retain possession of the subject property. 16
Petitioner's position lacks sufficient legal and factual moorings.
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation. 17 It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the
proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is
nevertheless binding between the parties. 18 Thus, the only right granted by law in
favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document
in which the mortgage is formalized. 19 As a general rule, the mortgagor retains
possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the
property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not
have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it
was constituted. 21 If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may
institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially,
whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds
therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.
Apparently, petitioner's contention that "[t]o require [him] . . . to deliver possession of
the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would
be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without basis. Regardless of its
possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in
the event of the debtor's default in the payment of his loan obligation.
Moreover, this Court cannot find any justification in the records to uphold petitioner's
contention that respondent delivered possession of the subject property upon the
execution of the "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" on
February 10, 1960 and that the transfer of possession to petitioner must therefore be
considered an essential part of the agreement between the parties. This self-serving
assertion of petitioner was directly contradicted by respondent in her
pleadings. 22 Furthermore, nowhere in the Court of Appeals' decisions promulgated on
March 31, 1995 (G.R. CV No. 42065) and on October 5, 1998 (G.R. SP No. 48310), or
in our own decision promulgated on July 8, 1996 (G.R. No. 120832) was it ever
established that the mortgaged properties were delivered by respondent to petitioner.
In Alvano v. Batoon, 2 this Court held that "[a] simple mortgage does not give the
mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain
some special provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented
any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention
of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full
payment of the loan.
22
Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor
of respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-
13038) in the name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying
the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-11566) in the name of petitioner Cornelio
Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant
for respondent to go back to court simply to establish her right to possess subject
property. Contrary to petitioner's claims, the issuance of the writ of possession by the
trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of our decision in G.R. No.
120832, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. 24 It bears stressing that a
judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 25
With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the
Court of Appeals' characterization of petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based on
the factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from the
very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondent's property as
mere security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim
reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to
reimbursement for any useful
expenses 26 which he may have incurred. 27
Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, this case should be remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for a determination of the total amount of
the loan, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner, and the period within which
respondent must pay such amount. 28 However, no interest is due on the loan since
there has been no express stipulation in writing. 29
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998
and its Resolution dated March 5, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent is entitled
to delivery of possession of the subject property. This case is hereby REMANDED to
the trial court for determination of the amount of the loan, the necessary expenses
incurred by petitioner and the period within which the respondent must pay the same.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146082 July 30, 2004
MELCHOR CUSTODIO, petitioner, appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO F. CORRADO, respondent.
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated July 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 45764, and its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated
September 9, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9,
in RTC Appeal Case No. 3301, which reversed the Decision4 dated August 19, 1996 of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas, dismissing respondent
Rosendo F. Corrado’s Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.
The facts and antecedent proceedings, as culled from records, are as follows:
On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment 5 case against
petitioner Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil
Case No. 116. It was dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that (1)
it had no jurisdiction as the complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was
no barangayconciliation, and (3) the plaintiff failed to prove his case by
preponderance of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC of Balayan, Batangas affirmed the
appealed decision docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099. 6
On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No.
120,7 and which is the core case subject of the present petition.
The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the
registered owner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered
by TCT No. T-21342. He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the
complaint, petitioner Melchor Custodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of
tenancy relationship with respondent’s father, Crisanto Corrado and without his
knowledge and consent, demolished his old residential house on the said lot and
constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his family now reside.
In his Answer,8 petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold
tenant of Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that
23
respondent’s father consented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years ago
when the subject lot was still owned by respondent’s father and before it was
transferred to respondent. As affirmative defenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action; (b) the required barangay conciliation under P.D.
15089 was not complied with; and (c) the present complaint is now barred on the
ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on forum shopping.
The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference:
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21342 covering the lot in question
is in the name of plaintiff Rosendo Corrado;
2. That the defendant has never been a tenant of the plaintiff;
3. That the construction of the two-bedroom bungalow structure on the
subject premises was without the consent of the plaintiff;
4. That the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 which involved the same parties
was by reason of alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508;
5. That subject property is located in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, and not in
Barangay Gulod, Calatagan;
6. That no Barangay Certification is attached to the instant complaint pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1508;
7. That the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court was appealed before the
Regional Trial Court which was docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099. 10
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint
without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.11
The MTC initially resolved several issues and ruled inter alia that: (a) It has
jurisdiction over the complaint which is an accion publiciana case although
denominated as recovery of possession and ownership; (b) Prior compliance
with barangay conciliation is not required because the parties reside in non-
adjoining barangays of different municipalities with respondent residing
in Barangay Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Batangas, and petitioner residing
in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan and the complaint included a prayer for preliminary
injunction and TRO; and (c) The filing of the present Civil Case No. 120 does not
constitute forum shopping and the judgment in the previous ejectment case in Civil
Case No. 116 will not amount to res judicata in the present case because there was no
judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 116. The MTC noted that there was no
adjudication as to the rights of the parties, particularly the determination of their
possessory rights in Civil Case No. 116 as its dismissal was anchored on respondent’s
non-compliance with the required barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 and on
respondent’s failure to allege the particular date of deprivation of possession required
for the court to determine whether the case was filed within the one (1) year period.
However, the MTC finds that the petitioner’s continued stay on respondent’s property
has factual and legal basis since evidence on record, such as milling tickets,
convincingly show that petitioner has been a tenant of respondent’s father, Crisanto
Corrado, cultivating the latter’s three (3)-hectare sugarcane land, including the subject
lot, since 1961. It did not give credence to respondent’s claim of ignorance to the
tenancy relationship between petitioner and his father since the latest milling tickets
showed that petitioner continued working on the subject lot even after it was
transferred to respondent’s name.
Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC, which set aside and reversed the
MTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 and a new one
entered declaring the plaintiff as the true and absolute owner of the residential
lot in question; ordering the defendant to deliver the possession thereof to the
plaintiff and to vacate the same, with costs against the defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.12
24
In reversing the MTC, the RTC found merit in respondent’s allegation that petitioner
cannot claim any right to possess respondent’s lot on the premise that he is an alleged
tenant of respondent’s father. The RTC found it unacceptable for the MTC to rule that
respondent is bound by the action of his father in allowing petitioner to construct a
house on the subject lot and occupy the same. The RTC stressed that the parties had
stipulated during the pre-trial that the subject lot is registered under the name of
respondent and that petitioner is not a tenant of respondent. Further, respondent
acquired the said lot in 1970 not from his father but from the government, which was
the registered owner since 1909. Thus, respondent’s father never acquired any right
over the said land, hence, he has no right to transmit or alienate the land to anyone.
The RTC further stated that petitioner’s alleged possession, if any, would have been
only by tolerance by the government and he would have acted promptly at the time
respondent purchased the lot if he truly believed that he had the legal right over the lot.
Finally, the RTC clarified that contrary to the MTC’s ruling, the case is not merely
an accion publiciana, where only physical possession is involved, but one of accion
reinvindicatoria because respondent claimed recovery of full possession as an absolute
owner. The RTC concluded that since respondent is the absolute owner of the
property, the MTC cannot bar him from recovering possession based on spurious
authority granted by a third party who is not an owner.
Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC
decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the RTC decision dated September 9, 1997 in
RTC Appeal Case No. 3301.
SO ORDERED.13
The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no
identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the
former is an ejectment suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the
date of deprivation of possession while the latter is for recovery of possession, and not
ejectment. It also brushed aside the alleged tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondent, noting that the milling tickets were issued for respondent’s father as the
planter and petitioner as the tenant, but without any evidence showing that they
referred to the subject lot and without any indication that petitioner was getting his
share from the subject lot.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 116 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 120
HAVE TWO (2) SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT WHAT DETERMINES THE NATURE OR CAUSE OF THE
ACTION IS NOT THE CAPTION OF THE COMPLAINT BUT THE
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT
FOR RES JUDICATA TO APPLY, "SUBSTANTIAL" AND NOT
ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION WILL SUFFICE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS AMPLY ESTABLISHED
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE A TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPONDENT AND HIS FATHER, CRISANTO
CORRADO.14
In our view, the relevant issues for our resolution are: (a) whether or not the principle
of res judicata is applicable in this case; and (b) whether the alleged tenancy
relationship between petitioner with respondent and the latter’s father was established
by preponderance of evidence.
On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable in
this case since the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and
120 would clearly reveal an identity of cause of action. Citing jurisprudence, it argued
that what should control in determining the cause of action are the averments in both
25
complaints seeking recovery of possession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of
dispossessing and ejecting petitioner from the property and restoring it to respondent
and not the different captions of the two complaints. He argued further that the
application of the principle of res judicata only requires substantial and not absolute
identity of causes of action. For his part, respondent countered that while there may be
identity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are not identical in Civil
Case Nos. 116 and 120 as the former is one for ejectment to recover material
possession while the latter is one for recovery of possession and ownership of the
subject land.
We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is
inapplicable because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits
and its cause of action is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession
and ownership.
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a)
identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action. 15
In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A
judgment on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when
there is determination which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without
trial.16 Thus, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of
action and the subject matter of the case.17 In this case, the MTC’s dismissal of Civil
Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack of jurisdiction and lack of proof of the date of
demand without determining and resolving who has the right of possession between
petitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was not resolved on the merits but was
dismissed on technical points. A judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction
cannot operate as res judicata on the merits.18
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. We
agree with the findings of the CA which we find no reason to set aside, to wit:
…In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit
and for failure of plaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was
deprived of his possession, the court held that it did not entitle him to file an
ejectment suit against herein defendant-petitioner. In Civil Case No. 120, the
cause of action is for recovery of possession and not ejectment. These are two
separate causes of action and therefore the principle of res judicata does not
apply to the present case.19
Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of
action from an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No.
120, and the judgment of the former shall not bar the filing of another case for
recovery of possession as an element of ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only who has
the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership. 20 Incidentally, we agree with
the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion publiciana but more
of an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondent’s allegation in the complaint
that he is the registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had constructed
a bungalow thereon and had been continuously occupying the same since then.
The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two
forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action
to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions
to judicially recover possession.21
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the
circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence.
In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,22 we held that a judgment in a case for
forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de
facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between the same parties respecting
title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of
26
a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity of causes of
action between the two.
Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him and
respondent’s father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that this is a
factual issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value of
evidences presented which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides,
this issue had already been squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and we find no
impelling reason to set it aside. According to the Court of Appeals, the milling tickets
only showed that they were issued to Crisanto Corrado but did not show whether such
tickets referred to the same lot in question. In petitions for review on certiorari, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of law, it must
involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this
Court, which is not a trier of facts.23
At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-
trial stage where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of
respondent and that petitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and
respondent are bound by such stipulations which are deemed settled and need not be
proven during the trial. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the
basic issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the
trial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that
the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision
dated July 28, 2000 and Resolution dated November 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 45764 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84831 June 20, 2001
PACENCIO ABEJARON, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ALEJANDRO
ABEJARON, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX NABASA and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
With the burgeoning population comes a heightened interest in the limited land
resource, especially so if, as in the case at bar, one's home of many years stands on the
land in dispute. It comes as no surprise therefore that while this case involves a small
parcel of land, a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in Silway,
General Santos City, the parties have tenaciously litigated over it for more than twenty
years.
Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to annul the respondent
court's Decision dated April 26, 1988 and Resolution dated July 12, 1988 reversing the
trial court's decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the owner of the subject lot.
The following facts spurred the present controversy:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a
118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General
Santos City described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded on the North by Road,
on the South by Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by Felix Nabasa, and on the West
by Road."1 In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-
square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the
area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. In 1949,
petitioner improved their abode to become a two-storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet
or 87.78 square meters made of round wood and nipa roofing.2 This house, which
stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 and a portion of
the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioner’s daughter, Conchita
Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed and in its stead, petitioner
Abejaron built another store which stands up to the present. In 1951, he planted five
coconut trees on the property in controversy. Petitioner's wife, Matilde Abejaron,
harvested coconuts from these trees.3 Petitioner Abejaron also planted banana and
avocado trees. He also put up a pitcher pump.4 All this time that the Abejarons
introduced these improvements on the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not
oppose or complain about the improvements.
Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his
house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and
1978.5 The last two declarations state that petitioner Abejaron’s house stands on Lots 1
and 2, Block 5, Psu 154953.6 Abejaron paid taxes on the house in 1955, 1966, and
1981.7
27
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-
square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953.8 Nabasa built his house about four
(4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house. Beatriz Gusila, a neighbor of the
Abejarons and the Nabasas confirmed that when she arrived in Silway in 1949, Nabasa
was not yet residing there while Abejaron was already living in their house which
stands to this day.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy.
Abejaron merely watched them do the survey9 and did not thereafter apply for title of
the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government
property.10 Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa
"clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied for and caused the
titling in his name" of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, including petitioner
Abejaron's 118-square meter portion.11 Petitioner imputes bad faith and fraud on the
part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the titling in his name of Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor
of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion
despite knowledge of Abejaron's actual occupation and possession of said portion. 12
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140
pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. As the
title included petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion of the lot, his son,
Alejandro Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron (petitioner Abejaron's wife), filed
a protest with the Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa's title
and application. The protest was dismissed on November 22, 1979 for failure of
Matilde and Alejandro to attend the hearings.13 Alejandro claims, however, that they
did not receive notices of the hearings. Alejandro filed a motion for reconsideration
dated January 10, 1980. Alejandro also filed a notice of adverse claim on January 14,
1980. Subsequently, he requested the Bureau of Lands to treat the motion as an appeal
considering that it was filed within the 60-day reglementary period. The motion for
reconsideration was endorsed and forwarded by the District Land Office XI-3 of the
Bureau of Lands in Koronadal, Cotabato to the Director of Lands in Manila on
November 24, 1981.14 But because the appeal had not been resolved for a prolonged
period for unknown reasons, petitioner Abejaron filed on March 12, 1982 an action for
reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City.15 On May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a notice of lis
pendens.16
Abner Lagsub, geodetic engineer, testified for the petitioner. Lagsub stated that on
March 30, 1980, Alejandro Abejaron hired him to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-
154953, the land in controversy. He surveyed the lot measuring 175 square meters.
Fifty-seven (57) square meters of Lot 1 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 3 were
occupied by Nabasa's house. This portion was fenced partly by hollow blocks and
partly by bamboo. On the remaining 118 square meters stood a portion of petitioner
Abejaron’s house and two coconut trees near it, and his store. Abejaron's 118-square
meter portion was separated from Nabasa's 57-square meter part by Abejaron's fence
made of hollow blocks. Both Nabasa’s and Abejaron’s houses appeared more than
twenty years old while the coconut trees appeared about 25 years old.
Back in 1971, Lagsub conducted a subdivision survey on Psu-154953. He was then
hired by the Silway Neighborhood Association to conduct the survey for purposes of
allocating lots to the members of the association, among whom were respondent
Nabasa and petitioner Abejaron. When the 1971 survey was conducted, both the
Abejarons and Nabasa were already occupying their respective 118 and 57 square
meter portions of Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa and Matilde Abejaron, representative of
petitioner, were present during the survey.17
Respondent Nabasa had a different story to tell. He contends that he had been residing
on a 12 x 15 meter or 180-square meter public land in Silway, General Santos City
since 1945. He admits that petitioner Abejaron was already residing in Silway when he
arrived there. Nabasa constructed a house which stands to this day and planted five
coconut trees on this 180-square meter land, but only two of the trees survived. Nabasa
never harvested coconuts from these trees as petitioner Abejaron claims to own them
and harvests the coconuts. In many parts of respondent Nabasa’s testimony, however,
he declared that he started occupying the 180-square meter area in 1976.18
Nabasa avers that previously, he and petitioner Abejaron were in possession of
portions of Lot 2, Psu-154953. This lot was subsequently surveyed and divided into
smaller lots with the area of petitioner Abejaron designated as Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-
154953 measuring one hundred eighty (180) square meters, while his was designated
as Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with an area of one hundred seventy five (175) square
meters.
Instead of applying for free patent over his Lot 2, petitioner Abejaron gave this lot to
his daughter Conchita Abejaron-Abellon and allowed her to file the application with
the District Land Office XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato. Conchita
28
secured Free Patent No. (XI-4)-3293 over Lot 2. Pursuant to this, she was issued
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4420. On April 27, 1981, Conchita's title was
transcribed in the Registration Book of General Santos City.
Respondent Nabasa, on the other hand, filed an application for Free Patent over Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953 with the District Land Office No. XI-4, Bureau of Lands,
Koronadal, South Cotabato. While the application was pending, petitioner Abejaron
forcibly encroached upon the northern and southwestern portion of Lot 1, Block 5,
Psu-159543. Abejaron fenced the disputed 118-square meter portion of Lot 1 and
despite Nabasa's opposition, constructed a store near the road. Petitioner Abejaron then
transferred his old house constructed on Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-154953 to a portion of the
disputed 118-square meter area. Petitioner's daughter, Conchita, patentee and title
holder of Lot 2, constructed her own house in Lot 2.
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877, covering Lot 1, Block 5, was issued to respondent
Nabasa on September 24, 1974. But before the patent could be transcribed on the
Registration Book of the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, the District Land
Officer of District Land Office No. XI-4 recalled it for investigation of an
administrative protest filed by the petitioner.19 The protest was given due course, but
petitioner Abejaron or his representative failed to appear in the hearings despite notice.
On November 22, 1979, the administrative protest was dismissed by the District Land
Officer for failure of petitioner Abejaron or his representative to appear in the hearings
despite notice.20 Respondent Nabasa's Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 was then re-
transmitted by the District Land Officer of District Land Office XI-4 to the Register of
Deeds, General Santos City, and the same was transcribed in the Registration Book of
the Registry of Property of General Santos City on December 13, 1979. Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4140, covering Lot 1, Block 2, Psu-154953, was issued to
respondent Nabasa.21
On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for
reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of
Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953.
During the trial, respondent Nabasa presented Abundio Guiral, his neighbor who had
been living since 1945 in Lot 3, Block 5, Psu-154953, adjoining Nabasa's Lot 1. He
testified that when he arrived in Silway, petitioner Abejaron was already living there.
Four months after, Nabasa started residing in the area. Nabasa constructed a house,
planted coconut trees, and fenced his 12 x 15 meter area. Abejaron's house in 1945 is
still the same house he lives in at present, but in 1977, it was jacked up and transferred
from Lot 2 to Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa tried to prevent the transfer to no avail. The
house was then extended towards Lot 2.22
On rebuttal, petitioner Abejaron presented two neighbors. One of them, Alejandra
Doria, started living in Silway in 1947. She testified that when she arrived in the
neighborhood, Abejaron's fence as it now stands between the 57-square meter portion
occupied by Nabasa's house and the 118-square meter area claimed by petitioner
Abejaron was already there.23 The other neighbor, Pacencia Artigo, also started living
in Silway in 1947. She declared that the house of the Abejarons stands now where it
stood in 1947. She also testified that the Abejarons previously had a store smaller than
their present store.24
On September 27, 1985, after trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner Abejaron, viz:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this court hereby
renders judgment as follows:
1. Declaring the possession and occupancy of Pacencio Abejaron over 118
square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in good faith and thereby
declaring the inclusion of 118 square meters of said lot in OCT No. P-4140
erroneous and a mistake, and for which, defendant Felix Nabasa is hereby
ordered to reconvey and execute a registerable document in favor of plaintiff
Pacencio Abejaron, Filipino, married and a resident of Silway, General
Santos City, his heirs, successors and assigns over an area of one hundred
eighteen (118) square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, situated at
Silway, General Santos City, on the Western portion of said lot as shown in
the sketch plan, Exhibit "R", and the remaining portion of 57 square meters of
said lot to be retained by defendant Felix Nabasa;
2) Should Felix Nabasa fails (sic) to do so, upon the finality of this judgment,
the Clerk of Court shall executed (sic) it in the name of Felix Nabasa,
widower, and will have the same effect as if executed by the latter and the
Register of Deeds, General Santos City, is hereby directed to issue New
Transfer Certificate of Title to Alejandro Abejaron over 118 square meters of
Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, and New Transfer Certificate of Title over
29
 57 square meters of same Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, in favor of Felix
Nabasa, and ultimately to have OCT No. P-4140 of Felix Nabasa cancelled
accordingly."
Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of respondent Nabasa, viz:
". . . the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud. In this case, Abejaron
failed to substantiate the existence of actual fraud. . . There was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor
was there a claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of the title, thus, the
title has become indefeasible (Frias v. Esquival, 67 SCRA 487). Abejaron
was not able to establish his allegation that Nabasa misrepresented his status
of possession in his application for the title. . . In fact, in Abejaron's answer to
Nabasa's counterclaim, he said that Nabasa has been occupying the area since
1950.
Contrary to the finding of the court a quo, the Bureau of Lands conducted an
ocular inspection before the title was issued. This was confirmed by Abejaron
himself (tsn, January 19, 1984).
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring Felix Nabasa
as the owner of the lot covered by O.C.T. No. P-4140. Costs against plaintif-
appellee.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision. On July 22, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari with the following assignment of errors:
"I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT ACTUAL FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND PROVEN BY THE PETITIONER AND SUSTAINED
BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROCURED
THE TITLE IN HIS NAME OF THE AREA OF THE LOT IN QUESTION,
LOT 1, BLOCK 5, LOCATED AT SILWAY, DADIANGAS, GENERAL
SANTOS CITY.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE LOT WHICH BELONGS TO THE PETITIONER IS LOT 2 OF
THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND THAT THE PETITIONER
FORCIBLY ENTERED INTO LOT 1 OF THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU,
AND FORCIBLY TRANSFERRED HIS OLD HOUSE FROM LOT 2 TO
LOT 1 IS BASED ONLY ON THE SELF-SERVING ALLEGATIONS OF
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY
COMPETENT AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS A CLEAR
RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BECAUSE HE HAS
BEEN IN ACTUAL AND LAWFUL POSSESSION FOR SO MANY
YEARS AND A CLAIMANT OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION."
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one
year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent
purchaser for value.25 The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding
and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who
secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner
thereof.26 Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on
fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear
and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. 27
Petitioner Abejaron does not claim to own Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. He in fact
admits that he believed the land in dispute was public in character, thus he did not
declare it for taxation purposes despite possession of it for a long time. Neither did he
30
apply for title over it on the mistaken belief that he could not apply for title of a public
land. In his Complaint, he stated that respondent Nabasa's fraudulent procurement of
Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 and OCT No. P-4140 over the disputed land deprived him
not of ownership, but of his "right to file the necessary application thereon with the
authorities concerned"28 as long-time possessor of the land.
Nonetheless, petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance is proper, viz:
". . . for an action of reconveyance of a parcel of land to prosper, it is not
necessary that the proponent be the absolute owner thereof. It is enough that
the proponent has an equitable right thereon. In the case at bar, the plaintiff
had been in lawful, open, continuous and notorious possession, occupation
and control in the concept of an owner of a greater portion of the subject lot
since 1945 and have (sic) thereby acquired an equitable right thereon
protected by law. Possession of public lands once occupation of the same is
proven, as the herein plaintiff did, under claim of ownership constitutes a
grant from the state (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). A portion of the
public land ceased to be public as soon as its claimant had performed all the
conditions essential to a grant (Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875)." 29
Petitioner's contention, buttressed by the Vera case and Chief Justice Teehankee's
dissent in the Villanueva case, is similar to the position taken by the plaintiff in Mesina
v. Vda. de Sonza, et al.30 In that case, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija an action for cancellation of the original certificate of title procured by the
defendant by virtue of a homestead patent. The title covered a public land which she
claimed to own through public, open, and peaceful possession for more than thirty
years. The law applicable in that case, which petitioner Abejaron apparently relies on
in the case at bar, is Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 or the Public Land Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, viz:
"Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act (now Property
Registration Decree), to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter."
(emphasis supplied)
Citing Susi v. Razon,31 the Court interpreted this law, viz:
". . . where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and
publicly with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions
of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as
Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to
have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts -an application
therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874
(reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director
of Lands. (Italics supplied)"
The Mesina and Susi cases were cited in Herico v. Dar,32 another action for
cancellation of title issued pursuant to a free patent. Again, the Court ruled that under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, with the
plaintiff's proof of occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessor-in-interest, title over the land had vested in him as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thenceforth, the land was no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent.33 The Court held, viz:
31
 "As interpreted in several cases (Susi v. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina v.
Pineda Vda. de Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960) when the conditions
as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The land, therefore, ceases to be of public domain, and beyond the authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent."34
In citing Republic v. Villanueva, et al.,35 petitioner Abejaron relied on the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Teehankee. However, the en banc majority opinion in that
case and in Manila Electric Company v. Bartolome,36departed from the doctrines
enunciated in the Susi, Mesina, and Herico cases. Citing Uy Un v. Perez,37 the Court
ruled that "the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation
of his title under Sec. 48(b) of Com. Act. No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942,
is 'derecho dominical incoativo' and that before the issuance of the certificate of title
the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains
to the State."38
The Court pointed out that the Villanueva and Meralco cases are different from the
oft-cited Susi case as the latter involved a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen
since time immemorial, while the land in dispute in the Villanueva and Meralco cases
were sought to be titled by virtue of Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. In
explaining the nature of land possessed since time immemorial, the Court quoted Oh
Cho v. Director of Lands,39viz:
"All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."
In 1986, however, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,40 this
Court en banc recognized the strong dissent registered by Chief Justice Teehankee in
the Villanueva case and abandoned the Villanueva and Meralco ruling to revert to the
Susi doctrine. Reiterating the Susi and Herico cases, the Court ruled:
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself [Sec. 48(b)] that the possessor(s) 'x x x shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x.' No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete."41 (Emphasis supplied)
This is the prevailing rule as reiterated in the more recent case of Rural Bank of
Compostela v. Court of Appeals, a ponencia of now Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,42 viz:
"The rule under the latter (Section 48[b] of the Public Land Act, as amended
by R.A. No. 1942), is that when the conditions specified therein are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and
the land ceases to be part of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands."43
The question brought to the fore, therefore, is whether or not petitioner Abejaron has
satisfied the conditions specified in Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 1942. Sec. 48(b) has been further amended by P.D. No. 1073 which took
effect on January 25, 1977. Sec. 4 of the P.D. reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of
the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
32
 occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945."
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (Italics
ours)44
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation
required by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that
occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not
apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b)
takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements
of this law, he would have already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This
follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al.,45 that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated,
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior
to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since
January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete
title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.46
Having laid down the law applicable to the case at bar, i.e., Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942, we now determine whether or not petitioner has
acquired title over the disputed land. In doing so, it is necessary for this Court to wade
through the evidence on record to ascertain whether petitioner has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the 118-square
meter disputed land for 30 years at least since January 24, 1947. It is axiomatic that
findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive on
the parties and upon this Court, which will not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal
unless these findings are not supported by evidence or unless strong and cogent
reasons dictate otherwise.47 One instance when findings of fact of the appellate court
may be reviewed by this Court is when, as in the case at bar, the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.48
Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he
built a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area.
This nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was
also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also changed to a fence made of
hollow blocks. The two-storey house, bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to
this day. In 1951, petitioner planted coconut trees near his house. While the petitioner
has shown continued existence of these improvements on the disputed land, they were
introduced later than January 24, 1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the
disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually
occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot determine the
land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land
was surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore,
prior to the survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of the land
petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and
incontrovertible proof.
The neighbors presented by the petitioner, namely Alejandra Doria, Pacencia Artigo,
and Beatriz Gusila, could not also further his cause as both Doria and Artigo stated
that they started residing in Silway in 1947, without specifying whether it was on or
prior to January 24, 1947, while Gusila arrived in the neighborhood in 1949. While
Doria testified that there was a fence between Abejaron's and Nabasa's houses in 1947,
she did not state that Abejaron's 118-square meter area was enclosed by a fence which
stands to this day. This is confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Lagsub's 1984 survey plan
which shows that a fence stands only on one side of the 118-square meter area, the side
adjacent to Nabasa's 57-square meter portion. Again, this poses the problem of
determining the area actually occupied and possessed by Abejaron at least since
January 24, 1947.
Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for
taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
33
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or
supported by other effective proof.49 Even the tax declarations and receipts covering
his house do not bolster his case as the earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at
least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh
incontrovertible."50 As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence of title to the
land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or
free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.
In De La Peña v. Court of Appeals and Herodito Tan,51 the petitioner filed an action
for reconveyance, claiming preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4 hectare
of land and imputing fraud and misrepresentation to respondent in securing a free
patent and original certificate of title over the land in controversy. The action for
reconveyance was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. This Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, viz:
"It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of
the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. (Tomas v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v.
Barlongay, G.R. No. 67583, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v.
Heirs of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 [1958]; Director of Lands v. Register of
Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 [1953]; Azurin v. Quitoriano, et al., 81 Phil. 261
[1948]). In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the
disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to
acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual possession since January
1947. . . Title to alienable public lands can be established through open,
continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. . . Not being
the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles
legally issued by the State. (Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 [1936]) In
such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom
the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings,
that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on
the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the
law. (See Sec. 101 of C.A. 141 [Public Land Act]; Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil.
1157, 1158 [1957]; Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
et al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 [1955]). Not being an applicant, much less a grantee,
petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance." (emphasis supplied)52
In the more recent case of Tankiko, et al. v. Cezar, et al.,53 plaintiffs filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that they were the actual occupants and residents of a 126,112-
square meter land which was titled to another person. The trial court dismissed the
action, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. Despite the appellate court's
finding that plaintiffs had no personality to file the action for reconveyance, the
disputed land being part of the public domain, it exercised equity jurisdiction to avoid
leaving unresolved the matter of possession of the land in dispute. On appeal to this
Court, we reinstated the decision of the trial court and dismissed the action for
reconveyance, viz:
". . . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the basis of the action filed
and relief sought, has a clear right that he seeks to enforce, or that would
obviously be violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of
standing. In the present case, respondents have no clear enforceable right, since
their claim over the land in question is merely inchoate and uncertain.
Admitting that they are only applicants for sales patents on the land, they are
not and they do not even claim to be owners thereof.
Second, it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because
they admit that they are not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales
patents thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is public in character and that it
should revert to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land
Act categorically declares that only the government may institute an action for
reconveyance of ownership of a public land. . .
xxx
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales
patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will
they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.
34
 xxx
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.
Thus, in Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, September 23, 1957, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the
patent was obtained by fraudulent means and consequently, prayed for the
annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court
declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government, to which
the property would revert." 54
Similarly, as petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is
not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the
reversion of the land to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion. 55 He has the
specific power and function to "represent the Government in all land registration and
related proceedings" and to "institute actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation
of the Constitution."56 Since respondent Nabasa's Free Patent and Original Certificate
of Title originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee.57
Having resolved that petitioner Abejaron does not have legal standing to sue and is not
the real party in interest, we deem it unnecessary to resolve the question of fraud and
the other issues raised in the petition. These shall be timely for adjudication if a proper
suit is filed by the Solicitor General in the future.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2492 before the
Regional Trial Court of South Cotabato, Branch 1, is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203760 December 3, 2014
HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural guardian, SUSAN
G. CANENCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 29,
2011 and the Resolution3dated October 1, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 113046 which set aside the Decision4 dated August 20, 2009 and the
Order5 dated January 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74
(RTC) in Sp. Civil Case No. 08-744, finding that the action instituted by petitioner was
not one for forcible entry, but for recovery of ownership and possession, hence, within
the original jurisdiction of the latter. Consequently, the CA ordered the remand of the
case to the R TC for trial on the merits.
The Facts
This case originated from a forcible entry Complaint 6 dated July 3, 2007 filed by
petitioner Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G.
Canencia (petitioner), against respondent Susan Lumontad (respondent) before the
Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal (MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 1929.
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T.
Javier (Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land
located at Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal
(subject land),7 covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 00-TY-002-11458.8 Since his
birth, petitioner’s family has lived in the residential house erected thereon. 9 Upon
Vicente’s death, petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession over
the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into the subject land and started
to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof,
despite petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests. 10 The dispute was submitted to
barangay conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent the instant forcible entry
complaint, averring, in addition to the foregoing, that reasonable compensation for the
use and occupancy of the above-said portion may be fixed at 5,000.00 per month. 12
In her Answer13 dated July 30, 2007, respondent admitted that during Vicente’s
lifetime, he indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject
land.14 Nevertheless, she claimed tobe the owner of the portion where the subject
building was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-1303115 in her
35
name.16 Hence, she took possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as
its owner.17
The MTC Ruling
In a Judgment18 dated November 11, 2007, the MTC dismissed the complaint for want
of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.19
It found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot,
with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an
area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject building was erected, was given toone
Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but
was eventually acquired by respondent from the latter through sale. 20 Based on this
finding, the MTC concluded that petitioner had no cause of action against respondent
since she was merely exercising her rights asthe owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided
lot.21
Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s complaint failed to aver the required
jurisdictional facts as it merely contained a general allegation that respondent’s entry
into the disputed portion was made by means of force and intimidation, without
specifically stating how, when, and where were such means employed. With such
failure, the MTC intimated that petitioner’s remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria instituted before the proper
forum.22 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision23 dated August 20, 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the MTC
ruling, and accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the disputed portion and
surrender possession thereof to petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay
petitioner the amounts of ₱5,000.00 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said
portion, as reasonable compensation for its use and occupation, and ₱20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, including costs of suit.24
Preliminarily, the RTC ruled that the facts averred in petitioner’s complaint – namely,
that petitioner, through his late father, owned and possessed the subject land, and that
by means of force and intimidation, respondent gainedentry thereto 25 – show that his
cause of action is indeed one of forcible entry that falls within the jurisdiction of the
MTC.26
On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being the owner and possessor of the
property in question, has the right to be respected in his possession and that respondent
forcibly and unlawfully deprived him of the same. 27
Unconvinced, respondent moved for reconsideration, 28 which was, however, denied in
an Order29 dated January 18, 2010, prompting petitioner to file an appeal before the
CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated September 29, 2011, the CA set aside the RTC ruling and
remanded the case to the latter court for trial on the merits. 31
It held that the issue of possession of the subject land is intimately intertwined with the
issue of ownership, such that the former issue cannot be determined without ruling on
who really owns such land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the
merits in the exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. 32
This notwithstanding, the CA still concluded that respondent had the subject building
constructed in the concept of being the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the
subject land.33 In this relation, it was observed that petitioner gave a misleading
description of TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, considering that said tax declaration only
covered petitioner’s family house and not the subject land where said improvement
was built, as petitioner alleged in his complaint.34 In truth, the CA found that the
subject land is separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-9660,35 which was cancelled
when the land was subdivided into two (2) lots, namely: (a) the 187.20 sq. m. lot
covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282536 given by Vicente to petitioner; and (b) the
172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282437 given by Vicente to
Anthony, which the latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. 00-
TY-002-1303138 in her name.
Further, the CA stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that
respondent employed force and intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of
36
the subject landas he failed to demonstrate the factual circumstances that occurred
during his dispossession of said property.39
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 40 which was, however, denied
in a Resolution41 dated October 1, 2012, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly set aside
the RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the case to the latter court for trial on the
merits in anaction for recovery of ownership and possession.
The Court’s Ruling
Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for forcible entry,
petitioner’s case nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that the allegations
in the petitioner’s complaint do not make a case for forcible entry but another action
cognizable by the RTC.42
As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao,43 "[t]he invariable rule is that what
determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the
case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in
physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by
another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential,
however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it
would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said
conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act
of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior
physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as
the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter." 44
A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional
averments, so as to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been
complied with. Said pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e.,
Vicente’s, successor-in-interest, was in prior physical possession of the subject land
but was eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by
respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry into the same and,
thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly, with these details, the means by which
petitioner’s dispossession was effected cannot be said to have been insufficiently
alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed by the CA. The "how"
(through unlawful entry and the construction of the subject building), "when" (March
26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the dispossession
all appear on the face of the complaint. In Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan, 45 the Court held
that the acts of unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon,
and excluding therefrom the prior possessor, would necessarily imply the use of
force,46 as what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint. Hence, it was
erroneous to conclude that petitioner only made a general allegation that respondent’s
entry in the premises was made by means of force and intimidation47 and,
consequently, that a forcible entry case was not instituted before the MTC. Given that
a forcible entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred
in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for
recovery of possession and ownership, otherwise known as an accion
reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.– x x x.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding
section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice.
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first
level courts by express provision of Section 33 (2)49 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,50 in
relation to Section 1,51 Rule 70, of the Rules of Court.52 Even in cases where the issue
37
of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts
maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, 53 as they are given
the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling
the issue of possession.54 It must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title tothe property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership.55
B. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint.
Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry
complaint, nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed
to justify his right to the de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the
disputed premises.1âwphi1
As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from
which petitioner hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only
covers his house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that
he has the right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the
contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in view of
TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering the same property as registered in her name. Thus,
with no evidence in support of petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence showing
respondent's right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion as its
ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, petitioner's forcible entry
complaint in Sp. Civil Case No. 08-744 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195669, May 30, 2016
Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Ando
Well-settled is the rule that the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer
during the pendency of an action for recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land
subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer does not amount to forum-
shopping.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the December 10, 2010
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition in CA-GR. SP
No. 01935 and its January 26, 2011 Resolution3which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereon.4
Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
Before Branch 2 of the MTCC of Mandaue City, the petitioner Bradford United
Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against herein respondents Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar Cardones, Zacarias
Gutierrez, Cornelio Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida Ibarra, Teofilo Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth
Mission, Dolly Resales and Eunice Tambangan, in their capacities as Members of the
Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC), and the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). This Complaint was
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936.5
In an Order dated February 9, 2005, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its
Complaint should not be dismissed for its failure to comply with the requirement on
the certification against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.6 According to the MTCC, BUCCI failed to mention in its certification against
non-forum-shopping a complete statement of the present status of another case
concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of land earlier filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI and the MBC against BUCCI. (Civil Case
No. MAN-1669, captioned "United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. and
Mandaue Bradford Church, Plaintiff v. Bradford United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, Defendant, for Recovery of Ownership with Preliminary Injunction".)7
The recovery of ownership case also involved Lot 3-F, the same parcel of land subject
of the unlawful detainer case, and yet another parcel of land, denominated simply as
Lot 3-C. On October 13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City-rendered its judgment in the
recovery of ownership case against therein plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of
therein defendant BUCCI. On November 19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed
a motion for reconsideration of said decision but their motion was denied by Order of
March 10, 2005.8
Meanwhile, the MTCC Branch 2 of Mandaue City, issued an Order 9 dated March
38
31,2005 dismissing the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to
comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed to the
RTC which was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5126-A.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision10 of March 13, 2006 in the unlawful detainer case, the RTC of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, affirmed the MTCC's dismissal thereof, with prejudice. The RTC
held that BUCCI was guilty of forum-shopping because it failed to certify under oath
that there was another action involving the same parties and the same Lot 3-F still
pending before another court.
BUCCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Order 11 of June 23,2006.
Aggrieved, BUCCI filed a Petition for Review12 before the CA docketed as CA-GR.
SP No. 01935.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
In its Decision13 of December 10, 2010, the CA held that the MTCC and the RTC
correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The CA opined that whatever decision
mat would be rendered in the action for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in
question would amount to res judicata in the unlawful detainer case. The CA ruled that
identity of the causes of action does not mean absolute identity, and that the test lies
not in the form of action but in whether the same set of facts or evidence would
support both causes of action. Furthermore, the CA found that BUCCI indeed failed to
state in the certification against forum-shopping in the unlawful detainer case a
complete statement of the status of the land ownership recovery case; and that such
failure impinges against Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CA
dismissed BUCCI's Petition for Review. The CA likewise denied BUCCI's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution dated January 26, 2011. 14
Hence, BUCCI is now before this Court through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.15
Issue
Petitioner presents the following issue for our consideration
WHETHER XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM[-] SHOPPING FOR FILING THE CASE
FOR EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER (CIVIL CASE NO. 4936)
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE [ACTION FOR] RECOVERY OF
OWNERSHIP XXX (CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669)[,] AND FOR FAILING TO
[DISCLOSE] THE PENDENCY OF THE [LATTER CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669]
IN THE CERTIFICATION OF NON[-] FORUM[-]SHOPPING IN THE [FORMER
CIVIL CASE NO. 4936].16
The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether BUCCI committed forum-
shopping when it failed to disclose in the certification on non-forum shopping of the
unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the action for recovery of
ownership of property then pending before the RTC of Mandaue City. The unlawful
detainer suit involved Lot 3-F which was also involved in the complaint for recovery
of ownership.
Herein petitioner BUCCI's verification and certification against forum-shopping
attached to the instant Petition, stated that UCCP had also filed an appeal with the CA
pertaining to the recovery of ownership suit; and this appeal was docketed as CA-GR.
No. 00983, then still pending adjudication before the CA. In the same verification and
certification against forum-shopping, BUCCI stressed that the case for recovery of
ownership of the disputed parcels of land was entirely different from the unlawful
detainer case, because the first case does not involve at all the issue of material/
physical possession of Lot 3-F.17
Petitioner's arguments
BUCCI posits that the most decisive factor in determining the existence of forum-
shopping is the presence of all the elements of litis pendentia, namely, (1) identity of
parties or representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for; (3) the reliefs are founded on the same facts; and (4) the identity of the preceding
particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the unlawful
detainer case and the case for recovery of ownership; and that the other three essential
elements are absent, to wit: that mere be identity of cause/s of action; that the reliefs
sought are founded on the same facts; and that the identity of the two preceding
39
particulars be such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. Specifically, BUCCI maintains that the cause of action in Civil Case
No. MAN-1669 is for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in dispute, whereas
the cause of action in Civil Case No. 4936, the summary action of unlawful detainer, is
the determination of who has the better or superior right to the material/physical
possession (or possession de facto), of Lot 3-F; that the prayer that they be declared
the lawful owners of the disputed lots in said Civil Case No. MAN-1669 is entirely
different or dissimilar from the reliefs prayed for in the summary action of unlawful
detainer (Civil Case No. 4936) by BUCCI, which is that BUCCI be given or awarded
the material or physical possession (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F.
Respondents' arguments
Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two cases are
dissimilar or different is of no moment or consequence because the latter's deliberate
non-disclosure in the certificate against non-forum shopping in the summaiy action of
unlawful detainer of the pendency-in-fact of the action for recovery of ownership of
the disputed parcels of land, which involved the same parties and the same property, in
the action for recovery of ownership, is an irremissibly fatal defect that cannot be
cured by mere amendment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC, 5. Certification against forum[-]shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission, of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum[-]shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions, (n)
The above-stated rule requires a twofold compliance, and this covers both the non-
commission of forum-shopping itself, and the submission of the certification against
forum-shopping.18
xxx The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.19
Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer
and the land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or
similar in the two cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is
entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or physical possession of the disputed
parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact); whereas the issue in the action for
recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful owner of
the disputed parcels of land.
With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the institution
of a subsequent action: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and [over] the parties;
40
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of
cause of action."20 It bears notice that in its certification against non-forum shopping,
now attached to this instant Petition, BUCCI mentioned that the decision in the land
ownership recovery case was still pending appeal before the CA, a claim that was not
controverted at all by respondents. Simply put, this means that the former judgment is
not yet final. Furthermore, the causes of action in the two cases are not identical or
similar. To repeat, in the summary action of unlawful detainer, the question to be
resolved is which party has the better or superior right to the physical/material
possession (or de facto possession) of the disputed premises. Whereas in the action for
recovery of ownership, the question to be resolved is which party has the lawful title or
dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to the disputed premises. Thus, in Malabanan v.
Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.21the petitioner therein asserted, among others, that the
complaint for unlawful detainer against him must be dismissed on grounds of litis
pendencia and forum-shopping in view of the pending case for annulment of an action
for dacion en pago and for the transfer certificate of title in another case, this Court
reiterated the well-settled rule that a pending action involving ownership neither
suspends nor bars the proceedings in the summary action for ejectment pertaining to
the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or differences in the reliefs prayed for.
Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases.
The issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence being
presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the
ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.
The issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the
principle that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to
the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of
action involving possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would
abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or
consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an
ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece
of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without
prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.22
The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of
ownership case would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful
detainer case, such that the court handling the latter case would be bound thereby and
could not render a contrary ruling in the issue of physical or material possession." 23 It
bears belaboring that BUCCI alleged in the instant Petition that although the RTC
dismissed the complaint against it in the ownership recovery case, it still filed the
unlawful detainer case because there was never a ruling in the former case as to who
between the parties had the better right to the material or physical possession (or
possession de facto) of the subject property. Of course, no less significant is the
assertion by BUCCI that although it had previously tolerated or put up with the lawful
occupation of the disputed property by respondent MBC, it nonetheless had to put an
end to such tolerance or forbearance, because all possible avenues for reconciliation or
compromise between the parties in this case had already been closed. 24 Thus, a
favorable ruling for BUCCI in the action for recovery of ownership would not at all
compel or constrain the other court (here the MTCC of Mandaue City) to also
obligatorily rule in the summary action of ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to the
material or physical possession, (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F
because even if it be proved that it has the lawful title to, or the ownership of, the
disputed lots, there is still bom the need and necessity to resolve in the summary action
of unlawful detainer whether there are valid or unexpired agreements between the
parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by the actual occupants of the disputed
property. Indeed, in a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of a parcel
of land can be ousted or evicted therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or
superior right to the material or physical (or de facto) possession thereof by virtue of a
valid lease or leasehold right thereto.
In Custodio v. Corrado,25 we declared that res judicata did not obtain in the case
because, among others, the summary action of ejectment was different from the case
for recovery of possession and ownership. There, we expounded that:
41
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120.

xxxx

The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (action publiciand) and from a reinvindicatory action (action
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (action interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two
fonns of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of ejectment, action publiciana or the plenary action
to recover the right of possession and action reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions
to judicially recover possession.

Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the
circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence.
In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that a judgment in a case for
forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de
facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between the same parties respecting
title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of
a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity of causes of
action between the two.26

This ruling holds true in the present Petition.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The December 10, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its January 26, 2011 Resolution in CA-GR. SP No. 01935
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Mandaue
City, Branch 2 is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to the complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936, instituted therein by
petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. against therein respondents.

Without costs. SO ORDERED.

42